Adam Smith's Moral and Political

Philosophy
First published Fri Feb 15, 2013
Adam Smith developed a comprehensive and somewhat unusual version of moral sentimentalism in
his Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759, TMS). e did not e!pressl" la" out a political philosoph" in
similar detail, #ut a distinctive set of views on politics can #e e!trapolated from elements of #oth TMS
and his Wealth of Nations (177$, %&)' student notes from his lectures on (urisprudence (17$)*17$+, ,-)
have also helped flesh out his thou.hts on .overnance. A central thread runnin. throu.h his wor/ is an
unusuall" stron. commitment to the soundness of the ordinar" human #ein.0s (ud.ments, and a concern to
fend off attempts, #" philosophers and polic"1ma/ers, to replace those (ud.ments with the supposedl"
#etter 2s"stems3 invented #" intellectuals. 4n his 2istor" of Astronom"3, he characteri5es philosoph" as
a discipline that attempts to connect and re.ulari5e the data of ever"da" e!perience (Smith 17956 77*7)'
in TMS, he tries to develop moral theor" out of ordinar" moral (ud.ments, rather than #e.innin. from a
philosophical vanta.e point a#ove those (ud.ments' and a central polemic of %& is directed a.ainst the
notion that .overnment officials need to .uide the economic decisions of ordinar" people. 8erhaps ta/in.
a cue from 9avid ume0s s/epticism a#out the capacit" of philosoph" to replace the (ud.ments of
common life, Smith is suspicious of philosoph" as conducted from a foundationalist standpoint, outside
the modes of thou.ht and practice it e!amines. 4nstead, he maps common life from within, correctin. it
where necessar" with its own tools rather than tr"in. either to (ustif" or to critici5e it from an e!ternal
standpoint. e aims indeed to #rea/ down the distinction #etween theoretical and ordinar" thou.ht. This
intellectual pro(ect is not unconnected with his political interest in .uaranteein. to ordinar" individuals
the 2natural li#ert"3 to act in accordance with their own (ud.ments.
1. Methodolo."
). Summar" of Smith0s Moral 8hilosoph"
+. Advanta.es of Smith0s Moral 8hilosoph"
7. :#(ections to Smith0s Moral 8hilosoph"
5. Smith0s 8olitical 8hilosoph"
$. ;onclusion
<i#lio.raph"
o 8rimar" Sources
o Secondar" Sources
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=elated >ntries
1. Methodology
Smith0s Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS) tends to arouse sharpl" diver.ent reactions amon. the
philosophers who pic/ it up. ?ant is said to have considered it his favorite amon. Scottish moral sense
theories, #ut others have dismissed it as devoid of s"stematic ar.ument, or derivative, in its theoretical
aspirations, of ume. %hat e!plains these disparate reactions is one and the same feature of the #oo/6
that it consists lar.el" of what Smith himself calls 2illustrations3 of the wor/in.s of the moral sentiments
(TMS, 2Advertisement3)@short vi.nettes, ele.antl" descri#ed, that attempt to show what fri.htens us
a#out death, what we find interestin. and what dull or distasteful a#out other people0s love affairs, how
moral luc/ factors into our assessment of various actions, or how and wh" we deceive ourselves. To
some, this provides the detail and ps"cholo.ical acuit" that the" find lac/in. in most moral philosoph"' to
others, it seems somethin. more properl" ta/en up #" novelists or empirical ps"cholo.ists, not the
#usiness of a philosopher. 4ndeed, one prominent view of TMS is that it is a wor/ in descriptive
ps"cholo." or sociolo.", not a contri#ution to normative moral theor" (;amp#ell 1971' =aphael )AA7). 4t
is hard to sBuare this readin. with the man" normative (ud.ments in TMS (see anle" )AA9, chapter )
and :tteson )AA), chapter $), and it misses the force of Smith0s insistence that the proper wa" to ma/e
normative (ud.ments is to consider the details of a phenomenon from an impartial perspective. To (ud.e
the wor/in.s of our moral faculties, then, we need to considerthem, and their uses, in appropriate detail.
,a"in. out in detail how the" wor/ can help us see how the" can #e corrupted, and therefore to avoid that
corruption, at least to some e!tent (see TMS $1*$, 9)*1A7). 4f this was Smith0s .oal@and it fits the te!t
of TMS ver" well@then he was en.a.ed not in the sociolo." or ps"cholo." #ut the phenomenology of
morals, descri#in. the wor/in.s of our modes of moral (ud.ment as carefull" as possi#le from within, and
#elievin. that the comprehensive view that results can itself help .uide us in moral (ud.ment. Moral
phenomenolo." is normative moral theor", for him, and there is no more foundational theor"@no set of
.eneral principles@of which we mi.ht avail ourselves. -ustification for how we ma/e moral (ud.ments
can onl" #e found within the wa" we actuall" do ma/e moral (ud.ments' #oth moral (ustification and
moral critiBue must #e immanent to, not transcendent of, our moral practice (compare TMS +1+*7).
A few implications of this approach. Cirst, Smith is an anti1reductionist. e does not thin/ moralit" can #e
reduced to a set of natural or divine laws, nor that it is simpl" a means for producin. 2the .reatest
happiness for the .reatest num#er of people,3 in the phrase coined #" his teacher, Crances utcheson. e
indeed sa"s e!plicitl", a.ainst the proto1utilitarianism of utcheson and ume, that philosophers in his
da" have paid too much attention to the conseBuences of actions, and he wants to focus instead on their
propriet"6 the relation the" #ear to the motive that inspires them (1D*19). At the same time, he ar.ues that
the moral s"stems proposed #" Samuel ;lar/e, %illiam %ollaston, and ,ord Shaftes#ur" overstress
propriet", which is (ust one 2essential in.redient3 in virtuous action ()97' see also )$5 and +)$). is own
view attempts to ta/e account of all the essential in.redients in virtue, and moral (ud.ment, and to resist
the temptation to reduce those in.redients to a sin.le principle.
Second, and relatedl", Smith0s wa" of approachin. virtue often resem#les Aristotle0s@who has also
sometimes #een seen as too fond of the description of virtue, and who tried to ac/nowled.e the man"
diverse elements of virtue, and the (ud.ment of virtue, rather than to reduce them to a sin.le principle.
Smith sa"s at the end of TMS that his s"stem corresponds 2prett" e!actl"3 with Aristotle0s ()71). The
attentive reader of TMS will have noticed this earlier6 when he characteri5es propriet" as l"in. #etween
the e!cess and defect of passion ()7), for instance, or when he distin.uishes the restraint of appetite out of
self1interest from the virtue of temperance ()D), or when he emphasi5es ha#it (15), +)7), or the
superiorit" of friendships of virtue over friendships of pleasure ())7*5).
Cinall", Smith0s phenomenolo.ical method is deepl" interwoven with stron. leanin.s toward
particularism. e insists that .eneral moral rules are 2founded upon e!perience of what, in particular
instances, our moral faculties, our natural sense of merit and propriet", approve, or disapprove of3 (159'
see also 1$A and +)A), and that our notions of ri.ht and wron. #ottom out in these reactions to particular
cases (+)A' see also 1D7 and Eill forthcomin.). is account of virtue as dependin. on our attempts to
ad(ust ourselves as closel" as possi#le to the feelin.s of the particular others we encounter also su..ests
that what is virtue in one set of circumstances ma" not #e so in somewhat different circumstances. These
commitments entail that moral theorists will .ive us little moral .uidance (Smith thin/s moral
theor" should help .uide moral practice6 TMS +15) if the" present (ust the .eneral structure of ri.ht and
wron.. A fine1.rained phenomenolo." of how we carr" out various /inds of moral (ud.ment, and the
errors or infelicities to which we are prone in that process, will #e far more helpful.
2. Summary of Smith's Moral Philosophy
%ith these methodolo.ical points in mind, let0s proceed to the contents of TMS. Smith #e.ins the #oo/
with an account of s"mpath", which he descri#es as arisin. when we ima.ine how we would feel in the
circumstances of others. (A rich discussion of Smith on s"mpath" can #e found in Eriswold 1999, ch.).)
