Carnap's Conception of Explication: From Frege To Husserl?: Michael Beaney

Draft 01/04/02
Carnaps Conception of Explication:

From Frege to Husserl?
Michael Beaney
The task of making more exact a vague or not quite exact concept used in everyday
life or in an earlier stage of scientific or logical development, or rather of replacing
it y a ne!ly constructed, more exact concept, elongs among the most important
tasks of logical analysis and logical construction" #e call this the task of
explicating, or of giving an explication for, the earlier concept """ $%arnap 1&4', ()
&"*
1 Introduction
+udolf %arnap is a key figure in the history of analytic philosophy, for he not only
played a central role in the !ork of the ,ienna %ircle in the decade from 1&2- to
1&.-, ut he also, in his susequent move to the /nited 0tates !ith the rise of 1a2i
3ermany, marked the shift in the centre of gravity of analytic philosophy from a point
in the 1orth 0ea to the mid)4tlantic" %arnap !as influenced y 5rege, +ussell and
#ittgenstein, the three main founders of the analytic tradition, and in turn !as a
crucial influence on 6uine, 3oodman and other ma7or thinkers in 4merica" 8ut
although in many !ays %arnap !as the archetypical 9analytic: philosopher, he !as
also influenced y philosophers outside the analytic tradition" ;n recent years the neo)
<antian roots of his thought have een emphasised= ut there are also points of
contact et!een %arnap and >usserl" ?y aim in this paper is to explore some of these
influences and relationships y considering %arnap:s methodology, and in particular,
the development of his vie!s on analysis"
The idea of explication is central to an understanding of %arnap:s
methodology= yet the term 9explication: itself did not appear in %arnap:s !ork until
1&4- $in 9The T!o %oncepts of @roaility:*, and the idea did not receive a full
discussion until 1&-0 $in the first chapter of the Logical Foundations of Probability*"
3iven that %arnap:s notion of explication ears a striking resemlance to the
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conception of analysis that 5rege articulated in his 1&14 lectures on 9Aogic in
?athematics:, !hich !e kno! %arnap attended, and !hich %arnap himself mentions
in his 9;ntellectual 4utoiography: in discussing 5rege:s influence on him, this
deserves explanation" #hy did it apparently take %arnap over thirty years of active
!ork in philosophy to reflect upon the central methodological conception that, it
seems, he took over from 5regeB 4nd !hy did %arnap choose the term 9explication:
$9Cxplikation:*B ;f his o!n remarks are to e elieved, it !as motivated y <ant:s and
>usserl:s uses of the term" Det his o!n use seems very different from either of theirs"
0o did %arnap move from a 5regean to a >usserlian conception of analysisB Er
should he e seen as offering some kind of synthesis of othB Er does %arnap:s
mention of >usserl simply reveal their common neo)<antian or 5regean heritageB ;t is
these questions that ; seek to ans!er in the present paper"
Freges Influence on Carnap
%arnap devotes three pages to 5rege in the first t!o sections of his 9;ntellectual
4utoiography: $1&F., 4)F, 12)1.*" ;n discussing his university education at Gena,
%arnap !rites that Hthe most fruitful inspiration ; received from university lectures did
not come from those in the fields of philosophy proper or mathematics proper, ut
rather from the lectures of 5rege on the orderlands et!een those fields, namely,
symolic logic and the foundations of mathematicsI $1&F., 4*" 4fter descriing 5rege
as a person, he goes on to mention t!o courses on 5rege:s 98egriffsschrift: that he
attended,
1
and 5rege:s satirical attack on >ermann 0chuert:s account of the
foundations of arithmetic,
2
and then !ritesJ
;n the summer semester of 1&14 ; attended 5rege:s course, Logik in der Mathematik"
>ere he examined critically some of the customary conceptions and formulations in
mathematics" >e deplored the fact that mathematicians did not even seem to aim at the
construction of a unified, !ell)founded system of mathematics, and therefore sho!ed a
lack of interest in foundations" >e pointed out a certain looseness in the customary
formulation of axioms, definitions, and proofs, even in !orks of the more prominent
mathematicians" 4s an example he quoted #eyerstrass: definitionJ H4 numer is a
series of things of the same kindI $H" " " eine Reihe gleichartiger DingeI*" >e critici2ed
in particular the lack of attention to certain fundamental distinctions, e"g", the
distinction et!een the symol and the symoli2ed, that et!een a logical concept and
1 %arnap:s notes on these t!o courses have no! een pulished, edited y 3ottfried 3ariel, in
istory and Philosophy of Logic, 1&&'= see 5rege !""
2 %f" 5rege #$= and for a discussion of this, <ien2ler 1&&&"
Draft 01/04/02Carnaps Conception of Explication .
a mental image or act, and that et!een a function and the value of the function"
/nfortunately, his admonitions go mostly unheeded even today" $1&F., F"*
%learly, !hat takes centre stage here is 5rege:s critique of mathematicians:
conceptions of their discipline, and the !ider philosophical implications of 5rege:s
o!n reconstructive activities !ere not, at least in %arnap:s eyes, addressed" This is
confirmed in the paragraph that immediately precedes the one 7ust quotedJ
4lthough 5rege gave quite a numer of examples of interesting applications of his
symolism in mathematics, he usually did not discuss general philosophical prolems"
;t is evident from his !orks that he sa! the great philosophical importance of the ne!
instrument !hich he had created, ut he did not convey a clear impression of this to his
students" Thus, although ; !as intensely interested in his system of logic, ; !as not
a!are at that time of its great philosophical significance" Enly much later, after the first
!orld !ar, !hen ; read 5rege:s and +ussell:s ooks !ith greater attention, did ;
recogni2e the value of 5rege:s !ork not only for the foundations of mathematics, ut
for philosophy in general" $1&F., F"*
This is reinforced later on in the autoiography, !hen %arnap !rites that H#hereas
5rege had the strongest influence on me in the fields of logic and semantics, in my
philosophical thinking in general ; learned most from 8ertrand +ussellI $1&F., 1.*"
5rege may have provided the logical instrument for %arnap:s o!n !ork, then, ut it
!as +ussell !ho !as credited more !ith its philosophical motivation"
This suggests an ovious ans!er to our question" The notion of explication that, in
effect, is adumrated in 5rege:s 9Aogic in ?athematics: lectures !as simply not
appreciated y %arnap at the time= and it took many years of his o!n reconstructive
activities, utilising 5regean logic, efore he reached the point at !hich a conception of
explication could e adequately conceptualised" 8ut could !e then argue that there
!as a delayed influence, prompted perhaps y the later $re*reading of 5rege:s !orks
that %arnap mentionsB 3iven that the 9;ntellectual 4utoiography: !as pulished in
1&F., !ell after the discussion of explication, the ans!er might again seem to e
largely negative, for %arnap does not mention 5rege:s influence in this regard" ;n any
case, 5rege:s 9Aogic in ?athematics: lectures remained unpulished, and although
%arnap:s notes on these lectures have survived, there seems to e no evidence that
%arnap later reread these 9!ith greater attention:" $; return to this in the next section"*
>o!ever, !hether or not there !as any direct influence of 5rege:s conception
of analysis in 9Aogic in ?athematics: on %arnap:s later notion of explication, there is
still a striking similarity, !hich suggests that a deeper explanation is required" ;n KK 4
and - !e !ill examine %arnap:s early notions of 9rational reconstruction: and 9quasi)
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analysis:, efore turning to his account of explication in KF" 5irst, ho!ever, !e must
outline the conception of analysis that 5rege articulates in his 1&14 lectures"
! Freges Conception of "nalysis
Ene !ay to approach the conception of analysis that 5rege offers in his 1&14 lectures
on 9Aogic in ?athematics: is y considering the response he provides there to !hat is
essentially the paradox of analysis" The paradox of analysis is often associated !ith
the !ork of 3"C" ?oore, and the name 9paradox of analysis: !as indeed first used, y
%">" Aangford $1&42*, in discussing ?oore:s !ork" 8ut the prolem itself has a much
longer history, and really goes ack to the paradox of inquiry formulated in @lato:s
Meno" 8ut even in its linguistic form, it can e found articulated long efore it !as
named as such, appearing explicitly, for example, in 5rege:s o!n !ritings" The
paradox can e stated as follo!s" %onsider an analysis of the form 9% is C:, !here % is
the analysandum $!hat is analysed* and C the analysans $!hat is offered as the
analysis*" Then either 9%: and 9C: have the same meaning, in !hich case the analysis
expresses a trivial identity= or else they do not, in !hich case the analysis is incorrect"
0o no analysis can e oth correct and informative"
1o! the ovious response to this is to disamiguate the notion of 9meaning:,
so that an analysis can e deemed correct at one level of meaning and informative at
another" This is 7ust !hat 5rege did in the first t!o of the three responses that can e
discerned in his !ork, corresponding to his early, middle and late philosophy" ;n his
early !ork, taken as including his "egriffsschrift and &rundlagen, 5rege distinguished
et!een 9content: $9;nhalt:* and 9mode of determination: of content" %onsider 5rege:s
key example in KF4 of the &rundlagenJ
$Da* Aine a is parallel to line b"
$D* The direction of line a is identical !ith the direction of line b"
4ccording to 5rege, $Da* and $D* have the same 9content:, ut 9split up: that content
in different !ays" This is seen as analogous to the relationship et!een the follo!ing
t!o propositionsJ
$1a* The concept F is equinumerous to the concept &" $There are as many o7ects
falling under concept F as under concept &, i"e", there are 7ust as many Fs as
&s"*
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$1* The numer of Fs is equal to the numer of &s"
The equivalence et!een these t!o propositions, asserted in !hat has come to e
kno!n as 9>ume:s @rinciple:, underlies 5rege:s logicism" Gust as $Da* is offered as a
!ay of contextually defining direction terms, through its equivalence to $D*, so $1a*
is offered as a !ay of defining numer terms, through its equivalence to $1*"
4lthough 5rege came to re7ect contextual definitions themselves, >ume:s @rinciple
!as retained, eing underpinned in his later !ork y his notorious 4xiom ,, in !hich
an analogous equivalence !as asserted" The equivalences involved here, at the time of
the &rundlagen, !ere understood as involving sameness of 9content:" En this early
vie!, then, the follo!ing response can e given to the paradox of analysis" 4n
analysis of the form 9% is C: is correct if 9%: and 9C: have the same content, and
informative if they 9determine: or 9split up: that content in different !ays"
;n his Philosophie der %rithmetik, >usserl o7ected to 5rege:s &rundlagen
definitions on the grounds that !hilst they may e extensionally equivalent, they !ere
not identical in 9content: $9;nhalt:*, !hich >usserl understood intensionally $1(&1,
122*" There is some 7ustification for this vie!J since $Da* and $D* involve different
concepts, it !ould seem that they cannot e intensionally equivalent" The amiguity
in the notion of 9content: that this suggests, ho!ever, had already een recognised y
5rege in dra!ing his distinction et!een 90inn: and 98edeutung:" This distinction first
appears in 95unction and %oncept: $FC*, !hich !as given as a lecture on & Ganuary
1(&1= and in his letter to >usserl of 24 ?ay 1(&1, he states explicitly that this is a
disamiguation of his earlier notion of 9content:"
.
