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ACT AND POTENCY

Paul Gerard Horrigan, Ph.D., 2009.


We arrive at an initial knowledge of the doctrine of act and potency
1
through the
observation of change or motion. Before Aristotle arrived at the scene, there were two great
errors concerning the problem of change and stability in beings: the static monism of Parmenides
and the philosophy of becoming of Heraclitus.

Though Parmenides was the first formulator of the principle of non-contradiction
(Aristotle and Aquinas later perfected this formulation) he, nevertheless, denied the possibility of
motion or change in the world, adopting a monistic conception of the world, a sad consequence
of his univocal conception of being. Parmenides of Elea and the Eleatic school reasoned more
or less in the following way: A thing either is or is not. If it is, it is being; if it is not, it is non-
being or nothing. Now when we say that a change takes place, that which comes to be, before the
change either is or is not. If it is, it is being; if it is not, it is non-being. But we cannot say that
before the change it is; for this would mean that it comes to be what it is already, that being
comes to be being. Obviously a thing cannot come to be what it already is. On the other hand, it
is equally impossible that what comes to be is not before the change; for this would mean that
non-being comes to be, that non-being becomes being. But it is clear that non-being cannot come
to be being. Hence we are forced to conclude that change or becoming is positively

1
Studies on act and potency: A. FARGES, Theorie fondamentale de lacte et de la puissance du moteur et du
mobile, Paris, 1893 ; A. BAUDIN, Lacte et la puissance dans Aristote, Revue Thomiste, 7 (1899), pp. 39-62,
153-172, 274-296, 584-608 ; G. MATTIUSSI, Le XXIV tesi della filosofia di S. Tommaso dAquino, Gregorian
University, Rome, 1925, pp. 1-27 ; G. MANSER, Das Wesen des Thomismus. Die Lehre von Akt und Potenz als
tiefste Grundlage der thomistischen Synthese, Paulus Verlag, Fribourg, 1935 ; P. DESCOQS, Sur la division de
ltre en acte et puissance daprs Saint Thomas, Revue de Philosophie, 38 (1938), pp. 410-430 ; V. A. BERTO,
Sur la composition dacte et de puissance dans les cratures, Revue de Philosophie, 39 (1939), pp. 106-121 ; P.
DESCOQS, Sur la division de ltre en acte et puissance daprs Saint Thomas. Nouvelles precisions, Revue de
Philosophie, 39 (1939), pp. 233-252, 361-70 ; C. FABRO, Circa la divisione dellessere in atto e potenza secondo
S. Tommaso, Divus Thomas, 42 (1939), pp. 529-552 ; A. SANDOZ, Sur la division de ltre en acte et puissance
daprs Saint Thomas, Revue de Philosophie, 40 (1940), pp. 53-76 ; VAN ROO, W. A., Act and Potency, The
Modern Schoolman, 18 (1940), pp. 1-4 ; C. GIACON, Atto e potenza, La Scuola, Brescia, 1947 ; J. D. ROBERT,
Le principe: Actus non limitatur nisi per potentiam subjectivam realiter distinctam, Revue philosophique de
Louvain, 47 (1949), pp. 44-70 ; W. NORRIS CLARKE, The Limitation of Act by Potency: Aristotelianism or
Neoplatonism?, The New Scholasticism, 26 (1952), pp. 167-194 ; E. BERTI, Genesi e sviluppo della dottrina
della potenza e dellatto in Aristotele, Studia Patavina, 5 (1958), pp. 477-505 ; C. FABRO, La determinazione
dellatto nella metafisica tomistica, in Esegesi tomistica, Pontificia Universit Lateranense, Rome, 1969, pp. 329-
350 ; H. P. KAINZ, The Thomistic Doctrine of Potency, Divus Thomas, 73 (1970), pp. 308-320 ; H. P. KAINZ,
Active and Passive Potency in Thomistic Angelology, M. Nijhoff, The Hague, 1972 ; C. A. FREELAND, Aristotles
Theory of Actuality and Potentiality, Pittsburgh, 1979 ; F. KOVACH, St. Thomas Aquinas: Limitation of Potency by
Act. A Textual and Doctrinal Analysis, in Atti del VIII Congresso Internazionale dellAccademia Pontificia di San
Tommaso dAquino (V), Libreria Editrice Vaticana, Vatican City, 1982, pp. 387-411 ; G. VERBEKE, The Meaning
of Potency in Aristotle, in Graceful Reason. Essays in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy Presented to Joseph Owens
CssR, edited by L. P. Gerson, Toronto, 1983, pp. 55-74 ; J. F. WIPPEL, Thomas Aquinas and the Axiom What is
Received is Received according to the Mode of the Receiver, in A Straight Path: Essays Offered to Arthur Hyman,
edited by Ruth Link Salinger, Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C., 1988, pp. 279-289 ; J. F.
WIPPEL, Thomas Aquinas and the Axiom that Unreceived Act is Unlimited, The Review of Metaphysics, 51
(1998), pp. 533-564.
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unintelligible
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and therefore impossible. What, then, must we say about the so-called changes
which we see happening all around us? Only one conclusion is possible: since change is
impossible, our senses deceive us when they testify to the reality of change; for reason clearly
shows that all change is a contradiction in terms. Moreover, it follows that all reality is but one
being. For whatever is different has to differ either by being or by non-being; now what differs
by non-being or nothing is not different; while on the other hand things cannot differ by being
because being is precisely that by which they are the same. In this way Parmenides was led to
static monism monism, because he admitted the existence of only one thing; static, because he
denied that this one thing was subject to any change whatsoever.
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Heraclitus, on the other hand, affirmed that only change was real, stability was an
illusion, there being no fixed natures or essences in things, everything being in a constant flux;
there are no stable beings but only change or becoming. Rather than deny the obvious testimony
of the senses for the reality of change, he (Heraclitus) chose to deny the reality of being.
According to him, reality is not being but becoming or change. Whatever seems to be is nothing
but a deception, just as a stream may seem to be always the same, but in reality is always
changing. His theory was aptly summarized in the famous formula panta rei, everything is in a
state of flux.
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It was Aristotle who arrived at a solution to the Parmenidean and Heraclitean errors
concerning change and stability in beings (entia) with his doctrine of act and potency. No
solution was considered to be satisfactory before Aristotle solved the puzzle. With Parmenides,
Aristotle maintained that being is real, and with Heraclitus, he asserted that change is real. The
solution of the apparent contradiction he sees in the fact that a distinction has to be made in being
itself. Being, he says, is distinguished in respect of potency and complete reality,
5
or as it is
usually expressed by scholastic philosophers, being is divided into being-in-act and being-in-
potency. In other words, Aristotle admits that there is a middle ground, not between being and
non-being, but between being-in-act and non-being, and this middle ground is called being-in-
potency. We say that potentially, for instance, a statue of Hermes is in the block of wood and
the half-line is in the whole, because it might be separated out, and we call even the man who is
not studying a man of science, if he is capable of studying.
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Thus when we say that a thing
comes to be, this does not mean that non-being becomes being, but merely that being-in-potency
becomes being-in-act, and this does not imply any contradiction. Therefore, being and change
are both intelligible, and there is no reason to reject the reality of either.
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The change or motion that we see around us is definitely real; it is the passage from being
in potency to being in actuality. It is the successive actualization of the potency. For example,
hot water is in a state of actuality and cold water is in a state of potentiality towards being hot
water. When water is heated with fire it slowly starts to boil. This process of water being heated

