`

Prohibiting, policing, permitting or

promoting? The interaction
between the policy and practice of
governments and the strategic
choices of NGOs in work with
vulnerable children and families
Voluntary Sector and Volunteering
Research Conference 2014

Hugh Salmon, Family for Every Child and Centre for Government and
Charity Management, London South Bank University
Professor Alex Murdock, Centre for Government and Charity
Management, London South Bank University


Introduction
Between 2009 and 2012 several countries, including Ethiopia, Russia and Moldova, debated or
enacted legislation increasing scrutiny and control over NGOs
1
, but for somewhat different
purposes.
2
This paper summarises research that explored how NGOs, faced with restrictive, and
at times contradictory, government policies and practices, adjust their strategic focus and tactics
in such a way as to still achieve their goals. The research was framed to examine two areas:
How do governments differ in their behaviour towards NGOs, both in the laws and
policies they set and in practice?
How do national NGOs in their countries respond strategically to the constraints and
opportunities presented by these policies and practices?
Following unrest and uprisings, between 2003 and 2005, in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan,
many other governments began to fear their national NGOs, influenced by foreign funders,
might play a role in provoking public protest. This sense of increasing mistrust of NGOs was
evident in the laws and policies adopted by the Russian and Ethiopian governments. This
research, interviewing representatives of NGOs working with children in nine countries, found
that mistrust of national NGOs, and a wish to restrict their activities, is a common element of
government policy and practice in a range of countries. However, it was also found that there is
in fact a spectrum of government approaches towards NGOs, summarised in this research as
ranging from policing or prohibiting, to permitting and promoting.
The observation that government policy and practice towards civil society varies across a wide
spectrum is not new. Najam (2000) identifies four main type of relationship: cooperative,
complementary, co-optive, and confrontational. In contrast to the trend towards greater
restriction on the activities of NGOs in several countries, in other countries researchers have
1
The term Non-Governmental Organisation is used in this paper, in preference to the now more widely used term, Civil Society
Organisation, because NGO has for a longer period been used to describe the non-state, non-commercial organisations working in
international development. Whereas CSOs represent the full range of size, purpose and form of organisations within civil society,
(Salamon, 2003, p.10), the term NGO tends to be more narrowly used to refer to organisations with the purpose and capacity to deliver
aid or services. The type of national, service-providing NGOs that are the focus of this study are typically led by professional managers
rather than volunteers from the communities they serve, and are generally financed by grants from donors, or grants or contracts from
government. This has led NGOs to be criticised for claiming to deliver services for or speak on behalf of poor or marginal groups, while
allowing little scope for such people to scrutinise their work or hold them to account. The Economist in 1999 asserted that NGOs are
increasingly acting as unelected and unaccountable special-interest groups, [which] disrupt global governance. This study does not
attempt to refute such assertions, but nonetheless considers them worthy of study, from a pragmatic perspective, based on their key role
in delivering services to groups that many governments fail to reach.
2
In Moldova a law was drafted to enable NGOs to bid for contracts to deliver services, thus increasing access to and quality of services, but
the first draft was highly restrictive in terms of requirements for accreditation.
In Russia, the Federal Law Introducing Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation Regarding the Regulation of
Activities of Non-commercial Organizations Performing the Function of Foreign Agents, passed by the Duma in July 2012, required all
non-commercial organizations (NCOs) to register with the Ministry of Justice, prior to receipt of funding from any foreign sources if they
intend to conduct political activities. These would then be named "NCOs carrying functions of a foreign agent." International Centre for
Not for Profit Law (2012).
In Ethiopia the Proclamation to Provide for the Registration and Regulation of Charities and Societies, January 2009 , led to legislation
preventing NGOs receiving more than 10% of their income from international sources from working in areas considered politically
sensitive - governance, human rights, conflict resolution or criminal justice.



