ACCEPTED

03-14-00199-CV
2514311
THIRD COURT OF APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
9/16/2014 4:32:17 PM
J EFFREY D. KYLE
CLERK
No. 03-14-00199-CV
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
STEVEN GREGORY SLOAT, ED BRYAN, CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY
INTERNATIONAL, DAVID J. LUBOW AND MONTY DRAKE
Appellants,
v.
MONIQUE RATHBUN,
Appellee.
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
DAVID J. LUBOW
On Appeal from the 207th Judicial District Court
ofComal County, Texas
Trial Court No. C-20 13-1 082B
Hon. Dib Waldrip of the 433rd Judicial District Court, Presiding
Stephanie S. Bascon
State Bar No. 19356850
LAW O FFICE OF STEPHANIE S . BASCON,
PLLC
297 W. San Antonio Street
New Braunfels, Texas 78130
Telephone: 830-625-2940
Facsimile: 830-221 -3441
sbascon@att.net
Oral Argument Scheduled for September 24, 2014
FILED IN
3rd COURT OF APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
9/16/2014 4:32:17 PM
JEFFREY D. KYLE
Clerk
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS ........................................................................................... i
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ..... ..... .... ..... .. .... .......... ....... ................ ....... .............. ... ... ii
INTRODUCTION ............. ..................................... ................... ....... ............. ........... .. 1
STATEMENT OF FACTS .......................... ..... ....................... ............ .... ..... .. ........... 2
ARGUMENT ......................... ..... .............. .............. .................. ................................. 4
I. THE "COMMERCIAL SPEECH" AND THE "BODILY INJURY"
EXEMPTIONS TO THE TCPA DO NOT APPLY ....... .......................... ...... .4
A. The "Commercial Speech" Exemption Does Not Apply to
Plaintiffs Claims against Lubow .. ............ ........................................... .4
B. The "Bodily Injury" Exemption of Section 27.010(c) Does Not
Apply to Plaintiffs Claims against Lubow ...................... .. ................ ... 5
II. THE TCPA APPLIES TO APPELLEE' S CLAIMS ASSERTED
AGAINST LUBOW ........ ....... ..... ... .. ..... ...... ............... ..... ................ ....... ..... .... 5
III. APPELLEE CANNOT SATISFY HER PRIMA FACIE BURDEN FOR
ANY OF HER CLAIMS AGAINST LUBOW ......... .. .................................... ?
A. Plaintiffs Tortious interference Claim is Legally Deficient and
Untimely .... .............. .... .. ... .. ... ..... .... ........ ......... .................... .. .................... . ?
B. Appellee has Presented No "Clear and Specific" Evidence of any
Claim for Tortious Interference with Contract Against Lubow ................. 8
C. Appellee Fails to Identify Any Statements by Lubow that Would
Support a Claim for Public Disclosure of Private Facts ............................. 9
D. Appellee has Presented No "Clear and Specific" Evidence of an
Actionable Invasion of Privacy Claim for Intrusion Upon Seclusion ..... 10
E. Appellee's Reliance on the "Gap-Filler" Claim of Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress is Not Supported by Texas Law and
Violates the First Amendment ................ .................................... ............. 1 1
F. Appellee Presented No Evidence to Support Vicarious Liability
against Lubow for the Actions of any other Appellant .......................... 12
IV. APPELLEE CANNOT SAVE THE DISTRICT COURT'S
ERRONEOUS AWARD OF FEES ..................... .. ........ .. ............................. 12
CONCLUSION AND PRAYER ........ ........ .... ......... .. .... ......... ................................ 12
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ................................................... ................... 13
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ..... ..... .... .. .... ........ ... ..... ............ ...................... ..... .... 13
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
Cases Pages
Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity, 19 Cal. 4th 1106, 1116, 81
Cal. Rptr. 2d 471,477, 969 P.2d 564,570 (Cal. 1999) ............................ ................. 6
First Nat '! Bank of Eagle Pass v. Levine, 721 S.W.2d 287,289 (Tex. 1986) ........... 7
Ludwig v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. App. 4th 8, 16-18,43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 350, 356-
357 (Cal. App. 1995, pet. denied) .................. ...................................... .. ...... ...... ........ ?
