Asia Pacific Industrial Engineering and Management System

Analysis of the Fire Explosion and Explosion Propagation

Control of Sugar Dust in the Yemen Company for Sugar
Refinery, Hodeida, Yemen
Frras Mohammed Ahmed Othman
a
, Maida A. Dela Cueva
b


a
Hayel Saeed Anam Group of Companies, Taiz , Yemen
b
Adamson University,900 San Marcelino St., Ermita, 1000 Manila, Philippines

Abstract
Explosions on sugar refineries of different causes occurred in the past, where there were injured employees,
damaged properties, and losses incurred by companies. Engineering and administrative solutions, can reduce the
likelihood of the explosion. This study aimed to create a cost efficient system that will reduce the chance of
explosion in the sugar refinery located in Hodeidah, Yemen, to protect employees, maintain safety and wellness,
and prevent property damages and company losses. The refinery process, with different components from different
work zones, was examined, identifying the areas containing huge amount of sugar dusts, and identifying potential
risks, using Failure mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA). Preventive measures were identified using the hierarchy
of the hazard controls, in conformance to international safety standards. The benefit-cost ratio was determined to
measure the cost effectiveness of the control measures. It has been found out that there is a possibility of sugar dust
explosion. Failure modes are identified with high Priority Risk Numbers (PRN) for different zones. Engineering
solutions such as suppression systems for belt conveyors in transporting sugar, for de-dusting systems, inerting
system for rotary dryer, explosion isolation valves and lightning protection systems were recommended, and have
been calculated to have a benefit-cost ratio of greater than 1.0. Finally, the recommended safety measures include
administrative solutions such as comprehensive housekeeping program, fire prevention and safety program, and
impose permitting systems specially in hot work areas.

Keywords: sugar dusts; explosion; FMEA
1. Background
Sugar dusts are flammable, and sugar refinery plants are susceptible to explosion which may
have devastating and susceptible effects. According to NFPA 654 (Standard for the Prevention of Fire
and Dust Explosions from the Manufacturing, Processing and Handling of Combustible Particulate
Solids) it takes only 0.8 mm layer of dust on the floor covering just 5% of the surface area of a room to
pose a significant explosion hazard. A dust explosion requires the simultaneous presence of two
additional factors - dust suspension and confinement. If any of the five elements are removed, dust
explosions will not occur, although a fire can still occur with oxygen, an ignition source, and the
combustible dust serving as a fuel. Very few employees of the sugar refinery plants are aware of this
risk. Among the 30 employees of the sugar refinery plant in Hodeida, Yemen, 65% are not aware of
the possibility of sugar dust explosions. It is then important to design the facilities to protect the
stakeholders, including the employees, and prevent potential hazards the sugar dust can bring, and
effective control measures should be made.

Hayel Saeed Anam (HSA) Group of Companies is a commercial entity that was established in
Yemen in 1938. Its activities include various investment fields in Saudi Arabia , Egypt, Malaysia and
Indonesia. A new plant of sugar refinery is being built in Hodeida, Yemen the Yemen for Sugar
Refinery (YCSR). The YCSR has a production capacity of the company is 660 thousand tons per year.
At present, the YCSR has a contract with De Smet Engineering and Contractors to provide the
equipment for sugar refinery. Based on the contract, De Smet Contractors will provide de-dusting
system in order to reduce the risks of dust explosions. The de-dusting unit collects sugar dusts from
discharged conveyors below the refined sugar silos and other transporting conveyors and sugar dryer.

This study aimed at designing preventive and protective procedures to control and reduce
risks of dusts explosions.

2.0 Methodology

The analysis was made based on the three zones of the refinery plant. Each of these zones
was examined. Potential hazards for each zone were identified using Failure Mode Effect Analysis
(FMEA).Failure Mode Effect Analysis (FMEA) concentrates on identifying possible failure modes and
their effects on the equipment and the whole system. Identification of potential failure modes leads to a
recommendation for an effective reliability of the system . Priorities on the failure modes were set
according to the FMEAs risk priority number (RPN) and concentrated effort were placed on the
higher RPN items obtained from the analysis. RPN has been calculated as the product of Severity,
Probability of Occurrence, and Probability of Detection !!"# ! ! ! ! ! !! . The values of RPN are
shown in Table 1. The company set an RPN of 51 as the critical. The values in red are considered
critical . the subsystem on each zone found to have RPN greater than or equal to 51were studied
further to minimize severity of failure, reduce the occurrence of the failure mode, and improve
detection.

Table 1. Risk Priority Number (RPN) values


Measures to control the potential hazards were identified; The potential benefits of the
proposed control measures, and the costs associated in the installation and maintenance for the
engineering controls were estimated, then the ratio of benefits and costs using the conventional and
modified B/C ratios were determined.

