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G.R. No.

L-63915 (146 SCRA 446) April 24, 1985

Taada vs. Tuvera
Petitioners sought a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the
publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders, invoking the right to be
informed on matters of public concern as recognized by the 1973 constitution.
Whether or not the publication of presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations,
executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders is necessary before its enforcement.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of
their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided The Court has ruled that publication
in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity
date-for then the date of publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day
following its publication-but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect. Article 2 does
not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of
its effectivity.
The publication of all presidential issuances of a public nature or of general applicability is mandated by
law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or
otherwise impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other
presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and
executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned.
Publication is, therefore, mandatory.
Kasilag versus Rodriguez Case Digest/ Brief 69
Phil 217
PROCEDURAL FACTS: This is an appeal taken by the defendant-petitioner from the
decision of the Court of Appeals which modified that rendered by the court of First Instance
of Bataan. The said court held: that the contract is entirely null and void and without effect;
that the plaintiffs-respondents, then appellants, are the owners of the disputed land, with its
improvements, in common ownership with their brother Gavino Rodriguez, hence, they are
entitled to the possession thereof; that the defendant-petitioner should yield possession of
the land in their favor, with all the improvements thereon and free from any lien
SUBSTANTIVE FACTS: The parties entered into a contract of loan to which has an
accompanying accessory contract of mortgage. The executed accessory contract involved
the improvements on a piece land, the land having been acquired by means of homestead.
P for his part accepted the contract of mortgage.

Believing that there are no violations to the prohibitions in the alienation of lands P, acting
in good faith took possession of the land. To wit, the P has no knowledge that the
enjoyment of the fruits of the land is an element of the credit transaction of Antichresis.

ISSUE: Whether or not P is deemed to be a possessor in good faith of the land, based upon
Article 3 of the New Civil Code as states Ignorance of the law excuses no one from
compliance therewith, the Ps lack of knowledge of the contract of antichresis.

HELD: The accessory contract of mortgage of the improvements of on the land is valid. The
verbal contract of antichresis agreed upon is deemed null and void.

REASONING: Sec 433 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides Every person who is
unaware of any flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition by which it is invalidated
shall be deemed a possessor of good faith. And in this case, the petitioner acted in good
faith. Good faith maybe a basis of excusable ignorance of the law, the petitioner acted in
good faith in his enjoyment of the fruits of the land to which was done through his apparent
acquisition thereof.
Facts : Jose Juego, a construction worker of D. M.
Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower,
Pasig City to his death. He was crushed to death when the
platform he was then on board and performing work, fell.
And the falling of the platform was due to the removal or
getting loose of the pin which was merely inserted to the
connecting points of the chain block and platform but
without a safety lock. Jose Juegos widow, Maria, filed in
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig a complaint for
damages against the deceaseds employer, D.M.
Consunji, Inc.

The employer raised, among other defenses, the widows
prior availment of the benefits from the State Insurance
Fund. Respondent avers, among others that the widow
cannot recover for from the company anymore an civil
damages on the account that it has recovered damages
under the Labor Code.

After trial, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the
widow and awarded actual and compensatory damages.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC in toto.

Issue: Whether or not private respondent is barred from
availing of death benefits under the Civil Code after
recovering from damages provided for under the Labor

Held: The Supreme Court has already ruled in various
cases that a recovery of damages under the Workers
Compensation Act is a bar to a recovery under an ordinary
civil action. It ruled that an injured worker has a choice of
either remedies. The Supreme Court allowed some
exceptions. In the case at bar, the CA ruled that the widow
had a right to file an ordinary action for civil actions
because she was not aware and was ignorant of her rights
and courses of action.

When a party having knowledge of the facts makes an
election between inconsistent remedies, the election is
final and bars any action, suit, or proceeding inconsistent
with the elected remedy, in the absence of fraud by the
other party. The first act of election acts as a bar.
Equitable in nature, the doctrine of election of remedies is
designed to mitigate possible unfairness to both parties. It
rests on the moral premise that it is fair to hold people
responsible for their choices. The purpose of the doctrine
is not to prevent any recourse to any remedy, but to
prevent a double redress for a single wrong. The choice of
a party between inconsistent remedies results in a waiver
by election.

However, waiver requires a knowledge of the facts basic
to the exercise of the right waived, with an awareness of
its consequences. That a waiver is made knowingly and
intelligently must be illustrated on the record or by the
evidence. A person makes a knowing and intelligent
waiver when that person knows that a right exists and has
adequate knowledge upon which to make an intelligent

In the case at bar, the widow was not aware of her rights
and remedies and thus her election to claim from the
Insurance Fund does not constitute a waiver on her part to
claim from the petitioner-company. Petitioners argument
that Art 3 of the New Civil Code, stating that Ignorance of
the law excuses no one cannot stand. The Supreme
Court ruled that the application of Article 3 is limited to
mandatory and prohibitory laws. This may be deduced
from the language of the provision, which, notwithstanding
a persons ignorance, does not excuse his or her
compliance with the laws. The rule in Floresca allowing
private respondent a choice of remedies is neither
mandatory nor prohibitory. Accordingly, her ignorance
thereof cannot be held against her .

