GONZALES V NLRC (ATENEO DE DAVAOUNIVERSITY)

313 SCRA 169BELLOSILLO; August 26, 1999

FACTS
- Lorlene Gonzales was a Grade 6 teacher in Ateneo de DavaoUniversity from 1974
to 1993, when she was terminated. In1991, the Grade School Headmaster sent her a
letter informingher of 2 complaints from parents of her students for alleged useof
corporal punishment. She demanded to know who theparents were because Ateneo
wouldnt tell her. When she foundout that Ateneo was soliciting complaints from
parents of herstudents, she demanded an investigation.- Ateneo sent her a notice of
investigation, schedule,Committee composition, affidavits of the parents, and the
rulesof procedure. She refused to take part in the investigationunless the rules of
procedure were revised. The committee,under advise of counsel, did not revise the
rules, since it hadbeen used for a different teacher in the past. The investigationwent
on, without her participation. In 1993, she was asked totender her resignation,
otherwise she would be consideredresigned.- Lorlene filed for illegal dismissal with
the LA. The LA foundthat she was indeed illegally dismissed because although
shewas afforded due process, Ateneo failed to establish substantialevidence as to
Lorlenes guilt. It was established that she is avery good teacher, equipped with the
appropriate educationalqualifications, trainings, seminars and work experiences.
Suchfact was affirmed by her present and former students, theirparents, colleagues
and the former headmaster of the grade school. As a matter of fact, 6 out of the nine
9 students andtheir parents/guardians retracted and withdrew theirstatements.-
NLRC reversed LAs decision, saying the dismissal was validand legal.
ISSUE
WON dismissal was valid and legal
HELD
NO- In view of the foregoing, the conclusion of the NLRC isunwarranted.
No due process
The committee refused to revise the rules of procedure. As a result, Lorlene wasnt
afforded a chance defendherself and to examine / cross-examine the accusers.
Failure to prove by substantial evidence
The evidence of Ateneo didnt measure up to the standard laid down in Ang Tibay
v CIR: "substantial evidence is more than mere scintilla. Itmeans such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind mightaccept as adequate to support a conclusion."
Lorlenes evidence
She was able to prove that shes acompetent and dedicated teacher of Ateneo for
17 years.- Employment is not merely a contractual relationship; it hasassumed the
nature of property right. It may spell thedifference whether or not a family will have
food on their table,roof over their heads and education for their children. It is forthis
reason that the State has taken up measures to protectemployees from unjustified
dismissals. It is also because of thisthat the right to security of tenure is not only a
statutory rightbut, more so, a constitutional right.
Disposition
NLRC decision reversed and set aside. LA decisionreinstated, affirmed and adopted.


G.R. No. 82511 March 3, 1992
GLOBE-MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORPORATION
vs.
NLRC and IMELDA SALAZAR
EN BANC
ROMERO,
J.:

FACTS:
Imelda L. Salazar was employed as general system analyst at GMCR. Delfin Saldivar,
with whom shewas allegedly very close, was also employed as manager for technical
operations'.When reports that company equipment and spare parts worth
thousands of dollars under the custody of Saldivar were missing, GMCR made an
investigation of the latter's activities. The report of the company's internal
auditor,Mr. Agustin Maramara, indicated that Saldivar had entered into a
partnership styled Concave Commercial andIndustrial Company with Richard A.
Yambao, owner and manager of Elecon Engineering Services (Elecon), asupplier of
petitioner often recommended by Saldivar. It also disclosed that Saldivar had taken
petitioner'smissing Fedders airconditioning unit for his own personal use without
authorization and also connived withYambao to defraud petitioner of its property.
The air conditioner was recovered only after petitioner GMCR filedan action for
replevin against Saldivar.

It likewise appeared in the course of Maramara's investigation that ImeldaSalazar
violated company regulations by involving herself in transactions conflicting with
the company's interestsby signing as a witness to the articles of said partnership
and that she had full knowledge of the loss andwhereabouts of the airconditioner
but failed to inform her employer.The company placed Salazar under preventive
suspension for one month giving her 30 days within which to,explain her side. But
instead of submitting an explanation, she filed a complaint against petitioner for
illegalsuspension, which she subsequently amended to include illegal dismissal,
vacation and sick leave benefits, 13thmonth pay and damages, after petitioner
notified her in writing that she was considered dismissed "in view of inability to
refute and disprove the findings.