3.0 Result and Discussion

3.1. Facility Description and Sugar Refinery Process
The sugar refinery process starts when the raw sugar will be unloaded by truck coming from the
seaport. There are two unloading stations near to the raw sugar store . The sugar is conveyed by belt
conveyors to the horizontal sugar silo. The sugar pile is done through a mobile head conveyor called
tripper. The tripper is moving along the raw sugar storage. The sugar will be taken by a front loader
to load one of the eight bins to feed the refinery through belt conveyors. The raw sugar is transported to
the process building for refining ,the refined sugar is transported through belt conveyor to the storage
area i.e. Four concrete silos of 3,000 T capacity, are then transferred to the bulk sugar truck or to the
packing buildings. Dozens of screw conveyors and horizontal conveyor belts transport granulated sugar
throughout the packing buildings which house manual or semi-automatic machines to pack the refined
sugar into various sizes. The closed granulated sugar screw conveyors and belt conveyors located
throughout the process , storage silos and dryer are equipped with dust removal equipment including
the equipment installed in the packing building - 1 bag filters to recover the air from dryer , and 1 bag
filters to recover the air from cooler and silos. None of the conveyors, however, is designed to safely
vent overpressure outside the enclosure if combustible sugar dust inside the enclosure is ignited.
10 1000 900 800 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 10
9 810 729 648 567 486 405 324 243 162 81 9
8 640 576 512 448 384 320 256 192 128 64 8
7 490 441 392 343 294 245 196 147 98 49 7
6 360 324 288 252 216 180 144 108 72 36 6
5 250 225 200 175 150 125 100 75 50 25 5
4 160 144 128 112 96 80 64 48 32 16 4
3 90 81 72 63 54 45 36 27 18 9 3
2 40 36 32 28 24 20 16 12 8 4 2
1 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 1
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
S
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P
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a
b
i
l
i
t
y

o
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D
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e
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t
i
o
n
Probability of accuarnce

The proposed site lay-out ( Figure 1) gives enough room to transport the refined sugar from the
process building to storage silos by means of belt conveyor instead of bucket elevator. This existing
system (without any bucket elevators) reduces the dust generating and simplifies the risk management
of explosion and fire .

Heat exchangers are installed in various places in the process building by using steam that comes
from the co-generating power plant. Steam comes from the boiler house at 63 bar. In the process house,
two pressure reducing stations are foreseen: One from 63 to 7 bar, other from 7 bar to 2 bar. i.e. The
steam produced is used as heat source in several heat exchangers the temperature of the steam is 107
o
C.
The steam consumption is approximately 93.2 % of the row sugar refined .

3.2. De-dusting System

There is a separate de-dusting system for the packing building and for the feeder belt conveyor
coming from the sugar storage silos. The aspiration pipes are connected to the feeding belt conveyor
and distributed throughout the plant ,the pipes aspiration points are located near to the opening to the
bagging machine right after the Weighing and dosing equipment .The de-dusting system is located
inside the sugar bagging building. Figure 16 shows the top view of the packing building showing the
general arrangement of the de-dusting system.

3.3. Possible Ignition Sources

Dust explosions occur when an effective ignition source of sufficient energy to initiate flame
propagation is present. Avoidance or elimination of potential sources of ignition is a very important
step in preventing dust explosions. The possible ignition sources that could lead to sugar dust explosion
in the Yemen Company for Sugar Refinery are: Flames and direct heat; Hot work; Hot surfaces;
Electrostatic sparks; Electrical sparks; Friction; Electrostatic; and Lightning, with a 30,0000C and
extreme high current.

3. 4. Possible Sugar Dust Sources

The sugar crystals have sharp edges as seen with the use of microscope. The abrasive nature of
sugar crystals makes the generation of fine particles easy when the particles are brushed against each
other . The rotary movement of the refined sugar inside the rotary drier and transporting it to the
Storage silos where it drops down at elevation of 30 meters makes the formation of sugar dust very
much significant . The sugar dust can be seen at the inlet and out let of transporting conveyors ,
throughout the intervals of the belt conveyor, and inside the storage soils . The sugar dust is sucked
with the use of suction fans which delivers the air with the dust particles to bag filter where 99 % of the
sugar dust gets trapped and collected leaving the air clean from the sugar dust.

3.5. Failure Mode and Effect Analysis

There are 13 subsystems identified in Zone 1, at which potential failure mode can occur, as
shown in Table 2. The potential effects were identified, and the corresponding RPN. Table 3 shows
all possible scenarios that might lead to failure for each potential failure mode for each subsystem, the
causes of failure mentioned in the FMEA spreadsheet are general and the possible scenarios of
potential causes of failure. There are several failure modes with High Risk Priority Numbers and
should be addressed at the earliest possible time: Carbon dioxide leakage having Risk Priority
Number ( 365 ); Contact with caustic soda having Risk Priority Number ( 350 ); Heat stock to operator
having Risk Priority Number ( 245); Running the pump without water ring having Risk Priority
Number ( 120); and Draw Bodies due to the centrifuge having Risk Priority Number ( 120). The safety
measures taken by the YCSR at this Zone like include: the conveyors are fitted with a speed switch,
security ropes and belt deport detectors. If one switch detects a failure or is activated, the conveyor
gives a warning signal to the control room; and an available static permanent magnet separator. It
removes all the ferrous elements that may lay in the raw sugar such as bolts, nuts.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
S.N
Subsystem/
Module &
Function
Potential
Failure
Mode
Potential End
Effects(s) of
Failure
Severity
Ranking
Potential
Cause(s) of
Failure
Probability of
Occurrence
Ranking
Current
Controls/
Fault
Detection
Probability
of Detection
Ranking
Risk Priority
Number.
Existing
(PRN)
Recommended
Action(s)
Severity
Ranking
Probability
of
Occurrence
Ranking
Probability of
Detection
Ranking
New
RPN
1
Melter to melt
the raw sugar
Over flow
of mixture
Burning and
scalds to
operator.
Down time to
plant.
7
Failure of
level sensor
2
Isolation of
the tank by
heat rated
material
Installation of
level sensor
4 56
1. Isolation of
the melter
with guard
rail .
2. Wearing the
PPE at all
time .
3. Regular
preventive
maintenance.
3 1 2 6
2
Melter to melt
the raw sugar
Burning
incident
due to
contact
Burning and
scalds to
operator.

6
Damage of
the isolation
material
with time
2
Isolation of the
tank by heat
rated material

7 84
1. Isolation of
the melter
with guard
rail .
2. Wearing the
PPE at all
time.
3. Posting
warning
signs.
4. Training
programs to
workers .