This is somewhat different from ume0s account, on which s"mpath" normall" consists in feelin. what
others atually feel in their circumstances@ume0s ma" #e called a 2conta.ion3 account of s"mpath",
while Smith0s is a 2pro(ective3 account (see Cleischac/er )A1))@and it opens up the possi#ilit" that our
feelin.s on another person0s #ehalf ma" often not match the feelin.s she herself has. 4ndeed to some
e!tent the" will never match, since ima.inin. oneself in a set of circumstances will alwa"s lac/ the
intensit" of actuall" e!periencin. those circumstances (TMS )1*)). This difference is of .reat importance
to Smith, since he maintains that sharin. the feelin.s of others as closel" as possi#le is one of our main
drives in life. %e ma/e constant efforts to ad(ust our feelin.s, as spectators, to those of the people
2principall" concerned3 in a set of circumstances (importantl", these include people acted upon as well as
a.ents), and to ad(ust our feelin.s as people principall" concerned to a level with which s"mpathetic
spectators can .o alon. (11A*1+, 1+5*$). 4t is this process of mutual emotional ad(ustment that .ives rise
to virtue6 the 2awful3 virtues of self1restraint, insofar we /eep ourselves, as people principall" concerned,
from feelin., or at least e!pressin., the full flood of our .rief or (o", and the 2amia#le3 virtues of
compassion and humanit", insofar as we strive, as spectators, to participate in the (o"s and sufferin.s of
others ()+*5).
Fltimatel", however, the feelin.s we see/ to have, and the standards #" which we (ud.e feelin.s, need not
#e identical with the feelin.s and standards that are actuall" current in our societ". %e /now that man"
actual spectators mis(ud.e our situations out of i.norance or interest, so we see/ to (ud.e, and act on, (ust
the feelin.s that a well1informed and impartial spectator would have (TMS 1)9, 1+5). Smith thin/s that
to s"mpathi5e with another0s feelin.s is to approve of those feelin.s (17), and to s"mpathi5e as we thin/
an impartial spectator would is to #estow moralapproval on those feelin.s. Moral norms thus e!press the
feelin.s of an impartial spectator. A feelin., whether on the part of a person motivated to ta/e an action or
on the part of a person who has #een acted upon #" others, is worth" of moral approval if and onl" if an
impartial spectator would s"mpathi5e with that feelin.. (A.ain, people acted upon are su#(ect to moral
(ud.ment as well as a.ents' reactions can #e (ud.ed as well as actions.) %hen achievin. a morall" ri.ht
feelin. is difficult, we call that achievement 2virtuous3' otherwise, we descri#e people as actin. or failin.
to act within the #ounds of 2propriet"3 ()5). Thus do moral norms and ideals, and the (ud.ments #" which
we .uide ourselves towards those norms and ideals, arise out of the process #" which we tr" to achieve
mutual s"mpath".
Smith distin.uishes two /inds of normative .uides to action6 rules and virtues. Moral rules, formed on the
#asis of our reactions to specific instances (we sa" to ourselves, 240ll never dothat3), #ar certain especiall"
e.re.ious /inds of #ehavior@murder, rape, theft@and provide a framewor/ of shared e!pectations for
societ" (15$*$$). The" are essential to (ustice, especiall", without which societies could not survive. The"
also ena#le people who are not full" virtuous to #ehave with a minimum of decorum and decenc" (1$)*
+), and help all of us cut throu.h the 2veil of self1delusion3 (15D) #" which we misrepresent our situations
to ourselves. Girtue reBuires more than simpl" followin. moral rules, however. :ur emotional
dispositions need to #e re1confi.ured so that we do not merel" 2affect3 the sentiments of the impartial
spectator #ut 2adopt3 those sentiments6 identif" ourselves with, #ecome, the impartial spectator, insofar as
that is possi#le (177). 4f we are trul" virtuous, a su#mission to certain rules will constrain ever"thin. we
do, #ut within that framewor/ we will operate without rules, tr"in. instead to mold ourselves with the
/now1how #" which an artist molds his cla", such that we develop dispositions to proper .ratitude,
/indness, coura.e, patience, and endurance.
This is a picture that owes a .reat deal to ume and -oseph <utler, #ut .ets wor/ed out #" Smith in much
.reater detail. 4t has #een hailed #" some as an especiall" sensi#le reco.nition of the /ind and de.ree of
virtue appropriate to modern li#eral politics and commercial societ" (<err" 199)' Mc;los/e" )AA$).
:thers see a dar/er, more pessimistic attitude towards virtue in Smith, echoin. the /inds of worries to #e
found in =ousseau a#out the corruption wrou.ht #" commerce (9w"er 19D7, chapter 7). Still others ar.ue
that Smith0s account of virtue re1wor/s #ut to a remar/a#le de.ree also retains the hi.hest ideals of #oth
the ;hristian and the ancient Ereco1=oman traditions, su..estin. that his willin.ness to uphold such an
ideal of character even in modern commercial societies should #e understand as a critiBue rather than an
endorsement of =ousseau (anle" )AA9).
4n an" case, Smith .ives us more a virtue ethics than the rule1#ased moral s"stems we identif" with ?ant
and the utilitarians. &evertheless, he also tries to incorporate some of the intuitions that .enerated these
other s"stems. As we have seen, he thin/s that we need to su#mit to .eneral rules, and his reasons for
supposin. that rel"in. on sentiment alone can feed our self1deceit anticipate ?ant0s critiBue of moral
sentimentalism in the !round"or# (see Cleischac/er 1991). Smith also ac/nowled.es that we in fact
(ud.e actions #" their effects as well as their intentions, and thin/s this sort of (ud.ment is appropriate as
lon. as we loo/ at effects as the" are intended, and not (ust as the" happen to occur. The 2merit3 of
actions, he sa"s in <oo/ 44 of TMS, depends on their conseBuences, even if their propriet" is independent
of conseBuences' the point, for him, is (ust that these are two different elements of moral (ud.ment and the
first is of .reater importance than the second (1DD). avin. insisted on this, he .rants that in some cases
the conseBuences of an action@where the" threaten the ver" survival of our societ", for instance@ma"
trump all other considerations (9A*91).
4n line with his concern for accurate moral phenomenolo.", Smith also tries to ma/e sense of the role that
reli.ion and culture pla" in our moral lives. e handles the first of these #" e!plainin. wh" people who
come to #elieve in hi.her powers will naturall" attri#ute virtues, and a concern for our virtue, to those
powers (1$+*$). e also sa"s that it adds to the sacredness we attri#ute to moral rules to see them as laws
of the 9eit", and to the importance of moralit" as a whole to see it as a wa" of 2co1operatHin.I with the
9eit"3 in the .overnance of the universe (1$$). And he shows how a #elief in an afterlife ma" #e
necessar" if we are to see the universe as (ust, which in turn is important if we are to maintain our
commitment to the value of actin. morall" (1$D*7A). 4n all these wa"s, #ut especiall" the last, he
anticipates ?ant0s moral ar.ument for #elief in Eod, without ever Buite insistin. that there is a Eod. At the
same time, he ma/es clear that an" reli.ion that .ives priorit" to ritual or creed over moralit" is #aleful,
and poses one of the .reatest dan.ers to a decent and peaceful societ" (TMS 17$*7' cf. %& DA)*+).
Smith handles the importance of culture under the headin. of 2custom and fashion.3 <oo/ G of TMS
ta/es up this topic, ac/nowled.in. the influence of prevailin. opinions in each societ" over all sorts of
value (ud.ments, and .rantin. that what is re.arded as virtuous will var" to some e!tent in accordance
with this influence. The Crench value politeness more than the =ussians, and the 9utch value fru.alit"
more than the 8oles (TMS )A7). The leisured classes in ever" countr" tend to #e less strict a#out se!ual
mores than the wor/in. classes (%& 797). These are easil" e!plica#le differences, and not worrisome
ones6 the" are matters of emphasis, and cannot affect 2the .eneral st"le of conduct or #ehaviour3 of a
societ". That .eneral st"le of conduct cannot var" in its essentials. &o societ" could survive otherwise
(TMS )A9, )11).
