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MADISON A commission for William Marbury as justice of the peace for the
County of Washington was signed by Pres. John Adams, but it was never delivered to him. The
signature of the Pres. is the last act necessary to complete the appointment & it is but ministerial on
the part of the Sec. of State to affix the seal & deliver the same to the appointee. The rights vested
thereupon are protected by law; and where a right is violated, so should there be a remedy in this
case mandamus. Where an exec. official is directed by law to perform a certain act, as opposed to
a mere discretionary action, and he reuses or fails to perform such, mandamus can issue to compel
the performance thereof. Although the Act vesting the SC power to issue mandamus can be
considered to extend the powers granted by the Consti, it is emphatically the province of the
Judiciary to determine what the law is & to determine whether to rule upon a case conformably to
the law, or to the Constitution.
SANTIAGO Jr. vs. BAUTISTA third honor only Teodoro Santiago Jr. was ranked 3
Honor by
the School Committee on the Rating of Students for Honors. Represented by his parents, he sues
& seeks the invalidation of the said rankings claiming bias among other grounds. Judcial Function is
the practice of determining what the law is & the rights of the parties w/ respect to a matter subj. of
controversy. It does not include hearing & determining a matter not in the form of a suit or action.
The school board did not exercise judicial functions & it is a rule that such rulings upon contests
and other merits are final & unappelable & no rights vest until after a winner has been proclaimed
by the body. It is comparable to finality of referees verdict.

Presidentail Anti-Graft Commission and transfers its functions to the Investigative and Adjudicatory
Division of the Office of the Deputy Exectuive Secretary for Legal Affairs, is constitutional pursuant to the
President's continuing authority to reorganise the administrative structure of the Office of the President in
order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency.
T h e I AD- ODESL A i s a f a c t - f i n d i n g a n d r e c o mme n d a t o r y b o d y n o t
v e s t e d wi t h q u a s i - j u d i c i a l p o we r s . While the term "adjudicatory" appears part of its
appellation, the IAD-ODESLA cannot try and resolve cases, its authority being limited to the conduct of investigations, preparation
of reports and submission of recommendations. E.O. 13 explicitly states that the IAD-ODESLA shall "perform powers, functions and
duties xxx, of PAGC."Under E.O. 12, the PAGC was given the authority to "investigate or hear administrative cases or complaints
against all presidential appointees in the government" and to "submit its report and
recommendations to the President." The IAD-ODESLA is a fact-finding and recommendatory body to the
President, not having the power to settle controversies and adjudicate cases.

MANILA ELEC. CO. vs. PASAY TRANSPORT CO. SC as arbiter Petitioner invokes the power
granted by Act No. 1446 empowering the SC to act as arbitrator to subsequent franchises and
rights of way to be granted under the franchise awarded to Charles M. Swift or the operation of an
electric railway. The SC can exercise judicial powers only & will abstain from exercising powers
that partake of a non-judicial nature such as the power to facilitate arbitration.

NOBLEJAS vs. TEEHANKEE SC power to discipline only w/in Judiciary Antonio Noblejas was
appointed as Commissioner of Land Registration & was investigated & suspended by Justice Sec.
Claudio Teehankee for approving subdivision plans in excess of the original titles. He invokes RA
No. 1151 w/c grants his position the same compensation, emoluments & privileges as a judge of
the CFI to justify his theory that only the SC may discipline, suspend, or remove him from office.
Such interpretation would violate separation of powers & make many other Presidential appointees
accountable only to the SC such as the Sol. Gen. The SC will engage only is judicial functions &
will not assume any other duty not pertaining to the administration of justice.

DIRECTOR OF PRISONS vs. ANG CHO KIO Ang Cho Kio was convicted of various offenses
committed in the Phils. but was pardoned upon the condition that he is to leave the country never to
return again. He left for Taipei but returned almost 6 years later on a stop-over; he was convinced
by his friends to stay longer. He was identified by the Immigrations investgator, and recommitted to
prison under the Revised Admin. Code. He files for habeas corpus but was denied by the trial court.
The CA likewise denied it but the decision contained a recommendation that the executive facilitate
his departure instead. The only task of the CA was to determine the legality of the petitioners
imprisonment. Only recommendations expressly allowed by law (Art. 5 RPC) may be allowed.
Others would constitute interference w/ the prerogatives of the Exec. Branch. Only relevant
opinions must be contained in the decision.

MARIANO vs. COMELEC Makati City Law RA No. 7854 converted the Mun. of Makati into a
highly urbanized city. It was assailed by the petitioners on the ground that it will have the city
acquire a new corporate existence & thus disregards the terms preivoulsly served by the elective
officials. He thus alleges that Mayor Binay might run and be re-elected in excess of the allowable
consecutive terms among others. These are merely hypothetical & speculative issues w/c have not
yet ripened into an actual case or controversy.

TANO VS SOCRATES - Ordinances deprived them of due process of law, their livelihood, and
unduly restricted them from the practice of their trade, in violation of Section 2, Article XII and
Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution. Second, Office Order No. 23 contained no
regulation nor condition under which the Mayor's permit could be granted or denied; in other words,
the Mayor had the absolute authority to determine whether or not to issue the permit. Third, as
Ordinance No. 2 of the Province of Palawan "altogether prohibited the catching, gathering,
possession, buying, selling and shipping of live marine coral dwelling organisms, without any
distinction whether it was caught or gathered through lawful fishing method," the Ordinance took
away the right of petitioners-fishermen to earn their livelihood in lawful ways. The LGU contends
that this was a valid exercise of power under the general welfare clause and the specific power to
protect the environment.

There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and also
serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A
becoming regard of that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of
extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior") courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and
those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Courts original
jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons
therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is [an] established policy. It is a policy
necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Courts time and attention which are better devoted to
those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Courts docket.
The propensity of litigants and lawyers to disregard the hierarchy of courts in our judicial system by
seeking relief directly from this Court must be put to a halt for two reasons: (1) it would be an imposition
upon the precious time of this Court; and (2) it would cause an inevitable and resultant delay, intended or
otherwise, in the adjudication of cases, which in some instances had to be remanded or referred to the
lower court as the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues
because this Court is not a trier of facts.

Macalintal vs PET - The case at bar is a motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner of the SCs decision
dismissing the formers petition and declaring the establishment of the respondent PET as constitutional.
Petitioner argues that PET is unconstitutional on the ground that Sec 4, Art VII of the Constitution does
not provide for the creation of the PET, and it violates Sec 12, Art VIII of the Constitution. The Solicitor
General maintains that the constitution of the PET is on firm footing on the basis of the grant of
authority to the Supreme Court to be the sole judge of all election contests for the President or
Vice-President under par 7, Sec 4, Art VII of the Constitution.
Yes. The explicit reference of the Members of the Constitutional Commission to a Presidential Electoral
Tribunal, with Fr. Joaquin Bernas categorically declaring that in crafting the last paragraph of Sec. 4, Art
VII of the 1987 Constitution, they constitutionalized what was statutory. Judicial power granted to the
Supreme Court by the same Constitution is plenary. And under the doctrine of necessary implication, the
additional jurisdiction bestowed by the last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution to decide
presidential and vice-presidential elections contests includes the means necessary to carry it into effect.
No. The traditional grant of judicial power is found in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution which
provides that the power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law. The set up embodied in the Constitution and statutes characterize the resolution of
electoral contests as essentially an exercise of judicial power. When the Supreme Court, as PET,
resolves a presidential or vice-presidential election contest, it performs what is essentially a judicial
power. The COMELEC, HRET and SET are not, strictly and literally speaking, courts of law. Although not
courts of law, they are, nonetheless, empowered to resolve election contests which involve, in essence,
an exercise of judicial power, because of the explicit constitutional empowerment found in Section 2(2),
Article IX-C (for the COMELEC) and Section 17, Article VI (for the Senate and House Electoral Tribunals)
of the Constitution.

Malaga vs. Penachos - The Iloilo State College of Fisheries (ISCOF) through its Pre-qualifications, Bids
and Awards Committee (PBAC) caused the publication in the November 25, 26 and 28, 1988 issues of
the Western Visayas Daily an Invitation to Bid for the construction of a Micro Laboratory Building at
ISCOF. Judge Lebaquin issued a restraining order prohibiting (PBAC) from conducting the bidding and
award the project. The defendants filed a motion to lift the restraining order on the ground that the court is
prohibited from issuing such order, preliminary injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction in
government infrastructure project under Sec. 1 of P.D. 1818. They also contended that the preliminary
injunction had become moot and academic as it was served after the bidding had been awarded and

On January 2, 1989, the trial court lifted the restraining order and denied the petition for preliminary
injunction. It declared that the building sought to be constructed at the ISCOF was an
infrastructure project of the government falling within the coverage of the subject law. It does not
automatically follow that ISCOF is covered by the prohibition in the said decree as there are irregularities
present surrounding the transaction that justified the injunction issued as regards to the bidding and the
award of the project.

ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL - Under Section 4 (1), Article III Judicial
Department of the Constitution, which provides that any vacancy in the Supreme Court shall be filled
within 90 days from the occurrence thereof, from a "list of at least three nominees prepared by the
Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy." The JBC has unanimously agreed in their meeting on
January 18, 2011, to start the process of the filling the Vacant position of the Retired Chief Justice.
Judicial Bar Council has published the said announcement in the Daily inquirer and Philippine Star news
papers on January 20, 2010. Despite of the issues JBC has decided to proceed to the next step of the
process by announcing the names of the following Associate Justices: Associate Justice Carpio,
Associate Justice Corona, Associate Justice Carpio Morales, Associate Justice Leonardo-De Castro,
Associate Justice Brion, and Associate Justice Sandoval and inviting the public to file their sworn
complaint, written report, or opposition, if any, not later than February 22, 2010, to the Following
Candidates. Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in
the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary the Constitutional Commission confined the
prohibition to appointments made in the Executive Department. However, Section 4(1) and Section 9,
Article VIII, mandate the President to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court within 90 days from the
occurrence of the vacancy, and within 90 days from the submission of the list, in the case of the lower
courts. The 90-day period is directed at the President, not at the JBC. Thus, the JBC should start the
process of selecting the candidates to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court before the occurrence of the
vacancy. The JBC has no discretion to submit the list to the President after the vacancy occurs, because
that shortens the 90-day period allowed by the Constitution for the President to make the appointment.
For the JBC to do so will be unconscionable on its part, considering that it will thereby effectively and
illegally deprive the President of the ample time granted under the Constitution to reflect on the
qualifications of the nominees named in the list of the JBC before making the appointment. The duty of
the JBC to submit a list of nominees before the start of the President's mandatory 90-day period to
appoint is ministerial, but its selection of the candidates whose names will be in the list to be submitted to
the President lies within the discretion of the JBC. The object of the petitions for mandamus herein should
only refer to the duty to submit to the President the list of nominees for every vacancy in the Judiciary,
because in order to constitute unlawful neglect of duty, there must be an unjustified delay in performing
that duty. The distinction between a ministerial and discretionary act is well delineated. A purely
ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed
manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own
judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done.



Macasiano v National Housing Authority - It is a rule firmly entrenched in our jurisprudence that the
constitutionality of an act of the legislature will not be determined by the courts unless that question is
properly raised and presented in appropriate cases and is necessary to a determination of the case.

PACU v. Secretary of Education - Petitioners assailed that Act 1207 as amended by Act 3075 and
Commonwealth Act 180 is unconstitutional on the following grounds: they deprive the owners of schools
and colleges as well as teachers and parents of liberty and property without due process of law, they
deprive parents of their natural right and duty to rear their children for civic efficiency, their provisions
conferring on the Secretary of Education unlimited power and discretion to prescribe rules and
standards constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative power and any law requiring governmental
approval or permit before a person can exercise a right (in this case, creation of a private school)
amounts to censorship. Respondents contended that the matter constitutes no justiciable controversy,
petitioners are in estoppel to challenge the validity of the said acts and the acts are constitutionally valid.
The Court shall exercise its judicial review only when the petitioners will suffer, or has suffered, an
injury as a result of a statute. The petitioners already have their permits to operate and are actually
operating by virtue of their permits and they did not show that the Secretary of Educations has
threatened to revoke their permits. Thus they did not suffer any injury and naturally need no relief in
the form they are seeking to obtain. Mere apprehension that the Secretary of Education might under the
law withdraw the permit of one of petitioners does not constitute a justiciable controversy. The Court
has decided to look into the matter so it will not be said that they refused to act even in the face of clear
violation of fundamental personal rights of liberty and property.
The power of the State to regulate establishments or business occupations shall mean the power to
require a permit or license.

Tan vs Macapagal - Eugene Tan (Roxas City), Silvestre Acejas (Romblon), and Rogelio Fernandez
(Davao City) as taxpayers submitted petition assailing validity of the Laurel-Leido Resolution (Res. 2127
of the Constitutional Convention). They claim that 1971 CONCON is without power under A15/S1/CON35
and RA 6132 to consider, discuss and adopt proposals which seek to revise CON35 through the adoption
of another form of government. SC dismissed petition after which an MR is submitted. The Court shall
exercise its power of judicial review only when
the petitioners have requisite standing and the issue is ripe for adjudication. The person who assails
validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained,
or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. This rule has been relaxed though where many
decisions nullified, at the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the disbursement of public funds. This
nullification is based upon the theory that expenditure of public funds by an officer of the State for the
purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes misapplication of such funds which may be
enjoined by the taxpayers. Moreover, where a constitutional question is raised, a Senator has usually
been considered to possess of the requisite personality to bring a suit. Petitioners in the present case do
not assert that they qualify under such categories. The doctrine of separation of powers calls for the other
departments being left alone to discharge their duties as they see fit. It is a prerequisite that something
had been accomplished or performed by the executive or legislative branch before a court may come into
the picture. As long as any proposed amendment is still unacted on by it, there is no room for the
interposition of judicial oversight. Only after the 1971 CONCON has made concrete what it intends to
submit for ratification may the appropriate case be instituted.

David vs. Arroyo - On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa
People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency. The factual
bases of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, respondents stated that the proximate cause behind the executive
issuances was the conspiracy among some military officers, leftist insurgents of the New Peoples Army
(NPA), and some members of the political opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate President Arroyo.
They considered the aim to oust or assassinate the President and take-over the reigns of government as
a clear and present danger. Knowing that during grave emergencies, it may not be possible or practicable
for Congress to meet and exercise its powers, the Framers of our Constitution deemed it wise to allow
Congress to grant emergency powers to the President, subject to certain conditions, thus:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress.

Suplico vs. NEDA - Respondent avers that there is no more justiciable controversy with the ZTE National
Broadband Network Project controversy for the Court to resolve. Petitioners contend that because of the
transcendental importance of the issues raised in the petition, which among others, included the
Presidents use of the power to borrow, i.e., to enter into foreign loan agreements, this Court should take
cognizance of this case despite its apparent mootness.
Judicial power presupposes actual controversies, the very antithesis of mootness. In the absence of
actual justiciable controversies or disputes, the Court generally opts to refrain from deciding moot issues.
Where there is no more live subject of controversy, the Court ceases to have a reason to render any
ruling or make any pronouncement.For a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an
actual case or controversy one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal
claims susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or academic or based on extra-legal
or other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of justice. Where the issue has become moot
and academic, there is no justiciable controversy, and an adjudication thereon would be of no practical
use or value as courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest,
however intellectually challenging.
While there were occasions when the Court passed upon issues although supervening events had
rendered those petitions moot and academic, the instant case does not fall under the exceptional cases.
In those cases, the Court was persuaded to resolve moot and academic issues to formulate guiding and
controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines or rules for future guidance of both bench and bar.

GONZALES vs. MACARAIG Jr. item vs provision case Gen. Approp. Act. 0f 1989 enacted into
law, but Sec. 55 thereof vetoed by Pres. Aquino. It provides that if Congress disapproves of or
reduces and item or approp. the Exec. may not augment the same by the use of approp. for other
items. Said vetoed clause is not a provision but an item, w/in the veto power of the Pres. It is an
inappropriate provision; hence treated as mere item. Provisions in an Approp. Law must relate to
specific approp. therein. It is merely an expression of Congressional policy. It is likewise a non-
appropriation item inserted in an approp. law. Note: power to augment lies dormant unless
otherwise authorized by law, in this case it was granted. It is, however, ideally embodied in
separate legislation. Proper remedy of Congress is to override the veto, not this court. Veto

PASCUAL vs. SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS Build roads on my private subdivision case
Sen. Jose Zulueta owned Antonio Subd. RA No. 920 appropriated funds for public roads, claimed
that he will donate parcels of his subd. to Govt. subj. to the condition that they will be used as
roads in effect increasing their value. Gov. Wenceslao Pascual of Rizal objected & sought to enjoin
Sec. of Public Works from enforcing. Congress is w/o power to appropriate public funds (& levy
taxes) for anything but a public purpose. Incidental interest to the public will not justify such use of
public money for private interests. Also violates prohibition against direct/indirect interest of
legislators in any grant/contract of the govt. Petition GRANTED.