1 1 5 5
3
Inside the
process
building
Heat stock
to operator
Heat related
illness due to the
hot working
environment
7
The nature
working
environment
in the
process
building
which
involves
heat.
5
Open type
process building
7 245
1. Appropriate
ventilation
system.
2. Warning
signs.
4 2 4 32
4
Heat exchanger
to heat the
Sugar syrup.

Burst of
pipe due to
Pipe
blockage

Burning to
operators .
Down time to
plant


6

No regular
cleaning

2

None

8

96

1. Isolation of
the heat
exchanger
2. Precaution
signs.
3. Wearing of
PPE at all
time.

3 1 8 24

Table 2. FMEA Sheet for Zone1










S.N
Subsystem/
Module &
Function
Potential
Failure
Mode
Potential End
Effects(s) of
Failure
Severity
Ranking
Potential
Cause(s) of
Failure
Probability of
Occurrence
Ranking
Current
Controls/
Fault
Detection
Probability
of Detection
Ranking
Risk Priority
Number.
Existing
(PRN)
Recommended
Action(s)
Severity
Ranking
Probability
of
Occurrence
Ranking
Probability of
Detection
Ranking
New
RPN
5
Carbonation
vessel for sugar
purification
Carbon
dioxide
leakage
Asphyxia and
health illness.
7
Seal wear
and tear
6 None 8 336
1. Providing
ventilation
system.
2. Regular
maintenance
for seals.
3. Wearing
breathing
mask at all
time.
4 2 3 24
6
Lime dosing
station for
sugar
purification.
Continuou
s contact
with Lime
stone
Danger to the
lungs and eye in
a long run
exposure
7
Failure of
de-dusting
system for
lime stone.
3
De-dusting
system
4 84
1. Regular
maintenance
for filters.
2. Training of
workers .
3. Wearing PPE
at all time.
4 2 2 16
7 Vacuum pump
Running
the pump
without
water ring
Pump burns
causing
downtime.
4
Running the
vacuum
pump dry.
3 None 10 120
1. Continues
water supply
to the vacuum
pump.
2. Preparing
check list
before
operating he
pump
2 1 4 8
8
Dosing of
caustic soda for
declaration
Contact
with
caustic
soda
Causes burns
and scarring, can
cause serious
damage to all
body tissues
contacted
7
The operator
dealing with
chemicals
5 None 10 350
1. Training
program for
awareness.
2. Precaution
signs .
3. Wearing PPE
at all time.

4 2 3 24
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
S.N
Subsystem/
Module &
Function
Potential
Failure
Mode
Potential End
Effects(s) of
Failure
Severity
Ranking
Potential
Cause(s) of
Failure
Probability
of
Occurrence
Ranking
Current
Controls/
Fault
Detection
Probability of
Detection
Ranking
Risk Priority
Number.
Existing
(PRN)
Recommended
Action(s)
Severity
Ranking
Probability
of
Occurrence
Ranking
Probability of
Detection
Ranking
New
RPN
9
Dosing of
Hydrogen
chloride for
decalaration
Contact
with
Hydrogen
chloride
May cause
damage to the
following
organs: Lungs,
Upper
Respiratory
,skin and eye.
7
The operator
dealing with
chemicals
5 None 10 350
1. Training
program for
awareness.
2. Precaution
signs .
3. Wearing PPE
at all time.

4 2 3 24
10
Evaporator
to
concentrate
the sugar
syrup.
Burning o
skin due to
contact
Burning and
scalds to
operator.

6
Wear and tear
of isolation
5 Isolation 3 90
1. Isolation by
guard rail.
2. Regular
preventive
maintenance.
3. Warning
signs.
4. Wearing PPE
at al time.
4 2 2 16
11
Heat
exchanger
to heat the
Sugar
syrup.
Burning o
skin due to
contact
Burning and
scalds to
operator.

6
Wear and tear
of isolation
5 Isolation 3 90
1. Isolation by
guard rail.
2. Regular
preventive
maintenance.
3. Warning
signs.
4. Wearing PPE
at all time.
4 2 2 16
12
Continues
and
discontinues
centrifugal
Draw
bodies
Cut and other
injuries and
may lead to
death due to
the high
kinetic energy
involved in
centrifuge
8
Worker contact
with rotating
parts
3 None 5 120
1. Isolation by
guard rail.
2. `Warning
signs.
3. Training of
workers to
increase
awareness..
4 2 5 40
13
Continues
and
discontinues
centrifugal
Mechanical
failure.
Total
destruction to
the machine
and injury to
worker due to
the broken
parts
8
Over load
No
preventive
maintenance
1 None 10 80
1. Regular
preventive
maintenance.
2. Wearing PPE
at all time.
3. Following
Operation
manuals
correctly.
4 1 5 20

Table 3. Scenarios that might lead to failure for each subsystem
S.
No
Subsystem/
Module &
Function
Potential
Failure
Mode
Potential End
Effects of
Failure
Possible scenarios of potential causes of failure.
1
Melter to melt the raw
sugar
Over flow of mixture
Burning and scalds to
operator.
Down time to plant.
The sensor got damage due to the heat of melter and did not operate causing the over flow of the.
The sensor did not give the signal to the control unit due to loos connection in the wiring .
The floating system of the sensor is filled with sugar syrup disabling the function of sensor.
Excessive voltage.
2
Melter to melt the roe
sugar
Burning incident due
to contact.
Burning and scalds to operator.