;n his 1(&4 revie! of >usserl:s
ook, he then uses this distinction in responding to >usserl:s criticism" ;n articulating
the criticism, he provides a clear statement of the paradox of analysis itselfJ
;f !ords and cominations of !ords refer to LbedeutenM ideas, then for any t!o of them
there are only t!o possiilitiesJ either they designate the same idea or they designate
different ideas" ;n the former case it is pointless to equate them y means of a
definitionJ this is 9an ovious circle:= in the latter case it is !rong" These are also the
o7ections the author raises, one of them regularly" 4 definition is also incapale of
analysing the sense, for the analysed sense 7ust is not the original one" ;n using the
!ord to e explained, ; either think clearly everything ; think !hen ; use the defining
expressionJ !e then have the 9ovious circle:= or the defining expression has a more
3 '", &'/ FR, 1-0= cf" C(, 1&(/ FR, 1(F" 5rege:s letter to >usserl of 24 ?ay 1(&1 makes clear that
5rege did not kno! of >usserl:s !ork until >usserl sent him a copy of Philosophie der %rithmetik,
!hich happened sometime in 4pril/?ay 1(&1" $>usserl:s preface is dated 4pril 1(&1, so it cannot have
occurred efore then"* ;t !as not >usserl:s criticism, then, that had prompted 5rege:s distinction"
Draft 01/04/02Carnaps Conception of Explication F
richly articulated sense, in !hich case ; do not think the same thing in using it as ; do in
using the !ord to e explainedJ the definition is then !rong" $R, .1&/ FR, 22-"*
;n reply, 5rege argues that for the mathematician N as opposed to the
9psychological logician: N it is only "edeutung, i"e", 9the thing itself:, that matters" 0o
9coincidence in extension: is all that a definition need captureJ neither the senses of
the relevant expressions nor the ideas evoked y them are relevant $R, .1&)20/ FR,
22-)F*" 5rege:s second response to the paradox of analysis can thus e stated as
follo!s" 4n analysis of the form 9% is C: is correct if 9%: and 9C: have the same
"edeutung, and informative if 9C: has a 9more richly articulated sense: than 9%:
$something that is not, strictly speaking, of concern to the mathematician*"
;n essence, ho!ever, 5rege:s second response is the same as his firstJ a
distinction is dra!n et!een t!o notions of meaning" 9%ontent: has ecome
98edeutung:, and 9mode of determination of content: has ecome 9sense:" 0o is
5rege:s second response etterB The ans!er is 91o:, for analyses and definitions must
capture more than 7ust sameness of "edeutung" %onsider the follo!ing t!o examplesJ
$%>*4 cordate is a creature !ith a heart"
$%<* 4 cordate is a creature !ith a kidney Li"e", a renateM"
;n oth cases !e have extensional equivalence, ut only $%>* !ould count as a good
definition" $%>* involves sameness of sense N on some conception of 9sense: N and
not 7ust sameness of "edeutung" 0o too in the case of 5rege:s o!n definitions and
axioms, sameness of sense and not 7ust sameness of "edeutung is required" ;n some
places, 5rege seems to ackno!ledge this" ;n 95unction and %oncept:, for example, he
remarks that !hat, in effect, are instances of the t!o sides of 4xiom , 9express the
same sense, ut in a different !ay: $FC, 11/ FR, 1.F*" This sounds more like the
9content:/9mode of determination of content: distinction, !ith 9content: no! eing
understood as 9sense:" ;n the &rundgeset)e itself, 5rege talks of the t!o sides of
4xiom , eing 9gleichedeutend: $&&, ;, K./ FR, 21.)4*, ut !hat he means in this
case is sameness of "edeutung and sense, as his later use of the term
9gleichedeutend: sho!s $&&, ;, K2'/ FR, 220*" Cven 5rege, then, !as a!are that
analyses and definitions require sameness of sense and not 7ust sameness of
"edeutung" 8ut if this is so, then the response to the paradox of analysis that is
suggested in his reply to >usserl is inadequate"
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;n his 1&14 lectures on 9Aogic in ?athematics:, 5rege makes his most
sustained attempt to resolve the issues involved here= and !e can regard these lectures
as offering his third and final response to the paradox of analysis" >e egins y
distinguishing et!een 9constructive: $9aufauende:* and 9analytic: $92erlegende:*
definitions" %onstructive definitions simply stipulate, for areviatory purposes, that a
ne! sign is to have the same sense as !ell as the same "edeutung as a more complex
sign" 4nalytic definitions analyse the sense of a sign 9!ith a long estalished use:= and
it is here that the prolems arise" ;f !e take an analytic definition of the form 9% is C:,
then there are t!o cases to consider" ;n the first case, 9%: and 9C: oviously have the
same sense, ut here, 5rege notes, !e should really talk of axioms, encapsulating !hat
Hcan only e recogni2ed y an immediate insightI $LM, 22'/ FR, .1F*" ;n the second
case, 9%: and 9C: do not oviously have the same sense" 8ut !hat !e do here, 5rege
argues, is introduce a ne! term 9": to replace 9%:, !here 9": is defined in the !ay !e
!ant, y means of 9C:" 0ince 9" is C: is a constructive definition, !e in effect bypass
the question as to !hether 9%: and 9C: have the same sense" >aving done this, !e can
then reintroduce the sign 9%: if !e !ish, as long as !e understand that it is to e
treated H as an entirely ne! sign !hich had no sense prior to the definitionI" $LM,
22')(/ FR, .1'"*
This strategy looks attractive as a response to the paradox of analysis" 5or if
the original sense drops out of consideration in our constructive activities, then there
is no longer an issue aout capturing it" %onsider, for example, 5rege:s definition of
90:J
$C0* The numer 0 is the extension of the concept 9equinumerous to the concept
not identical *ith itself:" $%f" FR, 11("*
;t is clearly asurd to suggest that the ordinary person kno!s this definition" 8ut given
the amount of confusion that there has een aout our concept of 2ero, it !ould seem
equally asurd to expect an analysis to capture our ordinary understanding" 4ll that is
necessary for such definitions to count as oth correct and informative is that they
allo! us to derive Hthe !ell)kno!n properties of numersI, as 5rege put it in the
&rundlagen $K'0*"
>o!ever, this strategy merely avoids rather than solves the paradox" Cven if
our ordinary understanding is deficient, it still acts as a constraint on our constructive
activitiesJ there remains something to !hich our analyses are ans!erale" 4t the very
least, the paradox of analysis simply re)emerges at the level of the system as a !hole,
as 5rege:s appeal to the 9!ell)kno!n properties of numers: indicates" 5rege admits to
a residual !orry here, ut according to him, !hat constraints there may e operate
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purely at the pre+theoretical level" Eur grasp of the senses of simple terms is often
confused, as if seen Hthrough a mistI, and the aim of logical analysis is to articulate
those senses clearly, in preparing the uilding stones for the susequent !ork of
construction $cf" LM, 22(/ FR, .1')(*" 8ut again, this merely seems to displace rather
than resolve the paradox of analysis"
4
;t should e clear 7ust ho! close 5rege:s conception of analysis is to %arnap:s
later conception of explication" 3iven that %arnap attended the lectures in !hich
5rege elaorated it, the ovious suggestion is that %arnap simply took over his
conception from 5rege" >o!ever, although %arnap:s notes on 5rege:s lectures have
survived, there are not, unfortunately, any interpolations or marginalia to indicate that
%arnap !as inspired y 5rege:s conception"
-
8ut even if there !ere, it !ould e to
miss the real point here" 5or !hat is important is the tension that underlies any
reconstructive pro7ect" En the one hand, the !ork of analysis is to elicit and clarify
!hat !e already kno!, and !e cannot depart too radically from our ordinary
understanding, on pain of clarifying nothing at all" En the other hand, there must e a
certain amount of reconstruction and revision, since our ordinary understanding is
frequently confused and unreliale" 3iven that %arnap follo!s 5rege in using logic in
a programme of philosophical reconstruction, it is not surprising that the tension
underlies his thought too, and that it should eventually prompt him to reflect
4 5or further discussion of 5rege and the paradox of analysis, see 8eaney 1&&F, KK -"4, -"- and ("-"
5 5or the record, here are %arnap:s notes on the relevant part of 5rege:s lecturesJ
Die Definition ist logisch OerflOssig, psychologisch !ertvoll"
Die Definition hilft nicht nur aufauen, sondern auch, das Pusammengeset2te 2u 2erlegen, 2"8" um
die Pahl der 4xiom 2u verringern" Cine solche Perlegung lQsst sich nicht e!eisen= nur fOhlen,
dass man das +ichtige getroffen hat, und e!ahren"
CxacterJ #ir auen von neuem auf, indem !ir das Crgenis unserer Perlegung enut2en" Pu!eilen
!ird auch in einer Definition der 0inn eines schon frOher lQngst gerauchten Peichens festgeset2t"
Dies kann man nicht e!eisen= es muss einleuchten= es ist keine !illkOrliche 5estset2ung, sondern
ein 4xiom"
Cs sei 4 das alte Peichen= !ir nehmen an, ein estimmtes, 2usammengeset2tes Peichen stimme
Oerein mit dem 0inn von 4" #enn !ir es nicht genau !issen, so verfahren !ir soJ !ir set2en
!illkOrlich fest, 8 soll den 0inn des 2usammengeset2ten Peichens haen" #ar dann die 1"
Definition richtig, so muss der 0inn von 4 mit dem von 8 Oereinstimmen" #ir vermeiden das
Peichen 4, und auen das gan2e 0ystem noch einmal auf, unter 8enut2ung nur von 8" #enn der
4ufau des 0ystems gelingt, so kRnnen !ir aus P!eckmaessigkeitsgrOnden auch !ieder das alte
Peichen einfOhren= nur mOssen !ir es als neu eingefOhrt etrachten, als o es vor der Definition
keinen 0inn gehat hQtte"
Cin!andJ #ie kann es Oerhaupt 2!eifelhaft sein, o der 0inn eines 2usammengeset2ten Peichens
Oereinstimmen mit dem 0inn eines schon lQngst ange!andten Peichens, dessen 0inn schon lQngst
fest steht" Ga, !enn dies der 5all istS 4er !enn !ir es nur H!ie durch einen 1eel erlickenIS
$%arnap:s notes, 111)10)0., F)'"*
; am grateful to 8rigitte /hlemann of the @hilosophisches 4rchiv der /niversitQt <onstan2, on ehalf
of the 0pecial %ollections Department of the /niversity of @ittsurgh Airaries, for sho!ing me these
notes, and going over her transcription of %arnap:s shorthand !ith me" The complete text of the notes is
currently eing edited y 3ottfried 3ariel for pulication" 5or the corresponding part of 5rege:s
lectures, see LM, 22-)(/ FR, .14)("
Draft 01/04/02Carnaps Conception of Explication &
systematically on his methodology in 7ust the !ay that 5rege did in his o!n later
!ork"
Draft 01/04/02Carnaps Conception of Explication10
# Carnaps Early $or%: &ational &econstruction
%arnap may not have introduced the term 9explication: until 1&4-, ut the central idea
that that term gave expression to !as present in some form from %arnap:s very
earliest !ork, and in particular, !as encapsulated in his conception of 9rational
reconstruction: $9rationale 1achkonstruktion:*, !hich formed the underlying
motivation of his first ma7or ook, Der logische %ufbau der 'elt, !hich !as
pulished in 1&2(" The connection et!een 9explication: and 9rational reconstruction:
!as made very clear in %arnap:s preface to the second edition of the %ufbau, !hich
appeared in 1&F2" 4fter noting that he !ould no longer put things in quite the !ay he
had earlier, he goes on to endorse the philosophical orientation of the ookJ
This holds especially for the prolems that are posed, and for the essential features of
the method !hich !as employed" The main prolem concerns the possiility of the
rational reconstruction of the concepts of all fields of kno!ledge on the asis of
concepts that refer to the immediately given" 8y rational reconstruction is here meant
the searching out of ne! definitions for old concepts" The old concepts did not
ordinarily originate y !ay of delierate formulation, ut in more or less unreflected
and spontaneous development" The ne! definitions should e superior to the old in
clarity and exactness, and, aove all, should fit into a systematic structure of concepts"
0uch a clarification of concepts, no!adays frequently called HexplicationI, still seems
to me one of the most important tasks of philosophy, especially if it is concerned !ith
the main categories of human thought" $1&F1, v"*
%arnap:s call for ne! definitions of old concepts echoes 5rege:s famous passage in
the &rundlagen $vi)viii* !here he re7ects the 9historical: approach to understanding
our concepts and advocates precisely that conceptual systematisation that is here
called 9rational reconstruction:" 8ut !hat also deserves note is the lack of any mention
of the prolems concerning the relationship et!een the old and the ne! concepts,
!hich %arnap:s later discussion of explication did at least attempt to address"
The %ufbau opens !ith a quote from +ussellJ HThe supreme maxim in scientific
philosophising is thisJ #herever possile, logical constructions are to e sustituted
for inferred entities"I
F
#e have already noted %arnap:s +ussellian motivation, and it is
clear that %arnap himself sa! his !ork as extending the +ussellian programme as he
understood it" ;n his 9;ntellectual 4utoiography:, he explicitly mentions the influence
of +ussell:s (ur ,no*ledge of the External 'orld, !hich he read in 1&21, and
endorses the !ords !ith !hich +ussell dra!s that ook to a conclusionJ Hthe study of
6 +ussell R#P, 11-= cf" L%, .2F"
logic ecomes the central study in philosophyJ it gives the method of research in
