Administrative Law

1. Pangasinan Transportation Co. vs. PSC, 70 Phil 221 (1940)

Facts:

Pangasinan Transportation Company Inc. (PTI) has been engaged for 20 years in the business of
transporting passengers in Pangasinan, Tarlac and Nueva Ecija through TPU buses in accordance with the terms
and conditions of the certificates of public convenience issued by the Public Utility Commission (later called Public
Service Commission). The company applied for an authorization to operate ten additional Brockway trucks on the
ground that they were needed to comply with the terms and conditions of its existing certificates and as a result of
the application of the Eight Hour Labor Law. PSC agreed to grant the authorization, but with two conditions as
provided for by section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 454: First, that the certificates of authorization issued to it
would be valid only for a period of 25 years counted from the date of promulgation; and second, that the company
may be acquired by the Philippine Commonwealth with proper payment of the cost price of its equipment, taking
into account reasonable depreciation to be fixed by the Commission at the time of it acquisition. PTI did not agree
with the conditions, and instead asked the Supreme Court to declare Commonwealth Act No. 454 unconstitutional.

Issue:

Whether or not Commonwealth Act No. 454 is unconstitutional for being undue delegation of legislative
power on the ground that without limitation, guide or rule except the unfettered discretion and judgment of the
Commission, constitute a complete and total abdication by the Legislature of its functions in the premises, and for
that reason, the Act, in so far as those powers are concerned

Ruling:

No, the law is not unconstitutional. The law is made subject to a sufficient standard that the PSC must
strictly follow. Inasmuch as the period to be fixed by the Commission under section 15 is inseparable from the
certificate itself, said period cannot be disregarded by the Commission in determining the question whether the
issuance of the certificate will promote the public interests in a proper and suitable manner. The Supreme Court
had earlier ruled that "public interest" furnishes a sufficient standard. Moreover, Commonwealth Acts Nos. 146
and 454 are not only the organic acts of the Public Service Commission but are "a part of the charter of every
utility company operating or seeking to operate a franchise" in the Philippines. (Streator Aqueduct Co. v. et al., 295
Fed. 385.) The business of a common carrier holds such a peculiar relation to the public interest that there is super
induced upon it the right of public regulation. When private property is "affected with a public interest it ceased to
be juris privati only." When, therefore, one devotes his property to a use in which the public has an interest, he, in
effect, grants to the public an interest in that use, and must submit to be controlled by the public for the common
good, to the extent of the interest he has thus created. He may withdraw his grant by discounting the use, but so
long as he maintains the use he must submit to control. Indeed, this right of regulation is so far beyond question
that it is well settled that the power of the state to exercise legislative control over public utilities may be exercised
through boards of commissioners.











2. Manila Electric Company vs. Pasay Transportation Co., G.R. No. L-37878, November 25, 1932

Facts:

The Manila Electric Company, filed a petition requesting the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a
board of arbitrators, to fix the terms upon which certain transportation companies shall be permitted to use the
Pasig bridge of the Manila Electric Company and the compensation to be paid to the Manila Electric Company by
such transportation companies, relates to the validity of section 11 of Act No. 1446 and to the legal right of the
members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, to act on the petition. Act No. 1446 above
referred to is entitled. "An Act granting a franchise to Charles M. Swift to construct, maintain, and operate an
electric railway, and to construct, maintain, and operate an electric light, heat, and power system from a point in
the City of Manila in an easterly direction to the town of Pasig, in the Province of Rizal." Section 11 of the Act
provides: "Whenever any franchise or right of way is granted to any other person or corporation, now or hereafter
in existence, over portions of the lines and tracks of the grantee herein, the terms on which said other person or
corporation shall use such right of way, and the compensation to be paid to the grantee herein by such other
person or corporation for said use, shall be fixed by the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of
arbitrators, the decision of a majority of whom shall be final."
When the petition of the Manila Electric Company was filed in this court, opposition was entered to the
petition by a number of public utility operators. On the submission of memoranda after an oral hearing, the
petition was made ready for resolution.

Issue:

Whether or not the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators the decision of a
majority of whom shall be final have the legal right to act in that capacity

Ruling:

No. The Supreme Court and its members should not and cannot be required to exercise any power or to
perform any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with the administering of judicial
functions. The Organic Act provides that the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands shall possess and exercise
jurisdiction as heretofore provided and such additional jurisdiction as shall hereafter be prescribed by law (sec. 26).
When the Organic Act speaks of the exercise of "jurisdiction" by the Supreme Court, it could not only mean the
exercise of "jurisdiction" by the Supreme Court acting as a court, and could hardly mean the exercise of
"jurisdiction" by the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators. There is an important
distinction between the Supreme Court as an entity and the members of the Supreme Court. A board of arbitrators
is not a "court" in any proper sense of the term, and possesses none of the jurisdiction which the Organic Act
contemplates shall be exercised by the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court holds that section 11 of Act No. 1446 contravenes the maxims which guide the
operation of a democratic government constitutionally established, and that it would be improper and illegal for
the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, the decision of a majority of whom shall be
final, to act on the petition of the Manila Electric Company. As a result, the members of the Supreme Court decline
to proceed further in the matter.











3. Antonio H. Noblejas vs. Claudio Teehankee, et al., G.R. No. L-28790, April 29, 1968

Facts:

Noblejas was the commissioner of land registration. Under RA 1151, he is entitled to the same
compensation, emoluments, and privileges as those of a Judge of CFI. He approved a subdivision plan covering
certain areas that are in excess of those covered by the title. The Secretary of Justice, Teehankee, sent a letter to
Noblejas, requiring him to explain why no disciplinary action should be taken against petitioner for "approving or
recommending approval of subdivision, consolidation and consolidated-subdivision plans covering areas greatly in
excess of the areas covered by the original titles." Noblejas answered and apprised the Secretary of Justice that, as
he enjoyed the rank, privileges, emoluments and compensation of a Judge of the Court of First Instance, he could
only be suspended and investigated in the same manner as a Judge of the Courts of First Instance, and, therefore,
the papers relative to his case should be submitted to the Supreme Court, for action thereon conformably to
section 67 of the Judiciary Act (R. A. No. 296) and Revised Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. Nevertheless, he was
suspended by the Executive Secretary based on "finding that a prima facie case exists against you for gross
negligence and conduct prejudicial to the public interest." Noblejas filed this case claiming the lack of jurisdiction
of the Executive Secretary and his abuse of discretion.

