Political Representation

B. Forest, McGill University, Montre al, QC, Canada

& 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Glossary
Descriptive Representation A principle of political
representation in which the social and/or demographic
composition of an elected body is similar to that of the
population or voting constituency.
Gerrymandering The manipulation of electoral district
boundaries intended to affect the outcome of elections.
Independence Theory of Representation A theory
of political representation in which the representative is
free to act independent from, and even contrary to, the
preferences of her/his constituents.
Mandate Theory of Representation A theory of
political representation in which the representative if
bound to act strictly in accordance with the preferences
of her/his constituents.
Proportional Representation An electoral system in
which voters cast ballots for parties rather than
candidates, and representatives are selected from lists
generated by parties in accordance with the proportion
of votes received by each party.
Territorial Representation An electoral system in
which candidates are elected from geographically
dened constituencies.
Substantive Representation A principle of political
representation where the interests of social,
demographic, and/or political groups are represented in
an elected body.
VoteSeat Ratio The ratio between the proportion of
votes a party wins and the proportion of seats the party
receives.
The Meanings of Political Representation
Nearly 40 years ago, political theorist Hannah Pitkin
argued that only a constellation of meanings could ad-
equately describe representation, and political represen-
tation in particular. The concept is so complex because
representation is an apparent absurdity: to make present
something that is not literally present. This would be
difcult enough if the something in question was a
simple object in the world, but an act of political rep-
resentation more typically calls the something into being.
In other words, an election or the formation of a legis-
lature constitutes the object being represented, for
example, the people, the will of the people, the nation,
the national interest, etc. At the same time, political
representation (at least in functioning democracies) must
also be a practical activity providing the means of gov-
ernance. The relationships among representation and
geography involve both the constitutive and the practical
dimensions of representation.
All democratic political representation relies on a
kind of political ction, the existence of the people as a
sovereign-holding, but abstract entity. That is, the people
hold power, but it is never possible to actually identify a
particular set of the population as the people. Indeed,
every less-than-unanimous vote reveals the ctitious
nature of the people because any resulting representative
or policy will have the support of (at best) a majority of
voters. Democratic political representation presents a
particular dilemma because the people are simul-
taneously rulers and subjects. As rulers, they are free to
act according to their political will, but as subjects, they
are bound by their own decisions. Political represen-
tation, and its practice in electoral systems, resolves this
dilemma by delegating power to representatives who
carry out the activities of governance. These represen-
tatives are typically restrained by constitutional provisions
and previously established laws as well as by future
elections.
The creative or constitutive nature of political rep-
resentation means that all systems of political represen-
tation have both actual and imaginary geographies. That
is, geographical studies of political representation involve
issues such as voting patterns and the division of state
powers, but also issues such as the right to vote, a
question that fundamentally denes the nature of the
state or nation.
Issues of political representation have attracted in-
creasing interest in political and electoral geography in
the last 20 years. The roots of this renewed interest lie in
historical, technical, and disciplinary developments. First,
the fall of communism in Central and Eastern Europe
(198990), the breakup of the Soviet Union (1991), and
the end of apartheid in South Africa (199194) led to a
renewed wave of democratization that often required
careful negotiation over both the institutional forms of
electoral systems and the nature of the political com-
munities to be represented. Second, the increased power
and sophistication of geographic information systems
(GISs) have brought new analytic power to the practice
of political districting and the analysis of voting patterns.
Finally, electoral geography is also moving beyond the
analysis of spatial patterns of voting, instead focusing
more on place-specic or neighborhood effects on vot-
ing preferences. These developments mean that political
254
geography in general, and electoral geography in
particular, has had to reexamine its assumptions about
political representation and related concepts.
The MandateIndependence Debate
Debate over the role of the representative, the so-called
mandateindependence debate, is one of the central
issues in political representation. Under the mandate
theory, a representative must always act in accordance
with the will of her/his constituents, and indeed, ceases
to represent them if s/he goes against their wishes.
Strictly speaking, the mandate theory holds that a rep-
resentative is simply a delegate, acting as a conduit to
convey the actions and interests of voters to an assembly.