This is a complaint by Lupo A. Atienza for Gross Immorality and Appearance of Impropriety against Judge
Francisco Brillantes, Jr.
Complainant alleged that he has two children with Yolanda De Castro with whom respondent Judge was
cohabiting with. Complainant claimed that respondent is married to one Zenaida Ongkiko with whom he
has 5 children. Respondent alleges that while he and Ongkiko went through a marriage ceremony (1965)
before a Nueva Ecija town Mayor, the same was not a valid marriage for lack of a marriage license. Upon
request of the parents of Ongkiko, respondent went through another marriage ceremony with her in
Manila. Again, neither party applied for a marriage license. Respondent claims that when he married De
Castro in civil rites in Los Angeles, California in 1991, he believed in all good faith and for all legal intents
and purposes that he was single because his first marriage was solemnized without a license. Respondent
also argues that the provision of Article 40 of the Family Code does not apply to him considering that his
first marriage took place in 1965 and was governed by the Civil Code of the Philippines; while the second
marriage took place in 1991 and governed by the Family Code.

WON Article 40 of the Family Code is applicable to the case at bar.
Yes. Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code on August
3, 1988 regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the Family Code, said
Article is given retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
accordance with the Civil Code or other laws. This is particularly true with Article 40, which is a rule of
procedure. Respondent has not shown any vested right that was impaired by the application of Article 40
to his case.
The plaintiffs were the owners of the property in question, leased to the defendants
since 1952. In January, 1969, the lease was converted to a month-to-month basis, and
the plaintiffs increased the rent to P30.00 a month. Since then, the defendants have not
paid the rent. This is why Espiritu, et. al, raised the complaint against the defendants
Cipriano, et. al. to the Municipal court of Pasig, Rizal.
The defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiffs complaint by invoking the prohibitory
provision of R.A. 6126 which states that there should be no increase of rent during a
one year period starting from March 30, 1970, where the rent does not exceed P300.00.
However, the increase of rent happened a year before the enactment of the statute.
Whether or not R.A. 6126 will have retroactive effect at the case at bar.
According to Article 4 of the Civil Code, no law shall be given retroactive effect unless
the contrary is provided. R.A. 6126 is not applicable at the case at bar. It is a well-
established rule of statutory construction that if the language of the law is plain, clear,
and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal interpretation. The principle of verba
legis or the plain meaning rule was applied.

Aruego vs CA

On March 7, 1983, a complaint for compulsory recognition and enforcement of successional rights
was filed before RTC Manila by the minors Antonia Aruego and alleged the sister Evelyn Aruego
represented by their mother Luz Fabian. The complaint was opposed by the legitimate children of
Jose Aruego Jr.
The RTC rendered judgment in favor of Antonia Aruego. A petition for certiorari was then filed
alleging that the Family Code of the Philippines which took effect on August 3, 1988 shall have a
retroactive effect thereby the trial court lost jurisdiction over the complaint on the ground of
ISSUE: Whether or not the Family Code shall have a retroactive effect in the case.
HELD: The Supreme Court upheld that the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect in so far
as the instant case is concerned as its application will prejudice the vested rights of respondents to
have her case be decided under Article 285 of the Civil Code. It is a well settled reception that laws
shall have a retroactive effect unless it would impair vested rights. Therefore, the Family Code in this
case cannot be given a retroactive effect.

Brehm vs Republic

Brehm was a non-resident alien of the Philippines. He filed a petition however, to adopt his
step-child. He argued that Article 335 of the New Civil Code which prohibits a non-resident alien to
adopt was inapplicable because it covers adoption only for the purpose of establishing a relationship
of paternity
and filiations where none existed, but not where the adopting parents are not total strangers to the
child. Petitioners further contended that they could adopt pursuant to Article 332 of the New Civil
Code which expressly authorizes the adoption of a step-child by a stepfather.

Whether or not Brehm as a non resident may adopt a child

Article 338 should be construed in connection with Article 335. Article 33G clearly states that
"The following cannot adopt ... (4) non-resident aliens." It is therefore mandatory because it contains
words of positive prohibition and is couched in negative terms, importing that the act required shall
not be done otherwise than designated (50 Am. JUl'. 51). On the other hand, Article 338 provides
that "the following may be adopted: (3) step-child by the step-father or step-mother." This provision is
merely directory and can only be given operation if the same does not conflict with the mandatory
provisions of Article 335, Moreover, it is Article 335 that confers jurisdiction to the court over the case
and before Article 338 may or can be availed of, such jurisdiction must first be established. There is
no question that petitioner Brehm is a non-resident. By his own testimony, he supplied the
conclusive proof of his status, and no amount of reasoning will overcome the same. For this reason
he cannot adopt.