Issue:

Whether the Commissioner of Land Registration may only be investigated by the Supreme Court (in view
of his having a rank equivalent to a judge)?

Ruling:

No. If the law had really intended to include the general grant of rank and privileges equivalent to
Judges, the right to be investigated and be suspended or removed only by the Supreme Court, then such grant of
privileges would be unconstitutional, since it would violate the doctrine of separation of powers because it would
charge the Supreme Court with an administrative function of supervisory control over executive officials,
simultaneously reducing pro tanto, the control of the Chief Executive over such officials. There is no inherent power
in the Executive or Legislative to charge the Judiciary with administrative functions except when reasonable
incidental to the fulfillment of judicial duties. The judiciary cannot give decisions which are merely advisory, nor
can it exercise or participate in the exercise of functions which are essentially legislative or administrative. The
Supreme Court and its members should not and cannot be required to exercise any power or to perform any trust
or to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with the administration of judicial functions. As such, RA
1151 while conferring the same privileges as those of a judge did not include and was not intended to include, the
right to demand investigation by the Supreme Court, and to be suspended or removed only upon the Courts
recommendation. Said rights would be violative of the Constitution.
The suspension of Noblejas by the Executive Secretary is valid. Also, the resolution of the consulta by a
Register of Deeds is not a judicial function, but an administrative process. It is conclusive and binding only upon the
Register of Deeds, not the parties themselves. Even if the resolution is appealable, it does not automatically mean
that they are judicial in character. Still, the resolution of the consultas are but a minimal portion of the
administrative or executive functions.











4. Garcia vs. Macaraig, 39 SCRA 106, 1972

Facts:

Judge Macaraig took his oath as Judge of the CFI of Laguna and San Pablo City on June 29, 1970. The
court, being one of the 112 newly created CFI branches, had to be organized from scratch. From July 1, 1970 to
February 28, 1971, Macaraig was not able to assume the duties and functions of a judge due to the fact that his
Court Room cannot be properly established due to problems as to location and as to appropriations to make his
Court up and running. When Macaraig realized that it would be sometime before he could actually preside over
his court, he applied for an extended leave (during the 16 years he had worked in the Department of Justice,
respondent had, due to pressure of duties, never gone on extended leave, resulting in his forfeiting all the leave
benefits he had earned beyond the maximum ten months allowed by the law). The Secretary of Justice, however,
prevailed upon respondent to forego his leave and instead to assist him, without being extended a formal detail,
whenever respondent was not busy attending to the needs of his court. Paz Garcia on the other hand filed a
complaint alleging that Macaraig is incompetent, dishonest and has acted in violation of his oath as a judge. Garcia
said that Macaraig has not submitted the progress of his Courts as required by law. And that Macaraig has
received salaries as a judge while he is fully aware that he has not been performing the duties of a judge.

Issue:

Whether or not Macaraig has acted with incompetence and dishonesty as Judge

Ruling:

Macaraigs inability to perform his judicial duties under the circumstances mentioned above does not
constitute incompetence. Respondent was, like every lawyer who gets his first appointment to the bench, eager to
assume his judicial duties and rid himself of the stigma of being a judge without a sala, but forces and
circumstances beyond his control prevented him from discharging his judicial duties. On the other hand, none of
these is to be taken as meaning that the Court looks with favor at the practice of long standing, to be sure, of
judges being detailed in the DOJ to assist the Secretary even if it were only in connection with his work of
exercising administrative authority over the courts. The line between what a judge may do and what he may not
do in collaborating or working with other offices or officers under the other great departments of the government
must always be kept clear and jealously observed, the principle of separation of powers on which our government
rests by mandate of the people thru the Constitution be gradually eroded by practices purportedly motivated by
good intentions in the interest of the public service. The fundamental advantages and the necessity of the
independence of said three departments from each other, limited only by the specific constitutional precepts on
check and balance between and among them, have long been acknowledged as more paramount than the serving
of any temporary or passing governmental conveniences or exigencies. It is thus of grave importance to the
judiciary under our present constitutional scheme of government that no judge of even the lowest court i n this
Republic should place himself in a position where his actuations on matters submitted to him for action or
resolution would be subject to review and prior approval and, worst still, reversal, before they can have legal
effect, by any authority other than the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, as the case may be. Needless to
say, the Court feels very strongly that it is best that this practice is discontinued.



JUAN YSMAEL & COMPANY, INC. vs. THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
FACTS: The petitioning Union, a legitimate labor organization duly registered with the Department of Labor, filed a
petition praying for the aforesaid certification, upon the ground that it is a labor organization composed of all the
salesmen working for the Ysmael Steel Manufacturing Co., which is operated by the Company, as a subsidiary
thereof, both of which are employers of the aforementioned salesmen; that there are in the Company two (2)
other labor unions and that the members of petitioning Union are not included in or represented by any of said
two (2) unions in their collective bargaining agreement with the Company, for the economic factors affecting the
members of petitioning Union are different and they constitute a separate and distinct union for an appropriate
bargaining unit. The Company filed an answer objecting to the petition upon several grounds, which were, in
effect, overruled by the Court in the order appealed from.
ISSUE:Whether the members of petitioning Union are employees of the Company.
HELD: The aforementioned difference in the manner of "selection and engagement" does not prove, however, the
alleged absence of employer-employee relationship. Most business enterprises have employees of different
classes, necessarily requiring different methods of selection and contracts of services of various types, without
detracting from the existence of said relationship. Besides, the very evidence for the Company shows that
commission agents are dispensed from physical examination and from punching the bundy clock because their
duties are extraneous to the factory work and they have no fixed hours to contact their customers.
It is our considered opinion that the lower court did not err in holding that the members of petitioning Union are
employees of the Company within the purview of the terms "employer" and "employee" as defined in the
Industrial Peace Act for purposes of certification of said union as the bargaining representative of its salesmen
or commission agents.