Galicto vs Aquino - Pres. Aquino, on September 8, 2010, issued EO 7 ordering (1) a moratorium on the
increases in the salaries and other forms of compensation, except salary adjustments under EO 8011 and
EO 900, of all GOCC and GFI employees for an indefinite period to be set by the President, and (2) a
suspension of all allowances, bonuses and incentives of members of the Board of Directors/Trustees until
December 31, 2010. The petitioner claims that as a PhilHealth employee, he is affected by the
implementation of EO 7, which was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Locus standi or legal standing has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in a
case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that
is being challenged. The gist of the question on standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake
in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions. This requirement of standing relates to the constitutional mandate that this Court settle only
actual cases or controversies. The Supreme Court was not convinced that the petitioner has
demonstrated that he has a personal stake or material interest in the outcome of the case because his
interest, if any, is speculative and based on a mere expectancy. In this case, the curtailment of future
increases in his salaries and other benefits cannot but be characterized as contingent events or
expectancies. To be sure, he has no vested rights to salary increases and, therefore, the absence of
such right deprives the petitioner of legal standing to assail EO 7. Neither can the lack of locus standi be
cured by the petitioners claim that he is instituting the present petition as a member of the bar in good
standing who has an interest in ensuring that laws and orders of the Philippine government are legally
and validly issued. This supposed interest has been branded by the Court in Integrated Bar of the Phils.
(IBP) v. Hon. Zamora, as too general an interest which is shared by other groups and [by] the whole
citizenry. Thus, the Court ruled in IBP that the mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule
of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in that case.

LEGASPI VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION - Civil Service Commission denied Valentin Legaspis
(petitioner) request for information on the civil service eligibilities of 2 people employed as sanitarians,
Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, in the Health Department in Cebu. Petitioners claims that his right
to information is guaranteed by the Constitution prays for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of
mandamus to compel the respondent Commission to disclose said information. The Solicitor General
challenges the petitioners standing to sue upon the ground that the latter does not possess any legal
right to be informed of the civil services eligibilities of the government employees concerned. SolGen
further argues that there is no ministerial duty on the part of the Commission to furnish the petitioner with
the information he seeks.

Civil Service Commission is ordered to open its register of eligible for the position of sanitarian, and to
confirm or deny, the civil service eligibility of Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, for said position in
the Health Department of Cebu City, as requested by the petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi. The petitioner,
being a citizen who, as such is clothed with personality to seek redress for the alleged obstruction of the
exercise of the public right. We find no cogent reason to deny his standing to bring the present suit. In
recognizing the people's right to be informed, both the 1973 Constitution and the New Charter expressly
mandate the duty of the State and its agents to afford access to official records, documents, papers and
in addition, government research data used as basis for policy development, subject to such limitations as
may be provided by law.while the manner of examining public records may be subject to reasonable
regulation by the government agency in custody thereof, the duty to disclose the information of public
concern, and to afford access to public records cannot be discretionary on the part of said agencies.
Certainly, its performance cannot be made contingent upon the discretion of such agencies. Otherwise,
the enjoyment of the constitutional right may be rendered nugatory by any whimsical exercise of agency
discretion. The constitutional duty, not being discretionary, its performance may be compelled by a writ of
mandamus in a proper case.

But the constitutional guarantee to information on matters of public concern is not absolute. It does not
open every door to any and all information. Under the Constitution, access to official records, papers, etc.,
are "subject to limitations as may be provided by law" (Art. III, Sec. 7, second sentence). The law may
therefore exempt certain types of information from public scrutiny, such as those affecting national
security. It follows that, in every case, the availability of access to a particular public record must be
circumscribed by the nature of the information sought, i.e., (a) being of public concern or one that involves
public interest, and, (b) not being exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee.
case of denial of access, the government agency has the burden of showing that the information
requested is not of public concern, or, if it is of public concern, that the same has been exempted by law
from the operation of the guarantee.

KILOSBAYAN vs. MANUEL L. MORATO - In Jan. 25, 1995, PCSO and PGMC signed an Equipment
Lease Agreement (ELA) wherein PGMC leased online lottery equipment and accessories to PCSO.
(Rental of 4.3% of the gross amount of ticket or at least P35,000 per terminal annually). 30% of the net
receipts is allotted to charity. Term of lease is for 8 years. PCSO is to employ its own personnel and
responsible for the facilities. Upon the expiration of lease, PCSO may purchase the equipment for P25
million. Feb. 21, 1995. A petition was filed to declare ELA invalid because it is the same as the Contract
of Lease Petitioner's Contention: ELA was same to the Contract of Lease.. It is still violative of PCSO's
charter. It is violative of the law regarding public bidding. It violates Sec. 2(2) of Art. 9-D of the 1987
Constitution. Standing can no longer be questioned because it has become the law of the case
Respondent's reply: ELA is different from the Contract of Lease. There is no bidding required. The power
to determine if ELA is advantageous is vested in the Board of Directors of PCSO. PCSO does not have
funds. Petitioners seek to further their moral crusade. Petitioners do not have a legal standing because
they were not parties to the contract

STARE DECISIS cannot apply. The previous ruling sustaining the standing of the petitioners is a
departure from the settled rulings on real parties in interest because no constitutional issues were actually
involved. LAW OF THE CASE cannot also apply. Since the present case is not the same one litigated by
the parties before in Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, Jr., the ruling cannot be in any sense be regarded as the
law of this case. The parties are the same but the cases are not. RULE ON CONCLUSIVENESS cannot
still apply. An issue actually and directly passed upon and determine in a former suit cannot again be
drawn in question in any future action between the same parties involving a different cause of action. But
the rule does not apply to issues of law at least when substantially unrelated claims are involved. When
the second proceeding involves an instrument or transaction identical with, but in a form separable from
the one dealt with in the first proceeding, the Court is free in the second proceeding to make an
independent examination of the legal matters at issue. Since ELA is a different contract, the previous
decision does not preclude determination of the petitioner's standing. STANDING is a concept in
constitutional law and here no constitutional question is actually involved. The more appropriate issue is
whether the petitioners are REAL PARTIES in INTEREST.

TONDO MEDICAL CENTER EMPLOYEES V. CA - President Estrada issued Executive Order No. 102,
entitled Redirecting the Functions and Operations of the Department of Health, which provided for the
changes in the roles, functions,and organizational processes of the DOH. Under the assailed executive
order, the DOH refocused its mandate from being the sole provider of health services to being a provider
of specific health services and technical assistance, as a result of the devolution of basic services to local
government units.

Petitioners allege that the HSRA should be declared void, since it runs counter to the aspiration and
ideals of the Filipino people as embodied in the Constitution. They claim that the HSRAs policies of fiscal
autonomy, income generation, and revenue enhancement violate Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15 and18 of
Article II, Section 1 of Article III; Sections 11 and 14 of Article XIII; and Sections 1 and 3 of Article XV of
the 1987Constitution. Such policies allegedly resulted in making inaccessible free medicine and free
medical services. This contention is unfounded. As a general rule, the provisions of the Constitution are
considered self-executing, and do not require future legislation for their enforcement. For if they are not
treated as self-executing, the mandate of the fundamental law can be easily nullified by the inaction of
Congress. However, some provisions have already been categorically declared by this Court as non self-
executing. In Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation ,this Court declared that Sections
11, 12, and 13 of Article II; Section 13 of Article XIII; and Section 2 of Article XIV of the1987 Constitution
are not self-executing provisions. In Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, the Court referred to Section 1 of
ArticleXIII and Section 2 of Article XIV of the Constitution as moral incentives to legislation, not as
judicially enforceable rights. These provisions, which merely lay down a general principle, are
distinguished from other constitutional provisions as non self-executing and, therefore, cannot give rise to
a cause of action in the courts; they do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights. Some of
the constitutional provisions invoked in the present case were taken from Article II of the Constitution --
specifically, Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15 and 18 -- the provisions of which the Court categorically ruled to
be non self-executing in the aforecited case of Taada v. Angara. Moreover, the records are devoid of
any explanation of how the HSRA supposedly violated the equal protection and due process clauses that
are embodied in Section 1 of Article III of the Constitution. There were no allegations of discrimination
or of the lack of due process in connection with the HSRA. Since they failed to substantiate how these
constitutional guarantees were breached, petitioners are unsuccessful in establishing the relevance of
this provision to the petition, and consequently, in annulling the HSRA. In the remaining provisions,
Sections 11 and 14 of Article XIII and Sections 1 and 3 of Article XV, the State accords recognition to the
protection of working women and the provision for safe and healthful working conditions; to the adoption
of an integrated and comprehensive approach to health; to the Filipino family; and to the right of children
to assistance and special protection, including proper care and nutrition. Like the provisions that were
declared as non self-executory in the cases of Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation
and Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, they are mere statements of principles and policies. As such, they
are mere directives addressed to the executive and the legislative departments. If unheeded, the remedy
will not lie with the courts; but rather, the electorates displeasure may be manifested in their votes.