2
Positively unintelligible is that which is seen not to be possible; negatively unintelligible is that which is not seen
to be possible. For example, a square circle is positively unintelligible, but a trip to the moon in one hour is
negatively unintelligible because we do not yet see how it can be done.
3
H. J. KOREN, Introduction to the Science of Metaphysics, B. Herder, St. Louis, 1965, pp. 105-106.
4
H. J. KOREN, op. cit., p. 106.
5
ARISTOTLE, Metaphysics, IX, 1, 1045b 34.
6
ARISTOTLE, op. cit., IX, 6, 1048a 31.
7
H. J. KOREN, op. cit., p.107.
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is a transition from cold water (the state of potentiality) to hot water (the state of actuality). What
is formerly in potency undergoes a successive actualization of the potency towards a state of
actuality (in hot water).

Potency is the capacity to have a perfection while act is the perfection which a subject
possesses. Act is contrasted to potency, which is the potentiality to receive the perfection or act.
Potency and act are directly known through experience as correlative to each other. In the case of
potency its very constitution is to be directed towards some type of act. Because they are primary
and evident notions, they cannot be strictly defined but only described by means of examples and
by contrasting these notions with one another
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: Strictly speaking, these terms cannot be defined.
Act and potency are immediate divisions of being. In order to be defined, being would have
to be their proximate genus in the definition; but being, as was pointed out before, is not a strict
and true genus.
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Though act and potency cannot be strictly defined, since a strict definition
consists of a genus and a specific difference, and these cannot be found in the most primary and
fundamental notions of being, nevertheless, potency may be described by means of its
relationship to act as the capacity for an act. Act itself, however, cannot even be described in this
way by means of a relationship to potency. For instance, it would not be correct to describe act as
the actuation or fulfillment of a potency. For in doing so we should imply that every act is a
fulfillment of a potency and therefore presupposes potency. While, as a matter of fact, it is true
that most acts presuppose potency, this is not so because they are acts, but because they are
limited acts. Act as act merely implies perfection, and not that this perfection is limited. All we
can do, therefore, to clarify the concept of act is to give examples.
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The act of building is in
him who is building now; but the potency of building is in him who is not building now,
although he is capable of it; the act of heat is in that which is hot now, but the potency of heat
is in that which is not hot now, although it is capable of being hot; the act of animality is in that
which is animal now, but the potency of animality is in that which is not animal now, although
it is capable of becoming animal; etc.
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Act and potency should be considered under two aspects, namely, the physical (which is
linked to change or motion), and the metaphysical. Regarding the physical aspect, act and
potency form the elements that make change or motion understandable. Here, what is actual
cannot be at the same time potential and vice versa. Hot water cannot be cold water at the same
time and in the same respect. Change is the transition between being in potentiality and being in
actuality.

Regarding the metaphysical aspect, act and potency form the stable constituent principles
of all finite beings, so much so that the potency, even after having been made actual, continues to
be a co-principle of its corresponding act. In all corporeal beings, which are hylemorphic
composites of prime matter (potency) and substantial form (act), prime matter remains even after
reception of its form.


8
Cf. R. J. KREYCHE, First Philosophy, Holt, New York, 1959, pp. 91-92.
9
C. BITTLE, The Domain of Being: Ontology, Bruce, Milwaukee, 1941, p. 56.
10
Cf. ARISTOTLE, Metaphysics, IX, 6, 1048a, 35ff ; AQUINAS, In IX Metaph., lecture 5, no. 1827.
11
H. J. KOREN, op. cit., p. 120.
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Potency is that which can receive an act or already has it. This statement implies a
number of things: 1. that potency is distinct from act; 2. that act and potency are not complete
realities but rather principles or aspects found in things; 3. that potency is to act as the imperfect
is to the perfect; and 4. that in itself potency is not a mere privation of act but is a real capacity
for perfection.

