FAMILY CODE

TITLE III
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE

JURISPRUDENCE ISSUE / RULING
Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together,
observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help
and support.

NOTES:
Love is new in the provision
Obligation of Spouses:
a) To live together under one roof and not to live separately
unless there is valid reasons.
b) To love, respect and to remain loyal to each other.
c) To provide help and support to each other.
To live together covers the right to cohabitation and consortium.
Cohabitation covers the Domestic and Sexual Community.
Cohabitation by parties cannot be imposed by the law or the courts.
Spouses are entitled to sexual access with each other. Limits:
abnormal sexual intimacy and it endangers health
Love To have devoted affection with each other. The provision
calls for a relationship which is more emotional and personal than
legal.
Mutual Respect observe esteem, courtesy and kindness. Must
recognize rights with differences and ready to understand and
forgive each other.
Mutual Fidelity obligation to be faithful with each other until death
divides them.
Mutual help and support means giving of aid and support.
Remedies available when one of the spouse neglects his/her duties.
a) Recovery of damage
b) Seek admonition
c) Legal Separation
d) Apply for sole administration of the ACP or CPG
e) Separation of property
f) Demand support

CHI MING TSOI v. CA

FACTS:
Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao Tsoi was married in 1988. After the
celebration of their wedding, they proceed to the house of defendants
mother. There was no sexual intercourse between them during their
first night and same thing happened until their fourth night. In an effort
to have their honeymoon in a private place, they went to Baguio but
Ginas relatives went with them. Again, there was no sexual
intercourse since the defendant avoided by taking a long walk during
siesta or sleeping on a rocking chair at the living room. Since May
1988 until March 1989 they slept together in the same bed but no
attempt of sexual intercourse between them. Because of this, they
submitted themselves for medical examination to an urologist in
Chinese General Hospital in 1989. The result of the physical
examination of Gina was disclosed, while that of the husband was
kept confidential even the medicine prescribed. There were
allegations that the reason why Chi Ming Tsoi married her is to
maintain his residency status here in the country. Gina does not want
to reconcile with Chi Ming Tsoi and want their marriage declared void
on the ground of psychological incapacity. On the other hand, the
latter does not want to have their marriage annulled because he loves
her very much, he has no defect on his part and is physically and
psychologically capable and since their relationship is still young, they
can still overcome their differences. Chi Ming Tsoi submitted himself
to another physical examination and the result was there is not
evidence of impotency and he is capable of erection.



ISSUE: Whether Chi Ming Tsois refusal to have sexual intercourse
with his wife constitutes psychological incapacity.

HELD:
The abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his
marriage is strongly indicative of a serious personality disorder which
to the mind of the Supreme Court clearly demonstrates an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage within the meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code.

If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform
his or her essential marital obligations and the refusal is senseless
and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to
psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Furthermore, one of
the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is to procreate
children thus constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally
destroy the integrity and wholeness of the marriage.
Art. 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In
case of disagreement, the court shall decide. The court may
exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter should
live abroad or there are other valid and compelling reasons for
the exemption. However, such exemption shall not apply if the
same is not compatible with the solidarity of the family.

NOTES:
Old law: vested to husband, New Law: Both spouses
GR: Spouses are obliged to live together.
EX: a) if the other spouses live abroad
b) there are other valid and compelling reasons for the
exemption. E.g. when husband demands for abnormal sex against
the will of the wife, the court can allow wife to live separately from
her husband. (Goita v. Campos Rueda)
The exemptions cannot be invoke if it affects the solidarity of the
family. The court will resolve in favor of the solidarity of the family.


Art. 70. The spouses are jointly responsible for the support of the
family. The expenses for such support and other conjugal
obligations shall be paid from the community property and, in the
absence thereof, from the income or fruits of their separate
properties. In case of insufficiency or absence of said income or
fruits, such obligations shall be satisfied from the separate
properties.
NOTES:
Old law: Husband has the burden of supporting the family;
New law: joint obligation of the spouses.
Sources of support (in order)
a) Community property or conjugal property
b) If none, from the income or fruits of the spouses separate
properties
c) If none, or insufficient, from their separate properties
Absolute Separation of property has different rule.
- Both spouses shall bear the family expenses in proportion to
their income. If insufficient or in default, to the current value of
their separate properties.
Liability for support of the spouse, common children,
legitimate children of either; against whom chargeable.
a) Absolute Community of Property Regime
- chargeable against community property
- if insufficient, spouses are solidarily liable for unpaid balance
with their separate properties, except for ante-nuptial debts (Art
94, par. 9)
b) Conjugal Partnership
- Conjugal property is liable
- if insufficient, spouses is solidarily liable for unpaid balance with
their separate properties.
c) Absolute Separation of Property
- no express provision
- Both spouses shall proportionately bear the family expenses. But
their liability to creditors for family expenses is solidary.
Support for Illegitimate Children
a) Separate property of their parents
b) If none of insufficient, absolute community or conjugal
partnership, if financially capable.
- The advances made shall be deducted from the share of
obliged spouse in the absolute community or conjugal
partnership upon liquidation
Parents-in-law have no obligation to support children-in-law
(Pelayo v. Lauron, et. al)

Art. 71. The management of the household shall be the right and
the duty of both spouses. The expenses for such management
shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of Article 70.


NOTES:
Old law: it is the wife who is in charge of the management of
the house; New Law: it is both the husband and the wife.
Management is both a right and a duty.

Expenses of management; Joint; paid on accordance to Art.
70.
a) From community property
b) If none, income or fruits of separate property
c) If none or insufficient, from the separate properties
Expenses NOT for the family consumption is not binding against the
community property. It is to be paid from the personal property of such
spouse.
(Art 68-71)
Ilusorio v. Buildner (May 12, 2000)


Potenciano Illusorio, 86 yr. Old, a lawyer, possessed a property valued
at million pesos, and the Chairman of the Board and President of
Baguio City Club. He married Erlinda on July 11, 1942. They have 6
children. They separated on 1972.

Potenciano went back to the Phil. from US on 1997 and stayed with
Erlinda for 5 months in Antipolo. On Feb 1998, Erlinda filed with the
RTC a petition for guardianship over person and property of
Potenciano. On May 1998, after attending a meeting in Baguio City,
Potenciano did not return home to Antipolo. On March 1999, Erlinda
filed with CA a petition for habeas corpus for the custody of
Potenciano. CA dismissed the petition for Habeas Corpus but
awarded visitation rights over her husband.

Issue: Whether the award for visitation right is proper. No.

SC: CA exceeded its authority when it awarded visitation rights to
Erlinda. Visitation right was never prayed for by erlinda. Potenciano
may not be subject of Visitation Right against his free choice and right
to privacy.

No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to
live with his wife. Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion of writ
of Habeas Corpus.
(Art 68-71) In 1977, Reyes married Anna Maria Villanueva in a civil ceremony. HELD: Art. 40 of the FC provides that, The absolute nullity of a
TY V. CA 2000

They had a church wedding in the same year as well. In 1980, the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of QC declared their marriage
as null and void; the civil one for lack of marriage license and the
subsequent church wedding due to the lack of consent of the parties.
In 1979, prior to the JDRC decision, Reyes married Ofelia. Then in
1991, Reyes filed for an action for declaration of nullity of his marriage
with Ofelia. He averred that they lack a marriage license at the time of
the celebration and that there was no judicial declaration yet as to the
nullity of his previous marriage with Anna. Ofelia presented evidence
proving the existence of a valid marriage license including the specific
license number designated. The lower court however ruled that
Ofelias marriage with Reyes is null and void. The same was affirmed
by the CA applying the provisions of the Art 40 of the FC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the absolute nullity of the previous of marriage
of Reyes can be invoked in the case at bar.

previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the
basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void. This means that before one can enter into a second marriage
he must first acquire a judicial declaration of the nullity of the previous
marriage and such declaration may be invoked on the basis solely of a
final judgment declaring the previous marriage as void. For purposes
other than remarriage, other evidences may be presented and the
declaration can be passed upon by the courts. In the case at bar, the
lower court and the CA cannot apply the provision of the FC. Both
marriages entered by Reyes were solemnized prior to the FC. The old
CC did not have any provision that states that there must be such a
declaration before remarriage can be done hence Ofelias marriage
with Reyes is valid. The provisions of the FC (took effect in 87) cannot
be applied retroactively especially because they would impair the
vested rights of Ofelia under the CC which was operational during her
marriage with Reyes.

ARTICLE 72: When one of the spouses neglects his or her duties to
the conjugal union or commits acts which tend to bring danger,
dishonor or injury to the other or to the family, the aggrieved party may
apply to the court for relief.

NEGLECT must not amount to Psychological Incapacity
1. Either spouse neglecting his or her duties to the conjugal union; or
2. Either spouse committing acts which tend to bring danger, dishonor
or injury to the other or to the family.
INJURY is physical, moral, emotional or psychological NOT economic
FORMS OF RELIEF:
1. Injunction
2. Receivership
3. Guardianship
4. Sole administration of properties

Court CANNOT COMPEL the wife to live with or return to the
husband.

ARTICLE 73: Either spouse may exercise any legitimate
profession, occupation, business or activity without the consent
of the other. The latter may object only on valid, serious, and
moral grounds.
In case of disagreement, the court shall decide whether or not:
1. The objection is proper; and
2. Benefit has accrued to the family prior to the objection or
thereafter. If the benefit accrued prior to the objection, the
resulting obligation shall be enforced against the community
property. If the benefit accrued thereafter, such obligation shall
be enforced against the separate property of the spouse who has
not obtained consent.

The other spouse may object only on (a) valid; (b)serious; and (c)
moral grounds
In case of disagreement:

1. The Court will decide
2. When the disagreement is referred to the court, it will determine
a. Whether the objection is proper
b. Whether the benefit has accrued to the family prior to the
objection or thereafter.

Go Vs. Court of Appeals

Facts:
In 1981, Hermogenes Ong and Jane Ong contracted with Nancy Go
for the latter to film their wedding. After the wedding, the newlywed
inquired about their wedding video but Nancy Go said its not yet
ready. She advised them to return for the wedding video after their
honeymoon. The newlywed did so but only to find out that Nancy Go
can no longer produce the said wedding video because the copy has
been erased.

The Ongs then sued Nancy Go for damages. Nancys husband, Alex
Go, was impleaded. The trial court ruled in favor of the spouses Ong
and awarded in their favor, among others, P75k in moral damages. In
her defense on appeal, Nancy Go said: that they erased the video
tape because as per the terms of their agreement, the spouses are
supposed to claim their wedding tape within 30 days after the
wedding, however, the spouses neglected to get said wedding tape
because they only made their claim after two months; that her
husband should not be impleaded in this suit.



ISSUE: Whether or not Nancy Go is liable for moral damages.

HELD:Yes. Her contention is bereft of merit. It is shown that the
spouses Ong made their claim after the wedding but were advised to
return after their honeymoon. The spouses advised Go that their
honeymoon is to be done abroad and wont be able to return for two
months. It is contrary to human nature for any newlywed couple to
neglect to claim the video coverage of their wedding; the fact that the
Ongs filed a case against Nancy Go belies such assertion.
Considering the sentimental value of the tapes and the fact that the
event therein recorded a wedding which in our culture is a
significant milestone to be cherished and remembered could no
longer be reenacted and was lost forever, the trial court was correct in
awarding the Ongs moral damages in compensation for the mental
anguish, tortured feelings, sleepless nights and humiliation that the
Ongs suffered and which under the circumstances could be awarded
as allowed under Articles 2217 and 2218 of the Civil Code.

Anent the issue that Nancy Gos husband should not be included in
the suit, this argument is valid. Under Article 73 of the Family Code,
the wife may exercise any profession, occupation or engage in
business without the consent of the husband. In this case, it was
shown that it was only Nancy Go who entered into a contract with the
spouses Ong hence only she (Nancy) is liable to pay the damages
awarded in favor of the Ongs.

AYALA INVESTMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP. VS CA

Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained a P50,300,000 loan from
petitioner Ayala Investment and Development Corp (AIDC). As added
security for the credit line extended to PBM, respondent Alfredo Ching,
Exec. Vice President of PBM, executed securing agreements on Dec
10, 1980 and March 20, 1981 making himself jointly and severally
answerable with PBMs indebtedness to AIDC.
PBM failed to pay the loan. Thus, in 1981, AIDC filed a case for sum
of money against PBM AND Alfredo Ching. After trial, the court
ordered the debtors PBM and Ching to jointly and severally pay AIDC
of the amount loaned.
The lower court issued a writ of execution, ending appeal, and a
notice of sheriff sale on 3 conjugal properties of respondent spouses.
Private respondent filed a case of injunction against petitioners to
enjoin the auction sale alleging that petitioners cannot enforce the
judgment against the conjugal partnership levied, on the ground that
the subject loan and did not contribute to the benefit of said conjugal
partnership lower court issued TRO to prevent sheriff from proceeding
with the enforcement of the writ of execution.
ISSUE: (1) Whether the obligation contracted by respondent husband
redounded to the benefit of the family? NO
(2) Whether the securing of the obligation is part of the profession of
the husband? NO
RULING:
(1) The conjugal partnership should not be made liable for the
surety agreement which was clearly for the befit of a third
party.
(2) As a surety for his own employer, this should not be taken to
mean he had embarked in the business of surety or guaranty.
The court ruled that there are 2 circumstances in relation to the issue
in the case at bar:
a.) Where the respondent husband acted as the principal
obligator wherein he directly received the money for his own
business, obligator si deemed to benefit the CP
Where the respondent husband acted only as a surety or guarantor,
the obligations cannot be deemed to benefit the CP
PROPERTY RELATIONS
Art. 74: The property relationship between husband and wife shall be
governed in the following order:
1. By marriage settlements executed before the marriage;
2. By the provisions of this Code; and
3. By the local custom.

Property Relations Between Husband & Wife
Governed by:
1. marriage settlements executed before the marriage or
antenuptial agreements
2. provisions of the Family Code
3. local customs (when spouses repudiate absolute community)

Marriage Settlements: must be in writing signed by the parties, and
made prior to the celebration of the marriage if it is not in writing it
shall be unenforceable.
- If there is no marriage settlement agreed upon or if the same
is void, then the absolute community if property will prevail.

Requisites:
1. made before celebration of marriage
2. in writing (even modifications)
3. signed by the parties
4. not prejudice third persons unless registered in the civil registry
5. to fix terms and conditions of their property relations
6. additional signatories
18-21: parents
civil interdictees & disabled: guardian

Not applicable when:
1. both spouses are aliens, even if married in the Philippines
2. as to extrinsic validity of contracts
3. contrary stipulation

EFFECT OF MARRIAGE SETTLEMENT:
1. Property in marriage settlement is registered did not redound
to family, creditor cant get from co-owned
2. If marriage settlement is not registered, can get from co-
owned
3. If redounded to benefit of family can get from co-owned even
if not registered.
*Marriage settlement must be fair, they must exercise good faith in
contracting the marriage settlement. However if the agreement is not
fair as long as the disadvantaged spouse shows that he/she
understood it then the marriage settlement shall be maintained.
LOCAL CUSTOMS: rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts
uniformly observed as a social rule, legally binding and obligatory.
EFFECT OF NO MARRIAGE SETTLEMENT:
1. If the mortgage was registered then the new spouses
property will also be liable.
2. If the mortgage was not registered the new spouse will not be
liable but the mortgage will be impaired and the debtor
spouse will loose the right to make use of the period.
Must give new securities so as not to loose the
period.

* If the marriage settlement does not particularize any valid property
regime such provision is void and thus the absolute community of
property shall prevail.
Art. 75: The future spouses may, in the marriage settlements, agree
upon the regime of absolute community, conjugal partnership of gains,
complete separation of property, or any other regime. In the absence
of a marriage settlement, or when the regime agreed upon is void, the
system of absolute community of property as established in this Code
shall govern.
- If a marriage settlement is absent or property regime agreed upon is
void, Absolute community of property will govern.

Article 76: Modifications in marriage settlement must be made before
the celebration of the marriage.
Art. 77: The marriage settlements and any modification thereof shall
be in writing, signed by the parties and executed before the
celebration of the marriage. They shall not prejudice third persons
unless they are registered in the local civil registry where the marriage
contract is recorded as well as in the proper registries of properties.
(Oral marriage settlement is VOID)

Exception under Article 66 and 67: Revival or adoption of new
property regime when those legally separated have reconciled.
Exception under Article 128: in case of abandonment of a spouse
other spouse can petition for receivership or administration of
properties or judicial decree of separation of properties
Exception under Article 135: Further grounds for judicial separation
of property
Exception under Article 136: voluntary and verified petition in court
of both spouses to modify regime into separate community of property
regime.
Pana V Heirs of Juanite ( Dec. 10, 2012) Issue: Whether or not the conjugal properties of spouses Efren and Art. 121. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:

Facts: Melecia and Efreno are husband and wife who were involved in
a crime. The wife, Melicia was convicted of the crime and Afren was
acquitted due to insufficiency of evidence. Melecia as the guilty party
was ordered together with other guilty parties to pay jointly and
severally the heirs of the victim.