The isolation is decaying with time.
The isolation wrapping is done poorly by contractor.
The warning sign is not in place .
The operator is not wearing the personal protective equipment
3
Inside the process
building
Heat stock to
operator
Heat related illness due to the
hot working environment
The operator is dehydrated due to the low consumption of water .
The ventilation fans are not installed in the process building .
The precaution sign is not installed in the area .
4
Heat exchanger to heat
the Sugar syrup.
Burst of pipe due to
Pipe blockage
Burning to operators .
Down time to plant
No regular cleaning before process start up.
The cleaning procedure is not done adequate.
The Affiation process is not efficient in taking out the impurities before going to the heat exchanger .
5
Carbonation vessel for
sugar purification
Carbon dioxide
leakage
Asphyxia and health illness.
Over pressure inside the carbonation vessel.
The seals are worn out .
The flanges are not tight enough to prevent the leakage.
6
Lime dosing station for
sugar purification.
Continuous contact
with Lime stone
Danger to the lungs and eye in
a long run exposure
The bag filters of the de-dusting system is not cleaned regularly.
The operator is not wearing the breathing mask during operation .
7 Vacuum pump
Running the pump
without water ring
Pump burns causing
downtime.
The operator is not familiar with the running procedure .
The operator did not attend the training course .
8
Dosing of caustic soda
for declaration
Contact with caustic
soda
Causes burns and scarring, can
cause serious damage to all
body tissues contacted
The operator is not familiar with the risk of the chemical .
The operator is not wearing the personal protective equipment.
Lack of patience during loading and unloading of chemical .
9
Dosing of Hydrogen
chloride for
declaration
Contact with
Hydrogen chloride
May cause damage to the
following organs: Lungs,
Upper Respiratory ,skin and
eye.
The operator is not familiar with the risk of the chemical .
The operator is not wearing the personal protective equipment.
Lack of patience during loading and unloading of chemical .
10
Evaporator to
concentrate the sugar
syrup.
Burning o skin due to
contact
Burning and scalds to operator.

The isolation is decaying with time.
The isolation wrapping is done poorly by contractor.
The warning sign is not in place .
The operator is not wearing the personal protective equipment . 11
Heat exchanger to heat
the Sugar syrup.
Burning o skin due to
contact
Burning and scalds to operator.

12
Continues and
discontinues
centrifugal
Draw bodies
Cut and other injuries and may
lead to death due to the high
kinetic energy involved in
centrifuge
The operator is not familiar with the running procedure .
The operator did not attend the training course .
The warning sign is not in place.
The machine is not isolated and guard .
13
Continues and
discontinues
centrifugal
Mechanical failure.
Total destruction to the
machine and injury to worker
due to the broken parts
Over load of the centrifugal .
Not conducting the preventive maintenance .
Not performing the inspection procedure before start up.


There are 21 subsystems identified with potential failures on Zone 2, as shown in Table 4.Table 5
shows as all possible scenarios that might lead to failure for each potential failure mode for each
subsystem, the causes of failure mentioned in the FMEA spreadsheet are general and the possible scenarios
of potential causes of failure. The subsystems that need to be prioritized include Dust Explosion due to hot
work having PRN (450); Dust Explosion due to Stopping the Drum when it is hot and full of sugar
having PRN (350); Dust Explosion due to Hot surfaces like Hot bearings having PRN (300); and Dust
Explosion due to electro static having PRN (300).The safety measures taken by the YCSR at this Zone
include: the conveyors are provided with a speed switch, security ropes and with belt deport detectors ,If
one switch detects a failure or is activated the conveyor should give a warning signal to the control room;
the conveyor cannot be started without the de-dusting system starting and have to stop in case of failure in
the de-dusting system; In case of shut down of the suction fan of the hot de-dusting system , the alert signal
is appearing in the control room to shut down the dryer; If the drier temperatures are out of range, the alert
signal is appearing in the control room to shut down the feed screw conveyor ; Certified explosion bursting
disc with burst sensor mounted on the outside of the filter unit and the rotary dryer.

There are 8 subsystems identified with Failure Modes as shown in Table 6, four of which
have High Risk Priority Numbers and should be addressed immediately : Dust Explosion due to Hot
bearing having PRN (300); Dust Explosion due to the accumulation of sugar dust having PRN
(300) ; Dust Explosion due to electro static having PRN (240); and Injury of the hand of the operator
(piercing) in the sewing machine having PRN (560). The safety measures taken by YCSR in this
zone include: The conveyors are fitted with a speed switch, security ropes and with belt deport
detectors ,If one switch detects a failure or is activated the conveyor is giving warning signal to the
control room; The conveyor cannot be started without de-dusting system starts and have to stop in
case of failure in the de-dusting system; Certified explosion bursting disc with burst sensor mounted
on the outside of the filter unit .

The evaluation of benefits and costs of the recommended actions mentioned in FMEA spread
sheet are shown in Table 8, wherein all the recommended actions have a B/C ratio of greater than 1.0.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
S.N
Subsystem/
Module &
Function
Potential
Failure
Mode
Potential
End
Effects(s)
of
Failure
Severity
Ranking
Potential
Cause(s) of
Failure
Probabilit
y of
Occurren
ce
Ranking
Current
Controls/
Fault
Detection
Probabilit
y of
Detection
Ranking
Risk
Priority
Number.
Existing
(PRN)
Recommende
d
Action(s)
Severity
Ranking
Probability
of
Occurrence
Ranking
Probabilit
y of
Detection
Ranking
New RPN
1
Sugar rotary
drier

Dust Explosion
Injury and
chances of
death to
workers
,including
Plant
down time
10
The
Electrical
connection
are no more
Explosion
proof due to
wear and tear
3
Explosion
venting.
Explosion
proof
connection
s.
6

