FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-52364. March 25, 1983.]

RICARDO VALLADOLID, petitioner, vs. HON. AMADO
G. INCIONG, Deputy Minister of Labor, and
COPACABANA APARTMENT-HOTEL, respondents.

SYLLABUS
3.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; PROCEDURAL DUE
PROCESS; NOT VIOLATED IN SUMMARY RESOLUTION
OF APPLICATIONS FOR CLEARANCE. J.R.M. cannot
claim that it was deprived due process considering
that applications for clearance have to be summarily
investigated and a decision required to be rendered
within ten (10) days from the filing of the opposition
(Section 8, Rule XIV, Book V, Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Labor Code). As this Court had
occasion to hold there is no violation of due process
here the Regional Director merely required the
submission of position papers and resolved the case
summarily thereafter (Cebu Institute of
Technology vs. Minister of Labor, 113 SCRA 237
[1982]).
4.LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; LABOR CODE;
TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT; ILLEGAL DISMISSAL; RIGHT
TO REINSTATEMENT; BACKWAGES NOT RECOVERABLE WHERE
EMPLOYEE INCURRED UNAUTHORIZED ABSENCES. J.R.M.
admits that Valladolid requested for leave for 3 days from
December 30, 1978, and thereafter for 15 days, but denies
that he notified the company of his absences subsequent to
this. The Regional Director ruled that the absences
of Valladolid were unauthorized but did not amount to gross
neglect of duty or abandonment of work which requires
deliberate refusal to resume employment or a clear showing in
terms of specific circumstances that the worker does not
intend to report for work. We agree. But as Valladolid had
been AWOL, no error was committed by respondent Regional
Director in ordering his reinstatement without backwages
(Marinduque Mining and Industrial Corp. vs. Minister of Labor
and Employment, 112 SCRA 280 [1982]).
D E C I S I O N
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J p:
The Order dated December 26, 1979 of the
Order of May 2, 1979 for reinstatement without
backwages issued by Regional Director Francisco L.
Estrella in Case No. R4-STF-2-1316-79 entitled, "Ricardo
C. Valladolid, Jr. vs. Copacabana Apartment-Hotel," is
being assailed by the parties in these petitions. Cdpr
J. R. M. & Co., Inc. (hereinafter referred to as JRM), as
petitioner in G.R. No. 53349, is also the respondent in G.R. No.
52364 named therein as Copacabana Apartment-Hotel. JRM
originally owned and operated not only Copacabana but also
Tropicana Apartment-Hotel. The principal stockholders of JRM
were the brothers Joseph, Manuel, Vicente and Roman, all
surnamed Yu. Upon the death of Joseph on October 12, 1975,
although both Copacabana and Tropicana continued
technically as owned by JRM, the controlling (70%) interest in
Copacabana was lodged in the surviving heirs of Joseph, with
brothers Manuel and Roman having a 15% interest each. JRM
was placed under the management of the heirs of Joseph. The
brothers Manuel, Roman and Vicente were allowed 100%
equity interest in Tropicana, which was operated separately
from JRM. Eventually, Tropicana and Copacabana became
competing businesses.
Ricardo Valladolid, petitioner in G.R. No. 52364 and
respondent in G.R. No. 53349, after the death of Joseph, was
employed by JRM in 1977 as a telephone switchboard
operator. He was subsequently transferred to the position of
clerk-collector by Mrs. Lourdes T. Yu, President of JRM. llcd
According to the affidavit of Daniel T. Yu, Executive Vice-
President, attached to the position paper submitted by JRM
before the Regional Director, the transfer was motivated by
the fact:
xxx xxx xxx
"That as such switchboard operator numerous
telephone conversations and communications
relating to business and confidential matters were
intercepted and relayed to Tropicana Apartment-
Hotel, a competitor;
"That to confirm suspicion on Ricardo Valladolid as
the person responsible for said interception and
relay, Mrs. Lourdes T. Yu, President of JRM & Co.,
Inc. sent him on an errand to Manila Hotel to bring
flowers on the occasion of Wedding Anniversary of
Mr. & Mrs. Yu Hong Ty. Matters which Mrs. Lourdes
Yu told him in confidence and admonitions not to
tell anyone, reached Tropicana people:
xxx xxx xxx 1
The affidavit further disclosed:
xxx xxx xxx
"That while serving in his capacity as clerk collector,
copies of Accounts Receivables, reach Tropicana
Management although said copies were not referred
to them;
"That conferred (sic) on numerous confidential
matters taken in the office of Copacabana
Apartment-Hotel reached Tropicana Apartment-
Hotel;
"That to finally and fully confirmed suspicions that
Ricardo Valladolid was the person responsible for
the aforementioned disclosures, a plan for the
entrapment was conceived by the management of
Copacabana Apartment-Hotel;
"That on November 9, 1979, pursuance of said plan,
a cash voucher for P500,000.00 supposedly in
payment for representation expenses to myself with
the corresponding check were prepared and issued
respectively by Juan V. Bermudo, Apartment-Hotel
Manager, who thereafter called
Ricardo Valladolid and asked the latter to bring the
said cash voucher and check to my room which he
did; few minutes later I came down to the office and
asked Mr. Ricardo Valladolid to prepare the
corresponding deposit slip to Pacific Banking
Corporation for said check;
"That thereafter, the aforementioned cash voucher,
corresponding check and deposit slip were kept in
the hotel vault with no other person other than
myself, Juan Bermudo and Ricardo Valladolid having
any knowledge of preparation and existence thereof;
"That unknown to Ricardo Valladolid, the
aforementioned check, cash voucher and deposit
slip were cancelled;
"That on December 4, 1978, Mr. Manuel Yu Chua,
came to Copacabana Apartment-Hotel as minority
stockholder of the latter, vehemently demanding for
an accounting of Copacabana books;
'That he strongly charged that information reached
him that I received a disbursement of P500,000.00
from Copacabana Apartment-Hotel as
representation expenses in my capacity as Executive
Vice-President thereof;
"That at this juncture, I brought out the cancelled
cash voucher, check and deposit slip; with mouth
agape, Manuel Yu Chua, could do nothing else but
admit that in fact, his informer within Copacabana
Apartment-Hotel was no other than Mr. Ricardo
C. Valladolid;
'That I then informed Manuel Yu Chua, that under
the circumstances, I could no longer repose any trust
whatsoever on Ricardo Valladolid and requested him
to take the latter to Tropicana Apartment-Hotel and
just swap him with someone else; Mr. Manuel Yu
Chua directed me to tell Valladolid to see him;
"That after few days, Ricardo Valladolid came back
and told me that Manuel Yu Chua has no place for
him at Tropicana Apartment-Hotel; in this
conversation, RicardoValladolid apologized for
having betrayed the trust that we had reposed on
him, especially after Mrs. Lourdes T. Yu had told him
to stay impartial; that he then having done this for
Manuel Yu Chua, the latter could not even accept
him in Tropicana Apartment-Hotel;
xxx xxx xxx 2
The entrapment scheme was corroborated by the affidavits of
Sofia Mo. Gianan, External Auditor of JRM & Co., Inc., and Juan
V. Bermudo; Copacabana Apartment-Hotel Manager, which
affidavits formed part of JRM's position paper filed before the
agency below. 3 The cancelled Cash Voucher, the uncashed
check, and the unused deposit slip, all in the respective
amounts of P500,000.00 were also attached to the same
position paper as Exhibits "4", "5" and "6".
On December 29, 1978, or after the entrapment scheme had
been effected, Valladolid filed a written request for a five (5)
day vacation leave starting December 30, 1978 with the
Manager of Copacabana, stating therein that he would report
for work on January 5, 1979. 4 He did not report for work on
January 5 but sent a telegram from Bicol on January 8, 1979
requesting for 15 days sick leave as he was confined for flu at
the Dr. Estrellado Clinic. 5 On January 23, 1979, Valladolid's
wife allegedly called up JRM informing the company through
its accountant, Eddie Escueta, that her husband was still sick
and requested for 30 days sick leave, which was allegedly
granted. This was denied by JRM.
Valladolid reported for work on February 16, 1979. The
Executive Vice-President, Mr. Daniel Yu, allegedly refused to
admit him and instead asked him to resign. JRM maintains
that Valladolid left the office that same day and never
returned, because he was reprimanded for his unauthorized
absences.
On February 22, 1979, Valladolid filed a Complaint for Illegal
Dismissal with vacation and sick leave pay. 6
On February 24, 1979, JRM sent a letter to Valladolid signed by
Daniel T. Yu, advising him of his preventive suspension
effective February 26, 1979 preparatory to the termination of
his services 10 days from receipt of a copy of the application
for clearance to dismiss him. The grounds given were: (1)
Willful Breach of Trust for having divulged, in various
instances, confidential business matters to competitors of the
company; and (2) Gross Neglect of Duty for having been
absent without leave or notice for more than 25 days, to the
detriment of the company. 7
On February 28, 1979, JRM filed said application for clearance
with the Ministry of Labor 8 The application for clearance
and Valladolid's complaint for Illegal Dismissal were
consolidated and docketed as R4-STF-2-1316-79. The parties
submitted their respective position papers and documentary
evidence. On May 2, 1979, the Regional Director issued the
following challenged Order: llcd
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the application
for clearance with preventive suspension is hereby
denied. Respondent is hereby ordered to reinstate
complainant to his former position without
backwages and without loss of seniority rights. Let
the time this case was pending be considered as
complainant's suspension for his absences.
The claims for vacation-sick leave pay is dismissed for failure
to substantiate the same."
Valladolid appealed the foregoing order to the Minister of
Labor seeking modification of the same, praying for the award
of backwages from the time he was illegally dismissed on
February 16, 1979 to the date of his actual reinstatement. JRM
also appealed the said Order.
On December 26, 1979, the Deputy Minister of Labor, in a
succinct Order, dismissed both appeals after finding "no
sufficient justification or valid reason to alter, modify, much
less reverse the Order appealed from."
On January 21, 1980, Valladolid filed a Petition for Certiorari
with this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 52364, praying for a
modification of the Order of December 26, 1979 of the Deputy
Minister of Labor so as to grant him backwages. This Court
resolved, on February 4, 1980, to give due course to the
petition, and required the parties to submit simultaneous
memoranda.
On March 12, 1980, JRM also filed a petition for Certiorari with
this Court assailing that same Order. This Court gave due
course to the petition and consolidated the same with G.R. No.
52364. Thereafter, the parties filed their respective
memoranda.
The non-award of backwages is the only issue being raised
by Valladolid claiming that the Orders in question are contrary
to law and evidence, and were issued arbitrarily and
capriciously with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to
excess or lack of jurisdiction.
JRM, on the other hand, assails the said Orders on the
following grounds:
I
"That respondent Deputy Minister of Labor
committed grave abuse of discretion when in his
questioned order in effect sustained the finding of
respondent Regional Director that there is no
evidence to support the dismissal of private
respondent.
II
That respondent Deputy Minister Amado Inciong and Regional
Director Francisco Estrella committed grave abuse of
discretion when they arbitrarily failed to consider in their
respective orders under review, established jurisprudence.
III
That respondent Regional Director committed grave abuse of
discretion when he held that preventive suspension is
equivalent to dismissal.
IV
That the order of respondent Hon. Amado Inciong was a
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment when it failed
to state the facts and conclusion of law upon which it is based.
V
That respondent Regional Director Francisco Estrella acted in
excess of his jurisdiction when, without any statutory authority
or transcending beyond his jurisdiction, he absolutely
disregarded procedural requirement in the hearing of the
present controversy, thus depriving petitioner of its right to
due process."
Valladolid, in his affidavit dated March 29, 1979, denied having
committed any breach of trust 9 In corroboration, he
presented the affidavits of Mr. Manuel Yu dated March 20,
1979 and March 29, 1979, wherein the latter stated
that Valladolid was "one of Copacabana's most hard-working
and efficient employees"; that Valladolid's work is "mere
routinary collection and clerical in nature which do not involve
trust (or) confidential business or trade secrets" which he may
'divulge' to other companies." 10
On this issue, the Regional Director ruled that "there is no
evidence on record that Valladolid furnished copies of
receivables or divulged confidential business matters to Mr.
Manuel Yu and the 'Tropicana People' including the
P500,000.00 'entrapment scheme'.
That finding is not supported by the records. The affidavits
attached to petitioner's position paper adequately show that
JRM did not act on mere suspicion but on the contrary, acted
prudently when it first transferred Valladolid from switch
board operator where he could eavesdrop on telephone
conversations, to a less crucial position of clerk-collector. But
even in the latter capacity, JRM's fears were confirmed as
shown by the entrapment scheme. Manuel Yu's certification as
to Valladolid's trustworthiness cannot be given much weight
not only because it was disproved by the entrapment
contrived but more so because even Manuel Yu himself
refused to employ him at Tropicana when Daniel Yu had
suggested that Tropicana absorb Valladolid because JRM had
lost confidence in the latter. And although Manuel Yu, who
owns 15% of the equity holding of Copacabana, and being a
member of the Board of Directors of JRM, had a right to know
the business standing of said establishment, there is basis to
believe that he would not have been able to pinpoint the
particular "disbursement" of P500,000.00, if the same had not
been leaked out to him. LexLib
Loss of confidence is a valid ground for dismissing an
employee. Proof beyond reasonable doubt of the employee's
misconduct is not required, it being sufficient that there is
some basis for the same or that the employer has reasonable
ground to believe that the employee is responsible for the
misconduct and his participation therein renders him
unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded of his
position. 11 However, as this was Valladolid's first offense, as
found by the Regional Director, dismissal from the service is
too harsh a punishment, considering that he had not been
previously admonished, warned or suspended for any
misdemeanor. Besides as clerk-collector, he need not be given
access to facts relative to the business of Copacabana, which,
if divulged to Tropicana would be to the former's prejudice.
Moreover, we find basis for the finding of the Regional
Director that Valladolid was terminated without prior
clearance. JRM sent a memorandum to Valladolid on February
24, 1979 advising him of his preventive suspension effective
February 26, 1979 pending approval of the application for
clearance to dismiss him. The clearance application was filed
on February 28, 1979. However, even prior to that date, or on
February 22, 1979, Valladolid had already filed a complaint for
Illegal Dismissal. This shows that Valladolid was indeed refused
admittance on February 16, 1979 when he reported back to
work, so that he was practically dismissed before he was
formally notified of his suspension leading to his dismissal, in
violation of the requirement of Section 3, Rule XIV, Book V,
Rules & Regulation Implementing the Labor Code. 12And as
provided in Section 2 of the same Rule, any dismissal without
prior clearance shall be "conclusively presumed to be
termination of employment without a just cause."
JRM cannot claim that it was deprived of due process
considering that applications for clearance have to be
summarily investigated and a decision required to be rendered
within ten (10) days from the filing of the
opposition. 13 As this Court had occasion to hold there is no
violation of due process where the Regional Director merely
required the submission of position papers and resolved the
case summarily thereafter. 14
Nor is the questioned Order of the Deputy Minister of Labor
violative of Section 9, Article X of the Constitution, which
requires a statement of the facts and the conclusions of law
upon which it is based. That prescription applies to decisions
of Courts of record. The Ministry of Labor is an administrative
body with quasi-judicial functions. Section 5, Rule XIII, Book
V, ibid., states that proceedings in the NLRC shall be non-
litigious and summary in nature without regard to legal
technicalities obtaining in courts of law. As the Deputy
Minister was in full accord with the findings of fact and the
conclusions of law drawn from those facts by the Regional
Director, there was no necessity of discussing anew the issues
raised therein. 15 cdphil
JRM admits that Valladolid requested for leave for 5 days from
December 30, 1978, and thereafter for 15 days, but denies
that he notified the company of his absences subsequent to
this. The Regional Director ruled that the absences
of Valladolid were unauthorized but did not amount to gross
neglect of duty or abandonment of work which requires
deliberate refusal to resume employment or a clear showing in
terms of specific circumstances that the worker does not
intend to report for work. We agree. But as Valladolid had
been AWOL, no error was committed by respondent Regional
Director in ordering his reinstatement without backwages. 16