The heirs of the victim filed a motion for execution of her real
properties. RTC then ordered the issuance of writ resulting in the levy
of real properties in the names of Efren and Melecia. Subsequently, a
notice of levy and a notice of sale on execution were issued.
Melecia can be levied and executed upon the satisfaction of Melicias
civil liability in the murder case.

Rulling: Art. 76. In order that any modification in the marriage
settlements may be valid, it must be made before the celebration of
the marriage, subject to the provisions of Articles 66, 67, 128, 135 and
136.
Clearly, therefore, the conjugal partnership of gains that governed the
marriage between Efren and Melecia who were married prior to 1988
cannot be modified except before the celebration of that marriage.
Post-marriage modification of such settlements can take place only
where: (a) the absolute community or conjugal partnership was
dissolved and liquidated upon a decree of legal separation;
18
(b) the
spouses who were legally separated reconciled and agreed to revive
their former property regime;
19
(c) judicial separation of property had
been had on the ground that a spouse abandons the other without just
cause or fails to comply with his obligations to the family;
20
(d) there
was judicial separation of property under Article 135; (e) the spouses
jointly filed a petition for the voluntary dissolution of their absolute
community or conjugal partnership of gains.
21
None of these
circumstances exists in the case of Efren and Melecia.
Art. 122. The payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or
the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the
conjugal properties partnership except insofar as they redounded to
the benefit of the family.
Neither shall the fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon them
be charged to the partnership.


(1) The support of the spouse, their common children, and the
legitimate children of either spouse; however, the support of
illegitimate children shall be governed by the provisions of this Code
on Support;
(2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the
designated administrator-spouse for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership of gains, or by both spouses or by one of them with the
consent of the other;
(3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the
consent of the other to the extent that the family may have benefited;
(4) All taxes, liens, charges, and expenses, including major or minor
repairs upon the conjugal partnership property;
(5) All taxes and expenses for mere preservation made during the
marriage upon the separate property of either spouse;
(6) Expenses to enable either spouse to commence or complete a
professional, vocational, or other activity for self-improvement;
(7) Antenuptial debts of either spouse insofar as they have redounded
to the benefit of the family;
(8) The value of what is donated or promised by both spouses in favor
of their common legitimate children for the exclusive purpose of
commencing or completing a professional or vocational course or
other activity for self-improvement; and
(9) Expenses of litigation between the spouses unless the suit is found
to be groundless.
If the conjugal partnership is insufficient to cover the foregoing
liabilities, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance
with their separate properties.1wphi1
Contrary to Efrens contention, Article 121 above allows payment of
the criminal indemnities imposed on his wife, Melecia, out of the
partnership assets even before these are liquidated. Indeed, it states
that such indemnities "may be enforced against the partnership assets
after the responsibilities enumerated in the preceding article have
been covered."[26] No prior liquidation of those assets is required.
This is not altogether unfair since Article 122 states that "at the time of
liquidation of the partnership, such [offending] spouse shall be
charged for what has been paid for the purposes above-mentioned."
ARTICLE 79
For the validity of any marriage settlement executed by a person
upon whom a sentence of civil interdiction has been pronounced
or who is subject to any other disability, it shall be indispensable
for the guardian appointed by a competent court to be made a
party thereto.
This article dwells on marriage settlement entered into by a civil
interdictee.
Civil Interdiction- An accessory penalty, which has the effect of
depriving the offender during the time of his sentence of the rights of
parental authority, or guardianship, either as to the person or property
of any ward, of marital authority, of the right to manage his property
and of the right to dispose of such property by any act or any
conveyance inter vivos
Thus, the guardian of a person sentenced to civil interdiction, or a
ARTICLE 80
In the absence of a contrary stipulation in a marriage settlement,
the property relations of the spouses shall be governed by
Philippine laws, regardless of the place of the celebration of
marriage and their residence.
This rule shall not apply:
. Where both spouses are aliens;
. With respect to the extrinsic validity of contracts affecting
property not situated in the Philippines and executed in the
country where the property is located; and
. With respect to the extrinsic validity of contracts entered into in
the Philippines but affecting property situated in a foreign
country whose laws require different formalities for its extrinsic
validity.
Art 80 provides that Philippine laws shall govern the property relations
ARTICLE 81
Everything stipulated in the settlements or contracts referred to
in the preceding articles in consideration of a future marriage,
including donations between the prospective spouses made
therein, shall be rendered void if the marriage does not take
place. However, stipulations that do not depend upon the
celebration of the marriages shall be valid.
If such marriage does not take place, the marriage settlement will
become void and ineffective, except stipulations that do not depend
upon the celebration of the marriage for their validity. ex: Child support
person suffering from disability (except minority) must be made party
to the marriage settlement of either of such persons.
of the spouses wherever they reside or regardless of the place of
celebration of marriage or place where their properties is located.
In Filipino-alien marriages: If husband is filipino, Philippine law shall
apply; If wife is Filipino, the national law of the husband shall apply.
Assumption: the husband is the administrator of the property,
therefore his national law shall apply to these cases.
Art 82 - Donations by reason of marriage Requisites:
1. made before its celebration;
2. in consideration of the Marriage; and
3. in favor of one or both of the future spouses

Art . 83 What rules govern Donations?
ordinary donations established in Title III of Book III of the Civil
Code

Art. 84 Effects of Marriage settlements other than Absolute
Community
1. They cannot donate to each other in their marriage
settlements more than one-fifth of their present property.
Meaning: They can still donate, as long as it does NOT
exceed 1/5. (E.g. Moderate gifts/donations in family
occasions)
2. Any excess (1/5) shall be considered void.
Donations of future property shall be governed by the provisions on
testamentary succession and the formalities of wills.


Art. 85 Donations subject to Encumbrances
Valid.
In case of Foreclosure:
1. property is sold for less than the total amount of the
obligation secured, the donee(the one who received)
shall NOT be liable for the deficiency;
2. property is sold for more than the total amount of the
obligation secured, the donee(the one who received)
SHALL be entitled to the excess.

Art. 86 When can donations (in case of marriage) be revoked? (1) If the marriage is NOT celebrated or judicially declared void ab
initio [except donations made in the marriage settlements, which shall
be governed by Article 81];
(2) marriage without the consent of the parents or guardian;
(3) annulled, donee acted in bad faith;
(4) separation, donee being the guilty spouse;
(5) If there is a resolutory condition, and is subsequently complied
with;
(6) donee has committed an act of ingratitude.


Art. 87. Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or
indirect, between the spouses during the marriage shall be void,
except moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other on
the occasion of any family rejoicing. The prohibition shall also
apply to persons living together as husband and wife without a
valid marriage.

NOTES:
Donations or gratuitous made during the marriage between
spouses done directly or indirectly
(through the children or grandchildren of a spouse by previous
marriage) are VOID.
Reasons for nullity of the said donations:
ARCABA v. TABANCURA

Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima Montallana became the
registered owners of Lot No. 437-A located at Balintawak St. and Rizal
Avenue in Dipolog City, Zamboanga del Norte in January 1956.
Zosima died in 1980 hence Francisco and his mother in law executed
a deed of extrajudicial partition with waiver of rights, where the latter
waived her share consisting of of the property in favor of Francisco.
Since Francisco do not have any children to take care of him after his
retirement, he asked Leticia, his niece, Leticias cousin, Luzviminda
and Cirila Arcaba, the petitioner, who was then a widow and took care
of Franciscos house as well as the store inside.

HELD:
The court in this case considered a sufficient proof of common law
relationship wherein donation is not valid. The conclusion was based
on the testimony of Tabancura and certain documents bearing the
signature of Cirila Comille such as application for business permit,
sanitary permit and the death certificate of Francisco. Also, the fact
that Cirila did not demand her wages is an indication that she was not
simply a caregiver employee.

Cohabitation means more than sexual intercourse, especially when
one of the parties is already old and may no longer be interested in
sex at the very least, cohabitation is a public assumption of men and
women holding themselves out to the public as such.
a) To protect unsecured creditors from being defrauded by any
or both spouses;
b) To prevent the stronger spouse from persuading the weaker
one to transfer of the latters property to the former;
c) To prevent the indirect modification of the marriage
settlements of the spouses during the marriage which is
prohibited (Art.76, FC) by the simple expedient of transferring
to the other spouse properties subject of the contract.
Provision applies also to donations between common law
spouses.
- Reason: they will be in a better situation than those who
are living within valid marriage.
- To declare the donation void, it must be proved that the
parties are having common law relationship at the time of
the donation
Exceptions: Moderate Gifts which the spouses may give to
each other on occasions of family rejoicing or celebration (Family
distress not included).
- Moderate is relative, it depends upon the financial capability and
social standing of the donor.
Other Exceptions:
a) Donation mortis causa, takes effect only after the death of
the donor (After dissolution of marriage)
b) Donation propter nuptias, given before marriage.
Indirect donation includes:
a) Children whom the other spouses had by another marriage.
b) Presumptive heir
c) Non-relative, used as dummies
Only those who are prejudiced can assail the donation.
Donation to paramour is VOID, ownership can be acquired by
(extra-ordinary) prescription.
Husband and wife cannot sell or lease property to each other
(also common law spouse).
- Exceptions:
a) when separation of property was agreed upon in marriage
settlements
b) If there has been a judicial separation of their property under
Art. 135 of the FC.
Husband and wife are cannot enter into Universal Partnership
of property (indirect donation).
According to Leticia, Francisco and Cirila were lovers since they slept
in the same room. On the other hand, Erlinda Tabancura, another
niece of Francisco claimed that the latter told her that Cirila was his
mistress. However, Cirila defensed herself that she was a mere
helper who could enter the masters bedroom when Francisco asked
her to and that Francisco was too old for her. She denied having
sexual intercourse with Francisco. When the nieces got married,
Cirila who was then 34 year-old widow started working for Francisco
who was 75 year old widower. The latter did not pay him any wages
as househelper though her family was provided with food and lodging.
Franciscos health deteriorated and became bedridden. Tabancura
testified that Franciscos only source of income was the rentals from
his lot near the public streets.

In January 1991, few months before Francisco died, he executed a
Deed of Donation Inter Vivos where he ceded a portion of Lot 437-A
composed of 150 sq m., together with his house to Cirila who
accepted the same. The larger portion of 268 sq m. was left under his
name. This was made in consideration of the 10 year of faithful
services of the petitioner. Atty Lacaya notarized the deed and was
later registered by Cirila as its absolute owner.

In Octoer 1991, Francisco died and in 1993, the lot received by Cirila
had a market value of P57,105 and assessed value of P28,550. The
decedents nephews and nieces and his heirs by intestate succession
alleged that Cirila was the common-law wife of Francisco.

ISSUE: Whether or not the deed of donation inter vivos executed by
Francisco in Arcabas favor was valid.


Hence, the deed of donation by Francisco in favor of Cirila is void
under Art. 87 of the Family Code.



ACP

Art 88. The absolute community of property between spouses
shall commence at the precise moment that the marriage is
celebrated. Any stipulation, express or implied, for the
commencement of the community regime at any other time shall
be void.

In absence of Marriage settlement (during the effectivity of FC), the
default regime of property is ACP.

Art. 89. No waiver of rights, shares and effects of the absolute
community of property during the marriage can be made except
in case of judicial separation of property.

When the waiver takes place upon a judicial separation of
property, or after the marriage has been dissolved or annulled,
the same shall appear in a public instrument and shall be
recorded as provided in Article 77. The creditors of the spouse
who made such waiver may petition the court to rescind the
waiver to the extent of the amount sufficient to cover the amount
of their credits.
Art. 90. The provisions on co-ownership shall apply to the
absolute community of property between the spouses in all
matters not provided for in this Chapter.


Precise moment refers to the very moment that the spouses say
their I Dos

In ACP, the husband and wife are co- owners of all the properties that
they bring into the marriage and those acquired by each or both of
them during the marriage which properties, upon the dissolution of the
marriage, the spouses will divide equally.



General Rule: no waiver of rights shares and effects of the absolute
community of property

Exception: 1. In case of judicial separation, which includes dissolution
of the ACP as a result of legal separation; 2. In case the marriage is
dissolved by death or annulment.

Waiver is allowed: 1. Must appear in public instrument (to effect 3
rd

person); must be recorded in the office of the Local Civil Registrar,
where the marriage contract is recorded and in the proper registries of
property.
Section 2. What Constitutes Community Property

Art. 91. Unless otherwise provided in this Chapter or in the
marriage settlements, the community property shall consist of all
the property owned by the spouses at the time of the celebration
of the marriage or acquired thereafter.

All properties belonging to H and W before marriage, except those
excluded by Art. 92, are automatically converted into community or
common property of the spouses, by marriage, without need of any
judicial act on the part of the owner-spouse transferring the same to
the community.

The spouses have no option to exclude specific properties from the
community.
Art. 92. The following shall be excluded from the community
property:

(1) Property acquired during the marriage by gratuitous title by
either spouse, and the fruits as well as the income thereof, if any,
unless it is expressly provided by the donor, testator or grantor
that they shall form part of the community property;

(2) Property for personal and exclusive use of either spouse.
However, jewelry shall form part of the community property;

(3) Property acquired before the marriage by either spouse
who has legitimate descendants by a former marriage, and the
fruits as well as the income, if any, of such property.

By gratuitous title means by donation , or testate or intestate
succession.
Art. 93. Property acquired during the marriage is presumed to
belong to the community, unless it is proved that it is one of
those excluded therefrom.


Section 3. Charges and Obligations of the Absolute Community

Art. 94. The absolute community of property shall be liable for:

(1) The support of the spouses, their common children, and legitimate children of either spouse; however, the support of illegitimate children shall be governed by the provisions of this Code on
Support;

(2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the designated administrator-spouse for the benefit of the community, or by both spouses, or by one spouse with the consent of the
other;

(3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that the family may have been benefited;

(4) All taxes, liens, charges and expenses, including major or minor repairs, upon the community property;

(5) All taxes and expenses for mere preservation made during marriage upon the separate property of either spouse used by the family;

(6) Expenses to enable either spouse to commence or complete a professional or vocational course, or other activity for self-improvement;

(7) Ante-nuptial debts of either spouse insofar as they have redounded to the benefit of the family;

(8) The value of what is donated or promised by both spouses in favor of their common legitimate children for the exclusive purpose of commencing or completing a professional or vocational course
or other activity for self-improvement;

(9) Ante-nuptial debts of either spouse other than those falling under paragraph (7) of this Article, the support of illegitimate children of either spouse, and liabilities incurred by either spouse by
reason of a crime or a quasi-delict, in case of absence or insufficiency of the exclusive property of the debtor-spouse, the payment of which shall be considered as advances to be deducted from the
share of the debtor-spouse upon liquidation of the community; and

(10) Expenses of litigation between the spouses unless the suit is found to be groundless.

If the community property is insufficient to cover the foregoing liabilities, except those falling under paragraph (9), the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate
properties.

Solidary liability:
If the community properties are not sufficient to pay for all the liabilities under this article except those falling under par. 9. The spouses are solidarily liable to creditors with their separate properties.
The spouse who pays the creditor with his or her separate property may get reimbursement from the ACP at the time of liquidation.
ARTICLE 95: Whatever may be lost during the marriage in any
game of chance, betting, sweepstakes, or any other kind of
gambling, whether permitted or prohibited by law, shall be borne
by the loser and shall not be charged to the community but any
winnings therefrom shall form part of the community property.

The GAMBLER bears the losses, but the winnings shall go to the
absolute community.
ARTILE 96: The administration and enjoyment of the community
property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of
disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to
recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must
be availed of within five years from the date of the contract
implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable
to participate in the administration of the common properties, the
other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These
powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without
authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse.
In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be
construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting
spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding
contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or
authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either
or both offerors.

*JOINT administration by both husband and wife.
*In case of DISAGREEMENT, the husband will prevail, SUBJECT to
recourse to the court by the WIFE for the proper remedy.
*ONLY within 5 years from date of contract implementing the
husbands decision.
*BUT if wife ratifies contract express or implied cannot annul anymore.

The other spouse may assume sole powers of administration when:1.

1. The other spouse is incapacitated.
2. The other spouse is unable to participate (i.e. abroad)

The power to administer does not include the power to dispose or
encumber solely by 1 spouse. Court authority or the approval of the
other spouse is required.
ARTICLE 97: Either spouse may dispose by will of his or her interest
in the community property.

*While the community subsists, either spouse may not dispose inter
vivos of his interest to the extent of of the community property
unless otherwise stipulated in the marriage settlement. For that matter,
he may dispose of such interest only by will.
ARTICLE 98: Neither spouse may donate any community property
without the consent of the other. However, either spouse may, without
the consent of the other, make moderate donations from the
community property for charity or on occasions of family rejoicing or
ARTICLE 99: The absolute community terminates:
(1) Upon the death of either spouse;
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
(3) When the marriage is annulled or declared void; or
ARTICLE 100: The separation in fact between husband and wife shall
not affect the regime of absolute community except that:
(1) The spouse who leaves the conjugal home or refuses to live
therein, without just cause, shall not have the right to be supported;
family distress

General Rule: In order to donate any community property, the other
spouse must consent.
Exception: Moderate donations do not need the consent of the other
spouse if for:
1. Charity
2. Occasions of family rejoicing or distress
*What is moderate depends on the financial circumstances of the
couple, the value of the property donated, and their social position.
(4) In case of judicial separation of property during the marriage
under Articles 134 to 138.