1. Potency is Really Distinct from Act. This can be shown when act is viewed as
separated from its corresponding potency. For example, the exterior sense of hearing sometimes
is hearing and at other times is not. Yet no one doubts that man has the potency or power for
hearing. The exterior sense of sight is sometimes seeing and other times is not, yet men have the
potentiality or capacity to see. A person may at times be walking, and at other times he may be at
rest, yet he still has the potentiality or capacity to walk. These various potencies or powers of
man may not be currently in use, that is, they may not be actualized, but they still remain
potencies. Thus, potency is characterized as being the capacity to have an act or by being a
receptive subject, and is therefore distinct from act. The constituent principles of a reality which
are called potency and act must be really distinct. For that which perfects cannot be really the
same as that which is perfectible; otherwise the perfectible would give itself an act which it does
not have, so that being would come from non-being. Moreover, if potency and act were not
really distinct, that which limits and that which is limited would be really the same, so that act
would limit itself.

From the real distinction of potency and act it follows that nothing can be potency and
act in the same respect because this would imply that that which perfects is really the same as
that which is perfected or perfectible. This assertion, however, does not mean that a higher
degree of the same act cannot be received by a subject whose potency is already partially
actualized. An intellect, for instance, which has already been actualized with respect to the
knowledge of one thing can continue to acquire more knowledge and thus becomes more
actualized. But that part of a potency which has become actualized is no longer potency. On the
other hand, in different respects a thing may be in potency and act at the same time. For instance,
the power of speech may be considered as an act insofar as it perfects mans nature, but insofar
as it can be perfected by the act of speech it is a potency. Thus it is quite possible that what is an
act in one order is a potency in a different order. It is even possible for an act to be unlimited in
one order and limited in a different order.
12


12
H. J. KOREN, op. cit., pp. 116-117. Kreyche explains the difference between a logical distinction (including the
virtual distinction) and a real distinction (major and minor) and shows that act and potency are really distinct by a
minor real distinction between metaphysical, not physical, principles of being: In general, there are two types of
distinction logical and real. Formally considered, a logical distinction is a lack of identity, not in the order of
things, but in the order of our concepts of things. Thus, if we conceive one and the same thing from two different
points of view (for example, six and a half dozen eggs), the distinction in question is not a real, but a logical one.
(Some logical distinctions are purely logical, as is the example given in the text; others are said to be virtual. A
virtual distinction is a logical one that has some basis in the thing itself). By contrast, a real distinction is one that
exists in the order of things themselves that is, independently of our knowledge of them. Thus the distinction, let us
say, between two parakeets exists apart from any consideration of the mind.
The example of the parakeets is an illustration of a real distinction between one thing and another. This type of
distinction is known in philosophy as a major real distinction, and the nature of such a distinction is obvious. Less
obvious, however, is the distinction that exists, not between two things, but between two or more parts of a single
thing, called a minor real distinction. We may exemplify this latter by the difference that exists between an arm
and a leg. Though really distinct, an arm and a leg are not, properly speaking, things. Yet they are distinct, really
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2. Act and Potency are Not Complete Realities but Rather Principles or Aspects Found in
Things. Act and potency are the distinct co-principles of a finite thing. Potency and act are not
things since they are not fully constituted entities with an independent status of their own;
rather, they are the intrinsic principles of a finite being, intrinsic co-principles which we find in
things, the intrinsic principles of being which, in union with each other, constitute or comprise
finite beings. Therefore, we affirm that potency and act so divide being that whatever exists is
either pure act (God), or is necessarily composed of potency and act as its first intrinsic
principles (which is the case with all finite beings).

3. Potency is to Act as the Imperfect is to the Perfect. In its strict meaning, act means
perfection, a completion, something determinate. Potency, on the other hand, is an imperfection,
a capacity for perfection. The fully finished marble statue of the Piet in St. Peters basilica is
something determinate, a perfection, something in act, while the shapeless block of marble that
was the initial material that Michelangelo would later use would be the determinable, the
imperfect, the potency, the potentiality for perfection.

4. In Itself Potency is not a Mere Privation of Act but a Real Capacity for Perfection. The
external sense of sight, when not in use, is not a mere privation, but is at that very moment
potentially capable of being actualized by the actual operation of seeing, which is a perfection.

Division of Potency

Passive Potency and Active Potency. The fundamental division of real potency
13
is
between passive potency and active potency. Passive potency is the capacity a thing has to be
changed by another as other,
14
while active potency is the power to effect a change in another as

