All rights reserved to Block G02, A.Y. 2014-2015, De La Salle University - College of Law.

Copyright 2014
Case Title: Quimiging (or Quimiging) v. Icao
G.R. No. 26795 || July 31, 1970
Topic: Commencement and termination of personality; Natural Persons; Birth.
Case brief written by Jerome Ellis B. Bernabe


FACTS:

Defendant-appellee Icao, although married, succeeded in having carnal intercourse with
plaintiff-appellant Quimiguing several times by force and intimidation, and without her
consent; as a result she became pregnant, and had to stop studying. Hence, she claimed
support at P120.00 per month, damages and attorney's fees.

Icao moved to dismiss for lack of cause of action since the complaint did not allege that
the child had been born; and after hearing arguments, the trial judge sustained
defendant's motion and dismissed the complaint. Thereafter, plaintiff moved to amend the
complaint to allege that as a result of the intercourse, plaintiff had later given birth to a baby
girl; but the court, sustaining defendant's objection, ruled that no amendment was
allowable, since the original complaint averred no cause of action.

ISSUE:

W/N Quimiguing has cause of action despite failure to allege fact of birth in complaint

HELD/RATIO:

Yes. A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional
personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40
of the Civil Code of the Philippines:

Art. 40. Birth determines personality; but the conceived child shall be
considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it, provided it be born
later with the conditions specified in the following article.

The unborn child, therefore, has a right to support from its progenitors, particularly of
Icao whose paternity is deemed admitted for the purpose of his motion to dismiss.

While it is true that Article 40 in prescribing that the conceived child shall be considered
born for all purposes that are favorable to it adds further provided it be born later with
the conditions specified in the following article (i.e., that the foetus be alive at the time it is
completely delivered from the mother's womb), this proviso, however, is not a condition
precedent to the right of the conceived child; for if it were, the first part of Article 40 would
become entirely useless and ineffective.

Orders under appeal were reversed and set aside. Costs against appellee.