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Addison vs Felix
FACTS: The defendants-appellees spouses Maciana Felix and Balbino Tioco purchased from plaintiff-
appellant A.A. Addison four parcels of land to which Felix paid, at the time of the execution of the deed,
the sum of P3,000 on account of the purchase price. She likewise bound herself to the remainder in
installments, the first of P,2000 on July 15, 1914, the second of P5,000 thirty days after the issuance to
her of a certificate of title under the Land Registration Act, and further, within ten years from the date of
such title, P10 for each cocoanut tree in bearing and P5 for each such tree not in bearing that might be
growing on said parcels of land on the date of the issuance of title to her, with the condition that the
total price should not exceed P85,000. It was further stipulated that Felix was to deliver to the Addison
25% of the value of the products that she might obtain from the four parcels "from the moment she
takes possession of them until the Torrens certificate of title be issued in her favor," and that within 1
year from the date of the certificate of title in her favor, Marciana Felix may rescind the contract of
purchase and sale. In January 1915, Addison , filed suit in the CFI of Manila to compel Felix to pay the
first installment of P2,000, demandable, in accordance with the terms of the contract of sale. The
defendants Felix and her husband Tioco contended that Addison had absolutely failed to deliver the
lands that were the subject matter of the sale, notwithstanding the demands they made upon him for
this purpose. The evidence adduced shows Addison was able to designate only two of the four parcels,
and more than two-thirds of these two were found to be in the possession of one Juan Villafuerte, who
claimed to be the owner of the parts he so occupied. The trial court held the contract of sale to be
rescinded and ordered Addison to return to Felix the P3,000 paid on account of the price, together with
interest thereon at the rate of 10% per annum.
ISSUE: Was there a delivery made and, therefore, a transfer of ownership of the thing sold?
HELD: The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court, with modification that the interest
thereon will be at the rate of 6% (instead of 10%) per annum from the date of the filing of the complaint
until payment. The thing is considered to be delivered when it is placed "in the hands and possession of
the vendee." It is true that the same article declares that the execution of a public instrument is
equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the object of the contract, but, in order that this symbolic
delivery may produce the effect of tradition, it is necessary that the vendor shall have had such control
over the thing sold that, at the moment of the sale, its material delivery could have been made.
Symbolic delivery through the execution of a public instrument is sufficient when there is no
impediment whatever to prevent the thing sold passing into the tenancy of the purchaser by the sole
will of the vendor. But if, notwithstanding the execution of the instrument, the purchaser cannot have
the enjoyment and material tenancy of the thing and make use of it himself or through another in his
name, because such are opposed by a third persons will, then the delivery has not been effected. In the
case at bar, therefore, it is evident, that the mere execution of the instrument was not a fulfillment of
the vendor's obligation to deliver the thing sold, and that from such non-fulfillment arises the
purchaser's right to demand, as she has demanded, the rescission of the sale and the return of the price.

63. Danguilan vs. IAC
FACTS: A residential and farm lot in Cagayan owned by Dominggo Melad were being claimed by
petitioner Felix Danguilan and respondent Apolonia Melad.
Apolonia contends that she acquired the property when Dominggo Melad sold it to her when she was
just three years old in which her mother paid the consideration. She contends that she just moved out
of the farm only when in 1946 Felix Danguilan approached her and asked permission to cultivate the
land and to stay therein. Dangguilan presented for his part 2 documents to prove his claim that the
properties were given to him by Dominggo Melad through an onerous donation. The onerous part of the
donation includes the taking care of the farm and the arrangement of the burial of Dominggo.
HELD: The ruling should be in favor of Danguilan. The contention of Apolonia that the deed of donation
is void because it was not made through a public document is of no merit. The deed was an onerous one
and hence, it was not covered by the rule in Article 749 requiring donations of real properties to be
effected through a public instrument. An onerous donation is effective and valid if it embraces the
conditions that the law requires. Since it has been proven that Danguilan did the conditions in the
onerous donation particularly the arrangement of Dominggos burial, the deed is deemed valid.
On the other hand, the deed of sale made in favor of Apolonia is suspicious. One may well wonder why
the transfer was not made to the mother herself, who was after all the one paying for the lands. The
averment was also made that the contract was simulated and prepared after Domingo Melad's death in
1945. Even assuming the validity of the deed of sale, the record shows that the private respondent did
not take possession of the disputed properties and indeed waited until 1962 to file this action for
recovery of the lands from the petitioner. If she did have possession, she transferred the same to the
petitioner in 1946, by her own sworn admission, and moved out to another lot belonging to her step-
brother. In short, she failed to show that she consummated the contract of sale by actual delivery of the
properties to her and her actual possession thereof in concept of purchaser-owner. Ownership does not
pass by mere stipulation but only by delivery.

