Davidson - Shemonah Peraqim and Fusul Al-Madani

Maimonides' "Shemonah Peraqim" and Alfarabi's "Ful Al-Madan"
Author(s): Herbert Davidson

Source: Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research, Vol. 31 (1963), pp. 33-50
Published by: American Academy for Jewish Research
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MAIMONIDES' SHEMONAH
PERAQIM
and
ALFARABI'S FUSUL AL-MADANI*
By
HERBERT DAVIDSON
University
of
California,
Los
Angeles
In the introduction to the brief treatise
commonly
called
Shemonah
Peraqim,'
Maimonides
speaks
of the sources that he
has used. He writes that he has drawn from various rabbinic
texts,
from ancient and recent
philosophers, and,
in the most
general terms,
from "the
compositions
of
many
men.""2
Then
he adds that sometimes he
may
have cited an entire
"quotation"
from a "well known book" without
indicating
that he was
quot-
ing.
He
gives
two reasons for not
stating
his source in these
cases.
First, giving
references would add
unnecessarily
to the
length
of his
essay. Secondly,
the
very
name of "that
person"
from whom he is
quoting might
cause a narrow-minded reader
to
suppose
that the statement is
necessarily "corrupt"
and that
it must contain some hidden "evil
content";
if
people
knew
whom Maimonides is
quoting they
would
reject
the
quotation
a
priori.
Therefore Maimonides
says
that he
thought
it best to
omit the name of "the author"
(al-qd'il).3
*
Professor Moshe
Perlmann
was kind
enough
to check
my transcriptions
of the Arabic.
1Maimonides
simply
called it "Introduction to Abot." Cf. D.
Rosin,
Die
Ethik des
Maimonides, Breslau, 1876, p. 31,
n. 1.
2
Cf. both the Hebrew and Arabic in
J.
I.
Gorfinkle,
The
Eight Chapters of
Maimonides on
Ethics,
New
York, 1912,
Hebrew
section, p.
6. Gorfinkle's
edition contains the Arabic and Hebrew of Maimonides' introduction to
Shemonah
Peraqim
followed
by
the Hebrew text of the book itself. The
Arabic text of the
book,
in Hebrew characters and without the
introduction,
was edited
by
M. Wolff as
Musa
Maimuni's Acht
Capitel (second edition,
Leiden, 1903). Subsequent
references will be to these two editions.
3
Cf. the Hebrew and Arabic in
Gorfinkle,
Hebrew
section, pp.
6-7.
33
34 HERBERT DAVIDSON
[2]
Maimonides is
being deliberately
indefinite here. The
"person"
or
"author"
that he mentions
may
be
simply
whoever
happens
to be the author of each
particular passage
that he
quotes.
However,
it is also
possible
to understand him as
saying
that
there is
just
one definite writer whom he
quotes extensively
and
whose name he hesitates to mention. If this
really
is Maimonides'
intention,
it is not
very
difficult to
guess
whom he
means;
his
two main
philosophic
sources were Avicenna and
Alfarabi,
and
of the two Alfarabi did far more work on the
subject
of ethics.
As it
happens,
we have
recently
been
provided
with a critical
edition of the text of Alfarabi which Maimonides
actually
does
quote
extensively,
and which he
surely
is
referring
to in his
introduction. This is
Fus~il
al-Madani
("Aphorisms
of the
Statesman")
edited
by
D. M.
Dunlop.4
Maimonides'
hesitance
to refer to his source
explicitly
is due to the fact that in sections
which he does not
quote,
Alfarabi denied such fundamental
religious
doctrines as divine
knowledge of,
and divine
providence
over individual
beings.s
Maimonides
presumably
feared that if
readers knew that he was
quoting
Alfarabi's
Fus.l
they
would
reject
as
"corrupt"
even the moral and
psychological
sections
of the book which he considers
perfectly acceptable.'
Maimonides'
dependence
on Alfarabi can be shown
by setting
any
of a number of
passages
in
Shemonah Peraqim opposite
corresponding passages
in
Fus.il
al-Madani.
As
specimens,
let
us consider two
passages,
one in which Maimonides
only para-
phrases
Alfarabi and another in which he
quotes
him verbatim.
In the
paraphrase,
Maimonides
repeats
Alfarabi's
description
of the
appetitive faculty
of the
soul, including
a list of a number
4
The
Fusil
al-Madani
(Aphorisms of
the
Statesman) of al-Farabi,
edited
with an
English
translation, introduction,
and
notes, by
D. M.
Dunlop,
Cambridge, England,
1961.
s
Cf.
Fuswfl
al-Madani, ??
81 and 82.
6
While not of decisive
significance,
it is
perhaps
worth
mentioning
that
Maimonides,
who
apparently gave
no formal title to the work that we are
considering,
did describe it as
eight
fus.l,
eight
sections or
chapters,
most
probably
with Alfarabi's
Fus.il
in mind. Cf. the
very
end of his
introduction,
Gorfinkle,
Hebrew
section, p.
7. On
fusiil
as
part
of a title of a book and as a
literary genre,
used
among
others
by Maimonides himself,
cf.
Dunlop,
pp.
9-10, 79.
[3]
PERA.IM
35
of emotional states located in that
faculty.