GR No. L-30061 (February 27, 1974)
People vs. Jabinal
Jabinal was found guilty of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition.
The accused admitted that on September 5, 1964, he was in possession of the revolver and the
ammunition described in the complaint, without the requisite license or permit. He, however,
claimed to be entitled to exoneration because, although he had no license or permit, he had an
appointment as Secret Agent from the Provincial Governor of Batangas and an appointment as
Confidential Agent from the PC Provincial Commander, and the said appointments expressly
carried with them the authority to possess and carry the firearm in question.
The accused contended before the court a quo that in view of his above-mentioned
appointments as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent, with authority to possess the firearm
subject matter of the prosecution, he was entitled to acquittal on the basis of the Supreme
Courts decision in People vs. Macarandang(1959) and People vs. Lucero(1958) and not on the basis
of the latest reversal and abandonment in People vs. Mapa (1967).
Whether or not appellant should be acquitted on the basis of the courts rulings in Macarandang
and Lucero, or should his conviction stand in view of the complete reversal of the MAcarandang
and Lucero doctrine in Mapa.
Decisions of this Court, under Article 8 of the New Civil Code states that Judicial decisions
applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system .
The settled rule supported by numerous authorities is a restatement of legal maxim legis
interpretatio legis vim obtinet the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent
court has the force of law.
Appellant was appointed as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent and authorized to possess a
firearm pursuant to the prevailing doctrine enunciated in Macarandang and Lucero under which
no criminal liability would attach to his possession of said firearm in spite of the absence of a
license and permit therefor, appellant must be absolved. Certainly, appellant may not be
punished for an act which at the time it was done was held not to be punishable.
The appellant was acquitted.
Martinez v Van Buskirk Digest

1. On the 11th day of September, 1908, Carmen Ong de Martinez, was riding a carromata in Ermita,
Manila when a delivery wagon owned by the defendant (used for the transportation of fodder and to
which two horses are attached), came from the opposite direction, while their carromata went close
to the sidewalk in order to let the delivery wagon pass by. However, instead of merely passing by,
the horses ran into the carromata occupied by the plaintiff with her child and overturned it, causing a
serious cut upon the plaintiffs head.

3. The defendant contends that the cochero, who was driving his delivery wagon at the time of the
accident, was actually a good servant and was considered a safe and reliable cochero. He also
claims that the cochero was tasked to deliver some forage at Calle Herran, and for that purpose the
defendants employee tied the driving lines of the horses to the front end of the delivery wagon for
the purpose of unloading the forage to be delivered. However, a vehicle passed by the driver and
made noises that frightened the horses causing them to run. The employee failed to stop the horses
since he was thrown upon the ground.

4. From the stated facts, the court ruled that the defendant was guilty of negligence. The court
specifically cited a paragraph of Article 1903 of the Civil Code. Hence, this is appeal to reverse such

Issue: Whether or not the employer, who has furnished a gentle and tractable team (of
horses) and a trusty and capable driver, is liable for the negligence of such driver.

NO. The cochero of the defendant was not negligent in leaving the horses in the manner described
by the evidence in this case. It is believed that acts or performances which, in a long time, have not
been destructive and which are approved by the society are considered as custom. Hence, they
cannot be considered as unreasonable or imprudent.

The reason why they have been permitted by the society is that they are beneficial rather that
prejudicial. One could not easily hold someone negligent because of some act that led to an injury or
accident. It would be unfair therefore to render the cochero negligent because of such

The court further held that it is a universal practice of merchants during that time to deliver products
through horse-drawn vehicles; and it is also considered universal practice to leave the horses in the
manner in which they were left during the accident. It has been practiced for a long time and
generally has not been the cause of accidents or injuries the judgment is therefore reversed.

Armigos v CA Digest
1. The private respondent, Cristito Mata, filed a complaint against the herein petitioner with the
Municipal Court of Digos Davao del Sur, for the collection of damages and attorney's fees. After trial,
judgment was rendered in favor of the private respondent.

2. A copy of the decision was received by the petitioner on 8 June 1977, and the following day, 9 June
1977, he filed a notice of appeal with the said municipal court, and on 24 June 1977, he completed
the other requirements for the perfection of an appeal, including the filing of an appeal bond and the
payment of the appellate court docket fee. However, when the case was elevated to the CFI for the
consideration of the appeal, the presiding judge thereof ruled that the appeal was filed beyond the
reglementary period; consequently, he dismissed the appeal.

3. Petitioners contention: that from 8 June 1977, when he received a copy of the decision of the
municipal court, to 24 June 1977, when he perfected his appeal, only fifteen (15) days had elapsed
so that the decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao del Sur, dismissing his appeal for having
been filed beyond the reglementary period, is erroneous and contrary to law. The petitioner
contended that the computation of the period to appeal should commence on the hour he received
copy of the decision, so that the first of the 15-day period comprising 24 hours is from 4:00 o'clock
p.m. of 9 June 1977 to 4:00 o'clock p.m. of 10 June 1977 and the last day, from 4:00 o'clock p.m. of
23 June 1977 to 4:00 o'clock p.m. of 24 June 1977.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner's contention is correct


1. The Court considered the day as synonymous with the date. Consequently, the 5th day shall be the
15 days after the appeal regardless of the time when it was submitted.

2. The rule stated in Article 13 of the Civil Code to the effect that "In computing a period, the first day
shall be excluded, and the last day included" is similar, but not identical to Section 4 of the Code of
Civil Procedure which provided that "Unless otherwise specially provided, the time within which an
act is required by law to be done shall be computed by excluding the first day and including the last;
and if the last be Sunday or a legal holiday it shall be excluded", as well as the old Rule 28 of the
Rules of Court which stated that prescribed or allowed by the Rules of Court, by order of a court, or
by any other applicable statute, the day of the act, event or default after which the designated period
of time begins to run is not to be included. The last day of the period so computed is to be included,
unless it is a Sunday or a legal holiday, in which event the time shall run until the end of the next day
which is neither a Sunday or a legal holiday."