180
Regular
preventive
maintenanc
e and
inspection.
6 2 3 36
2 Dust Explosion
May lead
to burning
of sugar
creating
source of
heat and
damage to
the dryer
10
Stopping the
Drum when
it is hot and
full of sugar
5
Explosion
venting.
Explosion
proof
connection
s

7 350
1. Tainting
to
operators
.
2. Followin
g
Operatio
n
manuals
correctly
.
7 2 2 28
3 Dust Explosion
Hot
bearings
and
creating
heat
source
10
Excessive
heat and
vibration on
bearings
4
Explosion
venting.
Explosion
proof
connection
s

6 240
1. Tainting
to
operators
.
2. Followin
g
Operatio
n
manuals
correctly
.
3. Regular
preventi
ve
maintena
nce and
inspectio
n.
7 1 2 14
4 Dust Explosion
Increasing
the
temperatur
e of dryer
,Creating
source of
ignition
which lead
to dust
explosion
10
Temperature
transmitter
not operating
3
LCD
monitoring
system
5 150
1. Tainting
to
operators
.
2. Followin
g
Operatio
n
manuals
correctly
.
3. Regular
preventi
ve
maintena
nce and
inspectio
n.
7 1 2 14
Table 4. FMEA Sheet for Zone2
5 Burning incident
Burning
and scalds
to
operator.

10
No warning
signs are
mounted near
to the dryer
6 Non 8 480
1. Isolation
by guard
rail.
2. Warning
signs.
3. Training
of
workers
to
increase
awarenes
s..

6 2 3 36
6
Belt
conveyor
transporting
the refined
sugar from
Dryer to
storage silos
and from
storage silos
to packing
building

Dust explosion
Injury and
chances of
death to
workers
,including
Plant
down time
10
Hot surfaces
like Hot
bearings
3
De-dusting
system
10 300
1. Regular
preventi
ve
maintena
nce
2. Installati
on off
frictionle
ss
bearings.
3. Impleme
nting the
explosio
n
venting

7 1 3 21
7 Dust explosion
Injury and
chances of
death to
workers
,including
Intensive
destruction
10
Spark due to
the electro
static
3
De-dusting
system
10 300
1. Groundin
g of the
system.


7 1 7 49
8 Dust explosion
Injury and
chances of
death to
workers
,including
Plant
down time
10
Spark due to
hot work
5
De-dusting
system
9 450
1. Intensive
Tainting
to staff.
2. Special
hot
working
permissi
on.

10 1 7 70
9 Dust explosion
Injury and
chances of
death to
workers
,including
Plant
down time
10
Inadequate
system for
dust suction
inside the
conveyor.
2
De-dusting
system
10 200
Regular
inspection of
filters in the
de-dusting
system.
10 1 5 50
10 Belt Damage
Belt
conveyor
damage
which lead
to Plant
downtime.
7
Overload and
speed
indicator not
operating
3
Overload and
speed
indicator
5 105
1. Tainting
to
operators
.
2. Followin
g
Operatio
n
7 1 2 14
manuals
correctly
.
3. Regular
preventi
ve
maintena
nce and
inspectio
n.
11 Belt Damage
Belt
conveyor
damage
which lead
to Plant
downtime.
7
Alignment
sensor not
operating
3
Alignment
sensor
5 105
1. Tainting
to
operators
.
2. Followin
g
Operatio
n
manuals
correctly
.
3. Regular
preventi
ve
maintena
nce and
inspectio
n
7 1 2 14
12
Dedusting
system for
dryer


Dust explosion of
the system
Injury and
chances of
death to
workers
,including
Plant
down time
8
Spark due to
the electro
static
3 Non 10 240
1. Spark
detection
system.
2. Flameles
s
explosio
n
venting
on pipe.
3. Isolation
quick
closing
valve.
4. Explosio
n
suppressi
on .
5. Groundi
ng of the
system.
4 1 3 12
13 Dust explosion
Injury and
chances of
death to
workers
,including
Plant
down time
8
Spark due to
hot work
3 Non 10 240
1. Spark
detection
system .
2. Flameles
s
explosio
n
venting
on pipe.
3. Isolation
quick
closing
valve.
4 2 4 32
4. Explosio
n
suppressi
on .
5. Groundi
ng of the
system.
6. Tainting
to
operators
.
7. Special
hot
working
permissi
on.
1.
14
Dedusting
system for
sugar cooler
and
conditionin
g

Dust explosion
Injury and
chances of
death to
workers
,including
Plant
down time
10
Spark due to
hot work
3 Non 10 300
1. Spark
detection
system .
2. Flameles
s
explosio
n
venting
on pipe.
3. Isolation
quick
closing
valve.
4. Explosio
n
suppressi
on .
5. Special
hot
working
permissi
on
4 2 4 32
15 Dedusting
system for
sugar cooler
and
conditionin
g

Dust explosion
Injury and
chances of
death to
workers
,including
Plant
down time
10
Ignition
source due
hot
equipment
like bearings
3 Non 10 300
1. Regular
preventi
ve
maintena
nce
2. Installati
on off
frictionle
ss
bearings.
3. Impleme
nting the
explosio
n
venting

7 1 3 21
16

Dust explosion of
the system
Injury and
chances of
death to
workers
,including
Plant
8
Spark due to
the electro
static
3 Non 10 240
1. Spark
detection
system .
2. Flameles
s
explosio
4 1 3 12












down time n
venting
on pipe.
3. Isolation
quick
closing
valve.
4. Explosio
n
suppressi
on .
5. Groundi
ng of the
system.
17
Storage
silos 4 X
3000T
Dust explosion
Damage to
the roof of
silos and
the
feeding
belt
conveyors,
death of
workers
10
Ignition
source due to
hot work
2
De-dusting
system
8 160
1. Spark
detection
system .
2. Explosio
n
venting
3. Tainting
to
operators
.
4. Special
hot
working
permissi
on
8 1 2 16
18 Dust explosion
Damage to
the roof of
silos and
the
feeding
belt
conveyors,
death of
workers
10
Ignition
source due
hot
equipment
like bearings
2
De-dusting
system
8 160
1. Regular
preventi
ve
maintena
nce
2. Installati
on off
frictionle
ss
bearings.
3. Impleme
nting the
explosio
n
venting