WHEREFORE, both Petitions for Certiorari are hereby denied.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Plana, Vasquez, Relova and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J., took no part.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 78648. January 24, 1989.]
RAFAEL N. NUNAL, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
AND MUNICIPALITY OF ISABELA, BASILAN, respondents.
SYLLABUS
3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT; SECTION
14, ARTICLE VIII, APPLICABLE ONLY IN CASES SUBMITTED FOR
DECISION BUT NOT TO AN ORDER OR RESOLUTION REFUSING
DUE COURSE TO A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI. In the first
place, our "Resolution" of 11 May 1988 was not a "Decision"
within the meaning of the Constitutional requirement. This
mandate is applicable only in cases "submitted for decision,"
i.e., given due course and after the filing of Briefs or
Memoranda and/or other pleadings, as the case may be. It is
not applicable to an Order or Resolution refusing due course
to a Petition for Certiorari. In the second place, the assailed
Resolution does state the legal basis for the dismissal of the
Petition and thus complies with the Constitutional provision.
(Tayamura, et al., vs. IAC, et al., G.R. No. 76355, May 21, 1987
[en banc]; see also Que vs. People, G.R. Nos. L-75217-18, 154
SCRA 160, September 21, 1987).
R E S O L U T I O N
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J p:
For resolution is petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the
Minute Resolution of this Court of 11 May 1988 dismissing the
Petition for Certiorari "for failure of the petitioner to
sufficiently show that the public respondent had committed
grave abuse of discretion in holding, among others, that the
compromise agreement of the parties is not enforceable
against the Municipality of Isabela, the latter not having been
impleaded as an indispensable party in the case."
In the present Motion, petitioner contends:
"1. The decision does not clearly and distinctly
express the facts and the law on which it is based;
"2. The Municipality of Isabela, Basilan, is bound by
the compromise agreement; and
"3. Public respondent "Commission on Audit (COA
for short) gravely abused its discretion in denying
the lawful claim for separation pay by your
petitioner." (Motion for Reconsideration, p. 1; Rollo,
p. 67)
The facts disclose that on 24 February 1986 petitioner was
appointed as Municipal Administrator of Isabela, Basilan. On 1
February 1980 he was administratively charged and dismissed
from the service for dishonesty, misconduct and for lack of
confidence. On appeal, the Merit Systems Board exonerated
petitioner and reinstated him to his position as Municipal
Administrator on 8 May 1980. LLphil
On 29 January 1981 petitioner was again dismissed for lack of
confidence by then Municipal Mayor Alvin Dans under
Administrative Order No. 54, Series of 1981. Upon denial of his
Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner filed Case No. 43, a suit
for Mandamus and Damages with Preliminary Injunction
against the Municipal Mayor, the Municipal Treasurer, and the
Sangguniang Bayan of Isabela, Basilan, before the then Court
of First Instance in Basilan Province, Branch I, praying for
reinstatement "with full backwages and other rights inherent
in the position." He also filed Case No. 45 with the same Court
seeking that he and his wife be paid their back salaries from 1
February 1980 to 31 May 1980 pursuant to the Decision of the
Merit Systems Board on 16 February 1981.
On 20 February 1984, during the pendency of the said case,
the Sangguniang Bayan of Isabela, Basilan, abolished the
subject position in its Resolution No. 902, Series of 1984, and
Ordinance No. 336, pursuant to the provisions of the Local
Government Code. prcd
On 5 December 1984, petitioner and his wife, on the one
hand, and on the other, Mayor Dans in his capacity both as
Municipal Mayor and as Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang
Bayan of Isabela, Basilan, the Municipal Treasurer and the
Provincial Fiscal (p. 4, Reply To Comment of COA), entered into
a Compromise Agreement stipulating, among others, that:
"1. The respondents shall pay petitioner Rafael
Nunal all back salaries and other emoluments due
him by reason of his employment as Municipal
Administrator of Isabela, Basilan, covering the period
from January 1, 1980 to August 15, 1984, together
with accumulated vacation/sick leaves, midyear and
Christmas bonuses in 1982 and 1983, and separation
pay under the Local Government Code, which are
reflected in the computation hereto attached and
made an integral part hereof . . ." (p. 13, Rollo)
Under the same Compromise Agreement, petitioner was also
considered as "retired" upon receipt of the monetary
considerations mentioned therein.
On 12 December 1984, the Court approved the Compromise
Agreement.
On 1 April 1985, petitioner collected his retirement benefits
although, concededly, no provision for the same had been
included in the Compromise Agreement (Petition, p. 6; Rollo,
p. 9).
On 17 September 1985, petitioner filed his claim for
separation pay in the amount of P54,092.50 to which he is
allegedly entitled due to the abolition of the position of
Municipal Administrator, which separation pay is provided for
by the Local Government Code (B.P. 337, Section 76).
On 6 January 1986 the Municipal Treasurer forwarded
petitioner's claim to the Provincial Auditor of Basilan. On 11
January, 1986, in a First Indorsement, the Provincial Auditor
opined that the claim was legal and proper but payment
thereof was made subject to availability of funds and the
ruling of the Regional Office of the Commission on Audit,
Region IX, Zamboanga City.
On 12 February 1986, in a 2nd Indorsement, the Regional
Director of the Commission on Audit, Region IX, Zamboanga
City, reversed the Provincial Auditor of Basilan and denied
petitioner's claim for separation pay. Petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration was forwarded to the Commission on Audit
(COA), Central Office, Quezon City.
On 13 October 1986 the COA Central Office, in its Decision No.
388, not only denied petitioner's claim for separation pay but
also disallowed the other payments made to petitioner. It
held:
"Premises considered, and it appearing that Mr.
Nunal has been paid back salaries and other
emoluments in the total amount of P90,362.96
pursuant to the Compromise Agreement, supra, this
Commission hereby directs that any and all
payments made to Mr. Nunal corresponding to the
period when he was no longer in the government
service should be disallowed in audit without
prejudice to his right of recourse against the officials
personally liable for his unlawful dismissal." (pp. 15-
16, Rollo)
Thus, this recourse by petitioner alleging grave abuse of
discretion by COA, which Petition we had previously dismissed
in our Resolution of 11 May 1988 as heretofore adverted to.
It appearing, however, that the Compromise Agreement was
duly signed by Mayor Alvin Dans as Mayor and as Presiding
Officer of the Sangguniang Bayan, by the Municipal Treasurer,
and by the Provincial Fiscal as their lawyer (Motion for
Reconsideration, p. 3); that the case was one for
reinstatement and backwages; and following the ruling of this
Court in Gementiza vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. Nos. L-41717-33,
113 SCRA 477, April 12, 1982), the Municipality of Isabela
should be deemed as impleaded in this case, it being apparent
that the officials concerned had been sued in their official
capacity. LLpr
"It should be noted that before the Court below,
respondents sued petitioner Mayor alone. However,
respondents, too, prayed for a Writ of Mandamus to
compel petitioner Mayor to reinstate them with
back salaries and damages. Respondents, therefore,
actually intended to sue petitioner in his official
capacity. Failure to implead the Municipality and
other municipal authorities should not deter this
Court, in the interests of justice and equity, from
including them herein as respondents." (at p. 488)
The Compromise Agreement, therefore, must be held binding
on the Municipality of Isabela, which was not, in any way,
deprived of its day in Court (Gabutas vs. Castellanes, L-17323,
14 SCRA 376, June 23, 1965). Thus, the payments to petitioner
of the sums of P68,389.25 as back salaries, P21,387.71 as total
accumulated vacation/sick leaves, P772.75 as Christmas
bonus, and the back salaries of Mrs. Nanie B. Nunal in the sum
of P3,096.00, have to be upheld. It likewise appears that
retirement benefits had also been collected by petitioner on 1
April 1985.
In respect, however, of the separation pay claimed by
petitioner, we uphold the ruling of the COA reading in part:
"Anent the second issue, this Commission believes
and so holds that the instant claim for separation
pay in addition to the retirement benefits earlier
received by claimant is bereft of any legal basis.
Culled from the records is the fact that Mr. Nunal
was dismissed from the service on January 29, 1981
and has not been reinstated to the service until his
position of Municipal Administrator of Isabela was
abolished. In other words, he was no longer in, or
had already been separated from, the service when
the said position was abolished. Evidently then, his
separation from the service was not attributable to
the abolition of the position but was due to his
dismissal and, therefore, Section 76 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 337 which provides
'Section 76. Abolition of Position. When the
position of an official or employee under the civil
service is abolished by law or ordinance, the official
or employee so affected shall be reinstated in
another vacant position without diminution of
salary. Should such position not be available, the
official or employee affected shall be granted a
separation pay equivalent to one month salary for
every year of service over and above the monetary
privileges granted to officials and employees under
existing law.'cannot be validly invoked as legal basis
for the claim for separation pay. Moreover, the fact
remains that as earlier seen Mr. Nunal has already
been paid his retirement benefits under the existing
retirement law. His entitlement, therefore, to
separation pay under Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 is
offensive to the general policy of the government
prohibiting payment of double retirement benefits
to an employee." (p. 4, COA Decision No. 388 p. 15,
Rollo)
To grant double gratuity is unwarranted (See Cajiuat,
et al. vs. Mathay, Sr., G.R. No. L-39743, 124 SCRA
710, September 24, 1983).
It may be that the matter of separation pay was included in
the Compromise Agreement. Nonetheless, it could not be
granted outright but still had to be claimed and passed in
audit, and has been aptly denied by COA. And although
petitioner did file suit against the Municipality for
reinstatement, it does not follow that he was not effectively
dismissed such that he could still be considered an incumbent
whose position had been abolished. A dismissed employee can
be considered as not having left his office only upon
reinstatement and should be given a comparable position and
compensation at the time of reinstatement (Cristobal vs.
Melchor, No. L-43203, 101 SCRA 857, December 29,
1980). LLjur
Finally, a word on petitioner's contention that the Resolution
of this Court under date of 11 May 1988 is not in accordance
with Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, which
provides:
"Sec. 14. No decision shall be rendered by any Court
without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the
facts and the law on which it is based.
"No petition for review or motion for
reconsideration of a decision of the Court shall be
refused due course or denied without stating the
legal basis therefor."
In the first place, our "Resolution" of 11 May 1988
was not a "Decision" within the meaning of the
Constitutional requirement. This mandate is
applicable only in cases "submitted for decision,"
i.e., given due course and after the filing of Briefs or
Memoranda and/or other pleadings, as the case may
be. It is not applicable to an Order or Resolution
refusing due course to a Petition for Certiorari. In the
second place, the assailed Resolution does state the
legal basis for the dismissal of the Petition and thus
complies with the Constitutional provision.
(Tayamura, et al., vs. IAC, et al., G.R. No. 76355, May
21, 1987 [en banc]; see also Que vs. People, G.R.
Nos. L-75217-18, 154 SCRA 160, September 21,
1987). llcd
It may be added that the Writ of Certiorari dealt with in Rule
65 of the Rules of Court is a prerogative Writ, never
demandable as a matter of right, "never issued except in the
exercise of judicial discretion." (Bouvier's Law Dictionary, 3d
Rev. [8th ed.]; Francisco, The Revised Rules, 1972 ed., Vol. IV-
B, pp. 45-46, citing 14 C.J.S., 121-122).
ACCORDINGLY, the Resolution of this Court of 11 May 1988 is hereby
PARTIALLY RECONSIDERED in that the disallowance by respondent
Commission on Audit of the amounts ordered paid by the Court of
First Instance of Basilan, Branch I, in its Decision dated 12 December
1984, is hereby SET ASIDE, but its disallowance of petitioner's claim for
separation pay of P54,092.50, is hereby SUSTAINED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.



















SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. 110817-22. June 13, 1997.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
MARCELINO A. BUGARIN, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; 1987 Constitution; ARTICLE VIII,
SECTION 14; THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO
EXPRESS THEREIN CLEARLY AND DISTINCTLY THE FACTS AND
THE LAW ON WHICH IT IS BASED; CASE AT BAR. We take up
first accused-appellant's charge that the decision of the trial
court does not state the grounds therefor. Indeed, the
Constitution provides in part in Art. VIII, Sec. 14 that "No
decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing
therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it
is based." This requirement is reiterated and implemented by
the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure as provided in Rule 120,
Sec. 2. The decision of the trial court falls short of this
requirement in at least three respects. First, it does not
contain an evaluation of the evidence of the parties and a
discussion of the legal questions involved. It does not explain
why the trial court considered the complainant's testimony
credible despite the fact that, as accused-appellant points out,
complainant could not remember the time of the day when
she was allegedly raped. It does not explain why accused-
appellant's licking of complainant's genital constituted
attempted rape and not another crime. Second, the
complainant testified that she had been raped five times, to
wit, in November 1989, on December 24, 1989, in June 1990,
on March 14, 1991, and on December 23, 1991, and that once,
on January 17, 1992, she was molested by her father who
licked her private part, for which reason six informations were
filed against him, but the decision found the accused-appellant
guilty of only four counts of rape (which the trial court
erroneously said three counts) and one count of attempted
rape, without explaining whether accused-appellant was being
acquitted of one charge of rape. Third, the decision is so
carelessly prepared that it finds the accused-appellant guilty of
three counts of consummated rape but sentences him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua "for each of
the four counts of . . . rape."
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; FUNCTION THEREOF. The requirement that
the decisions of courts must be in writing and that they must
set forth clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which
they are based serves many functions. It is intended, among
other things, to inform the parties of the reason or reasons for
the decision so that if any of them appeals, he can point out to
the appellate court the findings of facts or the rulings on
points of law with which he disagrees. More than that, the
requirement is an assurance to the parties that, in reaching
judgment, the judge did so through the processes of legal
reasoning. It is, thus, a safeguard against the impetuosity of
the judge, preventing him from deciding by ipse dixit.
Vouchsafed neither the sword nor the purse by the
Constitution but nonetheless vested with the sovereign
prerogative of passing judgment on the life, liberty or property
of his fellowmen, the judge must ultimately depend on the
power of reason for sustained public confidence in the
justness of his decision. The decision of the trial court in this
case disrespects the judicial function. AIaDcH
D E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, J p:
This is an appeal from the decision, 1 dated February 11, 1993,
which the Regional Trial Court, Branch 97 of Quezon City
rendered in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-92-28785 to 86 and Q-92-
31157 to 31160, finding accused-appellant Marcelino Bugarin
guilty of four counts of consummated rape and one count of
attempted rape and sentencing him as follows:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt as charged of multiple (3
Counts) rape and one count of attempted rape, and
in accordance with Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code sentences him to prison terms as follows:
1) For each of the four counts of the above rape,
reclusion perpetua.
2) For the attempted rape, two (2) years and four (4)
months in the minimum penalty to four (4) years in
the maximum period and to indemnify the private
complainant in the amount of P50,000.00 as moral
damages and exemplary damages of P50,000.00 to
deter sexual crimes of the sort committed by
accused.
SO ORDERED.
The complainant, Maryjane Bugarin, is the daughter of
accused-appellant. On February 22, 1992, accompanied by her
mother, Regina Bugarin, and her maternal aunt, Nena Padecio,
she complained to the Central Police District Command that
she had been repeatedly raped by accused-appellant. In her
sworn statement she related how, on nine different occasions
between November 1989 and January 17, 1992, her father
entered the common sleeping area of their house in Payatas,
Quezon City and, after holding her knees and spreading her
legs, succeeded in inserting his penis into her vagina and
kissed her breasts. She claimed that, on January 17, 1992, her
father molested her by "kissing her vagina" and that only by
repeatedly kicking him did he desist from molesting her any
further. cdasia