3. Human memory is frail - Human memory on dates or days is frail and unless the day is an
extraordinary one for a person, there is no reasonable certainty of its correctness. What more for the
exact hour when a pleading, order or decision is received by a party? The period laid down by the
law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional.

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CASE DIGEST ON NAMARCO V. TECSON [29 S 70 (1969)] - F: On 10/14/55, the CFI-Mla. rendered
judgment in a civil case, Price Stabilization Corp. vs. Tecson, et al. Copy of this decision was, on
10/21/55 served upon defendants in said case. On 12/21/65, NAMARCO, as successor to all the
properties, assets, rights, and choses in action of Price, as pltff in that case and judgment creditor therein,
filed w/ the same court, a complaint against defendants for the revival of the judgment rendered therein.
Def. Tecson moved to dismiss said complaint, upon the ground of prescription of action, among others.
The motion was granted by the court. Hence, the appeal to the CA w/c was certified to the SC, upon the
ground that the only question raised therein is one of law, namely,

ISSUE: W/n the present action for the revival of a judgment is barred by the statute of limitations.
Pursuant to Art. 1144 (3), NCC, an action for judgement must be brought w/in 10 yrs from the time the
judgment sought to be revived has become final. This in turn, took place on 12/21/55 or 30 days from
notice of the judgment-- w/c was received by defs. on 10/21/55-- no appeal having been taken therefrom.
The issue is thus confined to the date on w/c the 10 yrs from 12/21/55 expired. Pltff alleges that it was
12/21/65, but appellee maintains otherwise, bec. :when the law speaks of years xxx it shall be understood
that years are of 365 days each"-- and, in 1960 and 1964 being leap years, so that 10 yrs of 365 days
each, or an aggregate of 3650 days, from 12/21/55, expired on 12/19/65.
Pltff.-appellant further insists that there is no question that when it is not a leap year, 12/21 to 12/21 of the
following year is one year. If the extra day in a leap year is not a day of the year, bec. it is the 366th day,
then to what year does it belong? Certainly, it must belong to the year where it falls, and therefore, that
the 366 days constitute one yr.

HELD: The very conclusion thus reached by appellant shows that its theory contravenes the explicit
provision of Art. 13 limiting the connotation of each "year"-- as the term is used in our laws-- to 365 days.
[The action to enforce a judgment which became final on December 21, 1955 prescribes in 10 years.
Since the Civil Code computes "years" in terms of 365 days each, the action has prescribed on December
19, 1955, since the two intervening leap years added two more days to the computation. It is not the
calendar year that is considered.]

G.R. No. 915, U.S. v. Tiqui, 1 Phil. 306
Republic of the Philippines
August 1, 1902
G.R. No. 915
THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appellant,
AMBROSIO TIQUI, defendant-appellee.
Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta, for appellant.
Simplicio del Rosario, for private prosecutor.
Basilio R. Mapa, for appellee.
The final judgment in this case having been pronounced on the 31st day of March last,
the complaining witness, on the 5th day of April, gave notice of appeal. The appeal
was allowed. Counsel for the accused now moves the court to dismiss the appeal on
the ground that it was taken on the sixteen day after the promulgation of the sentence,
fifteen days being the term assigned by article 47 of the law.
The question arising is whether the fifteen days are to be counted from the very day of
the publication of the judgment.
In a doubtful case the law will be interpreted in the light of its underlying principles.
The law in question is based upon the American legislation, and the local legislation
in force prior to its promulgation, which, by section 1 thereof, is declared to be
continued in force in so far as not in conflict with its provisions.
Under the American system, in computing time the first day is excluded and the last
day included, it not being necessary to cite authority in support of this proposition,
inasmuch as the same doctrine has been established in the special legislation of the
Philippines, as may be seen in article 4 and 76 of the Code of Civil Procedure now in
force. No rule was more uniform in the law as formerly and as still enforced in these
Islands, as may be seen in the Codes of Criminal and Civil Procedure, as well as in the
Code of Commerce and the Civil Code. Article 1130 of the Civil Code establishes as a
principle that "when the term of an obligation is fixed by days to be counted from a
specified one, such day shall be excluded from the computation, which shall begin on
the following day." It not being demonstrated that article 47 of General Orders, No.
58, upon the subject of criminal procedure has intentionally departed from these
precedents, it must be construed harmoniously with the other law, both substantive
and adjective, which is wholly uniform on this subject. The reason why the first day is
excluded is undoubtedly because the appellant is given fifteen days in which to
appeal, and as Paragraph I, article 7 of the Civil Code provides that a day shall always
be understood to consist of twenty-four hours, it follows that the period allowed
would not be fifteen complete days were the day in question that is, the day of the
publication of the judgment to be included in the computation.
The motion is therefore overruled, with costs. So ordered.

