SENATE VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ERMITA

495 SCRA 170 Political Law Constitutional Law Legislative Branch Question Hour Constitutionality of E.O. 464
In 2005, scandals involving anomalous transactions about the North Rail Project as well as the Garci tapes surfaced. This prompted the Senate to conduct a
public hearing to investigate the said anomalies particularly the alleged overpricing in the NRP. The investigating Senate committee issued invitations to
certain department heads and military officials to speak before the committee as resource persons. Ermita submitted that he and some of the department
heads cannot attend the said hearing due to pressing matters that need immediate attention. AFP Chief of Staff Senga likewise sent a similar letter. Drilon,
the senate president, excepted the said requests for they were sent belatedly and arrangements were already made and scheduled. Subsequently, GMA
issued EO 464 which took effect immediately.

EO 464 basically prohibited Department heads, Senior officials of executive departments who in the judgment of the department heads are covered by the
executive privilege; Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of Staff are
covered by the executive privilege; Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief superintendent or higher and such other officers who in the
judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the executive privilege; Senior national security officials who in the judgment of the National Security
Adviser are covered by the executive privilege; and Such other officers as may be determined by the President, from appearing in such hearings conducted
by Congress without first securing the presidents approval.

The department heads and the military officers who were invited by the Senate committee then invoked EO 464 to except themselves. Despite EO 464, the
scheduled hearing proceeded with only 2 military personnel attending. For defying President Arroyos order barring military personnel from testifying
before legislative inquiries without her approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were relieved from their military posts and were made to face court
martial proceedings. EO 464s constitutionality was assailed for it is alleged that it infringes on the rights and duties of Congress to conduct investigation in
aid of legislation and conduct oversight functions in the implementation of laws.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 464 is constitutional.

HELD: The SC ruled that EO 464 is constitutional in part. To determine the validity of the provisions of EO 464, the SC sought to distinguish Section 21 from
Section 22 of Art 6 of the 1987 Constitution. The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution. Although
there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that
it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be implied. In other words,
the power of inquiry with process to enforce it is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate
wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative
body does not itself possess the requisite information which is not infrequently true recourse must be had to others who do possess it.

Section 22 on the other hand provides for the Question Hour. The Question Hour is closely related with the legislative power, and it is precisely as a
complement to or a supplement of the Legislative Inquiry. The appearance of the members of Cabinet would be very, very essential not only in the
application of check and balance but also, in effect, in aid of legislation. Section 22 refers only to Question Hour, whereas, Section 21 would refer specifically
to inquiries in aid of legislation, under which anybody for that matter, may be summoned and if he refuses, he can be held in contempt of the House. A
distinction was thus made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question hour. While attendance was meant to be discretionary in the question
hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation. Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely related and complementary to each other, should not
be considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress. One specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which
is to elicit information that may be used for legislation, while the other pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain
information in pursuit of Congress oversight function. Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under Section 21
and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation of powers.

While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its
demands for information. When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid
claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this power
the President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment. It is based on her
being the highest official of the executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of government which is sanctioned by a long-standing
custom. The requirement then to secure presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is only to appearances in the question hour, is valid on its
face. For under Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the appearance of department heads in the question hour is discretionary on their part. Section 1
cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the
refusal of the department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either by the President herself or by the
Executive Secretary.

When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the statutes which it has issued, its right to such information is
not as imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief Executive, such department heads must give a report of their performance as a matter of duty.
In such instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation of powers, states that Congress may only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the
inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is in aid of legislation under Section 21, the appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated
in Arnault.

BANAT VS COMELEC 2009
Facts:
On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution, docketed as NBC No. 07-041
(PL) before the NBC. BANAT filed its petition because "the Chairman and the Members of the COMELEC have recently been quoted in the national papers
that the COMELEC is duty bound to and shall implement theVeterans ruling, that is, would apply the Panganiban formula in allocating party-list seats."

BANAT filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the ruling in NBC Resolution No. 07-88. BANAT did not file a motion for reconsideration of
NBC Resolution No. 07-88.