Rehak Creative Services, Inc. v. Witt,
404 S.W.3d 716, 726 (Tex.App.-Houston [l4
1
h Dist.] 2013) ... ............................. 9
Sierra Club v. Andrews County, 418 S. W.3d 711, 715 (Tex. App.-El Paso, pet.
filed) ..... ................................................. ... ................. ...... ...... .......... ..... ...................... 9
Vaughn v. Drennon,
202 S.W.3d 308, 320 (Tex. App.- Tyler 2006, no pet.) ............................ ......... 10
Victoria Bank & Trust Co. v. Brady, 811 S.W.2d 931, 939 (Tex. 1991) ..... ............. 7
Wallace v. McCubbin, 196 Cal. App. 4th 1169, 1184, 128 Cal. Rptr. 3d 205,
216 (Cal. App. 2011, pet. denied) ............................................... .......................... 6, 7
Webb v. CBS Broadcasting, Inc. , No. 08 C 6241, 2011 WL 4062488 (N.D. Ill.
Sept. 13, 2011) ........................ .......................................................................... 10, 11
Webb v. Glenbrook Owners Ass 'n, Inc., 298 S. W.3d 374, 387 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 2009, no pet.) ........ ................................................................... .................... 11
Wehling v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 721 F.2d 506, 509 (5th Cir. 1983) ................... 10
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Smuck, 407 S.W.3d 830, 842 (Tex. App.- Houston
[14th Dist.] 2013, pet. denied) ................................................................................ 11
White v. Lieberman, 103 Cal. App. 4th 210, 221, 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d 608, 615
(Cal. App. 2002) ............... ................... .............. .................... ..................................... 7
ii
Statutes and Rules
TEX. Ctv. PRAC. &REM. CODE 27.005 .............................................................. .. .... . 6
TEX. Ctv. PRAC. & REM. CODE 27.005(b) .. .... .......................................................... 6
TEX. Ctv. PRAC. & REM. CODE 27.010(c) ................................................................ 5
TEX. R. APP. P. 9.7 ....................... ........................................ 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12
iii
INTRODUCTION
David Lubow adopts and incorporates by reference the Introduction in the
Reply Brief of the Appellant Church of Scientology International (the "Church").
TEX. R. APP. P. 9. 7.
David Lubow ("Lubow") is entitled to protection under the Texas Citizens
Participation Act ("TCPA") both in his individual capacity as a Squirrel Buster in
exercising his right to free speech and right to association and in his capacity as a
private investigator, acting in accordance with his California private investigator's
license, in assisting the Church in exercising its right to petition.
While the TCPA requires clear and specific evidence against a party moving
for dismissal (Lubow), the Appellee fails to distinguish between the actions of the
Squirrel Busters and the actions of the private investigators. The Appellee also
fails to di stinguish between the actions of the various private investigators. Each
of the individual defendant's actions is protected under the TCPA and needs to be
evaluated separately. They each took different actions at different times. Mr.
Lubow's actions, as an individual defendant in the litigation, must be evaluated
separately. He is not responsible for the actions of other defendants and Appellee
has failed to establish any vicarious liability amongst the defendants.
Lubow's activity as a Squirrel Buster took place, intermittently over the
course of five months in 2011. The Squirrel Busters completed their work in
1
September of 2011. (Appellee concedes that if that was all they had done, there
would be no cause of action). Their work as Squirrel Busters was done on public
propetty, involving public figures, for a finite period of time, which clearly invokes
the right of free speech and right of association.
Lubow's activities as a private investigator are limited to an interview with
one individual, Tanya Torrez, and limited contact with another, Melissa Montana,
both actions which, according to Appellee's evidence, took place in September
2010 (Torrez) and spring of 2011 (Montana). 42CR4883; 28CR3364-66. These
contacts were related to a public figure, Mr. Rathbun.
Lubow's actions were not commercial speech and are not exempted from the
TCPA by the bodily injury exemption. There is no evidence Mr. Lubow was
involved with surveillance across the street from Appellee's office/home; no
evidence that he was involved in surveillance extending over various years; and no
evidence Lubow conducted any work in Comal County.
Lubow is entitled to the protections of the TCP A and, as such, is entitled to
dismissal of Appellee's claims against him.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellee does not dispute the following facts: That Mr. Lubow is a private
investigator licensed in the state of California. 38CR4459 ~ 3 Lubow was
retained by Los Angeles attorney, Elliot Abelson, on behalf of his client, the
2
Church of Scientology International (the "Church"), to perform investigative
actions in support of litigation, prospective litigation and threatened litigation in
which the Church was or could be involved. 38CR4460 ~ 4 . He was also retained
to investigate potential violations of intellectual property rights licensed to the
Church relating to the Scientology religion. /d.