philosophy, 7ust as mathematics gives the method in physics"I
'
4nd after quoting
+ussell:s impassioned call for a 9ne! eginning:, %arnap commentsJ H; felt as if this
appeal had een directed to me personally" To !ork in this spirit !ould e my task
from no! onS 4nd indeed henceforth the application of the ne! logical instrument for
the purposes of analy2ing scientific concepts and of clarifying philosophical prolems
has een the essential aim of my philosophical activity"I $1&F., 1."*
8ut +ussell:s maxim is notoriously amiguous" Does it entail a programme of
ontological eliminati-ism, or 7ust of epistemological reductionismB +ussell:s theory of
descriptions lies at the root of the maxim, ut even if !e agree that +ussell:s theory
sho!s ho! definite descriptions may form part of a meaningful sentence !hilst
lacking meaning in themselves, this does not imply that the definite descriptions
9analysed a!ay: do not have a referent" 8ut it is clear that %arnap himself interpreted
+ussell:s maxim epistemologically rather than ontologically, as permitting rational
reconstruction rather than ontological deconstruction" %arnap !as famously
dismissive of ontological endeavours, and it !as the pro7ect of conceptual
clarification !ith the help of modern logic that %arnap really sa! as important"
The fact, ho!ever, that %arnap attempts to reduce our kno!ledge to a 9given:
that is understood phenomenalistically has often led to %arnap eing interpreted as
more +ussellian than he !as" 5or it also true that %arnap offers the possiility of a
reduction to a physicalistic ase= and the possiility of alternati-e 9reductions: sho!s
that 9rational reconstruction: is not regarded as part of an ontological enterprise N to
see !hat kinds of things are 9really: or 9ultimately: there" 4s %arnap himself explicitly
said in commenting on his %ufbau pro7ectJ H#ith respect to the prolem of the asis,
my attitude !as " " ontologically neutral" 5or me it !as simply a methodological
question of choosing the most suitale asis for the system to e constructed, either a
phenomenalistic or a physicalistic asis" The ontological theses of the traditional
doctrines of either phenomenalism or materialism remained for me entirely out of
consideration"I $1&F., 1("*
7 +ussell (,E', 24.= quoted y %arnap 1&F., 1." +ussell goes on to sayJ H;t !ill generally e found
that all our initial data, all the facts that !e seem to kno! to egin !ith, suffer from vagueness,
confusion, and complexity" %urrent philosophical ideas share these defects= it is therefore necessary to
create an apparatus of precise conceptions as general and as free from complexity as possile, efore
the data can e analysed into the kind of premisses !hich philosophy aims at discovering"I $(,E',
24-"* This too !ould have struck a strong chord in %arnap"
#hat, then, is the point of 9rational reconstruction:, if not to engage in a
pro7ect of ontological pruning or sortingB @art of the point !as precisely to sho! the
futility of ontological disputes, and this goes ack to %arnap:s first !ork, his doctoral
dissertation, Der Raum $1&21*, !hich had attempted to reconcile the different
conceptions of space of mathematicians, philosophers and physicists, y
distinguishing et!een formal space $understood as an astract logical system*,
intuitive space $interpreted in a <antian !ay ut restricted to topological properties*
and physical space $!hich !as empirical*" $%f" 1&F., 11)12"* The purpose of
clarifying the various conceptions of space !as to resolve the disagreements et!een
rival philosophical conceptions N not y endorsing one as opposed to the others, ut
y sho!ing ho! all three contained elements of the truth" The aim, in other !ords,
!as to clarify the 9logic: of our spatial concepts, and it !as this pro7ect that %arnap
generalised to encompass the !hole of our scientific concepts"
#hat this suggests is a much deeper motivation that is more <antian or neo)
<antian than +ussellian" %arnap !as more concerned !ith the form and structure of
our scientific kno!ledge than !ith its foundations" >e !as less interested in the
logical atomist pro7ect of uncovering 9ultimate constituents: than in elucidating the
intersu7ective conceptual structures that underlie the o7ectivity of our scientific
practices" 4lthough the 9linguistic turn: that !as prompted y the !ritings of 5rege,
+ussell and #ittgenstein can e seen as eing played out through the !ork of %arnap,
the 9rational reconstructions: that this involved !ere all aimed at the clarification of
our scientific concepts, !hich, as !e have seen, %arnap himself talked aout as
central in his 9;ntellectual 4utoiography:"
This neo)<antian reading of %arnap:s philosophy has gained considerale
ground over the last decade,
(
and it certainly provides an antidote to the more
traditional, 9+ussellian: reading" The key theme of the reading concerns the notion of
the a priori" 4s +eichenach explained in 1&20, in .he .heory of Relati-ity and %
Priori ,no*ledge, there are t!o aspects of <ant:s o!n notion !hich need to e
separated N the a priori as !hat is necessary or universally valid, and the a priori as
!hat is constitutive"
&
4ccording to <ant, the a priori forms and categories imposed y
8 0ee esp" %offa 1&&1= 5riedman 1&&&, 2000= +ichardson 1&&(= /eel 1&&2" /eel summarises the
neo)<antian reading thusJ Hthe ,ienna %ircle:s linguistic turn sought to uild on the <antian idea that
o7ectivity resides in the form of human cognition y exploring the form of symolic representational
systems"I $1&&2, 1'"*
9 %f" %offa 1&&1, 1&0)2= 5riedman 1&&&, '"
Draft 01/04/02Carnaps Conception of Explication1.
the human mind are not only necessary in the sense of eing universal ut are also
constitutive of the !orld as !e experience it, i"e" the phenomenal !orld $!hich is
!hat opens up the possiility of the synthetic a priori*" 8ut !ork in the 1&th century
on the foundations of geometry, in particular, had cast dout on <ant:s conception of
the synthetic a priori nature of mathematics, and those philosophers !ho !ere roadly
sympathetic to <ant:s pro7ect !ere forced to reinterpret the doctrine of the a priori"
Their ans!er !as to re7ect the notion of necessity or universal validity and to
emphasise instead the constitutive element" <no!ledge does indeed require forms and
structures that are imposed on the manifold of our intuitions, ut these forms may
themselves change over time" The elief in the changeaility of the a priori forms may
e a reflection of the historical consciousness that came of age in the 1&th century, ut
!hat +eichenach, %arnap and the other logical empiricists added !as the conception
of the con-entionality of these forms" 0uch a conception found its full)looded form
in %arnap:s principle of tolerance, !hich permitted the development of any linguistic
system y means of !hich to conceptualise our experience"
The importance of the role of constitution in %arnap:s philosophy is encapsulated in
the avo!ed central aim of the %ufbau N to develop !hat he calls a 9constitution
system: $9<onstitutionssystem:*, !hich sho!s ho! all our concepts can e organi2ed
into a structured system ased on a fe! fundamental concepts $KK 1)2*" ;ndeed,
%arnap originally !anted to call his ook 9<onstitutionstheorie:, or more fully,
9@rolegomena 2u einer <onstitutionstheorie der #irklichkeit:, ut in the end settled
reluctantly on the title that 0chlick had suggested"
10
9Der logische 4ufau der #elt:
certainly carries +ussellian connotations of 9construction:, !hereas 9constitution: is
more in keeping !ith the neo)<antian aspirations of the ook" Ef course,
9constitution: too can e interpreted as 9construction:, ut !hilst N argualy N the
latter is used more for 9comination: in a physical sense, the former allo!s more for
9composition: in a conceptual sense" 4t any rate, it is !orth separating the t!o
notions, reserving the first for the epistemic or semantic realm and the latter for the
metaphysical or ontological realm"
11
10 %f" %offa 1&&1, 2.1 and 40., n" 11" %offa also notes $20(* that the title of !hat !as in effect the
first draft of the ook !as 9,om %haos 2ur #irklichkeit:"
11 The importance of distinguishing et!een 9construction: and 9constitution: is !ell rought out y
%offaJ HConstitution is one of a handful of landmark notions that dominated nineteenth)century
developments in epistemology" >osts of philosophers tried to develop the <antian idea that experience
and its o7ects are constituted through our categories" ?ost sensitive thinkers had felt the force of
<ant:s point, ut they !ould have een hard)pressed to assign a manageale meaning to that elusive
notion" 5ollo!ing the ontological ent of traditional idealism, they compared constitution to
9+ational reconstruction:, then, might e etter named 9rational reconstitution:,
although the term 9rational: certainly suggests an epistemological rather than
metaphysical motivation" The point !as not to 9reconstruct: the !orld ut to
9reconstitute: our kno!ledge of it, and the aim of this !as to elucidate the structure of
our kno!ledge to demonstrate its o7ectivity"
12
The importance of structure can e
rought out if !e ask !hat the relationship is et!een 9ordinary: and 9reconstituted:
kno!ledge" #hat, more specifically, /ustifies a rational reconstructionB %arnap:s later
principle of tolerance might suggest that anything goes, ut there must clearly e
some constraints on the adequacy of a reconstruction" ;n descriing his %ufbau pro7ect
in his 9;ntellectual 4utoiography:, %arnap !ritesJ H4lthough ; !as guided in my
procedure y the psychological facts concerning the formation of concepts of material
things out of perceptions, my real aim !as not the description of this genetic process,
ut rather its rational reconstruction N i"e", a schemati2ed description of an imaginary
procedure, consisting of rationally prescried steps, *hich *ould lead to essentially
the same results as the actual psychological processI $1&F., 1-= italics added*" 8ut
!hat does %arnap mean y 9the same results:B The only example he gives is that of
material things, Husually immediately perceived as three)dimensional odiesI, ut to
e Hconstructed out of a temporal sequence of continually changing forms in the t!o)
dimensional visual fieldI $iid"*" The !ay that film and television !ork illustrates
very !ell !hat %arnap has in mind here, ut it is unclear ho! to generalise from this
case, and 9the same results: still needs further specification" >o!ever, if !e focus on
the role of structure, then an ans!er can e given" 5or if it is structure that !e are
primarily concerned to reveal, then preservation of structure must operate as the
essential criterion of correctness for rational reconstruction"
Ef course, 9preservation of structure: itself still needs further specification, ut at the
time of the %ufbau, %arnap did not suppose that there could e alternative logical
structures, and it is logical structure that is essentially at issue here" ;f !e recognise
once again the <antian dimension to %arnap:s thought, and distinguish, in particular,
et!een form and content, then !e can say that not only must rational reconstructions
preserve form or structure, ut also that their value precisely lies in abstracting from
construction, thus suggesting that !hat our mind does !ith the o7ects of experience is comparale to
!hat the engineer does !ith ridges and the carpenter !ith tales" ?any philosophers recogni2ed the
asurdity of this claim ut did not kno! ho! to avoid the inference from reduction to ontology"I $1&&1,
2.1"*
12 En %arnap:s 9structuralism:, captured in the claim that HE7ective reality is !hat is structurally
comprehensileI, see esp" /eel 1&&2, ch" 2 $the quote is from 4.*"
Draft 01/04/02Carnaps Conception of Explication1-
content" 3iven that the actual content $the intuitive 9;nhalt:* of human experience may
vary from person to person, or indeed from one time to another !ithin the life of a
single individual, then it is shared form or structure to !hich !e must appeal in
elucidating the intersu7ectivity that underlies the o7ectivity of our conceptual
practices"
To the extent that %arnap:s early conception of logical analysis, then, can e
characterised as involving 9rational reconstruction:, !e can extract from his early
thought a relatively clear ans!er to the paradox of analysis" %arnap may not have
explicitly addressed the issue in the !ay that 5rege did in his 1&14 lectures, ut his
!ork suggests ho! 5rege:s response might e refined" +ational reconstructions can e
regarded as correct in so far as they preserve structure, and informative to the extent
that, y astracting from content, the structure they reveal elucidates the o7ectivity of
our scientific practices"
' Carnaps Conception of (uasi)"nalysis
;n !hat !ay does rational reconstruction 9astract from content:B 3iven that in his
main $phenomenalistic* sketch of a 9<onstitutionssystem:, %arnap ases his
construction on !hat he calls 9Clementarerlenisse: $9elementary experiences:*, it
might e thought that his aim is precisely to reveal the $phenomenal* 9content: that
underlies our conceptual system N 7ust as +ussell sought to reduce our kno!ledge to
9sense)data: or 9sensiilia:" 8ut once again, the suggested comparison !ith +ussell
here is misleading= and the difference et!een their t!o pro7ects comes out most
strikingly in !hat is perhaps the most intriguing conception in %arnap:s %ufbau N that
of 0uasi+analysis"
1.