On 9 July 2007, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher asked the COMELEC, acting as NBC, to reconsider its decision to use the Veterans formula as stated in
its NBC Resolution No. 07-60 because the Veterans formula is violative of the Constitution and of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941). On the same day,
the COMELEC denied reconsideration during the proceedings of the NBC.
Facts:
Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) filed before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a petition to proclaim the
full number of party list representatives provided by the Constitution. However, the recommendation of the head of the legal group of COMELECs national
board of canvassers to declare the petition moot and academic was approved by the COMELEC en banc, and declared further in a resolution that the
winning party list will be resolved using the Veterans ruling. BANAT then filed a petition before the SC assailing said resolution of the COMELEC.
Issues:
(1) Is the 20% allocation for party-list representatives provided in Sec 5 (2), Art VI of the Constitution mandatory or is it merely a ceiling?
(2) Is the 2% threshold and qualifier votes prescribed by the same Sec 11 (b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
(3) Does the Constitution prohibit major political parties from participating in the party-list elections? If not, can major political parties participate in the
party-list elections?
Held:
(1) Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 mandates the filling up of the entire 20% allocation of party-list representatives found in the Constitution. The
Constitution, in paragraph 1, Sec 5 of Art VI, left the determination of the number of the members of the House of Representatives to Congress. The 20%
allocation of party-list representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives cannot be more then 20% of the members of the House of
Representatives.
(2) No. We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two percent threshold for the distribution of the
additional seats as found in the second clause of Sec 11(b) of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it
mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party-list seats when the available party-list seat exceeds 50. The continued
operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the
members of the House of Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives.We therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in relation to
the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Sec 11 (b) of RA 7941. The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle
to the full implementation of Sec 5 (2), Art VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of the-broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or
group interests in the House of Representatives.
(3) No. Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of
the Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings. However, by vote of 8-7, the
Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major political parties from participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.

BELGICA VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
G.R. No. 208566 Political Law Constitutional Law Local Government Invalid Delegation
Legislative Department Invalid Delegation of Legislative Power

This case is consolidated with G.R. No. 208493 and G.R. No. 209251.

The so-called pork barrel system has been around in the Philippines since about 1922. Pork Barrel is commonly known as the lump-sum, discretionary funds
of the members of the Congress. It underwent several legal designations from Congressional Pork Barrel to the latest Priority Development Assistance
Fund orPDAF. The allocation for the pork barrel is integrated in the annual General Appropriations Act (GAA).

Since 2011, the allocation of the PDAF has been done in the following manner:

a. P70 million: for each member of the lower house; broken down to P40 million for hard projects (infrastructure projects like roads, buildings, schools,
etc.), and P30 million for soft projects (scholarship grants, medical assistance, livelihood programs, IT development, etc.);

b. P200 million: for each senator; broken down to P100 million for hard projects, P100 million for soft projects;

c. P200 million: for the Vice-President; broken down to P100 million for hard projects, P100 million for soft projects.

The PDAF articles in the GAA do provide for realignment of funds whereby certain cabinet members may request for the realignment of funds into their
department provided that the request for realignment is approved or concurred by the legislator concerned.

Presidential Pork Barrel

The president does have his own source of fund albeit not included in the GAA. The so-called presidential pork barrel comes from two sources: (a)
the Malampaya Funds, from the Malampaya Gas Project this has been around since 1976, and (b) the Presidential Social Fund which is derived from the
earnings of PAGCOR this has been around since about 1983.
Pork Barrel Scam Controversy

Ever since, the pork barrel system has been besieged by allegations of corruption. In July 2013, six whistle blowers, headed by Benhur Luy, exposed that for
the last decade, the corruption in the pork barrel system had been facilitated by Janet Lim Napoles. Napoles had been helping lawmakers in funneling their
pork barrel funds into about 20 bogus NGOs (non-government organizations) which would make it appear that government funds are being used in legit
existing projects but are in fact going to ghost projects. An audit was then conducted by the Commission on Audit and the results thereof concurred with
the exposes of Luy et al.

Motivated by the foregoing, Greco Belgica and several others, filed various petitions before the Supreme Court questioning the constitutionality of the pork
barrel system.

ISSUES:
I. Whether or not the congressional pork barrel system is constitutional.
II. Whether or not presidential pork barrel system is constitutional.

HELD:
I. No, the congressional pork barrel system is unconstitutional. It is unconstitutional because it violates the following principles:

a. Separation of Powers

As a rule, the budgeting power lies in Congress. It regulates the release of funds (power of the purse). The executive, on the other hand, implements the
laws this includes the GAA to which the PDAF is a part of. Only the executive may implement the law but under the pork barrel system, whats happening
was that, after the GAA, itself a law, was enacted, the legislators themselves dictate as to which projects their PDAF funds should be allocated to a clear
act of implementing the law they enacted a violation of the principle of separation of powers. (Note in the older case of PHILCONSA vs Enriquez, it was
ruled that pork barrel, then called as CDF or the Countrywide Development Fund, was constitutional insofar as the legislators only recommend where their
pork barrel funds go).