The Labor Arbiter ordered GMCR to reinstate Salazar to her former or equivalent
position and to pay her fullbackwages and other benefits she would have received
were it not for the illegal dismissal including payment of moral damages. On appeal,
NLRC affirmed the aforesaid decision with respect to the reinstatement but
limitedthe backwages to a period of two (2) years and deleted the award for moral
damages.
ISSUE:
WON the Labor Tribunal committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that the
suspension andsubsequent dismissal of private respondent were illegal and in
ordering her reinstatement with two (2)years' backwages.
HELD:

PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION WAS LAWFUL
.
Preventive suspension does not signify that the companyhas adjudged the employee
guilty of the charges she was asked to answer and explain. Suchdisciplinary measure
is resorted to for the protection of the company's property pending investigationany
alleged malfeasance or misfeasance committed by the employee
.

GMCR had not violated Salazar'sright to due process when she was promptly
suspended. If at all, the fault, lay with private respondent when sheignored
petitioner's "giving her ample opportunity to present (her) side to the
Management." Instead, she wentdirectly to the Labor Department and filed her
complaint for illegal suspension without giving her employer achance to evaluate
her side of the controversy.
SEPARATION FROM EMPLOYMENT WAS NOT FOR CAUSE
. While loss of confidence or breach of trust is avalid ground for terminations it must
rest on some basis which must be convincingly established. An employeeshould not
be dismissed on mere presumptions and suppositions. GMCR "presumed reasonably
thatcomplainant's sympathy would be with Saldivar" and its averment that
Saldivar's investigation althoughunverified, was probably true, do not pass this
Court's test.
While we should not condone the acts ofdisloyalty of an employee, neither should
we dismiss him on the basis of suspicion derived fromspeculative inferences.
The report merely insinuated that in view of Salazar's special relationship with
Saldivar,she might have had direct knowledge of Saldivar's questionable activities.
Direct evidence implicating privaterespondent is wanting from the records. Also, the
report is one

sided since it came out after Saldivar had already resigned and he does not have
theopportunity to refute management's findings. Since the main evidence dealt
principally on the alleged culpabilityof Saldivar and without having had a chance to
voice his, stringent examination should have been carried out toascertain if there
existed independent legal grounds to hold Salazar answerable as well and, thereby,
justify her dismissal.
REMEDY IN LAW TO RECTIFY AN UNLAWFUL DISMISSAL

Art. 279 of the Labor Code, as amended, provides:Security of Tenure.

In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of
anemployee except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title.

An employee who is unjustly dismissedfrom work shall be entitled to reinstatement
without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his fullbackwages,
inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent
computed fromthe time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of
his actual reinstatement.Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code:Sec.
2. Security of Tenure.

In cases of regular employments, the employer shall not terminate theservices of an
employee except for a just cause as provided in the Labor Code or when authorized
byexisting laws.Sec. 3. Reinstatement.


An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall by entitled toreinstatement
without loss of seniority rights and to backwages."

There being no evidence to show an authorized, much less a legal, cause for the
dismissal of privaterespondent, she had every right, not only to be entitled to
reinstatement, but as well, to full backwages
.
Theintendment of the law in prescribing the twin remedies of reinstatement and
payment of backwages is, in theformer, to restore the dismissed employee to her
status before she lost her job, for the dictionary meaning of theword "reinstate" is
"to restore to a state, condition, positions etc. from which one had been removed"
and in thelatter, to give her back the income lost during the period of
unemployment. Both remedies, looking to the past,would perforce make her
"whole."Reasons advanced by the Court for denying reinstatement under the facts of
the case and the law applicablethereto; that reinstatement can no longer be effected
in view of the long passage of time or because of therealities of the situation; or that
it would be "inimical to the employer's interest; " or that reinstatement may
nolonger be feasible; or, that it will not serve the best interests of the parties
involved; or that the company wouldbe prejudiced by the workers' continued
employment; or that it will not serve any prudent purpose as whensupervening
facts have transpired which make execution on that score unjust or inequitable or,
to an increasingextent, due to the resultant atmosphere of "antipathy and
antagonism" or "strained relations" or "irretrievableestrangement" between the
employer and the employee.
The principle of "strained relations"
cannot be applied indiscriminately. Otherwise, reinstatement cannever be possible
simply because some hostility is invariably engendered between the parties as a
result of litigation. That is human nature.No strained relations should arise from a
valid and legal act of asserting one's right; otherwise an employeewho shall assert
his right could be easily separated from the service, by merely paying his separation
pay on thepretext that his relationship with his employer had already become
strained.It should be proved that the employee concerned occupies a position where
he enjoys the trust andconfidence of his employer; and that it is likely that if
reinstated, an atmosphere of antipathy and antagonismmay be generated as to
adversely affect the efficiency and productivity of the employee concerned.It has not
been proved that the position of private respondent is one that may be
characterized as a position of trust and confidence. As a systems analyst, Salazar
was very far removed from operations involving theprocurement of supplies.
Salazar's duties revolved around the development of systems and analysis of
designson a continuing basis. In other words, Salazar did not occupy a position of
trust relative to the approval andpurchase of supplies and company
assets.WHEREFORE, the assailed is hereby AFFIRMED. GMCR is ordered to
REINSTATE Salazar and to pay her backwages equivalent to her salary for a period
of two (2) years only.