Valerio 1
Article 15: Nationality PrincipleIbanez de Alcoa vs. HSBFacts:
Under the Old Civil Code, the principle of Patria Potestad, granted the parentof a child the
administration and usufruct of the property of their minor child untilthe formal emancipation of said
child upon reaching the age of majority. In 1901,the New Civil Code impliedly repealed this law by
introducing the concept of guardianship and removing the parents administration over the childs
property.Petitioners were formally emancipated by their parents on 1903, thereuponobtaining full
administration over their property. Following subsequent events,Aldecoa and Co., wherein petitioners
were partners thereof, became heavilyindebted and entered into mortgage agreement with the
HSB.Upon the liquidation of said firm, petitioners filed a proceeding and procured a judgment annulling
the articles of copartnership with Aldecoa and Co., anddecreeing that they were creditors and not
partners of the firm.It is contended by the petitioners that under the New Civil Code, their
emancipationwas null and void since they were no longer under the principle of Patria Potestad,and
thus had no capacity to enter into a mortgage agreement.
WON Isabel Palet, mother of the petitioners, could legally emancipate theplaintiffs under the law in
force in the Phils in 1903, and thus confer uponthem capacity to execute a valid mortgage on their real
HELD:The judgment of the court below, in so far as it sustains the validity of themortgage contract as to
Joaquin Ibaez de Aldecoa, is affirmed. In so faras that judgment declares the nullity of the mortgage as
to Zoilo Ibaezde Aldecoa, it is reversed, and the mortgage is hereby declared bindingupon the latter.
That the patria potestad (parental authority) of the mother did not terminateupon the enactment of
the new Code of Civil Procedure, but was saved fromthe operation of the new law by section 581
thereof. Hence, her rights andduties as to her children as well as theirs, should be regulated by
theprovisions of the old Civil Code. Under the old Civil Code the mother couldvalidly emancipate the
children, and, subsequent to such emancipation, thechildren could execute a binding mortgage upon
their real property with theconsent of their mothe

Insular Governmment

FACTS:An appeal from the judgment of the CFI of Manila dated 05 September
OOA 17 Apr 1903, in the City of Chicago, State of Illinois, USA, the
defendant an through a representative of the Insular Government of the
Philippine Islands, entered into a contract for two (2) years and to
receive a salary $ 1,200 a year as a stenographer.
The contract contained a provision that in case of a violation of its
terms on the part of the defendant, he becomes liable to the plaintiff for
the amount expended by the Government. On 11 February 1904, the defendant
left the service of the plaintiff and refused to make a further compliance
with the terms of the contract.
ISSUES: WON the law of the Philippines or that of the State of Illinois
would govern to the case at bar.
RULING: Contract was entered into in Illinois by a minor in the
Philippines but had the capacity in Illinois.

No rule is better settled in law than that matters bearing upon the
execution, interpretation, and validity of a contract are determined by
the law of the place where the contract is made.
DISPO: Affirmed

Bellis v Bellis
Amos G. Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States. He had five
legitimate children with his first wife (whom he divorced), three legitimate children with his
second wife (who survived him) and, finally, three illegitimate children.
6 years prior Amos Bellis death, he executed two(2) wills, apportioning the remainder of his
estate and properties to his seven surviving children. The appellants filed their oppositions to
the project of partition claiming that they have been deprived of their legitimes to which they
were entitled according to the Philippine law. Appellants argued that the deceased wanted his
Philippine estate to be governed by the Philippine law, thus the creation of two separate wills.
Whether or not the Philippine law be applied in the case in the determination of the illegitimate
childrens successional rights
Court ruled that provision in a foreigners will to the effect that his properties shall be
distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for
his national law cannot be ignored in view of those matters that Article 10 now Article 16
of the Civil Code states said national law should govern.

Where the testator was a citizen of Texas and domiciled in Texas, the intrinsic validity of his will
should be governed by his national law. Since Texas law does not require legitimes, then his will,
which deprived his illegitimate children of the legitimes, is valid.
The Supreme Court held that the illegitimate children are not entitled to the legitimes under the
texas law, which is the national law of the deceased.

January 31, 1963
ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the deceased, Executor and
Heir-appellees, VS. HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant
January 31, 1963

Edward E. Christensen, though born in New York, migrated to California, where he resided and
consequently was considered a California citizen. In 1913, he came to the Philippines where he became
a domiciliary until his death. However, during the entire period of his residence in this country he had
always considered himself a citizen of California. In his will executed on March 5, 1951, he instituted an
acknowledged natural daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen as his only heir, but left a legacy of sum of
money in favor of Helen Christensen Garcia who was rendered to have been declared acknowledged
natural daughter. Counsel for appellant claims that California law should be applied; that under California
law, the matter is referred back to the law of the domicile; that therefore Philippine law is ultimately
applicable; that finally, the share of Helen must be increased in view of the success ional rights of
illegitimate children under Philippine law. On the other hand, counsel for the heir of Christensen contends
that inasmuch as it is clear that under Article 16 of our Civil Code, the national law of the deceased must
apply, our courts must immediately apply the internal law of California on the matter; that under California
law there are no compulsory heirs and consequently a testator could dispose of any property possessed
by him in absolute dominion and that finally, illegitimate children not being entitled to anything and his will
remain undisturbed.