FACTS: Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in Manila. He filed for reconsideration which was
elevated to the SC and the SC remanded the appeal to the lower court for a new trial. While awaiting new
trial, he appealed for probation alleging that the he is innocent of the crime he was convicted of. Judge
Tuason of the Manila CFI directed the appeal to the Insular Probation Office. The IPO denied the
application. However, Judge Vera upon another request by petitioner allowed the petition to be set for
hearing. The City Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera has no power to place Cu Unjieng under
probation because it is in violation of Sec. 11 Act No. 4221 which provides that the act of Legislature
granting provincial boards the power to provide a system of probation to convicted person. Nowhere in
the law is stated that the law is applicable to a city like Manila because it is only indicated therein that only
provinces are covered. And even if Manila is covered by the law it is unconstitutional because Sec 1 Art 3
of the Constitution provides equal protection of laws for the reason that its applicability is not uniform
throughout the islands. The said law provides absolute discretion to provincial boards and this also
constitutes undue delegation of power because providing probation, in effect, is granting freedom, as in

The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows: This Act shall apply only in
those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation
officer at rates not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be
appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation Office. This
only means that only provinces that can provide appropriation for a probation officer may have a system
of probation within their locality. This would mean to say that convicts in provinces where no probation
officer is instituted may not avail of their right to probation.
There is no difference between a law which denies equal protection and a law which permits such denial.
A law may appear to be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it permits of unjust and illegal
discrimination, it is within the constitutional prohibition.

Baker v. Carr - In the State legislature of Tennessee, representation was determined by a 1901 law
setting the number of legislators for each county. Urban areas, which had grown greatly in population
since 1901, were underrepresented. Mayor Baker of Nashville brought suit, saying that the apportionment
denied voters of urban areas equal protection of the law as guaranteed by the 14th Amendment. The
federal court refused to enter the political thicket of State districting, and the case was appealed to the
Supreme Court. In a 6-2 ruling, the Supreme Court held that federal courts have the power to determine
the constitutionality of a State's voting districts. The plaintiffs' constitutional right to have their votes count
fairly gave them the necessary legal interest to bring the lawsuit. He argued that the case did not involve
a political question that prevented judicial review. A court could determine the constitutionality of a
State's apportionment decisions, he wrote, without interfering with the legislature's political judgments.
The case was returned to the federal court. If a voter no longer has the full constitutional value of his
franchise [right to vote], and the legislative branch fails to take appropriate restorative action, the doors of
the courts must be open to him.

By holding that voters could challenge the constitutionality of electoral apportionment in federal court,
Baker v. Carr opened the doors of the federal courts to a long line of apportionment cases. One year
later, Douglas extended the Baker ruling by establishing the one man, one vote principle in Gray v.
Sanders. In 1964, Wesberry v. Sanders extended that principle to federal elections, holding that as
nearly as practicable, one man's vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as another's.

Charles Baker (P) was a resident of Shelby County, Tennessee. Baker filed suit against Joe Carr, the
Secretary of State of Tennessee. Bakers complaint alleged that the Tennessee legislature had not
redrawn its legislative districts since 1901, in violation of the Tennessee State Constitution which required
redistricting according to the federal census every 10 years. Baker, who lived in an urban part of the
state, asserted that the demographics of the state had changed shifting a greater proportion of the
population to the cities, thereby diluting his vote in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Baker sought an injunction prohibiting further elections, and sought the remedy of reapportionment or at-
large elections. The district court denied relief on the grounds that the issue of redistricting posed a
political question and would therefore not be heard by the court.
1. Do federal courts have jurisdiction to hear a constitutional challenge to a legislative apportionment?
2. What is the test for resolving whether a case presents a political question?

Holding and Rule (Brennan)
1. Yes. Federal courts have jurisdiction to hear a constitutional challenge to a legislative
2. The factors to be considered by the court in determining whether a case presents a political
question are:
1. Is there a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department (i.e. foreign affairs or executive war powers)?
2. Is there a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving the issue?
3. The impossibility of deciding the issue without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for
non-judicial discretion.
4. The impossibility of a courts undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the
respect due coordinate branches of government.
5. Is there an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made?
6. Would attempting to resolve the matter create the possibility of embarrassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question?
The political question doctrine is based in the separation of powers and whether a case is justiciable is
determined on a case by cases basis. In regards to foreign relations, if there has been no conclusive
governmental action regarding an issue then a court can construe a treaty and decide a case. Regarding
the dates of the duration of hostilities, when there needs to be definable clarification for a decision, the
court may be able to decide the case.
The court held that this case was justiciable and did not present a political question. The case did
not present an issue to be decided by another branch of the government. The court noted that judicial
standards under the Equal Protection Clause were well developed and familiar, and it had been open
to courts since the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment to determine if an act is arbitrary and
capricious and reflects no policy. When a question is enmeshed with any of the other two branches
of the government, it presents a political question and the Court will not answer it without further
clarification from the other branches.

Osmea vs Pendatun - Then Congressman Osmea Jr filed a verified petition for declaratory relief,
prohibition and certiorari with preliminary injunction against Congressman Pendatun and others in their
capacity as members of the Special Committee created by House Resolution 59. He asked for the
annulment of the resolution on the ground of infringement upon his parliamentary immunity. He further
asked that the respondents should not require him to substantiate his charges against the president with
the admonition that if he failed to do so he must show cause why the House should not punish him. Said
charges emanated from his one-hour privileged speech entitled A Message to Garcia, which constituted
a serious assault upon the dignity of Garcia as the then President.
Section 15, Article 6 of the 1935 Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity upon member s of the
legislature which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every parliament in a democratic world. It
guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible in
criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum outside the Hall of Congress. However, it
does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body whenever his words and conduct are
considered disorderly or unbecoming of a member therein. Therefore, Osmeas petition is dismissed.
DE AGBAYANI VS. PNB - Agbayani obtained a loan P450 from PNB secured by a REM, which was to
mature 5 years later. 15 years later, PNB sought to foreclose the REM. Agbayani filed a complaint
claiming that it was barred by prescription. She also claims that she obtained an injunction against the
sheriff. PNB argued that the claim has not yet prescribed if the period from the time of issuance of EO32
to the time when RA 342 was issued should be deducted.
E0 32 was issued in 1945 providing for debt moratorium. RA 342 was issued in 1948 - extension of the
debt moratorium The RA 342 was declared void and since it was an extension of EO 32, EO 32 was
likewise nullified.
Here, RA 342 (the debt moratorium law) continued EO 32, suspending the payment of debts by war
sufferers. However RA 342 could not pass the test of validity. PNB claims that this period should be
deducted from the prescriptive period since during this time the bank took no legal steps for the recovery
of the loan. As such, the action has not yet prescribed.

The general rule is that an unconstitutional act because it suffers from infirmity, cannot be a source of
legal rights or duties. When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former
shall be void and the latter shall govern.

However, prior to the declaration of nullity of such challenged legislative act must have been in force and
had to be complied with. This is so as until after the judiciary, in an appropriate case declares its
invalidity, it is entitled to obedience and respect. Such legislative act was in operation and presumed to be
valid in all respects. It is now accepted that prior to its being nullified, its existence as a fact must be
reckoned with. This is merely to reflect the awareness that precisely because the judiciary is the
governmental organ which has the final say on whether a legislative act is valid, a period of time may
have elapsed before it can exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It
would e to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no recognition of what had
transpired prior to such adjudication.

The past cannot always be erased by judicial declaration. (OPERATIVE FACT DOCTRINE). The
existence of a statute prior to its being adjudged void is an operative fact to which legal consequences
are attached. During the 8 year period that EO 32 and RA 342 were in force, prescription did not run.
Thus, the prescriptive period was tolled in the meantime prior to such adjudication of invalidity.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MATEO - Appellant Efren Mateo was charged with ten counts of
rape by his step-daughter Imelda Mateo. During the trial, Imeldas testimonies regarding the rape incident
were inconsistent. She said in one occasion that incident of rape happened inside her bedroom, but other
times, she told the court that it happened in their sala. She also told the court that the appellant would
cover her mouth but when asked again, she said that he did not. Despite the irreconcilable testimony of
the victim, the trial court found the accused guilty of the crime of rape and sentenced him the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. The Solicitor General assails the factual findings of the trial and recommends an
acquittal of the appellant.

While the Fundamental Law requires a mandatory review by the Supreme Court of cases where the
penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, or death, nowhere, however, has it proscribed
an intermediate review. If only to ensure utmost circumspection before the penalty of death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment is imposed, the Court now deems it wise and compelling to provide in these
cases a review by the Court of Appeals before the case is elevated to the Supreme Court. Where life and
liberty are at stake, all possible avenues to determine his guilt or innocence must be accorded an
accused, and no case in the evaluation of the facts can ever be overdone. A prior determination by the
Court of Appeals on, particularly, the factual issues, would minimize the possibility of an error of
judgment. If the Court of Appeals should affirm the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, it could then render judgment imposing the corresponding penalty as the circumstances so
warrant, refrain from entering judgment and elevate the entire records of the case to the Supreme Court
for its final disposition.

Under the Constitution, the power to amend rules of procedure is constitutionally vested in the Supreme
Article VIII, Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts.