Complainant was examined on the same date by Emmanuel I.
Aranas, PNP Medico-Legal Officer, who found that she was "in
non-virgin state physically." 2 On February 25, 1992, she
returned to the police station to file formal charges against her
father. The case was referred to the Office of the Quezon City
Prosecutor which found probable cause and accordingly filed
charges for consummated rape and attempted rape by means
of force and intimidation committed on December 23, 1991
and January 17, 1992 against accused-appellant Marcelino
Bugarin. No bail was recommended "considering that the
evidence of guilt of the respondent is strong." The cases were
docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. Q-92-28785 and Q-92-28786
and raffled to Branch 88 of the Quezon City Regional Trial
Court.
On May 7, 1992, four more charges for rape by means of force
and intimidation committed on November 1989, May 1990,
June 1990, and March 14, 1991 were filed against accused-
appellant. Docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. Q-92-31157 to
31160, the additional cases were raffled to Branch 97 of the
same court. These cases were eventually consolidated and
assigned to Branch 88.
The informations in the six cases alleged as follows:
Crim. Case No. 92-31157
That on or about the month of June 1990 in Quezon
City, Philippines, the said accused by means of force
and intimidation, did then and there, wilfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge of the
undersigned MARY JANE BUGARIN y ASUNCION, a
minor, 15 years of age, without her consent and
against her will, to the damage and prejudice of the
latter.
The crime was attended by the aggravating
circumstance of relationship.
Crim.. Case No. 92-31158
That on or about the month of November, 1989 in
Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, by means
of force and intimidation, did then and there, wilfully
and feloniously have carnal knowledge with the
undersigned MARY JANE BUGARIN y ASUNCION
without her consent and against her will, to the
damage and prejudice of the latter.
The crime was attended by the aggravating
circumstance of relationship.
Crim.. Case No. 92-31159
That on or about the 14th day of March, 1991 in
Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, by means
of force and intimidation, did then and there, wilfully
and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the
undersigned MARYJANE BUGARIN y ASUNCION, a
minor, 15 years of age, without her consent and
against her will, to the damage and prejudice of the
latter.
The crime was attended by the aggravating
circumstance of relationship.
Crim.. Case No. 92-31160
That on or about the month of May 1990 in Quezon
City, Philippines, the said accused by means of force
and intimidation, did then and there wilfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge of the
undersigned MARYJANE BUGARIN y ASUNCION, a
minor, 15 years of age, without her consent and
against her will, to the damage and prejudice of the
latter.
The crime was attended by the aggravating
circumstance of relationship.
Crim.. Case No. 92-28785
That on or about the 17th day of January, 1992, in
Quezon City, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, with lewd designs and by means of
force and intimidation, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously commence the
commission of the crime of Rape directly by overt
acts, by then and there kissing the nipples and the
vagina of the undersigned MARYJANE BUGARIN Y
ASUNCION, a minor, and about to lay on top of her,
all against her will, however, the said accused did
not perform all the acts of execution which would
have produced the crime of Rape by reason of some
causes other than his own spontaneous desistance,
that is, undersigned complainant push him away, to
the damage and prejudice of the undersigned in
such amount as may be awarded to her under the
provisions of the New Civil Code.
Crim.. Case No. 92-28786
That on or about the 23rd day of December, 1991, in
Quezon City, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, with lewd designs and by means of
force and intimidation, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse
with the undersigned MARYJANE BUGARIN Y
ASUNCION, a minor, without her consent and
against her will, to her damage and prejudice in such
amount as may be awarded to her under the
provisions of the New Civil Code
Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty in
each case, after which trial ensued. Under questioning by the
prosecutor, Maryjane Bugarin narrated how her father
sexually assaulted her in their family's common sleeping area
while no one was at home and threatened her if she told
anyone about what happened.
Accused-appellant denied the charges against him. He claimed
to be God fearing and morally upright and that his wife, Regina
Bugarin, must have induced their daughter to file the
complaints against him because his wife blamed him for
financially neglecting their family since 1989.
In rebuttal, the prosecution presented Regina Bugarin who
testified that a good mother would not expose her child to
humiliation just to get back at her husband. She further
claimed that her daughter, who had been raised properly and
taught to be honest, could not have fabricated the charges
against the accused-appellant. aisadc
In a two-page decision, promulgated on February 11, 1993, the
trial court, after giving a summary of the testimonies of the
complainant and accused-appellant, laconically ruled:
The issue is simple. Is the private complainant
credible in her story of how she was raped? The
answer of this Court is an undoubtful and a definite
yes.
Accused-appellant questions the trial court's decision on the
ground that: (1) the testimony of Maryjane Bugarin is not
credible; (2) the elements of force and intimidation had not
been proved; and (3) the decision of the trial court does not
state the facts and law upon which it was based.
On the other hand, the Solicitor General, representing the
prosecution, contends that complainant, who was only 15
years old when she reported the crime, was not likely to
concoct charges against her father and that the moral
ascendancy of the father over her took the place of force and
intimidation in rape.
We take up first accused-appellant's charge that the decision
of the trial court does not state the grounds therefor. Indeed,
the Constitution provides in part in Art. VIII, 14 that "No
decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing
therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it
is based." This requirement is reiterated and implemented by
the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides in Rule
120, 2:
Sec. 2. Form and contents of judgment. The
judgment must be written in the official language,
personally and directly prepared by the judge and
signed by him and shall contain clearly and distinctly
a statement of the facts proved or admitted by the
accused and the law upon which the judgment is
based.
If it is of conviction, the judgment shall state (a) the
legal qualification of the offense constituted by the
acts committed by the accused, and the aggravating
or mitigating circumstances attending the
commission thereof, if there are any; (b) the
participation of the accused in the commission of the
offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or
accessory after the fact; (c) the penalty imposed
upon the accused; and (d) the civil liability or
damages caused by the wrongful act to be recovered
from the accused by the offended party, if there is
any, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a
separate action has been reserved or waived.
In case of acquittal, unless there is a clear showing
that the act from which the civil liability might arise
did not exist, the judgment shall make a finding on
the civil liability of the accused in favor of the
offended party.
The decision of the trial court falls short of this requirement in
at least three respects. First, it does not contain an evaluation
of the evidence of the parties and a discussion of the legal
questions involved. It does not explain why the trial court
considered the complainant's testimony credible despite the
fact that, as accused-appellant points out, complainant could
not remember the time of the day when she was allegedly
raped. It does not explain why accused-appellant's licking of
complainant's genital constituted attempted rape and not
another crime. Second, the complainant testified that she had
been raped five times, to wit, in November 1989, on
December 24, 1989, in June 1990, on March 14, 1991, and on
December 23, 1991, and that once, on January 17, 1992, she
was molested by her father who licked her private part, for
which reason six informations were filed against him, but the
decision found the accused-appellant guilty of only four counts
of rape (which the trial court erroneously said three counts)
and one count of attempted rape, without explaining whether
accused-appellant was being acquitted of one charge of rape.
Third, the decision is so carelessly prepared that it finds the
accused-appellant guilty of three counts of consummated rape
but sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua "for each of the four counts of . . . rape."
Maryjane claimed she had been raped on December 24, 1989,
but the information in Criminal Case No. Q-92-31160 is for
rape allegedly committed in May 1990. It must be for this
reason that the trial court convicted accused-appellant of only
four counts of rape, instead of five. But the trial court should
have explained so, if this was really the reason, and expressly
acquitted the accused-appellant of the charge under this
information.
The requirement that the decisions of courts must be in
writing and that they must set forth clearly and distinctly the
facts and the law on which they are based serves many
functions. It is intended, among other things, to inform the
parties of the reason or reasons for the decision so that if any
of them appeals, he can point out to the appellate court the
findings of facts or the rulings on points of law with which he
disagrees. More than that, the requirement is an assurance to
the parties that, in reaching judgment, the judge did so
through the processes of legal reasoning. It is, thus, a
safeguard against the impetuosity of the judge, preventing
him from deciding by ipse dixit. Vouchsafed neither the sword
nor the purse by the Constitution but nonetheless vested with
the sovereign prerogative of passing judgment on the life,
liberty or property of his fellowmen, the judge must ultimately
depend on the power of reason for sustained public
confidence in the justness of his decision. The decision of the
trial court in this case disrespects the judicial function.
We would normally remand this case to the trial court for
compliance with the constitutional requirement for decisions.
But this case has been pending for sometime and further delay
can be avoided if the Court simply reviews the whole
evidence. After all, the records of the trial court contain the
transcript of stenographic notes, the complainant's sworn
statement dated February 22, 1992, the resolution of the
prosecutor, and the statement of the arresting officer, on the
basis of which the Court may properly decide the case. 3 For
this reason the Court has decided to review this case despite
the failure of the trial court to make detailed findings of facts
and a statement of the reasons underlying its decision. lexlib
Now it is settled that when the complainant in a rape case,
more so if she is a minor, 4 testifies that she has been raped,
she says, in effect, all that is necessary to prove the
commission of the crime. 5 Care must be taken, however, that
her testimony is credible for a conviction to be justified based
on her testimony alone. 6 In this case, Maryjane Bugarin
testified on November 25, 1992 7 as follows:
Q On November 1989, was your father residing with you or
was he living with you?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, on November, 1989 do you remember any unusual
incident that happened, if any?
A Yes, sir, when he entered the room.
Q When you say "he," are you referring to Marcelino Bugarin?
A Yes, sir.
Q If Marcelino Bugarin is present today, would you be able to
identify him?
A Yes, sir. (witness is pointing to a man wearing a green t-shirt
who answers by the name Marcelino Bugarin when asked by
the Court).
Q On November 1989, you were mentioning that "he",
referring to the accused, entered your room, what happened?
A (witness crying) When he entered the room, he embraced
me and touched the different parts of my body and he
informed me that when I grow up, I would not become
innocent.
Q What do you mean by those words that he told you that
when you grow up you would not be innocent?
A So that when I grow up I will know what he will be doing.
Q What did he do?
A He touched my knees and spread them out and then holding
my breast and he put his sex organ inside me
Q When you say inside me, what do you mean?
A His sex organ entered my what, I am fertile.
Q What do you mean by what?
A My sex organ, sir.
Q What did you do when your father tried to put his sex organ
to your sex organ?
A I was trying to push his body away from me, and I said to
him, father, I don't like it, ayoko po.
Q Despite your pleas, what happened next?
A He still continued what he is doing, and when I fainted, he
suddenly moved back
Q After he moved back, what transpired afterwards?
A He went out and I was left crying.
Q After this first incident were there any other similar incident
which happened, if any?
A There are, sir, but I can't recall when.
Q How many times more or less?
A Around four (4) times.
Q After November 1989?
A Including November 1989.
Q How about on December 24, 1989, do you remember where
you were?
A Yes, sir. I was in our house.
Q Do you remember any unusual or extraordinary incident
that happened on December 24, 1989?
A Yes, sir. It is the same thing, that he did to me.
Q Please explain what the same thing he do to you?
A He embraced and kissed me on my cheek, my neck and also
my breast.
Q What happened next?
A He was spreading my legs.
Q Then after spreading your legs, what did the accused do?
A He let his sex organ touched my sex organ.
Q After that, what happened next?
A I cried again.
Q When you cried again, what did your father do, if any?
A His face became scaring.
Q Now, after December 24, 1989 incident, do you remember
where you were sometime in June 1990?
A I was in our house.
Q Specifically, in June of 1990, do you remember any unusual
incident that happened?
A The same thing happened, over and over.
Q What do you mean by the same thing happened, over and
over?
A He would embraced me and then kissed me and touched my
breast and kissed my nipples.
Q And, besides in embracing, kissing and kissing your nipples,
what else did your father do on June 1990?
A He kissed also my sex organ.
Q Beside kissing your sex organ, what else did he do, if any?
A He placed inside my sex organ his sex organ.
Q In March 14, 1991, where were you?
A I was also in our house.
Q Do you remember what happened, if any, On March 14,
1991?
A That's it again, I was in the room and again he embraced me
made me lie down then kiss my sex organ and then, he placed
again his sex organ inside my sex organ.
Q How about December 23, 1991, do you remember where
you were?
A I was also in the house.
Q What happened?
A I was lying down and he lied there beside me and told me to
accede to his desire.
Q What do you mean to accede to his desire?
A He wanted to use me again.
Q Then, he actually used you?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, on January 17, 1992, do you remember where you
were?
A I was also in our house.
Q Would you kindly tell what happened in your house on this
day?
A He licked my sex organ.
Q After that, what did he do next?
A He was threatening me.
Q What did you do when he threatened you?
A I was so afraid. (witness is crying)
Q What did the accused do after threatening you?
A He was doing nothing. He was just walking beside me.
Q What happened after you saw him walking just beside you
on that date?
A None, sir. I was just crying

The accused-appellant claims that Maryjane's testimony
contains inconsistencies which indicate that the charges
against him were fabricated. He points to the failure of
complainant on cross-examination to state in some instances
the exact date and time she was allegedly raped, and to the
fact that it took complainant two years before reporting the
incidents and that the prosecution did not present the medico-
legal officer who examined the complainant. Accused-
appellant also claims that no evidence was adduced to prove
that the rape was committed by force and intimidation.
The failure of the complainant to state in some cases the exact
date and time of the commission of rape is a minor matter and
can be expected when a witness is recounting the details of a
humiliating experience which are painful and difficult to recall
in open court and in the presence of other people. 8 Indeed,
this Court has ruled that complainant's failure to recall some
details of the crime, instead of suggesting prevarication,
precisely indicates spontaneity and is to be expected from a
witness who is of tender age and unaccustomed to court
proceedings.
Besides, the date of the commission of the rape is not an
essential element of the crime. 9 The precise time of the crime
has no substantial bearing on its commission, 10especially
since in this case the date and time of the commission of the
crime is not material to the accused-appellant's defense.
Indeed, accused-appellant's contention is only that he could
not have raped his daughter in the common bedroom at
nighttime because the place where they sleep is shut off from
the rest of their house by a curtain.
Suffice it to state that lust is no respecter of time and
place. 11 Our cases record instances of rape committed inside
family dwellings when other occupants are asleep. 12In the
case at bar, Maryjane testified that the accused-appellant was
able to rape her by sending out her siblings to play with their
neighbors' children, and while her mother was at work from 3
p.m. to 11 p.m. Complainant explained her apparent inability
to recall the exact dates of the assaults upon her, thus:
Q Madam witness, you mentioned that you were raped
sometime November 1989, June 1990, December 24, 1989,
March 14, 1991, December 23, 1991, how come that you knew
very well the date as December 24, March 14, December 23;
or rather, how come that your complaint is only sometime in
the early part of 1991?
A I remember because that was closed to the birthday of my
brother.
Q How about March 14, how come you knew very well that
you were molested by your father?
A Because at that time, our class will almost end and we were
given clearances.
Q What day is your last school day?
A I cannot remember. sir.
Q Is it usual that you knew very well March 14, and you do not
know very well your last day of your school day?
A Because March 14 is our clearance

Neither does the delay in making a criminal accusation impair
the credibility of a witness if such delay is satisfactorily
explained. 13 In People v. Coloma, 14 where the complainant
was also only 13 years old when first molested by her father,
the Court adverted to the father's moral and physical control
over the young complainant in explaining the delay of eight
years before the complaint against her father was made. In
this case, Maryjane must have been overwhelmed by fear and
confusion, and shocked that her own father had defiled her.
After all, she had been very close to him. She also testified that
she was afraid to tell her mother because the latter might be
angered, so that she finally confided to her aunt. Indeed, a
survey conducted by the University of the Philippines Center
for Women's Studies showed that victims of rape committed
by their fathers took much longer in reporting the incidents to
the authorities than did other victims. Many factors account
for this difference: the fact that the father lives with the victim
and constantly exerts moral authority over her, the threat he
might make against her, the victim's fear of her mother and
other relatives.
Nor is it entirely true that no evidence of force and
intimidation had been adduced during the trial. Maryjane
testified that she tried to resist her father's advances but, on
several occasions, she was overpowered by him. She was
embraced and thus prevented from escaping. 15 At other
times she was intimidated by menacing looks cast on
her 16 and by threats of harm. 17 Indeed, even if there was no
violence or force employed against her, the moral influence of
accused-appellant over the complainant sufficed to make the
crime rape. 18