In contrast, the independence theory characterizes the
representative as free to act according to her/his own
judgment and will, recognizing representatives as having
unique skills and expertise unavailable to a typical
constituent. This perspective would recognize a person
as a representative even if s/he acts contrary to the
expressed wishes of the constituency. The common
meaning of democratic political representation lies
somewhere between these two extremes, and relies on a
reciprocal relationship between the represented and the
representative.
Pitkin in particular argues that a proper understand-
ing of political representation requires elements of both
theories. The represented must be seen as capable of
understanding and expressing their own interests, rather
than simply being the subjects of caretaking (like children
or the mentally inrm). There should not typically
be conict between the wishes of constituents and the
actions of the representative, but such divergence must
be possible. When differences arise, the representative
must be able to explain and justify them. Democratic
states institutionalize this reciprocal relationship through
periodic elections, where voters can (in principle) replace
inadequate representatives.
Descriptive and Substantive Representation
Another major debate involves the relationship between
the identity of the representative and the composition
of her/his constituency. Political theorists typically
characterize this as a conict between descriptive and
substantive representation, sometimes described as the
politics of presence versus the politics of interests or
ideas. (Such discussions occur most often in the context
of gender, racial, ethnic, or religious minorities, but
are not necessarily limited to the role of such groups.)
Descriptive representation or the politics of presence
requires the physical presence of women, ethnic minor-
ities, etc. in a representative assembly. In a sense, a body
is representative when groups are present in the assembly
in the same proportion as in the population. Some argue
that descriptive representation has a value in and of itself,
and/or that it helps confer legitimacy to an elected
government, particularly in societies with signicant in-
equality and stratication. More sophisticated defenses
of descriptive representation suggest that the presence of
women and minorities actually changes the quality and
nature of deliberation in legislative bodies. A number of
representative democracies, such as India, have insti-
tutionalized the politics of presence by instituting quotas
for women and minority groups in legislative bodies. The
US also imposed gender quotas for elections in Iraq,
although it eschews them at home.
In contrast, substantive representation regards the
identity of the delegates as irrelevant because represen-
tatives are seen as agents protecting the interests of
constituents. While voters may consider the identity
of candidates while voting, the demographic composition
of the legislature per se is not important as long as rep-
resentatives are chosen in a way that allows the effective
expression of the interests of voters. A male, for instance,
would be seen as representative of females if he con-
sistently supported womens interests. The concept of
such objectively dened interests, however, can lead to
an apparent absurdity. If interests exist objectively, sub-
stantive representation suggests that a constituency need
not have a role in electing their representative, as with
the caretaker of a child or incapacitated adult. Con-
sequently, in its extreme form, substantive representation
poses problems that are similar to those found in the
independence theory of representation. This issue was
one of the major disputes during the American Revo-
lution, where the colonists objected to their virtual
representation in Parliament by representatives for
whom they had not voted.
As a practical matter, democratic representation
seldom involves either descriptive or substantive repre-
sentation exclusively. Even among voters who might
reject the idea of legislative or party list quotas, the
gender or ethnic identity of candidates can be a concern if
they feel that a member of their own group is better able
to understand and represent their interests. Much like the
mandateindependence debate, the extreme version of
each form of representation violates the principle that
within limits both representatives and constituents must
be able to act freely and to exercise judgment.
Critics of Democratic Representation
Marxist critics in particular argue that such theoretical
debates are irrelevant because democratic represen-
tation is impossible under a capitalist system. The
interests of capital too easily determine elections, and
debates between parties and candidates simply serve to
disguise how the state acts in the interests of capital. The
Political Representation 255
idea of candidates and parties competing with each other
is simply a political version of free-market economic
ideology. For these critics, structural forces rather than
individual merit or effort determine the winners and
losers in each realm. Insofar as political debate takes
place through the media, major corporations can easily
control the content and structure of political discussion
and identify only favorable candidates as legitimate and
serious. Similarly, the funding required for political
campaigns means that wealthy individuals and organ-
izations exercise a disproportionate impact on elections.
Moreover, elections themselves may be largely irrelevant
because those with the most inuence over represen-
tatives lobbyists, institutions, corporations, and so forth
are not affected by elections. The interests of capital
are represented regardless of the form of democratic
representation.
