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Successful Military Innovation

The fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 and subsequently the collapse of the Soviet empire changed the political
military situation within Europe. Nearly five decades of Cold War between the Western Alliance and the
Warsaw Pact countries, with relatively large standing armies and prepared mobilization plans, ended. The
fight between large mechanized formations on European countryside became more and more
improbable, and forced many Western countries to identify a new role for their armed forces as new
threats emerged. Yet, those military organizations often struggle with such doctrinal innovations,
especially in economic austere conditions combined with rapidly technological improvements. While such
strategic situations determine the environment in which the military operates, ultimately people lay the
foundations for a new approach. Therefore, successful innovation within a military organization depends
on aligning political and military strategy, creating a learning organization, and assuring popular support
to the military.
This essay identifies principles that induce change on organizational level based upon examples from the
interwar period, and has not the intention to discuss neither tactical nor technical changes in detail. Such
an essay would require more in depth study that draws us away from the initial argument. Without a
doubt, during the interwar period almost all military organizations reformed, based on their lessons
learned from World War I, and each of them booked significant advances in certain domains.
Nonetheless, some organizations as a whole proved to possess more adaptive skills than others.
Above all, innovations within military organizations depend on the integration of political and military
vision. Indeed, the military are subjected to political authority and a nations leadership directs its armed
forces. Now, if a nation wants to achieve its strategic goals by conducting war that nation must prepare its
forces correspondingly, and so The political object will thus determine both the military objective to be
reached and the amount of effort it requires. Though the Treaty of Versailles prevented Germany from
developing military air power, as soon as the Nazis controlled the Air Force as of 1933, it became one
the most innovative military organizations. The development of German air doctrine reflected clearly its
strategic situation within Central Europe, and as a result the Luftwaffe had to protect the German
vulnerabilities, namely cities and troops, by destroying the opponents air capabilities (air superiority and
air interdiction), rather than developing an offensive strategic bombing capability like the British Royal Air
Force. Additionally, the German air force reinforced and supported heavily the ground approach of
mechanized units, and thus enabling the first combined warfare doctrine. Moreover, to ensure this unified
air concept was implemented, Hitler appointed Gring in 1938 to Generalfeldmarschall, the highest
ranking officer in Germany.
The rise of the Red Army depended heavily on such integration. Though Svechin and Thukashesky had
divergent opinions on the strategic concept of war, namely attritional versus annihilation warfare,
ultimately politics determined the direction of the army. By 1937, the Soviets had built a mechanized and
airborne force that combined the concept of deep strikes and mobilization of the Soviet population and
economy around fixed officer cadres. Above that Stalin held a strong political grip on the army through the
use of political party commissioners in order to prevent subversive thoughts and assuring that the Red
Army remained a force loyal to the people. The purges in 1937 eliminated much of the innovations
process in the Red Army. Nevertheless, the innovations between 1924 and 1937 laid the foundations for
its later success against the German Operation Barbarossa.
Another principle of successful innovative approach resides in creating an honest, learning culture. While
Great-Brittan and France believed in the defense combined with heavy artillery, General von Seekt
recognized the shortfalls of the Ludendorff offensive doctrine developed in 1917. Based on his
experiences on the Eastern front, he chose to continue the development of the Ludendorff doctrine by
creating a specific staff element within the German military command, namely the Truppenamt, where
critical and open minded German officers could develop the changes needed for the organization based
upon honest examination of the facts of WWI. Approximately four hundred of the four thousand officers
worked on doctrinal innovation and investigated all organizational aspects, which led to Army Regulation
487. This document clearly articulated the principles of flexibility, tempo, decentralization of command
and assuming responsibility necessary to create the capability of Bewegungskrieg.
Meanwhile, the British senior military leadership failed to integrate new concepts of land warfare. Indeed,
Field Marshal Haig incompetence to capture unified lessons learned that could improve doctrine, resulted
in uncoordinated doctrinal innovations without significant organizational changes. More importantly, it took
the British Army fourteen years to establish a committee to examine WWI, and their report got modified by
the interventions of Field Marshal Montgomery-Massingberd. Besides those interferences, the British
Army fell short in its military education system. The esprit de corps mentality prevented officers to think
out of the Regimental system, and thus reflecting on the operational and tactical lessons. Officers
deemed academic and critical investigation inferior to loyalty to the Regiment. Such climate prevented
innovative officers from reaching senior positions.
Although the French Army organized their lessons learned system after the Great War probably more
seriously than the British, their focus remained predominantly on a tight control of the maneuver and
reinforcing existing doctrine. On top of that, French military leadership didnt confront their political
authorities with the discrepancy between requirements and available resources. They preferred avoiding
the discussion with left oriented politicians, which had pernicious effect for the French Air Force
development.
Finally, a successful innovation process in military organizations needs broad support, not only from
society, but also within the organization. The high number of casualties and the cruelty of WWI created an
anti-war environment in many European countries during the interwar period. A prominent example of
such dislike to British military authorities manifested itself in the Oxford resolution, which declared that
Britains best and brightest would not fight for either king or country. A similar feeling existed in France,
where the cult of the offense led to over one million dead or missing soldiers, or 16.4 % of its mobilized
male population. All these sentiments resulted in the Kellogg-Briand Pact in 1928, in which certain
countries renounced the use of war unless in self defense. This affected the political climate in which
military organizations existed, as politicians provide funding and direction. .
In contrast to Great-Britain and France, the German Army remained popular during the interwar period.
The German population perceived the Versailles treaty as unfair and too severe to Germany, and thought
that the military had done everything to win the war. As a result, they continued to admire the military
profession as a full-time profession, rather than an honorable occupation. More over, as soon as Hitler
came in power in 1933, the Nazi regime, with its broad popular support, allowed the German Army to
continue its rearmament programs.
Furthermore, organizational leaders and prominent innovative thinkers must guarantee broad support
from within. Liddell-Hart and Fuller conducted such attacks on British military leadership and refused help
from peers that they undermined their own position and doctrine. Their failure to ensure support from their
commanders, the organization they needed to convert, and politicians who set military policy resulted in
retarding the innovation. In the same way, Billy Mitchells vision based on scientific elements, neglected
combat experience, which resulted in mass casualties amongst pilots at the beginning of the strategic
bombing campaign by the allies in WWII.
In short, throughout history the strategic environment, budgetary constraints and a continuous
technological evolution challenged military organizations. In todays environment most Western defense
forces experience a similar situation then the one during the interwar period. An emerging threat, now
coming from Asia and Islam extremism, limited available resources as a result of a financial crisis since
2008, and the network enabling technology create comparable circumstances in which improvement and
reform remains difficult. However, armed forces can continue to be a successful, innovative organization if
political and military leaders clearly define the role and function of armed forces, if military leaders
embrace critical and out-the-box thinkers, and if society sufficient bolsters and sustains its army.



