97. Quinto & Tolentino, Jr. vs.

COMELEC
Gr No. 189698, February 22, 2010
Facts: The Commission on Elections questioned an earlier decision of the Supreme Court,
which declared the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and
Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678, unconstitutional. Both provide that any person
holding a public appointive office or position including active members of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, and other officers and employees in government-owned or controlled
corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his
certificate of candidacy.
Issue: Whether or not the given provisions violate the equal protection clause.
Held: No. The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws to
all persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as
determined according to a valid classification. The test developed by jurisprudence is that of
reasonableness, which has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial
distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purposes of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions
only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.
The assailed decision deemed that the above provisions satisfy the first, third and fourth
requisites of reasonableness. However, there was doubt that the different treatment of
appointive officials in comparison with elected officials is not germane to the purpose of the law.
Such distinction is justified, or germane to the purposes of the law, by considering that elected
officials are put in office by their constituents for a definite term, while there is no such
expectation for appointed official. Thus, elected officials can be said to be excluded from the
deemed-resigned provisions out of respect for the sovereign will of the electorate.

98. NPC vs. Pinatubo Commercial
GR No. 176006, March 26, 2010
Facts: The National Power Corporation (NPC)

questions the decision rendered by the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaluyong City, declaring items 3 and 3.1 of NPC Circular No. 99-75
unconstitutional, which [allow] only partnerships or corporations that directly use aluminum as
the raw material in producing finished products either purely or partly out of aluminum, to
participate in the bidding for the disposal of ACSR wires as unconstitutional for being violative of
substantial due process and the equal protection clause of the Constitution as well as for
restraining competitive free trade and commerce.
Issue: Whether items 3 and 3.1 of NPC Circular No. 99-75 violated the equal protection clause
of the Constitution.
Held: No. The equal protection clause means that no person or class of persons shall be
deprived of the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in
the same place and in like circumstances. The guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is
not violated by a legislation based on a reasonable classification. The equal protection clause,
therefore, does not preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded different
treatment under the law as long as the classification is reasonable and not arbitrary.
Items 3 and 3.1 clearly did not infringe on the equal protection clause as these were based on a
reasonable classification intended to protect, not the right of any business or trade but the
integrity of government property, as well as promote the objectives of RA 7832. Traders like
Pinatubo could not claim similar treatment as direct manufacturers/processors especially in the
light of their failure to negate the rationale behind the distinction.

99. Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. COMELEC
GR No. 190582, April 8, 2010
Facts: COMELEC refused to recognize Ang Ladlad LGBT Party, an organization composed of
men and women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered
individuals (LGBTs), as a party-list based on moral grounds. Petitioner then elevated the case to
the Supreme Court on certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not Ang Ladlad LGBT Party qualifies for registration as party-list under RA
No. 7941.
Held: Yes. The enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors in RA No. 7941 is
not exclusive. The crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but
whether a particular organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA No.
7941. Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with the legal requirements for
accreditation. Laws of general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs and they
deserve to participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other marginalized and
under-represented sectors. The principle of non-discrimination requires the laws of general
application relating to elections be applied to all persons, regardless of sexual orientation.

100. Louis Barok Biraogo vs. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010/ Lagman vs.
Ochoa, et. al.
GR Nos. 192935/193036, December 7, 2010
Facts: E. O. No. 1 was signed by Pres. Aquino, establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of
2010 (PTC). It is an ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary task
to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and
employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous administration
(Arroyo Administration), and to submit its finding and recommendations to the President,
Congress and the Ombudsman.
Issue: Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.
Held: Yes. Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies
and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. However, the equal
protection clause permits classification, if it passes the test of reasonableness. The test has four
requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the
purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all
members of the same class. Executive Order No. 1 violates the equal protection clause, since
the Truth Commissions clear mandate is to investigate the reported cases of graft and
corruption during the previous administration only. The Arroyo administration is but just a
member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not
including past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal
protection clause cannot sanction. Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification.