8 1 2 16















Table 5. Possible scenarios of potential causes of failure on Zone 2.
S.
No
Subsystem/Module &Function Potential Failure Mode Potential End Effects of Failure Possible scenarios of potential causes of failure.
1
Sugar rotary drier
Dust Explosion
Injury and chances of death to workers
,including Plant down time
The electrical connections are loos without isolation .
Electrical spark due to loose connection.
Hot surface due to the over load of the circuit breaker .
2 Dust Explosion
May lead to burning of sugar creating source
of heat and damage to the dryer
Failure in the rotating wheel.
The temperature increase inside the rotary dryer.
The operator is not aware of the consequences of the sudden shutting down of the rotary
dryer.
The warning sign is not in place .
Unpredicted failure of the monitoring software. .
3 Dust Explosion Hot bearings and creating heat source
Over load of the rotating rollers on the bearings.
Not providing lubrication for the bearings before start up .
Not conducting the preventive maintenance for the bearings.
4 Dust Explosion
Increasing the temperature of dryer ,Creating
source of ignition which lead to dust explosion
The sensor got damage due to the heat of rotating dryer and did not operate causing the
increase of heat .
The sensor did not give the signal to the control unit due to loos connection in the wiring .
The setting parameters for the software are corrupted .
5 Burning incident
Burning and scalds to operator.

No guard rails to isolate the area.
The operator is not aware of the hazard related to rotary dryer or no PPE.
No warning signs are mounted near.
6
Belt conveyor transporting the
refined sugar from Dryer to
storage silos and from storage
silos to packing building
.
Dust explosion
Injury and chances of death to workers
,including Plant down time
Over load of the rotating rollers on the bearings.
Not providing lubrication for the bearings before start up .
Not conducting the preventive maintenance for the bearings.
7 Dust explosion
Injury and chances of death to workers
,including Intensive destruction
Spark generated due to the electro static buildup on the surface of the conveyor due to
contact with sugar.
The equipment are not grounded to the earth.
8 Dust explosion
Injury and chances of death to workers
,including Plant down time
Residual smoldering particles left over right after the welding process.
No clear instruction and procedure on hot work permit especially for the dust hazard area .
The clearance distance and safe zone arrangement where not done before conducting the
welding process.
9
Belt conveyor transporting the
refined sugar from Dryer to
storage silos and from storage
silos to packing building.
Dust explosion
Injury and chances of death to workers
,including Plant down time
The preventive maintenance are not carried out for the de-dusting system .
Regular cleaning for the de-dusting system is not done.
The de-dusting pipe is shocked due to the accumulation of dust particles.
10 Belt Damage
Belt conveyor damage which lead to Plant
downtime.
The sensor got damage due to the heat and other physical damage.
The sensor did not give the signal to the control unit due to loos connection in the wiring .
The setting parameters for the software are corrupted .
11 Belt Damage
Belt conveyor damage which lead to Plant
downtime.
The sensor got damage due to the heat and other physical damage.
The sensor did not give the signal to the control unit due to loos connection in the wiring .
The setting parameters for the software are corrupted .
12
De-dusting system for dryer


Dust explosion of the system
Injury and chances of death to workers
,including Plant down time
Spark generated due to the electro static build-up on the surface of the dedusting unit due to
contact with sugar dust travelling at 20 m/s.
The equipment are not grounded to the earth.
13 Dust explosion
Injury and chances of death to workers
,including Plant down time
Residual smouldering particles left over right after the welding process.
No clear instruction and procedure on hot work permit especially for the dust hazard area .
The clearance distance and safe zone arrangement where not done before conducting the
welding process.
14
De-dusting system for sugar
cooler and conditioning

Dust explosion
Injury and chances of death to workers
,including Plant down time
15 Dust explosion
Injury and chances of death to workers
,including Plant down time
Over load of the rotating rollers on the bearings.
Not providing lubrication for the bearings before start up .
Not conducting the preventive maintenance for the bearings.
16

Dust explosion of the system
Injury and chances of death to workers
,including Plant down time
Spark generated due to the electro static buildup on the surface of the dedusting unit due to
contact with sugar dust traveling at 20 m/s.
The equipment are not grounded to the earth.


S.
No
Subsystem/Module &Function Potential Failure Mode Potential End Effects of Failure Possible scenarios of potential causes of failure.
17
Storage silos
4 X 3000T
Dust explosion
Damage to the roof of silos and the feeding
belt conveyors, death of workers
Residual smouldering particles left over right after the welding process.
No clear instruction and procedure on hot work permit especially for the dust hazard area .
The clearance distance and safe zone arrangement where not done before conducting the
welding process.
18 Dust explosion
Damage to the roof of silos and the feeding
belt conveyors, death of workers
Over load of the rotating rollers on the bearings.
Not providing lubrication for the bearings before start up .
Not conducting the preventive maintenance for the bearings.
19