This is also highlighted by the fact that in realigning the PDAF, the executive will still have to get the concurrence of the legislator concerned.

b. Non-delegability of Legislative Power

As a rule, the Constitution vests legislative power in Congress alone. (The Constitution does grant the people legislative power but only insofar as the
processes of referendum and initiative are concerned). That being, legislative power cannot be delegated by Congress for it cannot delegate further that
which was delegated to it by the Constitution.
Exceptions to the rule are:

(i) delegated legislative power to local government units but this shall involve purely local matters;
(ii) authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy in times of war or other national
emergency, or fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas,
tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government.

In this case, the PDAF articles which allow the individual legislator to identify the projects to which his PDAF money should go to is a violation of the rule on
non-delegability of legislative power. The power to appropriate funds is solely lodged in Congress (in the two houses comprising it) collectively and not
lodged in the individual members. Further, nowhere in the exceptions does it state that the Congress can delegate the power to the individual member of
Congress.

c. Principle of Checks and Balances

One feature in the principle of checks and balances is the power of the president to veto items in the GAA which he may deem to be inappropriate. But this
power is already being undermined because of the fact that once the GAA is approved, the legislator can now identify the project to which he will
appropriate his PDAF. Under such system, how can the president veto the appropriation made by the legislator if the appropriation is made after the
approval of the GAA again, Congress cannot choose a mode of budgeting which effectively renders the constitutionally-given power of the President
useless.

d. Local Autonomy

As a rule, the local governments have the power to manage their local affairs. Through their Local Development Councils (LDCs), the LGUs can develop their
own programs and policies concerning their localities. But with the PDAF, particularly on the part of the members of the house of representatives, whats
happening is that a congressman can either bypass or duplicate a project by the LDC and later on claim it as his own. This is an instance where the national
government (note, a congressman is a national officer) meddles with the affairs of the local government and this is contrary to the State policy embodied
in the Constitution on local autonomy. Its good if thats all that is happening under the pork barrel system but worse, the PDAF becomes more of a personal
fund on the part of legislators.

II. Yes, the presidential pork barrel is valid.

The main issue raised by Belgica et al against the presidential pork barrel is that it is unconstitutional because it violates Section 29 (1), Article VI of the
Constitution which provides:
No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
Belgica et al emphasized that the presidential pork comes from the earnings of the Malampaya and PAGCOR and not from any appropriation from a
particular legislation.

The Supreme Court disagrees as it ruled that PD 910, which created the Malampaya Fund, as well as PD 1869 (as amended by PD 1993), which
amended PAGCORs charter, provided for the appropriation, to wit:

(i) PD 910: Section 8 thereof provides that all fees, among others, collected from certain energy-related ventures shall form part of a special fund (the
Malampaya Fund) which shall be used to further finance energy resource development and for other purposes which the President may direct;
(ii) PD 1869, as amended: Section 12 thereof provides that a part of PAGCORs earnings shall be allocated to a General Fund (the Presidential Social Fund)
which shall be used in government infrastructure projects.

These are sufficient laws which met the requirement of Section 29, Article VI of the Constitution. The appropriation contemplated therein does not have to
be a particular appropriation as it can be a general appropriation as in the case of PD 910 and PD 1869.



