Islamists Are Dreaming of a Caliphate

State? Do They Know What They're

Talking About?
by Timothy R. Furnish

Timothy R. Furnish holds a PhD in Islamic, African and World history and works as an
author, analyst and consultant to the US military. His website is www.mahdiwatch.org and
he is on Twitter as @occidentaljihad. This article was first published on MahdiWatch.org.
With the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham annexing large sections of Iraq and Syria, and
the subsequent proclamation of a new caliphate under Ibrahim al-Badri, or Abu Bakr al-
Baghdadiruling as Caliph Ibrahimthe current clash of civilizations (between Islam
and every other one, particularly the Christian West) enters a new and potentially more
ominous phase. But while a terrorist-created caliphate is a net negative for the world
(Muslims included), the caliphate per se may yet result in some positives for the modern
worldas per the title of my not-yet-completed book, The Caliphate: Threat or
Opportunity?



My once and future book....

Some history of this primary Islamic political institution is in order, considering how
many misapprehensions exist on the topic. Khalifah means successor to Muhammad
as leader of the Muslim community/state, in both a political and religious senseas
pointed out by Patricia Crone and Martin Hinds, in Gods Caliph: Religious Authority in the
First Centuries of Islam (Cambridge, 1984). In fact, according to Crone and Hinds, the
office of the caliph even had eschatological overtones insofar as the occupant thereof
was rightly-guided by Allah in the same way (though perhaps not as intensely) as the
End Times Mahdi would be. Shi`is of various stripes eventually eschewed the caliphate
as a usurping Sunni office, opting instead for the Imamate dependent upon
Muhammads male descendants via Ali, Hasan or Husayn, and their offspringwhether
the legitimate line ran through the 5th Imam (Zaydis), the 7th (Ismailis) or the 12th
(Twelvers). Only one Shi`i groupthe Ismaili Sevener Fatimids, who ruled Egypt in the
medieval periodreally used the term caliph for its leaders, perhaps to curry
legitimacy with the bulk of Egypts population, which always remained staunchly Sunni.


The Fatimid Caliphate-Imamate, in dark green, 970-1171 AD.

The other major caliphates in history were all unambiguously Sunni; those of:
the Rashidun (rightly-guided), the first four men to succeed Muhammad; the
Umayyads of Damascus (661-750 AD); the Abbasids of BaghdadIslams Golden
Agefrom 750-1258 AD; and the Ottomans, who ruled for some six centuries until
right after World War I. One other caliphate was something of an outlier: that of the
North African al-Muwahhidun, or Almohads, which was founded as an overtly Mahdist
state by Ibn Tumart in the 12th century AD but which, after his death, transformed into a
(mere) caliphate.


Muhammad (with lens flare) & the four "Rashidun" caliphs: Abu Bakr, Umar, Uthman & Ali. No idea
which is which.

Other lesser, regional caliphal states have been proclaimed in the past, such as Usman
don Fodios Sokoto Caliphate of what is now northern Nigeria, and several short-lived
ones in the Iberian Peninsula. But over the last several centuries, the most powerful and
important caliphate, by far, was that of the Ottomans, adduced by Ablhamid II (Abd al-
Hamid II) in the late 19th/early 20th century as a rallying point for Pan-Islamic
unity. With the Ottoman defeat in World War I and the onset of the Turkish Republic,
the new secular rulers of Turkey first dissolved the political power of the House of
Osmanthe sultanatebut allowed it to retain the caliphate as a spiritual authority for
Muslims. But in 1924 even this was eradicated, and the last caliphAbdlmecid (Abd al-
Majid)was exiled to Paris.

The Royal Seal of the House of Osman, c. 1882. It's festooned with more weapons, bladed and
gunpowder, than a pick-up truck in Texas.

Others tried to claim the caliphate, or considered doing do: notably King Husayn of the
Hijaz in Arabia, who was ultimately defeated by the Sa`udis; and King Fuad of
Egypt. Islamic conferences on the caliphate met in Mecca in 1926 and Jerusalem in 1931,
but could not agree on the structure and function of the office, much less on someone
to occupy it. About the same time Rashid Rida, a leading Syrian-Egyptian Islamic
modernist, advocated a caliph as a preeminent mujtahid, or exerciser
of ijtihad (updater of Islamic law), while both of the Muslim Brotherhoods major
thinkers--Hasan al-Banna, its founder, and later Sayyid Qutb, its foremost theorist
endorsed the caliphate. Outside the Arab world, the Indo-Pakistani thinker Abu A`la
Mawdudi directly pushed for the caliphates re-establishment, stretching from Morocco
to Indonesia.