In the second
passage,
Maimonides
quotes, virtually verbatim,
a definition of a "con-
tinent" man and a definition of a
truly
"virtuous"
man.7
Then
from Alfarabi's remark that the continent man "is
equivalent
to the virtuous man in some
respects,"
Maimonides infers that
in other
respects
he is not
equivalent,
but inferior.
Alfarabi, Fu?Il al-Madani, p. 107,
11. 12-17
u4
43
~~ 0
A-~y~ C-~~~~LfJ
~j ylj~ j~~19f
~~219J4J7
Shemonak
Peraqim, chapter 1, p. 3,
11. 19-28
O.? ueJ
6%
j LJ1
tit
?;
j
Z..6 u I
1, aj
?sJ ~4 JA$) 4%UIJ
7
Cf.
Aristotle,
Eth. Nic
VII, 2, 1146a,
10-16.
36 HERBERT DAVIDSON
[4]
Alfarabi,
Fus.il
al-Madani, p. 112,
11.
3-7, 13-14
4j~W jJoi1d4JJyJ
.
-jo
J
.
I i Wt.
c" Lk~u .Ylrh ~j, p
4 L4%~~L &
Jw L a
J
U4J
Shemonak
Peraqim, chapter 6, p. 20,
1. 18
-
p. 21,
1. 37
JUL4;2
4I I ~
AAJ,!
I Ao
AJ C utRA
L LtL4 Low-$cjl~r
y-1 J-2
c
- 5 4
44 a
1t
i
r("U ~14; ~~kt y ~L141
A more
complete picture
of Maimonides'
dependence
can be
given by
an
analysis
of
Shemonah Peraqim arranged
in such a
way
that his use of
Fus.il
al-Madani
is
apparent. Page
references
are to the Arabic text of
Shemonah
Peraqim published by
M.
[5]
PERAJIM
37
Wolff8
followed,
when
appropriate, by
a reference to the Arabic
text of Alfarabi
published by Dunlop.9
Analysis
of
Shemonah
Peraqim
Chapter
I.
A.
Although
it contains several
faculties,
the human soul is
indivisible
(p. 1,
11.
1-11).-"
B. The "healer" of souls must know the nature of the soul
and its
parts (p. 1,
11.
12-18;
cf.
Fusafl
?4; p. 105,
11.
1-2,
5-6 is
quoted fairly closely).
C. The five
parts
of the soul are the
nutritive, sensitive,
imaginative, appetitive,
and intellectual
(p. 1,
11. 19-20=
Fus.al,
?6, p. 106,
11.
3-4).
D. Even the non-intellectual faculties of the human soul are
essentially
different from those of the souls of animals and
plants (p. 1,
1. 20 -
p.
2,
1.
22)."
E. The functions of the five faculties of the human soul.
Fus9il,
?6.
1. The subfaculties of the
faculty
of nutrition
(p. 2,
1. 23
-
p. 3,
1.
2;
cf.
Fus.al,
?6, p. 106,
1. 3
-
p.
107,
8
Cf.
above,
n. 2.
9 Cf.
above,
n. 4. An
anonymous
Hebrew translation of the
Fusfil
is extant
(Uri 78,
6 and Mich.
370, 3,
both in the Bodleian
Library).
A
comparison
of
that translation with Ibn Tibbon's translation of
Shemonah Peraqim
showed
some
similarities,
but
many differences,
in the Hebrew terms used to translate
the Arabic technical terms.
ro This is the view
expressed by
Alfarabi
elsewhere;
cf. Kitab Ard'
Ahl
al-Madinah
al-Fadilah,
ed. F.
Dieterici, Leiden, 1895, p.
37. Cf. also Avicenna's
De
Anima,
edited
by
F.
Rahman, Oxford, 1959, V, 7, pp.
250 ff. The
position,
according
to
Rosin,
was taken
against Hippocrates;
cf. Die Ethik des Mai-
monides, p. 45,
n.
5; p. 46,
n. 1. It is
probably
more correct to
say
that it was
taken
against
Galen. Cf.
Galen,
Omnia
Opera,
ed.
Kuehn,
Vol.
xv, p. 292,
and
Avicenna,
Canon
of
Medicine
I, 1, 6,
1
(Hebrew text, Naples, 1492, p. 5b;
Latin
text, Venice, 1582, p. 25b;
Arabic
text, Rome, 1593, p. 33),
where
although
Galen is not described as
believing
that man has three
separate
souls,
his
position
is
distinguished
from the "correct"
philosophic position.
I"
Cf.
Aristotle,
De Anima
II, 3, 414b,
20
ff.;
Avicenna's De
Anima,
ed,
Rahman, V, 7, p.
261 which contains an
image
similar to the one that
Maimonides uses.
38 HERBERT DAVIDSON
[6]
1.
6;
p. 106,
11. 10-11 are
quoted
with a
change
in order.
Alfarabi's detailed
explanations
are omitted
by
Mai-
monides since
they belong
to "the art of medicine"
and are out of
place here).
2. Sensation
(p. 3,
11.
2-5;
cf.
Fus.il,
?6, p. 107,
1.
7).
3.
Imagination (p. 3,
11.
6-19;
cf.
Fusiul,
?6, p. 107,
11.
8-11;
11. 8-9 are
quoted
almost
verbatim).'2
4.
Appetition (p. 3,
11.
19-28;
a
fairly
close
paraphrase
of
Fus.il,
?6, p. 107,
11.