distinct, because an arm is not a leg, nor is a leg an arm. The example in question is a minor real distinction between
physical parts. Most important of all for our own purposes is the distinction that exists, not between physical parts,
but between metaphysical principles of being. This too is a minor real distinction, and it is the distinction that exists
between potency and act.
From what we have just said it should be evident that potency and act are not merely distinct in our thinking
about them that is, not distinct by a type of logical distinction. They are really distinct in things themselves by a
minor real distinction. It should hardly be necessary at this point to prove that potency and act are distinct,
meaning really distinct. This is an immediate deduction from the nature of potency and act: in the measure in which
it is in act it is perfect. To deny that potency and act are really distinct is to admit in effect that something could be
perfect and imperfect from one and the same point of view, and this a plain contradiction.
Finally, it must be noted that any attempt to discount the real distinction between potency and act would render
impossible any genuine solution to the very problems that give rise to this distinction. Thus, if potency and act are
not really distinct, then the problem of change or becoming becomes insoluble. Further, if potency and act are not
really distinct, there is no genuine solution to the problem of limitation. In conclusion, if these principles are in any
sense real, it must be allowed that they are really distinct(R. J. KREYCHE, op. cit., pp. 100-103).
13
For the division of potency into logical potency and real potency (also called objective potency and subjective
potency), see R. P. PHILLIPS, Modern Thomisic Philosophy, vol. 2 (Metaphysics), Newman, Westminster, MD,
1935, pp. 180-181.
14
Pure Potency and Mixed Potency. Passive potency can be pure or mixed. Pure potency is potency that is not
actualized in any way, being essentially and totally indeterminate. It exists in the corporeal beings and is called
prime matter. Mixed potency is all that which is actuated in part but is still further actualizable. This pertains to
every finite being. Thus, for example, water is in act with respect to the form of water, but is in potency with respect
to heat. For a further division of passive potency, considered in reference to the agent, into natural and obediential,
see: H. Renard, The Philosophy of Being, Bruce, Milwaukee, 1950, p. 30.
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other. Passive potency is the capacity to receive, while active potency is the capacity to act or do,
the power to act or do. Passive potency is the capacity of a thing to be changed by another, while
active potency is the principle of activity in an agent. Passive potency is a receptive potency, a
capacity or principle which can be acted upon, while active potency is a power or principle of
action, such as the power of sight or the power of hearing.

Kreyche explains that the fundamental division of potency is that of the distinction
between active potency and passive potency: In general, active potency is the capacity or power
for performing an operation; passive potency is the capacity for receiving an act or perfection.

1. Active Potency. As examples of active potency, consider the capacity that a man has
for sensing, thinking, or willing. Capacities of this sort (usually designated as powers) share
partly in the nature of potency and partly in the nature of act. Inasmuch as a power or a faculty is
itself a certain kind of perfection it may be designated as an act. Thus the capacity that a man has
to think and reason is in a limited sense an act. However, if we compare the power itself that is,
as a mere capacity for doing something with the actual exercise of that power, we are then
entitled to speak of it as an active potency, because the mere possession of that power is not the
same as its actual use. It is from this latter point of view, then, that a power is characterized as
potency.

2. Passive Potency. Passive potency is the capacity for receiving an act, and just as we
distinguish act in the order of existence and act in the order of form we must correspondingly
distinguish the potency for receiving these two different kinds of act.

a) Entitative Potency. In all finite things the act of being (esse) is a received act. The
recipient principle of this act that is, the principle which receives it is what we call
entitative potency. Accordingly, since the essence of finite things is the recipient, limiting
principle of the very act by which they are, it is the essence of finite things which is their
entitative potency.
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b) Potency in the order of form. Corresponding to the two types of act in the order of
form there are also two kinds of potency: (i) Potency for receiving a substantial form. The
potency for receiving a substantial form is primary matter which is pure passive potency ; (ii)
Potency for receiving an accidental form. This latter is the potency in an already existing subject
for receiving any act that is superadded to its nature or essence. A diamond, for example, is in
potency for being cut (to various shapes and sizes) by a jeweler.
16


Alvira, Clavell and Melendo distinguish between three basic types of passive potency and
their corresponding acts, namely, between 1. prime matter and substantial form, 2. substance and
accidents, and 3. essence and act of being: Strictly speaking, the metaphysical character of
potency as a capacity to receive an act pertains to passive potency. However, it is not a

15
N. B. In thinking of essence as entitative potency we must not regard it as in any sense existing prior to its
actualization by esse. True enough, before something is said to exist, it is possible for that thing to exist. However,
we must not confuse entitative potency with mere possibility. Although essence (as entitative potency) is a genuine
principle of being, it may never be said to exist prior to its actualization by esse.
16
R. J. KREYCHE, op. cit., pp. 100-101.
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homogeneous reality, but one which is found at different levels. We can distinguish three basic
types of passive potency and their corresponding acts:

a) First, there is prime matter and substantial form. In bodily substances there is an
ultimate substratum, prime matter, in which substantial form is received. This form determines
the matter, and thereby forms one or another type of corporeal substance, such as iron, water or
oxygen.

Prime matter is the ultimate potential substratum, since it is of itself pure potency, a
merely receptive subject which lacks any actuality of its own. The substantial form is the first act
which prime matter receives.

b) Next, there is substance and accidents. All substances, whether material (composed
of matter and form) or purely spiritual, are subjects of accidental perfections, such as qualities or
relations. Unlike prime matter, the substance is a subject which is already in act through the
form, but which is of itself in potency with respect to the accidents.

c) Then, there is essence (potentia essendi), and act of being (actus essendi or esse). The
form, in turn, whether it is received in matter or not, is no more than a determinate measure of
participation in the act of being. The essences man, dog, pine tree, and uranium, for
instance, are different ways of participating in being. With respect to the act of being, everything
is a limiting receptive potency from the separated forms, to the composite of matter and form,
down to the accidents (which participate in the act of being through their union with the
substance).

Although we shall take this up later, at this stage, we might as well note that in bodily
beings, the form is act with respect to matter, and it is in potency with regard to the act of being
(esse). Matter is doubly potential, first with respect to form and then, through the form, with
respect to the act of being.
17


Division of Act

Pure Act and Mixed Act. Pure act in the absolute sense is act which admits of no
potentiality in any order whatsoever. Such an act would neither be a co-principle united to a
limiting potency nor would it be in potency to any act of a superior order. Pure act in the absolute
sense is God Himself, Who is Pure Act of Being. Mixed act is act which is received into potency,
or it is act which is in potency to act of another order. Mixed act is either entitative or formal.