8art G4 of TMS, added in the last edition, presents the virtues of prudence, #enevolence and self1
command #" wa" of a series of ele.ant character portraits, and part G44 offers a short histor" of moral
philosoph", which stresses the contri#utions of 8lato, Aristotle, and the Stoics. This wa" of concludin. the
#oo/ reinforces the emphasis on virtuous character, as opposed to a decision1procedure for specific
actions, and indicates that we mi.ht .ain #" returnin. to the ancient schools of moral philosoph" that
shared this emphasis. Smith does not endorse an" ancient moral theorist uncriticall", #ut@li/e
Shaftes#ur" and ume@he seems to loo/ forward to a revival of ancient Eree/ ethics, a modern retrieval
and re1wor/in. of the character ideals on which those schools had focused.
3. Advantages of Smith's Moral Philosophy
Smith0s version of moral sentimentalism has a num#er of advanta.es over those of his contemporaries.
is approach "ields moral (ud.ments closer to those we alread" normall" ma/e, and ma/es #etter sense
of the comple!it" and richness of #oth virtue and the (ud.ment of virtue. e is e!pressl" concerned to do
(ustice to this comple!it", critici5in. utcheson for reducin. virtue too sin.le1mindedl" to #enevolence,
and ume for puttin. too much emphasis on utilit".
4n addition, none of Smith0s predecessors had developed such an essentiall" social conception of the self.
utcheson and ume #oth see human #ein.s as havin. a natural disposition to are a#out the .ood of
their societ", #ut for Smith, all our feelin.s, whether self1interested or #enevolent, are onstituted by a
process of sociali5ation. Smith conceives of humanit" as less capa#le of solipsism than ume does, less
capa#le of the thorou.h.oin. e.oism that ume, in his famous discussion of the sensi#le /nave, finds it
so difficult to refute (ume 1777, D1*)). At the same time, Smith reconciles his social conception of the
self with a deep respect for the importance of each individual self, and the capacit" of each self for
independent choice. >thical self1transformation, for Smith, is inspired and .uided #" social pressures #ut
ultimatel" carried out #" the individual for him or herself. The 2impartial spectator3 #e.ins as a product
and e!pression of societ", #ut #ecomes, once internali5ed, a source of moral evaluation that ena#les the
individual to stand apart from, and critici5e, his or her societ". 4ndividuall" free action and the social
construction of the self are compati#le, for Smith, even dependent on one another.
%e can more full" appreciate what is distinctive in Smith #" comparin. him with ume. Smith0s thou.ht
circles around ume0s6 there is virtuall" nothin. in either TMS or %& without some sort of source or
anticipation in ume, althou.h there is also almost no respect in which Smith a.rees entirel" with ume.
Ta/e their accounts of s"mpath", for e!ample. %hen ume descri#es the wor/in.s of s"mpath", he sa"s
that emotions 2readil" pass from one person to another,3 li/e the motion of a strin. eBuall" wound up
with other strin.s, 2communicatHin.I itself to the rest3 (ume 17+9*7A, p. 57$' see also pp. +17, $A5). e
then e!plains that we o#tain our idea of the other person0s feelin.s #" inference@from the effects (smiles,
frowns) or causes of those feelin.s. 4n #oth cases, the other0s feelin., once inferred, communicates itself
directl" to us, and our ima.inations onl" intensif" our idea of that feelin. so as to raise it to the level of an
impression (ume 17+9*7A, pp. 57$, +19*)A). Cor Smith, #" contrast, we place ourselves in the other0s
situation and ima.ine what we would feel if we were there. 4ma.ination is essential to the production
even of the 2idea3 of another0s feelin.s, and s"mpathetic feelin.s are no lon.er ones that the other person
need actuall" have. (Smith points out that this e!plains how we s"mpathi5e with some people, li/e
.ravel" ill infants or the insane, who do not actuall" e!perience the sufferin. we feel on their #ehalf
HTMS 1)*1+I). This account allows for us to (ud.e other people0s feelin.s a.ainst the #ac/.round of our
s"mpathetic feelin.s for them. S"mpath" is thus not (ust a wa" of sharing feelin.s with others' it also
opens a gap #etween their feelin.s and ours. And that .ap .ives us a .rip on the notion@crucial to
Smith0s theor"@that certain feelin.s are appropriate to a situation, while others are not.
These seemin.l" sli.ht shifts from ume@understandin. s"mpath" as 1) produced #" the ima.ination
and )) a response to situations rather than somethin. passed on, causall", from one person to another@
have immense implications for the shape of Smith0s thou.ht. The first of them leads him to .ive a central
place to wor/s of the ima.ination in moral development. e freBuentl" #rin.s in e!amples from poetr"
and drama to e!plain or .ive evidence for his points (e..., TMS +A, +)*+, +7, 177, ))7), twice
recommends writers li/e Goltaire as .reat 2instructors3 in certain virtues (TMS 17+, 177), and seems to
see moral philosoph" itself as a wor/ of the ima.ination, a pro(ect that needs to draw on ima.inative
resources and that properl" aims at e!tendin. and enrichin. the moral ima.inations of its readers
(compare Eriswold 1999, chapter 1). 4t is therefore for him a pro(ect to which clarit", vivacit" and
ele.ance are as important as .ood ar.ument, and Smith was in fact ver" concerned with findin. the
appropriate rhetoric@the appropriate appeal to the ima.ination@for his wor/s (see Eriswold 1999'
Muller 199+' <rown 1997). <oth of his #oo/s are #eautifull" written, and filled with vivid, memora#le
e!amples.
The second of the shifts ena#les Smith to #e more of a moral realist than ume. Smith finds an in.enious
wa" of importin. Samuel ;lar/e0s concern with 2fitnesses3 (;lar/e 17A+) into moral sentimentalism. :n
his view, we aim to have, and act on, (ust those feelin.s that an impartial spectator would have in our
situations' the feelin.s we attri#ute to such a spectator are then the ones fitted to that situation. So our
feelin.s have somethin. to aim at, #" which the" can #e (ud.ed or measured. This allows Smith to tal/, as
he does throu.hout TMS, of 2fitness3 (e..., 179, 159, 1$5, +A5, +11), of feelin.s #ein. 2suita#le to their
o#(ects3 (1$*)A, 7A, 7A, 7+, 1A)), and, #" e!tension, of people #ein. suited to the approval or disapproval
#estowed upon them (5D, 117, 11D, 1)$). e there#" restores a meanin. to our ordinar" view of value
(ud.ments as correct or incorrect, and not merel" as fosterin. or discoura.in. actions and Bualities that
ma" #e useful to societ". =elatedl", he sees our sentiments as more fle!i#le than ume does, and more
responsive to criticism. As sociali5ed human #ein.s, we do not simpl" desire certain o#(ects #ut desire
toha$e (ust those desires of which an impartial spectator would approve. %hat are toda" called 2second1
order desires3 accompan" and shape all our first1order desires (11A111' compare Cran/furt 1971). This
.ives our emotions the internal structure the" need to #e a#le to chan.e in response to norms.
Accordin.l", it ma/es much more sense for Smith than for ume that we ou.ht to assess our sentiments
criticall". ume .rants that we correct our s"mpath" for partialit" #" adoptin. in ima.ination a 2stead"
and .eneral point of view3 (ume 17+9*7A, p. 5D1), #ut for Smith this concession comes too late. Smith
sees s"mpath" as #uildin. an aspiration to ma/e one0s sentiments harmoni5e with the sentiments of
others into those sentiments themsel$es% 4f the" did not alread" have such an aspiration, we would have
neither motivation nor reason to ta/e up the 2stead" and .eneral point of view.3 4t ma/es little sense to
treat our sentiments as #aldl" .iven natural reactions, impervious to reason, #ut then add that the" ma"
need 2correction.3 4f sentiments are #ald natural reactions, the" can #e neither correct nor incorrect' if
the" are impervious to reason, then we can have reason, at most, to appear to have sentiments other than
the ones we happen to have, not trul" to hange those sentiments. Cor Smith, the aspiration to #e worth"
of approval #elon.s to our sentiments from the #e.innin., and we have, accordin.l", #oth motivation and
reason to chan.e our sentiments if the" /eep us from this aspiration.