12-17).'3
5. Intellect
(p. 4,
11.
1-11;
cf.
Fusul,
?6, p. 107,
1. 18
-
p. 108,
1. 12. P.
107,
1. 18
--p.
108,
1. 3 is
quoted
closely,
and
p. 108,
11. 9-12 is
quoted verbatim'4).
F. The soul is a kind of matter and it reaches
completion
only by receiving
an intellectual form
(p. 4,
11.
12-22).'S
Chapter
II.
A. The observance and non-observance of
misewot
takes
place
in the sensitive and
appetitive
faculties of the soul
(p. 4,
1. 23
-
p. 5,
1.
13;
the remark on the
activity
of
imagina-
tion and
sense
during sleep
is
virtually
verbatim from
Fusul, ?6, p. 107,
1.
11).
B. Intellectual and moral virtue. An
expansion
of
Fus.Ql,
?7.
1. The intellectual virtues
(p. 5,
11.
14-23;
a
quotation
from
Fus.ul,
?7, p. 108,
11.
13-14, expanded by explana-
tions drawn from
?31, p. 125,
11.
1-2; ?34, p. 126,
11.
12-13; ?46, p. 133,
11.
5-6).16
2. The moral virtues. All of them are found in the
appetitive faculty (p. 5,
1. 24
-
p. 6,
1.
1;
an
expansion
of
Fu.il,
?7, p. 108,
11.
14-16).
12
Rosin,
Die Ethik des
Maimonides, p. 49,
n.
2,
saw that
virtually
the same
formula
appears
in Alfarabi's
Kitdb
al-Siydsah al-Madaniyah.
13
Cf. above, p.
35.
1' Maimonides' text
suggests
a
slightly
different
reading
for
FuwSil, p. 108,
11. 10-11.
15 Cf.
al-Madinah al-Fadilah,
ed.
Dieterici, pp.
43-44.
i6
This section is to be
compared
with
Aristotle,
Eth. Nic.
VI, 3, 1139b,
16
ff.
To Alfarabi's list Maimonides adds
"acquired
intellect"
('aql mustafad)
as
an
intellectual virtue.
[7] MAIMONIDES' SHEMONAH PERAdIM 39
3. The sensitive and
imaginative
faculties can be said
to act
correctly
but not to have virtues
(p. 6,
11.
1-6).
Chapter
III.
A. Like the
body,
the soul is
subject
to sickness and
health,
i. e.,
vice and virtue
(p. 6,
11.
9-14;
verbatim from
Fusfil,
?1, p. 103,
11.
5-8).
B. A sick
soul,
like a sick
body,
mistakes the bitter for the
sweet
(p. 6,
11.
15-26; virtually
verbatim from
Fus.il,
?37,
p.
129,
1. 11 -
p. 130,
1.
1,
and
p. 130,
11.
2-4,
with some
interpolations).
C. How the cure of
unhealthy
souls takes
place (p. 6,
1. 26 -
p. 7,
1.
23).
Chapter
IV.
A. Good actions are means between two extremes both of
which are
bad;
virtues are intermediate states of the soul
from which such actions
proceed;
illustrations
(p. 7,
1. 24-
p. 8,
1.
20;
a
quotation
of
Fuszil,
?16
with an
interpolation
and minor
alterations).17
17
In this
passage
Maimonides lists nine moral virtues with
corresponding
pairs
of vices. The
relationship
of the
passage
to Alfarabi and Aristotle is
as follows:
Eth.
Nic.
III,
6 - V is a
lengthy
discussion of ten moral virtues
with the
corresponding vices,
and of an
eleventh, modesty
or
shame,
which
lies between bashfulness and
shamelessness,
and
which,
Aristotle
states,
is
not
strictly
a virtue. Our text of Alfarabi
lists,
without
any
of the
explana-
tions and in a different
order,
nine virtues and their
corresponding
vices.
Modesty
is
included,
the
separate
virtues of
liberality
and
magnificence
are
apparently
treated as one
(sakhd')
because
they
are so
similar,
and the list is
reduced to nine
by
the omission of the
virtue,
unnamed
by Aristotle,
which
lies between ambition and the lack of ambition. Maimonides
copies
Alfarabi's
list in the same order and
using virtually
the same terms.
However,
he omits
one
virtue,
the virtue of
friendliness,
and adds the virtue of satisfaction
(qand'ah), lying
between ambition
(raghbah)
and the lack of ambition
(kasal);
this means that Maimonides had a more
complete
text of Alfarabi. In addition
Maimonides
simplifies
Alfarabi's list in several
places by giving
a
single
term
where Alfarabi had used
several,
and he also
interpolates
an
explanation
intended to
prevent any
confusion between moral
behavior,
and the moral
virtue itself which is a "state" of the soul. Most but not all of the virtues
discussed in Hilkot De'ot
I,
1
parallel
those discussed in Shemonah
Peraqim.
40 HERBERT DAVIDSON
[8]
B. The error of
considering
the extreme states of the soul to
be virtues
(p. 8,
1. 20 -
p. 9,
1.
5).
C. Virtues and vices are inculcated
by repeated
actions
(p. 9,
11.
6-11, virtually
verbatim from
Fus.il,
?8, p. 108,
1. 17 -
p. 109,
1.
2).
D-G.