Nor is a medical examination an indispensable element in
prosecutions for rape. 19 That the prosecution did not present
the medico-legal officer is, therefore, not an obstacle to a
finding of guilt in this case.
We think the evidence in this case proves beyond all
reasonable doubt that Maryjane had been raped on four
occasions by accused-appellant: November 1989, June 1990,
March 14, 1991, and December 23, 1991. Complainant has no
motive to incriminate her father. To the contrary, she testified
that she was close to him. The absence of a motive lends
greater credence to her testimony. 20 Neither does her
mother have any reason to falsely accuse Marcelino Bugarin.
Regina Bugarin suspected her husband of having an affair with
her sister in 1980 and confronted him, but she continued to
live with him. This fact makes it unlikely that she would use
her daughter to destroy her husband more than ten years
later. A mother would not expose her child to public trial, if
the charges she makes are not true. 21
We find no evidence, however, to find accused-appellant
guilty of the charge in Criminal Case No. Q-92-31160 for
alleged rape committed in May 1990. There is no evidence to
prove that accused-appellant raped complainant on that date.
Her testimony is to the effect that she was raped on another
date, December 24, 1989. But accused-appellant cannot be
convicted for this as no complaint was formally filed regarding
it. Accused-appellant must accordingly be acquitted of the
charge in Criminal Q-92-31160.
Nor do we think that accused-appellant is guilty of attempted
rape committed on January 17, 1992 as the trial court held.
Maryjane testified:
Q Now, on January 17, 1992, do you remember where you
were?
A I was also in our house.
Q Would you kindly tell what happened in your house on this
day?
A He licked my sex organ.
Q After that, what did he do next?
A He was threatening me.
Q What did you do when he threatened you?
A I was so afraid. (witness is crying)
Q What did the accused do after threatening you?
A He was doing nothing. He was just walking beside me.
Q What happened after you saw him walking just beside you
on that date?
A None, sir. I was just crying.

The intent to commit rape is not apparent from the act
described. It cannot be inferred from this act (licking
complainant's genital) alone that his intention was to have
sexual intercourse with her because it has not been shown
that he had at least placed himself on top of the
complainant. 22 The act imputed to him cannot be considered
a preparatory act to sexual intercourse. 23 Accused-appellant
is instead guilty of acts of lasciviousness. It can at least be
inferred from his act of kissing the genital of the complainant
that he was moved by lewd designs. 24
Although relationship, as an aggravating circumstance, is
alleged only in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-92-31157 to 31160, this
circumstance was nonetheless proved during the trial in
Criminal Case No. Q-92-28785 and, therefore, should also be
appreciated in that case to justify the imposition of the penalty
in its maximum period. cda
WHEREFORE, the decision dated February 11, 1993 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City is SET ASIDE and another
one is RENDERED finding accused-appellant Marcelino Bugarin
GUILTY of four counts of consummated rape in Criminal Cases
Nos. Q-92-28786, Q-92-31157, Q-92-31158, and Q-92-31159
and SENTENCED toreclusion perpetua and ORDERED to
INDEMNIFY the complainant Maryjane Bugarin in the amount
of P30,000.00 in damages for each count of rape committed;
and of acts of lasciviousness in Criminal Case No. Q-92-28785,
for which he is SENTENCED to suffer imprisonment from 6
months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to six 6 years of prision
correccional, as maximum.
In Criminal Case No. Q-92-31160, accused-appellant is hereby
ACQUITTED.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Romero, Puno and Torres, Jr., JJ ., concur.
||| (People v. Bugarin, G.R. Nos. 110817-22, June 13, 1997)

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 104874. December 14, 1993.]
DANILO HERNANDEZ, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS
and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Marcelo Y. Hernandez for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for People of the Philippines.

SYLLABUS

4. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT; DECISION
SHOULD STATE FACTS ON WHICH IT IS BASED; NO
PROSCRIPTION AGAINST COURT'S ADOPTION OF NARRATION
OF FACTS MADE IN BRIEFS OR MEMORANDA OF PARTIES. In
its decision the Court of Appeals merely stated: "The facts of
the case as summarized in the Appellee's Brief are as follows:"
and then quoted in full the statement of facts of the Solicitor
General. According to petitioner, the Court of Appeals did not
make its own "independent judicial opinion" by such act of
adopting the statement of facts made by the advance party.
What the Court of Appeals, in effect, said was that it found the
facts as presented by the Solicitor General as supported by the
evidence. The constitutional mandate only requires that the
decision should state the facts on which it is based. There is no
proscription against the court's adoption of the narration of
facts made in the briefs or memoranda of the parties, instead
of rewriting the same in its own words. Precisely, briefs or
memoranda are required in order to aid the courts in the
writing of decisions.
D E C I S I O N
QUIASON, J p:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court seeking to set aside the Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 05877, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, FINDING the decision appealed from
to be in accordance with law and the evidence, the
same is hereby AFFIRMED except as to Criminal Case
No. 21-87 where, for reasons above discussed, the
accused-appellant is ACQUITTED" (Rollo, p. 33).
CA-G.R. No. 05877 was an appeal by petitioner from the
decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, Cavite City in
Criminal Cases Nos. 21-87 to 29-87, the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows: cdll
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court
finds Danilo Hernandez guilty beyond reasonable
doubt in the following cases: Crim. Case No. 21-87,
for Estafa and he is hereby ordered sentenced to an
indeterminate prison term of from Twelve (12) years
and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as minimum
to Twenty (20) years ofreclusion temporal, as
maximum and to pay the offended party Remedios
de Leon in the amount of P150,000.00
corresponding to the value of jewelries embezzled
and unreturned and to pay the costs; Crim. Case No.
22-87, for Estafa, he is hereby ordered sentenced to
an indeterminate prison term of from Twelve (12)
years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as
minimum to Twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal,
as maximum and to pay the offended party
Remedios de Leon in the amount of P100,000.00 for
the value of the jewelries embezzled and to pay the
costs; Crim. Case No. 23-87, Violation of BP 22, he is
hereby sentenced to eight (8) months of prision
correccional and to pay the costs; Crim. Case No. 24-
87, for Viol. of BP 22, he is hereby sentenced to eight
(8) months of prision correccional and to pay the
costs; Crim. Case No. 25-87, for Estafa, he is hereby
sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of from
Twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal, as minimum to twenty (20) years
of reclusion temporal, as maximum and to pay the
offended party Remedios de Leon in the amount of
P250,000.00 for the value of the jewelries embezzled
and to pay the costs; Crim. Case No. 26-87, for Viol.
of BP 22, he is hereby sentenced to eight (8) months
of prision correccional and to pay the costs; Crim.
Case No. 27-87, for Estafa, he is hereby sentenced to
an indeterminate prison term of from Twelve (12)
years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as
minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal,
as maximum and to pay the offended party
Remedios de Leon in the amount of P280,000.00 for
the value of the jewelries embezzled and to pay the
costs; Crim. Case No. 28-87, for Estafa, he is hereby
sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of from
twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal, as minimum to twenty (20) years
of reclusion temporal, as maximum and to pay the
offended party Remedios de Leon in the amount of
P100,000.00 value of the jewelries embezzled and to
pay the costs; Crim. Case No. 29-87, for Viol. of BP
22, he is hereby sentenced to eight (8) months
of prision correccional, and to pay the costs" (Rollo,
pp. 49-50). cdrep
It appears that sometime in August 1986, petitioner was
introduced to Remedios de Leon by his aunt, as one engaged
in the business of buying and selling jewelry (TSN, March 17,
1987, pp. 18, 20).
In their first transaction, petitioner paid in cash the several
pieces of jewelry which he bought from de Leon. In their
subsequent dealings, petitioner either paid in cash or by way
of postdated checks (TSN, March 17, 1987, pp. 22-23). On one
occasion, petitioner issued post-dated checks with the
aggregate amount of P275,000.00. These checks bounced.
However, upon notice of dishonor by the drawee banks
concerned, petitioner paid de Leon cash in exchange for the
dishonored checks. Some checks were likewise exchanged
with cash even prior to their due date (TSN, March 17, 1987,
pp. 33, 37).
Several days before October 20, 1986, petitioner told de Leon
that he was interested in buying some more pieces of jewelry
(TSN, March 17, 1987, p. 60). On that date, at around 10:00
A.M., petitioner, together with his common-law wife,
Rosemarie Rodriguez, and two other companions, went to the
house of de Leon in Cavite City (TSN, March 17, 1987, p. 70).
Petitioner selected a pair of 2-carat diamond earrings worth
P150,000.00 for which he issued BPI Check No. 798246
payable to "cash" in the said amount and post-dated it to
October 26, 1986. The amount of the check was filled in by
Rosemarie Rodriguez and petitioner affixed his signature as
drawer (TSN, March 17, 1987, p. 69).
Petitioner and Rodriguez returned to de Leon's house at about
7:00 P.M. and bought one choker with 20 diamond stones and
one bracelet with 16 diamond stones, for which he issued BPI
Check No. 798247 payable to "cash" in the amount of
P250,000.00 and postdated it to October 27, 1986. Petitioner
specifically instructed de Leon to give him one week to confer
with his buyer before de Leon negotiates the check. The check
was also prepared by Rodriguez and signed by petitioner (TSN,
March 17, 1987, pp. 73-79). Cdpr