=elatedl", for Smith #ut not for ume there is a lot to learn a#out what sentiments we should have. 4n
neither the Treatise nor the second &n'uiry does ume spend an" si.nificant time on how we mi.ht learn
to acBuire new sentiments or alter the ones we have. <" contrast, the first five parts of TMS@almost two1
thirds of the te!t@are devoted to a delineation of the various wa"s in which we learn to assess our
sentiments, and in which learnin. to assess them ena#les us #oth to e!press them with propriet", and to
chan.e them.
There is also for Smith, far more than for ume, a place for moral histor". Smith0s deep interweavin. of
individuals with their societ", and of sociali5ation with moral development, alerts him to the man" wa"s
in which moral norms and ideals are inde!ed to historical circumstances (see Schliesser )AA$). This
comes out in the detailed accounts he .ives, in his lectures on (urisprudence, of how notions of propert",
contract, marria.e, and punishment have arisen and chan.ed in various societies. The idea of a histor" of
morals opens up here, and Smith@via his student -ohn Millar, who attended the lectures on (urisprudence
@was an important source of later sociolo.ical and anthropolo.ical accounts of normative chan.e.
Cinall", Smith is further from utilitarianism than ume. <oth the notion of sentiments as havin. or
lac/in. an intrinsic propriet" independentl" of their effects, and the ar.uments, in <oo/s 44 and 4G,
a.ainst reducin. our interest in (ustice and #eaut" to our interest in their useful effects, are meant to
counteract the utilitarian tendencies in ume. Smith0s particularist conception of moral (ud.ment, and his
pla"in. down of the effects of actions in favor of their motivations, /eep him far from conseBuentialism.
e #elieves that our faculties of moral evaluation are alwa"s directed toward the motivations and well1
#ein. of particular individuals in particular situations, not to .oods that mi.ht #e possessed (ointl" #"
.roups of human #ein.s, and he re(ects the idea that our assessments or decisions should aim at the
.reatest happiness for the .reatest num#er of people (TMS )+7). 4n addition, he sees happiness as so
shaped #" the possession of morall" appropriate dispositions that it cannot serve as a nonmoral .oal that
mi.ht help us define those dispositions. 4t is essential to the hedonic calculus that happiness #e defined
independentl" of moralit", so that it can #estow content on moral claims (see Mc9owell 199Da). That is
impossi#le, for Smith. Smith sees meetin. the demands of the impartial spectator as intrinsic to
happiness' there is no happiness independent of moralit".
4. O!ections to Smith's Moral Philosophy
Smith0s moral theor" has #een accused of three ma(or failin.s. Cirst, it offers us no clear procedure for
decidin. which actions we should ta/e in specific circumstances, no .uidelines for how we can tell, in
specific cases, what the impartial spectator has to sa". Second, the impartial spectator seems too
enmeshed in the attitudes and interests of the societ" in which it develops for it to #e free of that societ"0s
#iases, or to help us care impartiall" for all human #ein.s. And third, even if Smith0s anal"sis of moral
claims is correct, even if it is true that moral (ud.ments in ordinar" life consist in attempts to e!press how
an impartial spectator would feel a#out our conduct, it remains unclear what (ustifies these (ud.ments.
%h" should we heed the demands of the impartial spectatorJ
Smith would pro#a#l" dismiss the first of these o#(ections, as #ased on an erroneous notion of what moral
philosoph" ou.ht to do. Moral philosoph" can deepen our love for virtue, refine our understandin. of the
virtues, and enrich our understandin. of ourselves, all of which can conduce to a firmer moral disposition
and to a wiser, more careful approach to moral decisions, #ut it cannot and should not replace the
common1life processes #" which we actuall" ma/e those decisions. 8hilosoph" is an a#stract, intellectual,
and solitar" activit", while moral decision1ma/in. is and should #e concrete, driven #" emotion as much
as #" the intellect, and shaped #" our interactions with the people affected #" our actions.
The second and third o#(ections constitute what we mi.ht call a tri#alist or relativist and a s/eptical
challen.e. The tri#alist sees no reason to e!tend moral sentiments or modes of (ud.ment to people outside
his societ", and no reason to critici5e the #asic structures of moral sentiment in his societ". e there#"
seems to miss a #asic feature of moral demands. <ut where is the room for a universalist moralit" in
Smith0s accountJ Since we construct the impartial spectator within us out of attitudes in the societ"
around us, how can that spectator reach #e"ond our societ" sufficientl" to achieve a sensitive and
impartial concern for mem#ers of other societies, and to reco.ni5e where our societ"0s sentiments are
#iased or corruptJ
The s/eptic represents a "et deeper pro#lem. Smith sa"s that when we issue a moral (ud.ment, of others
or of ourselves, we e!press the relationship of one set of sentiments@the cooler, more reflective
sentiments characteristic of a spectator@to another. This seems a plausi#le account of what we actuall"
do, when (ud.in. morall"' it captures nicel" the 2feel3 of ordinar" moral (ud.ments. <ut does it .ive us
reason to heed such (ud.mentsJ 9oes it e!plain the normativit" of moral (ud.ments, our sense that we
ou.ht to listen to themJ
Smith clearl" re(ects an" tri#al limit to the reach of moral demands. e adopts the Stoic view that each
person is 2first and principall" recommended H#" natureI to his own care3 (TMS )19), and that we
similarl" care more a#out mem#ers of our own societ" than a#out people far awa" from us (1+9*7A, ))7*
D). At the same time, however@also li/e the Stoics@he thin/s that our moral feelin.s e!tend, if to a
lesser de.ree, to all rational and sensi#le #ein.s6 2our .ood1will is circumscri#ed #" no #oundar", #ut
ma" em#race the immensit" of the universe3 ()+5). 4ndeed, he re.ards acceptin. harm to one0s local
communit", if that is necessar" for the .ood of the universe, as a mar/ of the hi.hest wisdom and virtue
()+5*$). As Amart"a Sen has stressed, Smith also wants us to evaluate our conduct from the perspective
of an" human #ein. an"where, not (ust a mem#er of our own societ". Sen Buotes a passa.e in TMS in
which Smith sa"s that we 2endeavour to e!amine our own conduct as we ima.ine any other fair and
impartial spectator would ima.ine it3 (11A), ar.uin. that it implies we should see/ to #e informed #" the
views of people far outside our cultural communities. 2The need to invo/e how thin.s would loo/ to Kan"
other fair and impartial spectator,L3 sa"s Sen, 2is a reBuirement that can #rin. in (ud.ments that would #e
made #" disinterested people from other societies as well3 (Sen )AA96 1)5). And there is no Buestion, 4
thin/, that Smith aspired to provide such a standard of moral (ud.ment, a structure for moralit" that
reaches out across national and cultural #orders.
<ut is Smith0s impartial spectator capa#le of doin. thisJ ;onsider two of its features. Cirst, it uses
sentiments rather than reason as the #asis of its (ud.ments. 4t is not li/e =oderic/ Cirth0s ideal o#server,
dispassionatel" watchin. people from a#ove the emotional fra" (Cirth 195)). =ather, Smith follows
utcheson and ume in tracin. moral (ud.ment, ultimatel", to feelin.s. The impartial spectator is
supposed to #e free of partial feelin.s@feelin.s that depend on asta#e it mi.ht have in a dispute, or on
#lind favoritism or disli/e for one part" or the other@#ut it is not supposed to #e free of feelin.s
alto.ether, nor to reach for a principle it mi.ht derive from reason alone, independent of feelin. (see
=aphael )AA7, chapter $). <ut our feelin.s are notoriousl" shaped #" our societies, and it is not clear how
a device that depends on feelin.s could correct for #iases #uilt into them.