found NGOs still able to work quietly and constructively with government and local authorities,
innovating new models of service delivery, and improving policy and legislation. Fioramonti and
Heinrich (2007), in reviewing CIVICUS Civil Society Index reports in nine countries in Eastern
Europe, found that civil society groups can work effectively to influence policy, through policy
consultations, in demonstrating new ways of working and through advocacy activities, both
publicly and behind the scenes through direct contact with politicians and officials.
The question which then arises is how, faced with often sensitive and restrictive regimes, can
NGOs achieve an optimal balance of service delivery with advocacy in such a way as to maintain
their autonomy, authority and legitimacy. This study set out to identify whether and how NGOs
achieve this balance, and whether they find service delivery and advocacy, plus technical
assistance, to be incompatible or complementary strategic priorities.
Research Methods
This research was based on a mix of qualitative methods, best suited to explore in some depth
the nature of the relationship between government policy and practice towards NGOs and NGO
strategy in response. The researcher selected a purposive and pragmatic sample of ten
participants, based on ease of access from existing working contacts with their organisations. The
individuals were senior representatives of national NGOs working with vulnerable children and
families in Azerbaijan, Ethiopia, Georgia, Ghana, Guyana, Moldova, Russia and Zimbabwe, plus
representatives of two such NGOs in Nepal. Even though this sample of countries does not
represent all regions it does represent diverse social, economic and political contexts. Data
collection was conducted via two focus group discussions
3
with three participants each, and
individual interviews with four participants unavailable to participate in focus groups. Both
interviews and focus group discussions explored participants experience of government policy
and practice towards NGOs, using as reference points a proposed spectrum of typical
government traits 1. Prohibiting, 2. Policing, 3. Passive (or incompetent), 4. Permitting, 5.
Promoting. The participants were then invited to share up to three examples of changes in
government policy and practice in the past five years. Finally, participants were asked to reflect on
how NGOs, in response, balance service delivery, advocacy and technical assistance in their
strategic focus. All the interviews and focus groups were recorded and then transcribed. The
transcripts were then analysed against emerging themes and initial assumptions.

3
One focus group was composed of low income (Ethiopia and Zimbabwe) and lower middle income (Ghana) countries in sub-Saharan
Africa. The other group had a more contrasting representation of lower middle income countries from quite different regions (Georgia
and Guyana) plus Russia, a high income country, based on national income levels as defined and assessed by the World Bank.
http://data.worldbank.org/country



Findings

Data analysis of the participants categorisation of their governments policy and practice towards
NGOs revealed some interesting patterns, with six out of ten describing them as permitting, as
shown below:
Table 1
1
Prohibiting
restrict

2
Policing
regulate

3
Passive
(incl. indifferent,
incompetent or
corrupt)
4
Permitting
facilitate

5
Promoting
encourage
Russia
Ethiopia
Guyana Georgia
Zimbabwe
Ghana
Azerbaijan
Nepal 1
Moldova
Nepal 2

An overall finding was that the views of the participants in this study bore little resemblance to
CIVICUS Civil Society Index
4
scores for the environment faced by CSOs, previously assigned to
five countries
5
in this study.
4
The two most widely used tools for measuring civil society (Lyons, 2009) originate from the late 1990s: the Civil Society Index (CSI)
developed by CIVICUS (Heinrich, 2007) , and the Global Civil Society Index (GCSI), developed by the Center for Civil Society Studies at
Johns Hopkins University (Salamon & Sokolowski, 2004). For this study, the CSI is more applicable, since CSI assessments, using
participatory methods, have been carried out in five of the nine countries included, while the GCSI has not been completed in any of them.
The CSI also includes a range of indicators for not just the strength and vitality of civic groups, but their impact and the environment in
which they operate. The CSI scores for environment were considered in this research as a comparative measure of the context in which
the NGOs in this study are operating.
5
The Nepali participants rated their government at the more positive end of the spectrum, in contrast to Nepals low CSI environment
score of 1.3 (though the score was assigned in 2006, before the restoration of democracy which has enabled a more favourable
environment for civil society). The Russian participant, by contrast, put their government in the restrictive category, in contrast to the
relatively high CSI environment score assigned to that country in 2009,1.59 (though the CSI findings predate the more restrictive law on
NGOs passed by Russias Duma in 2012).The CSI scores for civil society environment for these countries (a higher score represents a more
favourable environment) were: Azerbaijan (2007) 1.1, Nepal (206) 1.3, Ghana (2006) 1.5, Russia (2009) 1.59, Georgia (2010) 1.7. (Dates
the scores were assessed are in brackets). From 2008, CSI scores were calculated on a 0 100 scale, but for the sake of comparability the
Georgia and Russia scores have been converted, so that all are shown as scores out of 3.



