CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS

IN PAKISTAN
Hasan Askari Rizvi's
compreensive s!"#$ o% !e s"&'ec! %rom !e (o"rna) o% !e
In!erna!iona) Ins!i!"!e %or S!ra!e*ic a%%airs
+overnance in Pakistan is a delicate balancing act between the military chiefs and the
elected civilian government. It is a power-sharing arrangement whereby the military has
important influence over foreign, security and key domestic issues, and mediates
confrontations among feuding political leaders, parties or state institutions- if such
confrontations are deemed threatening to political order and stability. Although the
civilian government enjoys considerable autonomy for political and economic
management and exercise of state authority, it is expected always to consider the
militarys sensibilities. !he military has repeatedly demonstrated that it can and will
influence the nature and direction of political change without necessarily assuming
power.
"ow to cope with this kind of soft military intervention is a common dilemma for
civilian leaders of states that have experienced prolonged military rule. !he civilian
regimes that succeed military rule face serious identity crises. #n the one hand, these
governments want to prove that they are not under the tutelage of the military and can act
autonomously. #n the other hand, they cannot afford to alienate the military leadership,
whose support is crucial to their survival. !heir task is complicated by the fact that the
top brass are loath to surrender the power and privileges that they enjoyed during the
years of military rule. !he military ensures that there are sufficient constitutional and
political safeguards to sustain their entrenched position in the period after their
withdrawal from direct rule. $xtended military rule in a multi-ethnic and diversified
society also increases political fragmentation and creates vested interests supporting
authoritarian and non-democratic political arrangements. !hese conditions make the task
of political management difficult for any post-martial law civilian regime aiming to
establish its credentials as a genuine democratic government while not alienating the
senior commanders.
Te Transi!ion !o
Civi)ian R")e
!he ascendancy of Pakistans military began shortly after the country-achieved
independence in %&'(. !he rapid degeneration of the political process enabled the
military to become an important decision-maker at the national level, culminating in the
direct assumption of power by the Army )hief, *eneral +later ,ield -arshal. Ayub /han,
through a coup in #ctober %&01. "e ruled under martial law until 2une %&34, when he
civilianised his regime by co-opting some politicians and establishing a constitution,
which legitimi5ed the continuation of his rule after the withdrawal of martial law. A
second coup was staged in -arch %&3& by *eneral 6ahya /han, who surrendered power
to an elected civilian leader in 7ecember %&(% after the military debacle in the %&(%
Indo-Pakistan war. !he military overcame the trauma of defeat within a few years, and
*eneral 8ia ul-"a9 reasserted military dominance by overthrowing the civilian
government in 2uly %&((. "e presided over the longest period of martial law in Pakistans
history +2uly %&(( 7ecember %&10. and handed power over to a civilian government
through a carefully managed disengagement.
!he civilian system that replaced 8ias military rule in %&10 enabled the military to shift
its emphasis from overt rule to a more subtle, but still ubi9uitous role. Instead of
exercising power directly +although the coup option is still available., the military has
become a formidable political actor, influencing the nature and direction of political
change. !his planned transition began when 8ia introduced far-reaching changes in the
%&(: )onstitution, emphasising an all-powerful President +8ia himself. and a weak Prime
-inister. 8ia saw his relationship with the Army as crucial to his survival and thus
guarded its professional and corporate interests. "e underlined his primacy in the
political process, not merely through his enhanced presidential powers, but also by
projecting his position of Army )hief as a bridge between the newly established civilian
government and the powerful armed forces.% "e periodically lashed out at the civilian
government to keep it in line. ;hen the Prime -inister tried to assert his autonomy, 8ia
sacked him in -ay %&11, thereby demolishing the civilianised system he had created. "e
was trying to co-opt another set of civilian leaders who could serve as adjuncts to
military supremacy when he was killed in an air crash in August.4
!he militarys decision not to assume power after 8ias death led to the holding of multi-
party elections and subse9uent transfer of power to a civilian government in 7ecember
%&11.: <ince then, the Army )hiefs have emphasised professionalism and no direct
involvement of soldiers in politics= they have generally supported the democratic process
and civilian governance.' !his support is tactical, however, based on a realistic
assessment of the political situation. It does not change the fact that they are central to the
political process.
A Pivo! in !e Po,er S!r"c!"re
!he Army )hief is a pivot in Pakistans post-%&11 power structure. !ogether with the
President and the Prime -inister, he constitutes one-third of the !roika -an extra-
constitutional arrangement for civilian-military consensus-building on key domestic,
foreign policy and security issues. !he !roika meets periodically= senior military and
civilian officials are summoned to give briefings relating to the issues under discussion.
!he Army )hief also holds meetings separately with the President and Prime -inister on
political and security affairs. Another institution that has gained prominence is the )orps
)ommanders meeting. Presided over by the Army chief, this conference includes top
commanders, Principal <taff #fficers at the Army "ead9uarters and other senior officers
holding strategic appointments. Its members not only discuss security and organisational
and professional matters, but also deliberate on domestic issues such as law and order,
and general political conditions>especially when the government and the opposition are
engaged in intense confrontation. !hese discussions are intended both to underline senior
officers political concerns and to develop a broad-based military consensus. $xecuting
the consensus decisions is left to the Army )hief, thereby strengthening his position when
he interacts with the President and the Prime -inister.
A smooth interaction among the !roika members ensures the militarys support for the
Prime -inister, which contributes to general political stability. If serious differences
develop among these key players, political uncertainty and instability are likely. !he
Prime -inister - the civilian side of the power e9uation - can find him or herself in a
difficult situation. !he military is well placed to exert pressure on him. ,urthermore, the
%&(: )onstitution, as amended by 8ia in %&10, greatly strengthened the position of the
President vis-a-vis the Prime -inister, making it difficult for the latter to emerge as an
autonomous power.
!he Prime -insters position was boosted somewhat by an April %&&( )onstitutional
amendment curtailing the Presidents powers so that he cannot dismiss the Prime
-inister. "owever, so long as the Prime -inister presides over divided and mutually
hostile political forces, he will have to work in harmony with the President - and the
Army.