Oleary v. brown pacific-maxon, inc.
FACTS: A contractor, engaged in construction work for the Navy on the Island of Guam, maintained for its
employees a recreation center adjoining a channel so dangerous that swimming was forbidden, and signs to that
effect were erected. After spending the afternoon at the center, an employee was drowned while attempting to
swim the channel in order to rescue two men in distress. Under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act, extended to this employee by the Defense Bases Act, the Deputy Commissioner found as a
"fact" that the employee's death arose out of and in the course of his employment, and awarded a death benefit
to his mother.
ISSUE:Whether or not the award should be sustained.
HELD: Such a rescue attempt is not necessarily excluded from the coverage of the Act. Under the Administrative
Procedure Act, the Deputy Commissioner's findings should be accepted unless they are unsupported by substantial
evidence on the record considered as a whole. Universal Camera Corp. v. Labor Board, ante p. The evidence was
sufficient to support the Deputy Commissioner's finding that the employee acted reasonably in attempting the
rescue, and that his death may fairly be attributed to the risks of his employment.

The test of recovery is not a causal relation between the nature of employment of the injured person and
the accident. Thom v. Sinclair, [1917] A.C. 127, 142. Nor is it necessary that the employee be engaged at the time
of the injury in activity of benefit to his employer. All that is required is that the "obligations or conditions" of
employment create the "zone of special danger" out of which the injury arose. Ibid. A reasonable rescue attempt,
like pursuit in aid of an officer making an arrest, may be "one of the risks of the employment, an incident of the
service, foreseeable, if not foreseen, and so covered by the statute.



Okeeffe v. smith associates 380 us 359-1965
FACTS: Robert C. Ecker drowned during a Saturday outing while boating on a South Korean lake. At the time of his
death he was employed at a defense base in South Korea by the respondent, Smith, Hinchman & Grylls Associates,
a government contractor.
Based upon the above stipulated facts, the Deputy Commissioner of the Bureau of Employees'
Compensation, United States Department of Labor, petitioner herein, determined 'that the accident and the
subsequent death of the decedent arose out of and in the course of employment.' 222 F.Supp. 4, 6. He therefore
awarded death benefits to the decedent's widow and a minor child in accordance with the terms of the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 44 Stat. 1424, as amended.
ISSUE: Whether or not the award for death benefits is valid.
HELD: Since we believe that the Deputy Commissioner and District Court properly applied the Brown-Pacific-
Maxon standard, and since we deem it necessary to preserve the integrity of the administrative process
established by Congress to effectuate the statutory scheme, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
The Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act,1 as extended by the Defense Bases Act, provides
workmen's compensation for any
'accidental injury or death arising out of and in the course of employment, and such occupational disease or
infection as arises naturally out of such employment or as naturally or unavoidably results from such accidental
injury, and includes an injury caused by the willful act of a third person directed against an employee because of
his employment.
The Court holds, per curiam, that Ecker died in the course of his employment. I see no meaningful interpretation of
the statute which will support this result except a rule that any decision made by a Deputy Commissioner must be
upheld (compare Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R. Co. That interpretation, although meaningful, is unsupportable.


Gonzales v victory labor union
FACTS: Herein petitioner Gonzalez was engaged in trawl fishing, and among his employees were Julian Beltran,
Severino Apawan, Ponciano Sayan, Quirico Mendez and Virgilio Baes all of them working in petitioner's fishing
boat, the M/L Emiliana. On March 31, 1962 the Acting Prosecutor of the Court of Industrial Relations filed a
complaint against petitioner, charging him with unfair labor practice in dismissing said employees without just
cause but by reason of their membership in VICLU and thereby interfering and coercing them in the exercise of
their right to self-organization.
ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal was valid.
HELD: Regarding their dismissal, we find that there was sufficient justification for the action taken by the
employer. It appears that these employees were found to have sabotaged the interest of their employer. They
pilfered the fish caught by them and sold them to private parties and pocketed the proceeds thereof. This
circumstance is a clear indication of sabotage and pilferage pure and simple. And the dismissal of this instant case
should, therefore, be in order.
It is claimed that there were acts of discrimination on the part of the employer when these employees were
dismissed. We hold the contrary view. Let us take for instance the so-called interview of the four employees by the
employer on February 7, 1962. One witness (Boltron) testified that the four of them were called together to the
office of the management and told them that they were dismissed because management did not like their
membership to their union. The other witness testified that such incident happened aboard the boat M/L Emiliana
(Witness Mendez). In another instance, Witness Apawan said that he was called alone to the office of respondent
employer and nobody was with them at the time he was told of his dismissal. These contradictory statements
clearly indicate that the employer has no knowledge of their membership at the time except when the complaint
was filed and notified by the filing of the same and their dismissal was not, therefore, motivated by any
discriminatory act on the part of the employer. As stated above, we find that there was justification of their
dismissal because of the pilferage committed by them in disposing a portion of the catch to private parties to the
loss of their employer. When an employee has committed an act inimical to the employer's interest, his dismissal is
just cause and may be permitted by this Court.

JUDGE ANA MARIA I. DOLALAS, EVELLYN K. OBIDO AND WILBERTO B. CARRIEDO, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN-MINDANAO and BENJAMIN VILLARANTE, JR., respondents.

Facts:
Petitioners, Judge Ana Maria I. Dolalas, Evelyn K. Obido and Wilberto B. Carriedo were charged
administratively by private respondent Benjamin Villarante, Jr. for miscarriage of justice, dishonesty, gross
neglect of duty, unnecessary delay in the administration of justice and for failure to prosecute the case
filed against Villarante by a police officer for an unreasonable length of time.
The Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao directed petitioners to submit their respective counter-
affidavits. Petitioners' motion to dismiss as well as their motion for reconsideration was denied by public
respondent, hence the petition before this Court.
Petitioner-judge contends that the Office of the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction to initiate an
investigation into as said charge relates to a judge's performance of her official duties over which the
Supreme Court has administrative control and supervision.
Public respondent Ombudsman-Mindanao, however, contends that what is sought to be determined by
the investigation is whether or not any undue delay in the disposition of the alarms and scandals case
resulted in injury to private respondent through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence and/or undue advantage to any party, in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Issue: WON the ombudsman can take cognizance of the case
Ruling:
This Court agrees with petitioner-judge. The complaint against petitioner-judge before the Office of the
Ombudsman is basically administrative in nature. In essence, petitioner-judge is being charged with
having violated Rule 1.02, Canon 1
6
and Rule 3.05, Canon 3
7
of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
It must be borne in mind that the resolution of the administrative charge of unduly delaying the
disposition of the said criminal case involves the determination of whether, in resolving the alarms and
scandals case, petitioner-judge acted in accordance with the guidelines provided in the Rules of Court and
in the Administrative Circulars in pursuance of the ideals embodied in the Code of Judicial Conduct. Such
is clearly an administrative matter. Unquestionably, this Court is mandated of the 1987 Constitution to
assume under section 6, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution to assume administrative supervision over all
courts and the personnel thereof.
SO ORDERED.

BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE, represented by the COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, respondent.
Facts:
Graft Investigation Officer II Christopher S. Soquilon of the Office of the Ombudsman received information from an
"informer-for-reward" regarding allegedly anomalous grant of tax refunds to Distillera Limtuaco & Co., Inc. and La
Tondea Distilleries, Inc. The Ombudsman issued a subpoena duces tecum addressed to Atty. Millard Mansequiao
of the Legal Department of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) ordering him to appear before the Ombudsman
and to bring the complete original case dockets of the refunds granted to Limtuaco and La Tondea.
The BIR, through Assistant Commissioner for Legal Service Jaime M. Maza, asked that it be excused from complying
with the subpoena duces tecum because the Limtuaco case was pending investigation by Graft Investigation
Officer II Napoleon S. Baldrias; and the investigation thereof and that of La Tondea was mooted when the
Sandiganbayan ruled in People v. Larin that "the legal issue was no longer in question since the BIR had ruled that
the ad valorem taxes were erroneously paid and could therefore be the proper subject of a claim for tax credit."
Without resolving the issues raised by the BIR, the Ombudsman issued another subpoena duces tecum addressed
to BIR Commissioner Liwayway Vinzons-Chato ordering her to appear before the Ombudsman and to bring the
complete original case dockets of the refunds granted to Limtuaco and La Tondea.
The BIR moved to reconsider the respondent's Order dated February 15, 1994 alleging that the matter subject of
the investigation was beyond the scope of the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and the subpoena duces tecum was
not properly issued in accordance with law; and non-compliance thereto was justifiable. The BIR averred it had the
exclusive authority whether to grant a tax credit and that the jurisdiction to review the same was lodged with the
Court of Tax Appeals and not with the Ombudsman.
Issue: WON Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the case
Ruling:
This Court is not persuaded. No less than the 1987 Constitution enjoins that the Ombudsman and his Deputies, as
protectors of the people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or
employees of the government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned
or controlled corporations, and shall, in appropriate case, notify the complainants of the action taken and the
result thereof.
Clearly, there is no requirement of a pending action before the Ombudsman could wield its investigative power.
The Ombudsman could resort to its investigative prerogative on its own

or upon a complaint filed in any form or
manner. Even when the complaint is verbal or written, unsigned or unverified, the Ombudsman could, on its own,
initiate the investigation.




OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, petitioner,
vs.
RUBEN ENOC, SUSANA B. ABAWAG, DOMINADOR D. DALA, CARLOS L. DENIA, ELVIRA I. LIM, TEODORO YOS,
DIOMEDES E. MIRAFUENTES, JOSEFINA L. TUNGAL, EMMA L. BERNALES, LETICIA LAGUNSAY, and EVANGELINE
GALLITO, respondents.
Facts:
Respondents were employed at the Office of the Southern Cultural Communities (OSCC), Davao del Sur, Provincial
Office, Digos, Davao del Sur with salaries below grade 27. They were charged with 11 counts of malversation
through falsification, based on alleged purchases of medicine and food assistance for cultural community
members, and one count of violation of R.A. No. 3019, 3(e), in connection with the purchases of supplies for the
OSCC without bidding/canvass.
The information were filed by the Ombudsman in the Regional Trial Court of Digos, Davao del Sur as none of the
respondents has the "rank" required under R.A. No. 8249

to be tried for the said crimes in the Sandiganbayan.
Respondents moved to quash the informations invoking the ruling in Uy v. Sandiganbayan
4
that the Ombudsman
has no authority to prosecute graft cases falling within the jurisdiction of regular courts. This motion was granted.
The Office of the Ombudsman filed the instant petition.

Issue: WON Ombudsman can try the case
Ruling:
The Court held that the Ombudsman has powers to prosecute not only graft cases within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan but also those cognizable by the regular courts. The power to investigate and to prosecute granted
by law to the Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified. It pertains to any act or omission of any public officer or
employee when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. The law does not
make a distinction between cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and those cognizable by regular courts. It has
been held that the clause "any illegal act or omission of any public official" is broad enough to embrace any crime
committed by a public officer or employee.
The Ombudsman is mandated by law to act on all complaints against officers and employees of the government
and to enforce their administrative, civil and criminal liability in every case where the evidence warrants. To carry
out this duty, the law allows him to utilize the personnel of his office and/or designate any fiscal, state prosecutor
or lawyer in the government service to act as special investigator or prosecutor to assist in the investigation and
prosecution of certain cases. Those designated or deputized to assist him work under his supervision and control.
The law likewise allows him to direct the Special prosecutor to prosecute cases outside the Sandiganbayans
jurisdiction in accordance with Section 11(4c) of RA 6770.
12. Fuentes vs. Ombudsman
Facts: Pursuant to a decision of the Supreme Court in an administrative case, Director Valenzuela filed with the
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao a criminal complaint charging Judge Fuentes with violation of
Republic Act No. 3019, Section 3 (e). The Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao then issued an order directing
petitioner to submit his counter-affidavit while the latter filed a motion to dismiss complaint and/or manifestation
to forward all records to the Supreme Court but it was denied.
Petitioner alleged that the respondent Ombudsman-Mindanao committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction when he initiated a criminal complaint against petitioner for violation of R.A. No.
3019, Section 3 [e]. And he conducted an investigation of said complaint against petitioner. Thus, he encroached
on the power of the Supreme Court of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel.
Issue: Whether the Ombudsman may conduct an investigation of acts of a judge in the exercise of his official
functions alleged to be in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, in the absence of an administrative
charge for the same acts before the Supreme Court.
Ruling: No. Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, provides:
"Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. - The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions
and duties: (1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any
public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or
inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this
primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation
of such cases."
xxx xxx xxx
"Section 21. Officials Subject To Disciplinary Authority, Exceptions.- The Office of the Ombudsman shall have
disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the Government and its subdivisions,
instrumentalities and agencies, including members of the Cabinet, local government, government-owned or
controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, except over officials who may be removed only by impeachment or
over Members of Congress, and the Judiciary."
Thus, the Ombudsman may not initiate or investigate a criminal or administrative complaint before his office
against petitioner judge, pursuant to his power to investigate public officers. The Ombudsman must indorse the
case to the Supreme Court, for appropriate action. Article VIII, Section 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the
Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the
Court of Appeals to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. Hence, it is the Supreme Court that is tasked to oversee
the judges and court personnel and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any
violation of the laws of the land. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running
afoul of the independence of the judiciary and the doctrine of separation of powers.