Pormento Vs Estrada Case
Judicial review; justiciable controversy; moot case.
Private respondent was not elected President in the May 10, 2010 election. Since the issue on the proper interpretation of the phrase any reelection in
Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution will be premised on a persons second (whether immediate or not) election as President, there is no case or
controversy to be resolved in this case. No live conflict of legal rights exists. There is in this case no definite, concrete, real or substantial controversy that
touches on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. No specific relief may conclusively be decreed upon by the Court in this case that will
benefit any of the parties. As such, one of the essential requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review, the existence of an actual case or
controversy, is sorely lacking in this case. As a rule, the Court may only adjudicate actual, ongoing controversies. It is not empowered to decide moot
questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the result as to the thing in issue in the case before it. When a
case is moot, it becomes non-justiciable. An action is considered moot when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy because the issues involved
have become academic or dead or when the matter in dispute has already been resolved and hence, one is not entitled to judicial intervention unless the
issue is likely to be raised again between the parties. There is nothing for the Court to resolve as the determination thereof has been overtaken by
subsequent events. Assuming an actual case or controversy existed prior to the proclamation of a President who has been duly elected in the May 10, 2010
election, the same is no longer true today. Following the results of that election, private respondent was not elected President for the second time. Thus,
any discussion of his reelection will simply be hypothetical and speculative. It will serve no useful or practical purpose. Atty. Evillo C. Pormento vs. Joseph
Erap Ejercito Estrada and Commission on Elections. G.R. No. 191988. August 31, 2010
[ G. R. NO. 156982, SEPTEMBER 08, 2004 ]
NATIONAL AMNESTY COMMISSION, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, JUANITO G. ESPINO, DIRECTOR IV, NCR, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, AND
ERNESTO C. EULALIA, RESIDENT AUDITOR, NATIONAL AMNESTY COMMISSION. RESPONDENTS.

FACTS:

Petitioner National Amnesty Commission (NAC) is a government agency created on March 25, 1994 by then President Fidel V. Ramos through
Proclamation No. 347. The NAC is tasked to receive, process and review amnesty applications. It is composed of seven members: a Chairperson, three
regular members appointed by the President, and the Secretaries of Justice, National Defense and Interior and Local Government as ex officio members.
It appears that after personally attending the initial NAC meetings, the three ex officio members turned over said responsibility to their
representatives who were paid honoraria beginning December 12, 1994. However, on October 15, 1997, NAC resident auditor Eulalia disallowed
on audit the payment of honoraria to these representatives amounting to P255,750 for the period December 12, 1994 to June 27, 1997, pursuant to COA
Memorandum No. 97-038.

ISSUE:

Whether representatives can be entitled to payment intended for ex-officio members

RULING:

The representatives in fact assumed their responsibilities not by virtue of a new appointment but by mere designation from the ex officio members
who were themselves also designated as such.
There is a considerable difference between an appointment and designation. An appointment is the selection by the proper authority of an individual
who is to exercise the powers and functions of a given office; a designation merely connotes an imposition of additional duties, usually by law, upon a
person already in the public service by virtue of an earlier appointment.
Designation does not entail payment of additional benefits or grant upon the person so designated the right to claim the salary attached to the
position. Without an appointment, a designation does not entitle the officer to receive the salary of the position.

ESTRADA VS DESIERTO
353 SCRA 452 Political Law Constitutional Law De Jure vs De Facto President Arroyo a de jure president
Joseph Erap Estrada alleges that he is the President on leave while Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo claims she is the President. From the beginning of Eraps
term, he was plagued by problems that slowly but surely eroded his popularity. His sharp descent from power started on October 4, 2000. Singson, a
longtime friend of Estrada, went on air and accused the Estrada, his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords. The expos
immediately ignited reactions of rage. On January 19, Estrada fell from power. At 1:20 p.m. of said day, the Erap informed then Executive Secretary
Edgardo Angara that General Angelo Reyes, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, had defected. January 20 turned to be the day of Eraps
surrender. On January 22, the Monday after taking her oath, Arroyo immediately discharged the powers and duties of the Presidency. After his fall from the
pedestal of power, Eraps legal problems appeared in clusters. Several cases previously filed against him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in
motion.

ISSUE: Whether or not Arroyo is a legitimate (de jure) president.

HELD: The SC holds that the resignation of Estrada cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by his leaving Malacaang. In the press release containing his final
statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic albeit with the reservation about its legality; (2) he
emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. He did not
say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability and that he was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears; (3) he
expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the
people as President; (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our country. Estradas
reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of the president which he has given up; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in the
promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained
if he did not give up the presidency. The press release was petitioners valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now in the past tense. Even if
Erap can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern
temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure President made by a co-equal branch of
government cannot be reviewed by this Court.

NERI VS SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF OFFICERS
549 SCRA 77 Political Law Constitutional Law The Legislative Department Inquiry in aid of legislation Executive Privilege
Legislative (Sec 21) & Oversight (Sec 22) Powers

In April April 2007, DOTC entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services for the
National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of $329,481,290.00 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the
Peoples Republic of China. The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. On the other hand, Joe De Venecia issued a statement that
several high executive officials and power brokers were using their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA.
Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He appeared in one hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and
during which he admitted that Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN project. He further narrated that
he informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on what they
discussed about the NBN Project, Neri refused to answer, invoking executive privilege. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on (a) whether or
not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve.
He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the SBRC averring that the communications between GMA and Neri is privileged
and that the jurisprudence laid down in Senate vs Ermita be applied. The SBRC cited Neri for contempt.