Dust explosion
Damage to the roof of silos and the feeding
belt conveyors, death of workers
Spark generated due to the electro static buildup on the surface of the Silo due to contact
with sugar.
The equipment are not grounded to the earth.
20 Poisoning Death to worker , or dyspnea or asthma
Breathing the antiseptic chemicals used to killer germs and insects inside the silos .
Breathing the pesticides chemical used to killer germs and insects inside the silos .
The operator not wearing the proper face mask and breathing filters during the process of
applying the pesticides and the antiseptic chemicals inside the silos.
21 Operator fall Death to worker or major injury
Appointing people having phobia of elevation to do the maintenance above the silos.
Not providing guard rails around the silos.
not installing anti slipping materials on footbaths.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
S.N
Subsystem/
Module &
Function
Potential
Failure
Mode
Potential End
Effects(s) of
Failure
Severity
Ranking
Potential
Cause(s) of
Failure
Probability of
Occurrence
Ranking
Current
Controls/
Fault
Detection
Probability
of Detection
Ranking
Risk Priority
Number.
Existing (PRN)
Recommended
Action(s)
Severity
Ranking
Probability
of
Occurrence
Ranking
Probability
of Detection
Ranking
New
RPN
1
Belt conveyor
transporting
the refined
sugar from
silos to
packing
building
Dust explosion
Injury and chances
of death to workers
,including Plant
down time
10
Hot surfaces
like Hot
bearings
3 None 10 300
1. Regular
preventive
maintenance
2. Installation off
frictionless
bearings.
Implementing
the explosion
venting

7 1 3 21
2
Belt conveyor
transporting
the refined
sugar from
silos to
packing
building
Dust explosion
Injury and chances
of death to workers
,including Plant
down time
10
Inadequate
system for dust
suction inside
the conveyor.
2 None 10 200
Regular inspection of
filters in the de-
dusting system.
10 1 5 50
3
Packing
building which
contains all
equipment for
sugar packing
Dust explosion
Injury and chances
of death to workers
,including Plant
down time
10
Accumulation
of sugar dust
on various
surfaces and
presence of
ignition
source.
3 None 10 300
1. Regular
cleaning of the
facility with
special vacuum.
2. Regular
inspection from
the safety in
charge.
3. Declaration of
no smoking
zone.

3 1 2 6
4
De-dusting
system which
collects the
dust from
different of the
packing system

Dust explosion
Injury and chances
of death to workers
,including Plant
down time
8
Spark due to
the electro
static
3 None 10 240
1. Spark detection
system .
2. Flameless
explosion
venting on pipe.
3. Isolation quick
closing valve.
4. Explosion
suppression .
5. Grounding of
the system.
4 1 3 12

Table 6. FMEA Sheet for Zone3




S.N
Subsystem/
Module &
Function
Potential
Failure
Mode
Potential End
Effects(s) of
Failure
Severity
Ranking
Potential
Cause(s) of
Failure
Probability of
Occurrence
Ranking
Current
Controls/
Fault
Detection
Probability
of Detection
Ranking
Risk Priority
Number.
Existing (PRN)
Recommended
Action(s)
Severity
Ranking
Probability
of
Occurrence
Ranking
Probability
of Detection
Ranking
New
RPN
5
Chute of
weighing
machine for
sugar .
Formation of
sugar dust which
leads to dust
explosion .
Injury and chances
of death to workers
,including Plant
down time
10
Accumulation
of sugar dust
on various
surfaces and
presence of
ignition
source.
3 Non 10 300
1. Regular
cleaning of the
facility with
special vacuum.
2. Regular
inspection from
the safety in
charge.
3. Declaration on
nonsmoking
zone..

3 1 2 6
6
Packing
machines.
Machine
trapping worker
hands while he is
feeding the bags.
Injury to worker 5
Operator not
focused while
performing the
work.
10 Non 10 500
1. Personnel
protective
equipment.
2. Manual
activation of
machine
clamps.
3. Training.
3 4 3 48
7
Packing
machines.
Back ach of the
operator.
Injury to worker 6
Worker lifting
the sugar bags
the wrong
way.
7 None 8 336
1. Personnel
protective
equipment.
2. Training
3 4 4 48
8
Sewing
machine to
close up the
sugar bag.
Injury of the
hand of the
operator
(piercing)
Injury to worker 7
Operator not
focused while
performing the
work.
7 None 10 560
1. Personnel
protective
equipment.
2. Training.
3. Installing
mechanical
guard.
3 4 4 48









Table 7. The possible scenarios of potential causes of failure are for Zone 3

S.
No
Subsystem/
Module &
Function
Potential
Failure
Mode
Potential End Effects of Failure Possible scenarios of potential causes of failure.
1
Belt conveyor transporting the refined sugar
from silos to packing building
Dust explosion
Injury and chances of death to workers ,including Plant
down time
Over load of the rotating rollers on the bearings.
Not providing lubrication for the bearings before start up .
Not conducting the preventive maintenance for the bearings.
2
Belt conveyor transporting the refined sugar
from silos to packing building
Dust explosion
Injury and chances of death to workers ,including Plant
down time
The preventive maintenance are not carried out for the de-dusting system .
Regular cleaning for the de-dusting system is not done.
The de-dusting pipe is shocked due to the accumulation of dust particles.
3
Packing building which contains all
equipment for sugar packing
Dust explosion
Injury and chances of death to workers ,including Plant
down time
Not performing the regular cleaning up with the use of vacuum cleaner can lead
to accumulation of sugar dust on various locations which can fuel the secondary
explosion.
4
De-dusting system which collects the dust
from different of the packing system
Dust explosion
Injury and chances of death to workers ,including Plant
down time
Spark generated due to the electro static build-up on the surface of the de-
dusting pipes due to contact with sugar.
The equipment are not grounded to the earth.
5 Chute of weighing machine for sugar .
Formation of sugar
dust which leads to
dust explosion .
Injury and chances of death to workers ,including Plant
down time
Not performing the regular cleaning up with the use of vacuum cleaner can lead
to accumulation of sugar dust on various locations which can fuel the secondary
explosion.
6 Packing machines.
Machine trapping
worker hands while he
is feeding the bags.
Injury to worker
Operator is not focused while performing the work.
Performing repetitive work for long time causes the body to fatigue and which
may lead to slower motion and absenteeism of concentration .
7 Packing machines.
Back ach of the
operator.
Injury to worker
The operator involves himself in bag lifting where he is not supposed to do
because the machines drops the bags and no need for the operator to interfere .
The wrong ergonomics arrangement which causes the operator to suffer from
injuries.