!he militarys primary consideration is not direct exercise of power, but protection and
advancement of its professional and corporate interests. If these interests can be
protected, it would prefer to stay on the sidelines. *iven militarys political experience,
organisational resources and institutional strengths, its senior commanders are reasonably
confident that they can pursue such a strategy. !he senior commanders are willing to
negotiate their interests and accommodate the civilian leaders. ;hat is not acceptable to
them, however, is a frontal attack on their institutional and corporate interests as they
define them, a deliberate campaign to malign the military, or unilateral decision-making
by the civilian leaders on matters which directly concern them. !hey will not support a
discredited civilian government nor allow the militarys name to be used by civilian
leaders, whether in government or in opposition, in their power struggle. !he scope for
manoeuvre for the civilian leaders can thus expand if they establish a relationship of trust
and confidence with the military.
Te Mi)i!ar$'s In!eres!s
Among the Pakistani militarys major interests and concerns, six stand out?
@ational security is obviously paramount. 7uring the 8ia era, the military directly
controlled nuclear policy and the conduct of the Afghan ;ar. @uclear policy has
remained their close preserve, even under civilian rule. Aena5ir Ahutto complained in
<eptember %&&% that she was denied information about highly sensitive aspects of the
countrys nuclear programme during her first term as Prime -inister. !he role of the
,oreign #ffice and the civilian leadership in formulating and implementing the
Afghanistan policy increased after the %&1& withdrawal of <oviet troops, but senior Army
commanders and the Inter-<ervice Intelligence +I<I. continue to have a significant input.
<imilarly, the Army maintains deep interest in policy towards India, including /ashmir.
!he military elite are not opposed in principle to Indo-Pakistani rapprochement, but they
are concerned that the civilian government not ignore what they see as @ew 7elhis
hegemonic agenda. <trong and credible conventional defence and nuclear-weapons
capabilities are considered vital to ward off Indian pressures and to enable Pakistan to
conduct independent foreign and domestic policies. Bnless the military is satisfied that
there are credible guarantees against Indias efforts to interfere, it will resist surrendering
its nuclear-weapon option and advise caution on normalising relations. ,urthermore, the
military-like most civilian policy-makers>will not want to improve bilateral relations
unless India addresses the issue of /ashmir.
#verseas weapons and e9uipment procurement is another military interest with foreign-
policy implications. !he three military services thus press the civilian government to
pursue foreign policy to facilitate this objective.
-ilitary autonomy and civilian non-interference in internal organisational matters and
service affairs is jealously guarded by senior commanders. !he service chiefs generally
resist any -inistry of 7efence tampering with their personnel recommendations,
including promotions, transfers and postings. -ilitary leaders view their autonomy and
civilian non-interference as crucial in maintaining service discipline and professionalism.
If the political leaders are able to make in-roads into the military and establish their
lobbies, the senior commanders think, the militarys overall discipline, organisational
coherence and institutional capacity to cope with the political environment will be
compromised.
!he military is opposed to any unilateral cut in defence expenditure by civilian leaders.
Its senior commanders are prepared to discuss budgetary issues with their non-military
leaders, but they are opposed to critical public statements by government leaders or to
any reduction that has not previously been cleared with them.
!he repeated exercise of power under martial law has enabled officers to accumulate
considerable perks and privileges, which the military inevitably wants protected - along
with generally improving service conditions.
!he military also expects a civilian government to ensure socio-political stability. !he
senior commanders therefore constantly review the governments political and economic
management, especially its interaction with the political adversaries, the handling of law
and order, and such issues as corruption, use of state machinery and patronage. Army
)hiefs have not hesitated to comment publicly on the political situation, advising political
leaders to put their house in order, not to crush their opposition, to settle contentious
issues through political means and negotiations, and on the need to establish a corruption-
free, transparent and effective administration. !heir interest in these matters stems from
the assumption that a polity in turmoil cannot sustain a professional military.
,urthermore, with the militarys industrial and commercial activities expanding through
its four welfare foundations, the governments economic and industrial policies have also
ac9uired direct relevance.0
#n a number of occasions, top Army commanders have used their influence to moderate
a conflict among the politicians andCor forced them into a settlement when they felt that a
confrontation would cause a major constitutional or political breakdown. !hey supported
the President in removing civilian governments in August %&&D, April %&&: and
@ovember %&&3, having concluded that these governments could no longer ensure
domestic peace, stability and order. In 7ecember %&&(, on the other hand, the Army
ultimately supported the Prime -inister in his bitter confrontation with the President and
the judiciary.
Te Mi)i!ar$ an# !e In!e))i*ence A*encies
!he military also relies on intelligence agencies to influence the political process. Bsing
intelligence services to monitor dissident political activity is nothing new in Pakistan.
"owever, the role of the -ilitary Intelligence +-I., the I<I and Intelligence Aureau +IA.
increased during the 8ia era. ;hile the -I is a purely military agency, the I<I might be
called semi-military. !he I<Is 7irector-*eneral is a serving Army officer +a Eieutenant-
*eneral or -ajor-*eneral., but he is appointed by the Prime -inister and reports both to
the civil and the military authorities. !he IA is a civilian agency. Although the -I focuses
on military-security related affairs, it overstepped its domain during the 8ia years by
becoming involved in domestic political activity and undertaking some political
assignments similar to those given to the I<I. It also counter-checked the intelligence
gathered by the I<I and other agencies and played an important role in implementing
orders to dismiss the governments in August %&&D and @ovember %&&3.3
!he I<I and the IA have been more active in domestic politics. !he former gained
prominence due to its association with the Afghan ;ar and the close links it cultivated
with the B< )entral Intelligence Agency +)IA. in a %&(&-1D, which enabled it to amass
si5eable material resources.( <ince the withdrawal of the <oviet troops from Afghanistan,
the -I and the I<I have focused more on domestic Pakistani affairs, the latter working to
implement the militarys political agenda. In the %&11 general elections, Army leaders
directed the I<I to help to establish a right-wing political alliance to counterbalance the
expected victory of Aena5ir Ahuttos Pakistan Peoples Party +PPP.. !he I<I arranged the
reunification of the Pakistan -uslim Eeague +P-E.s two faction, and then encouraged a
number of other parties to join the P-E to set up an electoral alliance, named Islami
2amhoori Itehad +I2I.. !he I<I remained associated with the I2I election campaign and
helped to coin anti-PPP slogans.1 In <eptember-#ctober %&1&, two I<I officers launched
#peration -idnight 2ackals in a bid to sway PPP members of the @ational Assembly to
back a vote of no-confidence against the Ahutto government.& <imilarly, the agency
played a role in the switching the -ohajir Faumi -ovement +-F-.s support from
Ahutto to the opposition. "owever, Ahutto managed to survive the no-confidence vote.