Curing vices;
asceticism is a
vice;
the Biblical command-
ments aim at
instilling virtue;
the ideal man
(p. 9,
1. 11 -
p.
16,
1.
11).
Chapter
V.
The
object
of human life is the
knowledge
of God.
Chapter
VI.
A. The
"philosophers'
" definitions of a "continent" and a
truly
"virtuous" man
(p. 20,
1. 17 -
p. 21,
1.
5;
a
virtually
verbatim
quotation
of
Fusil,
?13, p. 112,
11.
3-7, 13-14,
with an
interpolated explanation).'8
B-C. The rabbis' view on this
question;
harmonization of the
two views
(p.
21,
1. 5 -
p. 22).
Chapter
VII.
The
degree
of
prophecy
to which
any prophet
attains is
determined
by
the virtues and vices of the
prophet.
Chapter
VIII.
A.
People
are not born in
possession
of virtue or
vice,
al-
though they may
be born with a
predisposition
for one
or the other
(p.
26,
11.
11-17,
almost verbatim from
Fusfl, ?9, p. 109,
11.
7-10).
B-C.
Explanation
of
above;
discussion of human free will
(p. 26,
1. 18 -
p. 38).'9
This
analysis
shows that about five
percent
of
Shemonah
Peraqim
is taken
directly
from
Fusgil al-Madani,
and that well
s8 Cf.
above, p.
36.
i9
This section includes
part
of the
theory
of divine attributes that
appears
later in Moreh Nebukim. Cf. Moreh Nebukim
I, 57; III,
20.
[9]
MAIMONIDES'
SHEMONAH
PERAQIM
41
over half of the
strictly philosophic
sections in Shemonah
Peraqim
are built around direct
quotations
from that book.
Consequently,
although
most of this material
originated
in
Aristotle,
and
espe-
cially
in the
Nicomachean Ethics,
it is
extremely unlikely
that
Maimonides had before him either a translation or a
reworking
of Aristotle when he was
writing
Shemonah
Peraqim.2o
If the
Nicomachean
Ethics itself were
available,
we should
expect
him
to use it at least
occasionally
and not
rely
to such a
degree
on
Alfarabi. What has
happened,
in
fact,
is that Maimonides
has
simply
used Alfarabi as a source book for Greek ethical
philosophy.
In one
passage
Maimonides introduces his
quotation
from
Alfarabi with the remark "the ancients
(al-qudama')
have said""21
and in another with the remark "the
philosophers
have said.""22
Alfarabi himself could not
properly
be called an ancient
phi-
losopher by Maimonides,
the
phrase being appropriate only
for
the Greek
philosophers.
If
Maimonides
does describe him as
such,
it must mean that he is
using
him not as a
religious philoso-
pher
who dealt with
problems
of faith and reason similar to
those with which
Jewish philosophers
like Maimonides
dealt,
but rather as a transmitter and source book for ancient
phi-
losophy.
This
approach to,
and use of Alfarabi must have been
prompted by
the fact that in his own introduction to
Fusfil
al-Madani,
Alfarabi had written that his book consists of a
number of statements drawn from "the ancients"
(al-qudama').23
20 This is Rosin's
assumption;
cf. Die
Ethik
des
Maimonides, p. 6,
et
passim.
Rosin, p. 6,
n.
5,
mentions Maimonides'
commentary
on Abot
V,
14 as an-
other
example
of his use of Eth. Nic. But that
passage,
where the
completely
virtuous man is called a "divine man" and the
completely
vicious man is
called a
"beast," obviously
comes from
Fus.il,
?
11. Maimonides' com-
mentary
on Abot
I, 6,
which in
any
case will cause a certain amount of trouble
(cf. Rosin, p. 142), may
be Maimonides' own
expansion
of
Fusul, ?
57. For
Maimonides' citation of
Eth.
Nic.
elsewhere,
cf.
Moreh
Nebukim
III, 43;
49,
and Munk's
notes, pp. 343, 403,
416. For basic
philosophic concepts
which
appear
in Shemonah
Peraqim
and do not come from
Fusal,
cf. the
foregoing
analysis: I, A; I, D; I, F;
and nn.
16,
18.
2,
The
beginning
of
chapter
III
(Arabic text, p. 6;
Hebrew
text, p. 17).
22
The
beginning
of
chapter
VI
(Arabic text, p. 20;
Hebrew
text, p. 35).
23
Dunlop,
Fusail, p.
103.
42 HERBERT DAVIDSON
[10]
And, indeed,
in
Fus.il
al-Madani,
as
elsewhere,
Alfarabi takes
little account of
popular religion
and the
Qoran,
and
simply
repeats
his Greek sources as
they
came to him and as he under-
stood them.24
Once Maimonides had decided to borrow material from Alfarabi
it was
necessary
for him to exercise a certain amount of discre-
tion. There are a number of statements in
Fusl
al-Madani
bearing
on the nature of God and his relation to the
world.2s
These are not used
by Maimonides,
and
they clearly
were un-
acceptable
to
him,
for when he
speaks
on the same
subjects
he
takes a different
position,
more in accordance with
scriptural
and traditional
religion."6
Maimonides
only
uses the
psychological
and ethical sections in the
Fus.il.