8 Sewing machine to close up the sugar bag.
Injury of the hand of
the operator (piercing)
Injury to worker
Operator is not focused while performing the work.
Performing repetitive work for long time causes the body to fatigue and which
may lead to slower motion and absenteeism of concentration.



Table 8. Estimated costs and benefits for the recommended systems
Name of system
Estimated
benefit(saving on
the equipment)
equipment that
may get damage
according to the
scenario presented
(per 10 years)
Initial
Investment cost
the cost of the
suppression
system as per
the quotation
given by
reliable supplier
Conventional
Benefit to cost
Ratio with
Present worth
factor
Modified
Benefit to
cost Ratio
with present
worth factor
Conventional
Benefit to cost
Ratio with
Annual worth
factor
Modified
Benefit to cost
Ratio with
Annual worth
factor
Suppression
system for the
belt conveyor
transporting the
sugar from
process building
to storage silos
360,000$ 30,000$ 4.6 7.9 4.6 7.9
Suppression
system for the
belt conveyor
transporting the
sugar from the
storage silo to
the packing
building
380,000$ 36,245$ 4.066 6.825 4.066 6.825
Suppression
system for the
De-dusting units
1,250,000$ 142,569$ 3.468 5.622 3.468 5.622
Inerting system
for the rotary
dryer
360,000$ 35,161$ 4.021 6.807 4.021 6.807
Explosion
isolation valves
1,250,000$ 40,000$ 16.802 22.195 16.802 22.195
Lightning
protection
system
725,000$ 47,481$ 9.089 16.939 9.089 16.939

4.0 Conclusions/Recommendations

Based on the data gathered from analyzing the existing system in YCSR, the process of sugar
refining requires a lot of heating. The principle used in heating the syrup and hot air for the purpose of
sugar drying is done using heat exchangers with the means of hot steam coming from the coal
burning power plant. This type of heating makes the plant safer than direct heating using burners. The
risk of catching fire in this case is reduced significantly but the hot surfaces present a threat and could
cause dust explosions. Safety management system is not yet fully implemented. The safety team is
engaged in a daily work; monitoring the safety procedure to be followed while performing the
installation work done by contractors. It is very important to establish safety management system in
this company before starting the manufacturing operations, else, there could many accidents during the
time of commissioning of the machines due to the presence of unknown threats and unidentified
hazardous places.

The YCSR has implemented the de-dusting unit where the sugar dust is collected to bag filters
which is one of the important safety measures to control sugar dust explosion. The explosion venting is
provided in this de-dusting unit and in the rotary dryer to reduce the damage in case of any explosion.
These two measures cannot protect the equipment plant in case of an explosion. Thus, YCSR needs


additional safety control measures to reduce the risk of the sugar dust explosion following the hierarchy
of controls.

For zone 1, the following measures are recommended: machine guarding; Reliable
scheduling and documentation of maintenance activity; Implement safe work practices,
instruction and training; strict implementation of PPE wearing zone.
For zone 2, the following measures are recommended: machine guarding; Controlling the
risk using engineering controls stated in the NFPA standards, below are the engineering controls
stated in the NFPA standards; Use Engineering controls as referred to NFPA standards such as
Spark /Ember detection and suppression system, Deflagration detection and suppression
system, Lightning protection system, Automatic fast acting valve system, System grounding,
and Portable Electric vacuum cleaners; Reliable scheduling and documentation of maintenance
activity; Implement safe work practices, instruction and training; Strict implementation of PPE
wearing zones.
For zone3, the following measures and recommended: Control the risk using
engineering controls stated in the NFPA standards such as Spark /Ember detection and
suppression system, deflagration detection and suppression system, lightning protection
system, automatic fast acting valve system, system grounding, and portable electric
vacuum cleaners; Reliable scheduling and documentation of maintenance activity;
Implement safe work practices, instruction and training; strict implementation of PPE
zones.

All of the solutions mentioned have a B/C ratio of greater than 1.0, which means that the benefit
that the company can gain is greater than the costs to be incurred.

The implementation of the hierarchy control especially the proposed engineering solution can
save life and properties of the company, not only that but it can insure continuous operation of the
plant, reduced risks, increased productivity, healthier and happier better motivated employee, better
reputation among investors, customers and communities. The proposed solution is justified to have
more benefits comparing to the investment cost and besides, implementing this control measure can
lead to less premium paid to the insurance company as well . Safety is a corporate objective like sales
and profit. Safety is profitability in terms of saving lives, saving properties from being damage,
increased quality in products, decreased workers compensation claims savings when workers do not
have to be replaced or retrained due to accidents, and potential reductions in health and insurance
costs.

It is further recommended in the future to have periodical risk assessment; administrative
programs like training ( specially dust hazard awareness) and comprehensive housekeeping be created
to engage employees in controlling the dust accumulation, emergency evacuation plans, fire and
rescue drills must be conducted to be prepared in case of any incident, use belt conveyor designed with
explosion venting; impose permitting systems to hot work and confined spaces; install fire alarm and
fire fighting system; maintain bearing according to the manufacturers recommendations; prohibit the
use of compressed air to clean the dust.


5.0 References


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