1. Death (Apply Art. 103)
- Same proceeding as settlement of estate.
Spouse shall liquidate property if no judicial settlement proceeding
within 1 year. After 1 year cannot may encumbrance on property.
2. Legal separation (Apply Arts. 63 and 64)
4. Annulled or void (Apply rules on co-owenership)
5. Judicial separation of property (Apply Arts.134 to 138

the ACP is not synonymous with the dissolution of the
marriage. In Articles 99 (2) and (4), the ACP is dissolved although the
marriage is not. However, the dissolution of the marriage automatically
results in the dissolution of the ACP.
when a marriage is declared as a nullity, there is no
ACP to dissolve since there was no property regime to begin with. The
dissolution in such a case would be governed by the rules on co-
ownership.
es when the
ACP terminates. Another instance is when the marriage is terminated
by the reappearance of the absent spouse (Articles 42 and 43 (2).
(2) When the consent of one spouse to any transaction of the other is
required by law, judicial authorization shall be obtained in a summary
proceeding;
(3) In the absence of sufficient community property, the separate
property of both spouses shall be solidarily liable for the support of the
family. The spouse present shall, upon proper petition in a summary
proceeding, be given judicial authority to administer or encumber any
specific separate property of the other spouse and use the fruits or
proceeds thereof to satisfy the latter's share.

*Separation de facto does not dissolve the ACP.
ARTICLE 101: If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or
fails to comply with his or her obligations to the family, the aggrieved
spouse may petition the court for receivership, for judicial separation
of property or for authority to be the sole administrator of the absolute
community, subject to such precautionary conditions as the court may
impose.
The obligations to the family mentioned in the preceding paragraph
refer to marital, parental or property relations.
A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when her or she
has left the conjugal dwelling without intention of returning. The
spouse who has left the conjugal dwelling for a period of three months
or has failed within the same period to give any information as to his
or her whereabouts shall be prima facie presumed to have no
intention of returning to the conjugal dwelling.

*If a spouse abandons the other spouse without just cause or fails to
comply with his or marital obligations, the aggrieved spouse may
petition the court for the following:
1. Receivership
2. Judicial separation of property
3. Authority to be the sole administrator.
intention of returning.
Presumption of Abandonment:
When the spouse has left the conjugal dwelling for a period of 3
months without giving information as to his whereabouts.
ARTICLE 102: Upon dissolution of the absolute community regime,
the following procedure shall apply:
(1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the properties
of the absolute community and the exclusive properties of each
spouse.
(2) The debts and obligations of the absolute community shall be paid
out of its assets. In case of insufficiency of said assets, the spouses
shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate
properties in accordance with the provisions of the second paragraph
of Article 94.
(3) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses shall
thereafter be delivered to each of them.
(4) The net remainder of the properties of the absolute community
shall constitute its net assets, which shall be divided equally between
husband and wife, unless a different proportion or division was agreed
upon in the marriage settlements, or unless there has been a
voluntary waiver of such share provided in this Code. For purpose of
computing the net profits subject to forfeiture in accordance with
Articles 43, No. (2) and 63, No. (2), the said profits shall be the
increase in value between the market value of the community property
at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at
the time of its dissolution.
(5) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be
delivered upon partition, in accordance with Article 51.
(6) Unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, in the partition of the
properties, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated
shall be adjudicated to the spouse with whom the majority of the
common children choose to remain. Children below the age of seven
years are deemed to have chosen the mother, unless the court has
decided otherwise. In case there in no such majority, the court shall
Steps in liquidation:
1. Inventory
a. 3 lists
a.i. Inventory of community property
a.ii. Inventory of separate property of the wife
a.iii. Inventory of separate property of the
husband
2. Payment of Community Debts
a. First, pay out of community assets
b. If not enough, husband and wife are solidarily liable
with theirseparate property.
3. Delivery to each spouse his or her separate property if any.
4. Division of the net community assets
NOTE: There are special rules regarding the family home.
5. Delivery of presumptive legitimes if any to the children
a. The presumptive legitimes are given in the following
instances:
a.i. Death of either spouse (Article 103)
a.ii. Legal Separation (Articles 63 and 64)
a.iii. Annulment (Articles 50 - 52)
a.iv. Judicial Separation of Property (Articles
134 - 137)
Reappearance of the absent spouse which terminates the 2
nd

marriage(Article 43)
decide, taking into consideration the best interests of said children.
ARTICLE 103: Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the
community property shall be liquidated in the same proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased.
If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving spouse
shall liquidate the community property either judicially or extra-
judicially within six months from the death of the deceased spouse. If
upon the lapse of the six months period, no liquidation is made, any
disposition or encumbrance involving the community property of the
terminated marriage shall be void.
Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage without
compliance with the foregoing requirements, a mandatory regime of
complete separation of property shall govern the property relations of
the subsequent marriage.
ARTICLE 104. Whenever the liquidation of the community properties
of two or more marriages contracted by the same person before the
effectivity of this Code is carried out simultaneously, the respective
capital, fruits and income of each community shall be determined
upon such proof as may be considered according to the rules of
evidence. In case of doubt as to which community the existing
properties belong, the same shall be divided between the different
communities in proportion to the capital and duration of each.

Chapter 4. Conjugal Partnership of Gains
Section 1. General Provisions

Art. 105. In case the future spouses agree in the marriage
settlements that the regime of conjugal partnership gains shall
govern their property relations during marriage, the provisions in
this Chapter shall be of supplementary application.

The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal
partnerships of gains already established between spouses
before the effectivity of this Code, without prejudice to vested
rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or
other laws, as provided in Article 256.
Definition of conjugal property:
It is formed by a husband and his wife whereby they place in
a common fund and the fruits of their separate property, and
income from their work and industry, the same to be divided
between them EQUALLY (as a general rule) upon the
dissolution of the marriage or partnership.

Duration of conjugal partnership
The CPG is supposed to last until:
1. The dissolution of marriage like death or annulment; and
2. The dissolution of the partnership, like legal separation or
judicial separation of the property.

Conjugal Partnership exists:
- Only when the same has been agreed upon in the marriage
settlement
- Under CC, the general rule is the CPG; in FC, the general
rule is the absolute community of property. Hence, CPG
exists on marriages celebrated before the effectivity of FC.



Distinctions: CPG vs Ordinary Partnership

Conjugal Partnership

a. No juridical personality
b. Regulated generally by law
c. Generally managed by the
husband
d. Purpose is not particularly for
profit
e. Few grounds for dissolution
Ordinary Partnership

a. Has juridical personality
b. Regulated by agreement
between the parties and only
subsidiary by law
c. Management depends upon
the situation of the parties
d. Purpose is for profit
e. Many grounds for dissolution


Art. 106. Under the regime of conjugal partnership of gains, the
husband and wife place in a common fund the proceeds,
products, fruits and income from their separate properties and
those acquired by either or both spouses through their efforts or
by chance, and, upon dissolution of the marriage or of the
partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained by either or both
spouses shall be divided equally between them, unless otherwise
agreed in the marriage settlements.

Properties covered by conjugal partnership:
a.) The proceeds, products, fruits, and income from the separate
properties of the spouses
b.) Those acquired either or both of the spouses by their efforts or by
chance

Conjugal Partnership vs Absolute Community
Conjugal Partnership
1. Each spouse retains his or her
property before the marriage, and
only the fruits and income of such
properties become part of the
Conjugal Property during the
marriage.
2. The separate properties of the
spouses are returned upon the
dissolution of the partnership,
and only the net profits of the
partnership are divided equally
between the spouses or their
heirs.
3. The capital properties of the
Absolute Community
1. All the properties owned by the
spouses at the time of the
marriage become Community
Property except those provided
under Art 92.
2. The net remainder of the
properties of the absolute
community are divided equally
between the spouses or their
heirs upon the dissolution and
liquidation of the community
property.
3. Based essentially on the
mutual trust and confidence
spouses are kept separate and
distinct from the benefits acquired
by them during the marriage.
4. The exclusive properties of the
parties will have to be identified
and returned.
between the spouses and fosters
oneness and unity between them.
4. Easier to liquidate because the
net remainder of the community
properties is just divided between
the spouses or their heirs.
Art. 107. The rules provided in Articles 88 and 89 shall also apply
to conjugal partnership of gains.

Please see Articles 88 and 89
Art. 108. The conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules
on the contract of partnership in all that is not in conflict with
what is expressly determined in this Chapter or by the spouses
in their marriage settlements.

If the conjugal partnership is insufficient to cover liabilities,
the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance
with their separate properties.

Section 2. Exclusive Property of Each Spouse

Art. 109. The following shall be the exclusive property of each
spouse:
(1) That which is brought to the marriage as his or her own;
(2) That which each acquires during the marriage by gratuitous
title;
(3) That which is acquired by right of redemption, by barter or
by exchange with property belonging to only one of the spouses;
and
(4) That which is purchased with exclusive money of the
wife or of the husband.


Art. 110. The spouses retain the ownership, possession,
administration and enjoyment of their exclusive properties.
Either spouse may, during the marriage, transfer the
administration of his or her exclusive property to the other by
means of a public instrument, which shall be recorded in the
registry of property of the place the property is located.

Transfer of administration over the separate property may be
in public instrument, to the other spouse. It must also be
recorded in the registry of property of the place where the
property is located.

Art. 111. A spouse of age may mortgage, encumber, alienate or
otherwise dispose of his or her exclusive property, without the
consent of the other spouse, and appear alone in court to litigate
with regard to the same.

Note that the other spouse does not need consent to
alienate/encumber etc his or her exclusive property.

Art. 112. The alienation of any exclusive property of a spouse
administered by the other automatically terminates the
administration over such property and the proceeds of the
alienation shall be turned over to the owner-spouse.

Once the owner-spouse has alienated the property, the
administration thereof by the owner spouse automatically
terminates, and the proceeds of the alienation must be
turned over to the owner-spouse

Art. 113. Property donated or left by will to the spouses, jointly
and with designation of determinate shares, shall pertain to the
donee-spouses as his or her own exclusive property, and in the
absence of designation, share and share alike, without prejudice
to the right of accretion when proper.

If a friend donates to a married couple a parcel of land, the
land will not be conjugal, but separate property ( for each).
This is acquisition by gratuitous title. If a different proportion
or designation of share is made, such will be followed.
Right of accretion takes place when either spouse:
- refuses to accept
- is incapacitated to accept

- predeceases or dies before the perfection of the donation
Art. 114. If the donations are onerous, the amount of the charges
shall be borne by the exclusive property of the donee spouse,
whenever they have been advanced by the conjugal partnership
of gains.

The property donated is still the exclusive property of the
donee spouse, but he or she has an obligation to reimburse
the amount advanced by the conjugal partnership for the
charges on the property at the time of liquidation of the
partnership.

Art. 115. Retirement benefits, pensions, annuities, gratuities,
usufructs and similar benefits shall be governed by the rules on
gratuitous or onerous acquisitions as may be proper in each
case.
If they are gratuitous, they are the exclusive property of the
spouses to whom they are given. If they are onerous, then
such benefits are conjugal.
If the benefits are given by reason of payments from the
conjugal property, these shall pertain to the conjugal
partnership like annuities or proceeds of insurance.

Section 3. Conjugal Partnership Property

Art. 116. All property acquired during the marriage, whether the
acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or registered
in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal
unless the contrary is proved.

The presumption is it is conjugal if the property is acquired
during the marriage unless the contrary is proven (even if the
title is under the name of the spouse solely)

Art. 117. The following are conjugal partnership properties:

(1) Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the
expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition be for the
partnership, or for only one of the spouses;
(2) Those obtained from the labor, industry, work or profession
of either or both of the spouses;
(3) The fruits, natural, industrial, or civil, due or received
during the marriage from the common property, as well as the net
fruits from the exclusive property of each spouse;
(4) The share of either spouse in the hidden treasure which the
law awards to the finder or owner of the property where the
treasure is found;
(5) Those acquired through occupation such as fishing or
hunting;
(6) Livestock existing upon the dissolution of the partnership
in excess of the number of each kind brought to the marriage by
either spouse; and
(7) Those which are acquired by chance, such as winnings
from gambling or betting. However, losses therefrom
shall be borne exclusively by the loser-spouse.


Art. 118. Property bought on installments paid partly from
exclusive funds of either or both spouses and partly from
conjugal funds belongs to the buyer or buyers if full ownership
was vested before the marriage and to the conjugal partnership if
such ownership was vested during the marriage. In either case,
any amount advanced by the partnership or by either or both
spouses shall be reimbursed by the owner or owners upon
liquidation of the partnership.
This article applies to properties bought on installments by
the husband or wife before the marriage.
Note the need for reimbursement.
Ownership is transferred upon delivery of the property.
Delivery may be actual, constructive, or may be made by
execution of legal instrument.

Art. 119. Whenever an amount or credit payable within a period of
time belongs to one of the spouses, the sums which may be
Example:
Previous to her marriage, a wife lent a friend the sum of 10k payable

collected during the marriage in partial payments or by
installments on the principal shall be the exclusive property of
the spouse. However, interests falling due during the marriage on
the principal shall belong to the conjugal partnership.

in ten years with interest of 6% per annum. Three years after the loan
was contracted, she got married. After 5 years of married life, the
marriage was dissolved. The wife continued collecting for 2 years.
Who owns the principal and the interest?

1. Regarding the principal and the interest for the first 3 years,
the wife is the sole owner for she was not yet married.
2. As regards the principal for 5 years of married life, the wife is
also the owner. The law does not consider the installments
due during the marriage as fruits, and instead, considers
them as pertaining to the capital or to the paraphernal
property of the wife. But the interest for 5 years of married life
belong to the conjugal partnership. The interest here is
considered as fruits of the paraphernal property.
3. The principal and interest during the last 2 years belongs
solely to the wife. The conjugal partnership has ceased to
exist due to the dissolution of the marriage.
Art. 120. The ownership of improvements, whether for utility or
adornment, made on the separate property of the spouses at the
expense of the partnership or through the acts or efforts of either
or both spouses shall pertain to the conjugal partnership, or to
the original owner-spouse, subject to the following rules:

When the cost of the improvement made by the conjugal
partnership and any resulting increase in value are more than the
value of the property at the time of the improvement, the entire
property of one of the spouses shall belong to the conjugal
partnership, subject to reimbursement of the value of the
property of the owner-spouse at the time of the improvement;
otherwise, said property shall be retained in ownership by the
owner-spouse, likewise subject to reimbursement of the cost of
the improvement.

In either case, the ownership of the entire property shall be
vested upon the reimbursement, which shall be made at the time
of the liquidation of the conjugal partnership.

It is important to note which is bigger or greater:
a.) The value of the property just before the improvement was
made, or
b.) Its value after the improvement including the cose

If (a) is greater, the whole thing belongs to the owner-spouse, without
prejudice to reimbursement of the conjugal partnership. If (b) is
greater, the whole thing belongs to the conjugal partnership but the
owner-spouse must be reimbursed.

Ownership of the entire property (principal and improvement) vests on
the owner-spouse or the partnership, as the case may be, upon
reimbursement of the improvement, which shall be made at the time of
the liquidation of the conjugal partnership.

Art 121: The CP shall be liable for:
(1) The support of the spouse, their common children, and
legitimate children of either spouse; however, the support of
illegitimate children shall be governed by the provisions of
this Code on Support;
(2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by
the designated administrator-spouse for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership of gains, or by both spouses or by
one of them with the consent of the other;
(3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without
the consent of the other to the extent that the family may
have been benefited;
(4) All taxes, liens, and charges, and expenses, including major
or minor repairs upon the conjugal partnership property;
(5) All taxes and expenses for mere preservation made during

the marriage upon the separate property of either spouse;
(6) Expenses to enable either spouse to commence or complete
a professional, vocational, or other activity for self-
improvement;
(7) Antenuptial debts of either spouse insofar as they have
redounded to the benefit of the family;
(8) The value of what is donated or promised by both spouses in
favor of their common legitimate children for the exclusive
purpose of commencing or completing a professional or
vocational course or other activity for self-improvement; and
(9) Expenses of litigation between the spouses unless the
suit is found to be groundless.
If the conjugal partnership is insufficient to cover the foregoing
liabilities, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid
balance with their separate properties.
Art 122: The payment of personal debts contracted by the husband
or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the
conjugal partnership except in so far as they redounded to the
benefit of the family.
Neither shall fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon them
be charged to the partnership.
However, the payment of personal debts contracted by either spouse
before the marriage, that of fines and indemnities imposed upon them,
as well as the support of illegitimate children of either spouse, may be
enforced against the partnership assets after the responsibilities
enumerated in the preceding Article have been covered, if the spouse
who is bound should have no exclusive property or if it should be
insufficient; but at the time of the liquidation of the partnership,
such spouse shall be charged for what has been paid for the
above-mentioned.
What shall not be charged against the CPG:
(1) Debts incurred (before or during the marriage) except in so
far as they benefitted the family
(2) Fines and pecuniary indemnities

However, if the separate property is insufficient, the conjugal
partnership property shall be liable, subject to two conditions:
(1) The obligations of and charges upon the CP shall have been
covered;
There must be reimbursement during liquidation

Art 123: Whatever may be lost during the marriage in any game of
chance, or in betting, sweepstakes, or any other kind of gambling
whether permitted or prohibited by law, shall be borne by the loser and
shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership but any winnings
therefrom shall form part of the conjugal partnership of property.