From
them,
the neutral tech-
nical sections can
be,
and are
accepted by
him with no reserva-
tion. These include a
purely
technical
analysis
of the faculties
of the human
soul;27
and a
theory
of human virtue and
vice,
containing:
the distinction between moral and intellectual vir-
tue;28
the doctrine that moral virtue is a mean between two
extremes,
one of excess and one of defect
;29
a list of moral
virtues,
each shown to be a mean
lying
between two
extremes,
both of
which are
vices;30
the oft
repeated description
of virtue and vice
as the sickness and health of the
soul;31
the rule that moral
virtues and vices are instilled
through repeated
actions.32 Mai-
24
Fusil, ?
89 describes revelation as
something
which does not even deserve
the name of true
knowledge.
25 Cf.
above,
n. 5.
26
Cf. Maimonides' statements on divine
knowledge
and divine
providence
in
chapter
VIII.
27
Cf. the above
analysis
of
Shemonah
Peraqim, I, C; I,
E.
28 Cf. above
analysis, II,
B.
29 Cf. above
analysis, IV,
A.
30
Ibid.
3z
Cf. above
analysis, I, B; III. For the
conception
cf.
Plato, Gorgias, 464B;
Aristotle,
Eth. Nic.
I, 13, 1102a,
18-21
(in both,
the statesman is the healer
of the
soul);
Philo
Quod
Omnis Probus
Liber, II, 12,
Loeb
edition,
Vol.
IX,
p.
17. Rosin adds a number of
references,
both
non-philosophic
and
philosophic,
running
from the Bible and Homer on the one
hand,
to the
Jewish philosophers
on the
other;
cf. Die Ethik des
Maimonides, p. 78,
n. 4. Professor Moshe
Perlmann
has called
my
attention to Ikhwan
al-,Saf&',
Cairo, IV,
25.
32 Cf. above
analysis, IV,
C.
[11]
PERAQIM
43
monides
copies
these theories with no
significant change
because
he did not
feel
that
they
conflict in
any way
with the
Jewish
sources. There
were, though,
at least three
points
in connection
with ethical
philosophy
where Maimonides did see a certain
conflict with
Jewish
sources. It
may
be of interest to consider
how,
in these
cases,
he used his
judgment
in
accepting
or
adapting
Alfarabi.
(a)
In a
passage
cited
above,
Maimonides
quotes
verbatim
from Alfarabi a contrast between a "continent" man
(al-cdbit)
and a
truly
"virtuous" man
(al-fdil).33
The contrast
goes
back
to Aristotle34 and is described
by
Maimonides as the view of the
"philosophers."
The
philosophers,
he
writes,
defined a continent
man as a
person
who
"performs
virtuous
acts..,
.while
having
desire for evil
acts";
that is to
say,
this
man,
not
having
virtuous
desires,
must force himself to behave
rightly by overcoming
his
own
opposite
tendencies. On the other
hand,
the
very
desires
of the
truly
virtuous man are
virtuous,
and he behaves
correctly
simply by following
them. From Alfarabi's
concluding
statement
that "in
many respects
the continent man is the
equal
of the
virtuous
man,"
Maimonides infers that in other
respects
he is
not his
equal
but is inferior
(anqaS
martabah):
it is better to act
rightly spontaneously
than to have to force oneself to act
so.35
For this
view,
Maimonides discovers
support
in two verses of
Proverbs.36
He
finds, however,
that this
philosophic
view stands
in
apparent opposition
to a view stated in rabbinic literature.
The rabbis seemed to have held that it is better to force oneself
to act
rightly
than to act
rightly spontaneously
and
naturally.
One rabbinic maxim asserts that the
greater
the
man,
the
greater
will be his evil inclination. While this
particular
statement does
not indicate
approval
or
disapproval
on the
part
of the
rabbis,
another maxim is understood
by
Maimonides as
going
further in
asserting
that a
person's
merit and reward are
just proportional
to the
difficulty
that he has in
overcoming
his evil desires. And
33 Cf.
above, p.
36.
34 Cf.
above,
n. 7.
as
Cf.
above, p.
36.
36
Prov.
21:10;
21:15. Cf. Shemonah
Peraqim, chapter VI, (Arabic text,
p.
21; Hebrew
text, p. 35).
44 HERBERT DAVIDSON
[12]
still another maxim
goes
further
yet
in
actually commanding
men to desire what is forbidden in order then to be able to restrain
themselves
solely by
reason of the
thing's being forbidden.37
Maimonides, then,
is faced with what is
apparently
a
complete
opposition
between the views of the
"philosophers"
and the
rabbis,
the former
assigning greater
merit to the
person
who acts
rightly spontaneously,
while the latter
assign greater
merit to
the
person
who forces himself to act
rightly.
Given this
opposi-
tion,
Maimonides'
procedure
is not to
reject
either
view,
but
rather to draw a distinction which allows him to dissolve the
contradiction and to harmonize the two views. The
saving
dis-
tinction is one between moral norms which are
universally recog-
nized and
accepted by
all
society,
and
positive,
conventional law
which is established
only by
an act of
legislation,
in the
present
case
by
an act of divine
legislation.
This distinction is
applied
very neatly
and
logically
to the two
divergent
views under
consideration. The
philosophers
were concerned with universal
moral norms and
quite properly,
Maimonides
explains,
held that
the
truly
virtuous man is he who has a virtuous soul and thus
acts in accordance with such norms
by
an
ingrained
inclination.