Whether or not the Philippine law should prevail in administering the estate of Christensen?

The court in deciding to grant more successional rights to Helen said in effect that there are two rules in
California on the matter: the internal law which should apply to Californians domiciled in California; and
the conflict rule which should apply to Californians domiciled outside of California. The California conflict
rule says: If there is no law to the contrary in the place where personal property is situated, is deemed to
follow the person of its owner and is governed by the law of his domicile. Christensen being domiciled
outside California, the law of his domicile, the Philippines, ought to be followed. Where it is referred back
to California, it will form a circular pattern referring to both country back and forth.

Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals Case Digest/ Brief G.R. No. L-14628
Hermosisima vs. CA Cse Digest/ Brief (link)
Procedural Facts: Case filed in Court of First Instance of Cebu which rendered decision in favor of P
(soledad). Lower Courts decision was modified by the Court of Appeals by increasing compensatory
damages and moral damages.
Substantive Facts: Soledad Cagigas, a teacher and petitioner, who was almost ten (10) years younger
than she, used to go around together and were regarded as engaged, although he had made no
promise of marriage prior thereto their intimacy developed among them Soledad advised petitioner
that she was in the family way, whereupon he promised to marry her. Their child, Chris Hermosisima,
was born. However defendant married one Romanita Perez.

ISSUE: Whether or not moral damages are recoverable, under our laws, for breach of promise to
HELD: When the woman becomes pregnant and subsequently delivers. Although she cannot recover
moral damages for the breach, nevertheless she can recover compensatory damages for medical and
hospitalization expenses as well as attorneys fees.
REASONING: Because of defendant-appellant's seduction power, plaintiff-appellee, overwhelmed by
her love for him finally yielded to his sexual desires in spite of her age and self-control, she being a
woman after all, we hold that said defendant-appellant is liable for seduction and, therefore, moral
damages may be recovered from him under the provision of Article 2219, paragraph 3, of the new
Civil Code.

In the case of Llorente vs. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 122166. March 11,
1998), the Honorable Supreme Court ruled that bad faith does not
simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imputes a dishonest
purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a
breach of sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will; it
partakes of the nature of fraud. (Spiegel v. Beacon Participations, 8 NE
2nd Series, 895, 1007). It contemplates a state of mind affirmatively
operating with furtive design or some motive of self interest or ill will
for ulterior purposes (Air France v. Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155, 166-167).
Evident bad faith connotes a manifest deliberate intent on the part of
the accused to do wrong or cause damage. Furthermore, this must be
substantiated by evidence as the unbroken jurisprudence is that bad
faith under the law cannot be presumed, it must be established by clear
and convincing evidence.
Evident bad faith was illustrated in the case of Mejorada vs.
Sandiganbayan (G.R. Nos. L-51065-72 June 30, 1987). The accused therein
took advantage of his position as a right-of-way-agent by making the
claimants sign the aforementioned agreements to demolish and sworn
statements which contained falsified declarations of the value of the
improvements and lots. Honorable Supreme Court ruled that there was
evident bad faith on the part of the accused when he inflated the
values of the true claims and then divested the claimants of a large
share of the amounts due them.vi
Similarly, the Honorable Supreme Court ruled in the case of Deniega vs.
Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 109991 May 22, 1995) that there is evident bad
faith when the accused therein already paid the contractor a total of P
650,000.00 out of the contract price of P 652, 562.60 when only 36.24%
of the construction of the market has been completed. In so doing,
petitioners disregarded the provision in the contract that payment
should be based on the percentage of work accomplishment. Moreover,
the contract provided that in case of delay in the completion of the
project, the contractor shall be liable for liquidated damages at the rate
of 1/10 of 1% of the contract price per day of delay.
Lastly, there was also a finding of evident bad faith in the case of Asilo vs.
People (G.R. Nos. 159017-18, March 9, 2011) when the accused therein
demolished market stalls despite the fact that these were not considered
public nuisance and where there is no legal order for its demolition.
On the other hand, the Honorable Supreme Court ruled that there can
be no evident bad faith when the accused who is a an officer-in-charge
of a government hospital removed the name of the private complainant
from the plantilla and withheld her salary when the latter was found
moonlighting (Jacinto vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 84571 October 2, 1989).
In that case, the Honorable Supreme Court ruled that the actions taken
by petitioner afore-stated were not entirely without rhyme or reason.
They were measures taken by a superior against an erring employee
who studiously ignored if not defied his authority. In another case, it
also ruled that mistake on a doubtful or difficult question of law may be
the basis of good faith as long as it is not shown that they were
motivated by malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith (Daraug
vs. Perez, CA-G.R. SP No. 87152, September 18, 2006).
From the above-cited cases, it can be said that a person can be
considered in good faith where there is an honest intention to abstain
from taking any unconscientious advantage of another (PNB vs. Heirs of
Militar, G.R. No. 164801, June 30, 2006). In the case of People vs.
Ojeda (G.R. Nos. 104238-58, June 3, 2004), it was ruled that good faith
may be demonstrated, for instance, by a debtors offer to arrange a
payment scheme with his creditor. Any allegation of intent of malice or
deceit can be rebutted by an extraordinary effort to pay complainant
notwithstanding her own financial situation (People vs. Dimalanta, G.R. No.
157039, October 1, 2004).