64. Pasagui vs. Villablanco
FACTS: Plaintiffs Calixto Pasagui and Fausta Mosar bought a property in Leyte from Estaquia and Catalina
Bocar for P2,800. Before they could take possession of the property, defendant spouses Ester T.
Villablanca and Zosimo Villablanca took possession of it and harvested from the coconut plantation
thereon. Plaintiffs demanded the return of the property but the defendants refused. Plaintiffs filed a
case in the CFI but respondents contend that the case is a forcible entry and as such, CFI has no
ISSUE: WON the case is of forcible entry.
HELD: In order that an action may be considered as one for forcible entry, it is not only necessary that
the plaintiff should allege his prior physical possession of the property but also that he was deprived of
his possession by any of the means provided in section 1, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court. It is true
that the execution of the deed of absolute sale in a public instrument is equivalent to delivery of the
land subject of the sale. This presumptive delivery only holds true when there is no impediment that
may prevent the passing of the property from the hands of the vendor into those of the vendee. It can
be negated by the reality that the vendees actually failed to obtain material possession of the land
subject of the sale.
65. Dy Jr. vs. CA
FACTS: Wilfredo Dy purchased a truck and a farm tractor through LIBRA which was also mortgaged with
the latter, as a security to the loan. Petitioner, expresses his desire to purchased his brothers tractor in
a letter to LIBRA which also includes his intention to shoulder its mortgaged. LIBRA approved the
request. At the time that Wilfredo Dy executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of petitioner, the tractor
and truck were in the possession of LIBRA for his failure to pay the amortization. When petitioner finally
fulfilled its obligation to pay the tractor, LIBRA would only release the same only if he would also pay for
the truck. In order to fulfill LIBRAs condition, petitioner convinced his sister to pay for the remaining
truck, to which she released a check amounting to P22,000. LIBRA however, insisted that the check must
be first cleared before it delivers the truck and tractor.
Meanwhile, another case penned Gelac Trading Inc vs. Wilfredo Dy was pending in Cebu as a case to
recover for a sum of money (P12,269.80). By a writ of execution the court in Cebu ordered to seize and
levy the tractor which was in the premise of LIBRA, it was sold in a public auction to which it was
purchased by GELAC. The latter then sold the tractor to Antonio Gonzales.
RTC rendered in favor of petitioner.
CA dismissed the case, alleging that it still belongs to Wilfredo Dy.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a consummated sale between Petitioner and LIBRA?
HELD: No. The payment of the check was actually intended to extinguish the mortgage obligation so that
the tractor could be released to the petitioner. It was never intended nor could it be considered as
payment of the purchase price because the relationship between Libra and the petitioner is not one of
sale but still a mortgage. The clearing or encashment of the check which produced the effect of payment
determined the full payment of the money obligation and the release of the chattel mortgage. It was not
determinative of the consummation of the sale. The transaction between the brothers is distinct and
apart from the transaction between Libra and the petitioner. The contention, therefore, that the
consummation of the sale depended upon the encashment of the check is untenable.
66. Power Commercial and Industrial Corp. vs. CA
FACTS: Petitioner asbestos manufacturer Power Commercial and industrial corporation bought the
property of spouses Reynaldo and Angelita Quiambao located in Makati City. Since there are lessees
occupying the subject land, part of the deed of sale is a warranty of respondents that will defend its title
and peaceful possession in favor of the petitioners. The property is mortgage to PNP and as such,
petitioners filed a request to assume responsibility of the mortgage. Because of petitioners failure to
produce the required papers, their petition was denied. Petitioners allege that the contract should be
rescinded because of failure of delivery.
ISSUE: WON the contract is recissible due to breach of contract.
HELD: There is no breach of contact in this case since there is no provision in the contract that imposes
the obligation to the respondents to eject the people occupying the property. There was also a