The
rabbis, however,
were concerned with behavior which is
morally completely
neutral when viewed in
itself,
and becomes
obligatory
or
prohibited only by
the act of divine
legislation.
The most meritorious
way
of
obeying
that
legislation
is not
through any personal
inclination but
solely by
virtue of its
being
divinely ordained.38
It will be observed that Maimonides' solution does not affect
the
"philosophers'
"
position
in
any way.
It was
only
universal
moral norms and not divine
legislation
that Alfarabi and Aristotle
ever had in mind.
Consequently,
Maimonides has
accepted
the
view of the
"philosophers"
without the
slightest change.
If
any
forcible harmonization has been committed it can
only
have
37 Cf.
Shemonah Peraqim, chapter
VI
(Arabic text, p.
21;
Hebrew text,
p. 36).
The three rabbinic statements are:
Sukkah, 52a,
rl'
rinon
k
n
b
l~'n l'
m;
Abot
V, 23, wimaN riy
nm6;
Sifra
on Lev.
20:26,
v?1
~mN
n b
38
Shemonah
Peraqim, chapter
VI
(Arabic text, pp.
21-22;
Hebrew
text,
p. 36).
[13]
MAIMONIDES'
SHEMONAH
PERAQIM
45
been at the
expense
of the rabbis'
view;
that would
depend upon
whether the rabbis
really
meant to
say
what Maimonides
in-
terprets
them as
saying,
a
question
that
may
be left
open
here.
We need
only
note that in this
case, Maimonides, having
found
a
philosophic
view in
apparent opposition
with a view of the
rabbis,
endeavored to
preserve
the
philosophic
view
fully
intact.
(b)
Maimonides
opens chapter
II
by stating
that the
observance and non-observance of
religious
commandments
(al-ma'as
wal-td.'t
al-shar'iyah;
later:
al-'aberot
wal-miswot)
is a
concern of two
parts
of the human
soul,
the sensitive and the
appetitive.39
A little later in the
chapter,
he turns to moral
virtue,
and states that this is found not in
two,
but in
only
one
faculty,
the
appetitive,
for the sensitive
faculty
in this case
acts as
nothing
more than a "servant"
(khddim)
of the
appetite.4o
Here Maimonides is
paraphrasing Alfarabi,
who had followed
Aristotle in
stating
that the
part
of the soul in which moral
virtue and vice is to be found is the
appetitive faculty.4'
The
argument
was that moral virtue is a matter of choice and that
choice is to be found not in the sensitive
faculty
of the soul but
in the
appetitive faculty,
choice
being "appetition
with delibera-
tion"
(fovXcEvruLK?
'pe(~t).42
It is not
easy
to determine
just why
Maimonides
thought
that
the commandments are observed in the sensitive as well as the
appetitive faculty
while moral virtue is found
only
in the
latter,
seeing
that both the
performance
of the
commandments,
and
moral virtue are
equally
matters of choice.43 The
explanation
probably
should be
sought
in the consideration that moral
virtue,
although
inculcated and measurable
by
human
behavior,44 is
in essence a "state"
(its)
of the soul. A
person
can be de-
scribed as virtuous if he
possesses
this state of the soul even when
39
Shemonah
Peraqim, chapter
II
(Arabic text, pp. 4-5;
Hebrew
text, p. 14).
4o Ibid. (Arabic text, p. 5;
Hebrew
text, p. 15).
41
Fus.il
al-Madani, ?
7.
42
Aristotle,
Eth. Nic.
VI, 2, 1139a,
19-20 and
22-24;
cf.
III, 3, 1113a,
11.
43
This is
implied by
Maimonides' contrast of these faculties with the nu-
tritive and
imaginative
faculties which are not controlled
by choice, SAemonah
Peraqim, chapter
II
(Arabic text, p. 5;
Hebrew
text, p. 14).
44
On
both of these
points,
cf. Shemonah
Peraqim, chapter IV; FuIqil, ?? 7,
8.
46 HERBERT DAVIDSON
[14]
the
opportunity
does not arise for him to exercise
it.45
What is
commanded
by religious law,
on the other
hand,
includes not
only
the
inculcating
of such a "state" of the
soul,
but the
per-
formance of actions as well.46 The
commandments, depending
on the
performance
of
actions,
remain
unfulfilled,
no matter
how
willing
a
person may be,
until the actions are
performed.
Now
by saying
that the
religious
commandments are a con-
cern
of the sensitive
faculty,
Maimonides cannot mean that
sensation initiates the actions which are commanded: It was not
the sensitive
part
of the soul but the
appetitive part
that was
understood to initiate
action;47
the sensitive
part
is
passive.48
What he
probably
does mean is that while sensation is not indeed
the initiator or the
part responsible,
it is at least
directly
involved
in
performing many religious commandments,
those
specifically
where it is
necessary
to use one or another of the senses
as,
for
example,
to hear certain sounds.49 His
view, then, may
be
assumed to consist in the
following,
rather
fine,
distinction:
While the sensitive
faculty
of the soul is not indeed itself re-
sponsible
for the
performance
of
religious acts,
it is
directly
involved;s5 consequently,
this
faculty
has a role here that it
lacks in moral
virtue,
which in essence is a state of the
soul.s'
In the
present question
Maimonides
again
had to use his
discretion in
mediating contrary
claims of the
"philosophers"
as
transmitted
by Alfarabi,
and of Biblical and rabbinic law. Here
45 Cf. Eth. Nic.
II, 5, 1106a, 12; 6, 1106b, 36;
and the distinction between
?ts
and
iJepyela
in Eth. Nic.
