The Birth of an Atomic Europe?

The Messina meeting (June 1955), the Treaties of Rome (March 1957) and the
two years of delicate negotiations which linked the two now mainly associated
with the irth of the !!" (and hence today#s !$)
%ot clear at time, howe&er' (hole )ackage of )ro)osals discussed at Messina'
*rominent amongst them was +elgian scheme for atomic energy community
(largely attriutale to the ideas of Monnet and ,ouis -rmand)' This seemed to
ha&e great )otential'
o ,ogical successor to !"."' "oal and steel the /commanding heights# of
old !uro)ean economy0 atomic energy e1)ected to e e2ui& in new'
3ence made sense to em)loy the same model of sectoral integration'
o (ould hel) defray huge costs in&ol&ed and )ool scarce resources (notaly
uranium)'
o (ould hel) address !uro)e#s technological ackwardness in &ital new
sector (catching u) with $. and reducing de)endence on oil)
o -nd ecause it was a new sector, &ested interests less well estalished'
4t was therefore amongst the o)tions that the .i1 agreed to look into at Messina'
-nd des)ite some serious misgi&ings among some states (notaly 5) it attracted
some im)ortant ackers, notaly6
o 7rance'
.een as a means to otain &aluale e1)ertise, money and resources
for its own national atomic energy )rogramme6
5erman scientific know8how wld e &ery useful ()lus
)ledges, as we will see elow, of $. technical su))ort)
Money from its !uro)ean )artners wld hel) cash8stra))ed
49 Re)ulic 7rance
+elgium cld su))ly uranium (from the "ongo)0 later
su)erseded y $. offers of uranium su))lies
-ll of this &ery rele&ant to 7rance#s ci&ilian atomic energy
as)irations' These logical enough6
7rance is energy )oor (no oil0 little coal) atomic energy
attracti&e
-nd 7 did suse2 go on to ecome one of the most
e1tensi&e users in the world of atomic energy
+ut alongside such ci&ilian as)irations, 7 was always & conscious
of fact that all such technology and materials were /dual use#6 i'e'
cld e used for nuclear wea)ons )rogramme'
7 already committed to uilding an 7 om
+ut otaining !uro)ean assistance wld cut costs and s)eed
u) )rocess'
o -longside 7 enthusiasm, was strong $. su))ort'
4n )art this may ha&e een attriutale to Monnet#s role'
!uratom & much Monnet#s contri to Messina relaunch6
fitted with his )referred sectoral a))roach' -nd JM &
sce)tical aout )lanned !!"' (:idn#t elie&e 7 wld
su))ort it')
Therefore moilised his e1tensi&e and influential $.
network in su))ort of his new idea'
-lso reflect fundamental $. su))ort for !ur )ol unity
$. keen to su))ort relance after !:" disa))ointment
-nd )articularly attracted to any )ro;ect which looked
likely to win 7 su))ort (gi&en that it had een 7 which had
sunk !:")
+ut as .kogmar has recently demonstrated the $. also had more
s)ecific reasons to su))ort a )ro;ect in the field of nuclear energy
"ommercial incenti&e6 the $. the world leader in ci&il
atomic energy' $. su))liers keen to e2ui) !uro)e#s
)utati&e new atomic energy sector'
Military incenti&e6
o remo&ing !ur nuclear research from highly
secreti&e national )rogrammes (under way in 5+
and 70 most feared in 5) wld increase $. aility to
steer )rogramme away from mil a))lications (all
the more so if $. the main su))lier of e2ui)ment
and uranium)
o and $. wked hard to ha&e clause included in
!uratom which would forid mil a))lication of this
technology'
o This cld e&en hel) reassure .o&iets who were &
worried aout idea of 5 ac2uiring atomic om
o (ere it to succeed wld e ma; ste) twds nuclear
non8)roliferation' - significant )reoccu)ation of
the !isenhower go&t'
o -nd this is clear instance of the $. using the
!uro)ean integration )rocess for cold war ends (7
was of course doing the same < aleit for rather
different cold war ends)'
(ith such acking ()lus that of +elgium which had launched the idea) little
wonder that the nego started with some momentum'
o +ut soon ecame clear that 7 = $. enthu matched y lack of enthu from
5 = %,, oth of whom saw !uratom as an e1)ensi&e distraction from the
)ro;ect that really mattered6 the !!"'
o 7rom 195> onwards therefore ad&ance only assured ecause of so8called
/Junktim# < i'e' linkage etween !uratom and !!" meaning that 7 = $.
cldn#t get what they sght w?out allowing )rog twds !!" and &ice8&ersa'
o 4t was largely thanks to this that nego succeed' +y March 1957 Treaty
estalishing the !uro)ean -tomic !nergy "ommunity (!uratom) signed
and !uratom egan o)erations on January 1, 195@ at same time as !!"'
o $. succeed moreo&er in getting in a clause limiting the new "?ty to
ci&ilian use of atomic )ower only' -rticle Ae sti)ulated that the new "?ty
wld /make certain, y a))ro)riate su)er&ision, that nuclear materials are
not di&erted )ur)oses other than those for which they are intended#
%ot for first or last time, howe&er, $. was to find that steering !uro)e from
outside not & straightforward'
o $. o))osition to nuclear )roliferation collided head on with !uro)ean
interest in ac2uiring the key wea)ons of the cold war age6 nuclear oms'
o Therefore while !uro)eans ha))y to acce)t $. e1)ertise and uranium for
ci&ilian )rogrammes they did not acce)t that this dearred them from
running se)arate nuclear wea)ons )rogrammes'
Thus 78485 )ro;ect started u) efore !uratom had e&en een
signed
-fter re;ecting 78485, 7 wld s)end huge amount of effort ()ol and
fin ca)ital) in de&elo)ing force de frappe
-nd e&en the 5ermans remain & tem)ted y idea of de&elo)ing
nuclear wea)onry until late 19>Bs at least (es) 7ranC8Josef .trauss)
The non8)roliferation goal of !uratom unfulfilled < and the
de&elo)ment of inde)endent !uro)ean nuclear deterrents wld
remain a ma; issue throughout ne1t decade
7urthermore the se)aration of !uratom from nuclear wea)ons issue also did much
to render the institution itself much less central to its memer states'
o %ot admittedly the only factor6
-lso suffered from the fact that once 7rance was won round to the
merits of the !!", that Junktim which had ke)t the !uratom
)ro;ect ali&e disa))eared' 7 indeed went from eing the )ro;ect#s
iggest )romoter to its tormentor during the mid819>Bs'
-nd in the longer run suffered from the non8realisation of the
dreams of an atomic dominated future' "i&ilian nuclear )ower not
the commanding heights of the new economy'
o +ut the way in which 7rance and 5ermany (and e&en 4taly) looked
elsewhere for the realisation of their atomic amitions did de)ri&e
!uratom of something which might )otentially ha&e een one its most
attracti&e features'
o The institution was thus largely ecli)sed' -sored into the !!" with the
merger treaty of 19>7 and little heard of since < although it is still acti&e'
,ike the !:" though it is a further reminder of the way in which the !uro)ean
integration story and the cold war story are intertwined, although not necessarily
in a straightforward manner' -nd also a reminder of oth the centrality of $.
in&ol&ement in the integration )rocess < and the )otential limits of $. le&erage'