!he I<I was again active in the #ctober %&&D general elections. It obtained Gs %'D
million +H3.'0m. from a banker and distributed it mainly to the I2I and other Ahutto
opponents.%D In the case of the #ctober %&&: general elections, the -F- leaders
maintained that they withdrew from the @ational Assembly contest under pressure from
the Army and the I<I.
Information collected by intelligence agencies is used by the Army )hief to take up
internal and external security issues in !roika meetings and in his individual meetings
with the President and the Prime -inister. !he President has also relied on such
intelligence to formulate charge sheets against civilian governments he has dismissed.
!he Army authorities persuaded the caretaker government that was in power from
@ovember %&&3 ,ebruary %&&( to give the military greater say in the civilian IAs affairs,
by inducting more Army personnel in the service, and giving the -I a greater role in it.
Intelligence gathering has become increasingly important for senior commanders
pursuing behind-the-scenes political intervention. !hese agencies have been used to
support or oppose a particular political group and to encourage the governments
adversaries to take it on.
-enazir -"!!o
an# !e Mi)i!ar$
Aena5ir Ahutto was in power twice - from 7ecember %&11-August %&&D and from
#ctober %&&:-@ovember %&&3 - in each case heading a coalition government. 7espite the
militarys distrust of the PPP, Ahutto was allowed to assume power in 7ecember %&11
+following 8ias death that August. after the PPP emerged as the largest party in the
parliamentary elections. <he made three major concessions towards the military? support
for a five -year term for acting President Isha9 /han, a 8ia loyalist who enjoyed the
militarys support= retention of Et.-*en. 6a9ub Ali /han +8ias ,oreign -inister. in her
cabinet to ensure continuity in Afghanistan policy= and a promise not to make unilateral
reductions in defence expenditure and service conditions. <he publicly lauded the
militarys role in restoring democracy and vowed to strengthen the armed forces by
making resources available to them. !he military budget continued to rise during both
terms and her government worked closely with the military on Afghanistan and the
nuclear issue. "er second governments efforts to improve relations with the B<,
especially the one-time waiver to the application of the Pressler Amendment in %&&0-&3,
were appreciated by the military, enabling the latter to receive weapons and e9uipment
withheld by the B< since #ctober %&&D.%%
Ahuttos relations with the military soured, mainly because of her governments political
and economic mismanagement and bitter confrontation with her political adversaries that
virtually paralysed the administration. <enior commanders also bridled at what they took
to be civilian interference in the militarys internal and organisational affairs.
!he military considered its internal autonomy to be challenged by the civilian
governments interference with appointments and transfers. !he first dispute arose in -ay
%&1&, when the government changed the I<Is 7irector-*eneral to reduce the I<Is
involvement in domestic politics.%4 Army )hief *eneral -ir5a Aslam Aeg reluctantly
agreed, but was annoyed by the Prime -inisters decision to appoint a retired -ajor-
*eneral instead of a serving officer, as was traditional. *eneral Aeg also resented the
governments efforts to persuade the Army not to press punitive action against the officers
who had been removed from service for indiscipline after the execution of Aena5ir
Ahuttos father, former President and Prime -inister, 8ulfikar Ali Ahutto.%: A more
serious row developed when the government unsuccessfully attempted to retire Admiral
Iftikhar Ahmad <irohi, )hairman of the 2oint )hiefs of <taff )ommittee, in %&1&.
<imilarly, the governments attempts to interfere with retirement and extension of some
senior officers in 2une-2uly %&&D further strained civil-military relations.%' !he military
was also wary of Ahuttos keenness to cultivate Indias Prime -inister, Gajiv *andhi,
during his visits to Pakistan in 7ecember %&11 and 2uly %&1&. Army intelligence sources
collected enough evidence on the dialogue between the two leaders to lead the Army
commanders to view her as unreliable on security matters.
!he governments position towards the military was also weakened because of its
disappointing political performance. It was so haunted by fear that the ruling coalition
might collapse that the government spent most of its energies on sustaining its partners
support through political compromises, material rewards and corruption. Political
freedoms increased during this period, but Ahutto was unable to adopt policies for long-
term socio-economic transformation.%0
!he government and military also developed differences over how to handle a %&1&-&D
breakdown of law and order in <indh, caused by ethnic divisions in the province. Army
authorities, while assisting <indhs civilian authorities, resented what they perceived as
the governments attempt to use troops to settle its scores with political adversaries. In an
attempt to distance themselves from the government, the Army commanders asked for no
political interference in their work, permission to set up military courts, and the
invocation of a constitutional article that restricted the superior judiciarys powers to
enforce fundamental rights in areas under army control. !he civilian government refused.
!his severely strained civil-military relations and the Army )hief issued several public
statements on the <indh situation with strong political overtones.%3 !he opposition
political parties sided with the Army by supporting its demands, and the dispute went
unresolved.
-ost disastrous was the Ahutto governments confrontation with the Punjab, whose
provincial government was controlled by the opposition I2I, with @awa5 <harif as )hief
-inister. !he federal government and the Punjabs provincial government confronted
each other on nearly every administrative and political issue, causing much confusion and
uncertainty.
In the face of these developments, the Prime -inisters relations with the President
deteriorated. President Isha9 /han supported the military in its confrontations with
Ahutto and criticised her political and economic management. !he !roika broke down.