I, 8, 1098b,
33.
46
Cf. Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miswot,
shoresh
9;
H. A.
Wolfson, Philo,
Vol.
II,
205.
47 Cf.
Aristotle,
De Anima
III, 10, 433b,
27-28.
48 Cf.
Aristotle,
De Anima II, 5, 416b,
33.
49 As
hearing
the sound of the
shofar,
or the
reading
of the
shema';
cf.
Maimonides,
Mishneh
Torah,
Hilkot
Qeriat shema', II, 8;
Hilkot
Shofar I,
1.
50
The sensitive
faculty
differs from the nutritive and
imaginative
faculties
inasmuch as a man can
control,
and hence is
responsible for,
its
activity,
while he cannot control their
activity.
This is the reason that Maimonides
gives
for
saying
that the sensitive
faculty
is involved in
observing
the
religious
commandments while the nutritive and
imaginative
faculties are not. Cf.
Shemonah
I~eraqim, chapter
II
(Arabic text, p. 5;
Hebrew
text, p. 14).
5s
Cf.
Wolfson, Philo,
Vol.
II, 207-208,
312.
[15]
MAIMONIDES'
SHEMONAH PERAIM
47
it was not
quite
a matter of the two
parties having
different
opinions
on the same
subject,
but rather of their
being
concerned
with,
and
emphasizing
different
things:
the
"philosophers"
were
concerned with a moral virtue which is a state of the
soul,
while
Biblical and rabbinic law
placed
more
emphasis
on the actual
performance
of the
religious
commandments. Here
again
it
would have been
possible
for Maimonides to have
accepted
one
of the
points
of view at the
expense
of the other. He could have
denied the
significance
of a moral virtue which does not
express
itself in
acts,
or he could have denied the
significance
of ritual
actions. What he
does,
once
again,
is
accept
both claims side
by
side. In the matter which is our
present
concern,
that
is,
his
use of
Alfarabi,
we find that here too he
accepts
Alfarabi's
view intact.
(c)
On one
question
of moral
philosophy,
Maimonides does
make a radical
departure
from his source.
According
to
Alfarabi,
the director of human morals should be the statesman. This
conception
is
expressed
in the
very plan
and
purpose
of his book
which is a collection of
chapters
or
"aphorisms"
for the use of
the "statesman" in
inculcating
virtue
among
the inhabitants of
the state.52 The
conception
is also
expressed
in various sections
within the
book,s5
but nowhere more
prominently
than in con-
nection with the
metaphor
of the
"physician"
of the soul:
Just
as there are diseases of the
body,
Alfarabi
writes,
so there are
diseases of the
soul,
these
being
the moral vices. The
person
who heals men's bodies is the
physician. Analagously,
there
must be someone to heal men's
souls,
to inculcate virtue and
extirpate vice,
and this
person according
to Alfarabi is the
statesman.54
The
metaphor
seems to have struck Maimonides since he
repeats
it at
length
not
only
in
Shemonah
Peraqim
but elsewhere
as
well.ss
He
differs, however,
on one
important point,
the
identification of the
"physician
of the soul" as the statesman.
s52
Cf.
FuSal al-Madani,
introduction.
53
FUSal,
?? 24-29; 53-54;
84.
54
Fusal,
??
1, 3, 19,
23. Cf.
above,
n. 31.
ss
Mishneh Torah,
Hilkot
De'ot, II, 1-2; Pirqe
Mosheh, XXV, 59,
edited
by
S.
Muntner, Jerusalem. 1959, p.
363.
48 HERBERT DAVIDSON
[16]
While Alfarabi wrote that "he who treats souls is the
statesman,
who is also called the
king,"s6
Maimonides writes that the
"physicians
of the souls" are the "wise men"
(al-'ulamd').57
Further,
none of the
many
sections in
Fus.il
al-Madanz
referring
to
politics
and
political philosophy
finds even an echo in
Shemonah
Peraqim.
The
assumption
that the statesman is the
proper
guardian
of morals
together
with Alfarabi's entire concern for
politics
and
political theory
is so
consistently
avoided
by
Mai-
monides that there must have been
good
reason.
The reason can be found in Maimonides' later
work,
the
Guide
for
the
Perplexed.
There Maimonides
distinguishes
the
prophet
from the statesman and human
legislator,
as well as
from the class of "wise men"
('ulama').
All
three,
he
writes,
are
inspired,
in the technical sense that
they enjoy
a
spiritual
emana-
tion which is
continually
made available from the celestial world
upon
this world.ss
They
differ in the faculties of the soul in
which
they
receive this
inspiration.
The "wise man" receives it
in his intellect but not in his
imagination
and, consequently,
he
has
understanding
but lacks certain other abilities
including
that
of
political leadership.s9
The statesman is the
converse,
for his
inspiration
is limited to his
imagination.
As a result he has cer-
tain
aptitudes including
that of
political leadership,
but he lacks
understanding.
The
prophet
is
inspired
in both
ways
and,
there-
fore,
combines the
aptitudes
of both wise man and
statesman.6?