Entitative Act and Formal Act. Entitative act is the very act of being (esse) of a finite
thing. Entitative act is a mixed act inasmuch as it is received into a potency which limits it, not
inasmuch as it is in potency to further act, for esse is the ultimate act. Formal act, the act of
essence, act in the order of essence, is the act by which a thing is determined and perfected in its
species; v.g., substantial form.


17
T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, op. cit., pp. 77-78.
8
First Act and Second Act. Formal act may be understood as either first formal act or as
second formal act First formal act is act which does not presuppose an anterior act, but awaits a
subsequent act; v.g., substantial form. Second formal act, on the other hand, is act which
presupposes an anterior act; v.g., an accident. Therefore, second act is accidental act. Kreyche
explains that by formal act, or act in the order of form we mean any act which causes a thing,
not simply to be, but to be specified according to one or another of the determinate modes of
being. Formal act may be taken in one of the two following senses: a) First formal act. By first
formal act, we mean one which determines or specifies a thing according to its essence or nature.
It is that act by virtue of which a thing is one kind of being rather than another (for example, a
rabbit rather than a horse). The first formal act of material things is their substantial form ; b)
Second Formal Act. By second formal act, we mean any act that is a further modification or
determination of an already existing subject. The addition of a second formal act, though it
genuinely affects its subject, does not in any way change the nature of the subject that it
modifies. Thus any accidental perfection that a thing has (such as, say the sharpness of an
alligators teeth) is related to it (in our example, the alligator), as a second formal act.
18


But first act and second act can also be understood in a different, relative sense, namely,
in the indication of operative power (which is called first act), such as the power of hearing,
and its operation (which is called second act). Therefore, an operative faculty, such as the
operative power of intellect, which in the usual classification above, is second act, may be, in a
relative sense, be called first act in relation to its operation.

Alvira, Clavell and Melendo, on the other hand, prefer to describe operative power and
operation or action by using the terms active potency and second act, writing: Besides passive
potency, there is another kind of potency which is a capacity to produce or confer a perfection;
this is also called power, especially in common usage. Thus we speak of the power of an engine
or of a boxer, and of nuclear power.

The act corresponding to this potency is action or activity, which is called second act,
since operations arise in a subject by virtue of its first act, which is stable and more internal.

Active potency has the nature of act, since anything acts insofar as it is in act, whereas it
is, by contrast, a passive receiver (of the act) insofar as it is in potency. In order to give or
transmit a perfection to another, the subject must first have that perfection, since no one can give
what he does not have. Light or heat is only given off, for instance, by something which has
electrical or thermal energy, respectively.

Nevertheless, in creatures, active potency has a certain passivity. That is why it is called
potency (an active one) and not simply act. Powers are related to their acts as the imperfect is to
its corresponding perfection. Thus, to be in potency to understand is less perfect than to
understand actually. Operative faculties are not always in act. This clearly reveals that they are
really distinct from their operations. The will, for instance, is not the very act of loving, but the
power of carrying out that free act. Moreover, active powers have a certain passivity, inasmuch
as their transition to operation requires the influence of something external which sets them in a
condition to act. Thus, the intelligence needs an intelligible object and the impulse of the will.

18
R. J. KREYCHE, op. cit., p. 99.
9
Likewise, the motor powers of an animal presuppose the apprehension of a sense-perceptible
good and the motion of instinct or of the aestimativa (estimative power). No created power sets
itself in act by itself, without the influence of something outside itself, unless it were to be active
and passive with regard to the same thing, which is, of course, impossible.

We can speak of active potency in God (omnipotence) insofar as He is the principle of
the act of being of all things. But since this divine action does not entail any passivity or any
passage from potency to act, it is not strictly speaking a potency, but Pure Act.

Operations and their corresponding active powers are accidents. No created substance
is identical with its operation, but is only its cause. The human soul, for instance, is the principle
of spiritual activity, but it is not that very activity itself. Operations stem from the internal
perfection of the substance.

More specifically, active powers or faculties are accidents belonging to the category
quality; operation, in turn, is also an accident. If it is a transitive action, that is, an action with a
resulting external effect (building a house, tilling a field, sawing wood), it belongs to the
category action. In the case of immanent activity, which is specifically called operation
(thinking, seeing, imagining, loving) it belongs to the accident quality.
19


The Primacy of Act

Act has primacy over potency in a number of ways: 1. Act is prior to potency as regards
perfection; 2. Act has cognitive priority over potency; 3. Act has a causal primacy over potency;
and 4. Act has a temporal primacy over potency.

Act is Prior to Potency as Regards Perfection. Act is perfection while potency is
imperfection waiting to be perfected by act. A thing is perfect insofar as it is in act while
imperfect while in potency. Being in act constitutes the end or goal towards which being in
potency strives for. Sight, for example, is ordered towards the goal of seeing, and without the
latter activity the operative potency would be frustrated. With regard to man, his human body is
the potency which receives the rational soul as its act and becomes subordinated to this
perfection. Therefore, act is prior to potency as regards perfection.

In line with Aristotelian metaphysics, Krapiec speaks of an ontic (or substantial) primacy
of act over potency, writing: What should we understand by the term ontic or substantial
primacy? According to Aristotle, essence substance is the chief and primary manifestation of
being, and as such is something perfect. Essential primacy is, therefore, synonymous with perfect
primacy. The question, then, is what is more real, what constitutes the reason of being: act or
potency? Also, the perfection of a thing can be apprehended in two aspects: either by reason of
its form or by reason of its end.