Procedural matters, first and foremost, fall more squarely within the rule-making prerogative of the
Supreme Court than the law-making power of Congress. The rule here announced additionally allowing
an intermediate review by the Court of Appeals, a subordinate appellate court, before the case is elevated
to the Supreme Court on automatic review is such a procedural matter.

Pertinent provisions of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, more particularly Section 3 and Section
10 of Rule 122, Section 13 of Rule 124, Section of Rule 125, and any other rule insofar as they provide
for direct appeals from the Regional Trial Courts to the Supreme Court in cases where the penalty
imposed is death reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, as well as the resolution of the Supreme Court
en banc, dated 19 September 1995, in Internal Rules of the Supreme Court in cases similarly involving
the death penalty, are to be deemed modified accordingly.


This is the case of Bingbong Crisologo. A group of armed men set fire various inhabited houses in
Bantay, Ilocos Sur. Bingbong was charged but pleaded not guilty. AO 221 the Secretary of Justice
authorized Judge Anover of San Fernando La Union, to hold special term in Ilocos Sur. AO 226
Secretary of Justice authorized Judge Gutierrez (Vigan) to transfer the case to Judge Anovers Court in
La Union. Prosecution moved that Judge Gutierrez allow a transfer of the case to the La Union Circuit
Court by virtue of said AOs and for security and personal safety of the witnesses. The accused obviously
opposed the transfer of the case, claiming that the transfer of the case would be railroading them into a
conviction. Judge Gutierrez denied the transfer. Prosecution now imputes gadalej on Judge Gutierrez.

The Secretary of Justice has no power to assign cases to be heard. Any such power even in the guise of
AOs trenches upon the time-honored separation of the Executive and Judiciary. The law creating the
transfer of cases to Circuit Criminal Courts should be effected by raffle. Nevertheless, the COURT WILL
ORDER THE TRANSFER. There is a justified refusal by the witnesses in Ilocos Sur to testify where they
felt their lives would be endangered. Judge Gutierrez failed to consider the possibility of miscarriage of
justice may result. The witnesses had earlier manifested of the imperious necessity of transferring the
place of trial outside of Ilocos Sur, in the interest of truth and justice, and the State is to be given a fair
chance to present its side.

Here, to compel the prosecution to proceed to trial in a locality where its witnesses will not be at liberty to
reveal what they know is to make a mockery of the judicial process. The exigencies of justice demand
that the general rule should yield to occasional exceptions wherever there are weighty reasons therefor.
On of the incidental and inherent powers of the courts is that of TRANSFERRING THE TRIAL OF CASES
from one court to another of equal rank, whenever the imperative of securing a fair and impartial trial, or
of preventing a miscarriage of justice so demands.

*judicial power includes the transfer of cases. It is one of the incidental or inherent attributes necessary
for an effective administration of justice. The courts can by appropriate means do all things necessary to
preserve and maintain every quality needful to make the judiciary an effective institution of government.*

LINA VS. PURISIMA - Lualhati Lina was a bookkeeper at PVB. Petitioner files for mandamus to compel
Cabanos (President of Phil. Veterans Bank) to restore Lina to her position. Lina claims she was removed
from office by Cabanos who acted in gadalej. It appeared from the annexes of the amended petition that
Lina was dismissed by Cabanos pursuant to LOI # 13 / LOI # 19 for being notoriously undesirable. The
RTC dismissed the petition because:
Since the removal of Lina was pursuant to LOI issued by the President pursuant to Proclamation 1081,
the validity or legality of said act is beyond the power of the courts to review, much less modify, or
reverse. This is one of the express limitations upon the power of the Courts in GENERAL ORDER # 3 by
President Marcos.
The General Order provides that the courts cannot rule upon the validity or legality of any decree order or
act issued by President Marcos, pursuant to Proclamation 1081.
The petitioners right to redress is beyond dispute. When the RTC invoked General Order #3, it was
nothing short of an unwarranted abdication of judicial authority. The judge was apparently unaware that
the Court has always deemed General Order # 3 as practically inoperative even in the light of
Proclamation 1081. There is unanimity among Us in the view that it is for the Court rather than the
Executive to determine whether or not We make take cognizance of any given case involving the validity
of the acts of the Executive purportedly under the authority of martial law proclamations.
Also, the President has publicly acknowledged that even if there was martial law, it is still subject to the
authority and jurisdiction of the SC.
Thus, the RTC committed grave error in not taking jurisdiction over the case. Ordinarily, the case should
be remanded to the judge to be tried on the merits. Yet, this Supreme Court, whose power and duty to do
justice are inherent, plenary and imperative, extends to all instances where it appears that final resolution
of the parties involved full opportunity to be heard. Thus, the SC may at its option, whenever it feels the
best interest of justice would be thereby subserved, dispense with the usual procedure of remanding the
case to the court of origin for its own judgment, and instead, the SC may already resolve the issues and
rended the final judgment on the merits.
SC reinstated Lina to work.

SANTERO VS. CAVITE - Pablo Santero was had 2 sets of children from 2 different wives. He died.
The respondents were the Santero Children, the children by the 2
wife, although she was not married to
the father.
A motion for allowance was filed by the Santero children, through their guardian/mother Diaz. The filed
the motion for support, education, clothing, and medical allowance. This was granted by the court. This
was opposed by the other set of Santero Children (petitioners), the children by the 1
wife, who was also
not married to the father. They claim that the wards are no longer schooling and have already attained
the age of majority. Diaz countered that the reason why the children were not enrolled was due to lack of
funds. She cited Art 290/188 of the Civil Code (on support), as well as Rule 83 of the Rules of Court
(allowance to the widow and family in estate proceedings). The allowance was granted by the court.
Another motion for allowance was filed by Diaz for 3 additional children. These 3 additional children were
already of age, but Diaz claims that all of her children have the right to receive allowance, as advance of
the shares in their inheritance. Again, this was opposed by the other Santero Children (petitioners),
claiming that the children are employed and married, and that there is insufficient funds. They claim that
under the Rules of Court, they are no longer entitled to allowance.
The controlling provision should be Art 290/188 of the Civil Code (support) and not Rule 83 of the Rules
of Court (allowance to widow and family). The fact that respondents are of age, and are gainfully
employed, or married is of no moment and should not be regarded as the determining factor of their right
to allowance under Art 290/188.
While the Rules of Court limits allowances to the widow and only the minor children, the New Civil Code
gives the surviving spouse and his/her children without distinction. Hence, even the children who are no
longer minors are entitled to allowances as advances from their shares in the inheritance from their
father. Since the provision of the Civil Code, a substantive law, gives the surviving spouse and the
children the right to receive support during the liquidation of the estate of the deceased, such right cannot
be impaired by Rule 83 of the Rules of Court which is a procedural rule.

DAMASCO VS. LAGUI - Atty Damasco was charged with grave threats. He pleaded not guilty but was
convicted only of light threats. He was order to pay a fine of P100. Damasco filed a motion to rectify and
set aside the dispositve portion of the decision. He claims that he cannot be convicted of light threats,
necessarily included in the grave threats charge, as the lighter offense had already prescribed when the
information was filed. (light offenses prescribe in 2 mos, but the information was filed 70 days after) The
lower court denied the motion, explaining that since the Court had acquired jurisdiction to try the case
because the information was filed within the prescriptive period for grave threats, the same cannot be lost
by prescription, if after the trial what has been proven is merely light threats.

Prescription of a crime is the loss or waiver by the State of its right to prosecute an act prohibited or
punished by law. While it is a rule that an accused who fails to move to quash before pleading is deemed
to waive all objections, this rule cannot apply to the defense of prescription, which under Art 69 of the
RPC extinguishes criminal liability. To apply the suggestion could contravene said Art, which is part of
substantive law. This position is further strengthen by the Rules on CrimPro, which added the extinction
of offense as one of the exceptions to the general rule regarding the effects of a failure to assert a ground
of a motion to quash.

The claim that when an accused has been found to have committed a lesser offense includible within a
graver offense charged, he cannot be convicted of a lesser offense if it has already prescribed can only
be done through an overhaul of some existing rules on crimpro to give prescription a limited meaning (ie,
a mere bar to the commencement of criminal action and therefore waivable). BUT this will have to
contend with the Constitutional provision that while the Supreme Court has the power to promulgate rules
concerning the protection and enforcement of rights.. such rules shall not diminish, modify or increase
substantive rights.

In Re Cunanan - Congress passed Republic Act Number 972, commonly known as the Bar Flunkers
Act of 1953. In accordance with the said law, the Supreme Court then passed and admitted to the bar
those candidates who had obtained an average of 72 per cent by raising it to 75 percent.