13. Ledesma vs. CA
Facts: Petitioner Atty. Ronaldo P. Ledesma is the Chairman of the First Division of the Board of Special Inquiry (BSI)
of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID). In a letter-complaint filed by Augusto Somalio with the Fact
Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FIIB) of the Office of the Ombudsman, an investigation was requested on alleged
anomalies surrounding the extension of the Temporary Resident Visas (TRVs) of two (2) foreign nationals. The FIIB
investigation revealed seven (7) other cases of TRV extensions tainted with similar irregularities.

A complaint was then filed before the Administrative Adjudication Bureau (AAB) of the Office of the Ombudsman a
formal complaint against herein petitioner. Graft Investigation Officer Marlyn M. Reyes resolved
the administrative cases filed against petitioner and suspended him from the service for one (1) year for Conduct
Prejudicial to the Interest of the Service. Respondent Assistant Ombudsman Abelardo L. Aportadera, Jr. reviewed
the Joint Resolution which was approved by respondent Ombudsman Desierto on December 29, 1999.

The Court
of Appeals affirmed petitioners suspension but reduced the period from nine (9) months to six (6) months and one
(1) day without pay.
[12]


Petitioner questions the Court of Appeals pronouncement that the findings of the Ombudsman may not be said
to be merely recommendatory upon the Immigration Commissioner. He argues that to uphold the appellate
courts ruling expands the authority granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman and runs counter
to prevailing jurisprudence on the matter, particularlyTapiador v. Office of the Ombudsman.
[16]
Petitioner submits
that the Ombudsmans findings that the TRV applications were illegal constitutes an indirect interference by the
Ombudsman into the powers of the BOC over immigration matters.

Issue: WON the Ombudsmans action is only advisory in nature rather than one having any binding effect.
Ruling: No. The creation of the Office of the Ombudsman is a unique feature of the 1987 Constitution. The
Ombudsman and his deputies, as protectors of the people, are mandated to act promptly on complaints filed in
any form or manner against officers or employees of the Government, or of any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations. Foremost among its powers is
the authority to investigate and prosecute cases involving public officers and employees, thus:

Section 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions,
and duties:

(1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public
official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal,
unjust, improper, or inefficient.


Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as The Ombudsman Act of 1989, was passed into law on November
17, 1989 and provided for the structural and functional organization of the Office of the Ombudsman. RA 6770
mandated the Ombudsman and his deputies not only to act promptly on complaints but also to enforce the
administrative, civil and criminal liability of government officers and employees in every case where the evidence
warrants to promote efficient service by the Government to the people.
[19]


The authority of the Ombudsman to conduct administrative investigations as in the present case is
settled.
[20]
Section 19 of RA 6770 provides:

SEC. 19. Administrative Complaints. The Ombudsman shall act on all complaints
relating, but not limited to acts or omissions which:

(1) Are contrary to law or regulation;
(2) Are unreasonable, unfair, oppressive or discriminatory;
(3) Are inconsistent with the general course of an agencys functions, though in
accordance with law;
(4) Proceed from a mistake of law or an arbitrary ascertainment of facts;
(5) Are in the exercise of discretionary powers but for an improper purpose; or
(6) Are otherwise irregular, immoral or devoid of justification.

The point of contention is the binding power of any decision or order that emanates from the Office of
the Ombudsman after it has conducted its investigation. Under Section 13(3) of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution,
it is provided:

Section 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions,
and duties:

...

(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or
employee at fault, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or
prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith. (Emphasis supplied)

14. Estarija vs. Ranada
Facts: On August 10, 1998, respondent Edward F. Ranada, a member of the Davao Pilots Association, Inc. (DPAI)
and Davao Tugboat and Allied Services, Inc., (DTASI) filed an administrative complaint for Gross Misconduct before
the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, against petitioner Captain Edgardo V. Estarija, Harbor Master of the
Philippine Ports Authority (PPA), Port of Davao, Sasa, Davao City alleging that Estarija had been demanding monies
ranging from P200 to P2000 for the approval and issuance of berthing permits, and P5000 as monthly contribution
from the DPAI. The complaint alleged that prior to August 6, 1998, in order to stop the mulcting and extortion
activities of Estarija, the association reported Estarijas activities to the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI). On August 6, 1998, the NBI caught Estarija in possession of the P5,000 marked money used by the NBI to
entrap Estarija.
Consequently, the Ombudsman ordered petitioners preventive suspension and directed him to answer the
complaint. The Ombudsman filed a criminal case docketed as Criminal Case No. 41,464-98, against Estarija for
violation of Republic Act No. 3019,The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, before
the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch No. 8. On August 31, 2000, the Ombudsman rendered a decision in
the administrative case, finding Estarija guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct.
Estarija claimed that dismissal was unconstitutional since the Ombudsman did not have direct and immediate
power to remove government officials, whether elective or appointive, who are not removable by
impeachment. He maintains that under the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsmans administrative authority is
merely recommendatory, and that Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as The Ombudsman Act of 1989, is
unconstitutional because it gives the Office of the Ombudsman additional powers that are not provided for in the
Constitution.
Issue: Is the power of the Ombudsman to directly remove, suspend, demote, fine or censure erring officials
unconstitutional?