Electoral Systems and Political
Representation
Disputes over political representation generally take
place in conicts over electoral systems, rather than in
abstract policy debates. An electoral system is the
mechanism through which votes are translated (or not)
into political power. Within liberal democracies an
enormous variety of electoral systems exist in pure or
mixed forms, although most are variations of either
proportional representation (PR) or territorial-plurality
representation. Each system translates votes into power
in slightly different ways. Each offers particular tradeoffs
in the relationship between representatives and con-
stituents, and in the stability and responsiveness of
the political system. The choice of an electoral system
reects the institutionalized political values of a society
or at least the values of those in a position to choose the
system.
Proportional Representation
PR is the most common electoral system in the world.
It attempts to translate the proportion of votes for a
particular party into the same proportion of seats in
the elected assembly. Typically, parties establish a list of
candidates who win seats in proportion to the number of
votes the party receives. For example, in a parliament
with 200 open seats, a party receiving 50% of the vote
would place the rst 100 candidates on its list in the
assembly. All proportional systems, however, have limi-
tations. The total number of contested seats determines
the minimum percentage of votes required to elect a
representative. In a 200-seat parliament, a party would
need at least 0.5% (1/200) of the vote to place one
candidate. In practice, however, most jurisdictions using
PR establish a minimum threshold for electing candidates
(typically around 5%) regardless of the theoretical
minimum. Any party receiving less than the threshold
cannot place candidates in the assembly, and the re-
maining seats are allocated to the other parties. Table 1
shows the results with ve parties contesting a 200-
member assembly with a 5% minimum threshold for
election.
In this example the remaining seats are allocated
proportionally, rounding up to the nearest whole number,
but other methods can be used as well. The example
illustrates that proportional systems may not produce
proportionality; the top three vote-getting parties receive
extra seats, and the two smallest parties, representing
8% of the voters, are completely shut out. This problem
of disproportionality is worse in elections where a large
number of small parties fail to meet the minimum
threshold, or where the minimum threshold is very high.
States typically require minimum thresholds to limit
political fragmentation by forcing small constituencies to
nd common ground in one party or another. In parlia-
mentary systems, very low thresholds can give excessive
inuence to small parties who hold the balance of power
in coalition governments.
Territorial-Plurality Representation
The other common electoral system is territorial-
plurality representation. In the simplest version of such a
system, two or more candidates compete for a single seat
from a specic territorial unit (districts, ridings, boroughs,
etc.). In such single-member, rst-past-the-post systems,
the candidate with a plurality (or majority) of votes
wins the election. The major advantages of such systems
are (in principle) greater accountability and closer
Table 1 Allocating seats in a proportional system with 5% minimum threshold in a 200-member assembly
Party Percentage of the vote Initial seats Remaining seats Total seats Percentage of seats
(% Vote X 200) (% Vote X (200184))
A 42 84 7 91 45.5
B 30 60 5 65 32.5
C 20 40 4 44 22
D 4
E 4
Total 100 184 16 200 100
256 Political Representation
ties between a representative and her/his constituents
because representation is tied to a specic geographic
region and to a specic territorial constituency. All
territorial-plurality systems, however, suffer from the
so-called voteseat problem: the proportion of votes
gained by a party as a whole may not correspond closely
to the proportion of seats they receive in the legislature.
Table 2 illustrates how territorial representation can lead
to such disproportionality in a ve-member assembly
representing ve districts with equal numbers of voters.
In this example, candidates from Party A win close
elections in four of the ve districts but the party loses
the fth district badly. The four narrow margins mean,
however, that Party A wins 80% of the seats in the
assembly with just over 40% of the total vote. (Under PR,
Party A would win just two of the ve seats or 40%.)
Departures from proportionality can be even more severe
if three or more parties contest each district and winning
candidates only achieve pluralities rather than majorities.
Perhaps the best-known recent example of the voteseat
problem was the 2000 US presidential election, in which
George W. Bush received fewer votes than Vice-
President Al Gore, but won the election with narrow
victories in several states. Although the voteseat prob-
lem is endemic to all territorial systems of representation,
it is of particular concern when it leads to the exclusion
of political (gender, ethnic, or religious) minorities.
Territorial systems are also highly vulnerable to ger-
rymandering, a technique that inuences the voteseat
ratio by manipulating the boundaries of electoral dis-
tricts, boroughs, or ridings.