After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for admission to the bar
invoking its provisions, while other motions for the revision of their examination papers were still pending
also invoked the aforesaid law as an additional ground for admission. There are also others who have
sought simply the reconsideration of their grades without, however, invoking the law in question. To avoid
injustice to individual petitioners, the court first reviewed the motions for reconsideration, irrespective of
whether or not they had invoked Republic Act No. 972.

RA No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar, those candidates who suffered
from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparation. In the judicial system from which ours
has been evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law in the
practice of the profession and their supervision have been indisputably a judicial function and
responsibility. We have said that in the judicial system from which ours has been derived, the admission,
suspension, disbarment or reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is
concededly judicial.

On this matter, there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of the judicial and legislative
departments of the government. It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the
practice of law belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of
permissive character, or as other authorities may say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the
license. Republic Act Number 972 is held to be unconstitutional.

In Re Letter of the UP Law Faculty: "Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the Faculty of the
University of the Philippines College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and
Misrepresenation in the Supreme Court"
Statement of UP Professors. While the statement was meant to reflect the educators opinion on the
allegations of plagiarism against Justice Del Castillo, they treated such allegation not only as an
established fact, but a truth. They expressed dissatisfaction over Justice Del Castillos explanation on
how he cited the primary sources of the quoted portions and yet arrived at a contrary conclusion to those
of the authors of the articles supposedly plagiarized. The statement bore certain remarks which raise
concern for the Court. The first paragraph concludes with a reference to the decision in Vinuya v.
Executive Secretary as a reprehensible act of dishonesty and misrepresentation by the Highest Court of
the land. The authors also not only assumed that Justice Del Castillo committed plagiarism, they went
further by directly accusing the Court of perpetrating extraordinary injustice by dismissing the petition of
the comfort women in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary. They further attempt to educate this Court on how
to go about the review of the case. The insult to the members of the Court was aggravated by imputations
of deliberately delaying the resolution of the said case, its dismissal on the basis of polluted sources, the
Courts alleged indifference to the cause of petitioners, as well as the supposed alarming lack of concern
of the members of the Court for even the most basic values of decency and respect.
The publication of a statement by the faculty of the UP College of Law regarding the allegations of
plagiarism and misrepresentation in the Supreme Court was totally unnecessary, uncalled for and a rash
act of misplaced vigilance. Of public knowledge is the ongoing investigation precisely to determine the
truth of such allegations. More importantly, the motion for reconsideration of the decision alleged to
contain plagiarized materials is still pending before the Court. We made it clear in the case of In re Kelly
that any publication, pending a suit, reflecting upon the court, the jury, the parties, the officers of the court,
the counsel with reference to the suit, or tending to influence the decision of the controversy, is contempt
of court and is punishable.
The UP Law faculty would fan the flames and invite resentment against a resolution that would not
reverse the Vinuya decision. This runs contrary to their obligation as law professors and officers of the
Court to be the first to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which they owe fidelity according
to the oath they have taken as attorneys, and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice.

Bustos v. Lucero - The petitioner herein, an accused in a criminal case, filed a motion with the Court of
First Instance of Pampanga after he had been bound over to that court for trial, praying that the record of
the case be remanded to the justice of the peace court of Masantol, the court of origin, in order that the
petitioner might cross-examine the complainant and her witnesses in connection with their testimony, on
the strength of which warrant was issued for the arrest of the accused. The motion was denied and that
denial is the subject matter of this proceeding.
According to the memorandum submitted by the petitioners attorney to the Court of First Instance in
support of his motion, the accused, assisted by counsel, appeared at the preliminary investigation. In that
investigation, the justice of the peace informed him of the charges and asked him if he pleaded guilty or
not guilty, upon which he entered the plea of not guilty. Then his counsel moved that the complainant
present her evidence so that she and her witnesses could be examined and cross-examined in the
manner and form provided by law. The fiscal and the private prosecutor objected, invoking section 11 of
rule 108, and the objection was sustained. In view thereof, the accuseds counsel announced his
intention to renounce his right to present evidence, and the justice of the peace forwarded the case to
the court of first instance.
Section 11 of Rule 108 does not curtail the sound discretion of the justice of the peace on the matter.
While section 11 of Rule 108 defines the bounds of the defendants right in the preliminary investigation,
there is nothing in it or any other law restricting the authority, inherent in a court of justice, to pursue a
course of action reasonably calculated to bring out the truth.
Defendant cannot, as a matter of right, compel the complaint and his witnesses to repeat in his presence
what they had said at the preliminary examination before the issuance of the order of arrest. The
constitutional right of an accused to be confronted by the witnesses against him does not apply to
preliminary hearings nor will the absence of a preliminary examination be an infringement of his right to
confront witnesses. As a matter of fact, preliminary investigation may be done away with entirely without
infringing the constitutional right of an accused under the due process clause to a fair trial.

PNB Vs. ASUNCION - PNB granted credit accommodations and advances to Fabar Inc, for the
importation of machinery and equipment. The outstanding balance was P8.4M. The credit
accommodations are secured by the joint and several signatures of Barredo, Borromeo (respondents).
For failure to pay their obligations, PNB instituted a collection suit against Fabar and the Barredo,
Borromeo. Before the case could be decided, one of the respondents, BARREDO, died.
So the court issued an order of dismissal of the case, since money claim is a personal action, it is
extinguished upon death, and that the remedy is to file a claim with the estate during settlement
proceedings. The case was dismissed against ALL defendants. PNB filed a MR claiming that the
dismissal should only be against the deceased Barredo. Hence they file this certiorari.
According to the Rules of Court, nothing therein prevents a creditor from proceeding against the surviving
solidary debtors. Said provision merely sets up the procedure in enforcing collection in case a creditor
choose to pursue his claim against the estate of the deceased solidary debtor.
What is applicable in this is Art 1216 of the Civil Code. The creditor has the right to proceed against
anyone of the solidary debtors or some or all of them simultaneously. The choice is left to the solidary
creditor to determine against whom he will enforce collection. In case of death of one of the solidary
debtors, the creditor can choose to proceed against the surviving debtors, without necessity of filing a
claim in the estate of the deceased debtor.
To require the creditor to proceed against the estat would deprive him of his substantive rights under the
Civil Code. If the Rules of Court (Rule 86) would be applied literally, in effect, it would repeal the Civil
Code (Art 1216), because the creditor would have no chose but to proceeed against the estate of Barredo
only. Obviously, this would diminish the PNBs right under the Civil Code to proceed against any one,
some or all of the solidary debtors. Such a construction is not sanctioned by the principle that,
made to prevail over the Civil Code, the former being merely procedural, while the latter substantive.
Moreover, the Constitution provides that the rules promulgated by the SC should not diminish, increase,
or modify substantive rights.

PEOPLE v. LACSON - Petitioner asserts that retroactive application of penal laws should also cover
procedures, and that these should be applied only to the sole benefit of the accused. Petitioner asserts
that Sec 8 was meant to reach back in time to provide relief to the accused in line with the constitutional
guarantee to the right to speedy trial.

1. WON the 5 Associate Justices inhibit themselves from deciding in the MFR given they were only
appointed in the SC after his Feb. 19, 2002 oral arguments.
The rule should be applied prospectively. The court upheld the petitioners contention that while 8
secures the rights of the accused, it doesnt & shouldnt preclude the equally important right of the State
to public justice. If a procedural rule impairs a vested right, or would work injustice, the said rule may not
be given a retroactive application.

2. WON the application of the time-bar under 8 RCP 117 be given a retroactive application w/o
reservations, only & solely on the basis of its being favorable to the accused.
The Court isnt mandated to apply rules retroactively just because its favorable to the accused. The time-
bar under the new rule is intended to benefit both the State & the accused. When the rule was approved
by the court, it intended that the rule be applied prospectively and not retroactively, for to do so would be
tantamount to the denial of the States right to due process. A retroactive application would result in
absurd, unjust & oppressive consequences to the State & to the victims of crimes & their heirs.

Ampong vs. CSC - Petitioner Sarah P. Ampong and Decir were public school teachers under the
supervision of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS). Later, Ampong transferred to
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Alabel, Sarangani Province, where she was appointed as Court
Interpreter III. On July 5,1994, a woman representing herself as Evelyn Decir went to the Civil Service
Regional Office (CSRO) No. XI, Davao City, to claim a copy of her PBET Certificate of Eligibility. During
the course of the transaction, the CSRO personnel noticed that the woman did not resemble the picture of
the examinee in the Picture Seat Plan (PSP). Upon further probing, it was petitioner Ampong who took
and passed the examinations under the name Evelyn Decir.

The answer to the question at the outset is in the negative but the Court rules against the petition on the
ground of estoppel. It is true that the Civil Service Commission (CSC) has administrative jurisdiction over
the civil service. As defined under the Constitution and the Administrative Code, the civil service
embraces every branch, agency, subdivision, and instrumentality of the government, and government-
owned or controlled corporations. Pursuant to its administrative authority, the CSC is granted the power
to control, supervise, and coordinate the Civil Service examinations.This authority grants to the CSC the
right to take cognizance of any irregularity or anomaly connected with the examinations.