%iting the !ork of oth neo)<antians and 3estalt psychologists, %arnap held that the
fundamental units of experience !ere not the qualities $the colours, shapes, etc"*
involved in individual experiences $such as seeing a physical o7ect*, ut those
experiences themselves, taken as indivisile !holes" These !ere his
9Clementarerlenisse:, !hich formed the asis of the phenomenalistic version of his
9<onstitutionssystem: $KF'*" 8ut if these !ere indeed 9indivisile:, then ho! !as it
possile to determine the qualities involved in the elementary experiencesB 94nalysis:
13 %arnap:s informal account of quasi)analysis is presented in Division % $9Die 8asis:* of @art ;;; of
the %ufbau, KK F1)(., esp" KK F()'4, and his formal account in Division 4 of @art ;,, KK 10F)22" /nless
other!ise indicated, references given in !hat follo!s are to the relevant sections of the %ufbau"
Draft 01/04/02Carnaps Conception of Explication1F
N understood in the decompositional sense N could not yield these qualities, precisely
ecause they !ere not seen as constituents of the elementary experiences $KF(*"
14
%arnap:s ans!er !as that they are 9constructed: $in the sense of 9constituted:*
1-
y
!hat he called 9quasi)analysis:, a method that mimics analysis in yielding 9quasi)
constituents:, ut !hich proceeds 9synthetically: rather than 9analytically: $KK F&, '4*"
;n essence, %arnap:s method of quasi)analysis is 7ust that method of contextual
definition or logical astraction that 5rege had introduced in the &rundlagen"
1F
This
!as the example that 5rege had given to motivate his logicist 9constructions: $see K.
aove*J
$Da*Aine a is parallel to line b"
$D* The direction of line a is identical !ith the direction of line b"
4 line, !e might suggest, is also an 9indivisile: unit $at least in so far as it is intuited,
i"e", !here it is not seen as 9composed: of an infinity of points, or smaller lines*" Det it
too has properties that can e ascried to it on the asis of the relations it has to other
geometrical figures" ;n particular, !e can talk of its 9direction:, !hich, !hilst not
literally a 9constituent: of it arrived at y $decompositional* 9analysis:, can
nevertheless e introduced contextually, y means of the relation of parallelism" 0o
too in the case of >ume:s @rinciple, !e have an equivalence relation holding et!een
things of one kind $concepts* eing used to define N or 9construct:, as %arnap !ould
put it N things of another kind $numers*J
$1a* The concept F is equinumerous to the concept &"
$1* The numer of F:s is identical !ith the numer of &:s"
1umers too are not constituents of the concepts to !hich they are ascried, ut are
9constructed: from the appropriate equivalence relation"
>o!, then, does %arnap apply the method of astractionB 4lthough he
distinguishes et!een analysis and quasi)analysis, !hat he actually gives to explain
14 ; say more aout the decompositional sense of 9analysis: elo!"
15 3iven the !idespread use of 9construct: in this context, from no! on ; shall use it as synonymous
!ith 9constitute:, unless other!ise indicated" 8ut it is to e understood that 9construct: does not mean
9uild up out of parts:"
16 %arnap himself talks of the 5rege)+ussellian 9principle of astraction: in KF&, and in K'. mentions
its source in 5rege:s &rundlagen" ;t should e noted, though, that 5rege did not himself see it as a
principle of abstraction" %f" 8eaney 2000, K4"
Draft 01/04/02Carnaps Conception of Explication1'
the operation of quasi)analysis is an example of analysis, involving colours, !hich at
least normally are thought of as properties rather than 9quasi)properties: of o7ects
$K'0*"
1'
The simplest case can e seen as ased on the follo!ing $seemingly trivial*
contextual definition, the term 9is equicoloured to: areviating 9has the same colour
as: $to ring out its connection !ith the examples 7ust given*J
1(
$5a*E7ect 1 is equicoloured to o7ect 2"
$5* The colour of 1 is identical !ith the colour of 2"
4ccepting such a definition as unprolematic,
1&
and given that eing 9equicoloured: is
an equivalence relation, !e can immediately proceed to form the equivalence classes,
!ithin the relevant domain, from !hich to $structurally* define the constituent
colours"
%onsider, for example, a domain of o7ects numered 1 to F, each of !hich
possesses one and only one of three colours, lue, green and red, symolised y 9:,
9g: and 9r:, respectively, as represented in the follo!ing taleJ
20
ob/ect 1 2 . 4 - F
colour g r r
*a+le 1
;magine, ho!ever, that !e do not kno! !hat these o7ects are $all !e kno! is that
there are six o7ects, !hich !e have numered simply for reference*, nor !hat colours
they have $or even ho! many colours there are*" 8ut !hat !e do have is the complete
list of 7udgements concerning the sameness of colour of each pair of o7ects,
kno!ledge that is exhiited in the form of a list of ordered pairs for !hich the
equivalence relation holdsJ
21
17 3iven %arnap:s avo!ed ontological neutrality, it might seem surprising that %arnap presupposes
that colours are properties rather than quasi)properties" ; return to this shortly"
18 8oth the term 9equicoloured: used here and the term 9simicoloured: used elo! are my o!n"
19 ; take up the question of %arnap:s precise understanding of $5* shortly"
20 ;n !hat follo!s, ; dra! on the detailed discussions of quasi)analysis offered y 3oodman $1&'',
ch" -* and +ichardson $1&&(, ch" 2*, from !hom the examples $!ith 7ust one minor change* are taken"
21 ; here follo! +ichardson $1&&(, --* in giving an ordered pair list" 0ince !e are dealing !ith an
equivalence relation $a relation that is reflexive, symmetric and transitive*, it might seem redundant to
give e"g" oth T1, 2U and T2, 1U= ut in the case of the actual primitive relation that %arnap chooses for
his phenomenalistic construction, namely, 9recollection of similarity: et!een elementary experiences,
Draft 01/04/02Carnaps Conception of Explication1(
T1, 1U= T1, 2U= T1, .U=
T2, 1U= T2, 2U= T2, .U=
T., 1U= T., 2U= T., .U=
T4, 4U=
T-, -U= T-, FU=
TF, -U= TF, FU"
4lthough this may e all !e kno!, it is easy to derive from this the equivalence
classes, the classes of o7ects that have the same colourJ
V1, 2, .W= $4W= V-, FW"
%arnap calls these classes the colour classes $K'0*" The first corresponds to the colour
lue, the second to green and the third to red, and !e can regard the colour of an
o7ect as eing structurally defined as the property that the o7ect has in virtue of
eing a memer of the relevant equivalence class" 5urthermore, one can see ho! such
a result is independent of !hether such properties are indeed genuine or merely
9quasi: constituents of the o7ects" #e have achieved the required division in the
domain of o7ects, according to their colour, y proceeding from the ordered pair list"
%learly, if every o7ect has one and only one colour, and !e are dealing !ith
an equivalence relation, then it is very easy to determine the colour classes from the
ordered pair list" 8ut !hat if every o7ect has one or more coloursB %onsider, for
example, the case represented in the next tale $!hich is the same as the previous
case, except that more colours have een added to some of the o7ects*J
ob/ect 1 2 . 4 - F
colour r g g r gr
*a+le
;n this case, !e have to make use not of an equivalence or identity relation ut of a
similarity or part identity relation"
22
T!o o7ects are 9simicoloured:, let us say, if they
share at least one colour" The relevant ordered pair list !ould then e as follo!sJ
T1, 1U= T1, 2U= T1, .U= T1, -U= T1, FU=
T2, 1U= T2, 2U= T2, .U= T2, FU=
the order of the terms is important, since the relation is asymmetric" ;t might also seem redundant to
note the pairs that indicate reflexivity, e"g" T1, 1U, ut this is nevertheless important for deriving any
equivalence classes that are unit classes, e"g" V4W in this case"
22 %arnap does not discuss first the simpler case of an equivalence relation, ut immediately gives the
example of the relation of 9colour kinship: $95arver!andtschaft:*, as defined here $cf" K'0*"
Draft 01/04/02Carnaps Conception of Explication1&
T., 1U= T., 2U= T., .U= T., 4U= T., FU=
T4, .U= T4, 4U= T4, FU=
T-, 1U= T-, -U= T-, FU=
TF, 1U= TF, 2U= TF, .U= TF, 4U= TF, -U= TF, FU"
8ut ho! do !e get from this to the individual colour classesB En %arnap:s
conception, a colour class must fulfil oth of the follo!ing conditions $K'0*J
2.
$1*Cvery o7ect in the class stands in the relevant relation to every other o7ect in the
class"
$2* 1o o7ect outside the class stands in the relevant relation to every o7ect in the
class $i"e", the class is the maximal class*"
5rom the first line of the list, !e might hypothesise the follo!ing classJ V1, 2, ., -, FW"
8ut this violates the first condition, since T2, -U and T., -U are not on the list"
Dropping -, !e might then suggest V1, 2, ., FW" This does satisfy the t!o conditions=
and !e have our first colour class $corresponding to the colour lue*" Dropping 2 and
. yields V1, -, FW, !hich forms another colour class $corresponding to the colour red*"
0ince the second line of the list also yields V1, 2, ., FW, if !e then consider the third
line, similar reasoning yields oth this class yet again, dropping 4, ut also the further
colour class V., 4, FW, dropping 1 and 2 $corresponding to the colour green*" 1o ne!
colour classes can then e found, and !e have our three classes corresponding to the
three colours"
There is no dout that %arnap:s procedure here is ingenious, and if it !orks,
then it certainly opens up the possiility of defining all properties on the asis of a
similarity relation otaining et!een the o7ects of the chosen domain" The task is
then to choose the right o7ects and the right relation" 4s !e have noted, the o7ects
%arnap chooses are 9elementary experiences:, and the relation he chooses is that of
9recollection of similarity:, from !hich he then proceeds to 9rationally reconstruct: our
other notions" 1o! the details of this construction need not e given here=
24
!hat !e
23 The conditions must otain not 7ust for colour classes, ut for any 9similarity circle:, to use the
generic term that %arnap introduces here N since !e are not necessarily talking of equivalence classes,
and !e no! have a case !here transitivity fails" #e should also note that !hen the similarity relation
involved ecomes not a part identity ut a similarity relation that allo!s of degrees of similarity
$!ithin a defined limit*, then a gap opens up et!een the similarity circles and the colour classes,
requiring further manoevres to ridge $cf" K'2*" 0ince my main concern is !ith the underlying method,
; do not discuss these complications here, ut for detailed accounts, see Cerle 1&'-= 3oodman 1&'',
ch" -= +ichardson 1&&(, chs" 2).= and +unggaldier 1&(4, chs" 11)1."
24 5or further discussion, see 3oodman 1&'', ch" -= +ichardson 1&&(, chs" 2).= +unggaldier 1&(4,
@art ;;"
are primarily interested in is the method itself" %an it actually !orkB The ans!er is
that it only !orks if certain circumstances obtain, as %arnap himself recognises $K'0*"
To see this, consider the follo!ing case that differs from the last case solely in that
o7ect - is lue as !ell as redJ
ob/ect 1 2 . 4 - F
colour r g g r gr
*a+le !