Second, the impartial spectator develops within us as part of our efforts to ali.n our feelin.s with those of
the people immediatel" around us. The 2chief part of human happiness,3 for Smith, comes from the
consciousness that we are 2#eloved3 (TMS 71), #ut that is not possi#le unless our feelin.s, and the
actions we ta/e on those feelin.s, meet with other people0s approval. The search for feelin.s we can share
@for mutual s"mpath"@is a #asic human drive, and it leads amon. other thin.s to the rise of moralit".
:f course, that eventuall" means that we correct the modes of approval of people around us for #ias and
misinformation' we see/ the (ud.ment of an impartial spectator within rather than partial spectators
without. <ut Smith never su..ests that this impartial spectator uses different methods of (ud.in., appeals
to different sorts of norms, than our nei.h#ors do. 4t arises out of the actual process of moral (ud.ment
around us, and we heed it as part of our drive to find a harmon" of feelin.s with our actual nei.h#ors. 4t is
ver" unli/el", then, to use a method of (ud.in. radicall" unli/e those of our actual nei.h#ors, or perceive,
let alone correct for, a s"stematic #ias in the sentiments of our societ". 4f sentiments of condescension or
disli/e toward poor people, or #lac/ people, or .a" people, pervade our societ", then there is ever" reason
to e!pect that the impartial spectator we #uild within us will share those #iases rather than risin. a#ove
them.
These are the sorts of considerations that led Smith himself to worr" a#out the dan.er that 2esta#lished
custom3 can distort moral (ud.ment (TMS )1A), and that nature ma" lead people, foolishl" and un(ustl",
to admire the rich and despise the poor (5A*$)). Smith also worried that political faction and reli.ious
fanaticism can 2pervert3 our moral feelin.s (155*$, 17$*7), and did not su..est wa"s to correct for that
dan.er. 4t is unclear how his moral theor" mi.ht suppl" such a corrective.
Moreover, much that is attractive a#out Smith0s theor" is #ound up with this limitation' his relativistic
tendencies are not a mere mista/e #ut a conseBuence of the structure of his theor". The a#sence of
transcendental principles in favor of (ud.ments rooted in our ever"da" sentiments, the view of individuals
as aimin., #" wa" of moralit", for emotional harmon" with their nei.h#ors, the ps"cholo.ical insi.ht of
his view of moral development@all these thin.s .o to.ether with a picture on which we are deepl"
shaped #" our local societies in the wa" we ma/e moral (ud.ments, and can turn those (ud.ments on our
societ" onl" with difficult". 40ve ar.ued elsewhere that Smith thou.ht #etter information a#out the lives of
poor people could help well1off people (ud.e the poor more favora#l" (Cleischac/er )AA7, chapter 1A),
and perhaps he thou.ht that slaver" and other in(ustices could li/ewise #e overturned #" #etter
information6 information ena#lin. people to pro(ect themselves into the lives of slaves, especiall", and
there#" to s"mpathi5e with them. Sometimes Smith also drops proto1?antian hints that a concern for the
eBual worth of ever" human #ein. lies at the #asis of all moral sentiments (TMS 9A, 1A7, 1+7), and
Stephen 9arwall and =em" 9e#es have #rou.ht out a latent e.alitarianism in the structure of Smith0s
moral theor" that could #e turned a.ainst ine.alitarian social institutions (9arwall 1999' 9e#es )A1)).
<ut even a commitment to the eBual worth of ever" human #ein. can #e interpreted in wa"s that support
local #iases@?ant, notoriousl", maintained racist and se!ist views lon. after comin. up with his
ar.uments for eBual worth@and Smith in an" case sa"s little to (ustif" his e.alitarian tendencies. So it
must #e admitted that the tri#alist challen.e #rin.s out a wea/ness in Smith0s theor", and cannot easil" #e
answered without sacrificin. some of its central elements. (Cor more on these issues, see Corman1<ar5ilai
)A1A and Sa"re1Mc;ord )A1A).
e does #etter with the s/eptical challen.e. To the person who as/s, 2wh" #e moralJ,3 Smith essentiall"
provides what ;hristine ?ors.aard calls a 2reflective endorsement3 ar.ument (?ors.aard 199$6 19, 79*
D9). =eflective endorsement theorists@?ors.aard .ives ume and <utler as e!amples@su#stitute the
Buestion, 2are the claims of our moral nature .ood for human lifeJ3 for the Buestion, 2are moral claims
trueJ3 The" identif" a certain facult" for approval or disapproval as .ivin. force to moral claims, and then
as/ whether, on reflection, we can approve of that facult" of approval itself. This test reBuires in the first
instance that the facult" of moral approval approve of its own wor/in.s. 4t then loo/s to whether our other
faculties of approval can approve of the moral one6 we see/ a comprehensive endorsement, #" all our
modes of approval, of moral approval in particular. The second part of the test as/s a#ove all whether the
facult" for prudential approval@the facult" #" which we applaud or condemn thin.s in accordance with
self1interest@can applaud the moral facult", since the latter often reBuires us to override our self1interest.
%e should not assume that the first part of the test is trivial. ?ors.aard Buotes ume0s declaration that our
sense for morals
must certainl" acBuire new force, when reflectin. on itself, it approves of those principles, from whence it
is deriv0d, and finds nothin. #ut what is .reat and .ood in its rise and ori.in, (ume 17+9*7A, pp. )$7*D)
and contrasts this with ume0s earlier demonstration that the understandin., when reflectin. on its own
procedures, undermines itself (?ors.aard 199$, p. $)). So a facult" can fail a purel" refle!ive test6 it can
fail to live up to its own standards for evaluation. <ut the moral sense, for ume, and the impartial
spectator, for Smith, pass their own tests. 4ndeed, a .ood wa" to read TMS is to see Smith as
demonstratin., to an impartial spectator in a moment of reflection, that the impartial spectator we use in
the course of action operates in a reasona#le and no#le wa"@that, in particular, it is not (ust a tool of our
self1interest.
At the same time, to meet the full reflective endorsement test, Smith needs to show that heedin. the
impartial spectator does not, overall, onflit with our self1interest. 4n order to show this he tries, li/e
man" ancient ethicists, to .et us to re1thin/ the nature of self1interest. 4f we consider our real interests,
Smith maintains, we will see that the ver" Buestion, 2wh" should 4 #e moralJ,3 with its implicit
supposition that #ein. moral is somethin. 4 mi.ht want to avoid, is #ased on a misconception of self1
interest. 2The chief part of human happiness arises from the consciousness of #ein. #eloved3 (TMS 71),
Smith sa"s, and #ein. #eloved normall" reBuires actin. in accordance with the demands of the impartial
spectator. Giolatin. those demands will also normall" #rin. on internal unease@fear of discover", pan.s
of conscience, and other distur#ances@ma/in. it difficult to achieve the tranBuilit" that Smith ta/es to #e
a prime component of happiness (TMS 179). Cinall", if one full" incorporates the impartial spectator into
oneself, one will discover that moral self1appro#ation is itself a .reat source of happiness. <ut if
happiness consists so centrall" in the appro#ation of others, and in self1appro#ation, there can #e no
reasona#le conflict #etween pursuin. happiness and pursuin. moralit". So the demands of our moral
sentiments are (ustified, capa#le #oth of endorsin. themselves and of #ein. endorsed #" our nonmoral
sentiments.