Appellee does not dispute that the only evidence submitted by her to the trial
court of any investigation by Mr. Lubow was his alleged conversations with former
co-workers of Monique Rathbun, Tanya Torrez and Melissa Montana. 28CR3364-
66; 42CR4883.
There is still no evidence presented that Mr. Lubow, or any investigator
working for him or within his knowledge, ever photographed inside the Rathbun's
place of business/residence, used any form of electronic surveillance with respect
to the interior of his business/residence, used any form of microphone to overhear
private conversations inside or on the porch of their place of business/residence,
interfered with or wiretapped the Rathbuns' telephone or internet service,
physically blocked or interfered with their freedom of movement or physically
touched or threatened the Rathbuns, 38CR4461 ~ 7 or that any surveillance was
conducted by photographing into their windows or doors, or that any electronic
devices were used to track Marty Rathbun or Plaintiff, /d. , or that Mr. Lubow or
anyone working under his direction or in coordination with him, ever undertook
3
any unlawful actions, actions exceeding his California private investigator license,
or any action which otherwise violated the privacy of the Rathbuns. 38CR4461

In addition, there is no evidence presented to the trial court or this court that
Mr. Lubow or anyone working with or for him ever sent anything to Mrs. Rathbun
or to her place of employment, 28CR3388
Plaintiff does not dispute that Mr. Lubow was a Scientologist and that
Rathbun engaged in delivering Scientology services in his office/home in a manner
inconsistent with the Church's teachings and in attempts to attack and impugn the
Church, 38CR4462-63 or that Mr. Lubow was a filmmaker who had
written and produced a feature-length documentary titled Prescription Suicide?
38CR4459 ,-r3.
ARGUMENT
I. The "Commercial Speech" and the "Bodily Injury" Exemptions to the
TCPA Do Not Apply.
A. The "Commercial Speech" Exemption Does Not Apply to
Plaintiff's Claims against Lubow.
Lubow adopts and incorporates the arguments of Section LA of the
Church' s Reply Brief . TEX. R. APP. P. 9.7.
Lubow is entitled to protection under the TCPA in his individual capacity
and as a Squirrel Buster in exercising his right to free speech and right of
4
association and in his capacity as a private investigator, acting in accordance with
his California private investigator's license, in assisting the Church in exercising
its right to petition. Even as a Squirrel Buster, Mr. Lubow exercised his individual
right to freedom of speech and his right of association in gathering with other
Church members to expose the heretical nature of Mr. Rathbun' s supposedly
religious activities. Neither Mr. Lubow, nor the Squirrel Busters were in the
business of the sale of goods or services but rather in the exposure of someone they
bel ieved was challenging and undermining the integrity of their religion and they
were compelled to speak out against it. 38CR4463-64.
As a private investigator, Mr. Lubow' s speech of asking questions of former
co-workers was in support of the Church's right to petition. This speech was not
for the sale of goods or services but in fmding out information regarding a public
figure, Mr. Rathbun. 38CR4462.
The commercial exemption does not apply to Mr. Lubow.
B. The "Bodily Injury" Exemption of Section 27.010(c) Does Not
Apply to Plaintifrs Claims against Lubow.
Lubow adopts and incorporates the argument of Section LB. of the
Church' s Reply Brief, TEX. R. APP. P. 9.7.
II. The TCPA Applies to Appellee's Claims Asserted against Lubow.
Lubow adopts and incorporates by reference the arguments in Section II A,
B, C and D of the Church's Reply Brief. TEX. R. APP. P. 9. 7. In his capacity as a
5
private investigator, Lubow adopts and incorporates by reference the arguments in
Section II of Monty Drake' s Reply Brief. TEX. R. APP. P. 9.7.
Lubow is entitled to the protections of the TCPA when plaintiffs claims are
"based on, related to, or in response to" the exercise of his rights of free speech,
association, or petition. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE 27.005
Lubow, individually and as a Squirrel Buster, is entitled to the protections of
the TCPA in his exercise of his own right, as a member of the Church of
Scientology, exercising his right of free speech and right of association. Jd. at
27.005(b) (requiring dismissal of a legal action against the moving party, if the
moving party, shows the action is based on the party's exercise of the rights of free
speech, petition or of association, unless plaintiff can show by clear and specific
evidence of each element of the cause of action).