ISSUE: Whether or not the three questions sought by the SBRC to be answered falls under executive privilege.

HELD: The oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation.
The communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege.

1st, the communications relate to a quintessential and non-delegable power of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with
other countries. This authority of the President to enter intoexecutive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been
recognized in Philippine jurisprudence.

2nd, the communications are received by a close advisor of the President. Under the operational proximity test, petitioner can be considered a close
advisor, being a member of President Arroyos cabinet. And

3rd, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information
elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.

ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC)
G. R. No. 191002. March 17, 2010.

FACTS:
This case is based on multiple cases field with dealt with the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming compulsory requirement of Chief Justice
Puno on May 17, 2010 or seven days after the presidential election. On December 22, 2009, Congressman Matias V. Defensor, an ex officio member of the
JBC, addressed a letter to the JBC, requesting that the process for nominations to the office of the Chief Justice be commenced immediately. In its January
18, 2010 meeting en banc, the JBC passed a resolution which stated that they have unanimously agreed to start the process of filling up the position of Chief
Justice to be vacated on May 17, 2010 upon the retirement of the incumbent Chief Justice. As a result, the JBC opened the position of Chief Justice for
application or recommendation, and published for that purpose its announcement in the Philippine Daily Inquirer and the Philippine Star. In its meeting of
February 8, 2010, the JBC resolved to proceed to the next step of announcing the names of the following candidates to invite to the public to file their
sworn complaint, written report, or opposition, if any, not later than February 22, 2010. Although it has already begun the process for the filling of the
position of Chief Justice Puno in accordance with its rules, the JBC is not yet decided on when to submit to the President its list of nominees for the position
due to the controversy in this case being unresolved. The compiled cases which led to this case and the petitions of intervenors called for either the
prohibition of the JBC to pass the shortlist, mandamus for the JBC to pass the shortlist, or that the act of appointing the next Chief Justice by GMA is a
midnight appointment. A precedent frequently cited by the parties is the In Re Appointments Dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon.
Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the RTC of Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City, respectively, shortly referred to here as the Valenzuela
case, by which the Court held that Section 15, Article VII prohibited the exercise by the President of the power to appoint to judicial positions during the
period therein fixed.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing.
2. Whether or not there is justiciable controversy that is ripe for judicial determination.
3. Whether or not the incumbent President can appoint the next Chief Justice.
4. Whether or not mandamus and prohibition will lie to compel the submission of the shortlist of nominees by the JBC.

HELD:
1.Petitioners have legal standing because such requirement for this case was waived by the Court. Legal standing is a peculiar concept in constitutional law
because in some cases, suits are not brought by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of a law or any other government act but by
concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest. But even if, strictly speaking, the petitioners are not covered by the
definition, it is still within the wide discretion of the Court to waive the requirement and so remove the impediment to its addressing and resolving the
serious constitutional questions raised.

2. There is a justiciable issue. The court holds that the petitions set forth an actual case or controversy that is ripe for judicial determination. The reality is
that the JBC already commenced the proceedings for the selection of the nominees to be included in a short list to be submitted to the President for
consideration of which of them will succeed Chief Justice Puno as the next Chief Justice. Although the position is not yet vacant, the fact that the JBC began
the process of nomination pursuant to its rules and practices, although it has yet to decide whether to submit the list of nominees to the incumbent
outgoing President or to the next President, makes the situation ripe for judicial determination, because the next steps are the public interview of the
candidates, the preparation of the short list of candidates, and the interview of constitutional experts, as may be needed. The resolution of the
controversy will surely settle with finality the nagging questions that are preventing the JBC from moving on with the process that it already began, or
that are reasons persuading the JBC to desist from the rest of the process.

3.Prohibition under section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the judiciary.
The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the framers devoted time to meticulously drafting, styling, and arranging the
Constitution. Such meticulousness indicates that the organization and arrangement of the provisions of the Constitution were not arbitrarily or whimsically
done by the framers, but purposely made to reflect their intention and manifest their vision of what the Constitution should contain. As can be seen, Article
VII is devoted to the Executive Department, and, among others, it lists the powers vested by the Constitution in the President. The presidential power of
appointment is dealt with in Sections 14, 15 and 16 of the Article. Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contai ned in Section 15, Article VII to
the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the
provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equal ly applicable to the appointment
of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII.