4t should #e clear that this ar.ument does not involve an" reduction of moralit" to self1interest. Cor Smith,
the a.ent who supposes that self1interest can #e defined independentl" of moralit", and moralit" then
reduced to it, misunderstands the nature of self1interest. Such an a.ent lac/s a well1developed impartial
spectator within herself, and therefore fails to reali5e that actin. in accordance with moral demands is
essential to her own happiness. She will .ain a #etter understandin. of happiness onl" once she starts to
en.a.e in the pursuit of virtue. Smith e!plicitl" sa"s that the virtuous a.ent sees thin.s that others do not
(TMS 115*7, 17$*D). ,i/e the contemporar" philosopher -ohn Mc9owell, he thus su..ests that the
virtuous a.ent can properl" see the point of virtue, and how virtue helps constitute happiness, onl" from a
perspective within the actual practice of virtue. <ut, as Mc9owell sa"s, there is no reason to thin/ one can
find #etter ar.uments, or indeed an" ar.uments, for see/in. virtue from a perspective outside of such
practice (Mc9owell 199Da,#). There ma" therefore #e a certain circularit" to Smith0s defense of moralit",
as some of his critics have alle.ed, #ut the circularit" is not a vicious one, and an entirel" nonmoral
defense of moralit", which the critics seem to want, ma" #e impossi#le.
Smith himself does not clearl" spell out the responses 4 have proposed to the philosophical pro#lems that
his theor" raises. is stren.ths as a moral philosopher lie elsewhere. Moral philosophers need not #e
concerned solel" with the .rounds of moralit". 9ispla"in., clarif"in., and showin. the internal
connections in the wa" we thin/ a#out virtue is alread" a philosophical tas/, even if we set aside the
Buestion of whether that wa" of thin/in. is (ustified. There are indeed philosophers who re(ect the idea
that philosoph" is well1suited to offer (ustifications. Smith0s wor/ fits in with the view of 4ris Murdoch,
who understood moral philosoph" as consistin. in the attempt 2to fill in a s"stematic e!planator"
#ac/.round to our ordinar" moral life3 (Murdoch 197A, p. 75). is astute and nuanced anal"sis of what
.oes into moral approval@of the sorts of factors the impartial spectator considers, of how it can deceive
itself or otherwise .o wron., of how it develops and how it (ud.es different virtues in different wa"s@is
accomplishment enou.h, re.ardless of whether he adeBuatel" (ustifies the fact that we en.a.e in such
approval at all.
". Smith's Political Philosophy
4t is clear from the end of TMS that Smith intended to complement it with a s"stem of political
philosoph", and it is clear from the Advertisement to the last edition of TMS that %& represents the
partial #ut not complete fulfillment of that plan. Stri/in.l", what .ot left out was the part of political
philosoph" that most concerned Smith at the end of TMS, and that has most concerned other moral
philosophers who turn to politics6 a s"stematic account of (ustice. Smith0s lectures on (urisprudence dealt
with this topic, and from the notes we have on those lectures, he seems to have hoped to #uild a
comprehensive, universall"1applica#le theor" of (ustice out of impartial1spectator (ud.ments a#out
propert", contract, punishment, etc. <ut the manuscript drawn from these lectures was never finished, and
he had it #urned at his death. Some scholars speculate that the failure of this pro(ect was fore1ordained6
the moral theor" of TMS is too particularist to sustain a universall"1applica#le theor" of (ustice (see
Eriswold 1999, pp. )5$*D and Cleischac/er )AA7, chapter D). :thers have tried to re1construct such a
theor" for Smith (see aa/onssen 19D1 and 199$).
4n an" case, Smith concluded his lectures on (urisprudence with some e!tended remar/s on 2police3@
pu#lic polic" @and this he did, of course, wor/ up into a #oo/ of its own. 4t is unclear, however, how
much %& has to do with his philosophical concerns. Smith #ecame increasin.l" interested in political
econom" after completin. TMS, and %& can #e seen as the fruition simpl" of a new direction in his
research, unconnected to his moral s"stem. e did come to a comprehensive, one mi.ht sa"
philosophical, view of political econom"6 from his understandin. of the wor/in.s of economics, he
thou.ht that states could foster the productiveness of their economies onl" #" the rule of law,
accompanied #" a few limitations on #an/in. practices, and should otherwise lift measures that restrict or
encoura.e particular enterprises. The practical point of his treatise on economics was to ur.e this
restrained, modest approach to economic intervention on .overnin. officials. Smith did not
favor as hands1off an approach as some of his self1proclaimed followers do toda"@he #elieved that states
could and should re1distri#ute wealth to some de.ree, and defend the poor and disadvanta.ed a.ainst
those who wield power over them in the private sector (see Cleischac/er )AA7, M 57)@#ut he certainl"
wanted the state to end all policies, common in his mercantilist da", desi.ned to favor industr" over
a.riculture, or some industries over others. Smith #elieved stron.l" in the importance of local /nowled.e
to economic decision1ma/in., and conseBuentl" thou.ht that #usiness should #e left to #usinesspeople,
who understand the particular situations in which the" wor/ far #etter than an" .overnment official (on
this a"e/ understood Smith well6 see a"e/ 197D and ;. Smith )A1+). <" the same to/en, .overnance
should #e /ept out of the hands of #usinesspeople, since the" are li/el" to use it to promote their
particular interests, and not #e concerned for the well1#ein. of the citi5enr" as a whole6 Smith0s
opposition to the >ast 4ndia ;ompan" is #ased on this principle (see Muthu )AAD).
Smith0s political views tend more .enerall" towards a minimalist state. e did not want the state to micro1
mana.e the econom", and he also did not want it to promote reli.ion or virtue. e was suspicious of the
motives and s/ills of politicians, and their a#ilit", even when well1meanin., to chan.e societ" (see
Cleischac/er )AA7, chapter 11). And he did not #elieve that the political life was the crown of the moral
life, or that law or political institutions can help people develop virtue.
:ne mi.ht therefore wonder whether there is an" connection #etween his politics and his moral
philosoph". Aside from the construction of theories of (ustice@which, as we have noted, Smith wound
up not doin.@there are three main reasons wh" moral philosophers write political theories. Some, li/e
Aristotle, see moralit" as the cultivation of virtuous character and #elieve that the state can help people
with this cultivation. :thers, li/e -erem" <entham, see moralit" as ma!imi5in. human pleasure and
#elieve that le.al and political reform can contri#ute si.nificantl" toward that end. And still others, li/e
e.el, see moralit" as the e!pression of freedom and #elieve that states can em#od" the hi.hest
e!pression of freedom. <ut Smith #elieves none of these thin.s. is conception of moralit" is Buite
Aristotelian, #ut for him the state can do little to help people achieve virtuous character. e shares neither
<entham0s reduction of the .ood life to the pleasura#le life nor <entham0s optimism a#out the li/el"
effectiveness, for moral or hedonic purposes, of even much1reformed .overnments. And he never
descri#es the state as an e!pression of freedom.
That leaves us with the possi#ilit" that Smith tries in %& precisel" to tr" to cure his readers of the illusion
that states have a moral function. 4 don0t thin/ this is entirel" ri.ht, #ut it contains an important /ernel of
truth. There is a stron. Stoic component to TMS, and we mi.ht sa", in Stoic vein, that in %& Smith
wants to help us see how much the societ" around us is out of our control. %& shows us the .reat de.ree
to which social institutions and policies have unintended conseBuences, the central role, in particular, of
unforeseea#le factors in the wor/in.s of the mar/et, and the fact that uncontrolled mar/ets on the whole
do well #" all their participants. This allows us to #ecome reconciled to allowin. mar/ets, and other
social institutions, to run unfettered.
Smith is more of an >nli.htenment pro.ressive than this readin. su..ests, more of a #eliever that an
enli.htened understandin. of their circumstances can help people improve those circumstances, #ut he
had less faith in this notion than did most of his contemporaries. There are deep roots in his thou.ht for a
sceptical attitude towards pro.ressivism. is #elief in local /nowled.e leads him to #e suspicious of
lar.e1scale plans for the reform of societ". e also provides a num#er of reasons for dou#tin. whether we
can successfull" set for ourselves clear .oals for such reform. Cor most enli.htenment thin/ers, includin.