(Same with ACP, see Art 95)

Art 124: The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal
partnership of property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of
disagreement, the husbands decision shall prevail, subject to
recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must
be availed of within five years from the date of the contract
implementing such decision.

In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to
participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other
spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do
not include disposition or encumbrance without the authority of the
court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of
such authority or consent the disposition or encumbrance shall be
void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing
Art 125: Neither spouse may donate any conjugal partnership
property without the consent of the other. However, either spouse
may, without the consent of the other, make moderate donations
from the conjugal partnership property for charity or on occasions of
family rejoicing or family distress.
(Same with ACP, see Art 98.)
Art 126: The conjugal partnership terminates:
(1) Upon the death of either spouse;
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
(3) When the marriage is annulled or declared void; or
(4) In case of judicial separation of property during the
marriage under Art 134 to 138
(Same with ACP, see Art 99.)
offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person,
and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by
the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is
withdrawn by either or both offerors.
(Same with ACP, Art 96.)

Note: in case of conflict---husband prevails, but wife has judicial
redresswithin 5 years from the date of the contract implementing the
husbands decision.
Art 127: The separation in fact between husband and wife shall not
affect the regime of conjugal partnership, except that:
(1) The spouse who leaves the conjugal home or refuses to live
therein, without just cause, shall have no right to be
supported;
(2) When the consent of one spouse to any transaction of the
other is required by law, judicial authorization shall be
obtained in a summary proceeding; (this means that in cases
when consent of the absent spouse is necessary, a judicial
authorization instead will be secured by the spouse present)
(3) In the absence of sufficient conjugal partnership property, the
separate property of both spouses shall be solidarily liable for
the support of the family. The spouse present shall, upon
petition in a summary proceeding, be given judicial
authority to administer or encumber any specific
separate property of the other spouse and use the fruits
or proceeds thereof to satisfy the latters share.
(Same with ACP, see Art 100.)
Art 128: If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails to
comply with his or her obligations to the family, the aggrieved spouse
may petition the court for receivership, for judicial separation of
property, or for the authority to be the sole administrator of the
conjugal partnership property, subject to such precautionary
conditions as the court may impose.

The obligations to the family mentioned in the preceding paragraph
refer to marital, parental, or property relations.

A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when he or she
has left the conjugal dwelling without intention of returning. The
spouse who has left the conjugal dwelling for a period of three
months or has failed within the same period to give any
information as to his or her whereabouts shall be prima facie
presumed to have no intention of returning to the conjugal dwelling.
(Same with ACP, see Art 101.)
Art 129: Upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime, the
following procedure shall apply:
(1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the
properties of the conjugal partnership and the exclusive
properties of each spouse.
(2) Amounts advanced by the conjugal partnership in
payment of personal debts and obligations of either
spouse shall be credited to the conjugal partnership as an
asset thereof. (NOT PRESENT IN ACP, ART 102)
(3) Each spouse shall be reimbursed for the use of his or her
exclusive funds in the acquisition of property or for the
value of his or her exclusive property, the ownership of which
has been vested by law in the conjugal partnership (NOT
PRESENT IN ACP, ART 102)
(4) The debts and obligations of the conjugal partnership
shall be paid out of the conjugal assets. In case of
insufficiency of said assets, the spouses shall be solidarily
liable for the unpaid balance with their separate
properties, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph
(2) of Article 121.
(5) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the
spouses shall thereafter be delivered to each of them.
(6) Unless the owner had been indemnified from whatever
source, the loss or deterioration of movables used for the
benefit of the family belonging to either spouse, even due
to fortuitous event, shall be paid to said spouse from the
conjugal funds, if any. (NOT PRESENT IN ACP, ART 102)
(7) The net remainder of the conjugal partnership properties
shall constitute the profits which shall be divided equally
between husband and wife unless a different proportion or
division was agreed upon in the marriage settlements or
unless there has been a voluntary waiver or forfeiture of
such share as provided in this Code.
(8) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall
be delivered upon partition in accordance with Article 51.
(9) In partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and the lot
on which it is situated shall, unless otherwise agreed upon by
the parties, be adjudicated to the spouse with whom the
majority of the common children choose to remain.
Children below the age of seven years are deemed to have
chosen the mother, unless the court has decided otherwise.
In case there is no such majority, the court shall decide,
taking into consideration the best interests of said children.
Art 130: Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the conjugal
partnership property, shall be liquidated in the same proceeding for
the settlement of the estate of the deceased.

If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving spouse
shall liquidate the conjugal partnership property either judicially
or extrajudicially within six months from the death of the deceased
spouse. If upon the lapse of the six-month period no liquidation is
made, any disposition or encumbrance involving the conjugal
partnership property of the terminated marriage shall be void.

Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage
without compliance with the foregoing requirements, a mandatory
regime of complete separation of property shall govern the
property relations of the subsequent marriage.
(Same with ACP, see Art 103).
Art 131: Whenever the liquidation of the conjugal partnership of two or
more marriages contracted by the same person during the effectivity
of this Code is carried our simultaneously, the respective capital, fruits
and income of each partnership shall be determined upon such proof
as may be considered according to the rules of evidence. In
case of doubt as to which partnership the existing properties being,
the same shall be divided between the different partnerships in
proportion to the capital and duration of each.
Art 132: The Rules of Court on the administration of estates of
deceased persons shall be observed in the appraisal and sale of
property of the conjugal partnership, and other matters which are not
expressly determined in this Chapter.
Art 133: From the common mass of property support shall be given to
the surviving spouse and to the children during the liquidation of the
inventoried property and until what belongs to them is delivered; but
from this shall be deducted that amount received for support which
exceeds the fruits or rents pertaining to them.

Ayala Investment V CA (feb. 12, 1998)

Facts: Alfredo and Encarnacion Ching are married couple. Alfredo is
an executive of Phil. Blooming mills He is also a stockholder as a
consequence of his job. PBM contracted a loan to AIDC herein
petitioner and along with that loan is a surety made by Alfredo that
hed be jointly and severally liable. Upon default of PBM to pay its
obligation, AIDC then moved for the execution of real property of PBM
and thereafter also 3 real properties of the spouses Ching.

Issue: Whether or not the properties under conjugal partnership of
gains be levied to satisfy the liability arising from surety contract made
by one spouse alone?

Rulling: (A) If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the
contract, i.e., he directly received the money and services to be used
in or for his own business or his own profession, that contract falls
within the term . . . . obligations for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership." Here, no actual benefit may be proved. It is enough that
the benefit to the family is apparent at the time of the signing of the
contract. From the very nature of the contract of loan or services, the
family stands to benefit from the loan facility or services to be
rendered to the business or profession of the husband. It is
immaterial, if in the end, his business or profession fails or does not
succeed. Simply stated, where the husband contracts obligations on
behalf of the family business, the law presumes, and rightly so, that
such obligation will redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
(B) On the other hand, if the money or services are given to another
person or entity, and the husband acted only as a surety or guarantor,
that contract cannot, by itself, alone be categorized as falling within
the context of "obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership."
The contract of loan or services is clearly for the benefit of the
principal debtor and not for the surety or his family. No presumption
can be inferred that, when a husband enters into a contract of surety
or accommodation agreement, it is "for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership." Proof must be presented to establish benefit redounding
to the conjugal partnership.

Thus, the distinction between the Cobb-Perez case, and we add, that
of the three other companion cases, on the one hand, and that of
Ansaldo, Liberty Insurance and Luzon Surety, is that in the former, the
husband contracted the obligation for his own business; while in the
latter, the husband merely acted as a surety for the loan contracted by
another for the latter's business.
The evidence of petitioner indubitably show that co-respondent Alfredo
Ching signed as surety for the P50M loan contracted on behalf of
PBM.

Here, the property in dispute also involves the family home. The loan
is a corporate loan not a personal one. Signing as a surety is certainly
not an exercise of an industry or profession nor an act of
administration for the benefit of the family.

CHING V. CA On Sep 28, 1978, Philippine Blooming mills (PBMCI) obtained a 9-
million peso load from Allied banking corporation. For security, Alfredo

Issue: WON the argument of Mrs Ching is tenable.
Ching and 2 other persons executed a continuing guaranty binding
themselves to jointly and severally guarantee the payment of all the
PBMCI obligations owing the ABC to the extent of 38 million pesos.
PBMCI defaulted in the payment which amounted to 12,612,972.88
pesos. After the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment, the
sheriff then levied the 100,000 common shares of CityCorp stocks
registered solely in the name of Alfredo Ching. The wife of Mr. Ching
then moved to set aside the levy on attachment claiming that the
stocks were acquired by her and her husband during the marriage out
of conjugal funds. Furthermore, the indebtedness did not redound to
the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
Held:
The barefaced fact that the shares of stocks were registered in the
corporate books of citycorp investment solely in the name of Alfredo
does not constitute proof that the husband, not the conjugal
partnership, owned the same. It was the burden of ABC to prove such.
However, ABC failed to adduce evidence to prove this assertion.
For the conjugal partnership to be liable for a liability that should
appertain to the husband alone, there must be a showing that some
advantages accrued to the spouses. No presumption can be inferred
that when a husband entered into a contract of surety, the conjugal
partnership would thereby be benefited.
Also, the benefits contemplated must be those directly resulting from
the loan. They cannot merely a by-product or a spin-off of the loan
itself.
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS
FRANCISCO vs GONZALES
FRANCISCO VS GONZALES GR 177667

After securing a Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, Cleodualdo and
Michele have voluntarily agreed to set forth their obligations, rights
and responsibilities on matters relating to their children's support,
custody, visitation, as well as to the dissolution of their conjugal
partnership of gains in a compromise agreement.

Ownership of the conjugal property consisting of a house and lot
covered by TCT in the name of Cleodualdo M. Francisco, married to
Michele U. Francisco shall be transferred by way of a deed of
donation to Cleodia and Ceamantha, as co-owners, when they reach
nineteen (19) and eighteen (18) years old.

Respondent ordered Michele and her partner Matrai to vacate the
premises at LANGKA Drive, which was leased to them and to pay
back rentals, unpaid telephone bill, and attorney's fees.

A notice of sale was issued covering the property donated to the
children(Taal St.).

RTC denied the MR filed by Petitioners Grandmother as guardian-in-
fact of the children

CA DECISION: Michele's obligation was not proven to be a personal
debt, it must be inferred that it is conjugal and redounded to the
benefit of the family, and hence, the property may be held answerable
for it.

ISSUE : W the conjugal property of the former spouses may be
held accountable?

RATIO: NO. The power of the court in executing judgments extends
only to properties
unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor alone, in the
present case to those belonging to Michele and Matrai. *Cleodualdo
and Michele, having married prior to the effectivity of the FC thus their
property relation is governed by the Civil Code on conjugal partnership
of gains.

A wife may bind the conjugal partnership only when she-purchases
things necessary for the support of the family- when she borrows
money for that purpose upon her husband's failure to deliver the
needed sum-when administration of the conjugal partnership is
transferred to the wife by the courts or by the husband-or when the
wife gives moderate donations for charity.

In this case as the liability incurred by Michele arose from a judgment
rendered in an unlawful detainer case against her and her partner
Matrai. Michele, who was then already living separately from
Cleodualdo rented the house in Lanka Drive for her and Matrai's own
benefit. In fact, when they entered into the lease agreement, Michele
and Matrai purported themselves to be husband and wife.

Both Michele and Cleodualdo have waived their title to and ownership
of the house and lot in Taal St. in favor of petitioners. The property
should not have been levied and sold at execution sale, for lack of
legal basis.

ROBERTO AND VENUS BUADO VS COURT OF APPEALS AND
ROMULO NICOL
FACTS:
Mr. and Mrs. Buado filed a civil case against Erlinda Nicol.
On April 1987, the trial court rendered a decision ordering Erlinda
to pay damages to the petitioners.
The personal properties of Erlinda were insufficient to pay the
damages.
The sheriff levied and auctioned the property of Erlinda.
ISSUE:
ISSUE: Whether or not the obligation of Erlinda Nicol arising from her
criminal liability is chargeable to the conjugal partnership.

HELD: NO. Erlinda Nicols liability is not chargeable to the conjugal
partnership.

An auction sale was held with the petitioners as the highest bidder.
A certificate of sale was issued in favor of Mr. and Mrs. Buado.
After almost one year, the husband of Erlinda, Romulo Nicol, filed
a complaint for the annulment of certificate of sale and damages
with preliminary injunction against petitioners and deputy sheriff.
He argued that there was no proper publication and posting for the
auction sale. He also claimed that the judgment obligation of
Erlinda Nicol amounted to P40,000 only. The spouses Buado
obtained the P500,000 worth of property for only P51,685.

The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC and held
that Branch 21 has jurisdiction to act on the complaint filed by the
respondent in this case.
The petitioners filed a petition where they said that the Court of
Appeals committed a grave abuse of discretion for reversing the
decision given by the RTC.

Unlike in the system of absolute community where liabilities incurred
by either spouse by reason of a crime or quasi-delict is chargeable to
the absolute community of property, in the absence or insufficiency of
the exclusive property of the debtor- spouse, the same advantage is
not accorded in the system of conjugal partnership of gains. The
conjugal partnership of gains has no duty to make advance payments
for the liability of the debtor-spouse.

Petitioners argue that the obligation of the wife arising from her
criminal liability is chargeable to the conjugal partnership. The
Supreme Court does not agree to the contention of Mr. and Mrs.
Buado.

In Guadalupe v. Tronco, this Court held that the car which was
claimed by the third party complainant to be conjugal property was
being levied upon to enforce "a judgment for support" filed by a third
person, the third-party claim of the wife is proper since the obligation
which is personal to the husband is chargeable not on the conjugal
property but on his separate property. Hence, the filing of a separate
action by Romulo Nicol was proper.

The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed
Matthews v. Taylor (2009)

On June 30, 1988, respondent Benjamin A. Taylor (Benjamin), a
British subject, married Joselyn C. Taylor (Joselyn), a 17-year old
Filipina. On June 9, 1989, while their marriage was subsisting, Joselyn
bought from Diosa M. Martin a 1,294 square-meter lot (Boracay
property) situated at Manoc-Manoc, Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan, for
and in consideration of P129,000.00. The sale was allegedly financed
by Benjamin. Joselyn and Benjamin, also using the latters funds,
constructed improvements thereon and eventually converted the
property to a vacation and tourist resort known as the Admiral Ben
Bow Inn. All required permits and licenses for the operation of the
resort were obtained in the name of Ginna Celestino, Joselyns sister.
However, Benjamin and Joselyn had a falling out, and Joselyn ran
away with Kim Philippsen. On June 8, 1992, Joselyn executed a
Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of Benjamin, authorizing the
latter to maintain, sell, lease, and sub-lease and otherwise enter into
contract with third parties with respect to their Boracay property. On
July 20, 1992, Joselyn as lessor and petitioner Philip Matthews as
lessee, entered into an Agreement of Lease (Agreement) involving the
Boracay property for a period of 25 years, with an annual rental of
P12,000.00. The agreement was signed by the parties and executed
before a Notary Public. Petitioner thereafter took possession of the
property and renamed the resort as Music Garden Resort. Claiming
that the Agreement was null and void since it was entered into by
Joselyn without his (Benjamins) consent, Benjamin instituted an
action for Declaration of Nullity of Agreement of Lease with Damages
against Joselyn and the petitioner. Benjamin claimed that his funds
were used in the acquisition and improvement of the Boracay
property, and coupled with the fact that he was Joselyns husband,
any transaction involving said property required his consent.
Issue: Can an alien husband nullify a lease contract entered into by
his Filipina wife bought during their marriage? No.

SC: The rule is clear and inflexible: aliens are absolutely not allowed
to acquire public or private lands in the Philippines, save only in
constitutionally recognized exceptions. There is no rule more settled
than this constitutional prohibition, as more and more aliens attempt to
circumvent the provision by trying to own lands through another.