As a
corollary,
it
is, according
to
Maimonides, only
the
prophet
who can
produce legislation
that is concerned with both
the
spiritual
and
temporal
needs of
people6'
and which
succeeds
perfectly
in
prescribing
moral behavior that strikes the
mean.62
56
Fusfll,
?3.
s7
Shemonah Peraqim, chapter
III
(Arabic text, p. 7;
Hebrew text, p. 18).
s8
This is the emanation of the active intellect
upon
the sublunar world.
Cf. Moreh Nebukim, Wilna, 1904, II, 4, p.
20b; 36, p.
76a.
59 Maimonides does not
explain
too
clearly
how the emanation from the
active intellect creates
political aptitude,
but he seems to understand that
it
can
produce
a kind of "charismatic"
personality.
Cf.
Moreh
Nebukim, II,
38,
pp.
81b-82a.
60
Moreh Nebukim, II,
37.
6i
Moreh Nebukim, II, 40, p.
84b.
62 Moreh Nebukim, II, 39, p.
83b.
[17]
MAIMONIDES' SHEMONAH PERAJIM
49
The wise
man, although
he
may
know how to behave in
particular
instances,
lacks the
political
and
legislative ability
to draw
up
an ideal code of law. The statesman and
legislator,
on the
other
hand,
lacks the
understanding necessary
to care for
any-
thing beyond
the
temporal
needs of his
subjects.63
What this
means
is,
to use a familiar
phrase,
that Maimonides excludes
the
possibility
of a
"philosopher king" except
in so far as a
prophet
like Moses
may
have fulfilled that
description.
If we assume that Maimonides was
thinking
of a
similar,
if
not the same scheme when he wrote
Shemonah
Peraqim,
we can
see
why
he differed from Alfarabi on the function of the states-
man. The code of law that would
truly
care for all of the
spiritual
and moral needs of its
subjects
would have to be
prophetically
inspired;
it
would,
in
fact,
for
Maimonides,
be the Law of
Moses.64
This law
might
be
implemented, according
to
Maimonides,
either
by
a
prophet,
or
by
a ruler
(sultan) following
in the
steps
of a
prophet6s
similar,
one
may suppose,
to the
kings
of
Judah
who
"did what was
right
in the
eyes
of the Lord." But it had been
many
centuries since
prophecy
was alive or there had been an
opportunity
for a
Jewish
leader to rule in accordance with
prophetically inspired legislation.
Nor could Maimonides have
seen
any
reasonable
prospect,
at least in the natural order of
things,66
that a
political
leader
might
soon
appear
who would
govern
in accordance with the Law of Moses. Therefore he at-
tributed no moral function to the statesman and had little
interest in him. When it came to the
question
of the
"physician
of the
soul,"
Maimonides identified him as the wise man.
By
this he
may
have meant either the man who advises on matters
of moral virtue on the basis of the Law of
Moses,67
or the man
63
Moreh
Nebukim, II, 40, p.
84b.
64
Moreh
Nebukim, II, 39, pp.
83a-b.
6s Moreh
Nebukim, II, 40, p.
84a. It
might
also be
implemented by
a false
prophet
on the condition that he does a
perfect job
of
plagiarizing.
66
S. Zeitlin
suggests
that Maimonides believed the
coming
of the Messiah
to be
imminent;
cf.
Maimonides,
a
Biography,
New
York, 1955, pp.
83-85.
67
The wise men who are the
physicians
of the soul are named
by
Maimonides
'ulama',
in
Arabic;
cf.
above,
n. 57. However when Maimonides
speaks
of the
rabbinic
sages
he uses a Hebrew term and
speaks
of
al-kakamim;
cf. Arabic
50 HERBERT DAVIDSON
[18]
who
gives
such advice on the basis of
philosophic
ethical
theory,
or both. But in
any
case he meant someone who advises on an
individual basis.
In the introduction to
Shemonah
Peraqim,
Maimonides ex-
horts his reader to
accept
the truth wherever it
might
be
found,68
and he himself tried to act
accordingly.
The sections in
Fzusll
al-Madani
dealing
with moral
philosophy
and with
psychology
appeared
to him
generally acceptable
and he
quotes
from them
extensively.
Even in two
places
where Alfarabi's statements
could have been understood to conflict with Biblical or rabbinic
assumptions
he tries to retain them intact.
Only
on the
question
of the
possible
moral functions of the human statesman did
Maimonides feel that the whole status of the
prophetic legisla-
tion would be
jeopardized by
Alfarabi's view
and, therefore,
in
this one case he
rejects
Alfarabi's view
completely.
text, pp. 14, 15, 16, 20, 21, 22, 26, 28, 29,
30. It is not clear whether the two
terms are to be taken as identical. In the Hebrew Mishneh
Torah,
Maimonides
writes that the
physicians
of the souls are the
vn~n;
cf. Hilkot
De'ot, II, 1.
Cf. also Hilkot De'ot
I,
5:
Dan
1np2
. .
.
n1n1~2, nlynly
Dni O I
.
68
Gorfinkle,
Hebrew
section, p.
6.

Davidson - Shemonah Peraqim and Fusul Al-Madani

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Maimonides' "Shemonah Peraqim" and Alfarabi's "Ful Al-Madan"

Author(s): Herbert Davidson

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