Variations of the single-member, rst-past-the-post
system can either ameliorate or exaggerate the voteseat
mismatch. The voting system in multimember or at-large
districts (where candidates run for several seats simul-
taneously) can either completely exclude minority par-
ties and candidates, or can provide a mechanism for
proportionality. In the former case, election rules might
require candidates to run for particular seats, and require
voters to cast one and only one vote for each seat.
A cohesive political plurality could then elect all repre-
sentatives. Alternatively, candidates might all run against
each other simultaneously with the top vote getters
winning election. Such an arrangement prevents the ex-
clusion of a political minority, but allows the election of
candidates who have a relatively narrow base of support.
If the top candidate attracts 70% of the vote, for example,
the remaining representatives would be elected with less
than 30% support among the electorate. Nor do such
systems guarantee proportionality since (as in the above
example) a single candidate might win the lions share of
the vote.
Numerous electoral mechanisms have been proposed
and employed to overcome the seatvote mismatch and
to address the problem of minority exclusion. The single
transferable vote (STV) (called instant run-off voting
or IRV when used to elect candidates to a single seat)
identies the candidates with the broadest support by
having voters rank them in order of preference. Ballots
that would otherwise be wasted (either because the rst-
choice candidate received more votes than needed for
election, or too few to be competitive) are transferred
to the voters second- (third-, etc.) ranked candidate until
all seats are lled. STVattempts to ensure a closer match
in proportionality between votes and seats while still
retaining a territorially based system of representation.
Mixed Electoral Systems
States and other jurisdictions use a wide array of pro-
portional and territorial electoral systems, and scholars
have proposed an even greater variety to address the
practical and theoretical shortcomings of the existing
ones. PR and territorial-plurality systems are not
necessarily mutually exclusive, however, and many jur-
isdictions use some combination of them. Some seats in a
legislature, for example, might be elected from territorial
units while the remaining seats are assigned by pro-
portion of the total vote. Proportional systems may also
be used within a set of districts, where parties designate
separate lists for each territorial unit. The effect on
proportionality in these cases depends on the particular
design of the electoral system and on the distribution
of votes in any given election. Mixed systems often
Table 2 Territorial-plurality representation in a ve-member assembly
District % Votes for
candidates from
party A
% Votes for
candidates from
party B
Winning
candidate
1 51 49 A
2 52 48 A
3 51 49 A
4 52 48 A
5 10 90 B
Total votes 43.2 56.8
Total seats 80 20
(4 seats) (1 seat)
Political Representation 257
reect practical compromises among political factions
who would benet disproportionally from either PR or
territorial representation. As such, they embody mixed
principles and concepts of representation.
Principles of Representation in Electoral
Systems
Arguably, PR can promote both descriptive and
substantive representation more easily than territorial
representation because it is simpler to regulate the
composition of party lists than the composition of terri-
torial electorates. It is easier, for example, to require
that women or minorities constitute some minimum
percentage of the candidates on party lists, than to create
electoral districts where the same percentage of women
or minorities are likely to be elected. PR used with such
regulated party lists can thus easily guarantee descriptive
representation in an elected body. The profusion of
parties in a PR system may also increase the chances
that a particular constituency or interest group will have
representatives in the assembly.
PR (especially without regulated party lists) suggests a
bias toward the independent model and substantive
representation because representatives generally have
weaker ties to a particular constituency even one that
is concentrated geographically. Representatives are not
personally tied to a set of voters because voters cast
ballots for a party rather than individuals. Represen-
tatives thus embody the interests and positions of the
party, rather than a specic constituency per se, and
are consequently freer to act according to their own
judgment (within the limits of party discipline) and are
(arguably) less accountable to voters.
Although territorial representation is typically less
effective in creating proportionality and descriptive
representation, district systems ensure a strong tie be-
tween representatives and their constituencies, and in
principle increase accountability. Such a system en-
courages a mandate model because voters can remove
specic incumbents in favor of candidates who will more
accurately represent their wishes. More generally, terri-
torial systems allow for a distinct concept of the object of
representation: the geographic community. Rather than
representing the agglomerated will of individual voters
(as in PR), a representative comes from and embodies a
particular, identiable community that is or is imagined
to be more than the sum of its individual members.
