FABRE vs CA

It is permissible for the plaintiff to allege in the complaint alternative causes of action and join as many as may be
liable on such causes of action so long as there is no double recovery for the same injury. Thus, carrier may be sued
on the alternative causes of action of breach of contract and quasi delict.

Rule 8, 2 provides: Alternative causes of action or defenses. A party may set forth two or more statements of a
claim or defense alternatively or hypothetically, either in one cause of action or defense or in separate causes of
action or defenses. When two or more statements are made in the alternative and one of them if made independently
would be sufficient, the pleading is not made insufficient by the insufficiency of one or more of the alternative
statements.

FACTS:
Engracio Fabre and his wife own 1982 model Mazda minibus.
Petitioner hired Porfirio Cabil Jr as driver in 1981 after trying him for two weeks
Word for the World Christian Fellowship Inc. hired the minibus to take their 33 members
of the Young Adults Ministry from Manila to La Union for P3,000.
The group was supposed to leave on Nov 4, 1984 at 5PM but since some of the
passengers were late, they left Ortigas at 8PM.
Usual route to Caba, La Union is through Carmen Pangasinan.
It was the drivers first trip outside Manila.
Bridge at Carmen was under repair so driver took the detour through the town of Ba-ay in
Lingayen.
11:30 PM
o Came upon a sharp curve on the highway
o Road was slippery because it was raining.
o Bus was running at 50 kms/hr. It skids to the left road shoulder, hit the left traffic
steel brace and sign along the road, rammed the fence on Jesus Escano and turned
over and landed on its left side.
o Amyline Antonio was heavily injured.
Antonio brought the case in RTC of Makati
o Suffering from paraplegia and permanently paralyzed from waist down
Trial Court Findings:
The Fabres & Cabil ordered to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiffs
Basis :Arts 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
Court of Appeals
o Affirmed decision of RTC with modification.

ISSUE:

1. WON petitioners were negligent. YES
2. WON petitioners were liable for the injuries suffered by private respondents YES
3. WON damages can be awarded YES
4. WON petitioners may be made to respond to Antonio jointly and severally. YES




Ruling:
I. Cabil was grossly negligent and should be held liable for the injuries suffered by
Antonio.
o It was raining, dark and the road was slippery but still drove his bus at 50 km/hr.
He was unfamiliar with the terrain.
o Normal speed was only 20km/hr in the portion.
o Cabil's negligence gave rise to the presumption that his employers (FABRES)
were themselves negligent in the selection and supervision of their employee.

II. This case involves a contract of carriage. The Fabres, did not have to be engaged in
the business of public transportation for the provisions of the Civil Code on common
carriers to apply to them. This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon
proof that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection
and supervision of their employees.

III. The award of moral damages is authorized by Art. 1764, in relation to Art. 2220.
Cabil's gross negligence amounted to bad faith. Passengers testimonies fully
establish the physical suffering and mental anguish she endured as a result of the
injuries caused by petitioners negligence. Award of exemplary damages and
attorney's fees is warranted.

IV. Yes. The court used several precedents.

Viluan v. Court of Appeals,
Liability of petitioner [bus owner] springs from contract
Respondents [owner and driver of other vehicle] arises from quasi-delict.

Gutierrez vs. Gutierrez: Injury to a passenger due to the negligence of the driver on which he
was riding and of the driver of another vehicle, the drivers as well as the owners of the two
vehicles are jointly and severally liable for damages. Some members of the Court, though,are of
the view that under the circumstances they are liable on quasi-delict .

In the case of BLTB, private respondents in this case and her co-plaintiffs did not stake out
their claim against the carrier and the driver exclusively on one theory, much less on that of
breach of contract alone. After all, it was permitted for them to allege alternative causes of
action and join as many parties as may be liable on such causes of action so long as private
respondent and her co-plaintiffs do not recover twice for the same injury. What is clear from the
cases is the intent of the plaintiff there to recover from both the carrier and the driver, thus
justifying the holding that the carrier and the driver were jointly and severally liable because
their separate and distinct acts concurred to produce the same injury.