Pe vs Pe
TITLE: Pe vs. Pe


Alfonso Pe, the defendant, was a married man, agent of La Perla Cigar and Cigarette Factory in Gasan
Marinduque who was treated like a son by Cecilio Pe, one of the petitioners. Cecilio introduced
Alfonso to his children and was given access to visit their house. Alfonso got fond of Lolita, 24 year old
single, daughter of Cecilio. The defendant frequented the house of Lolita sometime in 1952 on the
pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary. Eventually they fell in love with each

Plaintiff brought action before lower court of Manila and failed to prove Alfonso deliberately and in
bad faith tried to win Lolitas affection. The case on moral damages was dismissed.

ISSUE: Whether or not defendant is liable to Lolitas family on the ground of moral, good custom and
public policy due to their illicit affair.


Alfonso committed an injury to Lolitas family in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and
public policy contemplated in Article 20 of the civil code. The defendant took advantage of the trust
of Cecilio and even used the praying of rosary as a reason to get close with Lolita. The wrong caused
by Alfonso is immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married man.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed. Defendant is hereby sentenced to pay the
plaintiffs the sum of P5,000.00 as damages and P2,000.00 as attorney's fees and expenses of
litigations. Costs against appellee.
219 SCRA 115 Civil Law Torts and Damages Breach of promise to Marry Article 21 of the
Civil Code
In August 1986, while working as a waitress in Dagupan City, Pangasinan, Marilou Gonzales, then
21 years old, met Gashem Shookat Baksh, a 29 year old exchange student from Iran who was
studying medicine in Dagupan. The two got really close and intimate. On Marilous account, she said
that Gashem later offered to marry her at the end of the semester. Marilou then introduced Gashem
to her parents where they expressed their intention to get married. Marilous parents then started
inviting sponsors and relatives to the wedding. They even started looking for animals to slaughter for
the occasion.
Meanwhile, Marilou started living with Gashem in his apartment where they had sexual intercourse.
But in no time, their relationship went sour as Gashem began maltreating Marilou. Gashem
eventually revoked his promise of marrying Marilou and he told her that he is already married to
someone in Bacolod City. So Marilou went home and later sued Gashem for damages.
The trial court ruled in favor of Marilou and awarded her P20k in moral damages. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
On appeal, Gashem averred that he never proposed marriage to Marilou and that he cannot be
adjudged to have violated Filipino customs and traditions since he, being an Iranian, was not familiar
with Filipino customs and traditions.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct.
HELD: Yes. Gashem is liable to pay for damages in favor of Marilou not really because of his breach
of promise to marry her but based on Article 21 of the Civil Code which provides:

In 1954, Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer planned their marriage. They decided to schedule it
on September 4, 1954. And so Wassmer made preparations such as: making and sending wedding
invitations, bought her wedding dress and other apparels, and other wedding necessities. But 2 days
before the scheduled day of wedding, Velez sent a letter to Wassmer advising her that he will not be
able to attend the wedding because his mom was opposed to said wedding. And one day before the
wedding, he sent another message to Wassmer advising her that nothing has changed and that he
will be returning soon. However, he never returned.
This prompted Wassmer to file a civil case against Velez. Velez never filed an answer and
eventually judgment was made in favor of Wassmer. The court awarded exemplary and moral
damages in favor of Wassmer.
On appeal, Velez argued that his failure to attend the scheduled wedding was because of fortuitous
events. He further argued that he cannot be held civilly liable for breaching his promise to marry
Wassmer because there is no law upon which such an action may be grounded. He also contested
the award of exemplary and moral damages against him.
ISSUE: Whether or not the award of damages is proper.
HELD: Yes. The defense of fortuitous events raised by Velez is not tenable and also
unsubstantiated. It is true that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong.
However, in this case, it was not a simple breach of promise to marry. because of such promise,
Wassmer made preparations for the wedding. Velezs unreasonable withdrawal from the wedding is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. Wassmers cause of action is supported under
Article 21 of the Civil Code which provides in part any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the
latter for the damage.
And under the law, any violation of Article 21 entitles the injured party to receive an award for moral
damages as properly awarded by the lower court in this case. Further, the award of exemplary
damages is also proper. Here, the circumstances of this case show that Velez, in breaching his
promise to Wassmer, acted in wanton, reckless, and oppressive manner this warrants the
imposition of exemplary damages against him.

People v. Ritter 194 SCRA 690
FACTS: On or about October 10, 1986, Ritter brought Jessie Ramirez and Rosario Baluyot in a hotel
room in Olongapo. Ritter masturbated Jessie and fingered Rosario. Afterwards, he inserted a foreign
object to the vagina of Rosario. The next morning, Ritter gave Jessie 200, and Rosario 300. Rosario told
Jessie that Ritter inserted an object inside her vagina. Sometime the following day, Rosario said that the
object has already been removed from her vagina. On May 14, 1987, Alcantara saw Rosario with bloody
skirt, foul smelling. Rosario was brought and confined to Olongapo City general Hospital. An OB-Gyne
tried to remove the object inside her vagina using forceps but failed because it was deeply embedded and
covered by tissues. She was having peritonitis. She told the attending physician that a Negro inserted the
object to her vagina 3 months ago. Ritter was made liable for rape with homicide.