Lubow, as a private investigator who interviewed a former co-worker of Ms.
Rathbun, is entitled to the protections of his principal, the Church of Scientology,
in its exercise of its right to petition. There is no dispute that Mr. Lubow acted in
the scope of his California license. 37CR4413. As an agent of the Church, he is
protected under the statute and entitled to dismissal as an agent acting in a manner
that protects his principal's First Amendment rights. See Briggs v. Eden Council
for Hope & Opportunity, 19 Cal. 4th 1106, 1116, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 471, 477, 969
P.2d 564, 570 (Cal. 1999), Wallace v. McCubbin, 196 Cal. App. 4th 1169, 1184,
6
128 Cal. Rptr. 3d 205, 216 (Cal. App. 2011, pet. denied), Ludwig v. Superior
Court, 37 Cal. App. 4th 8, 16-18, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 350, 356-357 (Cal. App. 1995,
pet. denied), and White v. Lieberman, 103 Cal. App. 4th 210, 221, 126 Cal. Rptr.
2d 608, 615 (Cal. App. 2002).
III. Appellee Cannot Satisfy Her Prima Facie Burden for Any of Her
Claims Against Lubow.
Lubow adopts and incorporates by reference the arguments in Section III of
the Church's Reply Brief. TEX. R. APP. P. 9.7.
In her brief, Appellee claims that she can show this court clear and specific
evidence in support of her causes of action (p. 50) and then she utterly fails to do
so. She fails to mention Mr. Lubow in her analysis of 3 of the 4 causes of action.
In that single specific reference, her evidence is not clear and specific and also
does not support the particular cause of action.
A. Appellee's Tortious Interference Claim is Legally Deficient and
Untimely.
Lubow adopts and incorporates by reference the arguments in Section III.C.
of the Church's Reply Brief. Tex. R. App. P. 9.7.
Plaintiffs claim for tortious interference is barred by the two-year statute of
limitations for that cause of action. Victoria Bank & Trust Co. v. Brady, 81 1
S.W.2d 931 , 939 (Tex. 1991) (requiring intentional act that was proximate cause of
breach of contract); First Nat'! Bank of Eagle Pass v. Levine, 721 S.W.2d 287,289
7
(Tex. 1986) (two-year Hmitations period). Plaintiff's present case was filed in
August of 2013. ICR28. Her own evidence shows she voluntarily resigned her
position on April 1, 2011, leaving her employment on April 30, 2011. 23CR2776;
11 CR1382; 27CR3229. In order to fall within the statute of limitations, she had to
have filed suit by April of 2013, which she failed to do. Instead, she filed her suit
four months after the statute of limitations for tortious interference with contract.
As such, Plaintiff' s tortious interference with contract claim should be dismissed.
B. Appellee has Presented No Clear and Specific Evidence of a Claim
for Tortious Interference with Contract against Lubow.
Plaintiff's claim against Mr. Lubow further fails because she presented no
evidence that he spoke with anyone at her place of business or prior to her
resigning (on April 1, 2011) and leaving her j ob (on April 30, 2011). Instead, she
alleges Mr. Lubow spoke with Tanya Torrez, however, Ms. Torrez was a co-
worker of Plaintiff in 2006-7 at a different job than the one Ms. Rathbun resigned
from in April of 2011. 42CR 4883. (Ms. Torrez worked with Ms. Rathbun at the
Coastal Bend Center for Independent Living; while Ms. Rathbun resigned from
Superior Health Plan. See 28CR3364). Ms. Montana, a human resources employee
at Superior, admits that Mr. Lubow came into their offices, several weeks after Ms.
Rathbun had resigned from her job. 28CR3364.
1
1
Ms. Montana only identifies Mr. Lubow in paragraph 5 as the person who came into the
office a week after receiving phone calls from a man she could not identify; a phone call that
occurred after Ms. Rathbun had resigned from her job. The court can only conclude that Mr.
8
Her other complaints about harassment at work are not clear or specific but
rather general complaints that "they" sent things or "Appellants" harassed her at
work. See Appellee' s Brief p. 51-56. None of this is clear and specific evidence
that Mr. Lubow committed tortious interference with contract and such claims
should be dismissed.
C. Appellee Fails to Identify Any Statements by Lubow that Would
Support a Claim for Public Disclosure of Private Facts.