Benjamin has no right to nullify the Agreement of Lease between
Joselyn and petitioner. Benjamin, being an alien, is absolutely
prohibited from acquiring private and public lands in the Philippines.
Considering that Joselyn appeared to be the designated vendee in
the Deed of Sale of said property, she acquired sole ownership
thereto. This is true even if we sustain Benjamins claim that he
provided the funds for such acquisition. By entering into such contract
knowing that it was illegal, no implied trust was created in his favor; no
reimbursement for his expenses can be allowed; and no declaration
can be made that the subject property was part of the
conjugal/community property of the spouses. In any event, he had and
has no capacity or personality to question the subsequent lease of the
Boracay property by his wife on the theory that in so doing, he was
merely exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal
property. To sustain such a theory would countenance indirect
controversion of the constitutional prohibition. If the property were to
be declared conjugal, this would accord the alien husband a
substantial interest and right over the land, as he would then have a
decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition. This is a right that the
Constitution does not permit him to have.
PANA V. HEIRS OF JOSE JUANITE, SR. AND JOSE JUANITE, JR.
DECEMBER 10, 2012

The prosecution accused Efren Pana, his wife Melencia, and others of
murder before the Regional Trial Court of Surigao City, and eventually
a decision was rendered acquitting Efren of the charge for
insufficiency of evidence but finding Melencia and another person
guilty as charged and was sentenced to death. The Supreme Court
affirmed RTCs decision but modified the penalty to Reclusion
Perpetua. As for the monetary awards, the court affirmed the award of
civil indemnity and moral damages but deleted the award for actual
damages for lack of evidentiary basis. In its place the court made an
award of php15, 000 each by way of temperate damages. In addition,
the court awarded Php50, 000.00 exemplary damages per victim to be
paid solidarily by them. The decision became executory of October 1,
2001. Upon motion for execution by the heirs of the deceased, the
RTC ordered the issuance of the writ resulting in the levy of real
properties registered in the names of Efren and Melencia.

Subsequently, a notice of levy and a notice of sale on execution were
issued. On April 3, 2002, Efren and his wife Melecia filed a motion to
quash the writ of execution claiming that the properties levied were
conjugal assets and not paraphernal of Melecia. On September 16,
2002, the RTC denied the motion. The spouses moved for
reconsideration but the RTC denied the same. In this case, it is
submitted that Efren and Melencia were married when the Civil Code
was still in effect. They did not execute a pre-nuptial agreement,
hence CPG governed their property relations. However, both RTC and
CA held that property regime changed into ACP when family code took
effect it reason out that Art. 256 of the Family Code provides that the
Code shall have retroactive effect in so far as it does not prejudice or
impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or
other laws. Both the RTC and the Court of the Appeals are in error on
this point. While it is true that the personal stakes of each spouses in
their conjugal assets are inchoate or unclear prior to the liquidation of
the conjugal partnership of hains and, therefore none of them can be
said to have acquired vested rights in specific assets , it is evident that
Article 256 of the Family Code does not intend to reac back and
automatically convert into absolute community of property relations all
conjugal partnership of gains that existed before 1988 excepting only
those with prenuptial agreements.

ISSUE: Whether or not the conjugal properties of spouses Efren and
Melencia can be levied and executed upon for the satisfaction of
Melencias civil liability in the aforesaid murder case.

HELD: YES, provided that the conditions under Article 121 of the
Family Code have been covered.
First of all, the Supreme Court explained that it is clear from the facts
that Efren and Melencia were married when the Civil code was still the
operative law on marriages. The presumption, absent any evidence to
the contrary, is that they were married under the regime of conjugal
partnership of gains. Furthermore, Article 119 of the Civil Code
provides that the future spouses main in marriage settlements agree
upon absolute or relative community or conjugal partnership of gains
or upon a complete separation of property, or upon any other regime.
The family code itself provides in Article 76 that marriage settlements
cannot be modified except prior to marriage, and clearly, under this
situation, the spouses cannot modify their regime. Post marriage
modification of settlements can take place only where (a) the absolute
community or conjugal partnership was dissolved and liquidated upon
a decree of legal separation; (b) the spouses who were legally
separated reconciled and agreed to revive their former property
regime; (c)judicial separation of property had been had on the ground
that a spouse abandons the other without just cause or fails to comply
with his obligations to the family; (d) there was judicial separation of
property under article 135; (e) the spouses jointly filed a petition for
the voluntary dissolution of their absolute community or conjugal
partnership of gains. None of these circumstances exists in this case.
a. UNDER THE CIVIL CODE
HEIRS OF CHRISTINA AYUSTE v. COURT OF
APPEALS
FACTS:
Christina Ayuste married Rafael Ayuste on September 24, 1961.
The couple resided in Manila but they operated a machine shop in
Lucena City. This business was managed by Rafael Ayuste.
The couple purchased on August 1982 a parcel of land with an area
of 180 square meters on which a residential house was built
situated at Lucena City for Mr. Ayustes temporary residence.
A deed of sale was executed and signed by the parties and filed
with the Register of Deeds of Lucena City. The property was
purchased from spouses Pedro and Aida David.
On February 1987, Mr. Ayuste, with the consent of Mrs. Ayuste sold
the said parcel of land for P40,000 to Malabonga.
HELD: The trial court erred in giving due course to the action for
annulment of sale. The Deed of Absolute Sale executed on February
27, 1987 by and between defendant-appellant and plaintiff-appellants
husband is declared VALID and BINDING upon the plaintiff-appellant.

The only issue which remains to be resolved is whether petitioners are
entitled to the annulment of the contract of sale entered into by Rafael
Ayuste without the consent of Christina Ayuste.

Under the Civil Code, although the husband is the administrator of the
conjugal partnership, he cannot alienate or encumber any real
property of the conjugal partnership without his wifes consent, subject
only to certain exceptions specified in the law. The remedy available to
Mr. Ayuste died on 1989 and Christina Ayuste found out that the
parcel of land was sold by her deceased husband without her
knowledge or consent.
In 1990, she filed a petition to for the annulment of the sale,
cancellation of the title issued in the name of private respondent
and for the payment of moral, exemplary and actual damages. In
her complaint Christina Ayuste alleges that her signature on the
deed of sale was forged.
The RTC granted the petition of Mrs. Ayuste.
Both parties appealed in the Court of Appeals for the decision
rendered by the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are entitled to the annulment of the
contract of sale entered into by Rafael Ayuste without the consent of
Christina Ayuste?

the wife in case her husband should dispose of their conjugal property
without her consent is laid down in Article 173 of the Civil Code which
states that:
The wife may, during the marriage, and within ten years from the
transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any
contract of the husband entered into without her consent, when such
consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband which tends
to defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership
property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs,
after the dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value of
property fraudulently alienated by the husband. A sale of real
property of the conjugal partnership made by the husband without the
consent of his wife is voidable. The action for annulment must be
brought during the marriage and within ten years from the questioned
transaction by the wife.

In the present case, the deed of sale was executed on February 27,
1987. Rafael Ayuste died on October 13, 1989. However, it was only
on March 2, 1990 that Christina Ayuste filed her complaint with the
lower court asking for the annulment of the sale. Although the action
was filed within ten years from the questioned transaction, it was not
brought during the existence of the marriage which was dissolved
upon the death of Rafael Ayuste in 1989. Clearly, the action for
annulment filed by Christina Ayuste was barred for having been filed
out of time.
The fact that Christina Ayuste only learned of the sale after the death
of her husband is not material.
HEIRS OF REYES VS MIJARES

Vicente and Ignacia were married in 1960 but separated de facto
since 1974. In 1984, Ignacia learned that Vicente sold a lot in 1983 to
souses Mijares which the couple purchased using their conjugal funds
from their garments business. She likewise found out that Vicente filed
a petition for administration and appointment of guardian,
misrepresenting her as already dead. The court, as a result, appointed
Vicente as guardian of their 5 minor children and authorized him to
sell the estate of Ignacia.
In 1966, Ignacia filed a complaint for annulemtn of sale against
spouses Mijares.
The trial court declared the sale of said lot void but only with respect to
the share of Ignacia. Ignacia filed a motion for modification of the
decision praying that the sale be declared void in its entirety. The trial
court modified its decision by declaring the sale void in its entirety.
Both parties appealed the decision to CA. CA reversed and set aside
the decision of the trial court. It ruled that notwithstanding the absence
of Ignacias consent to the sale, the same must be valid in favor of
respondents because they were innocent purchasers for value.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether the status of the sale to spouses Mijares was void,
voidable or valid? The contract is voidable.
(2) Whether it should be annulled on its entirety or only with
respect to the share of Ignacia? It should be annulled in its
entirety
(3) Whether respondent spouses were purchasers in good faith?
No, they were not purchasers of good faith.
RULING:
(1) Art 166, Civil Code: Unless the wife has been declared a
non-compos mentis or a spendthrift, or is under civil
interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium, the husband
cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the
conjugal partnership without the wifes consent.
Art 173: The wife may, during the marriage and within 10
years from the transaction questioned, ask the courts for the
annulment of any contract of the husband entered into
without her consentshould the wife fail to exercise this
right, she or her heirs after the dissolution of the marriage,
may demand the value of property fraudulently alienated by
the husband.
Hence, the husband could not alienate or encumber any
conjugal real property without the consent, express or
implied, of the wife, otherwise, the contract is voidable.
(2) It should be annulled in its entirely:
a) Conjugal partnership is liable for many obligations while
the conjugal partnership exists
b) Conjugal property is even subject to the payment of
debts contracted by either spouse before the marriage
c) Source of payment of fines if exclusive property of a
spouse be insufficient

It appears that Vicente was only given authority to sell in 1984 but the
agreement of sale took place in 1978.
Pelayo V Perez June 8, 2005

Facts: David Pelayo husband of Lorenza Pelayo executed on Jan. 11,
1988 conveyed to Melki Perez two parcels of agricultural land.
Lorenza howeer signed only on the 3
rd
page in the space provided for
the witness on which, Perez failed to register the deed on the registry
of deeds. Perez there upon filed a case asking specific performance
of the spouse. Spouses Pelayo responded that the cause of action of
Perez is unenforceable pursuant to RA 6656 which provides in Sec. 6
that contracts executed prior to its effectivity shall be valid only when
registered with the Registry of Deeds within a period of 3 months.
Being that Perez was unable to do the same then there should not be
any cause of action. They also said that the said contract of sale was
only to simulate a sale just so they can intimidate the illegal occupants
of the land since Perez is feared by many. However, Perez replied that
the lot was given to him by spouses in consideration of his services as
his attorney-in-fact to make necessary representation. David Pelayo
claimed as well that the contract of sale was without his wifes
consent. RTC rendered the deed of sale null and void on the account
that there was no consent by the wife and that Perez did not possess
nor pay taxes on the lots and that defendant Pelayo was indedted to
Perez for services rendered.
Issue:
Whether or not the deed of sale was null and void on the ground for
lack of marital consent.

Ruling: Petitioners not having questioned the Decision of the CA dated
November 24, 1994 which then attained finality, the ruling that the
deed of sale subject of this case is not among the transactions
deemed as invalid under R.A. No. 6657, is now immutable.
We agree with the CA ruling that petitioner Lorenza, by affixing her
signature to the Deed of Sale on the space provided for witnesses, is
deemed to have given her implied consent to the contract of sale.
Moreover, under Article 173, in relation to Article 166, both of the New
Civil Code, which was still in effect on January 11, 1988 when the
deed in question was executed, the lack of marital consent to the
disposition of conjugal property does not make the contract void ab
initio but merely voidable. Said provisions of law provide:
Art. 166. Unless the wife has been declared a non compos mentis or a
spendthrift, or is under civil interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium,
the husband cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the
conjugal property without the wifes consent. If she refuses
unreasonably to give her consent, the court may compel her to grant
the same.. . .
Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage, and within ten years from
the transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any
contract of the husband entered into without her consent, when such
consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband which tends
to defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership
property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs,
after the dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value of
property fraudulently alienated by the husband.
Hence, it has been held that the contract is valid until the court annuls
the same and only upon an action brought by the wife whose consent
was not obtained.
11
In the present case, despite respondents
repeated demands for Lorenza to affix her signature on all the pages
of the deed of sale, showing respondents insistence on enforcing said
contract, Lorenza still did not file a case for annulment of the deed of
sale. It was only when respondent filed a complaint for specific
performance on August 8, 1991 when petitioners brought up Lorenzas
alleged lack of consent as an affirmative defense. Thus, if the
transaction was indeed entered into without Lorenzas consent, we
find it quite puzzling why for more than three and a half years, Lorenza
did absolutely nothing to seek the nullification of the assailed contract.
The foregoing circumstances lead the Court to believe that Lorenza
knew of the full import of the transaction between respondent and
herhusband; and, by affixing her signature on the deed of sale, she,
in effect, signified her consent to the disposition of their conjugal
property.
HEIRS OF HERNANDEZ VS MINGOA [Part 7]



b. UNDER the FAMILY CODE
SABALONES VS CA


husband disputes the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the Court

As member of diplomatic service assigned to different countries,
petitioner Samson Sabalones left to his wife (respondent) the
administration of some of their conjugal properties for 15 years. He
retired as ambassador in 1985 and came back to the Philippines, but
not to his wife and children. 4 years later, he filed an action for
judicial authorization to sell a building and lot in Greenhills, San Juan,
saying that he was 68 years old, sick and living alone without any
income, and that his share of the proceeds of the sale to defray the
prohibitive cost of his hospitalization and medical treatment.

Respondent opposed the authorization and filed a counterclaim for
legal separation, alleging that the house in Greenhills was occupied by
SC RULING
We agree with CA that pending the appointment of an administrator
over the whole mass of conjugal assets, the respondent court was
justified in allowing the wife to continue with her administration. It was
also correct, taking into account the evidence adduced at the hearing,
in enjoining the petitioner from interfering with his wife's administration
pending resolution of the appeal.
The law does indeed grant joint administration over the conjugal
properties, as clearly provided in Art 124. However, Art 61 states that
after a petition for legal separation has been filed, the trial court shall,
in the absence of a written agreement, appoint either one of the
spouse or a 3
rd
person to act as administrator.
While no formal designation of administrator has been made, such
designation was implicit in the decision of the trial court denying
her and their 6 kids, and that they were depending for their support on
the rentals from another conjugal property (building and lot in Forbes
Park). She also informed the court that despite her husband's
retirement, he had not returned to his legitimate family and was
instead maintaining a separate residence with another woman and
their 3 kids. She asked the court to grant legal separation and order
the liquidation of their conjugal properties, with forfeiture of her
husband's share because of his adultery.

RTC found that petitioner had indeed contracted a bigamous
marriage, thus decreed the legal separation and forfeiture of
petitioner's share in the conjugal properties, declaring as well that he
was not entitled to support from his wife.

CA RULING (wife filed motion for issuance of writ of preliminary
injunction to enjoin petitioner from interfering with administration of
their properties. She alleged that he had harassed the tenant in
Forbes Park that his lease would not be renewed) =granted by CA

petitioner contended that since the law provides for joint administration
of conjugal properties, no injunctive relief can be issued against one or
the other because no right will be violated, he also cited Art 124 and
Art 61 of FC.

ISSUE W/N a preliminary injunction can be issued by the Court
(despite joint administration of conjugal properties)
the petitioner any share in the conjugal properties (and thus also
disqualifying him as administrator thereof). That designation was
in effect approved by the Court of Appeals when it issued in favor of
the wife with the preliminary injunction.
The primary purpose of injunction is to preserve status quo. The Court
notes that the wife has been administering the subject properties for
19 years now, without complaint on the part of petitioner. He has not
alleged, much less shown, that her administration has caused
prejudice to the conjugal partnership. In her motion for issuance of
preliminary injunction, the respondent wife alleged that the petitioner's
harassment of their tenant in Forbes Park would jeopardize the lease
and deprive her and her children of the income therefrom. She also
complained that petitioner executed a quitclaim over their conjugal
property in USA in favor of Thelma Cumareng (the other woman) to
improve her lifestyle, to the prejudice of his legitimate family. These
allegations show that injunction is necessary to protect the interests of
wife and kids.



ANTONIO and LUZVIMINDA GUIANG vs. COURT OF APPEALS
and GILDA CORPUZ

FACTS:
Judie and Gilda Corpuz were married on December 1968 in
Bacolod City before a judge.
Mr. and Mrs. Corpuz purchased a lot in Koronadal, South Cotabato.
In April 1988, the couple sold one half portion of their lot to spouses
Mr. and Mrs. Guiang.
Gilda Corpuz went to Manila on June 1989 to search for
employment abroad but she became a victim of an illegal recruiter.
While she was in Manila, Mr. Corpuz (the husband), sold the other
half of their residence to spouses Guiang (petitioners).

ISSUE: Whether or not the deed of transfer of rights was validly
executed, or it not, ratified by the execution of the amicable
settlement.

HELD: The disposition or encumbrance is voidable. Under Article 166
of the Civil Code, the husband cannot generally alienate or encumber
any real property of the conjugal partnership without the wifes
consent. The alienation or encumbrance if so made however is not
null and void. It is merely voidable. The offended wife may bring an
action to annul the said alienation or encumbrance. Thus, the
provision of Article 173 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, to wit:

Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage and within ten years from
the transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any
The daughter of Mrs. Guiang sent a letter to Gilda and the latter
replied that she does not consent the sale.
In March 1990, Gilda went home. She lived in their residence with
their children but the husband disappeared. The children said that
Mr. Corpuz had a new wife already.
As a result, Mr. and Mrs. Guiang filed a complaint against
respondent for trespassing.
Gilda field for the declaration of nullity of the deed of sale.
The trial court held that the deed of transfer of rights and amicable
settlement are void. The CA affirmed the decision of the lower court.