The tale suggests that !e ought to e ale to form the colour class V1, -, FW,
representing red, ut this class violates the second condition, since there is at least one
o7ect outside the class $e"g", 2* that is simicoloured to every o7ect in the class"
3oodman calls this the 9companionship difficulty: $1&'', 11'*, since it arises
!henever one of the colours $here red* is al!ays accompanied y another colour $here
lue*, though the latter may occur separately"
4 second difficulty arises if !e consider the follo!ing alternative case, !here o7ect 2
is red as !ell as lue and o7ect - is green as !ell as redJ
ob/ect 1 2 . 4 - F
colour r r g g gr gr
*a+le #
This tale suggests that !e ought to e ale to form oth the classes V1, 2, ., FW,
representing lue, and V1, 2, -, FW, representing red, ut oth violate the second
condition" The class !e can form is V1, 2, ., -, FW N every o7ect is related to every
other o7ect, and there is no o7ect outside the class related to every o7ect in the class
N ut this is not !hat !e !ant" 3oodman calls this the 9difficulty of imperfect
community:, ecause in the latter class, there is no one quality that all its memers
share"
2-
%learly, !hat these difficulties sho! is that there may e no one)one correspondence
et!een the qualities to e represented and the constructed classes" ;n the case of the
25 Cven if !e allo! 9dis7unctive: properties, e"g", red)or)lue, !e have still failed to represent red and
lue individually"
companionship difficulty, there are classes that !e !ant to form ut !hich cannot e
formed, and in the case of the second difficulty, there are classes that can e formed
ut !hich !e do not !ant to e formed" ;n the first case, there is a property for !hich
there is no corresponding class= and in the second case, there is a class for !hich there
is no corresponding quality" This latter !ay of putting it suggests that there are t!o
further possiilities hereJ that there is a property for !hich there is more than one
corresponding class, and that there is a class for !hich there is more than one
corresponding property" 3iven that classes are extensional entities $if t!o classes have
the same o7ects, then they are the same class*, the first possiility is ruled out= ut the
second possiility !ould arise in a case of !hat might e called 9mutual
companionship: N !here t!o properties al!ays accompany one another" The class that
!e may e ale to form !ould represent oth properties $7ust ecause classes are
extensional entities*"
2F
;n response to the companionship difficulty $!hich !e can here understand in oth its
forms*, %arnap suggests that the more o7ects there are and the smaller the average
numer of colours that an o7ect possesses, the less likely this difficulty !ill arise
$K'0*" 8ut as he himself also recognises, this presupposes that there are no systematic
connections et!een colours, and as 3oodman remarks $1&'', 11'*, this threatens to
make the ruling out of 9unfavourale circumstances: circular N %arnap:s method is to
e restricted to those cases !here it !orks" >o!ever, in defence of %arnap,
+ichardson has argued that the companionship difficulty is only a prolem if the
method of astraction is used in analysis rather than quasi)analysis $1&&(, -&)F4*" ;n
quasi)analysis, !here there are no actual constituents to pick out, there is no
independent reality against !hich to 7udge the resulting constructions" ;f it is only
structural properties !ith !hich !e are concerned, then these are indeed only
ans!erale to the relations on !hich the constructions are ased"
This defence is clearly in keeping !ith the neo)<antian rather than +ussellian
interpretation of the %ufbauJ the aim is to reveal the structure of our conceptual
7udgements rather than to uncover the 9ultimate: constituents of our experiences" The
prolem, though, is that %arnap is y no means as clear aout the difference et!een
analysis and quasi)analysis as this defence suggests, for in K(1 %arnap talks of
9unfavourale circumstances: not otaining N as a condition of 9irregularities: in the
26 #e thus have the three types of difficulty for %arnap:s conception of quasi)analysis that
<leinknecht $1&(0, 2'* has noted"
constructions not arising N e-en in the case of 0uasi+analysis" >o!ever, almost as an
afterthought, he concludes this section as follo!sJ
a more detailed investigation, !hich !e have to omit for lack of space, sho!s that these
interferences in the concept formation through quasi analysis can occur only if
circumstances are present under !hich the real process of cognition, namely, the
intuitive quasi analysis !hich is carried out in real life, !ould also not lead to normal
results" $K(1"*
#hat %arnap seems to e suggesting here is that similar 9interferences: occur in actual
psychological processes, so that it is to the credit of his account of quasi)analysis that
room is made for them" The difficulties, in other !ords, can e turned to his o!n
advantage" 5urthermore, this only reinforces the neo)<antian reading" ;f the aim is to
reveal the structure of our actual conceptual experience, then !hatever 9hidden:
properties may underlie our experiences are irrelevant" ;f in our experience t!o
particular shades of colour do indeed al!ays go together, and their distinguishaility
is no!here apparent in our experience, then there is no need to respect this in our
9rational reconstruction: N indeed, this fact should precisely e reflected"
>o!ever, !hat the aove passage also reveals is the appeal to 9ho! things
really are: that frequently surfaces in %arnap:s pre)systematic or extra)systematic
remarks" >e does not explicitly take the neo)<antian line in arguing that there simply
is no 9fact of the matter: as to !hat the !orld is like independently of our cognitive
processes" The tension et!een his +ussellian and neo)<antian motivations is perhaps
no!here so clear as in the very distinction he dra!s et!een analysis and quasi)
analysis" 5or if analysis is understood as uncovering 9constituents:, and quasi)analysis
is understood as merely constructing 9quasi)constituents:, then that makes the
distinction an ontological one" 8ut this is in clear conflict !ith %arnap:s professed
ontological neutrality" %arnap suggests that analysis and quasi)analysis are formally
analogous N to the extent that oth make use of the method of astraction $KF&*" 8ut if
!e !anted to capture the distinction more formally, !e might suggest that !e
distinguish et!een the follo!ing t!o results, $5* and $5*, of the method of
astraction applied to our initial proposition $5a*J
$5a* E7ect 1 is equicoloured to o7ect 2"
$5* The colour of 1 is identical !ith the colour of 2"
$5* The colour $constituent* of 1 is equal to the colour $constituent* of 2"
5or if analysis yields constituents rather than quasi)constituents, and the !holes of
!hich the constituents are parts are themselves distinct $i"e", the o7ects 1 and 2 in
this case*,
2'
then the t!o colour constituents of 1 and 2 cannot, strictly speaking, e
identical ut only equal, in the relevant respect" 0o !hilst quasi)analysis can e seen
as yielding $5*, analysis should e thought of as yielding $5*"
>o!ever, if this account of analysis is right, then an infinite regress threatens" 5or if
t!o constituents are uncovered, then there !ill e some similarity relation holding
et!een them, in !hich case the method of astraction $contextual definition* can e
applied again to uncover further constituents" 0o either !e need some different
account of constituent, !hich %arnap does not supply, or !e no longer have a clear
distinction et!een analysis and quasi)analysis" 4ll !e really have is quasi)analysis=
and this in any case might seem to e all !e have in $9pure: uses of* the method of
astraction, !hich, after all, is seen more as a 9constructive: process"
Ef course, if there is no viale distinction et!een analysis and quasi)analysis,
!here oth are seen as involving the method of astraction, then this might seem to
support the neo)<antian rather than +ussellian interpretation N or etter, 9rational
reconstruction: N of %arnap:s %ufbau pro7ect" 8ut the truth seems to e that %arnap, at
the time of the %ufbau, !as in a transitional stage" >is position !as inherently
unstaleJ he !as in the process of freeing himself from the +ussellian programme that
had to some extent inspired him, !hilst allo!ing his more neo)<antian instincts,
!hich one might suggest !ere more deeply emedded in his philosophical outlook, to
guide his development, a development that !as to lead to the conception of logical
analysis characteristic of his later philosophy" This conception surfaces even in the
%ufbau" >ere is one characteristic passage, in !hich %arnap summarises his vie! of
quasi)analysisJ
the analysis or, more precisely, quasi)analysis of an entity that is essentially an
indivisile unit into several quasi)constituents means placing the entity in several
kinship contexts on the asis of a kinship relation, !here the unit remains undivided"
$K'1"*
2(
27 This rules out 0iamese t!in cases, !here one or more constituent parts are shared y t!o larger
!holes" 4gain, this reveals ho! ontological assumptions may underlie conceptions of analysis"
28 The 3erman readsJ Hdie 4nalyse, richtigerJ 6uasianalyse, eines 3eildes, das seinem #esen nach
eine un2erlegare Cinheit ist, in mehrere 6uasiestandteile edeutet die Cinordnung des 3eildes in
mehrere ,er!andtschafts2usammenhQnge auf 3rund einer ,er!andtschaftse2iehung, !oei die
Cinheit un2erteilt leit"I ; have slightly altered the standard Cnglish translation $y +olf 4" 3eorge*,
%ompare this !ith %arnap:s characterisation of logical analysis in his 1&.4 paper,
9Die ?ethode der logischen 4nalyse:J
The logical analysis of a particular expression consists in the setting)up of a linguistic
system and the placing of that expression in this system" $1&.F, 14."*
2&
4fter the pulication of the %ufbau, %arnap never talks of 9quasi)analysis: again,
except in referring to the ideas of the %ufbau itself, and !e can see !hy" 5or in the
contrast it suggests !ith 9analysis:, there !ere realist undertones of an ontological
kind that %arnap !as later keen to purge" ;t !ould e tempting to conclude y saying
that %arnap:s distinction et!een analysis and quasi)analysis turned out to e only a
quasi)distinction= ut it !ould e more accurate to say N as far as %arnap !as
concerned N that it !as only a pseudo)distinction, a residue of unreconstructed
metaphysical thinking"
, Carnaps -ater $or%: Explication
8et!een the %ufbau and the introduction of the term 9explication:, %arnap:s ideas
developed in important !ays" ;n 9The Climination of ?etaphysics through Aogical
4nalysis of Aanguage:, !hich appeared in 1&.2, %arnap outlined a conception of
logical analysis in !hich metaphysical thinking !as not merely aandoned ut
explicitly repudiated" The aim of logical analysis !as, on the positive side, to clarify
the concepts of empirical science, and, on the negative side, to sho! that metaphysical
statements !ere meaningless 9pseudo)statements:" Aogic !as seen as the only method
of philosophy, and as %arnap argued in his second ma7or !ork, .he Logical #yntax of
Language $1&.4*, this entailed the identification of philosophy !ith the logic of
scienceJ
The aim of logical syntax is to provide a system of concepts, a language, y the help of
!hich the results of logical analysis !ill e exactly formulale" Philosophy is to be
!hich renders 9eines 3eildes, das seinem #esen nach eine un2erlegare Cinheit ist: simply as 9of an
essentially unanaly2ale entity:, !hich does not do full 7ustice in this context to the meaning of
9un2erlegar: and its echo in the use of 9un2erteilt: that follo!s" ;t is !orth noting here that in an early
draft of !hat ecame the %ufbau, %arnap did indeed talk of 9Perlegung: and 96uasi2erlegung: rather
than 94nalyse: and 96uasianalyse:, !hich reinforces the suggestion that analysis !as originally
understood more in the decompositional sense"
29 HDie logische 4nalyse eines estimmten 4usdrucks esteht in der 4ufstellung eines 0prachsystems
und in der Cinordnung des 4usdrucks in dieses 0ystem"I The paper !as !ritten for a conference in
@rague in 0eptemer 1&.4, ut !as not pulished until 1&.F"
Draft 01/04/02Carnaps Conception of Explication2-
replaced by the logic of science N that is to say, y the logical analysis of the concepts
and sentences of the sciences, for the logic of science is nothing other than the logical
syntax of the language of science" $1&.', xiii"*
;n his susequent !ork, %arnap came to recognise that logical syntax needed to e
supplemented y semantics, and it !as the aim of the t!o volumes of his #tudies in
#emantics $1&42, 1&4.* to provide this supplementation" There is a great deal to say
aout these developments, and their relationship to the !ork of other philosophers and
logicians, most notaly, #ittgenstein, 3Rdel and Tarski"
.0
8ut there remained an
underlying methodological unity in these developments, and for the purposes of the
present paper, !e can concentrate on the more systematic account of methodology
that %arnap later provided"
The term 9explication: first appears in %arnap:s !ork, in print, in Gune 1&4-, in
a paper entitled 9The T!o %oncepts of @roaility:" %arnap makes clear in the
opening paragraph that his main goal is to offer explications of our pre)scientific
conceptions of proaility, although he concentrates in this paper on providing
9clarifications: of the t!o explicanda that he claims to find in ordinary language" $The
detailed explications !ere to e pulished in 1&-0*" %arnap also pulished another
paper on a related topic in 4pril 1&4-, 9En ;nductive Aogic:, !hich, though it refers to
his forthcoming Gune paper in a footnote, makes no mention of explication" This may
not in itself signify that %arnap did not have the concept of explication in mind !hen
he !rote the paper, except that, in the final section of this paper, he does indeed offer
some methodological reflections, in terms not of 9explication: ut of 9rational
reconstruction:, !hich, as !e have seen, !as his original term for his philosophical
method" 0o !e can conclude that at some point et!een the !riting of 9En ;nductive
Aogic: and 9The T!o %oncepts of @roaility:, !hich !ere pulished in 4pril 1&4-
and Gune 1&4-, respectively, though oviously !ritten earlier, %arnap introduced the
term 9explication:"
;n his 9;ntellectual 4utoiography:, %arnap !rites that H5rom 1&42 to 1&44 ; had a
research grant from the +ockefeller 5oundation" During this time, !hich ; spent near
0anta 5e, 1e! ?exico, ; !as first occupied !ith the logic of modalities and the ne!