Ruling: No. Among the powers of the Ombudsman enumerated in Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution are:

Section 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and duties:
1. Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public
official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper, or inefficient.
2. Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any public official or employee of the
Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as of any
government owned or controlled corporation with original charter, to perform and expedite
any act or duty required by law, or to stop, prevent, and correct any abuse or impropriety in
the performance of duties.
3. Direct the Officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or employee
at fault, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution,
and ensure compliance therewith.
4. Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case, and subject to such limitations as may
be provided by law, to furnish it with copies of documents relating to contracts or
transactions entered into by his office involving the disbursement or use of public funds or
properties, and report any irregularity to the Commission on Audit for appropriate action.
5. Request any government agency for assistance and information necessary in the discharge
of its responsibilities, and to examine, if necessary, pertinent records and documents.
6. Publicize matters covered by its investigation when circumstances so warrant and with due
prudence.
7. Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape, mismanagement, fraud, and corruption in
the Government and make recommendations for their elimination and the observance of
high standards of ethics and efficiency.
8. Promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such other powers or perform such functions
or duties as may be provided by law.
Rep. Act No. 6770 provides for the functional and structural organization of the Office of the
Ombudsman. In passing Rep. Act No. 6770, Congress deliberately endowed the Ombudsman with the power to
prosecute offenses committed by public officers and employees to make him a more active and effective agent of
the people in ensuring accountability in public office.
[29]
Moreover, the legislature has vested the Ombudsman with
broad powers to enable him to implement his own actions.

15. Ombudsman v Masing (2008)
FACTS:Respondents Florita A. Masing, former Principal of the Davao City Integrated Special School, and JocelynA.
Tayactac, an office clerk in the same school, were administratively charged before the Office of theOmbudsman for
allegedly collecting unauthorized fees, failing to remit authorized fees, and to accountfor public funds.Respondents
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction overthem. Respondents alleged
that the DECS has jurisdiction over them which shall exercise the samethrough a committee to be constituted
under Section 9 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4670, otherwise known as the The Magna Carta for Public School
Teachers.
The motion was denied. Ombudsman rendered a joint decision finding respondents Masing andTayactac guilty.
Masing was dismissed from service while Tayactac was suspended for 6 months.On appeal, CA
reversed.Meanwhile, Masing faced yet another administrative case before the Ombudsman for charges of
oppression, serious misconduct, discourtesy in the conduct of official duties, and physical or mentalincapacity or
disability due to immoral or vicious habits.Ombudsman found Masing guilty as charged and ordered her
suspension for six (6) months without pay.On appeal, CA also reversed.Ombudsman, which was not impleaded as
respondent in the cases, filed an Omnibus Motion toIntervene and for Reconsideration. CA denied the on the
grounds that (1) intervention is not properbecause it is sought by the quasi-judicial body whose judgment is on
appeal, and (2) intervention, even if permissible, is belated under Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court.Hence,
appeal before SC. The 2 cases were consolidated.
ISSUE: 1. WON Ombudsman may intervene and seek reconsideration?
2. WON Ombudsman may directly discipline public school teachers and employees?

HELD: 1. YES.In Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoy, we recognized the standing of the Civil Service
Commission(CSC) to appeal a decision of the Court of Appeals which reversed its decision finding Dacoycoy
guilty.Although the CSC was the quasi-judicial body which rendered the decision appealed to the CA, it became the
party aggrieved or adversely affected by its decision which seriously prejudices the civil service system.
However, rather than remand the cases at bar to the CA for a ruling on the merits of the Ombudsmans motions
for reconsideration, we shall resolve the legal issues involved in the interest of speedy justice.
2. YES.
The authority of the Ombudsman to act on complaints filed against public officers and employees is explicit in
Article XI, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution. Article XI, Section 13 of the same Constitution delineates the
powers, functions and duties of the Ombudsman. The enumeration of these powers is non-exclusive.

Congress enacted R.A. No. 6770, otherwise known as The Ombudsman Act of 1989, giving the Office such other
powers that it may need to efficiently perform the task given by the Constitution. In fine, the manifest intent of the
lawmakers was to bestow on the Office of the Ombudsman full administrative disciplinary authority in accord with
the constitutional deliberations.

The authority of the Office of the Ombudsman to conduct administrative investigations is beyond cavil. As
the principal and primary complaints and action center against erring public officers and employees, it is mandated
by no less than Section 13(1), Article XI of the Constitution. In conjunction therewith, Section 19 of R.A. No. 6770
grants to the Ombudsman the authority to act on all administrative complaints.

It is erroneous, therefore, for respondents to contend that R.A. No. 4670 confers an exclusive disciplinary authority
on the DECS over public school teachers and prescribes an exclusive procedure in administrative investigations
involving them. R.A. No. 4670 was approved on June 18, 1966. On the other hand, the 1987 Constitution was
ratified by the people in a plebiscite in 1987 while R.A. No. 6770 was enacted on November 17, 1989. It is basic
that the 1987 Constitution should not be restricted in its meaning by a law of earlier enactment. The 1987
Constitution and R.A. No. 6770 were quite explicit in conferring authority on the Ombudsman to act on complaints
against all public officials and employees, with the exception of officials who may be removed only by
impeachment or over members of Congress and the Judiciary.