PLDT VS NLRC

Marilyn Abucay has been an employee of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone
Company (PLDT) for ten years when it was discovered that she accepted bribes from
certain customers in order to facilitate the phone connections of said customers. PLDT
terminated her employment. A labor case was filed by Abucay. The National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) found the dismissal to be valid but nevertheless, the NLRC ordered
PLDT to pay Abucay separation pay equivalent to one month pay for every year of service.
PLDT assailed the said decision. PLDT averred that separation pay is only available in cases
where the employee has been illegally dismissed and reinstatement is no longer possible.
PLDT further argued that to award Abucay separation pay is tantamount to rewarding her
misdeeds.
The Solicitor General, arguing for the NLRC, cited numerous previous cases where
separation pay has been awarded by the Supreme Court even if the employees dismissal
were due to just and authorized causes.
ISSUE: Whether or not Abucay is entitled to separation pay.
HELD: No. In this case, the Supreme Court finally set the rules as to when separation pay is
proper in cases where the employee is dismissed for valid reasons.
As a rule, and under the Labor Code, a person dismissed for just and authorized causes is
not entitled to separation pay. However, based on equity, an exception can be made if the
employee is dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct or those reflecting on his
moral character. Where the reason for the valid dismissal is, for example, habitual
intoxication or an offense involving moral turpitude, like theft or illicit sexual relations with a
fellow worker, the employer may not be required to give the dismissed employee separation
pay, or financial assistance, or whatever other name it is called, on the ground of social
justice.
In the case at bar, the reason for Abucays dismissal is due to her acceptance of a bribe
which is dishonesty and is immoral. The fact that she has worked with the PLDT for more
than a decade, if it is to be considered at all, should be taken against her as it reflects a
regrettable lack of loyalty that she should have strengthened instead of betraying during all of
her 10 years of service with the company. The court also made a pronouncement:
Compassion for the poor is an imperative of every humane society but only when the
recipient is not a rascal claiming an undeserved privilege. Social justice cannot be permitted
to be refuge of scoundrels any more than can equity be an impediment to the punishment of
the guilty. Those who invoke social justice may do so only if their hands are clean and their
motives blameless and not simply because they happen to be poor.



VIERNES V NLRC (BENGUET ELECTRIC COOP)
400 SCRA 557
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ; April 4, 2003

FACTS
- The 15 complainants services were contracted as meter readers by Benguet
Electric Cooperative (BENECO) for less than a months duration from October 8 to
31, 1990. Their employment contracts, couched in identical terms, read:
You are hereby appointed as METER READER (APPRENTICE) under BENECO-NEA
Management with compensation at the rate of SIXTY-SIX PESOS AND SEVENTY-FIVE
CENTAVOS (P66.75) per day from October 08 to 31, 1990.
- The said term notwithstanding, the complainants were allowed to work beyond
October 31, 1990, or until January 2, 1991. On January 3, 1991, they were each
served their identical notices of termination dated December 29, 1990. The same
read:
Please be informed that effective at the close of office hours of December 31, 1990,
your services with the BENECO will be terminated. Your termination has nothing to
do with your performance. Rather, it is because we have to retrench on personnel as
we are already overstaffed.
- The complainants filed separate complaints for illegal dismissal. It is the
contention of the complainants that they were not apprentices but regular
employees whose services were illegally and unjustly terminated in a manner that
was whimsical and capricious. On the other hand, the respondent invokes Article
283 of the Labor Code in defense of the questioned dismissal.
- The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaints for illegal dismissal but directed
BENECO to extend the contract of each complainant, with the exception of Viernes
who was ordered to be appointed as regular employee, a months salary as
indemnity for failure to give the 30-day notice, and backwages.
- The NLRC declared the complainants dismissal illegal, thus ordering their
reinstatement to their former position as meter readers or to any equivalent
position with payment of backwages limited to one year but deleting the award of
indemnity and attorneys fees. The award of underpayment of wages was affirmed.