4.Writ of mandamus does not lie against the JBC. Mandamus shall issue when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act that the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station. It is proper when the act against which it is
directed is one addressed to the discretion of the tribunal or officer. Mandamus is not available to direct the exercise of a judgment or discretion in a
particular way. For mandamus to lie, the following requisites must be complied with: (a) the plaintiff has a clear legal right to the act demanded; (b) it must
be the duty of the defendant to perform the act, because it is mandated by law; (c) the defendant unlawfully neglects the performance of the duty enjoined
by law; (d) the act to be performed is ministerial, not discretionary; and (e) there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.

Jamar M. Lulayan v. Gov Abdusakar v. TanSupremacy of Civilian AuthoritySEAN
SUMMARY: The calling-out powers contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to thePresident. An exercise by another official, even if he is the local
chief executive, is ultra vires,and may not be justified by the invocation of Section 465 of the Local Government Code.IN THIS CASE:
Governor Tan exceeded his authority when he declared a state of emergencyand called upon the Armed Forces, the police, and his own Civilian Emergency
Force. Thecalling-out powers contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to the President.
FACTS:
Three members from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) were kidnappedin the vicinity of the Provincial Capitol in Patikul, Sulu.-
Andres Notter, Eugenio Vagni, and Marie Jean Lacaba, were purportedly inspecting awater sanitation project for the Sulu Provincial Jail when they were
seized by three armedmen who were later confirmed to be members of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG).-
A Local Crisis Committee, later renamed Sulu Crisis Management Committee (Committee)was then formed to investigate the kidnapping incident.-
The Committee convened under the leadership of respondent Abdusakur Mahail Tan, theProvincial Governor of Sulu.-
Governor Tan issued Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2009, declaring a state of emergency inthe province of Sulu.-
The Proclamation cited the kidnapping incident as a ground for the said declaration,describing it as a terrorist act pursuant to the Human Security Act (R.A.
9372).-
It also invoked Section 465 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. 7160), whichbestows on the Provincial Governor the power to carry out emergency
measures duringman-made and natural disasters and calamities, and to call upon the appropriatenational law enforcement agencies to suppress disorder
and lawless violence.-
In the Proclamation, Tan called upon the PNP and the Civilian Emergency Force (CEF) toset up checkpoints and chokepoints, conduct general search and
seizures includingarrests, and other actions necessary to ensure public safety.-
Petitioners, Jamar Kulayan,et al. claimed that Proclamation No. 1-09 was issued ultra vires ,and thus null and void, for violating Sections 1 and 18, Article VII
of the Constitution, whichgrants the President sole authority to exercise emergency powers and calling-out powersas the chief executive of the Republic
and commander-in-chief of the armed forces.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a governor can exercise the calling-out powers of a President
HELD:
-It has already been established that there is one repository of executive powers, andthat is the President of the Republic.
-This means that when Section 1, Article VII of the Constitution speaks of executive power,it is granted to the President and no one else.
-Corollarily, it is only the President, as Executive, who is authorized to exercise emergencypowers as provided under Section 23, Article VI, of the
Constitution, as well as whatbecame known as the calling-out powers under Section 7, Article VII thereof.
-While the President is still a civilian, Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution mandates thatcivilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military,
making the civilian president the nations supreme military leader.
-The net effect of Article II, Section 3, when read with Article VII, Section 18, is that a civilian President is the ceremonial, legal and administrative head of
the armed forces.
-The Constitution does not require that the President must be possessed of military trainingand talents, but as Commander-in-Chief, he has the power to
direct militaryoperations and to determine military strategy.
-Normally, he would be expected to delegate the actual command of the armed forcesto military experts; but the ultimate power is his.
-Given the foregoing, Governor Tan is not endowed with the power to call upon thearmed forces at his own bidding.
-In issuing the assailed proclamation, Governor Tan exceeded his authority when hedeclared a state of emergency and called upon the Armed Forces, the
police, and hisown Civilian Emergency Force.
-The calling-out powers contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to the President.
-An exercise by another official, even if he is the local chief executive, is ultra vires, andmay not be justified by the invocation of Section 465 of the Local
Government Code