Smith0s predecessors utcheson and ume, what human #ein.s desire seemed fairl" o#vious. Cor Smith,
this is not so o#vious. Smith #elieves that it is ver" difficult for us to /now our true intentions (TMS 15$*
9), and that our desires are heavil" shaped #" social interaction. e also casts dou#t on the de.ree to
which we see/ thin.s that are trul" useful to our ends. 4n a famous passa.e, he sa"s that we are more
interested in a thin.0s apparent ondui$eness to utilit" than in its atual utilit" (179*DA). This
o#servation serves as the (umpin.1off point for his first fora" into economics. The 2poor man0s son, whom
heaven in its an.er has visited with am#ition3 pursues wealth without /nowin. what it is reall" li/e,
#ecause it seems@falsel"@to #e useful (1D1*+). 4n several wa"s, then, Smith pictures human desires and
aims as more opaBue than do most other >nli.htenment thin/ers. This picture informs his distinctive
account of societ" and histor", moreover, accordin. to which unintended conseBuences tend to #e more
important than intended ones and the course of histor" is correspondin.l" un/nowa#le in advance. :n
such a view, it is futile for politicians to tr" to determine the future development of their societies. The"
do #etter restrictin. their activities to protectin. individual li#ert" a.ainst violence@to defense and the
administration of (ustice.
%e mi.ht call this the li#ertarian readin. of Smith, and it certainl" captures an important element of his
political philosoph". Smith .ives (ustice priorit" over the other virtues in TMS (D$), he #e.ins his lectures
on (urisprudence #" sa"in. that the maintenance of (ustice is 2the first and chief desi.n of ever" s"stem of
.overnment3 (Smith 197D, p. 5), and he #rin.s in (ustice as a constraint on economic activit" man" times
in %& (e..., %& 157, 5+9, $D7). <ut he does not sa" that the enforcement of (ustice is the sole (o# of
.overnment. The third of the tas/s he .ives to .overnment in %& consists in 2maintainin. and erectin.3 a
#road ran.e of 2pu#lic/ wor/s and N pu#lic/ institutions3 for the .ood of the whole societ" (%& $D7*
D). 4n TMS, the chapter often Buoted as claimin. that (ustice is the onl" virtue that ma" #e enforced
actuall" maintains onl" that 2/indness or #eneficence, N cannot, among e'uals, #e e!torted #" force3
(TMS D1). 4n a state 2antecedent to the institution of civil .overnment,3 Smith sa"s, no impartial spectator
would approve of one person0s usin. force to ma/e another act #eneficentl". <ut once civil .overnment
has #een esta#lished, people ma" le.itimatel" #e forced to carr" out at least the .reatest and most o#vious
duties of #eneficence. Smith sa"s that
HtIhe civil ma.istrate is entrusted with the power not only of ( restraining in)ustie, but of promoting the
prosperity of the ommon"ealth, #" esta#lishin. .ood discipline, and #" discoura.in. ever" sort of vice
and impropriet"' he ma" prescri#e rules, therefore, which not onl" prohi#it mutual in(uries amon. fellow1
citi5ens, #ut command mutual .ood offices to a certain de.ree. (D1, m" emphasis)
Smith warns a.ainst ta/in. this license for a .eneral promotion of virtue too far@that, he sa"s, would #e
2destructive of all li#ert", securit", and (ustice3@#ut he also sa"s that ne.lectin. it will lead 2to man"
.ross disorders and shoc/in. enormities3 (TMS D1). These enormities ma" well include the miser" of the
poor, a central concern of Smith0s in %&. Smith had no principled o#(ections to .overnment power #ein.
used to help the poor, and indeed proposed a num#er of policies with that in mind. 4t should #e
remem#ered that the idea that .overnments mi.ht massivel" re1distri#ute wealth out of fairness to the
poor was not on the a.enda in Smith0s time. :nl" in the 179As, after Smith died, did -erem" <entham and
Tom 8aine offer their .round#rea/in. povert" pro.rams' the socialism of =o#ert :wen and ;harles
Courier la" another .eneration in the future. Fntil the late ei.hteenth centur", most writers on the role of
.overnment vis1O1vis the poor maintained that .overnments should /eep the poor in povert", so that the"
show proper respect to their superiors and not waste mone" on drin/. Smith had more influence than
an"one else in chan.in. this attitude@he was one of the earliest and most fervent champions of the ri.hts
and virtues of the poor, ar.uin. a.ainst wa.e caps and other constraints that /ept the poor from risin.
sociall" and economicall" (see <au.h 19D+ and Cleischac/er )AA7, chapter 1A).
Smith also had a more restricted conception of individual ri.hts than do contemporar" li#ertarians.
Ta!ation does not count as an" sort of threat to propert" ri.hts, for him@he indeed descri#es pa"in. ta!es
as 2a #ad.e N of li#ert"3 (%& D57)@nor does the .overnment0s mere support for certain ideas and
values count as an infrin.ement of the ri.ht to conscience. Althou.h it ma" #e inefficient and otherwise
unwise, it is not un)ust for the .overnment to intervene in the econom" on #ehalf of one or another
commercial interest, to spread propa.anda for one or another conception of virtue, or even to esta#lish a
reli.ion. Smith of course opposes economic intervention of this /ind and thin/s it #etter if .overnments
do not esta#lish reli.ions, #ut his views on these issues stem from concerns other than (ustice. Moreover,
he favors militia trainin. to instill coura.e in people, state incentives ur.in. people to stud" science and
philosoph", and state encoura.ement for secular amusements@the latter two as an 2antidote to the poison
of Hreli.iousI enthusiasm and superstition.3 (%& 79$) So Smith0s state is not a neutral one, in the modern
sense, and it is not wholl" uninterested in the promotion of virtue.
%h", then, does Smith recommend such a minimal stateJ The interventions 4 have listed are practicall"
the onl" ones he ur.es in %&, and even in those cases, Smith calls for limited state action. %h" allow
.overnments to .o so far, and no fartherJ
The first answer to that is that Smith did not thin/ .overnment officials were competent to handle much
#eside the needs of defense and the administration of (ustice. Smith0s writin.s are permeated #" a lac/ of
respect for the sorts of people who .o into politics6 for the vanit" that leads them to see/ fame and power,
for the presumption #" which the" re.ard themselves as morall" superior to others, and for the arro.ance
#" which the" thin/ the" /now the people0s interests and needs #etter than the people do themselves. e
also #elieves that politicians tend to #e manipulated #" the preachin. of merchants who do not have the
.ood of the nation as a whole at heart (%& )$$*7), and that the" can rarel" /now enou.h to .uide lar.e
num#ers of people. ;orrelativel", Smith has a .reat respect for the competence and virtue of common
people. e shows no trace of the thou.ht, common at the time and stron.l" held #" utcheson, that a
class of wise and virtuous people ou.ht to rule over the common herd.
4n addition, Smith holds that social sanctions can do a #etter (o# at man" tas/s that other thin/ers
e!pected of political sanctions. is rich account in TMS of the wa" that spectators around us su#tl" and
unconsciousl" shape us morall" ena#les him to hold that .overnments need not teach virtue. Societ",
independent of .overnmental power, will do that on its own. Thus sumptuar" laws are unnecessar"
#ecause the desire to maintain or increase one0s social status will /eep most people prudent and fru.al
(%& +71*$). Thus reli.ious .roups that spontaneousl" arise without .overnment assistance do a #etter
(o# of inculcatin. virtues than their .overnment1supported counterparts (%& 79)*$). And thus@
implicitl"@the civic repu#lican o#session with a citi5en militia is overwrou.ht #ecause the ha#its of self1
command inculcated #" militar" service can also #e achieved, for most people, #" the social interactions
of the mar/et (see Cleischac/er 1999, pp. 15+*$, 1$9*7)).
Cinall", Smith limits the activities of .overnments #ecause he considers it crucial to the development of
virtue that people have plent" of room to act, and shape their feelin.s, on their own. <ecomin. a .ood
human #ein. is ultimatel" a tas/ that each individual must ta/e up for him or herself. 8eople develop
#etter moral (ud.ment #" actuall" ma/in. moral (ud.ments (%& 7D)*+, 7DD), and virtue reBuires the
practice of virtue (TMS +)7)' we cannot achieve these thin.s simpl" #" followin. the sa"1so of an
authorit". So e!ercises of power tend to #e inimical to moral development, and .overnments should use
their power mostl" to minimi5e the de.ree to which power .ets e!ercised elsewhere.