ISSUES
1. WON the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the
reinstatement of petitioners to their former position as meter readers on
probationary status in spite of its finding that they are regular employees under
Article 280 of the Labor Code
2. WON the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in limiting the backwages of
petitioners to one year only in spite of its finding that they were illegally dismissed,
which is contrary to the mandate of full backwages until actual reinstatement but
not to exceed 3 years
3. WON the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in deleting the award of
indemnity pay which had become final because it was not appealed and in deleting
the award of attorneys fees because of the absence of a trial-type hearing
4. WON the mandate of immediately executory on the reinstatement aspect even
pending appeal as provided in the decision of Labor Arbiters equally applies in the
decision of the NLRC even pending appeal, by means of a motion for reconsideration
of the order reinstating a dismissed employee or pending appeal because the case is
elevated on certiorari before the Supreme Court

HELD
1. YES
Ratio There are two separate instances whereby it can be determined that an
employment is regular: (1) The particular activity performed by the employee is
necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer; or (2) if the
employee has been performing the job for at least a year.
Reasoning
- Petitioners fall under the first category. They were engaged to perform activities
that are necessary to the usual business of BENECO. We agree with the labor
arbiters pronouncement that the job of a meter reader is necessary to the business
of BENECO because unless a meter reader records the electric consumption of the
subscribing public, there could not be a valid basis for billing the customers. The fact
that the petitioners were allowed to continue working after the expiration of their
employment contract is evidence of the necessity and desirability of their service to
BENECOs business. In addition, during the preliminary hearing of the case on
February 4, 1991, BENECO even offered to enter into another temporary
employment contract with petitioners. This only proves BENECOs need for the
services of the petitioners. With the continuation of their employment beyond the
original term, petitioners have become full-fledged regular employees. The fact
alone that the petitioners have rendered service for a period of less than 6 months
does not make their employment status as probationary.
- The principle [exception to the rule in Ratio] enunciated in Brent School vs.
Zamora applies only with respect to fixed term employments. While it is true that
petitioners were initially employed on a fixed term basis as their employment
contracts were only for October 8 to 31, 1990, after October 31, 1990, they were
allowed to continue working in the same capacity as meter readers without the
benefit of a new contract or agreement or without the term of their employment
being fixed anew. After October 31, 1990, the employment of petitioners is no
longer on a fixed term basis. The complexion of the employment relationship of
petitioners and BENECO is thereby totally changed. Petitioners have attained the
status of regular employees.
2. YES
Reasoning
- A279 LC, as amended by RA 6715 [effective March 21, 1989], provides that an
illegally dismissed employee is entitled to full back wages, inclusive of allowances,
and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his
compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement.
Since petitioners were employed on October 8, 1990, the amended provision shall
apply to the present case. Hence, it was patently erroneous, tantamount to grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC in limiting to one year the back wages
awarded to petitioners.
3. YES
Ratio An employer becomes liable to pay indemnity to an employee who has been
dismissed if, in effecting such dismissal, the employer fails to comply with the
requirements of due process
Reasoning
- The indemnity is in the form of nominal damages intended not to penalize the
employer but to vindicate or recognize the employees right to procedural due
process which was violated by the employer. Under A2221 CC, nominal damages are
adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded
by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of
indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.
- Indemnity is not incompatible with the award of back wages. These two awards
are based on different considerations. Back wages are granted on grounds of equity
to workers for earnings lost due to their illegal dismissal from work. On the other
hand, the award of indemnity is meant to vindicate or recognize the right of an
employee to due process which has been violated by the employer. In this case,
BENECO failed to comply with the provisions of Article 283 of the Labor Code which
requires an employer to serve a notice of dismissal upon the employees and to the
Department of Labor, at least one month before the intended date of termination. As
to the award of attorneys fees, the same is justified by the provisions of Article 111
of the Labor Code.
4. YES
Reasoning
- A223 LC is plain and clear that the decision of the NLRC shall be final and
executory after 10 calendar days from receipt by the parties. In addition, Section
2(b), Rule VIII of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC provides that should
there be a motion for reconsideration entertained pursuant to Section 14, Rule VII of
these Rules, the decision shall be executory after 10 calendar days from receipt of
the resolution on such motion. We find nothing inconsistent or contradictory
between the two. The provision of the NLRC Rules of Procedure merely provides for
situations where a motion for reconsideration is filed. Since the Rules allow the
filing of a motion for reconsideration of a decision of the NLRC, it simply follows that
the ten-day period provided under Article 223 of the Labor Code should be
reckoned from the date of receipt by the parties of the resolution on such motion. In
the case at bar, petitioners received the resolution of the NLRC denying their motion
for reconsideration on October 22, 1992. Hence, it is on November 2, 1992 that the
questioned decision became executory.
Disposition Petition PARTLY GRANTED. Decision of the NLRC is MODIFIED. BENECO
is ordered to reinstate petitioners to their former or substantially equivalent
position as regular employees, without loss of seniority rights and other privileges,
with full back wages from the time of their dismissal until they are actually
reinstated. The indemnity to petitioners is REINSTATED. BENECO is also ordered to
pay attorneys fees in the amount of 10% of the total monetary award due to the
petitioners. In all other respects the assailed decision and resolution are AFFIRMED