Form is the factor perfecting the thing. Act is essentially more perfect than potency in
the formal aspect. Why? Let us consider how things arise. The form of a thing is what designates
the things essence; it is the basis for defining the thing; it comes to the thing as its ultimately

19
T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, op. cit., pp. 78-79.
10
determining factor. Now, the form of the thing is act, for forms are acts in relation to passive
potency, that is, in relation to matter with all its dispositions. If, then, form is act and form is the
essential perfection of a thing, since it constitutes the things essence, then act is the essential
perfection of a thing, since it constitutes the things essence, then act is the essential perfection of
the thing; it is essentially more perfect than potency, than all the factors that dispose the thing to
receive form-act.

The essential perfection of act in relation to potency becomes still more apparent when
act is analyzed as the things end. The final cause justifies all other causes, for the real motion
and generation of a thing ultimately depends on its end, which as a motive force is the reason of
being of action. In relation to potency, act is an end, and the end is what is more perfect in the
order of causes. Consequently, act is also something most perfect, and so, in relation to potency,
act is a perfection.

Act is an end in the order of both passive and active potency. In the realm of passive
potency, matter is not determined until it possesses act. The emergence of act, therefore fulfills
matter and determines it, as the end determines the efficient cause to a particular kind of action.
Act is likewise an end, and thus also a perfection, in relation to active potency, since such
potency exists for action. The very arrangement of elements constituting this potency points to
the fact that active potency is ordered to act-action, without which it is completely unintelligible.
Act, therefore, lies at the basis of the understanding of passive and active potency, insofar as the
understanding of a thing takes place by apprehending its formal and final causes.

If act is essentially more perfect than potency (as is clear from the analysis of formal and
final causality, with which causes act is identified), then each thing is perfect to the extent it is in
act and imperfect to the extent it is in potency (unumquodque perfectum est, inquantum est actu,
imperfectum inquantum in potentia). Moreover, if a thing is perfect to the extent it is act, that is,
if the measure of perfection is the act or the actuality of a thing, then pure act is all-perfect, and
everything else apart from it is only relatively perfect (actus purus est omniperfectus, actus in
aliquo ordine purus in eo est totaliter perfectus).
20


2. Act Has Cognitive Priority over Potency. Act has a cognitive priority over potency as
the latter is defined by the former, that is, in relation to the former, as the ability or capacity to
build is known from the act of building, or the ability or capacity for sight is known from the act
of seeing. Any potency is known through its act, since it is no more than the capacity to receive
it, possess it, or produce a perfection. Consequently, the definition of each potency includes its
own act, which is what differentiates it from other potencies. Thus, hearing is defined as the
power to grasp sounds, and the will is defined as the power to love the good. The primacy of act
in knowledge is based on the very nature of potency, which is nothing but the capacity for an
act.
21
Cognitive primacy, says Krapiec, occurs when the cognition of one thing requires the
prior cognition of another, so that the one thing may be cognized in light of the other. Act enters
into the understanding of potency; act is the reason of the cognition of potency; and, therefore,
act is cognitively prior to potency. But why does act conceptually justify potency? Potency is
real when it has within it real dispositions in relation to some act. In other words, potency

20
M. KRAPIEC, Metaphysics: An Outline of the History of Being, Peter Lang, New York, 1991, pp. 252-253.
21
T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, Metaphyiscs, Sinag-Tala, Manila, 1991, p. 80.
11
becomes something real through its real ordination to act. Consequently, it is found in relation to
act, and this is a relation that defines potency through act, without which potency is
unintelligible. This is also why the names of a real potency are not derived from the potency, but
from the act that defines and realizes it, the act to which the given potency is ordered.

From this it follows that the understanding and explanation of potency takes place
through act, while the understanding of act takes place spontaneously, by way of induction and
through an analysis of examples (potentia innotescit et definitur per actum, actus autem non
potest definiri). Properly speaking, neither act nor potency has a strict definition, since they are
the first elements of being and cognition; still, this very cognition we have of act and potency is
governed by a certain subordination. On the basis of a previously cognized act, by means of
intuition or a quasi demonstration, we can cognize the character of potency. Act expresses in
itself a certain perfection, a certain completed being, and so it can be cognized without appealing
to potency, whereas potency can never be cognized without act. Act, therefore, specifies
potency and endows it with a determinate content (actus explicat potentiam, seu potentia sumit
speciem ex actu).
22


3. Act has a Causal Primacy over Potency. What is in potency does not become actual
without the influence of something already in act. For example, fire (something in act) causes
cold wood (in potency) to become hot and then to be fire. Without that prior act cold wood
would never of itself be in act. Either it burns by fire (in act) or is heated by the sun (in act)
which causes the cold wood to be hot. Therefore, act has a causal primacy over potency.

4. Act has a Temporal Primacy over Potency. Potency does indeed have a certain
temporal primacy over act; for example, the operative powers of intellect and will (active
potencies) come before the production of the activities of thinking and willing (second acts).
However, the operative potencies of intellect and will point to an agent cause, the soul, which is
prior in act. Another example: an acorn (in potency) came before the full grown pine tree (in
act), but this acorn had to be, of necessity, the fruit of a prior tree (in act). Therefore, act has a
temporal primacy over potency. In examining the temporal primacy of act in relation to
potency, Aristotle makes certain distinctions, separately considering potency in a concrete case,
where the potency in question is passive potency, and potency and act as such, apprehended in
their content absolutely. Passive potency, apprehended in a concrete case in some individual, is
temporally prior to act. On the other hand, act as act, conceived of in terms of the species, is
temporally prior in relation to potency. When we consider some individual, this here human
being, Socrates, we know that this here human being at some previous time did not exist. But if
he now lives and exists, then before he came into existence, before he became act, he existed in
potency in his causes. The state of potency, therefore, temporally precedes the state of act in the
concrete case: the life of a human being. Hence, potency in the order of actualization, in the
order of coming into existence, is prior to act in concrete individuals. A similar situation occurs
with every being that has arisen in time. Real potency, however, is always realized, actualized,
through some act. That which is in potency does not of itself pass from potency to reality, or act;
it does not actualize itself. This actualization takes place under the influence of some factor
external to potency, an acting factor: act.
23


22
M. KRAPIEC, op. cit., p. 251.
23
M. KRAPIEC, op. cit., p. 252.
12
The Relation Between Act and Potency as Constitutive Principles of Being

Regarding the relation between act and potency as principles of being, we can state the
following: 1. Potency is the subject in which the act is received; 2. Act is limited by the potency
which receives it; 3. Act is multiplied through potency; 4. Act is related to potency as that which
is participated to the participant; and 5. The act-potency composition does not destroy the
substantial unity of being.