After detailed consultations between the President and the Army )hief and a decision on
the political situation in the )orps )ommanders meeting in late 2uly %&&D, the President
sacked Ahutto in the first week of August.%(
Te Secon# -"!!o +overnmen!
Aena5ir Ahutto began her second term of office in #ctober %&&: after her party and the
allies won the largest number of seats in the @ational Assembly in the %&&: general
elections. <he again headed a coalition but she had the advantage of having two
provinces - <indh and the Punjab - under the partys control. A PPP government was also
established in the @orth ;est ,rontier Province +@;,P. in April %&&'. A PPP nominee,
,aroo9 Ahmed Eeghari, was elected President. Ahuttos relations with the military were
much improved as her government studiously avoided interference in its internal affairs
and considered its input on major security and foreign-policy matters.
;hat got the Ahutto government into trouble in %&&3 was its abysmal performance in the
civilian sector and its failure again to provide an effective and transparent administration.
$thnic violence in /arachi and "yderabad intensified during %&&0-&3 as the -F-
hardcore and law-enforcement agencies +the police and rangers. confronted each other.%1
Amid this confrontation there emerged a nexus among organised crime, drug mafia,
Afghan ;ar veterans and the -F-. !he result was increased violence, including
indiscriminate killings by unidentified gunmen, arson and looting of government and
private property. Bnable to cope with the situation, the government gave a relatively free
hand to the police and the rangers, who resorted to excessive force. !here were serious
complaints about human-rights violations as a number of accused died in police custody.
!here were also religious-sectarian killings, mainly but not exclusively in the Punjab, as
two extreme groups of <hia and <unni -uslims engaged in an armed gang war.%&
!he economy too began to falter in %&&3, after reasonable growth during %&&' and %&&0.
Inflation, devaluation, price hikes, poor fiscal management and corruption added to the
governments woes. !he International -onetary ,und +I-,.s pressures for structural
changes, declining foreign-exchange reserves and the threat of defaulting on loan
repayments dogged the government.
As in its first term, the ruling PPP and the main opposition, the Pakistan -uslim Eeague
+P-E.-@awa5 +the former I2I. engaged in combative political discourse. It was a bitter
struggle, and Ahutto created additional problems for her government by antagonising the
top judiciary in an attempt to fill it with political appointees.4D
!he President expressed concern about deteriorating economic conditions and advised
Ahutto to take effective measures against civil unrest and crime, including alleged
corruption by her husband Asif Ali 8ardari. !he ensuing breach between the two became
a complete rupture after Ahuttos estranged brother, -urta5a, was killed in a police shoot-
out in /arachi in <eptember %&&3 and the Prime -inister hinted that this could have been
done at the Presidents behest.
Army )hief *eneral 2ehangir /aramat interceded to defuse the conflict between the
President and the Prime -inister, but he soon decided that Ahutto was not amenable to
advice. Ay this time, Ahuttos popular base had eroded. !he PPP was a shambles, it had
been neglected by the leadership and the population at large was disaffected by inflation
and general economic insecurity. !he opposition parties organised street protests and
demanded the governments dismissal. Bnder these circumstances, the President had no
difficulty in enlisting the Army )hiefs support to remove Ahutto from office4%
As in %&&D, this dismissal was carried out coup-style. !he Army took control of the Prime
-inisters house, all key government offices and media stations in Islamabad before the
President issued the dismissal order. Airports were closed for several hours, mobile
phones and pagers were switched off, and the -I took control of the IA head9uarters in
Islamabad. !he Army )orps head9uarters in the four provincial capitals were open on the
night of the dismissal and passed on the initial instructions of the Presidency and the
Army head9uarters to top civil servants.
Na,az Sari%
an# !e Mi)i!ar$
@awa5 <harif began his first term as Prime -inister in @ovember %&&D, with the
endorsement of the President and leading military officers. *roomed during 8ias martial
law, he won the appreciation of the senior commanders, thanks to his defiant posture
towards the first Ahutto government.44 "e maintained cordial relations with military
leaders and did not reprimand the Army )hief, *eneral Aeg, for publicly opposing the
governments pro-B< policy during the %&&% *ulf ;ar. A supporter of strong military
deterrence, <harif continued to allocate considerable resources to the military. And he left
the military personnels various perks and privileges alone. @onetheless, civil-military
differences once again emerged over appointments and transfers, maintaining law and
order in <indh, and the governments performance both at home and abroad.
)ivil unrest in <indh, which had caused problems between the Army and the two Ahutto
governments, created similar strains for the <harif government. Although the Army
agreed to undertake a security operation in -ay %&&4, it again balked at being viewed as
an instrument of the civilian government. As the security operation was launched in rural
areas, an opposition stronghold, Army commanders realised that the government wanted
them to target PPP workers and that the local administration was protecting the pro-
government elements. !hey also felt that the security environment could not improve
unless similar action was taken in the urban areas. In 2une, the Army decided to extend its
operation to the urban areas, resulting in a direct confrontation between the Army and the
-F- activists who were entrenched there, and causing much embarrassment to the
<harif government, as the -F- was its ally. <ome cabinet members publicly expressed
strong resentment towards the Army decision, the <harif government disowned these
statements but the damage was done. !ensions were worsened by allegations that the
government tried to buy off the Army )hief and senior commanders with substantial
material rewards. *eneral 2anjua, at a )orps )ommanders meeting in late %&&4, referred
to government efforts to corrupt the Army.4:
!he military also worried about the governments foreign-policy performance. In #ctober
%&&D, a month before <harif assumed power, the B< retaliated against Islamabads
nuclear programme by invoking the %&10 Pressler Amendment to suspend economic
assistance and military sales to Pakistan. ;hile agreeing that Pakistan should not
unilaterally surrender its nuclear-weapon options, the military expected the government
to devise a diplomatic solution for reviving weapons procurement from the B<. <uch a
prospect was marred, however, as Islamabad and ;ashington diverged on issues of drug-
trafficking and the activities of the Pakistan-based Islamic extremists - the so-called
Afghan ;ar veterans. In %&&4, the B< <tate 7epartment placed Pakistan on the watch
list of states allegedly sponsoring terrorism +it was removed in %&&:.. !he military,
concerned about Pakistans image abroad and keen to obtain weapons, felt that the
government was not doing enough to counter these unfavourable developments.