Lubow adopts and incorporates by reference the arguments in Section liLA.
of the Church' s Reply Brief. T EX. R. APP. P. 9.7. Plaintiffs general assertions that
"Lubow and other agents of [the Church]" allegedly told her friends and family
"false information about her husband" and "private information about her
husband' s family" is not clear and specific evidence against Mr. Lubow.
Appellee' s Br. p. 55. Ms. Rathbun generally alleges that Mr. Lubow, along with
others, communicated with friends and family (whom Appellee does not identify)
spreading false information about her husband. ld. This is not clear and specific
evidence of public disclosure of private facts by Mr. Lubow. In addition, Appellee
concedes that the discussion with family, friends and co-workers were not intended
Lubow' s contact with Ms. Montana occurred after Ms. Rathbun had resigned from Superi or.
Any conclusion to the contrary or any conclusion that Mr. Lubow did anything other than
what is referenced in paragraph 5 of Ms. Montana's declaration would require inferences that
are not permissible under the statute, which Appellee concedes is improper. Appellee brief
p. 50, citing Sierra Club v. Andrews County, 418 S.W.3d 711 , 715 (Tex. App.- EI Paso, pet.
filed); see also Rehak Creative Services, Inc. v. Witt, 404 S.W.3d 716, 726 (Tex.App.-
Houston (14th Dist.) 2013)
9
for anyone other than the person contacted and was not placed in the public
environment.
2
Appellee Brief, p. 41. Appellee's claim for invasion of privacy for
public disclosure of private facts fails and should be dismissed.
D. Appellee Has Presented No "Clear and Specific" Evidence of an
Actionable Invasion of Privacy Claim for Intrusion Upon
Seclusion.
Lubow adopts and incorporates by reference the arguments in Section III.B.
of the Church's Reply Brief. Tex. R. App. P. 9.7.
There is no "clear and specific" evidence that Mr. Lubow intruded into
Appellee's seclusion. It is undisputed that Mr. Lubow's activities took place
outside and even away from Appellee's office/home. 38CR4461. There is no
evidence let alone clear or specific evidence, that Mr. Lubow 1) eavesdropped on
Plaintiff's conversation with the aid of wiretaps, microphones, or spying, 2) used
any electronic surveillance or any form of a microphone to overhear private
conversations, or 3) obtained any view of the Plaintiffs homes that could not be
seen from the public street. Vaughn v. Drennon, 202 S.W.3d 308, 320 (Tex.
App.-Tyler 2006, no pet.); see also Wehling v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 721 F.2d
506, 509 (5th Cir. 1983) ("broadcast provided the public with nothing more than
could have been seen from a public street"); Webb v. CBS Broadcasting, Inc., No.
2
This Court has discretion to accept the statements in Appellee's Brief as judicial admissions.
fig_, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Smuck, 407 S.W.Jd 830, 842 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
2013, pet. denied).
10
08 C 6241, 2011 WL 4062488 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 13, 2011) (dismissing claim for
intrusion where defendants used zoom lens to film plaintiff from across the street,
on grounds that plaintiffs activities were in plain view and she made no attempt to
keep them private); Webb v. Glenbrook Owners Ass 'n, Inc. , 298 S.W.3d 374, 387
(Tex. App.- Dallas 2009, no pet.) (holding that property owner had "lawful right"
to install surveillance cameras looking out from his property to adjoining property,
and that such surveillance did not constitute intrusion on privacy of adjoining
owner).
Appellee cannot support her claim for intrusion upon seclusion against Mr.
Lubow.
E. Appellee's Reliance on the "Gap Filler" Claim for Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress Finds No Support in Texas Law
and Violates the First Amendment.
Lubow adopts and incorporates the argument in Section III.D of the
Church' s Reply Brief. TEX. R. APP. P. 9.7.
AlJ of Plaintiffs claims rely on the same set of facts which means she
cannot rely on the gap-filler cause of action of Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Distress ("liED"). Even if she could, she fails to establish by clear and specific
evidence of conduct by Mr. Lubow that rises to the level of "extreme and
outrageous" conduct. Instead, she makes broad sweeping statements of alleged
misbehavior that she attributes to no one specifically. Appellee's Br. p. 52. She
11
complains about "years-long" efforts to harass, but the only evidence she has
provided regarding Lubow is conduct as a Squirrel Buster from April to September
of 2011, 35CR4176-78, and an interview with a former co-worker in late 2010,
42CR4883, and a brief discussion with a co-worker in spring of 2011. 28CR3364.