Insisting that the contract of sale was merely voidable, petitioners aver
that it was duly ratified by the contending parties through the
amicable settlement they executed on March 16, 1990. The position
is not well taken. Doctrinally and clearly, a void contract cannot be
ratified.
contract of the husband entered into without her consent, when such
consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband which tends
to defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership
property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs
after the dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value of
property fraudulently alienated by the husband.

This particular provision giving the wife ten (10) years during [the]
marriage to annul the alienation or encumbrance was not carried over
to the Family Code. It is thus clear that any alienation or
encumbrance made after August 3, 1988 when the Family Code took
effect by the husband of the conjugal partnership property without the
consent of the wife is null and void.

Manalo v. Camaisa Petitioner, Thelma A. Jader-Manalo made an offer to buy the
properties of the respondents from the husband of Norma Fernandez
C. Camaisa, respondent Edilberto Camaisa. After some bargaining,
petitioner and Edilberto agreed upon the purchase price and terms of
payment. The agreement handwritten by the petitioner was signed by
Edilberto, with assurance from him that he would secure his wifes
consent. Petitioner was later on surprised when she was informed that
respondent spouses were backing out of the agreement. Hence, she
filed a complaint for specific performance and damages.


ISSUE:
Whether or not the husband may validly dispose of a conjugal
property without the wife's written consent. No.


SC:
Under Art. 124 of the Family Code: In the event that one spouse is
incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration
of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers
of administration. These powers do not include the powers of
disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court
or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such
authority or consent the disposition or encumbrance shall be void.

The properties subject to the contract in this case were conjugal;
hence, for the contracts to sell to be effective, the consent of both
husband and wife must be obtained. Respondent Norma Camaisa did
not give her written consent to the sale. Even granting that respondent
Norma actively participated in negotiating for the sale of the subject
properties, which she denied, her written consent to the sale is
required by law for its validity. She may have been aware of the
negotiations for the sale of their conjugal properties, however that is
not sufficient to demonstrate consent.
HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS & LOAN BANK vs. MIGUELA C. DAILO
G.R. No. 153802

Miguela Dailo and Marcelino Dailo, Jr were married on August 8,
1967. The spouses purchased a house and lot situated at San Pablo
City, the Deed of Absolute Sale, however, was in the name of the
husband to the exclusion of the wife. In 1993 husband Marcelino
executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of one
Gesmundo, authorizing the latter to obtain a loan (300, 000.00) from
petitioner Homeowners Savings to be secured by the spouses Dailos
house and lot in San Pablo City. These transactions took place without
the knowledge and consent of respondent wife Miguela. With the loan
unpaid, petitioner instituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on
the mortgaged property. After the extrajudicial sale thereof, a
Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of petitioner as the highest
bidder. After the lapse of one year without the property being
redeemed, petitioner consolidated the ownership thereof by executing
an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership and a Deed of Absolute
Sale.

In 1995, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. died. Claiming that she had no
knowledge of the mortgage constituted on the subject property, which
HELD: NO. Article 124 of the Family Code provides in part:

ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal
partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. . . .

In applying Article 124 of the Family Code, this Court declared that the
absence of the consent of one renders the entire sale null and void,
including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the
husband who contracted the sale.

Respondent and the late Marcelino were married on August 8, 1967.
In the absence of a marriage settlement, the system of relative
conjugal partnership of gains governed the property relations between
respondent and her late husband. With the effectivity of the Family
Code on August 3, 1988, Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains
in the Family Code was made applicable to conjugal partnership of
gains already established before its effectivity unless vested rights
have already been acquired under the Civil Code or other laws.

was conjugal in nature, respondent instituted an action for Nullity of
Real Estate Mortgage and Certificate of Sale, Affidavit of
Consolidation of Ownership, Deed of Sale, Reconveyance with Prayer
for Preliminary Injunction and Damages against petitioner. Petitioner
prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the
property in question was the exclusive property of the late Marcelino
Dailo, Jr.

After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of
respondent Miguela, hence this petition. Petitioner contends that
article 124 of the Family Code should be construed in relation to
Article 493 (rule on co-ownership of CC) of the Civil code. That
although Article 124 of the Family code requires the consent of the
other spouse to the mortgage of the property, the framers of the law
could not have intended to curtail the right of a spouse from exercising
full ownership over the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to
him under the concept of co-ownership. Moreover, the loan obtained
redounded to the benefit of the family.

ISSUE: Whether the mortgage constituted by the late marcelino dailo,
jr. on the subject property as co-owner thereof is valid as to his
undivided share.

The rules on co-ownership do not even apply to the property relations
of respondent and the late Marcelino even in a suppletory manner.
The regime of conjugal partnership of gains is a special type of
partnership, where the husband and wife place in a common fund the
proceeds, products, fruits and income from their separate properties
and those acquired by either or both spouses through their efforts or
by chance. Unlike the absolute community of property wherein the
rules on co-ownership apply in a suppletory manner, the conjugal
partnership shall be governed by the rules on contract of partnership
in all that is not in conflict with what is expressly determined in the
chapter (on conjugal partnership of gains) or by the spouses in their
marriage settlements. Thus, the property relations of respondent and
her late husband shall be governed, foremost, by Chapter 4 on
Conjugal Partnership of Gains of the Family Code and, suppletorily, by
the rules on partnership under the Civil Code. In case of conflict, the
former prevails because the Civil Code provisions on partnership
apply only when the Family Code is silent on the matter.

The basic and established fact is that during his lifetime, without the
knowledge and consent of his wife, Marcelino constituted a real estate
mortgage on the subject property, which formed part of their conjugal
partnership. By express provision of Article 124 of the Family Code, in
the absence of (court) authority or written consent of the other spouse,
any disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal property shall be void.

The aforequoted provision does not qualify with respect to the share of
the spouse who makes the disposition or encumbrance in the same
manner that the rule on co-ownership under Article 493 of the Civil
Code does. Where the law does not distinguish, courts should not
distinguish. Thus, both the trial court and the appellate court are
correct in declaring the nullity of the real estate mortgage on the
subject property for lack of respondents consent.

Certainly, to make a conjugal partnership respond for a liability that
should appertain to the husband alone is to defeat and frustrate the
avowed objective of the new Civil Code to show the utmost concern
for the solidarity and well-being of the family as a unit.The burden of
proof that the debt was contracted for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership of gains lies with the creditor-party litigant claiming as
such.
Ravina vs Villa Abrille

Facts:
Spouses Mary Ann and Pedro acquired lot 7 in Davao city with TCT T-
88674 in their names. Said lot was adjacent to lot 8 which Pedro
acquired when he was still single and was registered solely under his
name. Spouses used their conjugal funds and loan from DBP to build
a house on lot 7 and Pedro's lot. Consequently, they made
improvements, including a poultry house and an annex.

The husband got a mistress sometime in 1991 and started to neglect
his family. The wife was forced to sell or mortgage their movables to
ISSUE: Whether or not the husband can sell lot 8 which is
conjugal property without the consent of the wife.

Held:
No. Art 160 of NCC provides that all property of the marriage is
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it is proven
that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.

Lot 7 is an exclusive property of the husband since it was acquired
prior to his marriage with the respondent. However, lot 8 was acquired
in 1983 during the marriage of the spouses. There is no evidence
proving that the subject property was acquired through exchange or
support the family. On his own, the husband wanted to dispose of the
house and two lots to the petitioners Patrocinia and Wilfredo Ravina.
The wife opposed but the husband still sold the property without the
wife's consent and signature.

While the wife and children were out, the husband and some CAFGU
members transferred all their belongings from the house to an
apartment. When they got home, they were prevented from entering
house. Thus, the wife filed a complaint for the annulment of sale with
damages against the husband and the petitioners. During the trial, the
husband alleged that the house was built from his exculsive funds.

RTC ruled in favor of the wife, declaring that the sale of lot 8 was void,
being conjugal property while the sale of lot 7 was valid since it was
the husband's exclusive property. CA declared that the sale of lot 7 to
the petitioners was valid but the sale of lot 8 is null and void; that the
husband is ordered to return the value of the consideration for lot 8 to
petitioners; that the petitioners are ordered to reconvey the house and
lot to the wife.




barter. The presumption of the conjugal nature of the property subsists
in the absence of a convincing evidence to overcome such
presumption.

A sale or encumbrance of conjugal property concluded after the
effectivity of the FC is governed by which states that a disposition or
encumbrance is void if done without the consent of both the husband
and wife, or in case of one spouse's inability, the authority of the court.

Unlike in the NCC which gives the wife 10 years to annul the
alienation or encumbrance, any alienation or encumbrance under the
FC without the consent of both spouses is null and void. Just like in
ACP, if the husband, without the knowledge and consent of the wife,
sells conjugal property, the sale is void. If the sale was with the
knowledge and not the consent of the wife, the wife has 5 years from
the date of the contract to annul the sale.

In the present case, the wife filed within the prescribed period.
However, her action to annul the sale pertains only to the conjugal
house and lot which does not include lot 7 which is an exclusive
property of the husband.

Petitioners cannot argue that they were buyers in good faith since they
knew that at the time of the sale, Pedro was married to Marry Ann and
her signature did not appear in the deed. Even if they were to argue
that the property is an exclusive property of the husband, that they
proceeded with the sale regardless of the wife's contention and that
the was in actual and public possession of the house at the time of the
sale, clearly indicates that they are not purchasers in good faith.
FUENTES VS ROCA

Sabina Tarroza owned a titled 358-square meter lot. She sold it to her
son, Tarciano Roca. Tarciano did not meantime have the registered
title to his name. Six years later, Tarciano offered to sell the lot to
petitioners spouses Fuentes. They arranged to meet at the office of
Atty. Romulo Plagata whom they asked to prepare the documents of
sale. They later signed an agreement to sell which agreement stated
that it was to take effect in six months.
The agreement required the Fuentes spouses to pay Tarciano a
downpayment of P60K for the transfer of the lots title to him. Within
six months, Tarciano was to secure the consent of his estranged wife
Rosario to the sale.
In working with the other requirements, Atty. Plagata said that he went
to see Rosario in one of his trips in Manila and had her sign the
affidavit of consent. As soon as Tarciano met the other conditions, Atty.
Plagata notarized Rosarios affidavit. A new title was issued to the
Fuentes spouses and the remaining payment was given to Tarciano.
Tarciano passed away, followed by his wife.
Eight years later, in 1997, the children of Tarciano and Rosario filed an
action for annulment of sale and reconveyance on the ground that it is
void since Rosario did not give her consent to it and her signature has
been forged. The Fuentes spouses presented Atty. Plagata who
testified that he personally saw Rosario sign the document although
he admitted otarizing it only 4 months after. Besides , the 4-year
ISSUE:
1) Whether Rosarios signature on the document of consent to
her husband Tarcianos sale of their conjugal land to Fuentes
spouses were forged? Yes
2) Whether Rocas action for the declaration of nullity of that
sale to the spouses already prescribed? No, an action to
annul a void contract is imprescriptible
3) Whether only Rosario, the wife, whose consent was not had,
could bring the action to annul that sale? No
RULING:
1) Atty. Palagata admittedly falsified the jurat of the affidavit of
consent. That jurat declared that Rosario swore to the
document signed in Zamboanga City in Jan 11, 1989 when,
as he testified, he swore she supposedly signed it about 4
months earlier at her residence in Manila on Sept 15, 1988.
While a defective notarization will merely strip the document
of its public character and reduce it into a private instrument,
that falsified jurat, taken together with the marks of forgery in
the signature, dooms the document as proof of Rosarios
consent to the sale of the land. That the Fuentes spouses
honestly relied on the notarized affidavit as proof of
Rosarios consent does not matter. The sale is still void
without an authentic consent.
prescription period for annulling sale due to fraud or forgery already
lapsed.
2.) The law that applies to this case is the Family Code, not
the Civil Code. Although Tarciano and Rosario got married in
1950, Tarciano sold the property in 1989, a few months after
the Family Code took effect.
Art 124. FC: In the event that one spouse is incapacitated
or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the
conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole
powers of administration. These powers do not include the
powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the
authority of the court or the written consent of the other
spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the
disposition or encumbrance shall be void.
Art 1410, Civil Code: The action or defense for the
declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not
prescribe.
Hence, in case at bar, the passage of time did not erode the
right to bring such an action.
3.) No, the sale was void from the beginning. Consequently,
the land remained the property of Tarcianos heirs, namely,
the Rocas.
Reimbursement of Conjugal Funds

Ferrer V Ferrer Nov. 9 2006

Facts: Josefa Ferrer is a widow of Alfredo Ferrer.Alfredo own a lot
even prior to his marriage to Josefa. Before the marriage, Alfredo
obtained a loan to cause for the improvement to that lot. However the
loan was paid from their conjugal funds.

The respondent on this case are Alfredos brothers who have taken
possession of the property pursuant to a deed of sale executed by
Alfredo.

Petitioner now would want that she be paid for her share of the
improvements made to the property, which was before alienatd to the
respondents; was a n exclusive propertyof Alfredo, being that it was
acquired before their marriage.
Issue: Whether or not Josefa is intitled to a reimbursement?
Ruling: Indeed, Article 120 provides the solution in determining the
ownership of the improvements that are made on the separate
property of the spouses at the expense of the partnership or through
the acts or efforts of either or both spouses. Thus, when the cost of
the improvement and any resulting increase in value are more than
the value of the property at the time of the improvement, the entire
property of one of the spouses shall belong to the conjugal
partnership, subject to reimbursement of the value of the property of
the owner-spouse at the time of the improvement; otherwise, said
property shall be retained in ownership by the owner-spouse, likewise
subject to reimbursement of the cost of the improvement. The subject
property was precisely declared as the exclusive property of Alfredo
on the basis of Article 120 of the Family Code.
What is incontrovertible is that the respondents, despite the
allegations contained in the Complaint that they are the buyers of the
subject premises, are not petitioners spouse nor can they ever be
deemed as the owner-spouse upon whom the obligation to reimburse
petitioner for her costs rested. It is the owner-spouse who has the
obligation to reimburse the conjugal partnership or the spouse who
expended the acts or efforts, as the case may be. Otherwise stated,
respondents do not have the obligation to respect petitioners right to
be reimbursed.


ARTICLE 134
In the absence of an express declaration in the marriage
settlements, the separation of property between spouses during
the marriage shall not take place except by judicial order. Such
judicial separation of property may either be voluntary or for
sufficient cause.

Art 134 is applicable where the property regime of the spouse is other
than a complete separation of property.
ARTICLE 135
Any of the following shall be considered sufficient cause for
judicial separation of property:
(1) That the spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to a
penalty which carries with it civil interdiction;
(2) That the spouse of the petitioner has been judicially declared
an absentee;
(3) That loss of parental authority of the spouse of petitioner has
been decreed by the court;
(4) That the spouse of the petitioner has abandoned the latter or
failed to comply with his or her obligations to the family as
provided for in Article 101;
(5) That the spouse granted the power of administration in the
marriage settlements has abused that power; and
ARTICLE 136
The spouses may jointly file a verified petition with the court for
the voluntary dissolution of the absolute community or the
conjugal partnership of gains, and for the separation of their
common properties.
All creditors of the absolute community or of the conjugal
partnership of gains, as well as the personal creditors of the
spouse, shall be listed in the petition and notified of the filing
thereof. The court shall take measures to protect the creditors
and other persons with pecuniary interest. (191a)

This article talks about voluntary judicial separation of properties.
(6) That at the time of the petition, the spouses have been
separated in fact for at least one year and reconciliation is highly
improbable.
In the cases provided for in Numbers (1), (2) and (3), the
presentation of the final judgment against the guilty or absent
spouse shall be enough basis for the grant of the decree of
judicial separation of property. (191a)
this list in Art 135 is EXCLUSIVE.
for par 1-3, presentation of final judgment is needed, for par 4-6, only
proof of the cause or ground for separation of property.
ARTICLE 137
Once the separation of property has been decreed, the absolute
community or the conjugal partnership of gains shall be
liquidated in conformity with this Code.