constructive delivery because the deed of sale was made in a public document. The contention of the
petitioners that there could be no constructive delivery because the respondents are not in possession
of the property is of no merit. What matters in a constructive delivery is control and not possession.
Control was placed in the hands of the petitioners that is why they were able to file an ejectment case.
Prior physical delivery or possession is not legally required and the execution of the deed of sale is
deemed equivalent to delivery.
67. Vallarta vs. CA
FACTS: Respondent Rosalinda Cruz entrusted to petitioner Victoria Villarta seven pieces of jewelry on
November 1968. On December of the same year, Villarta exchanges one jewelry to another and issued a
post-dated check in favor of Cruz. Cruz deposited the check but it was dishonored for lack of funds. An
estafa case was filed against Villarta but she argued that she can only be civilly liable because even
though the check bounced, she only gave it for a pre-existing obligation. She contends a person cannot
be imprisoned for non-payment of debt.
ISSUE: WON the transaction is a sale or return
HELD: The transaction is not a sale or return but a sale on approval or sale on acceptance. When Cruz
gave the jewelry to Villarta on November, the clear intention is to make the latter choose which item
she wanted to buy. There was no meeting of the minds yet at this point and hence, it cannot be
considered as delivery. If ownership over the jewelry was not transmitted on that date, then it could
have been transmitted only in December 1968, the date when the check was issued. In which case, it
was a "sale on approval" since ownership passed to the buyer. Vallarta, only when she signified her
approval or acceptance to the seller, Cruz, and the price was agreed upon. It is still criminal fraud or
deceit in the issuance of a check which is made punishable under the Revised Penal Code, and not the
non-payment of the debt.
68. Sta. Ana vs. Hernandez
FACTS: Spouses Jose Santa Ana, Jr. and Lourdes Sto. Domingo sold a land in Bulacan to respondent Rosa
Hernandez for P11,000 lump sum. (there were two other previous sales to different vendees of other
portions of the land) The boundaries of the land were stated in the deed of sale and its approximate
land area.
Petitioners-spouses caused the preparation of the subdivision plan but Hernandez didnt agree to the
partition. As such, petitioners-spouses filed a case alleging that Hernandez is occupying in excess of
17000 square meter of the land sold. Hernandez claims that the excess area is part of the land she
ISSUE: WON the excess area occupied by Hernandez is part of the land sold.
HELD: The sale involves a definite and identified tract, a corpus certum, that obligated the vendors to
deliver to the buyer all the land within the boundaries, irrespective of whether its real area should be
greater or smaller than what is recited in the deed. To hold the buyer to no more than the area recited
on the deed, it must be made clear therein that the sale was made by unit of measure at a definite price
for each unit. The sale in this case only involves the definite boundaries but only approximate land
areas. As such, Art. 1542 concerning the sale for lump sum must be considered.
69. Carbonell vs. CA
FACTS: 2 buyers offered to buy the sellers land w/ assumption of mortgage The price proposal of Buyer
1 was accepted and memorandum was made allowing the seller to occupy the land for 1 year and to
lease it thereafter. When Buyer 1 went to the Seller w/ the deed, Seller told him that he already gave
the lot to Buyer 2. Buyer 2 presented a memorandum wherein the Seller obligated himself to sell the lot
to well as a deed of sale. Buyer 2 had the sale registered 4 days after the 1st sale was registered.
HELD him, as: Buyer 1 was in good faith at the time of their negotiations & the perfection of the sale,
there was no 2nd sale yet to speak of. The circumstances show that Buyer 2 was in bad faith. The 1st
sale was properly perfected & consummated; Seller retained possession of her house as a lessee.
Although the memorandum between Buyer 1 & Seller wasnt in the form required by the Statute of
Frauds, it was still proof of a partially performed sale. The assumption of the mortgage & the lease of
the house formed part of the consideration of the sale. Other issues involve BPS.
DOCTRINE: Court reiterated Art. 1544 on Double Sales4. Good faith of the buyer of the realty is essential