semantical method of extension and intension" Aater ; turned to the prolems of
proaility and induction"I $1&F., .F"* The former resulted in Meaning and $ecessity,
30 5or discussion of %arnap:s development in this period, see %offa 1&&1, chs" 1-)1'= %reath 1&&&=
5riedman 1&&&, @art Three= ?ormann 2000, chs" -)'= +icketts 1&&F= /eel 1&&2, ch" -"
Draft 01/04/02Carnaps Conception of Explication2F
pulished in 1&4', and the latter in Logical Foundations of Probability, pulished in
1&-0" ;n the preface to the first edition of Meaning and $ecessity, %arnap confirms
that HThe investigations of modal logic !hich led to the methods developed in this
ook !ere made in 1&42, and the first version of this ook !as !ritten in 1&4.,
during a leave of asence granted y the /niversity of %hicago and financed y the
+ockefeller 5oundationI $1&4', iv*" 3iven that the underlying idea of rational
reconstruction !as already in place at this time, !hat can have stimulated talk of
9explication:B T!o particular pulications are relevant hereJ firstly, the appearance in
1&42 of the volume on ?oore in 9The Airary of the Aiving @hilosophers: series,
edited y @aul 0chilpp, in !hich %" >" Aangford has a paper on the paradox of
analysis= and secondly, the pulication also in 1&42 of the Dictionary of Philosophy
edited y Dagoert +unes, in !hich %arnap himself makes a numer of contriutions"
Aet us consider their possile influences y turning to the t!o main pulications that
presented %arnap:s !ork in the period from 1&42"
The notion of explication is introduced very early in Meaning and $ecessity"
;n K2 %arnap !ritesJ
The task of making more exact a vague or not quite exact concept used in everyday life
or in an earlier stage of scientific or logical development, or rather of replacing it y a
ne!ly constructed, more exact concept, elongs among the most important tasks of
logical analysis and logical construction" #e call this the task of explicating, or of
giving an explication for, the earlier concept= this earlier concept, or sometimes the
term used for it, is called the explicandum= and the ne! concept, or its term, is called an
explicatum of the old one" $1&4', ()&"*
4t this point there is then the follo!ing footnoteJ H#hat is meant here y
9explicandum: and 9explicatum: seems similar to !hat Aangford means y
9analysandum: and 9analysans:= see elo!, n" 42, p" F."I $1&4', (, fn" '"* 5ollo!ing
up this further footnote, !e find a reference to Aangford:s paper on ?oore and the
paradox of analysis, at the point in %arnap:s o!n ook !here he offers his conception
of intensional structure as a solution to the paradox of analysis" 4s !e have noted,
Aangford:s paper !as pulished in 1&42= and the ovious suggestion is that it !as this
paper that prompted not only %arnap:s o!n response to the paradox of analysis, as
illustrating his conception of intensional structure, ut also his conception of
explication, as modelled on Aangford:s conception of analysis"
Draft 01/04/02Carnaps Conception of Explication2'
;n illustrating his conception of explication in K2 of Meaning and $ecessity,
%arnap takes the example of 5rege:s and +ussell:s logicist 9explication: of numer
terms such as 9t!o: N Hthe term 9t!o: in the not quite exact meaning in !hich it is
used in everyday life and in applied mathematicsI, and their different explications of
phrases of the form 9the so)and)so:" 8ut %arnap:s introduction of the idea of
explication precedes his discussion of 9A)truth:, !hich is offered Has an explicatum
for !hat philosophers call logical or necessary or analytic truthI $1&4', '*, and other
such 9A)concepts:" >o!ever, %arnap says little aout !hat constraints there may e
on the adequacy of an explication" >e does indeed say that explication Hconsists in
laying do!n rules for the use of corresponding expressions in language systems to e
constructedI $1&4', (*, ut on the relation et!een the explicandum and the
explicatum, all he says is thisJ H3enerally speaking, it is not required that an
explicatum have, as nearly as possile, the same meaning as the explicandum= it
should, ho!ever, correspond to the explicandum in such a !ay that it can e used
instead of the latter"I $;id"*
%arnap provides a much fuller discussion of explication in the first chapter of
Logical Foundations of Probability, pulished in 1&-0" Ene of %arnap:s main aims in
this ook is to clarify our various conceptions of proaility" 0ince these conceptions
have only a vague articulation in everyday life, %arnap sees his task as that of making
these conceptions more precise, that is, of providing an explication for them $cf" 1&-0,
1)2*" >e thus first offers some general methodological remarks concerning
explication" 0ince these also develop, to a considerale extent, the rief remarks he
makes aout explication in 9The T!o %oncepts of @roaility:, !hich, revised,
formed the second chapter of Logical Foundations of Probability, ; shall concentrate
on the fuller discussion here"
K2 of %arnap:s first chapter is entitled 9En the %larification of an
Cxplicandum:, and after offering a characterisation of explication similar to that
provided in Meaning and $ecessity $quoted aove*, %arnap goes onJ
The term 9explicatum: has een suggested y the follo!ing t!o usages" <ant calls a
7udgement explicative if the predicate is otained y analysis of the su7ect" >usserl, in
speaking aout the synthesis of identification et!een a confused, nonarticulated sense
and a susequently intended distinct, articulated sense, calls the latter the 9Cxplikat: of
the former" $5or oth uses see Dictionary of philosophy L1&42M,
.1
ed" D" +unes, p" 10-*"
31 The square rackets here are %arnap:s" The t!o sets of square rackets that follo! enclose my o!n
interpolations"
Draft 01/04/02Carnaps Conception of Explication2(
#hat ; mean y 9explicandum: and 9explicatum: is to some extent similar to !hat %">"
Aangford calls 9analysandum: and 9analysans:J Hthe analysis then states an appropriate
relation of equivalence et!een the analysandum and the analysansI L1&42, .2.M= he
says that the motive of an analysis His usually that of supplanting a relatively vague
idea y a more precise oneI L1&42, .2&M"
$@erhaps the form 9explicans: might e considered instead of 9explicatum:= ho!ever, ;
think that the analogy !ith the terms 9definiendum: and 9definiens: !ould not e useful
ecause, if the explication consists in giving an explicit definition, then oth the
definiens and the definiendum in this definition express the explicatum, !hile the
explicandum does not occur"* The procedure of explication is here understood in a
!ider sense than the procedures of analysis and clarification !hich <ant, >usserl, and
Aangford have in mind" The explicatum $in my sense* is in many cases the result of
analysis of the explicandum $and this has motivated my choice of the terms*= in other
cases, ho!ever, it deviates delierately from the explicandum ut still takes its place in
some !ay= this !ill ecome clear y the susequent examples"
#hat !e have here is a reference oth to Aangford:s paper on the paradox of analysis,
and also to <ant:s and >usserl:s notions of explication as %arnap found them
descried in a dictionary of philosophy pulished in 1&42"
.2
<ant:s and >usserl:s
conceptions, ho!ever, are quite different" 5or <ant, 9explicative: is opposed to
9ampliative:, as one !ay to characterise his analytic/synthetic distinction"
9Cxplication: in <ant:s sense simply means to 9extract: the constituent concepts of a
complex concept $to find the predicates 9contained: in the su7ect concept* N
9analysis: in the sense of 9decomposition:" 8ut >usserl:s notion is much closer to
%arnap:s, as involving a precisification of an everyday concept" ;ndeed, %arnap
recognises in the second paragraph that there is an important difference here, in
distinguishing et!een 9analysis: in !hat is clearly the <antian sense and
9explication: in his sense" 4lthough it may e that the results of 9analysis: and
9explication: coincide in specific cases, i"e", !here there is a precise concept that is
simply eing clarified $9decomposed:*, they may diverge in other cases, !here
9analysis: perhaps can only go so far and explication has to take over"
This distinction is in effect put to !ork in !hat %arnap goes on to say" 5or if the
explicandum is not itself exact, then there cannot e an exact ans!er as to !hether the
explicatum correctly explicates the explicandum $as !as recognised y 5rege in his
32 The dictionary $+unes 1&42* !as one to !hich %arnap himself made several contriutions" The
entry under 9Cxplication:, !ritten y Dorion %airns, the >usserl scholar, readsJ H$3er" %uslegung* ;n
>usserlJ 0ynthesis of identification et!een a confused, non)articulated $internally indistinct,
unseparated* sense and a susequently intended distinct, articulated, sense" The latter is the explicate
$Explikat* of the former"I /nder 9Cxplicative 7udgment:, !ritten y ,ernon G" 8ourke, !hich
immediately follo!s, !e readJ H$Aat" explicatio, unfolding* 4 mental action !hich explains a su7ect y
mentally dissecting it= $<ant* a 7udgment in !hich the predicate is otained y analysis of the su7ect"I
;t !ould appear that !hat %arnap says aout <ant:s and >usserl:s conceptions of explication derive
only from these dictionary entries"
Draft 01/04/02Carnaps Conception of Explication2&
9Aogic in ?athematics: lectures*" 8ut !e clearly need to say something aout the
explicandum if the explication is to e understood at all, and it is here that 9analysis:
in the sense of 9clarification: takes place" Cven though the terms to e explicated may
e imprecise, %arnap !rites, Hthere are means for reaching a relatively good mutual
understanding as to their intended meaning" 4n indication of the meaning !ith the
help of some examples for its intended use and other examples for uses not no!
intended can help the understanding"I $1&-0, 4"* #hat is required is 9elucidation:
$9CrlQuterung:* rather than explication proper, !hich requires a theoretical system in
!hich rules for the use of the corresponding expressions are laid do!n $cf" 1&-0, .,
-*"
..
4ccepting, then, that an everyday concept has een 9elucidated: sufficiently to engage
in explication, !hat are the criteria of adequacy for explicationB ;n K., %arnap lays
do!n four requirements for a concept to e an adequate explicatum for a given
explicandumJ
$1* similarity to the explicandum=
$2* exactness=
$.* fruitfulness=
$4* simplicity"
4s far as the first is concerned, %arnap !ritesJ HThe explicatum is to e similar to the
explicandum in such a !ay that, in most cases in !hich the explicandum has so far
een used, the explicatum can e used= ho!ever, close similarity is not required, and
considerale differences are permittedI $1&-0, '*" 4s an example, %arnap takes the
case of a iologist explicating our pre)scientific concept of a fish, replacing it y the
iologically defined concept, !hich %arnap suggests !e call 9piscis: to avoid
confusion" ?ost of !hat !e used to call 9fishes: still come out as 9pisces:, ut !hales
are oviously one exception" There is enough similarity, even though there are
important divergences"
0o !hat 7ustifies the divergences from ordinary languageB The ans!er, of
course, lies in the advantages of the scientific system in !hich the explicatum is
located, and this is !hat is rought out y the other three requirements that %arnap
formulates" 4s far as the second is concerned, %arnap !ritesJ HThe characteri2ation of
the explicatum, that is, the rules of its use $for instance, in the form of a definition*, is
33 4gain, there is an echo here of the distinction et!een elucidations and definitions that 5rege dre!
in his 9Aogic in ?athematics: lectures= LM, 224/ FR, .1."