1. Potency is the Subject in which the Act is Received. We look at a man, for example,
and begin to know his various perfections (acts), like the color of his hair, eyes and skin, without
ever denying that these perfections reside in that person (potency), who is the subject of these
perfections (acts).

2. Act is Limited by the Potency which Receives It. Every act received in a subject is
limited by the capacity of that subject. The perfection of redness in an apple is limited by the
substance apple, its recipient. An apple can only contain as much redness as the dimensions of
that fruit allow. Unreceived act is in itself unlimited, and when one finds limited instances of act,
it is because of a potency which receives and limits it.
24


3. Act is Multiplied Through Potency. The same act can be present in many individuals
which can receive it, as for example, when the specific perfection apple is possessed by many
individual apples because it is present in a potency, namely, prime matter. The same substantial
form is multiplied in many individuals of the same species. Accidents (acts) are also multiplied
by their respective potencies, namely substances. The accident red, for example, is multiplied
insofar as there are many objects having that same color.

Concerning the multiplication of act by potency, Gardeil writes: If potency is the
(intrinsic) principle of limitation, it is also, and for that very reason, the principle of
multiplication. Suppose an act that is not limited by potency; such an act is unlimited or perfect,
and therefore unique. Unique, because if two beings were equally (and infinitely) perfect, one
could not differ from the other; in fact, they would cancel each other. Wherever, then, perfection
is plural, the perfection must be limited. But we know it is not limited by itself, hence by
something not itself; and this, as we have learned, is potency, which limits act (or perfection) by
receiving it and thus makes possible its plurification.
25


Krapiec explains that the question of the limitation of act by potency is connected with
the problem of the multiplicity of beings, an ancient problem whose roots lie in the Eleatic
school. How is the multiplicity of beings to be explained, if act is temporally prior and ultimately
this act can only be pure act? Once again, it is not a question here of a causal interpretation (e.g.,
that this multiplicity arose as a result of the causation known as creation), but of an immanent
explanation: What is the internal cause of the fact that beings are many rather than one? If they
were caused as multiple, then what in them is the inner reason of this multiplicity?

24
Cf. J. F. WIPPEL, Thomas Aquinas and the Axiom that Unreceived Act is Unlimited, The Review of
Metaphysics, 51 (1998), pp. 533-564.
25
H. D. GARDEIL, Introduction to the Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, vol. 4 (Metaphysics), B. Herder, St.
Louis, 1967, pp. 196-197.
13
This problem becomes even more acute when we consider that act itself viewed
analogically, despite the fact that it is something analogical or basically diverse in its
construction, does not express any diversity or multiplicity when viewed from the side of act
itself, from the side of the primary analogate (i.e., in its pure form, for each transcendental
analogy has a primary analogate). Act is then absolutely identical with itself.

What is the reason for multiplicity in beings? If act as act expresses identity with itself
(realized only in the primary analogate of transcendental analogy), then multiplicity is derived
not from the side of act but from the side of some potency that limits and, together with act,
constitutes a being. Why?

The thesis of the multiplication of being is based on the prior thesis of the limitation of
act by potency. All multiplication requires limitation. If the principle of the limitation of act by
potency did not hold, then the fact of the multiplication of beings would also not be possible
and then only one, absolute, all-perfect being would exist. Hence, if manifold beings exist, they
presuppose limitation, and so they presuppose potency.

St. Thomas argument concerning the impossibility of the existence of many Gods, or
supremely perfect beings, will help illuminate this point. If two supremely perfect beings existed,
then they would either differ from one another in some respect or not differ in any respect. If
they did not differ in any respect, then they would not be two beings but one and the same being.
Consequently, only one being would exist, which is contrary to the assumption of the existence
of two beings. If, on the other hand, they differed in some respect, then one being would have a
perfection not possessed by the other. The being not possessing that perfection would already be
a limited being, since it would lack the ontic perfection possessed by the other being. Now, the
cause of limitation lies in potentiality. And so the cause of the multiplication of being also lies in
the potentiality of being. Ontic multiplicity, therefore, necessarily presupposes ontic limitation.