;hat kept the strains in civil-military relations under control was President Isha9 /hans
support for the <harif government. "e acted as a bridge and a buffer between <harif and
the top commanders. Aut this crucial relationship was damaged when, having
successfully neutralised the PPP-led agitation in 7ecember %&&4, <harifs advisers
decided to take steps to curtail the Presidents power.
!he stage for a confrontation was set when the Army )hief, *eneral 2anjua, died of a
sudden heart attack in 2anuary %&&:. <harif and his advisers insisted on appointing )orps
)ommander Ashraf as the new Army )hief. As his connections with <harif were well
known, the President used his discretionary powers to appoint the little-known *eneral
Abdul ;aheed /aker, to the position instead.
<harif retaliated by declaring that his government would amend the constitution to deny
the President this discretionary power. !he ruling party subse9uently indicated that it
might not nominate Isha9 /han for a second term when his term expired in late %&&:,
sparking a power struggle between pro-President and pro-Prime -inister camps. !he
main opposition party, the PPP, repeated its demand to hold fresh elections under a
neutral administration.
!he Army )hief tried unsuccessfully to mediate the conflict, but there was no respite.
<harif lost patience and accused the President of conspiring to dislodge his government in
a national address on April %( . !he strategy of going public against the President did not
help <harif, but only alienated the top brass - already unhappy about the governments
performance. As expected, the President moved decisively, first by seeking the blessings
of the Army )hief. "e then approached the PPP for support, which was willingly offered.
After securing his position, the President dismissed <harif the next day on charges of
corruption, nepotism, terrorising opponents, violating the )onstitution and subverting the
armed forces authority.4' A legal battle ensued, and on -ay 43 the <upreme )ourt
declared the Presidential order as unconstitutional and restored <harifs government. !he
confrontation did not end. -uch to the Prime -inisters dismay, the Punjab and @;,P
governments were collaborating with the President, making it difficult for the restored
federal government to function effectively. In a bid to oust the pro-presidential *overnor
and )hief -inister in the Punjab, )haudhry Altaf "ussain and -an5oor ;atto
respectively, <harif used his parliamentary majority to pass a resolution which called
upon the President to hand over the Punjab administration to his own nominee. ;ithout
seeking the re9uired approval of the President, the <harif government issued a
proclamation to implement the resolution. !his bid failed because the Army )hief refused
to make any paramilitary forces available to effect the change in the Punjab on the
grounds that the presidential proclamation was unauthorised.
It was after this take-over bid that the Army )hief and other senior commanders decided
to contain the crisis. In a 2uly % special meeting, the )orps )ommanders underlined the
need to use constitutional and legal methods for resolving the crisis and suggested that,
given the widespread demand for new elections, it would be desirable to hold them.
!hese views were communicated to the President and the Prime -inister by the Army
)hief. -eanwhile, the opposition, led by the PPP, infuriated by the governments attempt
to take over the Punjab government, declared that it would not accept anything other than
new general elections and announced a Eong -arch to Islamabad to blockade the city
until the government resigned.
!he Army )hief and his senior staff engaged in hectic mediation between the President
and the Prime -inister to develop a mutually acceptable formula for elections. !he )hief
also met Ahutto and persuaded her to withdraw her Eong -arch call. It was this intense
military pressure that made the President and Prime -inister 9uit their offices
simultaneously, making way for a caretaker government to hold new elections that
brought in Ahutto for a second term as Prime -inister.40
Te Secon#
Sari% +overnmen!
<harif returned to power in ,ebruary %&&( after a gap of over three years. "is
government dominated parliament with over two-thirds of the seats in both houses. !he
PPP was reduced to %( seats in the @ational Assembly and was almost destroyed in the
Punjabs provincial assembly. <harifs P-E-@ party also assumed power in three
provinces - @;,P, the Punjab and <indh. !he President and the military elite welcomed
the change, especially the magnitude of <harifs success, hoping that he would be able to
create a stable, effective and transparent administration.
<harif adopted a new strategy during his second term using his numerical strength in
parliament to secure his hold over power, undermining other !roika members and state
institutions. "e engineered the passage, in April %&&(, of the %:th constitutional
amendment, which withdrew the Presidents power to dismiss the government and
dissolve the @ational Assembly. !he amendment also assigned the Prime -inister a
greater role in appointing service chiefs, thereby eliminating the Presidents discretionary
powers. !he %'th amendment, passed in 2uly, enhanced the party leaders powers at the
expense of party members in parliament and provincial assemblies by declaring that a
member would lose his or her seat if he or she defected, violated party discipline or voted
against the party. !he party leader was the final authority in judging members conduct on
these matters with no recourse to the judiciary or any independent authority. !his
amendment in effect created a dictatorship for the party leader and insured <harif against
any intra-party dissension.
!he parliament also adopted new legislation in -ay %&&( to dilute the autonomous
character of the accountability process established by the caretaker government in
@ovember %&&3 for dealing with corruption complaints against those holding high public
offices. !he power to appoint the )hief Accountability )ommissioner shifted from the
President to the Prime -inister. !he latters secretariat was assigned a key role in
initiating and investigating charges of corruption, thereby making it possible for the
ruling party to use the accountability process to pressure political adversaries.43
;hile taking these measures to strengthen its position, the government also took care to
avoid triggering any negative reaction from the military. Aefore introducing the %:th
amendment, the Prime -inister discussed the matter with the Army )hief, *eneral
2ehangir /aramat. Although the top commanders had valued the Presidents dismissal
powers over the government - since this was one avenue for the military to press for
change - the Army )hief agreed out of respect for <harifs electoral mandate. <imilarly,
*eneral /aramat was consulted before the government asked the @aval )hief to resign
after his alleged involvement in defence-deal kickbacks in April %&&(, and on the
appointment of a new @aval )hief. !he government agreed to induct army officers
between the ranks of captain and colonel on a permanent basis into the police, the IA and
the ,ederal Investigation Agency +,IA. helping to satisfy long-term military aspiration
for greater control over intelligence services.4( In -arch %&&(, Et.-*en. -oeenuddin
"aider was appointed *overnor of <indh within a week of his retirement, although the
-F-, an ally of the ruling P-E-@, wanted to hold the post. Another Et.-*en., appointed
*overnor of @;,P by the caretaker government in @ovember %&&3, was allowed to
continue by <harif. ,inally, <harif accepted Armys proposal to allow the Army )hief to
hold simultaneously the post of )hairman of the 2oint )hief of <taff )ommittee when its
incumbent, Air )hief -arshal ,aroo9 ,iro5 /han, retired in @ovember %&&(.