All respondents gave at least two examples of significant changes and developments in
government policy and practice towards NGOs in their sector in the past five years. The majority
of these examples were positive. Less than one fifth of changes or developments that participants
recalled were experienced as wholly negative (see Table 2). However there were examples when
a generally positive ranking on the spectrum of government traits did not match the examples
provided; in particular the Ghanaian and Georgian participants, who rated their governments as
permitting, but recalled no wholly positive changes in the governments approach in the last five
years.
Table 2: Countries ranked by proportion of changes / developments rated as positive
(positive changes scored 1 point, mixed 0 and negative -1)

Azerbaijan 3 (3 positive changes)
Nepal 3 (3 positive, 1 mixed combined score of 2 NGOs)
Guyana & Moldova 2 (2 positive, 1 mixed)
Zimbabwe 1 (2 positive, 1 negative)
Russia 1 (1 positive, 2 mixed)
Ethiopia 0 (1 positive, 1 negative)
Ghana -1 (1 negative, 1 mixed)
Georgia -2 (2 negative, 1 mixed)
An unexpected finding in response to the first and second question was the positive
categorisation of the government of Azerbaijan by the participant from that country, and her
recollection of three recent positive developments, contrasted with the more negative remarks
of her counterpart from Ghana. These responses contradict what would have been predicted on
the basis of the CSI scores for these countries, which score Ghana more favourably than
Azerbaijan. What such unexpected findings most reveal is how differently individual NGOs may
perceive and experience recent trends in their countries, compared to what one would assume
to be the case based on published reports or data on those countries.
The final question asked respondents to place their NGOs on a triangular spectrum of strategic
options (figure 1), and to plot the direction of any strategic change, in their organisations
balance of focus between technical assistance, service delivery and advocacy. Three of the NGOs
reported a focus on one approach (Ghana on service delivery, Ethiopia on technical assistance
and the second Nepali participant on advocacy). Three NGOs said they balance two approaches
(Guyana and Zimbabwe: service delivery and advocacy; Moldova: technical assistance and
advocacy). Finally, three NGOs said they balance all three approaches: for the participant from
Azerbaijan this meant an absolutely equal balance of all three, but for one Nepali participant



slightly less emphasis on service delivery than the other two options, and for the participant from
Russia slightly less emphasis on technical assistance.
Figure 1

Technical Assistance











All of the participants that identified an intended direction of change of strategic focus stated
some degree of preference for working more on technical assistance, apart from Zimbabwe for
whom the priority was to focus more on advocacy. Ghana and Guyana identified a need to
increase both technical assistance and advocacy, whereas the second Nepali participant
highlighted a need to shift more to service delivery as well as technical assistance. The NGOs
from Moldova and Azerbaijan were confident with their current strategic balance so did not see
a need to change it.
Classification of government policy and practice
Analysis of collected data revealed four broad categories of government policy and practice.
Type A: Prohibiting and policing, mistrust and restriction.
Type B: Passive indifference, incompetence or corruption.
Type C: Permitting and promoting
Type D: Permitting and promoting, but inconsistently
Ghana Guyana
Nepal2 Zimbabwe
Russia
Nepal 1
Ethiopia
Moldova
Azerbaijan
Service delivery
Advocacy