4ndeed, for Smith, .overnments can #est encoura.e virtue precisel" #" refraining from encoura.in.
virtue. 4n TMS, the person who merel" tries to appear virtuous, whether out of fear of the law or out of
fear of social disapproval, is not reall" virtuous. <ut there is a slidin. scale here. :ne who acts virtuousl"
out of concern for the praise and #lame of her nei.h#ors is not as virtuous as one who is concerned to #e
praise1worth" in the e"es of an impartial spectator, #ut one who acts virtuousl" out of concern for le.al
sanctions is worse than either of the other two. As lon. as nei.h#ors /now each other reasona#l" well,
their approval and disapproval will normall" ta/e into account the particular circumstances, the peculiar
histor" and ps"cholo.", of the individuals the" (ud.e@their (ud.ments will reflect, sa", the difference in
.ratitude due to a loudl" self1pit"in. parent as opposed to a trul" lon.1sufferin. one. ,e.al sanctions are
#lunt instruments that cannot attend to such su#tleties. So social approval is more li/el" than le.al
approval to pic/ out the ri.ht sort of actions to mar/ for moral worth. Curthermore, since social sanctions
are milder than le.al sanctions@it is much easier to i.nore a nei.h#or0s disapproval than a threat of
imprisonment@people who care a#out social sanctions displa" #etter character than people who can #e
motivated to .ood action onl" #" the law. The pressure of social sanctions is more li/e, and more li/el" to
draw one towards, the pressure of conscience. >ven if concern for social approval is not the ideal
motivation for moral action, therefore, it is at least some si.n of .ood character, and a step alon. the wa"
to the motivations of the full" virtuous person. ,e.al sanctions #" contrast affect our ph"sical well1#ein.
and social standin. so severel" that the" drive out all thou.ht of the sanctions of conscience. A
.overnment concerned to foster virtue in its citi5ens should therefore aim as much as possi#le to remove
its own sanctions from the pursuit of virtue. Eovernments foster virtue #est where the" refuse, directl", to
foster virtue at all6 (ust as the" protect economic development #est where the" refuse, directl", to protect
development. This ironic conception of .overnment power runs throu.h all of Smith0s political thin/in..
Accordin.l", his main political o#(ect in writin. %& is to instill modest" in polic"1ma/ers, to ur.e them
to ta/e on onl" ver" limited, well1defined tas/s, and to reco.ni5e that the flourishin. of their societ" does
not, on the whole, much depend on them.
4n sum, if Smith0s political philosoph" loo/s li/e li#ertarianism, it is a li#ertarianism aimed at different
ends, and .rounded in different moral views, than that of most contemporar" li#ertarians. Toda", man"
li#ertarians are suspicious of the notion that individuals ou.ht to develop virtues e!pected of them #"
others6 #e"ond, at least, those virtues that are needed for the functionin. of the mar/et and the li#eral state
themselves. Smith does not share this attitude. e is far from an a.nostic a#out what a .ood human life
loo/s li/e, let alone an enthusiast for a conception of the .ood life that eschews virtue in favor of
preference1satisfaction. e is not a positivist sceptical of the si.nificance of moral ar.ument, li/e Milton
Criedman, nor a hedonist, li/e <entham and his followers, nor a radical individualist, li/e the followers of
A"n =and. An" decent human life, he #elieves, reBuires certain virtues, and depends on a respect and love
of individuals for the people around them. 4f he encoura.es .overnments, nevertheless, to refrain from
promotin. virtue, that is #ecause he thin/s that social forces can effectivel" achieve that end without
.overnment help, and that le.al sanctions are in an" case useless or counter1productive for the promotion
of virtue. So he ma" arrive at some li#ertarian conclusions, #ut not in the wa" that most li#ertarians do.
#. $onclusion
Smith has an account of the nature of moral (ud.ment, and its development, that is richer and su#tler than
ume0s' he offers a protot"pe for modern Aristotelianism in moralit"' he #rin.s out the importance of the
ima.ination to moral development as few other philosophers have done' he is an earl" and forceful
promoter of the notion that histor" is .uided lar.el" #" unintended conseBuences' and he derives from
these views an unusual variant of li#eral politics. Cew of these contri#utions are spelled out with the
clarit" and ti.ht ar.umentation that contemporar" philosophers demand of their canonical fi.ures, #ut
Smith compensates for this wea/ness #" the humanit" and thou.htfulness of his views, #" their
detachment from metaph"sical commitments, and #" an a#undance of historical and ima.inative detail.
The richness of his ideas, and their Buiet plausi#ilit", earn him a place amon. the most important of
modern moral and political philosophers.
%iliography
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Qor/6 &ew Qor/ Fniversit" 8ress, pp. $9*DD.
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3ubli *ffairs, )D ())6 1+9*$7.
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3hilosophy, )A (1)6 1A9*7A.
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3henomenologial ,esearh, 1) (+)6 +17*75.
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D) (+)6 )791$9.
***, 1999, * Third 2onept of 4iberty9 5udgment and Freedom in :ant and *dam Smith,
8rinceton6 8rinceton Fniversit" 8ress.
***, )AA7, <n *dam Smith7s Wealth of Nations9 * 3hilosophial 2ompanion, 8rinceton6 8rinceton
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Fniversit" 8ress.
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***, 199$, Natural 4a" and Moral 3hilosophy, ;am#rid.e6 ;am#rid.e Fniversit" 8ress.
anle", ="an, )AA9, *dam Smith and the 2harater of 8irtue, ;am#rid.e6 ;am#rid.e Fniversit"
8ress.
a"e/, Criedrich, 197D, 2Adam Smith0s Messa.e in Toda"0s ,an.ua.e,3 in a"e/, Ne" Studies in
3hilosophy, 3olitis, &onomis and the 1istory of 6deas, ;hica.o6 Fniversit" of ;hica.o 8ress, pp. )$7*
9.
?ors.aard, ;hristine, 199$, Soures of Normati$ity, ;am#rid.e6 ;am#rid.e Fniversit" 8ress.
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and reality, ;am#rid.e6 arvard Fniversit" 8ress, pp. +*)).
***, 199D#, 2Girtue and reason,3 in Mc9owell, Mind, $alue, and reality. ;am#rid.e6 arvard
Fniversit" 8ress, pp. 5A*7+.
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Muller, -err", 199+, *dam Smith in his Time and <urs, 8rinceton6 8rinceton Fniversit" 8ress.
Murdoch, 4ris, 197A, The So$ereignty of !ood, ,ondon6 =outled.e.
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KElo#ali5ationL in the A.e of >nli.htenment,3 3olitial Theory, +$ ())6 1D5*)1).
:tteson, -ames, )AA), *dam Smith7s Mar#etplae of 4ife, ;am#rid.e6 ;am#rid.e Fniversit" 8ress.
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Other Selected Secondary &iterature
<rown, Givienne and Samuel Cleischac/er (eds.), )A1A, The 3hilosophy of *dam Smith, ,ondon6
=outled.e.
Cric/e, ;hristel and ans18eter SchTtt (eds.), )AA5, *dam Smith als Moralphilosoph, <erlin6 de
Eru"ter.
ont, 4stvan and Michael 4.natieff (eds.), 19D5, Wealth and 8irtue, ;am#rid.e6 ;am#rid.e
Fniversit" 8ress.
-ones, 8eter and Andrew S/inner (eds.), 199), *dam Smith ,e$ie"ed, >din#ur.h6 >din#ur.h
Fniversit" 8ress.
Montes, ,eonidas, )AA7, *dam Smith in 2onte=t, ,ondon6 8al.rave Macmillan.
Schliesser, >ric, forthcomin., *dam Smith, ,ondon6 =outled.e.
Smith, ;rai., )AA$, *dam Smith7s 3olitial 3hilosophy, ,ondon6 =outled.e.
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http'((plato.stanford.edu(entries(smith)moral)political(