However, the efforts of the Muslim Brotherhood and Mawdudi notwithstanding, from
the 1950s until recently, the Pan-Islamic idea of the caliphate largely took a back seat to
either enthnolinguistic-based unity schemes (Pan-Arabism, Pan-Turkism) or to nation-
state sovereignty. But in recent decades (certainly since 1979), the failure of such
agendas has caused many of the worlds 1.6 billion Muslims to take another look at
Islamic history as a unifying force for the ummahwhich, in Sunni contexts, means
chiefly the caliphate. Pro-caliphal propaganda has been sowed around the world, first
and foremost, since 1952 by Hizb al-Tahrir, which openly promoted the resurrection of
the caliphate. (I have attended two of this organizations yearly meetings in the US, in
2009 and 2012, and written on the former in the Washington Times and on the latter
at my website.) Zeal for the caliphate particularly consumes many in Pakistan, where
over a dozen parties espouse it (as per Vernie Liebl, The Caliphate, Middle Eastern
Studies, Vol. 45, No. 3, May 2009, pp. 373-391). So ISISs new caliphate did not spring ex
nihilo from al-Baghdadis fevered brow; rather, the groundwork for bringing back such
has been being laid almost since the last Ottoman ruler was deposed. Many Muslims
probably a minority, but still tens if not hundreds of millionsare willing to consider a
renewed caliphate as a unifier and a point of pride for their faith, the worlds second-
largest. But most of those probably would not have made the leader of ISIS their first
choice.


Home page of the "Party of Liberation's" website. HT has been the John the Baptist to Caliph Ibrahim's
messianic success.

How does Caliph Ibrahim stack up against historical Islamic standards? According to
Ibn Khaldun, the great medieval Muslim sociologist and historian, the caliphs
prerequisites are: 1) knowledge of Islamic law; 2) honesty and virtue; 3) ability to lead
and wage jihad (yes, holy war); 4) physical health and lack of bodily defects; 5) Qurayshi
origin (descent from Muhammad); and of course 7) maleness (see The Muqaddimah,
Princeton University, 1981, pp. 158-60). But as Bernard Lewis points out (The Political
Language of Islam, University of Chicago, 1988, p. 99 and passim), as Islamic history wore
on legitimacyof qualificationswas progressively reduced to the point where, in
effect, only two conditions remainedpower and Islam. As long as the ruler possessed
the necessary armed strength to seize and hold power, and as long as he was a Muslim,
however minimal and however nominal, that sufficed. According to Liebl (pp. 387ff),
that medieval/early modern concept of the caliphate was echoed in, and given the stamp
of approval by, the 1926 Cairo conference, which mandated only that the caliph be a
Muslim and a free sovereign capable of defending Islamof waging jihad, in other
words. (It was even stated that the caliph could accede to power via conquest.)

Caliph Ibrahim fits a number of Ibn Khalduns requirements: PhD in Islamic law,
demonstrated aptitude for jihad, health, and XY chromosomes. His followers probably
credit him with probity, as well. He lacks only Muhammadan descent (although dont be
surprised if a fatwa to that effect from a caliphal-friendly `alim shows up in short
order). And he certainly meets the two bare bones requirements as laid out by the Cairo
Conference. Just as Usama bin Ladin, a renegade non-cleric, could issue a fatwa of
jihad against Jews and Crusaders and have it heeded by many, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, a
renegade leader, can proclaim a caliphate with himself in command. In fact, the latter
probably has more legitimacy than UBL, since he actually rules substantial territory, is far
more formally knowledgable about Islam, and has been in the front ranks fighting
against the avowed enemies of Islam (rather than having spent the most recent years
plotting from a cave or safe house). Nothing succeeds like success, especially when it
comes to the caliphate.

A decade ago the US National Intelligence Council tried to peer into the palantir
and envision geopolitics in 2020. Part of that included the fictional scenario of a new
caliphate. The two most important lessons learned from this exercise include the
following: 1) a Caliphate would not have to be entirely successfulto present a serious
challenge to the international order; and 2) the proclamation of a caliphate would not
lessen the likelihood of terrorism and, in fomenting more conflict, could fuel a new
generation of terrorists. As the first of these contentions is already being borne out
with the erasure of the Iraqi-Syrian border, Jordans possibly nextand the second
almost sure to follow, concern over the new caliphate is more justified than dismissive
sang-froid.