However, the Constitution provides that the Supreme Court is given exclusive administrative supervision
over all courts and judicial personnel. By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that can
oversee the judges and court personnels compliance with all laws, rules and regulations. It may take the
proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation. No other branch of government
may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.

MACEDA VS. VASQUEZ - Abrera was from the Public Attorneys Office. He alleged that Maceda, the
Judge of RTC-Antique, falsified his certificate of service. Maceda was said to have certified all criminal
and civil cases have been decided within a period of 90 days. Abrera claims that in truth and in fact, no
decision has been rendered in 5 civil and 10 criminal cases. Macedas defense is that he had been
granted by the SC an extension of 90 days to decide the said cases. He also argues that the
Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over him since the offense charged arose from the performance of his
official duties, which is under the control and supervision of the SC. (He claims that the Ombudsman
encroaches on the SCs power of supervision over inferior courts).

A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is administratively liable to the SC for serious misconduct
and inefficiency, AS WELL AS criminally liable to the State under the RPC for felonious act. However, in
the absence of any administrative action taken against him by the SC with regard to his certificate of
service, the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Courts power of
administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of

The SCs administrative supervision includes all courts and all court personnel, from the Presiding Justice
of the CA, down to the lowest MTC clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only the SC that can oversee the
judges and court personnels compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against
them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this power,
without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.

Thus, the Ombudsman should first refer the matter to the SC for determination whether the said
certificates reflect the true status of his pending case load, since only the Court has the necessary
records to make such determination. The Ombudsman cannot compel this Court, to submit its records, or
to allow its personnel to testify on this matter.

Should a judge, having been granted by the SC an extension of time, report these cases in his certificate
of service? As this question had not yet been raised with, much less resolved by this Court, how could the
Ombudsman resolve the present criminal case that requires the resolution of said question?

In fine, where a criminal complaint against a judge or other court employee arises from their
administrative duties, the Ombudsman must DEFER ACTION on said complaint and REFER THE SAME
to this Court for determination whether said judge or court employee had acted within the scope of their
administrative duties.

Chavez vs. Judicial and Bar Council - In 1994, instead of having only seven members, an eighth
member was added to the JBC as two representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC one from
the House of Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then,
the JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the representatives from
the Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote each. At present, Senator Francis Joseph G.
Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as
representatives of the legislature. It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition.
Respondents argued that the crux of the controversy is the phrase a representative of Congress. It is
their theory that the two houses, the Senate and the House of Representatives, are permanent and
mandatory components of Congress, such that the absence of either divests the term of its substantive
meaning as expressed under the Constitution. Bicameralism, as the system of choice by the Framers,
requires that both houses exercise their respective powers in the performance of its mandated duty which
is to legislate. Thus, when Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution speaks of a representative from
Congress, it should mean one representative each from both Houses which comprise the entire
Congress. Respondents further argue that petitioner has no real interest in questioning the
constitutionality of the JBCs current composition. The respondents also question petitioners belated filing
of the petition.
(1) Whether or not the conditions sine qua non for the exercise of the power of judicial review have been
met in this case; and
(2) Whether or not the current practice of the JBC to perform its functions with eight (8) members, two (2)
of whom are members of Congress, runs counter to the letter and spirit of the 1987 Constitution.
(1) Yes. The Courts power of judicial review is subject to several limitations, namely: (a) there must be an
actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act
must have standing to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such
that he has sustained or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (c) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality
must be the very lis mota of the case. Generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when these
conditions sine qua non are present, especially when the constitutionality of an act by a co-equal branch
of government is put in issue.
The Court disagrees with the respondents contention that petitioner lost his standing to sue because he
is not an official nominee for the post of Chief Justice. While it is true that a personal stake on the case
is imperative to have locus standi, this is not to say that only official nominees for the post of Chief Justice
can come to the Court and question the JBC composition for being unconstitutional. The JBC likewise
screens and nominates other members of the Judiciary. Albeit heavily publicized in this regard, the JBCs
duty is not at all limited to the nominations for the highest magistrate in the land. A vast number of
aspirants to judicial posts all over the country may be affected by the Courts ruling. More importantly, the
legality of the very process of nominations to the positions in the Judiciary is the nucleus of the
controversy. The claim that the composition of the JBC is illegal and unconstitutional is an object of
concern, not just for a nominee to a judicial post, but for all citizens who have the right to seek judicial
intervention for rectification of legal blunders.
(2) Yes. The word Congress used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic
sense. No particular allusion whatsoever is made on whether the Senate or the House of Representatives
is being referred to, but that, in either case, only a singular representative may be allowed to sit in the
JBC. The seven-member composition of the JBC serves a practical purpose, that is, to provide a solution
should there be a stalemate in voting.
It is evident that the definition of Congress as a bicameral body refers to its primary function in
government to legislate. In the passage of laws, the Constitution is explicit in the distinction of the role
of each house in the process. The same holds true in Congress non-legislative powers. An inter-play
between the two houses is necessary in the realization of these powers causing a vivid dichotomy that
the Court cannot simply discount. This, however, cannot be said in the case of JBC representation
because no liaison between the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. Hence, the term
Congress must be taken to mean the entire legislative department. The Constitution mandates that the
JBC be composed of seven (7) members only.
Notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of the JBC, all its prior official
actions are nonetheless valid. Under the doctrine of operative facts, actions previous to the declaration of
unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are not nullified.

NITAFAN VS. CIR - The judges here seek to perpetually prohibit the CIR from making any deduction of
withholding taxes from their salaries.
They submit that any tax withheld from their emoluments or compensation as judicial officers constitute a
decrease or diminution of their salaries which is contrary to the Constitution mandating that their salaries
shall not be decreased during their term. They also contednt that this is anathema to an independent

Are the salaries of judges exempt from income tax? NO. The clear intent of the Con-Com was to delete
an express grant of exemption from payment of income tax to members of the Judiciary, so as to give
since then authorized the continued deduction of withholding tax from the salaries of all the members of
the Judiciary. The Court has discarded the doctrine in Perfecto vs. Meer which exempted them from
payment of income tax.

The Court thus reiterates that the salaries of Justices and Judges are properly subject to the general
income tax law applicable to all income earners and that the payment of such taxes does not fall within
the constitutional protection against the decrease of their salaries during their continuance in office.

(there was a discussion on the intent of the framers.. Fr. B in the deliberations proposed an amendment
that the salaries shall not be diminished but may still be subject to the general income tax.

The debates, interpellations and opinions expressed disclosed that the true intent of the framers of the
Constitution was to make the salaries of the Judiciary taxable. In the spirit that all citizens should bear
their aliquot part of the cost of maintaining the government, they must all share in the burden of general
income taxation equitably.

VARGAS VS. RILLORAZA - Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the Sec 14 of the Peoples Court
Section 14 provides: SEC. 14. Any Justice of the Supreme Court who held any office or position under
the Philippine Executive Commission or under the government called Philippine Republic may not sit and
vote in any case brought to that Court under section thirteen hereof in which the accused is a person who
held any office or position under either or both the Philippine Executive Commission and the Philippine
Republic or any branch, instrumentality and/or agency thereof.

"If, on account of such disqualification, or because of any of the grounds of disqualification of judges,
in Rule 126, section I of the Rules of Court, or on account of illness, absence or temporary disability
the requisite number of Justices necessary to constitute a quorum or to render judgment in any case
is not present, the President may designate such number of Judges of First Instance,Judges-at-large
of First Instance, or Cadastral Judges, having none of the disqualifications set forth in said section
one hereof, as may be necessary to sit temporarily as Justices of said Court, in order to form a
quorum or until a judgment in said case is reached."

They claim that:
(a) It provides for qualifications of members of the Supreme Court, other than those provided in
section 6, Article VIII of the Philippine Constitution.
"(b) It authorizes the appointment of members of the Supreme Court who do not possess the
qualifications set forth in section 4, Article VIII, of the Philippine Constitution.
"(c) It removes from office the members of the Supreme Court by means of a procedure other than
impeachment, contrary to
Article IX, of the Philippine Constitution.
"(d) It deprives the' Commission on Appointments of Congress of its constitutional prerogative to
confirm or reject appointments to the Supreme Court.
"(e) It creates two Supreme Courts.
"(f) It impairs the rule making power of the Supreme Court, contrary to section 13, Article VIII, of the
Philippine Constitution.
"(g) it is a Bill of Attainder, for it punishes by disqualification members of the Supreme Court who
rendered said public service during the Japanese occupation.
"(h) it denies the equal protection of the laws
"(i) It is an ex post pacto legislation.
"(j) it amends the Constitution by a procedure not sanctioned by Article XV, of the Philippine
"(k) It destroys the independence of the Judiciary, and it permits the 'packing' of the Supreme court in
certain cases, either by Congress or by the President."