In the evening of October 22, 1986, petitioner again went to
the house of de Leon and bought one heart-shaped diamond
set. In payment thereof, he issued BPI Check No. 798248
payable to "cash" in the amount of P280,000.00 and post-
dated it to November 9, 1986 (TSN, March 17, 1987, pp. 84-
89).
On October 23, 1983, petitioner made a long-distance call to
de Leon and inquired whether she still had jewelry for sale.
When she said that she did, petitioner made an appointment
with her. Petitioner arrived at de Leon's house at around 2:30
P.M. The two went to a restaurant, where petitioner selected
a set of earrings and a ring, each piece with a 1-carat diamond
(TSN, March 31, 1987, pp. 15-16). In payment for the set,
petitioner issued to de Leon BPI Check No. 798250 payable to
"cash" in the amount of P100,000.00 and dated that same day
(October 23, 1992). Petitioner told de Leon that the check was
funded and that she could even withdraw the amount on that
day. De Leon did not encash the check for the bank was closed
(TSN, March 31, 1987, pp. 16, 19).
In the evening of October 24, 1986, petitioner with Rodriguez
went to de Leon's house and bought a 5-carat diamond piece.
In payment thereof, petitioner indorsed to de Leon ASB Check
No. 245964 in the amount of P150,000.00 post-dated to
November 10, 1986 and issued by one Enrique Araneta (TSN,
March 31, 1987, pp. 21-26).
BPI Checks Nos. 798246, 798247 and 798250 were drawn
against insufficient funds, while BPI Check No. 798248 and ASB
Check No. 245964 were drawn against a closed account. Cdpr
Petitioner was charged in nine informations with estafa and
violation of B. P. Blg. 22.
At his arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the
charges (Rollo, pp. 16-17).
After a joint trial, petitioner was convicted of the nine charges
in a joint decision.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the conviction of petitioner
was affirmed as to Criminal Cases Nos. 22-87, 23-87, 24-87,
25-87, 26-87, 27-87, 28-87, and 29-87, and reversed as to
Criminal Case No. 21-87.
In this petition, petitioner claims that his conviction of nine
distinct offenses subject of nine separate informations in a
single judgment is reversible error. This contention is
untenable.
The case of United States v. Tanjuatco, 1 Phil. 116, relied upon
by petitioner, is distinguishable from the instant case.
In Tanjuatco, we held that the trial court improperly rendered
a single judgment for two offenses in one of the two criminal
cases, in the absence of a consolidation of the two cases. In
the case at bench, the trial court rendered a judgment for
each of the nine separate informations, albeit in the same
decision.
We further stated in Tanjuatco that the trial court violated "an
essential right of the accused, inasmuch as he is entitled,
although accused of two offenses, to a trial in each of the two
cases upon the proofs adduced in each individual case, and
upon the allegations set forth in each information. It is not
permissible to take into account or consider in one case the
facts proved in the other, and vice versa" (at pp. 117-
118). Cdpr
The trial of the nine criminal cases was conducted jointly
without any objection from petitioner. Even had he signified
his opposition to the joint trial, such opposition would have
been unavailing. A consolidation of trials, at the court's
discretion, is allowed in "charges for offenses founded on the
same facts, or forming part of a series of offenses of similar
character" (1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, Rule 119, Sec.
14).
Petitioner also complains that while he assigned eight errors,
the Court of Appeals did not make a complete findings of fact
as to the last two assigned errors (Rollo, pp. 11-12).
In the last two assigned errors, petitioner claims that the trial
court erred:
VII
"IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT IN CRIMINAL CASES NOS. 21-87
TO 29-87 NOTWITHSTANDING ABSENCE OF
INCULPATORY EVIDENCE AND PRESENCE OF
NUMEROUS PROOFS NEGATING THE SOUNDNESS OF
SUCH VERDICT.
VIII
IN PRONOUNCING THE ACCUSED, THROUGH A
SINGLE JUDGMENT, GUILTY OF ALL THE NINE
DISTINCT OFFENSES COVERED BY THE NINE
SEPARATE INFORMATIONS SUBJECT MATTER OF
CRIMINAL CASES NOS. 21-87 TO 29-87, INCLUSIVE"
(Rollo, p. 56).
Obviously, the Court of Appeals did not deem it necessary to
make a separate findings of fact for said assigned errors,
because they were just the necessary consequences of the
previous, assigned errors. cdphil
Petitioner next questions: (i) as violative of the constitutional
mandate that decisions shall contain the facts and the law on
which they are based (1987 Constitution, Art. VIII, Sec. 14, par.
1), the decision of the Court of Appeals which merely adopted
the statement of facts of the Solicitor General in the appellee's
brief, and (ii) as violative of the constitutional mandate
requiring that any denial of a motion for reconsideration must
state the legal basis thereof (1987 Constitution, Art. VIII, Sec.
14, par. 2), the denial of his motion for reconsideration on the
basis of a comparison of said motion with the "comment
thereon" (Rollo, pp. 10-12).
In its decision the Court of Appeals merely stated: "The facts of
the case as summarized in the Appellee's Brief are as follows:"
and then quoted in full the statement of facts of the Solicitor
General (Rollo, p. 20). According to petitioner, the Court of
Appeals did not make its own "independent judicial opinion"
by such act of adopting the statement of facts made by the
advance party (Rollo, p. 11).
What the Court of Appeals, in effect, said was that it found the
facts as presented by the Solicitor General as supported by the
evidence. The constitutional mandate only requires that the
decision should state the facts on which it is based. There is no
proscription against the court's adoption of the narration of
facts made in the briefs or memoranda of the parties, instead
of rewriting the same in its own words.
Precisely, briefs or memoranda are required in order to aid the
courts in the writing of decisions.
We note that aside from adopting the statement of facts of
the Solicitor General, the Court of Appeals also made findings
of fact in the course of its discussion of the assignment of
errors.
As to the denial of the motion for reconsideration, the Court of
Appeals stated in its Resolution dated March 30, 1992: LLjur
"Acting on the motion for reconsideration filed by
the accused-appellant of the decision dated
December 13, 1991 and the comment thereon of the
Solicitor General, the court finds no cogent reason
that could justify a modification or reversal of the
decision sought to be reconsidered.
Accordingly, the instant motion for reconsideration
is hereby DENIED for lack of merit" (Rollo, p. 35).
The denial, therefore, was based on the ground that the Court
of Appeals did not find any "cogent reason that could justify a
modification or reversal of the decision sought to be
reconsidered.".
Petitioner claims that the decision of the trial court is not
supported by the evidence, which is contrary to the findings of
the Court of Appeals that said decision is "in accordance with
law and the evidence" (Rollo, p. 12). He points out that the
appellate court should not have believed the trial court's
conclusion that "the sole testimony of the offended party
would have sufficed to sustain her assertions" (Rollo, p. 47).
He claims that self-serving declarations of a party favorable to
himself are not admissible and that none of the alleged
witnesses to the transactions were presented.
The common objection known as "self-serving" is not correct
because almost all testimonies are self-serving. The proper
basis for objection is "hearsay" (Wenke, Making and Meeting
Objections, 69).
Petitioner fails to take into account the distinction between
self-serving statements and testimonies made in court. Self-
serving statements are those made by a party out of court
advocating his own interest; they do not include a party's
testimony as a witness in court (National Development Co. v.
Workmen's Compensation Commission, 19 SCRA 861
[1967]). LexLib
Self-serving statements are inadmissible because the adverse
party is not given the opportunity for cross-examination, and
their admission would encourage fabrication of testimony.
This cannot be said of a party's testimony in court made under
oath, with full opportunity on the part of the opposing party
for cross-examination.
It is not true that none of the alleged witnesses to the
transactions was presented in court (Rollo, p. 13). Yolanda
Dela Rosa, an eye-witness to some of the transactions,
testified for the prosecution. Assuming that Dela Rosa was not
presented as a witness, the testimony of de Leon sufficed to
sustain the conviction of petitioner. The conviction of an
accused may be on the basis of the testimony of a single
witness (People v. Rumeral, 200 SCRA 194 [1991]). In
determining the value and credibility of evidence, witnesses
are to be weighed, not counted (People v. Villalobos, 209 SCRA
304 [1992]).
Petitioner also contends that while he was condemned by the
trial court to pay civil indemnity, no evidence was actually
presented in court to prove the existence, ownership and
worth of the pieces of jewelry other than the checks (Rollo, p.
14).
The existence of the jewelry was established by de Leon
herself, who testified that petitioner even selected the pieces
of jewelry before buying them.
As to the ownership of the jewelry, we held in People v. Dy,
109 SCRA 400 (1981) that:
"Ownership is not a necessary element of the crime
of estafa . . . In estafa, the person prejudiced or the
immediate victim of the fraud need not be the
owner of the goods. Thus, Article 315 of the Revised
Penal Code provides that 'Any person who shall
defraud another (it does not say 'owner') by any
means mentioned herein below shall be punished . .
. .' All that is necessary is that the loss should have
fallen on someone other than the perpetrators of
the crime . . ." (at p. 408). llcd
The trial court based the civil indemnity on the actual price of
the jewelry as agreed upon by petitioner and de Leon at the
time of the transactions and this is reflected by the face value
of the checks.

Petitioner further contends that the trial court erred in
admitting the checks in evidence without the prosecution first
proving that his signatures on the checks were authentic
(Rollo, pp. 13-14). If petitioner claims that his signatures on
the checks were forged, the burden is on him to prove such
fact. He who alleges must prove his allegations.
In the trial court, petitioner presented a certification issued by
the San Juan Police Station to the effect that he reported as
lost several blank checks, to wit: BPI Checks Nos. 798246,
798247, 798248, 798249, and 798250, and AB Check No.
245964. We agree with the trial court when it gave little
weight to the certification. Like the trial court, we wonder why
petitioner never filed a criminal case against de Leon, if said
checks were really stolen.
Lastly, petitioner contends that because "the amounts covered
by the checks were deposited by the offended party in her
savings account with the Prudential Bank, it becomes the
liability of the bank by its acceptance to pay for the amounts
of the checks" (Rollo, pp. 14-15). LexLib
The case of Banco de Oro v. Equitable Banking Corporation,
157 SCRA 188 (1988) cited by petitioner as authority, dealt
with the negligence of a collecting bank which facilitated the
payment by the drawee bank of the value of a check with a
forged endorsement and signature of the payee. No such issue
is involved in the case at bench.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the
Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Davide, Jr. and Bellosillo, JJ ., concur.
||| (Hernandez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104874,
December 14, 1993)

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 132428. October 24, 2000.]
GEORGE YAO, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Arturo S. Santos for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
SYNOPSIS