Again, this lacks clarity and specificity as it relates to claims against Mr. Lubow,
and is not extreme and outrageous so as to rise to the level of liED and, as such,
Appellee' s liED claims against Mr. Lubow fail.
F. Appellee Presented No Evidence to Support Vicarious Liability
against Lubow for the Actions of any other Defendant.
Lubow adopts and incorporates by reference the arguments in Section III.A
of the Reply Brief of Appellant Monty Drake. T EX. R. APP. P. 9.7.
IV. Appellee Cannot Save the Trial Court's Erroneous Fees Award.
Lubow adopts and incorporates the argument in Section IV. of the Church' s
Reply Brief. TEX. R. APP. P. 9.7.
CONCLUSION AND PRAYER
Appellant David J. Lubow prays that this Court reverse the trial court's order
which denies his Motion to Dismiss and awards fees and costs against him, grant
his Motion to Dismiss and render judgment for him, dismissing all of Plaintiffs
claims with prejudice and remanding for further proceedings concerning his claim
for attorneys' fees and costs under the TCPA. Mr. Lubow prays for such other and
further relief to which he may be entitled.
12
Respectfully submitted:
By: /s/ Stephanie S. Bascon
Stephanie S. Bascon
SBN 19356850
Law Office of Stephanie S. Bascon PLLC
297 W. San Antonio St.
New Braunfels, Texas 78130
(830) 625-2940
(830) 221-3441 facsimile
sbascon@att.net
A ITORNEY FOR APPELLANT
DAVIDJ.LUBOW
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
Pursuant to TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(i)(3), the undersigned hereby certifies that
this Brief of Appellants complies with the applicable word count limitation
because it contains 2897 words, excluding the parts exempted by TEX. R. APP. P.
9 .4(i)( 1 ). In making this certification, the undersigned has relied on the word-count
function in Microsoft Word 2007, which was used to prepare the Brief of
Appellants.
/s/ Stephanie S. Bascon
Stephanie S. Bascon
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that on the 16th day of September, 2014, the
foregoing Brief for Appellant David J. Lubow was served on the following
attorneys in accordance with the requirements of the Texas Rules of Appellate
Procedure via electronic filing or emaiL
Ray B. Jeffrey
A. Dannette Mitchell
JEFFREY & MITCHELL, P. C.
2631 Bulverde Road, Suite 105
Bulverde, TX 78163
Marc F. Wiegand
THE WIEGAND LAW FIRM, P.C.
434 N. Loop 1604 West, Suite 2201
San Antonio, TX 78232
13
Elliott S. Cappuccio
PULMAN, CAPPUCCIO PULLEN
& BENSON, LLP
2161 N.W. Military Hwy., #400
San Antonio, TX 78213
J. Iris Gibson
HAYNES & BOONE LLP
600 Congress Ave., Suite 1300
Austin, TX 78701
0. Paul Dunagan
SARLES & OUIMET
370 Founders Square
900 Jackson Street
Dallas, TX 75202
Ricardo Cedillo/ Isaac Huron
Davis Cedillo & Mendoza
McCombs Plaza, Ste. 500
755 E. Mulberry Ave.
San Antonio, TX 78212
George H. Spencer
Clemens & Spencer
112 E. Pecan St., Ste. 1300
San Antonio, TX 78205
Lamont A. Jefferson
HAYNES & BOONE LLP
112 E. Pecan Street, Suite 1200
San Antonio, TX 78205-1540
Jonathan H. Hull
REAGAN BURRUS
401 Main Plaza, Suite 200
New Braunfels, TX 78130
Bert H. Deixler
KENDALL BRILL KLI EGER
10100 Santa Monica Blvd., Suite 1725
Los Angeles, CA 90067
Wallace B. Jefferson
Rachel Ekery
ALEXANDER DUBOSE JEFFERSON
& TOWNSEND, LLP
515 Congress Avenue, Suite 2350
Austin, TX 78701
Thomas S. Leatherbury
Marc A. Fuller
VINSON & ELKINS LLP
Trammell Crow Center
2001 Ross Avenue, Suite 3700
Dallas, Texas 75201
Telephone: 214.220.7792
Facsimile: 214.999.7792
Eric M. Lieberman
RABINOWITZ, BOUDIN, STANDARD,
KRINSKY & LIEBERMAN PC
45 Broadway, Suite 1700
New York, New York 10006
Telephone: 212.254.1111
Facsimile: 212.674.4614
/s/ Stephanie S. Bascon
Stephanie S. Bascon
14