in registering his deed of sale (a.k.a. anterior registration) to merit the protection in Art. 1544, per 2nd
par. of the said article.5 If theres no inscription (registration), what is decisive is prior possession in
good faith.
70. Quimson vs. Rosete
71. Cheng vs Genato
FACTS: Respondent Genato entered a contract to sell to spouses Da Jose pertaining to his property in
Bulacan. The contract made in public document states that the spouses shall pay the down payment and
30 days after verifying the authenticity of the documents, they shall pay the remaining purchase price.
Da Jose spouses was not able to finish verifying the documents and as such asked for a 30 day extension.
Pending the extension and without notice to the spouses, Genato made a document for the annulment
of the contract. Petitioner Cheng expressed interest over the property and paid 50K check with the
assurance that the contract between Genato and the spouses Da Jose will be annulled. Da Jose spouses
protested with the annulment and persuaded Genato to continue the contract. Genato returned the
check to Cheng and hence, this petition.
HELD: The contract between Genato and spouses Da Jose was a contract to sell which is subject to a
suspensive condition. Thus, there will be no contract to speak of, if the obligor failed to perform the
suspensive condition which enforces a juridical relation. Obviously, the foregoing jurisprudence cannot
be made to apply to the situation in the instant case because no default can be ascribed to the Da Jose
spouses since the 30-day extension period has not yet expired.
Even assuming that the spouses defaulted, the contract also cannot be validly rescinded because no
notice was given to them. Thus, Cheng's contention that the Contract to Sell between Genato and the
Da Jose spouses was rescinded or resolved due to Genato's unilateral rescission finds no support in this
case. The contract between Genato and Cheng is a contract to sell not a contract of sale. But But even
assuming that it should be treated as a conditional contract of sale, it did not acquire any obligatory
force since it was subject to a suspensive condition that the earlier contract to sell between Genato and
the Da Jose spouses should first be cancelled or rescinded.
Art.1544 should apply because for not only was the contract between herein respondents first in time; it
was also registered long before petitioner's intrusion as a second buyer (PRIMUS TEMPORE, PORTIOR
JURE). (Spouses made annotation on the title of Genato). Since Cheng was fully aware, or could have
been if he had chosen to inquire, of the rights of the Da Jose spouses under the Contract to Sell duly
annotated on the transfer certificates of titles of Genato, it now becomes unnecessary to further
elaborate in detail the fact that he is indeed in bad faith in entering into such agreement.
72. Coronel vs. CA
FACTS: Coronel et al. consummated the sale of his property located in Quezon City to respondent
Alcaraz. Since the title of the property was still in the name of the deceased father of the Coronels, they
agreed to transfer its title to their name upon payment of the down payment of 50K. and thereafter an
absolute deed of sale will be executed. Alcarazs mother paid the down payment in behalf of her
daughter and as such, Coronel made the transfer of title to their name. Notwithstanding this fact,
Coronel sold the property to petitioner Mabanag and rescinded its prior contract with Alcaraz.
ISSUE: WON the rescission of the first contract between Coronel and Alcaraz is valid.
HELD: The case is a contract of sale subject to a suspensive condition in which consummation is subject
only to the successful transfer of the certificate of title from the name of petitioners' father, to their
names. Thus, the contract of sale became obligatory. With regard to double sale, the rule that the first in
time, stronger in right should apply. The contention of the petitioner that she was a buyer in good faith
because the notice of lis pendens in the title was annotated after she bought the property is of no merit.
In case of double sale, what finds relevance and materiality is not whether or not the second buyer was
a buyer in good faith but whether or not said second buyer registers such second sale in good faith, that
is, without knowledge of any defect in the title of the property sold. The ruling should be in favor of
Alcaraz because Mabanag registered the property two months after the notice of lis pendens was
annotated in the title and hence, she cannot be a buyer in good faith.