Caliph Ibrahim & former Ottoman Caliph Mehmet V. Both proclaimed jihad; one is just a snazzier dresser
with more bling.
But while the self-styled caliphal Islamic State is quite problematic, its perhaps not
the geopolitical disaster that some would have it. First, al-Badris caliphate may yet be
rejected by the non-Arab-jihadist Muslim population, on the grounds of his lacking
Qurayshi bona fides and/or his deficiency of ties to the last Ottoman
caliph. Second, more reputable organizations like the Organization of Islamic
Cooperation or al-Azhar University/MosqueSunni Islams highest authority (founded,
ironically, by the aforementioned Shi`i Fatimids)will almost inevitably condemn and
illegitimize the Islamic State [IS]. Third, claimants with far more plausible claims to the
caliphate--such as descendants of the Ottoman royal line, King Abd Allah II of Jordan or,
perhaps most credibly, the family of Barkat Ali Khan Mukarram Jah Asaf Jah VIII, with
ties to the Ottoman and Mughal rulers (see Liebl, pp. 384ff.)might dispute the
pretensions of Caliph Ibrahim. So too might the Saudis, who have never asserted
such but whose rulership of Mecca and Medina makes their claim more religiously, if less
militantly, convincing.

Some argue that the new caliphates brutal practices of beheading and crucifixion will
inevitably make it unpopular and lead to its demise. Perhaps. But theres a problem
with that thesis: both beheading and crucifixion are enjoined in the Quran for,
respectively, battlefield opponents and those who war against Allah (and
Muhammad) and/or cause immorality. (Here is my analysis of Islamic decapitation; an
excellent break-down of the Quranic passage backstopping crucifixion can be found
here.) IS[IS] may be violent, but its not thereby unIslamic; in fact, the caliphate can
claim, quite plausibly, to be hewing closer to the Quran than the Sunni leaders in
Amman or Riyadhnever mind the murtaddun, apostates, ruling in Damascus and
Baghdadas it hews through infidel necks.

As for the alleged threat IS[IS] poses to the West in general and the US in particular: in
the near term, such is doubtfulhyperbolic claims about conquering
Rome notwithstandingbut on a long(er) time frame, Caliph Ibrahim, if he and his
devotees stay in power, is indeed a clear and present danger to our allies and interests in
the Middle East proper. Not just Jordan and northern Saudi Arabia are in the caliphs
crosshairs; much more ominously, IS[IS] almost certainly plans on attacking Israel in
order to liberate al-Quds, Jerusalem. This is all the more true to the extent that the
new caliphate is motivated by eschatological fervor (as per my previous post). Al-
Badris hubris is so great that he may even begin to think of himself in Mahdist termsif
his followers are not already doing so.

How on earth is any of this positive? A number of ways come to mind. First, a caliph that
enjoins beheadings and crucifixions and simultaneously adduces his strict adherence to
the Quran and the example of Muhammad might, just might, cause some Muslims to
start questioning slavish adherence to same. Second, this caliphate is inexorably
exposing the fact that Iraq and Syria (and likely Jordan) possess only the thinnest gauze
of legitimacy, and that the ethnic and sectarian realities on the ground would likely be
better served by a reversion to the Ottoman realities; certainly the Kurds would benefit
thereby. Third, a caliph and state dedicated to jihad against not just non-Muslims, but
Shi`is, would (further) draw Jordan, Sa`udi Arabia and Egyptand likely even Turkey
into closer cooperation with the US and Israel. Relatedly, perhaps even the worlds
foremost state sponsor of terrorthe Islamic Republic of Iranmight realize that the
Dajjal in their midst is worse than the Great Satan over the horizon. Fourth, with a
Quranic literalist caliphate subjugating tens of thousands of Christians to dhimmi status,
and raping and killing those who object, perhaps at long last the majority-Christian
countries of the worldled by the largest one, the USwill stand up for their co-
religionists in the Middle East.


The Sack of Rome by Muslim Arabs (846 AD) as depicted on a $6 US of Islam bill. Sheer genius
from moneyartstore.com

And who knows? If the US, or at least this administration, is too craven to protect
Christians from such a horrific caliphate, then an El Cid may emerge from a more worthy
venue--one that is not ashamed to stand up for his, and its, civilizational, and yes,
religious, heritage.