101. Savage vs. Taypin
G.R. No. 134217. May 11, 2000
Facts: Petitioners Savage, seek to nullify the search warrant issued by respondent Judge
Aproniano B. Taypin of the Regional Trial Court, Br. 12 Cebu City, which resulted in the seizure
of certain pieces of wrought iron furniture from the factory of petitioners located in Biasong,
Talisay, Cebu. The issuance was based upon the allegations by the private respondent, that
Savages products are the object of unfair competition involving design patents, punishable
under Art. 189 of the Revised Penal Code as amended.
Issue: Whether or not unfair competition involving design patents are punishable under Article
189 of the Revised Penal Code, justifying the issuance of the search and seizure of the
properties.
Held: No. The issue of the existence of "unfair competition" as a felony involving design
patents, referred to in Art. 189 of the Revised Penal Code, has been rendered moot and
academic by the repeal of the article, by the Intellectual Property Code on January 1, 1998. In
the issuance of search warrants, the Rules of Court requires a finding of probable cause in
connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched and the things to be seized. Hence, since there is no crime to speak of, the search
warrant is therefore defective on its face.

102. Govt of the USA vs. Puruganan
GR No. 148571, September 24, 2002
Facts: Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the US Government requested the
extradition of Mark Jimenez. A hearing was held by the respondent judge to determine whether
a warrant of arrest should be issued. During which, the lower court issued its questioned Order,
directing the issuance of a warrant for Jimenezs arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at
one million pesos in cash.
Issue: Whether or not Jimenez is entitled to notice and hearing before a warrant for his arrest
can be issued.
Held: No. Section 2 of Article III of the Constitution, which was invoked by Jimenez, does not
require a notice or a hearing before the issuance of a warrant of arrest. To determine probable
cause for the issuance of arrest warrants, the Constitution itself requires only the examination,
under oath or affirmation, of complainants and the witnesses they may produce. There is no
requirement to notify and hear the accused before the issuance of warrants of arrest.
At most, in cases of clear insufficiency of evidence on record, judges merely further
examine complainants and their witnesses. In the present case, validating the act of respondent
judge and instituting the practice of hearing the accused and his witnesses at this early stage
would be discordant with the rationale for the entire system. If the accused were allowed to be
heard and necessarily to present evidence during the prima facie determination for the issuance
of a warrant of arrest, such a procedure could convert the determination of a prima facie case
into a full-blown trial of the entire proceedings and possibly make trial of the main case
superfluous.


103. People vs. Libnao
G.R. No. 136860. January 20, 2003
Facts: Appellant Agpanga Libnao was convicted of violating Article II, Section 4 of R.A. No.
6425 in relation to R.A. No. 7659. She and her co-accused were apprehended at a checkpoint,
while they were riding in a tricycle with a bag of marijuana. This occurred after the PNP had
conducted surveillance operation on suspected drug dealers in the area, and acted on a tip that
the two drug pushers, riding in a tricycle, would be making a delivery that night.
Issue: Whether or not the search and consequent arrest of the appellant was lawful in the
absence of the proper warrants.
Held: Yes. The general rule is that a search may be conducted by law enforcers only on the
strength of a search warrant validly issued by a judge as provided in Article III, Section 2 of the
1987 Constitution. However, the constitutional guarantee operates only against unreasonable
searches and seizures. There are certain familiar exceptions to the rule, one of which relates to
search of moving vehicles. Warrantless search and seizure of moving vehicles are allowed in
recognition of the impracticability of securing a warrant under said circumstances as the vehicle
can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant may be sought.
When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such would be constitutionally
permissible only if the officers made it upon probable cause, i.e., upon a belief, reasonably
arising out of circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle
contains as item, article or object which by law is subject to seizure and destruction. The
warrantless search in this case is not without a probable cause, based on the surveillance and
information gathered by the PNP. It is also clear that at the time she was apprehended, she
was committing a criminal offense, delivery or transporting prohibited drugs. Under the Rules of
Court, one of the instances a police officer is permitted to carry out a warrantless arrest is when
the person to be arrested is caught committing a crime in flagrante delicto.