73. Mendoza vs. Kalaw
FACTS: Federico Caet sold his land under a conditional sale to Primitivo Kalaw. Less than two months
after, he sold it again to Agapito Mendoza under an absolute sale. Mendoza took possession of the land
and enclosed it with fence. Kalaw attempted to claim possession but Mendoza refused. Kalaw
attempted to have his title registered in the registry of deeds but was denied by for the reason that
there existed some defect in the description of the property, and that the title of the vendor had not
therefore been registered. The register of deeds, however, did make a preventive annotation.

HELD: The ruling should be in favor of Mendoza because even if he acquired the property subsequent to
the conditional sale in favor of Kalaw, a conditional sale, before the performance of the condition, can
hardly be said to be a sale of property, especially where the condition has not been performed or
complied with.

74. Adalin vs. CA
FACTS: Appellee-Vendors sold their 5-door commercial building to Appellants Yu and Lim located in
front of Imperial Hotel in Cotabato City. Since there are lessees in the property, the vendors offered it
first to them twice but they refused both offers. As such, appellee-vendors and appellants executed a
deed of conditional sale. The contract states that they appellants will pay the down payment of 300K
first and the remaining balance after the appellee-vendors completely evicted the lessees occupying the
property. After the vendors and the tenants made known their intention to buy the property for a
higher price. As such, the vendors executed three deeds of sale of registered land in favor of the
lessees. The vendors offered to return the downpayment paid by the appellants but the latter refused.
The vendors contend that they can rescind the contract because the condition to evict the tenants was
not completed.

HELD: Although the contract was a conditional sale, what was subject to the condition is the payment of
the balance. Both parties have their respective obligations yet to be fulfilled, the seller the eviction of
the tenants and the buyer, the payment of the balance of the purchase price. The choice of who to sell
the property to, however, had already been made by the sellers and is thus no longer subject to any
condition nor open to any change. In that sense, the sale to the appellants was definitive and absolute.
A clear breach of contract was made by the vendors. A case double sale occurred when the vendors sold
the property to the tenants. When the tenants bought the property, they are fully aware of its prior sale
to the appellants. Though the second sale to the said tenants was registered, such prior registration
cannot erase the gross bad faith that characterized such second sale, and as such, there is no legal basis
to rule that such second sale prevails over the first sale of the said property.

75. Espiritu vs. Valerio
FACTS: Valerio filed a case to quiet title against mother and daughter Espiritu who were asserting their
adversary rights over said land and disturbing his possession thereof. Valerio presented a deed of sale
from which he acquired the property while the Espiritus allege that they acquire the same from their
deceased father. The Espiritus also presented two deeds of sale to prove that their deceased father have
a legal right over the property which they inherited.

ISSUE: WON mother and daughter Espiritu have a better right over the property.

HELD: Apparently, this case concerns the sales of one parcel of land by the same vendor but in favor of
two different vendees. If both allegations of the parties are valid, Espiritu's contention that they have a
better right than that the claimed by Valerio would seem to be meritorious in the light of the facts of the
case and the provisions of Article 1544 of the New Civil Code, it not being disputed that the Deed of Sale
in favor of them was registered first. But since the deeds of sale presented by Esiritu are found to be
falsified, they have no legal right to claim the disputed property.