16. MACALINTAL VS COMELEC
FACTS: Petitioner Macalintal files a petition for certiorari and prohibition, seeking a declaration that certain
provisions of R.A. No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) are unconstitutional. The Court upholds
petitioners right to file the instant petition, stating in essence that the petitioner has seriously and convincingly
presented an issue of transcendental significance to the Filipino people, considering that public funds are to be
used and appropriated for the implementation of said law.
Petitioner raises three principal questions for contention:
(1) That Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 allowing the registration of voters who are immigrants or permanent
residents in other countries, by their mere act of executing an affidavit expressing their intention to return to the
Philippines, violates the residency requirement in Art. V, Sec. 1 of the Constitution;
(2) That Section 18.5 of the same law empowering the COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates for national
offices and party list representatives, including the President and the Vice-President, violates the constitutional
mandate under Art. VII, Sec. 4 of the Constitution that the winning candidates for President and Vice-President
shall be proclaimed as winners only by Congress; and
(3) That Section 25 of the same law, allowing Congress (through the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee
created in the same section) to exercise the power to review, revise, amend, and approve the Implementing Rules
and Regulations (IRR) that the COMELEC shall promulgate, violates the independence of the COMELEC under Art.
IX-A, Sec. 1 of the Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether or not Congress may, through the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created in Section 25
of Rep. Act No. 9189, exercise the power to review, revise, amend, and approve the Implementing Rules and
Regulations that the Commission on Elections, promulgate without violating the independence of the COMELEC
under Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution.
HELD: No. By vesting itself with the powers to approve, review, amend and revise the Implementing Rules &
Regulations for RA No. 9189, Congress went beyond the scope of its constitutional authority. Congress trampled
upon the constitutional mandate of independence of the COMELEC. Under such a situation, the Court is left with
no option but to withdraw from its usual silence in declaring a provision of law unconstitutional.
CJ punos opinion:
I now come to section 17.1 of Rep. Act No. 9189 which provides:
Sec. 17. Voting by mail.-
17.1. For the May, 2004 elections, the Commission shall authorize voting by mail in not more than three (3)
countries, subject to the approval of the Congressional Oversight Committee. Voting by mail may be allowed in
countries that satisfy the following conditions:
(d) Where the mailing system is fairly well-developed and secure to prevent occasion of fraud;
(e) Where there exists a technically established identification system that would preclude multiple or proxy
voting; and
(f) Where the system of reception and custody of mailed ballots in the embassies, consulates and other foreign
service establishments concerned are adequate and well-secured.
Thereafter, voting by mail in any country shall be allowed only upon review and approval of the Joint Oversight
Committee. (emphases supplied)
From the law itself, it is clear that Congress has already set the necessary standards to guide the COMELEC in
identifying the countries where voting by mail may be allowed, viz: (1) the countries must have a mailing system
which is fairly developed and secure to prevent occasion of fraud; (2) there exists a technically established
identification that would preclude multiple or proxy voting; and (3) where the system of reception and custody of
mailed ballots in the embassies, consulates and other foreign service establishments concerned are adequate and
well-secured.
Since the legislative standards have been defined, all that remains is their enforcement. Our Constitution has
specifically given the COMELEC the power to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an election. The power is exclusive and it ought to be self-evident that it cannot be subject to review
and revision or veto by Congress in the exercise of its oversight power. Again, the reason for the exclusivity is to
insulate COMELEC from the virus of partisan politics. In the exercise of this exclusive power, the Commission must
be accorded considerable latitude. Unless the means and methods adopted by COMELEC are clearly illegal or
constitute grave abuse of discretion, they should not be interfered with.[238] Thus:
There are no ready-made formulas for solving public problems. Time and experience are necessary to evolve
patterns that will serve the ends of good government. In the matter of the administration of the laws relative to
the conduct of elections, as well as in the appointment of election inspectors, we must not by any excessive zeal
take away from the Commission on Elections the initiative which by constitutional and legal mandates properly
belongs to it. Due regard to the independent character of the Commission, as ordained in the Constitution,
requires that the power of this court to review the acts of that body should, as a general proposition, be used
sparingly, but firmly in appropriate cases. We are not satisfied that the present suit is one of such cases.
17. COMPANIA GENERAL DE TABACOS DE FILIPINAS VS BOARD OF PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSIONERS
FACTS; COMPANIA GENERAL DE TABACOS DEFILIPINAS
is a foreign corporation organized under the laws of Spain and engaged in business in the Philippine Islands as a
common carrier of passengers and merchandise by water: On June 7, 1915, the Board of Public Utility
Commissioners issued and caused to be served an order to show cause why they should not be required to present
detailed annual reports respecting its finances and operations respecting the vessels owned and operated by it, in
the form and containing the matters indicated by the model attached to the petition. They are ordered to present
annually on or before March first of each year detailed report of finances and operations of such vessels as are
operated by it as a common carrier within the Philippine Islands, in the form and containing the matters indicated
in the model of annual report which accompanied the order to show cause herein.
COMPANIA GENERAL DE TABACOS DEFILIPINAS denied the authority of the board to require the report asked for
on the ground that the provision of Act No.2307 relied on by said board as authority for such requirement was, if
construed as conferring such power, invalid as constituting an unlawful attempt on the part of the Legislature to
delegate legislative power to the board. It is cumbersome and unnecessarily prolix and that the preparation of the
same would entail an immense amount of clerical work
ISSUE: w/n it is constitutional to require the petitioner to pass a detailed report to the Board
of Public Utility Commissioners of the Philippine Islands.
Whether the power to require the detailed report is strictly legislative, or administrative, or merely relates to the
execution of the law.
HELD: The section of Act No. 2307 under which the Board of Public Utility Commissioners relies for its authority, so
far as pertinent to the case at hand, reads as follows:
Sec. 16. The Board shall have power, after hearing, upon notice, by order in writing, to require every public utility
as herein defined: (e) To furnish annually a detailed report of finances and operations, in such form and containing
such matters as the Board may from time to time by order prescribe.
The statute which authorizes a Board of Public Utility Commissioners to require detailed reports from public
utilities, leaving the nature of the report, the contents thereof, the general lines which it shall follow, the principle
upon which it shall proceed, indeed, all other matters whatsoever, to the exclusive discretion of the board, is not
expressing its own will or the will of the State with respect to the public utilities to which it refers.
Such a provision does not declare, or set out, or indicate what information the State requires, what is valuable to
it, what it needs in order to impose correct and just taxation, supervision or control, or the facts which the State
must have in order to deal justly and equitably with such public utilities and to require them to deal justly and
equitably with the State. The Legislature seems simply to have authorized the Board of Public Utility
Commissioners to require what information the board wants. It would seem that the Legislature, by the provision
in question, delegated to the Board of Public Utility Commissioners all of its powers over a given subject-matter in
a manner almost absolute, and without laying down a rule or even making a suggestion by which that power is to
be directed, guided or applied.
The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as
to what shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance
of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made.
The Supreme Court held that there was no delegation of legislative power, it said:
The Congress may not delegate its purely legislative powers to a commission, but, having laid down the general
rules of action under which a commission shall proceed, it may require of that commission the application of such
rules to particular situations and the investigation of facts, with a view to making orders in a particular matter
within the rules laid down by the Congress. In section 20 (of the Commerce Act),
Congress has authorized the commission to require annual reports. The act itself prescribes in detail what those
reports shall contain. In other words, Congress has laid down general rules for the guidance of the Commission,
leaving to it merely the carrying out of details in the exercise of the power so conferred. This, we think, is not a
delegation of legislative authority. In the case at bar the provision complained of does not law "down the general
rules of action under which the commission shall proceed." nor does it itself prescribe in detail what those reports
shall contain. Practically everything is left to the judgment and discretion of the Board of Public Utility
Commissioners, which is unrestrained as to when it shall act, why it shall act, how it shall act, to what extent it
shall act, or what it shall act upon.The Legislature, by the provision in question, has abdicated its powers and
functions in favor of the Board of Public Utility Commissioners with respect to the matters therein referred to, and
that such Act is in violation of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902. The Legislature, by the provision referred to, has
not asked for the information which the State wants but has authorized and board to obtain the nformation which
the board wants.
18 US vs ANG TANG HO
FACTS:
On 30July 1919, the Philippine Legislature (during special session) passed and approved Act No. 2868 entitled An
Act Penalizing the Monopoly and Hoarding of Rice, Palay and Corn. The said act under extraordinary circumstances
authorizes the Governor General to issue the necessary Rules and Regulations in regulating the distribution of such
products. Pursuant to this Act, On 01 August 1919, the GG issued EO 53 which was published on 20 August 1919.
The said EO fixed the price at which rice should be sold. On the other hand, Ang Tang Ho, a rice dealer, voluntarily,
criminally and illegally sold a ganta of rice to Pedro Trinidad at the price of eighty centavos. The said amount was
way higher than that prescribed by the EO. The sale was done on the 6th of August 1919. On 08 August 1919, he
was charged in violation of the said EO. He was found guilty as charged and was sentenced to 5 months
imprisonment plus a P500.00 fine. He appealed the sentence countering that there is an undue delegation of
power to the Governor General.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is undue delegation to the Governor General.