!he crisis that nearly destroyed the second <harif government started with its
confrontation with the judiciary. !he crisis erupted when the )hief 2ustice, <ajjad Ali
<hah, asked for the elevation of three )hief 2ustices and two senior judges of the
provincial "igh )ourts to the <upreme )ourt. !he government nullified this
recommendation by reducing the number of <upreme )ourt judges through an executive
order. As the )hief 2ustice persisted in his demand, the government threatened to pass a
law to legitimise the executive order. !his dispute turned into a general confrontation
between the superior judiciary and the executive. !he government used its executive
powers and control of the parliament and the media to discredit the <upreme )ourt,
especially the )hief 2ustice, while the )hief 2ustice employed his constitutional authority
and judicial powers to challenge the government.
!aking advantage of the crisis, opposition leaders filed several court challenges against
<harif and the constitutional changes he had introduced. !he <upreme )ourt took up
these cases and suspended the %'th amendment regarding party discipline and the
defection of members of parliament. !he government saw this action as an attempt by the
)ourt to dislodge it from power. ;hen, in response to bitter criticism from <harif and
other party leaders, the <upreme )ourt initiated contempt of court proceedings, the
government retaliated by amending the contempt of court law in parliament.41 ;hen the
President delayed signing the new legislation by invoking his constitutional powers to
keep the matter pending up to :D days, the ruling party threatened to impeach him.
<ome of the judges who diverged from the )hief 2ustices strategy of confrontation were
encouraged by the government to revolt. !his caused the first ever split in the <upreme
)ourt, with pro-government and pro-)hief 2ustice judges passing orders against each
other. ;hen government supporters mobbed the )hief 2ustices court to disrupt contempt
proceedings against the Prime -inister, the )hief 2ustice approached the President and
the Army )hief to make troops available for the )ourts security.4& As the President
endorsed the demand, battle lines were clearly drawn between the government on the one
hand, and the )hief 2ustice and the President on the other. !he opposition parties
supported the )hief 2ustice.
!he Army leadership grew increasingly alarmed at these developments. It temporarily
defused the situation by persuading the Prime -inister to appoint judges recommended
by the )hief 2ustice. Eater, the Army )hief tried to restrain <harif from impeachment
proceedings against the President, but to no avail= the crisis escalated. Pro-government
judges ordered the suspension of the )hief 2ustice. !he Prime -inister then asked the
President to appoint a new )hief 2ustice, which he refused to do. ;hile the government
repeated its threat to impeach the President, the )hief 2ustice restored the powers of the
President to dismiss the government, the pro-government judges hurriedly suspended this
order.
;ithout the Armys support, the President could neither avoid impeachment nor remove
the Prime -inister from office. All previous government dismissals had been
implemented through the Army. Aut this time, crucially, the military elite refused to side
with the President. Gemoving the Prime -inister and dissolving of the @ational
Assembly less than %4 months after the elections would have been awkward, especially
because the governments support - both in parliament and outside - was still intact. !he
confrontation was expected to persist and any caretaker administration would have faced
serious problems in holding new elections. <uch a situation was bound to affect
Pakistans faltering economy. !he senior commanders therefore felt that removing the
President was the least problematic way to resolve the conflict. Gealising that the Army
would not support him, the President decided to resign.:D !he )hief 2ustice was
subse9uently eased out when the acting President appointed a new )hief 2ustice proposed
by the government.
!he crisis exposed the continuing frailty of Pakistans political and constitutional
arrangements. !he outcome can be interpreted as a success for <harif, but it also
underscored his dependence on the military. ;ith a new, pliant President in office, <harif
may be tempted to use his parliamentary support to strengthen his position even further.
"owever, in the face of serious political and economic problems, he will continue to need
solid military support.
Conc)"sion
!he militarys decision to stay in the barracks after President 8ias death in %&11, began
Pakistans democratic transition. "owever, the four civilian governments that followed
were troubled by the necessity of balancing democratic imperatives with the legacy of
long military rule. !hese governments, dependent on fractious and diverse political
forces, have had to contend with a powerful and disciplined military that guarded its
professional and corporate interests jealously.
!he military elite concedes that governance is not one of its primary tasks, and gives this
right to the civilian leaders. Aut the military leadership also firmly believes that it must
play an autonomous role, with input into important political decisions and that it must
mediate when political competition between civilian groups appears disorderly. !he elite
is prepared to support a government as long as it ensures stability and effectively
performs its duties towards the citi5enry and the state, and does not threaten military
interests.
!his is a power-sharing arrangement, a hybrid between civilian and military rule. It has
created a space for the political leaders and participatory political processes, it has
expanded the scope of political freedoms= and the infrastructure of civil society is
growing. "owever, sustaining this space and political leaders room for manoeuvre
depends on working harmoniously with the senior commanders. !he greater the
confidence and trust between the two, and the smoother the functioning of the !roika, the
better are the prospects for stability and continuity in the political process.
)ivilian governments face numerous handicaps, which make it difficult for them to
command the political process fully. Pakistans civil order and domestic political
economy is in turmoil. ;idening ethnic, regional and religious-sectarian cleavages, the
after-effects of the Afghan ;ar, and weapons proliferation, all pose serious challenges to
the government. !he Army is more deeply involved now than a decade ago in support
activities for the civilian government? law-and-order tasks= relief and rescue operations
after natural disasters= the use of its organisational and technological resources for public
welfare projects= greater induction of its personnel in civilian institutions= anti-terrorist
activities= and containing narcotics trafficking.