Participants observations of how they experienced each of these categories in their working
relationships with government are summarised below.
Type A: Prohibiting and policing, mistrust and restriction
Restrictive legislation, regulation and monitoring
Most participants experienced some form of government restriction, but the starkest examples
of recent restrictive laws on NGOs were from Ethiopia and Russia. In Ethiopia, the law passed in
2009 prohibited national NGOs that are more than 10% funded by foreign sources from
working on governance, human rights, conflict resolution, or criminal justice issues, with further
more recent restrictions on their expenditure
6
. The Russian participant emphasised the restrictive
environment faced by NGOs, not only as a result of the recent law classifying foreign-funded
NGOs as foreign agents and greatly restricting their work, but also in the generally close
surveillance of the work of NGOs
7
. Also mentioned as a major constraint on NGOs, was
excessive bureaucracy and tight regulation and monitoring. The Ethiopian participant described
increasing regulatory hurdles, requiring re-registration, and bureaucratic requirements by various
government departments, restricting not only their work but their ability to secure foreign grants.
Hostile behaviour and threats
Several participants referred to threats of closure or ad hoc bans on certain activities based on
suspicion of foreign or political influence, in particular in the case of Zimbabwe. However, the
Zimbabwean participant also noted that NGOs are generally left alone to carry out their work if
they continue to focus on their core child protection remit. She also noted that the level of
interference was varied according to the political atmosphere, increasing before elections when
politicians feared NGOs could influence voters. The participants from Ghana, Guyana and Nepal
all mentioned that their governments at times try to influence donors choice of local NGO
partners indirectly, through negative comments about certain NGOs.
Lack of trust and defensiveness
While some participants linked governments lack of trust to suspicion of the influence of foreign
funding, in Guyanas case there seemed to be a general reluctance to share responsibility for child
protection, despite the governments lack of capacity in this field. In Georgia, the participant
described how the previous government had enabled a greater role for NGOs in service delivery,
but become more resistant to advocacy, and defensive in response to criticism of the new
outsourced services. NGO service providers voicing public criticism could face public rebuke or a
reduction of their contract. This defensiveness was also manifest in the Georgian governments
refusal to allow NGOs to carry out monitoring and evaluation of public services.
6
A more recent guideline has restricted to 30% of expenditure the amount that Ethiopian charities can spend on
administration, as opposed to direct service delivery. The participant from Ethiopia explained that administration has been
broadly defined by the government as including research and technical assistance activities, and most staff salary costs.
7
The government very closely monitors what theyre actually doing these NGOs and if they are doing something that the
government it is not liking they could just be shut down. Russian participant, in focus group.



Type B: Passive indifference, incompetence or corruption:
Lack of defined policy or interest in strategic cooperation with NGOs
The participant from Guyana in particular spoke of the government apathy and lack of a strategic
approach, failure to respond to NGO policy initiatives and lack of interest in supporting NGO-
run services, though at times relying on them. The Russian federal government was described as
indifferent and detached in its relationship with NGOs.
Lack of transparency
Several participants referred to some degree of lack of transparency in governments interaction
with NGOs, particularly in relation to funding decisions. In both Azerbaijan and Russia,
participants mentioned that contracting services, in one sense a welcome development if it
involves a truly open tender, is often influenced by corruption or conducted unfairly, with certain
NGOs favoured.
Lack of government capacity to regulate, monitor and evaluate NGOs
The inability to carry out objective monitoring, and its negative consequences for NGOs, was
described in detail by the participant from Azerbaijan. The second Nepali participant spoke of
corruption and nepotism undermining the objectivity of monitoring, but welcomed monitoring
and evaluation when done well as immensely useful for both government and NGO.
Corruption, especially in relation to donor funds and enforcement of
regulations
This was cited as a concern in Georgia, Guyana and Nepal, with corrupt practices and political
bias evident in the interaction between government and NGOs, and often on both sides
8
. The
participant from Guyana recounted experiences of donor funding for NGOs, to be disbursed via
government, not reaching the intended beneficiaries. One Nepali participant spoke of officials
seeking commission in return for not imposing fines for breach of regulations, or for access to a
grant.
Type C: Permitting and Promoting
A more constructive and cooperative type of relationship was illustrated by many examples of
how even governments resistant to perceived criticism, through public advocacy, can be
receptive to NGOs demonstrating new services or providing technical assistance, or willing to
contract their services.
Clear policy commitment to cooperate with NGOs
8
there are many organisations that are corrupted, and bureaucrats are also corrupted, and then there is a link between the
NGOs and political parties and the bureaucrats also. Nepali participant, in interview.