Responsiveness and Stability in Electoral
Systems
Electoral systems must also balance responsiveness and
stability. These refer to the relationship between a
change in voting patterns and the consequent change in
the elected assembly. PR systems are (in theory) perfectly
responsive; a 5% increase (or decrease) in the votes for a
party will translate into a 5% increase (or decrease) in
the number of seats held by that party. In practice,
changes in vote totals may not translate perfectly into
changes in seat totals because of threshold requirements
and limited assembly size.
The balance between stability and responsiveness is
more complex in territorial representation because the
voteseat ratio of a particular set of electoral districts
can produce outcomes that are either too stable or too
responsive. In the former case, even large changes in the
overall vote total do not change the composition of
the elected assembly, whereas in the latter case, small
changes in the vote produce huge swings in the legis-
lature. Overly stable systems result when parties have
either large majorities or small minorities in districts.
Even relatively large losses or gains by one party or
another in total votes are not sufcient to change the
majorities or minorities in many districts, so the com-
position of the assembly remains unchanged. In contrast,
a set of districts with very narrow margins may be overly
responsive because a tiny shift in the electorate may
cause one party to lose every seat. A particular set of
electoral districts may also be asymmetrically responsive:
a large loss of votes by one party may not produce
any change in the assembly, but a small gain in votes
may result in signicant gains.
Stability and responsiveness raise nal dilemma of
territorial representation. The principle of accountability
holds that voters should be able to remove an incumbent
from ofce, and elected ofcials are presumably more
responsive to their constituents if they are in danger of
losing the next election. At the same time, legislatures
benet from some degree of political continuity and
stability. Thus a situation that is desirable in an indi-
vidual district accountability ensured by narrow elec-
tion margins may produce excessive responsiveness
when applied in every district.
Political Representation and Political
Communities
Concepts and principles of political representation are
fundamental not only to the structure of electoral sys-
tems, but also to the relationships among the franchise,
the polity, and citizenship. In nation-states, the right to
vote is one criterion of membership in the nation, but
in all states, this right is a measure of full citizenship. Full
citizenship, including the franchise, confers membership
in the people. A full citizen therefore carries both the
right of sovereign power and political interests that
require representation. In short, only full citizens are full
participants in the political life of a state. In this way, acts
258 Political Representation
of political representation create political communities
rather than simply reecting the will of preexisting
ones. Consequently, analyses of political representation
ultimately involve issues of citizenship, exclusion, and
power. While systems of territorial representation present
clear geographic questions, all systems of political rep-
resentation even pure PR raise signicant issues
for political geographers.
See also: Citizenship; Democracy; Electoral Cartography;
Electoral Districts; Electoral Geography; Gerrymandering;
Governance; Identity Politics; Private/Public Divide.
Further Reading
Forest, B. (2001). Mapping democracy: Racial identity and the
quandary of political representation. Annals of the Association of
American Geographers 91, 143--166.
Johnston, R. (2002). Manipulating maps and winning elections:
Measuring the impact of malapportionment and gerrymandering.
Political Geography 21, 1--31.
Johnston, R., Pattie, C., Dorling, D. and Rossiter, D. (2001). From votes
to seats: The operation of the UK electoral system since 1945.
Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Keyssar, A. (2000). The right to vote: The contested history of
democracy in the United States. New York: Basic Books.
Lijphart, A. (1999). Patterns of democracy: Government forms and
performance in thirty-six countries. New Haven: Yale University
Press.
Lublin, D. (1997). The paradox of representation: Racial
gerrymandering and minority interests in Congress. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.
Marston, S. A. (1990). Who are the people?: Gender, citizenship, and
the making of the American nation. Environment and Planning D:
Society and Space 8, 449--458.
Monmonier, M. S. (2001). Bushmanders and bullwinkles: How
politicians manipulate electronic maps and census data to win
elections. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Morgan, E. S. (1988). Inventing the people: The rise of popular
sovereignty in England and America. New York: W. W. Norton and
Company.
Phillips, A. (1995). The politics of presence. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Pitkin, H. (1967). The concept of representation. Berkeley: University of
California Press.
Relevant Websites
http://www.fairvote.org/
A site with many election-related resources, sponsored by the
Center for Voting and Democracy.
http://www.electoralgeography.com/new/en/
A site with many worldwide election results and electroal maps,
especially of recent elections.
http://www.redistrictinggame.org/
An interactive redistricting site from the Annenberg Center at the
University of Southern California.
Political Representation 259