Works Cited

Jonathan, M. House. Towards Combined Arms Warfare: A Survey of Tactics, Doctrine and Organization
in the 20th Century. Thesis presented at the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS,
1984, 65-70.
Carl, von Clausewitz. On War. Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1976), 80 and 87.
Williamson, Murray. Strategic Bombing, in Military Innovation in the Interwar Period. Edited by
Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millet (Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 108-116 and
128-143.
Jacob, W. Kipp. Military Reform and the Red Army 1918 1941, in The Challenge of Change: Military
Institutions and New Realities, 1918-1941. Edited by Harold R. Winton and David R. Mets (Lincoln, NE:
University of Nebraska Press, 2000), 129 131.
Jonathan, M. House, Red Army Developments, 1921-41, US Army Command and General Staff College,
H200 Book of Readings (Fort Leavenworth: USACGSC, August, 2011), 45-46.
Kipp, op. cit., 112.
Ludendorffs tactical innovations provided a breakthrough, yet a high cost. Timothy, T. Lupfer, The
Dynamics of Doctrine: The Changes in German Tactital Doctrine During the First World War.
Leavenworth Papers No.4. (Fort Leavenworth, KS, Combat Studies Institute, Command and General
Staff College, 1981), 41-49.
James, S. Corum. A Comprehensive Approach to Change, in The Challenge of Change: Military
Institutions and New Realities, 1918-1941. Edited by Harold R. Winton and David R. Mets (Lincoln, NE:
University of Nebraska Press, 2000), 37-41.
Williamson, Murray. Armored Warfare: The British, French, and German Experience, in Military
Innovation in the Interwar Period. Edited by Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millet (Cambridge, NY:
Cambridge University Press, 1996), 22-24.
Eugene, C. Kiesling in The Challenge of Change: Military Institutions and New Realities, 1918-1941.
Edited by Harold R. Winton and David R. Mets (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2000), 3 and
10-11.
Murray, op. cit., 14-15.
Ibid, 9.
Ibid, 13.
House. Towards Combined Arms Warfare: A Survey of Tactics, Doctrine and Organization in the 20th
Century. 66.
Murray, op. cit., 17.
Ibid, 24-25.
Murray, op. cit., 125-127 and 139.

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