In contrast to those participants describing their government as indifferent or lacking a clear
policy, several participants experienced a commitment to work with NGOs in meeting national
development goals or implementing national action plans, sometimes under the influence of
donors. In both Nepal and Zimbabwe, this commitment was made with the arrival of a new
government.
Grants and contracts are provided fairly
Again in contrast to those governments showing type B traits, the participants from Georgia and
Moldova in particular spoke of direct government funding for national NGOs, through grants or
tenders for contracts. Georgias government had already begun to outsource services to NGOs.
Moldova, and to a lesser extent Azerbaijan, had begun the process of developing laws and
regulations to enable accreditation and contracting of non-state service providers. Despite her
criticism of some lack of transparency and favouritism, the Russian participant did identify
mechanisms for state funding at three different administrative levels, as well as increasing access
to grants from large state corporations.
9

Clear regulation and monitoring, enabling trust and fairness in government
NGO cooperation
In contrast to international criticism of restrictive legislation, in particular the new Ethiopian and
Russian laws, it was the view of many of participants, including from these countries, that a
benefit of well organised regulation and monitoring is that public trust in NGOs increases, and
government-NGO relations are experienced as fair and transparent. The participant from Ghana
was highly critical of his government for not having acted on NGO calls for the 1961 law still
used to regulate NGOs to be updated. The participant from Azerbaijan, rather than criticising the
government for harsh measures applied in particular against human rights groups, expressed
support for the governments reasons for seeking to apply restrictions on NGOs.
10

Positive consultation with NGOs
The participants from Azerbaijan, Moldova and Nepal spoke positively of bodies set up to enable
consultation with NGOs producing results. The Moldovan participant gave an example of NGOs
working together to apply for a draft law, on accreditation of service providers, to be amended.
The Ghanaian participants experience, however, was that the government was willing to invite
national NGOs to consultation meetings but not to contract them to provide services or
technical assistance.
Technical cooperation with NGOs to pilot new services that governments can
9
They [state-owned corporations] are investing huge resources in social areas in the regions where they have presencethe fact
that there is more money available from the corporate sector is a positive thing because in a way they are affecting the changes to
the social policies. Russian participant, in focus group.
10
there was just recently a law that any grant or donation needs to be registered with the Ministry of Justice. Now the NGO
community are up in arms about it but I understand: of course they want to see whos getting what money from where for what,
its understandable. And if youre doing a proper job its nothing to worry about. Azerbaijan participant, in interview.



then scale up
In such cases, NGOs felt their efforts were leading to positive change on a nationwide scale and a
sustainable basis. The successful demonstration, testing and refinement of new service models,
later scaled up by the government, was a particular theme of the Moldovan participants account
of the impact achieved by her NGO over an extended period, but also referred to in Georgia and
Ethiopia.
Type D: Permitting and promoting, but inconsistently