During the pendency of the proceedings for separation of
property, the absolute community or the conjugal partnership
shall pay for the support of the spouses and their children. (192a)

Effects of separation of property between spouses:
. The absolute community or conjugal partnership of the spouses is
dissolved and liquidated.
. Each spouse shall thereafter have exclusive management,
ownership, and disposition of all his or her earnings and the fruits of
his or her separate property.
. The liability of the spouses to creditors shall, however, be solidary
with their separate properties.
. The mutual obligation of the spouses to support each other continues
except when there is legal separation between them.
. the rights previously acquired by creditors are not prejudiced.
ARTICLE 138
After dissolution of the absolute community or of the conjugal
partnership, the provisions on complete separation of property
shall apply. (191a)
ARTICLE 139
The petition for separation of property and the final judgment
granting the same shall be recorded in the proper local civil
registries and registries of property. (193a)

Duty to record:
1. the petition for separation of property
2. final judgment granting the same
ARTICLE 140
The separation of property shall not prejudice the rights
previously acquired by creditors. (194a)
ARTICLE 141
The spouses may, in the same proceedings where separation of
property was decreed, file a motion in court for a decree reviving
the property regime that existed between them before the
separation of property in any of the following instances:

(1) When the civil interdiction terminates;

(2) When the absentee spouse reappears;

(3) When the court, being satisfied that the spouse granted the
power of administration in the marriage settlements will not
again abuse that power, authorizes the resumption of said
administration;

(4) When the spouse who has left the conjugal home without a
decree of legal separation resumes common life with the other;

(5) When parental authority is judicially restored to the spouse
previously deprived thereof;

ARTICLE 142
The administration of all classes of exclusive property of either
spouse may be transferred by the court to the other spouse:

(1) When one spouse becomes the guardian of the other;

(2) When one spouse is judicially declared an absentee;

(3) When one spouse is sentenced to a penalty which carries with
it civil interdiction; or

(4) When one spouse becomes a fugitive from justice or is in
hiding as an accused in a criminal case.

If the other spouse is not qualified by reason of incompetence,
conflict of interest, or any other just cause, the court shall
appoint a suitable person to be the administrator. (n)

This provision is in line with Article 110
(6) When the spouses who have separated in fact for at least one
year, reconcile and resume common life; or

(7) When after voluntary dissolution of the absolute community
of property or conjugal partnership has been judicially decreed
upon the joint petition of the spouses, they agree to the revival of
the former property regime. No voluntary separation of property
may thereafter be granted.

The revival of the former property regime shall be governed by
Article 67. (195a)

Revival of the original property regime may be subject of a
motion in the same proceedings where the separation of
property was granted.
Reconciliation between parties does not mean automatic
revival of the former regime.
once the spouses agree to revive their former regime, no voluntary
separation of property may be granted thereafter
MULLER VS MULLER Petition for review on certiorari which terminated the regime of
absolute community of property between petitioner and respondent.

Elena (P) and Helmut (R) (German) were married in Germany and
resided there in a house owned by Rs parents but later permanently
resided in the Ph.

R had inherited the house in Germany from his parents which he sold
and used the proceeds for the purchase of a parcel of land in Antipolo
and in the construction of a house. The Antipolo property was
registered in the name of P (Because of the Constitutional prohibition
that aliens cannot own REAL properties in the PH).

After they separated, R filed a motion for separation of properties

RTC DECISION: terminated the regime of absolute community of
property; It also decreed the separation of properties between them
and ordered the equal partition of personal properties located within
the country, excluding those acquired by gratuitous title during the
marriage.

Re Antipolo property, R cannot recover his funds because it was a
violation of Section7, Article XII of the Constitution which prohibited
aliens from procuring private lands.

CA DECISION: there is nothing in the Constitution preventing R from
procuring land then ordered P to reimburse him said amount.
(See the case of BORROMEO v. DESCALLAR)
ISSUE: WON respondent is entitled to reimbursement of the funds
used for the acquisition of the Antipolo property?

HELD:
NO. respondent., Save for the exception provided in cases of
hereditary succession, respondents disqualification from owning lands
in the Philippines is absolute. Not even an ownership in trust is
allowed. Where the purchase is made in violation of an existing statute
and in evasion of its express provision, no trust can result in favor of
the party who is guilty of the fraud.

R cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is clear
that he willingly and knowingly bought the property despite the
constitutional prohibition.

VIRGILIO MAQUILAN vs DITA MAQUILAN

FACTS:
Virgilio and Dita Maquilan are spouses who once had a blissful
married life.
They were blessed to have one son.
while the Honda Dream shall be for the defendant; - The passenger
jeep shall be for the plaintiff who shall pay the defendant the sum of
P75,000.00 as his share thereon and in full settlement thereof; -
The house and lot shall be to the common child.
Their marriage turned bitter when petitioner Virgilio discovered that
private respondent was having illicit sexual affair with her paramour.
The petitioner filed a case of adultery against private respondent
Dita Maquilan and the paramour.
Dita Maquilan and her paramour were convicted of the crime
charged and were sentenced to suffer imprisonment.
Private respondent, Dita, filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage, Dissolution and Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership of
Gains and Damages on 2001.
During the pre-trial of the said case, petitioner and respondent
entered into a Compromise Agreement.
Partial settlements are as follows:
- P500,000.00 of the money deposited in the bank jointly in the
name of the spouses shall be withdrawn and deposited in favor and
in trust of their common child, Neil Maquilan, with the deposit in the
joint account of the parties. The balance of such deposit, which
presently stands at P1,318,043.36, shall be withdrawn and divided
equally by the parties;
- The store that is now being occupied by the plaintiff shall be
allotted to her while the bodega shall be for te defendant. The
defendant shall be paid the sum of P50,000.00 as his share in the
stocks of the store in full settlement thereof.
- The motorcycles shall be divided between them such that the
Kawasaki shall be owned by the plaintiff

Moreover, the contention that the Compromise Agreement is
tantamount to a circumvention of the law prohibiting the guilty spouse
from sharing in the conjugal properties is misplaced. Existing law and
jurisprudence do not impose such disqualification.
The conviction of adultery does not carry the accessory of civil
interdiction.

Neither could it be said that the petitioner was not intelligently and
judiciously informed of the consequential effects of the compromise
agreement, and that, on this basis, he may repudiate the Compromise
Agreement. The argument of the petitioner that he was not duly
informed by his previous counsel about the legal effects of the
voluntary settlement is not convincing. Mistake or vitiation of consent,
as now claimed by the petitioner as his basis for repudiating the
settlement, could hardly be said to be evident.
The petitioner filed for Omnibus Motion praying for the repudiation
of the Compromise Agreement on the grounds that his previous
lawyer did not intelligently and judiciously apprise him of the
consequential effects of the said agreement.
The RTC and CA dismissed the petition of Mr. Maquilan.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the partial voluntary separation of property made by
the spouses pending the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
is valid.

HELD: YES. The petitioner contends that the Compromise Agreement
is void because it circumvents the law that prohibits the guilty spouse,
who was convicted of either adultery or concubinage, from sharing in
the conjugal property. Since the respondent was convicted of
adultery, the petitioner said that her share should be forfeited in favor
of the common child under Articles 43(2) and 63 of the Family Code.
To the petitioner, it is the clear intention of the law to disqualify the
spouse convicted of adultery from sharing in the conjugal property;
and because the Compromise Agreement is void, it never became
final and executory. Moreover, the petitioner cites Article 2035 of the
Civil Code and argues that since adultery is a ground for legal
separation, the Compromise Agreement is therefore void. These
arguments are specious.

Chapter 6. Regime of Separation of Property

Art. 143. Should the future spouses agree in the marriage
settlements that their property relations during marriage shall be
governed by the regime of separation of property, the provisions
of this Chapter shall be suppletory.

Spouses retain their ownership, management, and control of their
properties before the marriage and those acquired during the
marriage, together with their earnings and fruits and accessories of
their separate properties, each of them is responsible for his or her
Art. 144. Separation of property may refer to present or future
property or both. It may be total or partial. In the latter case, the
property not agreed upon as separate shall pertain to the
absolute community.


Art. 145. Each spouse shall own, dispose of, possess, administer
and enjoy his or her own separate estate, without need of the
consent of the other. To each spouse shall belong all earnings
from his or her profession, business or industry and all fruits,
natural, industrial or civil, due or received during the marriage
Art. 146. Both spouses shall bear the family expenses in
proportion to their income, or, in case of insufficiency or default
thereof, to the current market value of their separate properties.

The liabilities of the spouses to creditors for family expenses
shall, however, be solidary.

liabilities, with each spouse contributing to the family expenses
proportionately with their income or value of their properties.

Separation of property exists: 1. By agreement of the parties in their
marriage settlement; or 2. If decreed by court in proper case.

SP cannot be later on converted during the marriage to CPG.
CPG can be converted into SP regime during the marriage,
provided that there is judicial approval.

from his or her separate property.


ARTICLE 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to
marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages
and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property
acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they
lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint
efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares.
For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the
acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have
contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the
household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her
share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in
common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of
their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the
share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in
favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any
or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share
shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence
of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all
cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the
cohabitation.

Requisites of Article 147:
1. The man and the woman must have capacity to marry each
other.
2. The man and the woman cohabit.
3. The cohabitation is exclusive.
4. The man and the woman are not married to each other or
are married to each other but the marriage is void.
woman would be special co-ownership.
-ownership covers:
1. Wages and salaries of either the man and the woman
2. Property acquired through the work or industry of either or
both
a. If the partner did not acquire the property directly,
ARTICLE 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the
preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both of the parties
through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry
shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective
contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their
contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal.
The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money
and evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in
the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal
partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in
bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her shall be forfeited
in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both
parties are in bad faith.

-in partners who do not fall under Article 147.
apply if:
1. The live-in partners do not have the capacity to marry each
other; or
a. Example of this is that there is an impediment of
relationship, crime or age.
2. The cohabitation is not exclusive.
-ownership only covers property acquired by both
parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property or
industry. This is very similar to an ordinary partnership.
-in partner is legally married to someone else, the share of
that live-in partner will accrue to the property regime of his or her
existing valid marriage.
or her share shall be forfeited to their common children or
descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong
to the innocent party.



that partner's efforts must consist of the care and
maintenance of the family and of the household in
order for such party to own 1/2 of the acquired
property
-ownership arises even if the common-law wife does not work is
not gainfully employed. The common-law wife is still a co-owner since
she ran the household and held the family purse even if she did not
contribute thereto.
-ownership (Art. 147) and the
ordinary co-ownership is found in Article 147. In this special co-
ownership, the following cannot be done:
1. The co-ownership cannot be terminated until the
cohabitation is also terminated.
2. The co-owner may not dispose or encumber his share in the
property.

Valdes vs. RTC

Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971 and
begotten 5 children. Valdez filed a petition in 1992 for a declaration of
nullity of their marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code,
which was granted hence, marriage is null and void on the ground of
their mutual psychological incapacity. Stella and Joaquin are placed
under the custody of their mother while the other 3 siblings are free to
choose which they prefer.

Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision regarding
the procedure for the liquidation of common property in unions
without marriage. During the hearing on the motion, the children filed
a joint affidavit expressing desire to stay with their father.


ISSUE: Whether or not the property regime should be based on
co-ownership.

HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of the
cause thereof, the property relations of the parties are governed by
the rules on co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is
prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts.
A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall
be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said partys
efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family.
(Art 147) BUENAVENTURA VS CA

In 1992, petitioner Noel Buenaventura filed for declaration of nullity of
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. After respondent
filed her answer, petitioner amended his petition stating that both he
and his wife were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage.
RTC declared their marriage null and void ab initio. Among the orders
of the court in its judgment was the liquidation of assets of the
conjugal partnership property particularly
a.) Separation/retirement benefits received from the Far East
Bank and Trust Company (giving her 50% thereof together
with 12% interest per year)
b.) Outstanding shares of stock with Manile Memorial Part and
rovident Group of Companies (giving her 50% of it)
Petitioner appealed the decision to the CA. While case was pending,
respondent filed a motion to increase the P15k monthly support
pendent lite of their son. CA increased the support to P20k and
dismissed petitioners appeal for lack of merit.
ISSUE: Whether the wife may be given the share of his retirement
benefits with 12% interest thereon although it was a gratuitous and
exclusive property of the husband; ad of his shares of stock
although said shares were acquired by Noel before his marriage? YES

RULING:
-The general rule applies, which is that in case a marriage is declared
void ab initio, the property regime applicable and to be liquidated,
partitioned, distributed is that of equal co-ownership.

-In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property, the
property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is
governed by the provisions of Art 147 (or 148 as the case may be) of
the Family Code.

Art 147: When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry
each other, live exclusively with each other as husband anf wife
without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their
wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and
the property acquired by both of them through their work or
industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while
they loved together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their
joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal
shares.

-Since the properties ordered to be distributed by the court a quo were
found, by both trial court and CA, to have been acquired during the
union of the parties, the same would be covered by the rules on co-
ownership. No fruits of a separate property of one of the parties
appear to have been involved in said distribution.
Abing V Waeyan July 31, 2006

Facts: In 1986, petitioner John and respondent Juliet cohabited as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. Together, they
bought a house erected on a lot owned by Dino in Benguet. The tax
declaration was thereafter transferred to respondents name.

In 1995, they decided to partition their properties as their relationship
soured. Eventually, John demanded Juliet to vacate the annex
structure when respondent failed to pay petitioners share in their
properties. John alleged that he alone paid for the construction of the
annex structure.

John however failed to prove that he alone spent for the construction.

Issue: Whether or not the property subject of the suit pertains to the
exclusive ownership of petitioner.
Ruling: In this connection, Article 147 of the Family Code is instructive.
It reads:
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry
each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages
and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property
acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they
lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint
efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares.
For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the
acquisition by other party of any property shall be deemed to have
contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the
household.
The law is clear. In the absence, as here, of proofs to the contrary, any
property acquired by common-law spouses during their period of
cohabitation is presumed to have been obtained thru their joint efforts
and is owned by them in equal shares. Their property relationship is
governed by the rules on co-ownership. And under this regime, they
owned their properties in common "in equal shares." Being herself a
co-owner of the structure in question, Juliet, as correctly ruled by the
CA, may not be ejected therefrom.

Metrobank vs Pascual 547 SCRA 246

Respondent Nicholson Pascual andFlorencia Nevalga were married
on January 19, 1985. During the union,Florencia bought from spouses
Clarito and Belen Sering a 250-square meter lot with a three-door
apartment standing thereon located in Makati City. The Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT)covering the purchased lot (Lot no.156283)
was issued in the name of Florencia married to NicholsonPascual.In
1994, Florencia filed a suit for the declaration of nullity of marriage
under Art 36 FC, w/c was granted by the Quezon City RTC in1995. In
the same decision, the RTC,inter alia, ordered the dissolution and
liquidation of the ex-spouses conjugal partnership of gains,w/c the
latter failed.On April 30, 1997, Florencia, together with spouses
Norberto and Elvira Oliveros, obtained a P58 million loan from
petitioner Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. (Metrobank). To secure the
obligation, Florencia and the spouses Oliveros executed several real
estate mortgages (REMs) on their properties,including one lot no.
156283. Due to the failure of Florencia and the sps Oliveros to pay
their loan obligation, MBC foreclosed the property.Nicholson filed on
June 28, 2000, before the Makati RTC a Complaint to declare the
nullity of the mortgage of the disputed property, alleging that the
property, which is still conjugal property,was mortgaged without his
consent.MBTC alleged that the disputed lot,being registered in
Florencias
name,was paraphernal. Florencia was declared in default. The RTC
Issue:
Whether or not the subject property is conjugal partnership property
underArticle 116 of the Family Code.
Held:
The court ruled in favor of Nicholson. The disputed property is
conjugal.While Metrobank is correct in saying thatArt. 160 of the Civil
Code, not Art. 116 of the Family Code, is the applicable legal provision
since the property was acquired prior to the enactment of the Family
Code, it errs in its theory that,before conjugal ownership could be
legally presumed, there must be a showing that the property was
acquired during marriage using conjugal funds.Art. 160 of the New
Civil Code providesthat all property of the marriage is presumed to be
conjugal partnership,unless it be prove[n] that it pertains exclusively to
the husband or to the wife. This article does not require proof that the
property was acquired with funds of the partnership. The presumption
applies even when the manner in which the property was acquired
does not appear. As Nicholson aptly points out, if proof obtains on the
acquisition of the property dur ing the existence of the marriage, then
the presumption of conjugal ownership applies. Proof of acquisition
during the marital coverture is a condition sine qua nonfor the
operation of the presumption in favor of conjugal ownership. When
thereis noshowing as to when the property was acquired by the
spouse, the fact that a title is in the name of the spouse is an
rendered judgment finding for Nicholson. The CA affirmed the RTC but
deleted the award moral damages and attorneys fees.
indication that the property belongs exclusively to said spouse.
ALAIN M. DIO v. MA. CARIDAD L. DIO


For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements
must be present:
1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other;
2. They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and
3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is
void


January 1998 petitioner and respondent got married.
On May 2001, petitioner filed an action for Declaration of
Niullity of Marriagw against respondent citing psychological incapacity
under article 36. Petitioner alleged that respondent failed in her marital
obligation to give love and support to him, and had abandoned her
responsibility to the family, choosing instead to go on shopping sprees
and gallivanting with her friends that depleted the family assets.
Petitioner further alleged that respondent was not faithful, and would
at times become violent and hurt him.
The trial court declared their marriage void ab initio.
The court ruled that A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF
MARRIAGE shall only be issued upon compliance with Article[s] 50
and 51 of the Family Code. It later altered it to A DECREE OF
ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall be issued after
liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties properties
under Article 147 of the Family Code.