The Solgen countered that:
"1. Power of Congress to enact section 14 of Commonwealth Act No. 682.
"2. Section 14 of Commonwealth Act No. 682 does not and is not intended to provide an additional
qualification :for members of the Supreme Court, much less does it amend section 6, Article VIII, of
the Constitution of the Philippines.
"3. Qualifications of members of the Supreme Court prescribed in section 6, Article Vill of the
Constitution 'apply to permanent "appointees"--not to temporary 'designees.'
"4. Section 5, Article Vill of the Constitution is not applicable to temporary designations under section
14, commonwealth Act No. 682.
"5. It does not remove but merely disqualifies the members of the Supreme Court affected to sit and
vote in the particular class of cases therein mentioned.
"6. It does not create an additional 'Special Supreme Court,'
"7. It does not impair the rule-making power of the - Supreme Court but merely supplements the
Rules of Court.
"8. It is not a bill of attainder.
"9. It is not an ex post pacto law.
"10. It does not deny equal protection of the laws either to the Justices of the Supreme Court affected
or to the treason indictees; concerned.
"11. It does not amend any constitutional provision.
"12. It does not destroy the independence of the judiciary or curtail the jurisdiction of the Supreme

1) Whether the Congress had power to add to the pre-existing ground for disqualification of a Justice.
2) Whether a person may act as Justice of the SC who has not been duly appointed by the President and
not confirmed by the CA, even only as DESIGNEE
3) Whether the manner of designation by the President can constitutionally sit temporarily as Justice of
the SC.

1. NO. If section 14 were to be effective, such members of the Court who held any office or position under
the Philippine Executive Commission, would be disqualified from sitting and voting in the instant case,
because the accused herein is a person who likewise held an office under the PEC. In other words, what
the constitution ordained as a power and a duty to be exercised and fulfilled by said members of the
Court, the challenged law would prohibit them from exercising and fulfilling. IN short, what the constitution
directs, the section 14 prohibits. This is a clear repugnancy to the fundamental law.

Whatever modification the legislature may propose must not contravene the provisions of the constitution.
Thus, the disqualification added by Sec 14 to those already existing at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution is arbitrary, irrational and violative of the constitution.

2. NO. No person not so appointed by the President WITH the consent of the CA, may act as Justice of
the SC. The designation made by Section 14 does not comply with the requirement of appointment. An
additional disqualifying circumstance of the designee is the lack of confirmation or consent by the CA.
So, it may happen that a designee under Sec 14 sitting as a substitute Justice of the SC, and
participating therein in the deliberations and functions of the SC, does not possess the qualifications of
regular members of the SC.
NO temporary composition of the SC is authorized by the Constitution. The phrase unless otherwise
provided for by law does NOT authorize any legislation that would alter the composition of the SC, no
matter how brief a time it may be imagined. In principle, what matters is not the length or shortness of the
alternation of the constitutional composition of the Court, but the very permanence and unalterability of
that constitution so long as the constitution which ordains it remains permanent and unaltered.

3. NO. No matter how brief or temporary the participation of the judge, there is no escaping that he would
be participating in the deliberations of the the SC, and his vote would count as much as that of any
regular Justice. A temporary member thereof is a misnomer, for that is not a position contemplated by
the constitution. The Constitution is clear that the CJ and the Justices who compose the SC have to be
appointed by the President and confirmed by the CA. Mere designation under Sec 14, does not satisfy
said requirement.

The designees cannot be such members in view of the fact that they have not been appointed nor

De La Llana vs Alba - In 1981, BP 129, entitled An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds
Therefor and for Other Purposes, was passed. De la Llana was assailing its validity because, first of all,
he would be one of the judges that would be removed because of the reorganization and second, he said
such law would contravene the constitutional provision which provides the security of tenure of judges of
the courts, He averred that only the SC can remove judges NOT Congress.

The SC ruled the following way: Moreover, this Court is empowered to discipline judges of inferior courts
and, by a vote of at least eight members, order their dismissal. Thus it possesses the competence to
remove judges. Under the Judiciary Act, it was the President who was vested with such power. Removal
is, of course, to be distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of the office. There can be no
tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is
an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint
of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the
incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of separation. As to its effect, no distinction
exists between removal and the abolition of the office. Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases
to be a member of the judiciary. In the implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore, it would be in
accordance with accepted principles of constitutional construction that as far as incumbent justices and
judges are concerned, this Court be consulted and that its view be accorded the fullest consideration. No
fear need be entertained that there is a failure to accord respect to the basic principle that this Court does
not render advisory opinions. No question of law is involved. If such were the case, certainly this Court
could not have its say prior to the action taken by either of the two departments. Even then, it could do so
but only by way of deciding a case where the matter has been put in issue. Neither is there any intrusion
into who shall be appointed to the vacant positions created by the reorganization. That remains in the
hands of the Executive to whom it properly belongs. There is no departure therefore from the tried and
tested ways of judicial power. Rather what is sought to be achieved by this liberal interpretation is to
preclude any plausibility to the charge that in the exercise of the conceded power of reorganizing the
inferior courts, the power of removal of the present incumbents vested in this Tribunal is ignored or
disregarded. The challenged Act would thus be free from any unconstitutional taint, even one not readily
discernible except to those predisposed to view it with distrust. Moreover, such a construction would be in
accordance with the basic principle that in the choice of alternatives between one which would save and
another which would invalidate a statute, the former is to be preferred.

People vs Gacott - For failure to check the citations of the prosecution, the order of respondent RTC
Judge Eustaquio Gacott, Jr. dismissing a criminal case was annulled by the SC. The respondent judge
was also sanctioned with a reprimand and a fine of P10,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law. The
judgment was made by the Second Division of the SC.
To support the Courts ruling, Justice Regalado relied on his recollection of a conversation with former
Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion who was the Chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary of the 1986
Constitutional Commission of which Regalado was also a member.
The very text of the present Sec. 11, Art. VIII of the Constitution clearly shows that there are actually two
situations envisaged therein. The first clause which states that the SC en banc shall have the power to
discipline judges of lower courts, is a declaration of the grant of that disciplinary power to, and the
determination of the procedure in the exercise thereof by, the Court en banc. It was not therein intended
that all administrative disciplinary cases should be heard and decided by the whole Court since it would
result in an absurdity.
The second clause, which refers to the second situation contemplated therein and is intentionally
separated from the first by a comma, declares on the other hand that the Court en banc can order their
dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues
in the case and voted therein. In this instance, the administrative case must be deliberated upon and
decided by the full Court itself.
Pursuant to the first clause which confers administrative disciplinary power to the Court en banc,
a decision en banc is needed only where the penalty to be imposed is the dismissal of a judge,
officer or employee of the Judiciary, disbarment of a lawyer, or either the suspension of any of
them for a period of more than 1 year or a fine exceeding P10, 000.00 or both.
Indeed, to require the entire Court to deliberate upon and participate in all administrative matters or cases
regardless of the sanctions, imposable or imposed, would result in a congested docket and undue delay
in the adjudication of cases in the Court, especially in administrative matters, since even cases involving
the penalty of reprimand would require action by the Court en banc.

Air France vs Carrascoso -

PEOPLE V. ESCOBER - Escober, Punzalan and 3 others were accused of committing robbery with
homicide in Balintawak, QC on Dec. 3, 82. Mr. Vicenta Chuas office was robbed of P5K and his children
were stabbed to death. Escober was company guard & alleged mastermind. Abuyen was former guard
relieved due to absence & found sleeping on duty.

1. WON RTC conformed with Art. 9, Sec 9 of the Constitution
No. Art 9. Sec 9 states that decision should have facts, not present in decision. Generalizations and
conclusions without detailed facts as basis. Appellate court cant check if findings were sufficient and
logical. Justice and fairness over speed. People v. Banayo: decision should show evidence, facts based
on evidence and supporting jurisprudence and authority

2. WON Escober is guilty
No. Opening of gate is normal when someone knocks especially if you know him. He might have lacked
better judgment or laxity in performance of duties though. The firing of the gun as a ritual to avoid
suspicion is too risky a ritual. It can kill. 5-10 minutes too short a time to plan a conspiracy. Abuyen even
asked Punzalan to kill Escobar. Then Abuyen pointed the gun at Escobar and asked Punzalan to tie him;
he also tries to shoot him. Offering the information that he was not hit was also just to assure employer
who seemed concerned. Mrs Chuas statement may have been confused cause it was taken last.
Perhaps she forgot details due to agitation.

3. WON Punzalan is guilty
Yes. Extrajudicial confession is inadmissible because it was not properly performed and was without
counsel. Conspiracy was proven. He was fetched and he fled with suspects. He shouldve gone to the
police if innocent. People vs. Rogel: Homicide through robbery, all principals in robbery are liable for
homicide unless they tried preventing it.

Salazar vs Marigomen