Draft 01/04/02Carnaps Conception of Explication.0
to e given in an exact form, so as to introduce the explicatum into a !ell)connected
system of scientific conceptsI $iid"*" The requirement of exactness lay at the core of
the idea of rational reconstruction, and talk of 9!ell)connectedness: here highlights
once again the importance of a clearly revealed structure in the system that is
constructed"
#ell)connectedness also lies at the asis of the third requirement" HThe
explicatum is to e a fruitful concept, that is, useful for the formulation of many
universal statements $empirical la!s in the case of a nonlogical concept, logical
theorems in the case of a logical concept*"I $;id"* 4nd in explaining this, %arnap
!ritesJ H4 scientific concept is the more fruitful the more it can e rought into
connection !ith other concepts on the asis of oserved facts= in other !ords, the
more it can e used for the formulation of la!sI $1&-0, F*" Taking %arnap:s example
once again, fishes as scientifically defined $pisces* have more properties in common N
have more connections !ith one another N than fishes as pre)scientifically understood
$animals living in !ater*, allo!ing more general statements to e formulated $iid"*"
.4
The requirement of fruitfulness that %arnap formulates here is a clear echo of the
emphasis that 5rege placed on the fruitfulness of definitions in his early !ork, and in
the &rundlagen, in particular" 4ccording to 5rege, the definitions of numer that he
offers are fruitful precisely to the extent that they allo! him to derive 9the !ell)kno!n
properties of numers: $see K. aove*= and here too, !e might say, the value of the
reconstructed system lies in the connections that it exhiits et!een the concepts
defined and the statements formulated"
.-
%arnap:s final requirement is simplicityJ HThe explicatum should e as simple as
possile= this means as simple as the more important requirements $1*, $2*, and $.*
permitI $1&-0, '*" The simplicity of a concept is to e measured, %arnap states,
according to the form of its definition and the forms of the la!s connecting it !ith
other concepts, ut he rightly emphasises that any simplicity considerations are
suordinate to the other three considerations $iid"*"
The central example that %arnap discusses to elucidate his account of
explication is the concept of temperature, !hich %arnap offers as an explicatum for
the concept of !armth" %arnap first distinguishes et!een classificatory, comparati-e
34 >ere there is an analogy !ith the use of colour classes, in !hich every o7ect is related to every
other o7ect, to define colours in the %ufbau"
35 %f" 5rege, &L, K2J HThe aim of proof is not only to place the truth of a proposition eyond all
dout, ut also to afford insight into the dependence of truths on one anotherI $FR, &2*" %f" &L, ix"
and 0uantitati-e concepts" To concentrate on the simplest cases $monadic properties
and dyadic relations*, classificatory concepts, such as *arm, classify things into t!o
mutually exclusive kinds $*arm and not+*arm*= comparative concepts, such as
*armer, express a relation et!een t!o things ased on a comparison, given in the
form of a 9more $in a certain respect*: statement= !hilst quantitative concepts, such as
that of temperature, descrie things y the ascription of numerical values $cf" 1&-0, ()
&*" %arnap !ritesJ H%lassificatory concepts are the simplest and least effective kind of
concept" %omparative concepts are more po!erful, and quantitative concepts still
more= that is to say, they enale us to give a more precise description of a concrete
situation and, more important, to formulate more comprehensive general la!s"I
$1&-0, 12"* The concept of temperature, %arnap then argues, may e regarded as an
explicatum for the comparative concept *armer, in that it makes more precise !hat
the latter expresses" Things may indeed e ordered y means of the relation *armer
than, and therey assigned a numer representing their position in the series, ut
assigning them a numer representing their temperature grants them some more
9asolute: value"
>o! then does the explication of 9!armth: y means of 9temperature: satisfy
%arnap:s four requirementsB #e may readily grant that the explicatum is exactJ there
are clear rules governing the use of the concept of temperature, and a thermometer, for
example, can e easily used to measure temperature" The explicatum is fruitful, as
there is indeed a !ell)connected scientific system in !hich the concept of temperature
plays a central role in the formulation of la!s and general statements" The explicatum
is also relatively simpleJ it is oth easily defined $or at least permits straightfor!ard
measurement* and readily incorporated into scientific la!s" 4ll three requirements
concern the nature and role of the explicatum !ithin the scientific theory" The
interesting N and prolematic N philosophical question concerns the relation et!een
the explicatum and the explicandum, precisely the question raised y the paradox of
analysis" ;f 9considerale differences are permitted: $cf" 1&-0, '*, then !hat constraint
at all does the requirement of similarity imposeB
;n the present example, %arnap interprets the requirement of similarity as
follo!sJ HThe concept Temperature is to e such that, in most cases, if x is !armer
than y $in the prescientific sense, ased on the heat sensations of the skin*, then the
temperature of x is higher than that of yI $1&-0, 12*" To see the connection !ith
5rege:s examples of 9fruitful: definitions, particularly as given as contextual
definitions in the &rundlagen $and 4xiom , of the &rundgeset)e has the same form*,
and %arnap:s o!n use of the method of astraction in the %ufbau, let us set this out as
follo!sJ
$Ta* x is !armer than y"
$T* The temperature of x is higher than the temperature of y"
$Tc* There are numerical values n and d, !here d U 0, such that x has a temperature
of $nXd*Y and y has a temperature of nY"
Gust as in 5rege:s examples, an equivalence relation holding et!een o7ects of one
kind is offered as a !ay of defining an identity statement concerning o7ects of a more
astract kind, so too here a comparative relation holding et!een t!o o7ects,
expressed in $Ta*, is used as the starting)point for an explication that involves a more
theoretical concept, captured in $T*"
.F
$Tc* 7ust makes explicit the quantitative
measurement that the appeal to temperature allo!s" ;n each case, there is at least a
hope that the definiens and the definiendum, or the explicandum and the explicatum,
are 9equivalent: in some appropriate sense= ut in so far as one relies on ordinary
language and the other uses concepts precisely defined !ithin a scientific system,
there may e cases !here discrepancies arise" %arnap himself descries a case in
!hich a discrepancy occursJ
0uppose ; enter a moderately heated room t!ice, first coming from an overheated room
and at a later time coming from the cold outside" Then it may happen that ; declare the
room, on the asis of my sensations, to e !armer the second time than the first, !hile
the thermometer sho!s at the second time the same temperature as at the first $or even
a slightly lo!er one*" Cxperiences of this kind do not at all lead us to the conclusion
that the concept Temperature defined !ith reference to the thermometer is inadequate
as an explicatum for the concept #armer" En the contrary, !e have ecome accustomed
to let the scientific concept overrule the prescientific one in all cases of disagreement"
;n other !ords, the term 9!armer: has undergone a change of meaning" ;ts meaning !as
originally ased directly on a comparison of heat sensations, ut, after the acceptance
of the scientific concept Temperature into our everyday language, the !ord 9!armer: is
used in the sense of 9having a higher temperature:" $1&-0, 12)1."*
The example is instructive" 5or it is not 7ust that !e can allo! the odd
discrepancy !ithout invalidating the explication, ut that the explication may actually
have value to the extent that it opens up and explains discrepancies N and indeed, not
36 There are also differences here, particularly !ith regard to the direction of explanation" 5or 5rege,
in the numer case, $1a* is offered as a !ay of defining $1*" 5or %arnap, $T* is used to explicate
$Ta*"
Draft 01/04/02Carnaps Conception of Explication..
only discrepancies et!een our ordinary language and the scientific language, ut
also !ithin ordinary language" T!o people may disagree over !hether the room, say,
is !armer or colder than it !as a fe! minutes ago, and an appeal to the thermometer
reading may settle the question" 4nd furthermore, as %arnap points out, our ordinary
use of language may change as a result, and ecome more refined in its o!n
application" 4t the very least !e !ill ecome more sensitive to possile discrepancies,
and all these advantages may e seen as contriuting to the value of the explication"
Cxplications, !e might say N and !e might see this as revealing a further <antian
dimension to %arnap:s thought N come to play a regulative role in ordinary life"
4ll of this opens up a !hole range of issues that %arnap himself did not say a great
deal aout, ut that !e should indeed appreciate in accounting for the value of an
explication" 5rom his earliest !ork, it seems, %arnap !as osessed !ith the
9explicatum: or the 9rationally reconstructed: side of things= and !e can see this as
reflected in the requirements for an adequate explication that %arnap lays do!n" Three
of the four requirements concern solely the properties of the explicatum, and even the
first requirement only talks vaguely of a 9similarity: relation" Det !e ought, perhaps,
to heed 8rentano:s insight into the structure of intentionality, and emphasise that an
explication is al!ays an explication of something, and !e cannot simply 7udge the
value of an explication solely in terms of the scientific system in !hich it plays a part"
4ppreciation of the context in !hich the explication arises, and the !ay in !hich it
refines, or resolves discrepancies !ithin, our ordinary understanding, is essential" This
!as something to !hich >usserl !as highly sensitive"
. Husserls Conception of Explication
4s !e sa! in the last section, according to %arnap himself, his introduction of the
term 9explication: !as partly motivated y >usserl:s talk of 9explication: as Hthe
synthesis of identification et!een a confused, nonarticulated sense and a
susequently intended distinct, articulated senseI $%arnap, 1&-0, K2*" 4lthough it
seems that %arnap:s kno!ledge of >usserl:s conception !as derived solely from
Dorion %airns: definition in +unes: Dictionary of Philosophy $1&42*, and no genuine
influence can e detected, it is instructive to compare %arnap:s conception !ith
>usserl:s"
>usserl:s most sustantial discussion of explication occurs in chapter 2 of @art
; of Experience and 3udgement, a !ork that !as edited $!ith >usserl:s authority* y
Aud!ig Aandgree and pulished in 1&.&, the year after >usserl died" >usserl here
distinguishes et!een 9simple: or 9immediate: apprehension $9schlichte Crfassung:*
and 9explication: $9Cxplikation:*, and does indeed talk of a 9synthesis of
identification: $K22*" >is concern is !ith the different levels of reflective perception
of an o7ect" 90imple apprehension: is the lo!est level, !hen all !e are a!are of is the
o7ect 9as a !hole: $iid"*" 8ut as >usserl had explained earlier in the ook $K(*, every
experience of a thing has its 9internal hori2on:, delimiting an area of possile
kno!ledge eyond that core that constitutes our immediate apprehension" Cxperience
has a 9retentional: and 9protentional: structureJ in oserving an o7ect, our experience
is informed y our existing kno!ledge and expectations" #e may recall previous
perceptions or already have in mind a type that the o7ect instantiates, for example,
and !e may imagine !hat the o7ect !ould look like from a different angle or
anticipate ho! it might change" 4t the second level, then, our kno!ledge is enriched
as !e elucidate further aspects of the o7ect" This is explication"
Explication is penetration of the internal hori)on of the ob/ect by the direction of
perceptual interest4 ;n the case of the unostructed reali2ation of this interest, the
protentional expectations fulfill themselves in the same !ay= the o7ect reveals itself in
its properties as that !hich it !as anticipated to e, except that !hat !as anticipated
no! attains original givenness" 4 more precise determination results, eventually
perhaps partial corrections, or N in the case of ostruction N disappointment of the
expectations, and partial modali2ation" $E3, K22"*
;n so far as this process reveals aspects of the o7ect that are there to e
revealed, talk of 9explication: seems appropriate N appropriate, that is, if something
like the <antian conception of explication, as the mental dissection of a complex into
its constituents, is the model" 8ut this is not >usserl:s conception, as he makes clear in
K2F" 5or him, explication is the clarification $!erdeutlichung* of !hat is anticipated
!ithin the inner hori2on of the o7ect, and !hat is anticipated is typically vague and
confused" ;nstead of a 9completely determined sense:, !hich simply requires
unpacking, there is !hat >usserl calls a 9frame of empty sense:, !hich is gradually
filled in as explication proceeds" 8ut to talk of this 9frame of empty sense: is not to
say, on the other hand, that there is nothing from !hich !e start" >usserl distinguishes
explication as he understands it from 9analytic clarification: $9analytische
,erdeutlichung:*, !hich is indeed an 9explication in empty consciousness:, !here the
Draft 01/04/02Carnaps Conception of Explication.-
o7ect of explication need not e 9intuitively given: $K2F*" 98rother: can e analysed
as 9male siling:, for example, !ithout any rother eing present= ut it is not
conceptual analysis that >usserl has in mind" Cxplication is an enrichment of sense
operating throughout *ithin the domain of intuition" 1evertheless, >usserl does allo!
that our expectations may e disappointed, and that partial corrections may occur, and
this rings him closer to %arnap" %arnap may conceive of rational reconstruction or
explication as abstracting from intuitive content, ut oth >usserl and %arnap see
explication as a process of precisification, y means of !hich our ordinary
understanding is refined, and if necessary, transformed"
4s !e have seen, ho!ever, %arnap is not particularly concerned !ith the
relationship et!een the explicandum and explicatum, requiring merely that they e
9similar:" 5or >usserl, on the other hand, it is the movement of explication itself that
is of central concern, and he descries its essential structure in K24" Taking an o7ect
#, !ith internal properties or 9determinations: $98estimmungen:* 5, 6, etc", >usserl
characterises explication as a process in !hich the determinations are referred to a
9sustrate: !hich serves as the locus for the 9synthesis of identification:"
The process of explication in its originality is that in !hich an o7ect given at first hand
is rought to explicit intuition" The analysis of its structure must ring to light ho! a
t*ofold constitution of sense L#inngebungM is reali2ed in itJ Ho7ect as sustrateI and
Hdetermination 5 ZI= it must sho! ho! this constitution of sense is reali2ed in the
form of a process !hich goes for!ard in separate steps, through !hich, ho!ever,
extends continuously a unity of coincidence N a unity of coincidence of a special kind,
elonging exclusively to these sense)forms" $E3, K24a"*
Cxplication not only reveals properties of an o7ect, ut also opens up the very
distinction et!een 9sustrate: and 9determination: on !hich the integrity of the
process depends $K24*" 4s >usserl !rites, H4fter the explication of the 5, the #
ecomes #5= after the emergence of the 6, $#5*6, and so onI $K24c*" The movement of
explication consists in Ha continuous internal transformationI, !herey the properties
of the o7ect that are precipitated out are rooted in Ha permanent synthesis of
coincidenceI $iid"*"
>usserl goes on to discuss various complications, in further explication of the
process itself, ut the essential conception is clear" 4lthough >usserl focuses on
reflective perception of an o7ect, the account can e readily extended to other cases
such as the mathematical and scientific ones that occupied 5rege and %arnap" >ere
explication involves opening up not 7ust logical distinctions such as that et!een
su7ect and predicate ut also function)argument forms, causal structures, and so on"
;ndeed, !e can regard the !hole panoply of science as a tool in opening up the
Draft 01/04/02Carnaps Conception of Explication.F
structures of experience in 7ust that enrichment of our understanding that >usserl !as
so concerned to conceptualise"
Developing this >usserlian account offers a !ay of supplementing and
partially correcting the 5regean)%arnapian conception of reconstructive explication"
To see this, let us return to the paradox of analysis, and consider ho! it might e
resolved y ringing together elements from 5rege:s, %arnap:s and >usserl:s thought"
;f !e egin !ith 5rege:s first t!o responses, then !e can agree that a good analysis
must 9split up content: in a 9more richly articulated: !ay, ut there is no single
ifurcation of meaning that provides a general ans!er" Cxplication may open up more
than 7ust one distinction= the full resources of a roader conceptual frame!ork or
more po!erful theoretical system may e required" #e can agree !ith all three that an
analysis should not e regarded as simply trying to capture our pre)existing
conceptions, confused as they often are, although our ordinary understanding does act
as a constraint, at the level of structure" The aim of analysis is to elucidate this
structure, and to refine rather than replace our ordinary conceptions, !hich does not
rule out revising them !herever necessary"
This can e illustrated y taking a simple example from chemistry, involving
the analysis of a process rather than an o7ectJ
$0#* 0alt dissolves in !ater"
$1>* 2>
2
E X 1a%l >
.