HELD:
Fist of, Ang Tang Hos conviction must be reversed because he committed the act prior to the publication of the
EO. Hence, he cannot be ex post facto charged of the crime. Further, one cannot be convicted of a violation of a
law or of an order issued pursuant to the law when both the law and the order fail to set up an ascertainable
standard of guilt. The said Act, as to the judgment of the SC, wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly what the
standard policy should contain, so that it could be put in use as a uniform policy required to take the place of all
others without the determination of the insurance commissioner in respect to matters involving the exercise of a
legislative discretion that could not be delegated, and without which the act could not possibly be put in use. The
law must be complete in all its terms and provisions when it leaves the legislative branch of the government and
nothing must be left to the judgment of the electors or other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so that, in
form and substance, it is a law in all its details in present, but which may be left to take effect in future, if
necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event.

19 PEOPLE vs VERA
FACTS:
Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in Manila. He filed for reconsideration which was elevated to the SC
and the SC remanded the appeal to the lower court for a new trial. While awaiting new trial, he appealed for
probation alleging that the he is innocent of the crime he was convicted of. Judge Tuason of the Manila CFI
directed the appeal to the Insular Probation Office. The IPO denied the application. However, Judge Vera upon
another request by petitioner allowed the petition to be set for hearing. The City Prosecutor countered alleging
that Vera has no power to place Cu Unjieng under probation because it is in violation of Sec. 11 Act No. 4221 which
provides that the act of Legislature granting provincial boards the power to provide a system of probation to
convicted person. Nowhere in the law is stated that the law is applicable to a city like Manila because it is only
indicated therein that only provinces are covered. And even if Manila is covered by the law it is unconstitutional
because Sec 1 Art 3 of the Constitution provides equal protection of laws. The said law provides absolute discretion
to provincial boards and this also constitutes undue delegation of power. Further, the said probation law may be
an encroachment of the power of the executive to provide pardon because providing probation, in effect, is
granting freedom, as in pardon.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is undue delegation of power.
HELD:
The act of granting probation is not the same as pardon. In fact it is limited and is in a way an imposition of
penalty. There is undue delegation of power because there is no set standard provided by Congress on how
provincial boards must act in carrying out a system of probation. The provincial boards are given absolute
discretion which is violative of the constitution and the doctrine of the non delegability of power. Further, it is a
violation of equity so protected by the constitution. The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which
reads as follows: This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have
provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said
probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the
Probation Office. This only means that only provinces that can provide appropriation for a probation officer may
have a system of probation within their locality. This would mean to say that convicts in provinces where no
probation officer is instituted may not avail of their right to probation.

20 PELAEZ vs AUDITOR GENERAL
FACTS:
From Sept 04 to Oct 29, 1964, the President (Marcos) issued executive orders creating 33 municipalities this is
purportedly in pursuant to Sec 68 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides that the President of the
Philippines may by executive order define the boundary, or boundaries, of any province, sub-province,
municipality, [township] municipal district or other political subdivision, and increase or diminish the territory
comprised therein, may divide any province into one or more subprovince. The VP Emmanuel Pelaez and a
taxpayer filed a special civil action to prohibit the auditor general from disbursing funds to be appropriated for the
said municipalities. Pelaez claims that the EOs are unconstitutional. He said that Sec 68 of the RAC has been
impliedly repealed by Sec 3 of RA 2370 which provides that barrios may not be created or their boundaries
altered nor their names changed except by Act of Congress or of the corresponding provincial board upon
petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected and the recommendation of the council of the
municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is situated. Pelaez argues, accordingly: If the
President, under this new law, cannot even create a barrio, can he create a municipality which is composed of
several barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities? The Auditor General countered that only barrios are
barred from being created by the President. Municipalities are exempt from the bar and that t a municipality can
be created without creating barrios. Existing barrios can just be placed into the new municipality. This theory
overlooks, however, the main import of Pelaez argument, which is that the statutory denial of the presidential
authority to create a new barrio implies a negation of the bigger power to create municipalities, each of which
consists of several barrios.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Congress has delegated the power to create barrios to the President by virtue of Sec 68 of the
RAC.

HELD:
Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the government the power to fill in the details in the
execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of
separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself it must set forth therein the policy to be executed,
carried out or implemented by the delegate and (b) fix a standard the limits of which are sufficiently
determinate or determinable to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. Indeed,
without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would, in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the
essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with
reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority.
In the case at bar, the power to create municipalities is eminently legislative in character not administrative.