Cooperation, but only by certain ministers or departments, or with a select
number of NGOs
The Guyanese participant mentioned that cooperation often depends on the attitude or political
motives of the minister in charge at the time, though at lower levels of government there may be
greater and more consistent willingness to cooperate with the mutual aim of improving services.
In Zimbabwe and Nepal changes of government and of ministers were experienced as a major
cause of inconsistency and uncertainty in relations with government. In Moldova and Russia,
concerns were mentioned that the opportunities for consultation, and to apply for contracts,
were often restricted only to a few NGOs.
Governments are opportunistic or self-interested
The Georgian participant said that positive cooperation occurs when a government partner sees
their political interests as aligned with that of the NGO. In such cases a minister may even permit
NGOs to advocate publicly on the issue. A common experience was of governments main
interest in working with NGOs being to gain access to funding, particularly for governments in
lower income countries reliant on donor funding. For example, accessing donor funds through
cooperation with NGOs was a greater preoccupation for the government of Guyana than for
that of Azerbaijan, which can support its work through oil and gas revenues. Participants from
Ethiopia, Guyana, Russia and Zimbabwe complained that their governments motivation to
cooperate with NGOs is often simply to take the credit for NGOs successes. Even if this meant,
as described in Guyana, distorting reality to give the impression that a successful project was were
their initiative.
Governments make but fail to keep promises to support or fund NGOs
In Moldova examples of policy commitments not being fulfilled were seen to result from poor
organisation, while in Nepal the failures were blamed on a lack of will and persistent mistrust of
NGOs. Direct budget support for governments by donors was experienced by some participants,
in particular in Guyana and Moldova. This was promoted following the Paris Declaration on Aid
Effectiveness (2005) though in some cases has been reversed or suspended owing to donor
concerns that governments are not meeting commitments to human rights or democratisation.
While the Paris agenda principle of national ownership and coordination of funding was


welcomed by some participants, and did enable some governments to fund non-state service
provision, their actual experience of direct budget support was that it reduced national NGOs
access to funds considerably. In Moldova the European Union had made commitments to direct
budget support, but the NGO representative noted that this was experienced as a mixed
blessing, in particular as government disbursed funds to NGOs for service delivery but not for
advocacy or monitoring.
11

NGO strategy and tactics in response to government
policy and practice
Seven main strategic approaches were identified from participants responses:
1. Building bridges and relationships with those in power
There were frequent references to the importance of the NGO being in a positive, trusting
relationship with government counterparts. This meant being, variously: humble, flexible,
opportunistic and well prepared. Suggested tactics included allowing politicians to take the credit
for successes and, as detailed by the participant from Azerbaijan
12
, careful timing, targeting and
planning in submission of proposals.
2. Working closely with donors can facilitate cooperation with government, if
NGO independence is also maintained
In most countries in this study, apart from Russia, the key donor is UNICEF
13
. The need to take
into account UNICEFs plans and priorities, when working with government, was noted by the
participant from Guyana. Others, including a participant from Nepal, criticised the tendency of
some NGOs to become dependent on donor opportunities as they run the risk of losing local
credibility and authority, and being seen as more influenced by the agenda of foreign donors
than the needs of their local stakeholders.
3. Advocacy is better received by governments when framed in terms of
upholding social and economic rights, rather than civil or political rights
The experience of participants from Ethiopia, Russia and Zimbabwe was that NGOs that speak
up on issues that a government finds politically sensitive face restrictions, reprisals and threats of
closure. Such governments tend to regard NGOs as legitimate only in so far as they are able to
11
I started to speak to the Minister by saying that I can see that youre very happy that much of the money now comes directly to
you but I think that you cant have a democratic society... without having good conditions for the NGOs to be credible partners for
you to monitor what the government and the local authorities do. Moldovan participant, in interview.
12
This is the kind of government you just have to get everything done for them, present them with a ready package rather than
trying to talk them round and waiting for them to do something. if you want something done you have to bring it to the table
yourself I think with advocacy its about catching the right person at the right time. Azerbaijan participant, in interview.
13
UNICEF is the UN childrens agency. Strictly speaking it is a multi-lateral implementing partner rather than a donor as it also
relies on donor funds for its work, some of which it then sub-grants or contracts to NGOs. In Russia UNICEF was asked to close
its country programme in 2012, even though, as the participant noted, they had been playing a key role as an intermediary
between NGOs and government.