Hence, just as the following formulation was operative in relation to the validity and
binding force of the principle of limitation, namely, that act in the order in which it is act cannot
be limited, so, too, here we should affirm the principle that any act in the order in which it is
act can be multiplied only by passive potency. Ontic multiplication in this case refers to the
individuation of material beings.
26


4. Act is Related to Potency as that Which is Participated to the Participant. The doctrine
of act and potency can be understood using the theory of participation.
27
To participate means to

26
M. KRAPIEC, op. cit., pp. 260-261.
27
Studies on Thomistic participation metaphysics: C. A. HART, Participation and the Thomistic Five Ways, The
New Scholasticism, 26 (1952), pp. 267-282 ; W. NORRIS CLARKE, The Meaning of Participation in St. Thomas
Aquinas, Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, 26 (1952), pp. 147-157 ; L. B.
GEIGER, La participation dans la philosophie de St. Thomas dAquin, Paris, 1953 ; G. LINDBECK, Participation
and Existence in the Interpretation of St. Thomas Aquinas, Franciscan Studies, 17 (1957), pp. 1-22, 107-125; C.
FABRO, Partecipazione e causalit, S.E.I., Turin, 1961 ; H. J. JOHN, Participation Revisited, The Modern
Schoolman, 39 (1962), pp. 154-165 ; C. FABRO, La nozione metafisica di partecipazione, 3
rd
ed., S.E.I. Turin,
1963 ; J. ARTOLA, Creacin y participacin, Publicaciones de la Institucin Aquinas, Madrid, 1963 ; C. FABRO,
Elementi per una dottrina tomistica della partecipazione, Divinitas, 2 (1967), pp. 559-586 ; P. C. COURTS,
Participation et contingence selon Saint Thomas d Aquin, Revue Thomiste, 77 (1969), pp. 201-235 ; J. CHIU
14
have something in part or something in a partial manner. This presupposes that there are other
subjects that possess the same perfection, none of them possessing that said perfection in full.
Also, in participation, the subject cannot be identical to what it possesses; the subject merely
possesses this perfection by participation only. The subject of participation has the perfection,
possesses the perfection; he is not the perfection, he doesnt have the perfection by essence, that
is, in a full and exclusive manner, by being identical with it. Creatures have the act of being
while God is the Act of Being by Essence, that is, Essence and Act of Being are identical in the
Divine Being. Now, while pure actuality is act by essence, the relationship of act and potency is
one of participation. The subject (potency) capable of receiving a perfection (act) is the
participant, and the act itself is that which is participated in by the subject.

5. The Act-Potency Composition does not Destroy the Substantial Unity of a Being. Act
and potency are not subsistent beings (entia) in themselves but rather constituent principles of
finite beings (entia). They are not things but rather the co-principles of a thing. Potency is by
nature a capacity for perfection, a capacity towards an act, to which it is essentially ordered and
without which it would not be able to exist at all (prime matter [potency], for example, exists for
the form [act], without which it simply would not exist). Potencys union with its act cannot
therefore give rise to two individual things, two separate beings.

YUEN HO, La doctrine de la participatin dans le Commentaire de Saint Thomas sur le Liber de Causis, Revue
philosophique de Louvain, 27 (1972), pp. 360-383 ; T. FAY, Participation: The Transformation of Platonic and
Neoplatonic Thought in the Metaphysics of Thomas Aquinas, Divus Thomas, 76 (1973), pp. 50-64 ; O. N.
DERISI, Participacin, acto y potencia y analogia en Santo Toms, Rivista di filosofia neoscolastica, 65 (1974),
pp. 415-435 ; C. FABRO, The Intensive Hermeneutics of Thomistic Philosophy: The Notion of Participation, The
Review of Metaphysics, 27 (1974), pp. 449-491 ; O. N. DERISI, La existencia o esse imparticipado divino, causa
de todo ser participado, Sapientia, 31 (1976), pp. 109-120 ; P. LAZZARO, La dialettica della partecipazione
nella Summa contra Gentiles di S. Tommaso dAquino, Parallelo, Regio Calabria, 1976 ; K. REISENHUBER,
Participation as a Structuring Principle in Thomas Aquinas Teaching on Divine Names, Studies in Medieval
Thought, 20 (1978), pp. 240-242; A. BASAVE, La doctrina metafisica de la participacin en santo Toms de
Aquino, Giornale di Metafisica, 30 (1979), pp. 257-266 ; A. L. GONZLEZ, Ser y participacin, EUNSA,
Pamplona, 1979 ; O. N. DERISI, El fundamento de la metafisica tomista: El Esse e Intelligere Divino, fundamento y
causa de todo ser y entender participados, Sapientia, 35 (1980), pp. 9-26 ; O. N. DERISI, Del ente participado al
Ser imparticipado, Doctor Communis, 35 (1982), pp. 26-38 ; O. N. DERISI, La participacin del ser, Sapientia,
37 (1982), pp. 5-10, 83-86, 243-248 ; P. MAZZARELLA, Creazione, partecipazione, e tempo secondo san
Tommaso dAquino, Studia Patavina, (1982), pp. 308-335 ; O. N. DERISI, La participacin de la esencia, in
Cinquantanni di Magistero Teologico. Scritti in onore di Mons. Antonio Piolanti, Studi tomistici (26), Libreria
Editrice Vaticana, Vatican City, 1985, pp. 173-184 ; C. FABRO, Partecipazione agostiniana e partecipazione
tomistica, Doctor Communis, 39 (1986), pp. 282-291 ; J. F. WIPPEL, Thomas Aquinas and Participation, in
Studies in Medieval Philosophy, Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C., 1987, pp. 117-158 ; C. P.
BIGGER, St. Thomas on Essence and Participation, The New Scholasticism, 62 (1988), pp. 319-348 ; T. TYN,
Metafisica della sostanza. Partecipazione e analogia entis, Edizioni Studio Domenicano, Bologna, 1991, pp. 18-20,
523-583, 813-933 ; R. A. TE VELDE, Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas, Brill, Leiden, 1995 ; J.
F. WIPPEL, Participation and the Problem of the One and the Many, in J. F. Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of
Thomas Aquinas, Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C., 2000, pp. 94-131 ; T. TYN,
Partecipazione, in T. Tyn, Metafisica della Sostanza: Partecipazione e analogia entis, Fede e Cultura, Verona,
2009, pp. 562-624.