Petitioner was convicted with the crime of unfair competition
in the MeTC. Later, he filed an appeal to the RTC where Judge
Angeles affirmed the conviction quoting in his decision the
dispositive portion of the MeTC decision and then stated,
"after going over the evidence on record, the Court finds no
cogent reason to disturb the findings of the MeTC." Petitioner
then filed a motion for reconsideration of the RTC decision but
the same was denied. On the last day of the period allowed by
law to perfect an appeal, petitioner filed a notice of appeal
instead of the required petition for review with the Court of
Appeals. This, appellate court dismissed; and when petitioner
finally filed a petition for review on certiorari, the same was
also dismissed.
Since petitioner never instituted the correct mode appeal on
time, he lost his right to appeal. Nevertheless, the Court has
noted that the decision of the RTC affirming the conviction of
petitioner palpably transgressed Section 14, Art. VIII of the
Constitution which requires that court decisions clearly and
distinctly state the facts and law on which the decision was
based. Hence, the resolution of the Court of Appeals was set
aside and the decision of the RTC nullified. The records of the
case was remanded to the RTC for further proceedings and for
the rendition of judgment in accordance with Sec. 14, Art. VIII
of the Constitution.
SYLLABUS
3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT; COURT'S
DECISION MUST CLEARLY AND DISTINCTLY EXPRESS THE FACTS
AND THE LAW ON WHICH IT IS BASED. [T]he decision of the
RTC affirming the conviction of YAO palpably transgressed
Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution, which states: Sec.
14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without
expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law
on which it is based. . . [The Court has] sustained decisions of
lower courts as having substantially or sufficiently complied
with the constitutional injunction notwithstanding the laconic
and terse manner in which they were written and even if
"there (was left) much to be desired in terms of (their) clarity,
coherence and comprehensibility" provided that they
eventually set out the facts and the law on which they were
based, as when they stated the legal qualifications of the
offense constituted by the facts proved, the modifying
circumstances, the participation of the accused, the penalty
imposed and the civil liability; or discussed the facts
comprising the elements of the offense that was charged in
the information, and accordingly rendered a verdict and
imposed the corresponding penalty; or quoted the facts
narrated in the prosecution's memorandum but made their
own findings and assessment of evidence, before finally
agreeing with the prosecution's evaluation of the case. [The
Court has] also sanctioned the use of memorandum decisions,
a specie of succinctly written decisions by appellate courts in
accordance with the provisions of Section 40, B.P. Blg. 129 on
the grounds of expediency, practicality, convenience and
docket status of our courts. [The Court has] also declared that
memorandum decisions comply with the constitutional
mandate. In Francisco v. Permskul, however, [the Court] laid
down the conditions for the validity of memorandum decisions
. . . Tested against these standards, [the Court] find[s] that the
RTC decision at bar miserably failed to meet them and,
therefore, fell short of the constitutional injunction. The RTC
decision is brief indeed, but it is starkly hallow, otiosely
written, vacuous in its content and trite in its form. It achieved
nothing and attempted at nothing, not even at a simple
summation of facts which could easily be done. Its inadequacy
speaks for itself. [The Court] cannot even consider or affirm
said RTC decision as a memorandum decision because it failed
to comply with the measures of validity laid down in Francisco
v. Permskul. It merely affirmed in toto the MeTC decision
without saying more. A decision or resolution, especially one
resolving an appeal, should directly meet the issues for
resolution; otherwise, the appeal would be pointless.
4. ID.; ID.; ADHERENCE TO CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
OF DECISIONS, RATIONALE. [The Court] reiterates its our
admonition in Nicos Industrial Corporation v. Court of Appeals,
in that while it conceded that brevity in the writing of
decisions is an admirable trait, it should not and cannot be
substituted for substance; and again in Francisco v. Permskul,
where the Court cautioned that expediency alone, no matter
how compelling, cannot excuse non-compliance with the
constitutional requirements. This is not to discourage the
lower courts to write abbreviated and concise decisions, but
never at the expense of scholarly analysis, and more
significantly, of justice and fair play, lest the fears expressed by
Justice Feria as the ponente in Romero v. Court of
Appeals come true, i.e., if an appellate court failed to provide
the appeal the attention it rightfully deserved, said court
deprived the appellant of due process since he was not
accorded a fair opportunity to be heard by a fair and
responsible magistrate. This situation becomes more ominous
in criminal cases, as in this case, where not only property
rights are at stake but also the liberty if not the life of a human
being. Faithful adherence to the requirements of Section 14,
Article VIII of the Constitution is indisputably a paramount
component of due process and fair play. It is likewise
demanded by the due process clause of the Constitution. The
parties to a litigation should be informed of how it was
decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons
that led to the conclusions of the court. The court cannot
simply say that judgment is rendered in favor of X and against
Y and just leave it at that without any justification whatsoever
for its action. The losing party is entitled to know why he lost,
so he may appeal to the higher court, if permitted, should he
believe that the decision should be reversed. A decision that
does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on
which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was
reached and is precisely prejudicial to the losing party, who is
unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review
by a higher tribunal. More than that, the requirement is an
assurance to the parties that, in reaching judgment, the judge
did so through the processes of legal reasoning. It is, thus, a
safeguard against the impetuosity of the judge, preventing
him from deciding ipse dixit. Vouchsafed neither the sword nor
the purse by the Constitution but nonetheless vested with the
sovereign prerogative of passing judgment on the life, liberty
or property of his fellowmen, the judge must ultimately
depend on the power of reason for sustained public
confidence in the justness of his decision.
.D E C I S I O N
DAVIDE, JR., C.J p:
In this petition for review on certiorari, George Yao (hereafter
YAO) assails the 25 April 1995 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 16893 which dismissed his appeal and
ordered the remand of the records of the case to the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 52, Caloocan
*
City (hereafter
MeTC) for execution. YAO was convicted by said MeTC for
unfair competition.
YAO's legal dilemma commenced in June 1990 when the
Philippine Electrical Manufacturing Company (hereafter
PEMCO) noticed the proliferation locally of General Electric
(GE) lamp starters. As the only local subsidiary of GE-USA,
PEMCO knew that it was a highly unlikely market situation
considering that no GE starter was locally manufactured or
imported since 1983. PEMCO commissioned Gardsmarks, Inc.
to conduct a market survey. Gardsmarks, Inc., thru its
trademark specialist, Martin Remandaman, discovered that
thirty (30) commercial establishments sold GE starters. All
these establishments pointed to Tradeway Commercial
Corporation (hereafter TCC) as their source. Remandaman was
able to purchase from TCC fifty (50) pieces of fluorescent lamp
starters with the GE logo and design. Assessing that these
products were counterfeit, PEMCO applied for the issuance of
a search warrant. This was issued by the MeTC, Branch 49,
Caloocan City. Eight boxes, each containing 15,630 starters,
were thereafter seized from the TCC warehouse in Caloocan
City.
Indicted before the MeTC, Branch 52, Caloocan City for unfair
competition under Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code were
YAO, who was TCC's President and General Manager, and
Alfredo Roxas, a member of TCC's Board of Directors. The
indictment 1 charged YAO and Roxas of having mutually and in
conspiracy sold fluorescent lamp starters which have the
General Electric (GE) logo, design and containers, making them
appear as genuine GE fluorescent lamp starters; and inducing
the public to believe them as such, when they were in fact
counterfeit. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. C-
155713.
Both accused pleaded not guilty. At the trial, the prosecution
presented evidence tending to establish the foregoing
narration of facts. Further, the State presented witnesses Atty.
Hofilena of the Castillo Laman Tan and Pantaleon Law Offices
who underwent a familiarization seminar from PEMCO in 1990
on how to distinguish a genuine GE starter from a counterfeit,
and Allan de la Cruz, PEMCO's marketing manager. Both
described a genuine GE starter as having "a stenciled silk-
screen printing which includes the GE logo . . . back to back
around the starter, a drumlike glowbulb and a
condenser/capacitor shaped like an M&M candy with the
numbers .006." They then compared and examined random
samples of the seized starters with the genuine GE products.
They concluded that the seized starters did not possess the full
design complement of a GE original. They also observed that
some of the seized starters did not have capacitors or if they
possessed capacitors, these were not shaped like M&M. Still
others merely had sticker jackets with prints of the GE logo.
Mr. de la Cruz added that only Hankuk Stars of Korea
manufactured GE starters and if these were imported by
PEMCO, they would cost P7.00 each locally. As TCC's starters
cost P1.60 each, the witnesses agreed that the glaring
differences in the packaging, design and costs indisputably
proved that TCC's GE starters were counterfeit.
The defense presented YAO as its lone witness. YAO admitted
that as general manager, he has overall supervision of the
daily operation of the company. As such, he has the final word
on the particular brands of products that TCC would purchase
and in turn sold. He also admitted that TCC is not an
accredited distributor of GE starters. However, he disclaimed
liability for the crime charged since (1) he had no knowledge
or information that the GE starters supplied to TCC were fake;
(2) he had not attended any seminar that helped him
determine which TCC products were counterfeit; (3) he had no
participation in the manufacture, branding, stenciling of the
GE names or logo in the starters; (4) TCC's suppliers of the
starters delivered the same already branded and boxed; and
(5) he only discussed with the suppliers matters regarding
pricing and peak-volume items. EHScCA
In its 13-page 20 October 1993 decision, 2 the MeTC acquitted
Roxas but convicted YAO. In acquitting Roxas, the trial court
declared that the prosecution failed to prove that he was still
one of the Board of Directors at the time the goods were
seized. It anchored its conviction of YAO on the following: (1)
YAO's admission that he knew that the starters were not part
of GE's line products when he applied with PEMCO for TCC's
accreditation as distributor; (2) the prosecution's evidence
(Exhibit G-7), a delivery receipt dated 25 May 1989 issued by
Country Supplier Center, on which a TCC personnel noted that
the 2000 starters delivered were GE starters despite the
statement therein that they were China starters; this fact gave
rise to a presumption that the TCC personnel knew of the
anomaly and that YAO as general manager and overall
supervisor knew and perpetrated the deception of the public;
(3) the fact that no genuine GE starter could be sold from 1986
whether locally manufactured or imported or at the very least
in such large commercial quantity as those seized from TCC;
and (4) presence of the elements of unfair competition.
The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:
For the failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt
of the accused, Alfredo Roxas, of Unfair Competition
under Article 189 (1) of the Revised Penal Code . .
. i.e., to prove that he was Chairman of the Board of
the Tradeway Commercial Corporation on October
10, 1990, as well as to have him identified in open
court during the trial, he isacquitted of the
same. IaESCH
But because the prosecution proved the guilt of the
other accused, George Yao, beyond reasonable
doubt as principal under the said Article 189 (1) for
Unfair Competition, he is convicted of the same. In
the absence of any aggravating or mitigating
circumstances alleged/proven, and considering the
provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is
sentenced to a minimum of four (4) months and
twenty-one (21)days of arresto mayor to a maximum
of one (1) year and five (5) months of prision
correccional.
This case was prosecuted by the law offices of
Castillo Laman Tan and Pantaleon for . . . PEMCO . . .
Considering that no document was submitted by the
private complainant to show how the claim of
300,000 for consequential damages was reached
and/or computed, the court is not in a position to
make a pronouncement on the whole amount.
However, the offender, George Yao, is directed to
pay PEMCO the amount of P20,000 by way of
consequential damages under Article 2202 of the
New Civil Code, and to pay the law offices of Castillo,
Laman Tan and Pantaleon the amount of another
P20,000.00 as PEMCO's attorney's fees under Article
2208 (11) of the same.
This decision should have been promulgated in open
court on July 28, 1993 but the promulgation was
reset for August 31, 1993 in view of the absence of
parties; it was again re-set for today.
promulgated this 20th day of October, 1993 in
Kalookan City, Philippines. 3
YAO filed a motion for reconsideration, which the MeTC
denied in its order 4 of 7 March 1994.
YAO appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City
(RTC). The appeal was docketed as Criminal Case No. C-
47255(94) and was assigned to Branch 121 of the court.
On 24 May 1994, Presiding Judge Adoracion G. Angeles of
Branch 121 issued an order 5 directing the parties to file their
respective memoranda.
On 4 July 1994 YAO filed his Appeal Memorandum. 6
Without waiting for the Memorandum on Appeal of the
prosecution, which was filed only on 20 August 1994, 7 Judge
Adoracion Angeles rendered on 27 July 1994 a one-page
Decision 8 which affirmed in toto the MeTC decision. In so
doing, she merely quoted the dispositive portion of the MeTC
and stated that "[a]fter going over the evidence on record, the
Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the
Metropolitan Trial Court."
YAO filed a motion for reconsideration 9 and assailed the
decision as violative of Section 2, Rule 20 of the Rules of
Court. 10 In its order 11 of 28 September 1994, the RTC denied
the motion for reconsideration as devoid of merit and
reiterated that the findings of the trial court are entitled to
great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed on appeal
unless for strong and cogent reasons.
On 4 October 1994, YAO appealed to the Court of Appeals by
filing a notice of appeal. 12
The appealed case was docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 16893. In
its Resolution 13 of 28 February 1995, the Court of Appeals
granted YAO an extension of twenty (20) days from 10
February or until 12 March 1995 within which to file the
Appellant's Brief. However, on 25 April 1995 the Court of
Appeals promulgated a Resolution 14 declaring that "[t]he
decision rendered on July 27, 1994 by the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 121, has long become final and executory" and
ordering the records of the case remanded to said court for
the proper execution of judgment. The pertinent portion of
the Resolution reads:
In Our resolution, dated February 28, 1995, accused-
appellant was granted an extension of twenty (20)
days from February 10, 1995, or until March 12,
1995 within which to file appellant's brief.
To date, no appellant's brief has been filed.
From the Manifestation, filed on March 24, 1995, by
City Prosecutor Gabriel N. dela Cruz, Kalookan City, it
would appear that:
xxx xxx xxx
2. George Yao received a copy of the RTC's decision on
August 16, 1994, and filed a motion for reconsideration
on August 30, 1994. On October 3, 1994, George Yao
received a copy of the RTC's order, dated September 28,
1994, denying his motion for reconsideration.
3. On October 4, 1994, George Yao filed a notice of
appeal by registered mail.