deliver needed services. The participant from Azerbaijan emphasised that highlighting the rights
of families to access certain services is better received than broader rights-based appeals. The
participant from Moldova emphasised the vital role for childrens NGOs of ensuring childrens
views can influence policy development. She described how her NGOs recent focus on enabling
child participation in improving services had led government and local authorities to accept the
benefits of a more inclusive approach to policy making.
4. Taking a long-term, patient approach
Determination and persistence were the other ingredients of success described by the participant
from Moldova, with breakthroughs often following long periods with little government
cooperation. Four other participants gave examples of the benefits of a long-term, carefully
planned and targeted approach. The Guyanese participant, in particular, spoke of the benefits of
the NGO remaining focused on a clear agenda over a period of time, in working with
government, even if there are frequent changes of minister.
5. Forming an alliance can strengthen NGOs voice and influence
Several participants described how their influence was amplified when they formed a coalition,
which, as was the case in Nepal, can sometimes elect a representative to join national consultative
bodies. Participants from both Ethiopia and Moldova stressed the need for partnership and
consultation between NGOs also to involve local community groups and enable direct
participation by children, to strengthen their representativeness and relevance.
6. Focusing on technical assistance rather than advocacy can be a more
effective way to influence policy and improve services
In some countries where advocacy is prohibited, such as Ethiopia, the government was found still
to be open to expert, solution-focused advice and practical demonstration. In such cases NGOs
help officials see the problem and possible solutions for themselves rather than making public
statements. In Russia, the participant said the authorities are receptive if presented with clear
evidence of what works. The participant from Moldova recommended balance of well-timed,
targeted advocacy and technical assistance. In short, the approach to influencing government
policy recommended by many participants was one of discrete, targeted, planned, evidence-
based and measured technical advice, with government seeing the NGO as a constructive
partner not a public critic. Participants from Azerbaijan, Ethiopia and Nepal added that it helps
first to demonstrate the effectiveness of new service models before offering technical advice,
which alone might not be accepted.
7. Maximum impact and sustainability results from a balance of service
delivery, technical assistance and advocacy
The participants from Georgia, Moldova and Azerbaijan stressed that the optimal approach is to
plan and coordinate use of all three strategic approaches in a balanced way, each enhancing the


effectiveness of the others. The participant from Azerbaijan was emphatic that one approach
would not work in isolation from the others
14
.

14
We do all three because in my opinion thats the only way to get anywhere. We have to do the service delivery to build up the
understanding and the awareness and the demand for that service. We have to be expert in that service, to then provide the technical
assistance, which the government needs to be able to in turn take on the service. And then of course you also have to have a long-running
advocacy campaign to build up everyones understanding and awareness and move them to action. Azerbaijan participant, in interview.