)ompeting political forces tend to be intolerant towards each other, thereby undermining
political institutions and processes. !here is no consensus among them as to how to keep
the military out of politics. #n the contrary, feuding politicians have not hesitated to use
the military to dislodge their adversaries from power. In a situation of acute confrontation
and crisis, the military can always find civilian support for its expanded role.
!he militarys position has also been strengthened because <outh Asias regional security
environment has not improved with the end of the )old ;ar. Pakistans security
predicament persists because of civil war in Afghanistan, and because Pakistan and India
are engaged in an undeclared nuclear-weapons and missile race. <uch regional insecurity
increases the militarys relevance to decision-making.
All these factors make it easy for the military to maintain its central role in the political
process. !he militarys profile depends on the civilian governments performance - how it
maintains economic and political stability and civic peace and order, and how it deals
with the militarys professional and corporate interests. !he militarys options increase if
the governments political and economic performance falters, if it faces a crisis of
legitimacy aggravated by popular unrest in the major urban centres, or if political
competition turns nasty. !he military retains the capability to veto Pakistans transition to
democracy.
A-O.T THE A.THOR
"asan-Askari Gi5vi is Fuaid-i-A5am professor at the southern Asian Institute,
school of international and public affairs, )olumbia Bniversity, @ew 6ork, and
professor of political science, Punjab university, Eahore.
NOTES
%. 7aily 2ang +Eahore., %& -arch %&13.
4. <ee #mar @oman, Pakistan? Political and $conomic "istory <ince %&'( +Eondon? /egan Paul,
%&&D., p.%%1.
:. ,or an analysis of the military commanders decision not to assume power, see "asan-Askari
Gi5vi, !he Eegacy of -ilitary Gule in Pakistan. <urvival, vol. :%, no. :, -ay-2une %&1&, pp.
400-31.
'. !he Army )hiefs in 9uestion were -ir5a Aslam Aeg +%&11-&%., Asif @awa5 2anjua +%&&%-&:.,
Abdul ;aheed /aker +%&&:-&3. and 2ehangir /aramat +%&&3 to present..
0. !he military has four foundations which own industrial enterprises and engage in business and
commercial activities. !heir profits are used for the welfare of former service personnel and their
families. !hey include the ,auji ,oundation and the Army ;elfare !rust +Army., the <haheen
,oundation +Air ,orce. and the Aahria ,oundation +@avy..
3. Iftikhar ". -alik, <tate and )ivil <ociety in Pakistan +@ew 6ork? <t -artins Press, %&&(., pp.
%DD-%D%. <ee also !he Independent, 3 @ovember %&&3= and 7aily 2ang, 0 @ovember %&&3.
(. ,or the I<Is connections with the )IA, see Eawrence Eifschult5, 7angerous Eiaison? !he
)IA-I<I connection, @ewsline +/arachi., <eptember %&1&, pp. '&-0'.
1. Army )hief *eneral Aslam Aeg admitted in a -ay %&&0 interview that the Army did not trust
the PPP in %&11. As the PPP was expected to win the elections, the Army decided to balance the
situation by creating the I2I. <ee !he @ation +Eahore., & -ay %&&0
&. <peaking to the press after being removed from service, one of the officers involved in
#peration -idnight 2ackals said, toppling the Aena5ir government was not my own mission but
I was assigned this task. <ee !he @ews +Eahore., & 2uly %&&'. ,or details of the operation, see
ibid., 0 and 3 August %&&'= !he Anatomy of #peration -idnight 2ackals, !he @ation, 40
<eptember %&&4.
%D. !he then I<I )hief gave a list of people who received funds during the %&&D general elections
to the @ational Assembly in 2une %&&3. It included several prominent political leaders, among
them @awa5 <harif= *hulam -ustafa 2atoi, caretaker Prime -inister at the time= and -ohammad
/han 2unejo, a former Prime -inister. <ee "erald +/arachi., 2uly %&&3, p. %0. In ,ebruary %&&(,
*eneral Aeg maintained that it was I<I practice to support certain candidates under the
Presidents directions and that, in %&&D, the I<I made funds available to the I2I. <ee !he -uslim
+Islamabad., 40 ,ebruary %&&(. Aeg also maintained that the I<I distributed Gs 3Dm +H4.(3m. to
the political parties while Gs 1Dm +H:.3&m. were used as a special fund. <ee Pakistan !imes
+Eahore., %( 2une %&&(= and Altaf *auhar, !he -ysteries of <ecret <ervice ,unds, !he @ation, 3
-ay %&&'.
%%. !he %&10 Pressler Amendment to the B< ,oreign Assistance Act made it obligatory for the
B< President to issue annual certification that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear explosive
device as a pre-condition for the release of economic assistance and military sales to Pakistan. In
%&&D, President *eorge Aush refused to issue such a certification, thereby stalling new economic
assistance and military sales to Pakistan from % #ctober. !his embargo also applied to weapons,
military e9uipment and ,-%3 aircraft Pakistan had ordered and paid for before the above date.
Bnder the %&&0 Arown Amendment, the B< administration released weapons and military
e9uipment withheld since #ctober %&&D, but no new military sales were permitted. ,or 41 ,-%3
aircraft, the B< was to refund Pakistans money by selling these to some third country. As the B<
could not find a buyer, the ,-%3 issue is still pending= Pakistan is pressing for the refund of its
money.
%4. !o the annoyance of the Army and the intelligence establishment, Ahutto appointed a
committee headed by a former Air ,orce )hief, Air )hief -arshal 8ulfikar Ali /han, to review
the working of the I<I and other intelligence agencies and to recommend measures to improve
their performance. !he report was not made public and there is no evidence to suggest that the
government implemented any of its recommendations.