E
X
X %l X 1a
X
X E>"
$0#* represents a familiar process $an everyday phenomenon of our 9life)!orld:*, and
$1>*, !e could say, provides its 9chemical analysis: $a translation into the language of
science*" There is also a sense in !hich, for the purposes of chemistry, $1>* does
replace $0#*, in that it is this equation that represents the reaction and that plays its
part in more complex analyses of chemical processes" 1evertheless, in no sense does a
chemist discard its informal characterisation, as captured in $0#*" #hatever
manipulation of chemical formulae a chemist may perform, the informal
characterisations remain in the ackground, presupposed in our scientific activity" ;n
offering $1>* as the analysis of $0#*, then, the chemist is refining rather than
replacing ordinary language, for certain scientific purposes"
There is an extent to !hich correct and informative analyses do involve
9splitting up content: differently" #hat makes $1>* a correct analysis of $0#*, for
example, is that they oth refer to the same 9content: N in this case, the same chemical
process" >o!ever, even this requires qualification" 5or 9!ater: as !e ordinarily
understand it N the !ater that !e drink and !ash in N is not 7ust >
2
E, ut also
contains 9impurities:= and 9salt: too can refer to more than 7ust 1a%l" 0o the 9content:
of $1>* is itself an idealised refinement of the 9content: of $0#*" 8ut !hat tends to
Draft 01/04/02Carnaps Conception of Explication.'
happen in such cases is ad7ustment of our ordinary notions to reinforce the analysis"
$1>* makes us interpret $0#* as H0odium chloride dissolves in 9pure: !aterI= and
once the ad7ustment is made, then !e do have sameness of 9content:" 0ameness of
9content: is indeed a constraint on the adequacy of an analysis, ut this is not to say
that the 9real: content of the sentence of ordinary language is properly grasped prior to
understanding the theory in !hich the analysis is offered" >usserl talks of the results
of explication as 9precipitates: $91iederschlQge:*, and the metaphor is apt" 5or
contents or senses too should e seen as crystallised out in analysisJ the material is
already there in the fluid of our everyday life, ut it needs the seed of a theoretical
concern to precipitate them out"
.'
;n the end, !hat makes an analysis a good one is its
success, as part of some overall theory, in convincing us that our ordinary discourse is
indeed imprecise, and requires refinement for scientific purposes"
>o! informative an analysis is !ill depend on !hat !e learn in this process"
/ltimately, there is no ahistorically positioned ans!er as to !hether an analysis is
oth correct and informative" 8efore the theory is developed in !hich the analysis is
offered, the analysis, if it is understood at all, !ill seem incorrect= and after it is
developed, !ith the necessary transformation in our understanding effected, it !ill e
correct ut uninformative" To talk of 9correctness: is to make a move *ithin a system=
yet informativeness arises in the process of developing, learning and using a system"
4n analysis is 9informative:, in other !ords, y eing transformati-e" 5rege and
%arnap may have developed systems in !hich 9correctness: !as located, ut it !as
>usserl !ho recognised the transformative aspect of explication"
/ Conclusion: Carnap and the 0aradox of "nalysis
4s !e sa! in K., the conception of analysis that 5rege articulated in his 1&14 lectures,
!hich %arnap attended, !as essentially a response to the paradox of analysis
$although it !as not kno!n as such at the time*" 4s !e sa! in KF, according to %arnap
himself, his introduction of the term 9explication: !as partly prompted y Aangford:s
discussion of the paradox of analysis in 1&42" 0o it might seem surprising that %arnap
does not offer his conception of explication, !hich ears a striking similarity to
5rege:s later conception of analysis, as his o!n response to the paradox of analysis" ;n
37 %f" 8eaney 1&&F, K("-, on !hich ; have dra!n in the response offered here to the paradox of
analysis"
Draft 01/04/02Carnaps Conception of Explication.(
Meaning and $ecessity $1&4'*, !here his conception of explication is first discussed,
%arnap also offers a solution to the paradox, ut here he appeals to the notion of
intensional structure" %onsider the example that %arnap takes from ?ooreJ
.(
$81*The concept brother is identical !ith the concept male sibling"
$82* The concept brother is identical !ith the concept brother"
The first, %arnap !rites, His a sentence conveying fruitful information, although of a
logical, not a factual, natureI, !hilst the second is Hquite trivialI $1&4', F.*" 8ut if the
t!o concepts are identical, ho! can this eB %arnap:s ans!er is to distinguish t!o
notions of meaning, !hich is precisely the response that 5rege gave to the paradox in
his early and middle periods" $81* and $82* are 9A)equivalent:, in %arnap:s terms, ut
differ in intensional structure, i"e", are not 9intensionally isomorphic:" $81* A)implies
$82*, and vice versa, ut $81* and $82* are uilt up in different !ays out of their
constituent 9designators:"
.&
Aangford, in his original discussion of the paradox, had
suggested that the t!o expressions representing the analysandum and analysans in a
correct and informative analysis !ere Hcognitively equivalent in some appropriate
senseI ut not HsynonymousI $1&42, .2F*" 4ccording to %arnap, the notion of A)
equivalence explicates cognitive or logical equivalence, and the notion of intensional
isomorphism explicates synonymy $1&4', F4*"
;n a short critique of this account, Aeonard Ainsky $1&4&* argued that %arnap:s
solution !as not in general adequate" >is o7ection can e seen y comparing $82*
!ith the follo!ing variantJ
40
$8.*The concept brother is identical !ith the concept "ruder"
$82* and $8.* are intensionally isomorphic, ut $8.* is argualy not as trivial as $82*"
4dmittedly, using terms from t!o different languages introduces complications, ut
the essential point remains" ;t !ould e perfectly possile to define a ne! Cnglish
!ord, say, 9miling:, as an areviation for 9male siling:, and then the follo!ing
!ould equally seem not as trivial as $82*J
$84* The concept brother is identical !ith the concept mibling"
38 %f" ?oore 1&42, FF-)'= %arnap 1&4', F.)4"
39 %f" %arnap 1&4', K2, for his definitions of the A)concepts, and K14, for his account of intensional
structure"
40 To preserve the connection !ith ?oore:s original example, ; have adapted Ainsky:s o!n examples
in !hat follo!s"
Draft 01/04/02Carnaps Conception of Explication.&
4s Ainsky remarks, Hone can produce intensional isomorphism at !ill $or destroy it*
y definitional areviationI $1&4&, .4'*"
;n reply to Ainsky, %arnap $1&4&* admits that his account does not resolve the
paradox in this particular kind of case, ut he defends his general strategy" 4
distinction must al!ays e dra!n et!een t!o notions of meaning, such that the
relevant expressions have the same 9meaning: in one sense ut different 9meanings: in
a another sense= ut !hat these senses are !ill depend on the case" %arnap goes on to
offer seven different explicata for the ordinary notion of 9synonymy: $and notes that
there may e many more esides*, of varying degrees of strength, and suggests that a
different pair of explicata is required in Ainsky:s case"
%arnap:s reply is deeply revealing of his philosophical methodology,
illustrating oth its value and limitations" 5or given that a distinction seems called for,
it is certainly useful to have a series of possile explicata to choose from" 8ut the real
!ork is to e done in sho!ing ho! one pair of explicata clears up the prolem"
%arnap:s response to the paradox of analysis is to offer explications rather than
explication itself" ;ronically, the solution is there in %arnap:s very practice, ut it lies
in the process, not the results" 5or if !e simply offer the results, then the paradox of
analysis !ill re)emerge !ith respect to them" The distinction that needs to e dra!n is
not so much et!een different senses of 9sense:, ut et!een our understanding
efore and after the analysis" The relevant expressions do not have a range of timeless
9meanings:, t!o of !hich simply require specification to solve the paradox" ;f 9sense:
encapsulates !hat !e understand, then this changes in the process of analysis, and it
is the process that needs clarification" %arnap:s distinctions may help us think aout
the process, ut they are not the solution to the paradox itself"
;f someone has only a vague idea of !hat 9rother: means, then eing told that
a rother is a male siling may e informative $though 9siling: may require even
more explanation*, ut it is informative y crystallising the sense of 9rother:" ;t may
also e informative y making clear the logical relations et!een the concepts
brother, male and sibling, ut this too helps crystallise the relevant senses for us $so
that !e can use the terms more accurately or spontaneously, for example*" Ence the
senses are crystallised, then the sentence is no longer informative" ;f !e still regard it
as so, then it is ecause !e imagine a process y !hich someone comes to learn
something= and it is this process that underlies the informativeness" 0imilarly, for
someone !ho is fluent in oth Cnglish and 3erman, $8.* !ill e uninformative, and if
!e regard it as informative, it is ecause !e imagine an Cnglish)speaker, say, learning
3erman"
Ef course, examples such as $8.* and $84* !ould not normally count
as analyses" #e do in general demand, as 5rege, >usserl, Aangford and %arnap all
recognised, that the analysans e more 9articulate:" %arnap provides useful conceptual
tools to understand such articulation, and often illustrates their use in philosophical
!ork himself" 8ut !hen he does so, he tends to overlook the constraints imposed y
our ordinary understanding, even !hen they implicitly operate in his o!n thought, as
his employment of quasi)analysis in the %ufbau sho!s" #hat is philosophically
important is the process of explication rather than simply its end)products" 1iet2sche
!rote that H4ll concepts in !hich an entire process is semiotically telescoped elude
definitionI $1((', (0*" This is certainly true of the concept of explication" 8ut even
!here definitions and analyses can helpfully e offered, they themselves should e
understood as telescoping a !hole process"
41
41 5irst drafts of this paper !ere !ritten !hilst a +esearch 5ello! at the ;nstitut fOr @hilosophie of the
/niversity of Crlangen)1Ornerg, funded y the 4lexander von >umoldt)0tiftung, during 1&&&)2000"
; am grateful to oth institutions for their generous support" ,ersions of the material !ere presented at
the /niversities of Crlangen, <onstan2 and Gena, at the Aogica 2000 conference in Ailice, %2ech
+epulic in Gune 2000, the >E@E0 conference in ,ienna in Guly 2000 and the 0pindel conference in
?emphis in 0eptemer 2001, efore the conference on %arnap at Gena in 0eptemer 2001 for !hich a
penultimate draft !as prepared" 0horter versions of parts of the paper have appeared in 8eaney 2000
and 2002" ; !ould like to thank all those !ho made possile and contriuted to fruitful discussion of
the issues, and in particular, 4ndr[ %arus, +ichard %reath, ?ichael 5riedman, 3ottfried 3ariel,
Terence >organ, #olfgang <ien2ler, %arsten <lein, Gens <ulenkampff, 0andra Aapointe, Thomas
?ormann, ,olker @eckhaus, ?at7a\ @otr], Crich +eck, Thomas +icketts, Gean)?ichel +oy, %hristiane
0childknecht, %hristian Thiel, Gohn Tienson, Thomas /eel, 8rigitte /hlemann and Cd Palta" ; have
een helped enormously y the ideas and comments of others, ut only ; can take responsiility for
ho! they have een explicated in the present paper"
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?ichael 8eaney
Department of @hilosophy, Epen /niversity, ?ilton <eynes, ?<' F44, Cngland
m"a"eaneycopen"ac"uk

Carnap's Conception of Explication: From Frege To Husserl?: Michael Beaney

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