Conclusions
How governments differ in their policy and practice
towards NGOs
Some of the patterns in NGO government relationships that this research detected could be
linked to socio-economic context. The most consistent difference was between the governments
of the four former Soviet countries
15
and the others. Despite socio-economic differences
between them
16
, these four governments demonstrated clear intentions to fund NGOs to
deliver services. In the case of Moldova, and to some extent Azerbaijan, this was accompanied by
a willingness to receive technical assistance from specialist NGOs. For those with lower income,
Georgia and Moldova, the commitment to promote cooperation with NGOs could be partly
attributed to donor influence, in particular where a condition of direct budget support was
enabling NGO participation in delivery of services. In Azerbaijan and Russia where donor
influence was much less, governments willingness to work with certain NGOs appeared to
derive more from a recognition of their technical expertise, though participants found this
willingness to be inconsistent and often tempered by indifference or detachment.
In the countries with the lowest levels of GDP per capita, Ghana, Nepal and Zimbabwe but not
Ethiopia, participants experienced government interest in cooperation with NGOs as linked to
opportunities access to donor funds. However, their limited budgets meant these governments
also had weaker capacity to fund or contract NGOs, and to monitor and regulate relations with
NGOs.
How NGOs make strategic choices and plans in response
to government policy and practice
The NGOs studied had adopted a wide variety of strategic approaches and tactics, with different
combinations of service delivery, advocacy and technical assistance. However, when asked about
the future strategic direction of their NGO, in response to the legal and policy environment, all
except the participant from Zimbabwe
17
showed some interest in a greater focus on technical
assistance.
A second finding was that all the NGOs, with the exception of Ethiopia, could still see some role,
or an increasing role for advocacy in their strategic approach as a means to influence government
15
Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and Russia.
16
Within the former Soviet states, there are considerable differences in GDP and UN measures of human development which divide
them into two groups Russia and Azerbaijan, with higher levels of income and development but lower scores on measures of civil society,
perceptions of corruption (an indicator of strength of governance and rule of law) and accountability and public voice (as measured by
the Freedom House index); as compared with Georgia and Moldova, with weaker socio-economic indicators but stronger in terms of the
measures of civil society, control of corruption and accountability.
17
Zimbabwes case could be explained by its high level of political uncertainty, with the participant foreseeing the next few months, with a
scheduled constitutional referendum and presidential elections, as crucial for determining the future environment for government NGO
cooperation.



policy, legislation and practice so as to achieve wider more sustainable benefits for stakeholders
than could be achieved through NGOs simply providing services. Even those NGOs that
described their main focus as technical assistance or service delivery still saw these activities as
means to an end rather than an end in itself, the end being achieving positive change at national
level. However, for those with governments sensitive to public criticism, these long term goals
were seen as more likely to be achieved through quiet partnership than public advocacy.
A third set of findings relate to common practices adopted by NGOs to ensure they were taken
seriously by government, and trusted by the public, including: promoting and complying with
strong regulation and monitoring of NGOs; joining together to form alliances to enhance their
voice and credibility, and presenting clear evidence for policy and practice recommendations
from participatory research or evaluations of new services.
A fourth set of findings was the most common criteria for successful NGO government
cooperation, which included: building strong, trusting relationships with individuals and certain
departments in government; developing cooperation based on shared interests with key
government counterparts, and effectively coordinating with donor spending plans. However,
participants also warned that conspicuous alignment with donors, especially when government
are suspicious of the agenda of donor governments, can undermine NGOs perceived credibility
and independence and their claims primarily to speak and act for on and behalf of local
communities and vulnerable groups. This reinforces the need for NGOs to maintain high levels
of transparency, accountability and representativeness in order to retain the public trust and
credibility they need for their work to be valued and effective.
Finally, the research highlighted that national NGOs face unique and often unexpected
challenges as they engage with governments in varied and changing political and legal
environments. Often the reported experiences of NGO staff contradicted what would be
predicted from published reports and indicators from their country. The largely positive accounts
of the participant from Azerbaijan were not what would have been predicted from the countrys
low ranking on measures of civil society and freedom of association
18
, while the participants from
Ghana and Georgia only voiced negative perceptions of recent change, in contrast to reports
showing a generally positive government approach towards civil society in these countries.
19
The
way NGOs approach relations with government, how they experience the overall direction of
change in their country, and the way this in turn influences their strategic planning, therefore
appears to be as much the result of individual perception and expectations, and personal
relationships and connections, as the broader social, economic or political factors described in
published data and reports.

18
Sattarov et al, 2007, and Freedom House, 2012, Nations in Transit report http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/nations-
transit/2012/azerbaijan
19
Darkwa et al (2006) and Losaberidze (2010).



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