%:. *eneral Aeg claimed in April %&&0 that he controlled the urge to assert his authority as Army
)hief three times? immediately after 8ias death in %&11= on the appointment of a retired officer
as I<I chief= and when Ahutto sought reprieve for the dismissed Army officers. <ee 7aily
Pakistan +Eahore., 4( April %&&0.
%'. <ee <aeed <haf9at, )ivil--ilitary Gelation in Pakistan +Aoulder, )#? ;estview Press, %&&(.,
pp. 441-4&= and <amina Ahmad, !he -ilitary and $thnic Politics, in )harles ". /ennedy and
Gasul A. Gais +eds., Pakistan %&&0 +Aoulder, )#? ;estview Press, %&&0., pp. %D:-:%.
%0. !hese freedoms included releasing a large number of prisoners sentenced by the military
courts and partial relaxation of controls on electronic media.
%3. Army )hief Aeg said in a 2uly %&&D statement that if the Army was given the necessary legal
authority, it would restore absolute peace and harmony in <indh in the shortest possible time.
<ee Army in Aid of the )ivil Power, 7efence 2ournal +/arachi., vol. %3, nos. (-1, 2uly-August
%&&D, pp. :(-'&, 0(-01.
%(. In dismissing the Ahutto government, President Isha9 /han cited several grounds, including
corruption and nepotism= wilfully undermining and violating )onstitutional arrangements=
usurping the provinces authority= failing to maintain law and order in <indh= and the @ational
Assemblys inability to discharge substantive legislative functions because of internal discord,
dissension, corrupt practices and buying political loyalties by offering material inducements.
%1. In -ay %&&4, when @awa5 <harif was Prime -inister, the Army resumed a security operation
in <indh under Article %'( of the )onstitution which Ahutto inherited when she assumed power.
!he Army brought down the level of violence, but it could not fully control the situation. #n :D
@ovember %&&', the Army decided to end its operation and handed back responsibility to the
police and the paramilitary rangers, although the civilian government wanted the Army operation
to continue.
%&. !he Pakistan press covered the killings and other incidents of violence during %&&0-&3 in
detail. !he "erald and @ewsline published several investigative reports on ethnic and religious
violence in %&&3.
4D. In August %&&', the government appointed 4D new judges to the Punjab "igh )ourt. !hirteen
of them were PPP activists= three were known for their political links with P-E-2unejo +a
coalition partner.. <ome of them had nominal, if any, "igh )ourt-level experience. <ee the report
in !he ,riday !imes, %%-%( August %&&'.
4%. !he President gave nine major grounds for dismissing Ahuttos second government?
widespread killings of innocent people, especially those in police custody= malicious propaganda
against the presidency and the armed forces with reference to -urta5a Ahuttos murder= delay in
implementing the <upreme )ourt judgement on appointing judges= attempts to destroy the
judiciarys independence= failure to separate the judiciary and the executive= bugging the
telephones of judges, senior civilian and military officials= corruption, nepotism and breaking
rules and administrative procedures= transferring civil servants on political considerations and
inducting a cabinet minister who faced legal proceedings= and failing to reconsider oil and gas
disinvestment deals sent back to the cabinet by the President.
44. @awa5 <harif was appointed to the Punjab provincial cabinet during martial law. In %&10, he
was appointed )hief -inister of the province and remained so after the I2I won provincial
elections in the Punjab in %&11. In the early %&1Ds, the martial-law government returned his
familys industrial concern Ittefa9 Industries, which had been nationalised by the elder Ahutto
government in %&(4.
4:. <ee Ahmed Gashid, 7eath of a Pragmatist, !he "erald, 2anuary %&&:, pp. 00-03a. #ne
widely circulated story was that, as strains surfaced in civil-military relations, <harif offered an
expensive car to the Army )hief, which he refused to accept.
4'. !he President also referred to the charge levelled by *eneral 2anjuas widow that her husband
was poisoned, alleging that the pro-government elements could be involved because 2anjua had
developed differences with the <harif government. <ubse9uent medical investigations showed
that the general had died of a heart attack. ,or the text of the dismissal order, see !he @ation, %&
April %&&:. <ee also @ajam <ehti, %D% 7ays that <hock Pakistan, !he ,riday !imes, 44-41 April
%&&:, p. := and <amina 6asmeen, 7emocracy in Pakistan? !he !hird 7ismissal, Asian <urvey,
vol. :', no. 3, 2une %&&', pp. 0(4-11.
40. ,or an informed discussion of the political developments during -ay-2uly %&&:, especially
the Armys role, see 8afar Abbas, $nter the Army, !he "erald, 2uly %&&:, pp. %&-4'a= 8ahid
"ussain, 7ay of the *eneral , @ewsline, 2uly %&&:, pp. 4'-:Da= and "asan-Askari Gi5vi, !he
6ear of 7ramatic )hanges, !he @ation, :% 7ecember %&&:.
43. !he Accountability Aureau in the Prime -inisters secretariat was headed by <aifur Gehman,
a @awa5 loyalist and business friend who was also a <enator on the ruling P-E-@ ticket.
4(. <ee 7awn, : and 4D -ay %&&(= and the -uslim, % 2uly %&&(.
41. ;hile commenting on the suspension of the %'th amendment, <harif said that the )hief
2ustices action was illegal and unconstitutional and that it would revive horse trading in the
parliament. "e also maintained that the )hief 2ustice had created a situation that, was both
unfortunate and undemocratic. <ee ibid., :D #ctober %&&(.
4&. ,or the governments efforts to split the <upreme )ourt, see 8afar Abbas, "ow the 2udiciary
was ;on, !he "erald, 7ecember %&&(, pp. ::-:0. ,or the governments involvement in the mob
attack on the <upreme )ourt, see Idrees Aakhtiar, !he $nd of )ivility, pp. '4a= 8ahid "ussain,
;inner !akes All, @ewsline, 7ecember %&&(, pp. 44-4(= and the -uslim, 4& and :D @ovember
%&&(
:D. ,or details about the last stage of the confrontation, see @ew 6ork !imes, 4 and : 7ecember
%&&(= and 7awn, : 7ecember %&&(.