76. Tanedo vs. CA
FACTS: Lazaro Taedo executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of Ricardo Taedo and Teresita Barrera
in which he conveyed a parcel of land which he will inherit. Upon the death of his father he executed an
affidavit of conformity to reaffirm the said sale. He also executed another deed of sale in favor of the
spouses covering the parcel of land he already inherited. Ricardo registered the last deed of sale in the
registry of deeds in their favor. Ricardo later learned that Lazaro sold the same property to his children
through a deed of sale.

ISSUE: WON the Taedo spouses have a better right over the property against the children of Lazaro

HELD: Since a future inheritance generally cannot be a subject of a contract, the deed of sale and the
affidavit of conformity made by Lazaro has no effect. The subject of dispute therefore is the deed of sale
made by him in favor of spouses Taedo and another to his children after he already legally acquired the
property. Thus, although the deed of sale in favor of private respondents was later than the one in favor
of petitioners, ownership would vest in the former because of the undisputed fact of registration. On
the other hand, petitioners have not registered the sale to them at all. Petitioners contend that they
were in possession of the property and that private respondents never took possession thereof. As
between two purchasers, the one who registered the sale in his favor has a preferred right over the
other who has not registered his title, even if the latter is in actual possession of the immovable

77. Cruz vs. Cabana
FACTS: Leodegaria Cabana sold his real propery first to Teofilo Legaspi and Illuminada Cabana and then
later to Abelardo Cruz. Legaspi and Cabana were able to take possession of the property but they were
not able to register the deed of absolute sale because the property was still mortgaged to PNB. They
however were able to register with the RD the sale with the right to repurchase. On the other hand,
Cruz succeeded to register the deed of absolute sale in his favor.

HELD: Even though Cruz was the first to register the deed of absolute sale, he cannot be given a better
right over the property because he was a buyer in bad faith. Cruz knew the prior sale of the property
because he was informed by the RD that Legazpi and Cabana already registered the sale of the said
property. Knowledge of a prior transfer of a registered property by a subsequent purchaser makes him a
purchaser in bad faith and his knowledge of such transfer vitiates his title acquired by virtue of the latter
instrument of conveyance which creates no right as against the first purchaser.
78. Navara vs. CA
FACTS: Leocadio Navera owns a parcel of land in Albay which was inherited by his 5 children. His 3
children already have their share of the inheritance from the other properties of Leocadio. The subject
land was now owned by his 2 daughters. An OCT was issued in the name of Elena Navera et.al (et.al
refers to his sister Eduarda Navera) When Elena died, his share of the land was inherited by her heirs
Arsenio and Felix Narez. The other portion was owned by Eduarda. Eduarda sold her portion to her
nephew Arsenio and then one year after to Mariano Navera. Both sales were made in a public
instrument but both sales were also not registered in the Registry of Property.

ISSUE: WON the second sale of the property is valid.

HELD: Since the records show that both sales were not recorded in the Registry of Property, the law
clearly vests the ownership upon the person who in good faith was first in possession of the disputed
lot. The possession viewed in the law includes not only the material but also the symbolic possession,
which is acquired by the execution of a public instrument. This means that after the sale of a realty by
means of a public instrument, the vendor, who resells it to another, does not transmit anything to the
second vendee, and if the latter, by virtue of this second sale, takes material possession of the thing, he
does it as mere detainer, and it would be unjust to protect this detention against the rights of the thing
lawfully acquired by the first vendee. In the case at bar, the prior sale of the land to respondent Arsenio
Nares by means of a public instrument is clearly tantamount to a delivery of the land resulting in the
material and symbolic possession thereof by the latter.

79. Agricultural and Home Extension Development vs. CA

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