ISSUE: WON a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be
issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties
properties under Article 147 of the Family Code

HELD: NO. Citing Valdes v. RTC, in a void marriage, regardless of its
cause, the property relations of the parties during the period of
cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the
Family Code. Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of parties
who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to
contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void, such as
petitioner and respondent in the case before the Court.
The elements of 147 are present in this case and there is no question
that Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the property relations
between petitioner and respondent.
It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the
Rule applies only to marriages which are declared void ab initio or
annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family
Code. In short, Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to
marriages which are declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the
Family Code, which should be declared void without waiting for the
liquidation of the properties of the parties.
Since the property relations of the parties in art 40 and 45 are
governed by absolute community of property or conjugal partnership
of gains, there is a need to liquidate, partition and distribute the
properties before a decree of annulment could be issued. That is not
the case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code because the marriage is governed by the ordinary rules on co-
ownership.
In this case, petitioners marriage to respondent was declared void
under Article 36 of the Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45.
Thus, what governs the liquidation of properties owned in common by
petitioner and respondent are the rules on co-ownership. In Valdes,
the Court ruled that the property relations of parties in a void marriage
during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or
Article 148 of the Family Code. The rules on co-ownership apply and
the properties of the spouses should be liquidated in accordance with
the Civil Code provisions on co-ownership. Under Article 496 of the
Civil Code, [p]artition may be made by agreement between the
parties or by judicial proceedings. x x x. It is NOT necessary to
liquidate the properties of the spouses in the same proceeding for
declaration of nullity of marriage.

AGAPAY VS PALANG

Miguel Palang contracted marriage with Carlina in Pangasinan on
1949. He left to work in Hawaii a few months after the wedding. Their
only child Herminia was born in May 1950. The trial court found
evident that as early as 1957, Miguel attempted to Divorce Carlina in
Hawaii. When he returned for good in 1972, he refused to lived with
Carlina and stayed alone in a house in Pozzorubio Pangasinan.

The 63 year old Miguel contracted a subsequent marriage with 19
year old Erlinda Agapay, herein petitioner. 2 months earlier, they
jointly purchased a parcel of agricultural land located at Binalonan
Pangasinan. A house and lot in the same place was likewise
HELD:
The sale of the riceland on May 17, 1973, was made in favor of Miguel
and Erlinda. However, their marriage is void because of the subsisting
marriage with Carlina. Only the properties acquired by both parties
through their actual joint contribution shall be owned by them in
proportion to their respective contributions. It is required that there be
an actual contribution. If actual contribution is not proved, there will be
no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares.

Erlinda established in her testimony that she was engaged in the
business of buy and sell and had a sari-sari store. However, she
purchased. On the other hand, Miguel and Carlina executed a Deed
of Donation as a form of compromise agreement and agreed to
donate their conjugal property consisting of 6 parcels of land to their
child Herminia.

Miguel and Erlindas cohabitation produced a son named Kristopher.
In 1979, they were convicted of concubinage upon Carlinas
complaint. 2 years later, Miguel died. Carlina and her daughter
instituted this case for recovery of ownership and possession with
damages against petitioner. They sought to get back the land and the
house and lot located at Binalonan allegedly purchase by Miguel
during his cohabitation with petitioner. The lower court dismissed the
complaint but CA reversed the decision.

ISSUE: Whether the agricultural land and the house and lot should be
awarded in favor of Erlinda Agapay.



failed to persuade the court that she actually contributed money to but
the subjected riceland. When the land was acquired, she was only
around 20 years old compared to Miguel who was already 64 years
old and a pensioner of the US Government. Considering his
youthfulness, its unrealistic how she could have contributed the
P3,750 as her share. Thus, the court finds no basis to justify the co-
ownership with Miguel over the same. Hence, the Riceland should, as
correctly held by CA, revert to the conjugal partnership property of the
deceased and Carlina.

With respect to the house and lot, Atty Sagun, notary public who
prepared the deed of conveyance for the property revealed the
falshood of Erlindas claim that she bought such property for P20,000
when she was 22 years old. The lawyer testified that Miguel provided
the money for the purchase price and directed Erlindas name alone
be placed as the vendee.

The transaction made by Miguel to Erlinda was properly a donation
and which was clearly void and inexistent by express provision of the
law because it was made between persons guilty of adultery or
concubinage at the time of the donation. Moreover, Article 87 of the
Family Code, expressly provides that the prohibition against donation
between spouses now applies to donations between persons living
together as husbandand wife without a valid marriage, for otherwise,
the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out to be better
than those in legal union.
It is immaterial that Miguel and Carlina previously agreed to donate
their conjugal property in favor of Herminia. Separation of property
between spouses during the marriage shall not take place except by
judicial order or without judicial conferment when there is an express
stipulation in the marriage settlements. The judgment resulted from
the compromise was not specifically for separation of property and
should not be so inferred.
Tumlos v. Fernandez (2000)

Mario and Lourdes Fernandez were plaintiffs in an action for
ejectment filed against Guillerma, Gina and Toto Tumlos. In the
complaint, spouses Fernandez alleged that they are the absolute
owners of an apartment building that through their tolerance they
allowed the Tumlos to occupy the apartment for the last 7 years
without payment of any rent. It was agreed that Guillerma will pay
1,600 a month while the other defendants promised to pay 1,000 a
month which was not complied with. Demand was made several
times for the defendants to vacate the premises as they are in need of
the property for the construction of a new building.

Defendants appealed to RTC that Mario and Guillerma had an
amorous relationship and that they acquired the property in question
as their love nest. It was likewise alleged that they lived together in
the said apartment building with their 2 children for about 10 years and
that Gullerma administered the property by collecting rentals from the
lessees until she discovered that Mario deceived her as to the
annulment of their marriage.

ISSUE: WON Guillerma is a co-owner of the said apartment under
Article 148. NO.

SC:
SC rejected the claim that Guillerma and Mario were co-owners of the
subject property. The claim was not satisfactorily proven by Guillerma
since there were no other evidence presented to validate it except for
the said affidavit. Even if the allegations of having cohabited with
Mario and that she bore him two children were true, the claim of co-
ownership still cannot be accepted. Mario is validly married with
Lourdes hence Guillerma and Mario are not capacitated to marry each
other. The property relation governing their supposed cohabitation is
under Article 148 of the Family Code. Actual contribution is required
by the said provision in contrast to Art 147 which states that efforts in
the care and maintenance of the family and household are regarded
as contributions to the acquisitions of common property by one who
has no salary, income, work or industry. Such is not included in Art
148. If actual contribution is not proven then there can be no co-
ownership and no presumption of equal shares.
MALLILIN V. CASTILLO

Eustaquio Mallilin Jr. and Ma. Elvira Castillo were both married and
with children but separated from their respective spouses and
cohabited in 1979 while respective marriages still subsist. They
established Superfreight Customs Brokerage Corporation during their
union of which petitioner was the President and Chairman and
respondent as Vice President and Treasurer. They likewise acquired
real and personal properties which were registered solely in
respondents name. Due to irreconcilable conflict, the couple
separated in 1992. Petitioner then demanded his share from
respondent in the subject properties but the latter refused alleging that
said properties had been registered solely in her name. Furthermore,
respondent denied that she and petitioner lived as husband and wife
because they were still legally married at the time of cohabitation.

Petitioner filed complaint for partition of co-ownership shares while
respondent filed a motion for summary judgment. Trial court
dismissed the former and granted the latter.

ISSUE: Whether couples who were not capacitated to marry each
other at the time they were living together could own properties in
common.
HELD: Yes. Article 144 of the Civil Code applies only in cases in
which a man and a woman cohabit without the benefit of marriage
provided that they are not incapacitated to marry each other, or in
which the marriage is void ab initio, provided it is not bigamous.
However, under Article 148, if the parties are incapacitated to marry
each other, properties acquired by them through their joint
contribution, property or industry, shall be owned by them in common
in proportion to their contributions which, in the absence of proof to the
contrary, is presumed to be equal. Hence, there is co-ownership even
though the couples in union are not capacitated to marry each other.

In the case at bar, all but one of the properties were alleged to have
been acquired after the FC took effect on Aug. 3, 1988. With respect
to the property acquired before the FC took effect, if it is shown that it
was really acquired under the regime of the Civil Code, then it should
be excluded.

Furthermore, when CA dismissed petitioners complaint for partition on
grounds of due process and equity, his right to prove ownership over
the claimed properties was denied. Such dismissal is unjustified since
both ends may be served by simply excluding from the action for
partition the properties registered in the name of Steelhouse Realty
and Eloisa Castillo, not parties in the case.
(Insert in Art 148) SAGUID VS CA

Seventeen-year old Gina Rey was married but separated de facto
from her husband when she met petitioner Jacinto Saguid. The two
decided to cohabit as husband and wife in a house built on a lot
owned by Jacintos father. Jacinto made a living as the patron of their
fishing vessel. Gina, on the other hand, worked as a fish dealer, but
decided to work in Japan from 1992 to 1994 when her relationship
with Jacintos relatives turned sour. In 1996, the couple decided to
separate and end their 9year cohabitation.

Jacinto filed a complaint for Partition and Recovery of Personal
Property with Receivership. She alleged that from her 1500.00
dollar/month as entertainer in Japan, she was able to contribute P70K
in the completion of their unfinished house and an amount to purchase
personal properties.
Meanwhile, Jacinto claimed that the expenses for the construction of
their house were defrayed solely from his income.
ISSUE: Whether the trial courts decision is supported by evidence?
Yes

RULING:
-It is not disputed that both parties were not legally capacitated to
marry each other because the former was validly married to another
man at the time for her cohabitation with the latter. Their property
regime therefore is governed by Art 148 of the Family Code which
applies to relationships in a state of concubinage, among others.
-Before Art 148 of the FC was enacted, there was no provision
governing property relations of couples living in a state of adultery or
concubinage. Hence, even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of the
property occurred before the FC took effect, Art 148 governs.
-Both parties claim that the money used to purchase the disputed
personal properties came partly from their joint account. While there is
no question that both parties contributed in their joint account deposit,
there is however, no sufficient proof of the exact amount of their
respective shares therein. Pursuant to Art 148, in the absence of proof
of the extent of the parties respective contribution, their share shall be
presumed to be equal.

Atienza v. de Castro November 29, 2006

Facts: Lupo, a married man cohabited with Yolanda as husband and
wife. During their coverture, they allegedly acquired a real property
and registered it under the name of Yolanda. Their cohabitation turned
sour, hence, they parted. He filed an action for partition contending
that they owned it in common under the concept of limited co-
Ruling: It is not disputed that the parties herein were not capacitated
to marry each other because Lupo Atienza was validly married to
another woman at the time of his cohabitation with Yolanda. Their
property regime, therefore, is governed by Article 148 of the Family
Code, which applies to bigamous marriages, adulterous relationship,
relationships in a state of concubinage, relationships where both man
and woman are married to other persons, and multiple alliances of the
Article 148 of the Family Code was enacted, there was no provision
governing property relations of couples living in a state of adultery or
concubinage. Hence, even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of the
property occurred before the Family Code took effect, Article 148
governs.

The applicable law being settled the burden of proof rests upon the
ownership. Yolanda contended that she alone was the owner as she
acquired it thru her own savings as a businesswoman. The RTC
declared the property subject of co-ownership, but the CA reversed it
as he failed to prove material contribution in the acquisition of the
same. On appeal, he contended that he was not burdened to prove
that he contributed in the acquisition of the property because with or
without contribution he was deemed a co-owner adding that under
Article 484, NCC, for as long as they acquired the property during their
extramarital union, such property would be legally owned by them in
common and
governed by the rule on co-ownership.

Issue: What law will govern? Who rightfully owns the property in
question?

same married man. Under this regime, only the properties acquired
by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money,
property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion
to their respective contributions.

As it is, the regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the
union of parties who are not legally capacitated to marry each other,
but who nonetheless live together as husband and wife, applies to
properties acquired during said cohabitation in proportion to their
respective contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the extent of
the proven actual contribution of money, property or industry. Absent
proof of the extent thereof, their contributions and corresponding
shares shall be presumed to be equal.

Here, although the adulterous cohabitation of the parties commenced
in 1983, or way before the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3,
1998, Article 148 thereof applies because this provision was intended
precisely to fill up the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code.
party who, as determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case,
asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by
competent evidence and reliance must be had on the strength of the
partys own evidence and not upon the weakness of the opponents
defense. The petitioner as plaintiff below is not automatically entitled
to the relief prayed for. The law gives the defendant some measure of
protection as the plaintiff must still prove the allegations in the
complaint. Favorable relief can be granted only after the court is
convinced that the facts proven by the plaintiff warrant such relief.
Indeed, the party alleging a fact has the burden of proving it and a
mere allegation is not evidence.

In this case Petitioner failed to prove that he alone paid for the said
property and respondent on the other hand was able to counter with
enough evidence that she alone paid for the same.
BORROMEO vs DESCALLAR [Part 7]




GO-BANGAYAN v. BANGAYAN Sally initiated a Bigamy Case against Benjamin, but this was
dismissed.
Benjamin, in turn, filed a petition for declaration of a non-
existent marriage / declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground that
his marriage to Sally was bigamous and that it lacked the formal
requisites to a valid marriage. Benjamin also asked the trial court for
the partition of the properties he acquired with Sally in accordance
with Article 148 of the Family Code, for his appointment as
administrator of the properties during the pendency of the case, and
for the declaration of Bernice and Bentley as illegitimate children. A
total of 44 registered properties became the subject of the partition
before the trial court, including37 properties listed by Sally in her
answer.
Their marriage was declared void and inexistent.
On the issue of partition, the trial court ruled that Sally
could not claim the 37 properties she named in her answer as part of
her conjugal properties with Benjamin. The trial court ruled that Sally
was not legally married to Benjamin. Further, the 37 properties that
Sally was claiming were owned by Benjamins parents who gave the
properties to their children, including Benjamin, as advanced
inheritance.
The 37 titles were in the names of Benjamin and his brothers
and the phrase "married to Sally Go" was merely descriptive of
Benjamins civil status in the title. As regards the two lots under TCT
Nos. 61720 and 190860, the trial court found that they were bought by
Benjamin using his own money and that Sally failed to prove any
actual contribution of money, property or industry in their purchase.
While the RTC found that Sally was a registered co-owner of
the lots covered by TCT Nos. 61722, N-193656, and 253681 as well
ISSUE: WON their property relation is governed by Art. 148.

RULING: YES, Art. 148 applies.
Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of
marriage. Thus, only the properties acquired by them through their
actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned
by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions.
Thus, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly excluded
the 37 properties being claimed by Sally which were given by
Benjamins father to his children as advance inheritance. Sallys
Answer to the petition before the trial court even admitted that
"Benjamins late father himself conveyed a number of properties to his
children and their respective spouses which included Sally x x x.
As regards the seven remaining properties, we rule that the
decision of the Court of Appeals is more in accord with the evidence
on record. Only the property covered by TCT No. 61722 was
registered in the names of Benjamin and Sally as spouses. The
properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 were in the name of
Benjamin

with the descriptive title "married to Sally." The property
covered by CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were registered in the name of
Sally with the descriptive title "married to Benjamin" while the
properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 were registered in
the name of Sally as a single individual. We have ruled that the words
"married to" preceding the name of a spouse are merely descriptive
of the civil status of the registered owner. Such words do not
prove co-ownership. Without proof of actual contribution from
either or both spouses, there can be no co-ownership under
Article 148 of the Family Code.

as the two condominium units under CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783, it also
ruled that TCT No. 61722 and the two condominium units were
purchased from the earnings of Benjamin alone. The RTC further
ruled that these properties and the rest of the properties were part of
the conjugal partnership of Benjamin and Azucena, without prejudice
to Benjamins right to dispute his conjugal state with Azucena in a
separate proceeding.
The trial court further ruled that Sally acted in bad faith
because she knew that Benjamin was married to Azucena. Applying
Article 148 of the Family Code, the trial court forfeited all of Sallys
share in favor of Bernice and Bentley while Benjamins share reverted
to his conjugal ownership with Azucena.
It is worthy to note that throughout the proceedings, Sally
hardly produced her own evidence, instead insisting that Benjamin,
who was not around, should be put on the stand. On appeal, the
CA mostly upheld the ruling of the RTC, with the exception of a few
properties, and that Sallys insistence on presenting Benjamin and
failure to submit her own evidence amounted to a waiver of the right
to present evidence.
CA ruled that their property relation is governed by Art 148 of
FC.
1. 37 properties belong to Benjamin and his siblings
2. TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 registered in the name of
Benjamin belong to him exclusively because he was able to
establish that they were acquired by him solely.
3. TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 and under CCT Nos. 8782
and 8783 were exclusive properties of Sally in the absence of
proof of Benjamins actual contribution in their purchase
4. TCT No. 61722 registered in the names of Benjamin and
Sally shall be owned by them in common, to be shared
equally.
However, the share of Benjamin shall accrue to the conjugal
partnership under his existing marriage with Azucena while Sallys
share shall accrue to her in the absence of a clear and convincing
proof of bad faith.