ISSUE: W/N Ritter was liable for rape and homicide

HELD: No. The prosecution failed to prove that Rosario was only 12 years old when the incident with
Ritter happened. And that Rosario prostituted herself even at the tender age. As evidence, she received
300 from Ritter the following morning. A doctor/specialist also testified that the inserted object in the
vagina of Rosario Baluyot by Ritter was different from that which caused her death. As evidence, Rosario
herself said to Jessie the following day that the object has been removed already. She also told the
doctor that a Negro inserted it to her vagina 3 months ago. Ritter was a Caucasian. Ritter was also
acquitted for the criminal case of rape with homicide. However, it does not exempt him for the moral and
exemplary damages he must award to the victims heirs. It does not necessarily follow that the appellant
is also free from civil liability which is impliedly instituted with the criminal action. Ritter was deported.

Nikko Hotel vs. Reyes
TITLE: Nikko Hotel Manila vs. Reyes
CITATION: GR No. 154259, February 28, 2005


Petitioners Nikko Hotel Manila and Ruby Lim assailed the decision of the Court of Appeals in reversing
the decision of RTC of Quezon City. CA held petitioner liable for damages to Roberto Reyes aka
Amang Bisaya, an entertainment artist.

There are two versions of the story:
Mr. Reyes: On the eve of October 13, 1994, Mr. Reyes while having coffee at the lobby of Nikko Hotel
was approached by Dr. Violet Filart, a friend several years back. According to Mr. Reyes, Dr. Filart
invited him to join a birthday party at the penthouse for the hotels former General Manager, Mr.
Tsuruoka. Plaintiff agreed as Dr. Filart agreed to vouch for him and carried a basket of fruits, the
latters gift. He He lined up at the buffet table as soon as it was ready but to his great shock, shame
and embarrassment, Ruby Lim, Hotels Executive Secretary, asked him to leave in a loud voice enough
to be heard by the people around them. He was asked to leave the party and a Makati policeman
accompanied him to step-out the hotel. All these time, Dr Filart ignored him adding to his shame and

Ms. Ruby Lim: She admitted asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party but not in the manner claimed by the
plaintiff. Ms. Lim approached several people including Dr. Filarts sister, Ms. Zenaida Fruto, if Dr.
Filart did invite him as the captain waiter told Ms. Lim that Mr. Reyes was with Dr. Filarts group. She
wasnt able to ask it personally with Dr. Filart since the latter was talking over the phone and doesnt
want to interrupt her. She asked Mr. Reyes to leave because the celebrant specifically ordered that
the party should be intimate consisting only of those who part of the list. She even asked politely
with the plaintiff to finish his food then leave the party.

During the plaintiffs cross-examination, he was asked how close was Ms. Lim when she approached
him at the buffet table. Mr. Reyes answered very close because we nearly kissed each other.
Considering the close proximity, it was Ms. Lims intention to relay the request only be heard by him.
It was Mr. Reyes who made a scene causing everybody to know what happened.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners acted abusively in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party.


Supreme Court held that petitioners did not act abusively in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party.
Plaintiff failed to establish any proof of ill-motive on the part of Ms. Lim who did all the necessary
precautions to ensure that Mr. Reyes will not be humiliated in requesting him to leave the party.
Considering almost 20 years of experience in the hotel industry, Ms. Lim is experienced enough to
know how to handle such matters. Hence, petitioners will not be held liable for damages brought
under Article 19 and 20 of the Civil Code.

Contract of Sale Ownership Rescissible Contract Unjust Enrichment
On November 21, 1964, Chan Lin offered to buy 170 cavans of rice from Sandoval at P37.25/sack
(P6332.50). Sandoval agreed so from Rosales, Pangasinan, Chan Lin accompanied Sandovals
driver to have the rice be delivered to San Fernando, La Union. Upon arriving, the sacks of rice were
unloaded but when Sandovals driver tried to collect the payment, Chan Lin was nowhere to be
found. The driver then tried to collect from Aniano, who was the storeowner where they unloaded the
rice. But Aniano refused to pay, saying that he made the payment to Chan Lin for P33/cavan and
that he will not return the sacks of rice to Sandoval as they were paid already. Apparently, Aniano
and Chan Lin had an earlier agreement that Chan Lin will sell him 170 cavans of rice for P33 each.
Aniano said Chan Lin swindled Sandoval. Sandoval filed for replevin.
ISSUE: Who is the rightful owner of the 170 cavans of rice?
HELD: Ownership was transferred to Chan Lin when the cavans of rice were delivered to Anianos
store. This was agreed upon in the contract between Sandoval and Chan Lin. However, it was found
that 3 days after the delivery, Chan Lin returned Anianos money. Aniano claimed that he then
returned the cavans of rice to Sandoval. But Sandovals driver said Aniano never returned the sacks
of rice. They would have withdrawn the replevin case had the sacks of rice been returned. Sandoval
has all the right to recover the rice and rescind the contract as he was not paid. Aniano cannot
unjustly enrich himself at the expense of Sandoval.