We will assume from the said Manifestation that the
decision of the RTC and the order denying YAO's
motion for reconsideration were sent to and
received by YAO's counsel.
Proceeding from said assumption, Yao had fifteen
(15) days from August 16, 1994 to elevate his case to
this Court. On August 30, 1994, or fourteen (14) days
thereafter, Yao filed a motion for reconsideration.
When he received the Order denying his aforesaid
motion on October 3, 1994, he had one more day
left to elevate his case to this Court by the proper
mode of appeal, which is by petition for review. Yao,
however, on October 4, 1994, filed a notice of
appeal by registered mail informing the RTC that he
is appealing his conviction to the Court of Appeals.
By then, the fifteen (15) day period had already
elapsed.
That notwithstanding, the Branch Clerk of Court,
RTC, Branch 121, transmitted to this Court the entire
records of the case, thru a transmittal letter, dated
October 13, 1994, and received by the Criminal
Section of this Court on October 28, 1994. YAO's
counsel, on February 20, 1995, filed with this Court,
a motion for extension of period to file brief for
accused-appellant which was granted in Our
resolution mentioned in the opening paragraph of
this resolution.
Petitions for review shall be filed within the period
to appeal. This period has already elapsed even
when Yao filed a notice of appeal by registered mail,
with the RTC of Kalookan City. Worse, the notice of
appeal is procedurally infirm.
YAO filed an Urgent Motion to Set Aside Entry of Judgment
contending that the 25 April 1995 resolution did not
specifically dismiss the appeal, for which reason, there was no
Judgment on which an entry of judgment could be issued. He
also argued that the attendant procedural infirmities in the
appeal, if any, were cured with the issuance of the 28 February
1995 resolution granting him twenty (20) days from 10
February 1995 or until 12 March 1995 within which to file an
appellant's brief and in compliance thereto, consequently filed
his appellant's brief on 2 March 1995. 15
In its Resolution 16 of 26 January 1998, the Court of Appeals
denied the Urgent Motion to Set Aside the Entry of Judgment
for lack of merit. It considered the 25 April 1995 resolution as
having "in effect dismissed the appeal, [hence] the Entry of
Judgment issued on May 26, 1995. . . was proper."
In this petition for review on certiorari, YAO reiterates the
arguments he raised in his Urgent Motion to Set Aside the
Entry of Judgment of the Court of Appeals, thus: (1) that the
entry of judgment was improvidently issued in the absence of
a final resolution specifically dismissing the appeal; (2) the
procedural infirmity in the appeal, if any, has been cured; and
(3) the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying him (YAO) due
process of law.
In support of his first argument, YAO cites Section 1, Rule 11 of
the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals, thus:
SEC. 1. Entry of Judgment Unless a motion for
reconsideration is filed or an appeal is taken to the
Supreme Court, judgments and final resolutions of
the Court of Appeals shall be entered upon the
expiration of fifteen (15) days after notice to parties.
YAO claims that the 25 April 1995 resolution of the Court of
Appeals was not a judgment on his appeal nor was it "a final
resolution" contemplated in the Internal Rules since it did not
specifically dismiss his appeal. A fortiori, the entry of judgment
was improvidently issued for lack of legal basis.
YAO also repeats his argument that any procedural infirmity in
the appeal was cured when the RTC gave due course to the
appeal, elevated the records to the Court of Appeals which in
turn issued on 13 December 1994 a notice to file his
Appellant's Brief and granted him until 12 March 1995 within
which to file the appellant's brief.
Finally, YAO asserts that he was denied due process
considering that (1) none of the elements of unfair
competition are present in this case; (2) he filed his appeal to
the Court of Appeals within the reglementary period; and (3)
notwithstanding his filing of a notice of appeal (instead of a
petition for review), it was a mere procedural lapse, a
technicality which should not bar the determination of the
case based on intrinsic merits. YAO then invokes the plethora
of jurisprudence wherein the Supreme Court "in the exercise
of equity jurisdiction decided to disregard technicalities";
"decided [the case] on merits and not on technicalities";
"found manifest in the petition strong considerations of
substantial justice necessitating the relaxing of the stringent
application of technical rules," or "heeded petitioner's cry for
justice because the basic merits of the case warrant so, as
where the petition embodies justifying circumstances";
discerned "not to sacrifice justice to technicality"; discovered
that the application of "res judicata" and estoppel by
judgment amount to a denial of justice and/or a bar to a
vindication of a legitimate grievance." 17
In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General prays that
the petition should be dismissed for lack of merit. It maintains
that although the 25 April 1995 resolution did not specifically
state that the appeal was being dismissed, the intent and
import are clear and unequivocable. It asserts that the appeal
was obviously dismissed because the RTC decision has long
become final and executory. YAO failed to challenge the RTC
decision, within the reglementary period, by filing a petition
for review of the same with the Court of Appeals pursuant
to Section 1 of Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. Instead, he filed
an ordinary appeal by way of a notice of appeal. Hence, the
period to file the correct procedural remedy had lapsed.
There is no dispute that YAO availed of the wrong procedural
remedy in assailing the RTC decision. It is clear from the
records that YAO received a copy of the adverse RTC judgment
on 16 August 1994. He has fifteen (15) days or until 31 August
1994 within which to file either a motion for reconsideration
or a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. Fourteen
(14) days thereafter or on 30 August 1994, YAO opted to file a
motion for reconsideration the pendency of which tolled the
running of the period. He received a copy of the RTC's order
denying the motion for reconsideration on 3 October 1994. He
had therefore, only one day left, 4 October 1994 as the last
day, within which to file with the Court of Appeals a petition
for review. 18 However, on said date, YAO filed a notice of
appeal. He palpably availed of the wrong mode of appeal. And
since he never instituted the correct one, he lost it.
The right to appeal is not a constitutional, natural or inherent
right. It is a statutory privilege of statutory origin and,
therefore, available only if granted or provided by
statute. 19 Since the right to appeal is not a natural right nor a
part of due process, it may be exercised only in the manner
and in accordance with the provisions of law.20 Corollarily, its
requirements must be strictly complied with.
That an appeal must be perfected in the manner and within
the period fixed by law is not only mandatory but
jurisdictional. 21 Non-compliance with such legal
requirements is fatal, 22 for it renders the decision sought to
be appealed final and executory, 23 with the end result that
no court can exercise appellate jurisdiction to review the
decision. 24
In the light of these procedural precepts, YAO's petition
appears to be patently without merit and does not deserve a
second look. Hence, the reasons he enumerated to persuade
this Court to grant his petition and reinstate his appeal are
obviously frivolous if not downright trivial. They need not even
be discussed here.
In the normal and natural course of events, we should dismiss
the petition outright, if not for an important detail which
augurs well for YAO and would grant him a reprieve in his legal
battle. The decision of the RTC affirming the conviction of YAO
palpably transgressed Section 14, Article VIII of the
Constitution, which states:
Sec. 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court
without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the
facts and the law on which it is based.
xxx xxx xxx
Let us quote in full the RTC judgment:
This is an appeal from the decision of the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 52, Kalookan City,
in Crim. Case No. C-155713, the dispositive portion
of which reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
But because the prosecution proved the guilt of the
other accused, George Yao, beyond reasonable
doubt as principal under the said Article 189 (1) for
Unfair Competition, he is convicted of the same. In
the absence of any aggravating or mitigating
circumstances alleged/proven, and considering the
provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is
sentenced to a minimum of four (4) months and
twenty-one (21) days of arresto mayor to a
maximum of one (1) year and five (5) months
of prision correccional.
xxx xxx xxx
After going over the evidence on record, the Court
finds no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the
Metropolitan Trial Court.
WHEREFORE, this Court affirms in toto the decision
of the Metropolitan Trial Court dated October 20,
1993.
SO ORDERED.
That is all there is to it.
We have sustained decisions of lower courts as having
substantially or sufficiently complied with the constitutional
injunction notwithstanding the laconic and terse manner in
which they were written and even if "there (was left) much to
be desired in terms of (their) clarity, coherence and
comprehensibility" provided that they eventually set out the
facts and the law on which they were based, 25 as when they
stated the legal qualifications of the offense constituted by the
facts proved, the modifying circumstances, the participation of
the accused, the penalty imposed and the civil liability; 26 or
discussed the facts comprising the elements of the offense
that was charged in the information, and accordingly rendered
a verdict and imposed the corresponding penalty; 27 or
quoted the facts narrated in the prosecution's memorandum
but made their own findings and assessment of evidence,
before finally agreeing with the prosecution's evaluation of the
case. 28
We have also sanctioned the use of memorandum
decisions, 29 a specie of succinctly written decisions by
appellate courts in accordance with the provisions of Section
40, B.P. Blg. 129 30 on the grounds of expediency, practicality,
convenience and docket status of our courts. We have also
declared that memorandum decisions comply with the
constitutional mandate. 31
In Francisco v. Permskul, 32 however, we laid down the
conditions for the of validity of memorandum decisions, thus:
The memorandum decision, to be valid, cannot
incorporate the findings of fact and the conclusions
of law of the lower court only by remote reference,
which is to say that the challenged decision is not
easily and immediately available to the person
reading the memorandum decision. For the
incorporation by reference to be allowed, it must
provide for direct access to the facts and the law
being adopted, which must be contained in a
statement attached to the said decision. In other
words, the memorandum decision authorized under
Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129 should actually embody
the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the
lower court in an annex attached to and made an
indispensable part of the decision.
It is expected that this requirement will allay the
suspicion that no study was made of the decision of
the lower court and that its decision was merely
affirmed without a proper examination of the facts
and the law on which it is based. The proximity at
least of the annexed statement should suggest that
such an examination has been undertaken. It is, of
course, also understood that the decision being
adopted should, to begin with, comply with Article
VIII, Section 14 as no amount of incorporation or
adoption will rectify its violation.
The Court finds necessary to emphasize that the
memorandum decision should be sparingly used lest
it become an addictive excuse for judicial sloth. It is
an additional condition for the validity that this kind
of decision may be resorted to only in cases where
the facts are in the main accepted by both parties
and easily determinable by the judge and there are
no doctrinal complications involved that will require
an extended discussion of the laws involved. The
memorandum decision may be employed in simple
litigations only, such as ordinary collection cases,
where the appeal is obviously groundless and
deserves no more than the time needed to dismiss
it.
xxx xxx xxx
Henceforth, all memorandum decisions shall comply
with the requirements herein set forth both as to
the form prescribed and the occasions when they
may be rendered. Any deviation will summon the
strict enforcement of Article VIII, Section 14 of the
Constitution and strike down the flawed judgment as
a lawless disobedience.
Tested against these standards, we find that the RTC decision
at bar miserably failed to meet them and, therefore, fell short
of the constitutional injunction. The RTC decision is brief
indeed, but it is starkly hallow, otiosely written, vacuous in its
content and trite in its form. It achieved nothing and
attempted at nothing, not even at a simple summation of facts
which could easily be done. Its inadequacy speaks for itself.
We cannot even consider or affirm said RTC decision as a
memorandum decision because it failed to comply with the
measures of validity laid down in Francisco vs. Permskul. It
merely affirmed in toto the MeTC decision without saying
more. A decision or resolution, especially one resolving an
appeal, should directly meet the issues for resolution;
otherwise, the appeal would be pointless. 33
We therefore reiterate our admonition in Nicos Industrial
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 34 in that while we conceded
that brevity in the writing of decisions is an admirable trait, it
should not and cannot be substituted for substance; and again
in Francisco v. Permskul, 35 where we cautioned that
expediency alone, no matter how compelling, cannot excuse
non-compliance with the constitutional requirements.
This is not to discourage the lower courts to write abbreviated
and concise decisions, but never at the expense of scholarly
analysis, and more significantly, of justice and fair play, lest the
fears expressed by Justice Feria as the ponente in Romero v.
Court of Appeals 36 come true, i.e., if an appellate court failed
to provide the appeal the attention it rightfully deserved, said
court deprived the appellant of due process since he was not
accorded a fair opportunity to be heard by a fair and
responsible magistrate. This situation becomes more ominous
in criminal cases, as in this case, where not only property
rights are at stake but also the liberty if not the life of a human
being.
Faithful adherence to the requirements of Section 14, Article
VIII of the Constitution is indisputably a paramount
component of due process and fair play. 37 It is likewise
demanded by the due process clause of the
Constitution. 38 The parties to a litigation should be informed
of how it was decided, with an explanation of the factual and
legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court. The
court cannot simply say that judgment is rendered in favor of
X and against Y and just leave it at that without any
justification whatsoever for its action. The losing party is
entitled to know why he lost, so he may appeal to the higher
court, if permitted, should he believe that the decision should
be reversed. A decision that does not clearly and distinctly
state the facts and the law on which it is based leaves the
parties in the dark as to how it was reached and is precisely
prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the
possible errors of the court for review by a higher
tribunal. 39 More than that, the requirement is an assurance
to the parties that, in reaching judgment, the judge did so
through the processes of legal reasoning. It is, thus, a
safeguard against the impetuosity of the judge, preventing
him from deciding ipse dixit. Vouchsafed neither the sword nor
the purse by the Constitution but nonetheless vested with the
sovereign prerogative of passing judgment on the life, liberty
or property of his fellowmen, the judge must ultimately
depend on the power of reason for sustained public
confidence in the justness of his decision. 40
Thus the Court has struck down as void, decisions of lower
courts and even of the Court of Appeals whose careless
disregard of the constitutional behest exposed their
sometimes cavalier attitude not only to their magisterial
responsibilities but likewise to their avowed fealty to the
Constitution.
Thus, we nullified or deemed to have failed to comply with
Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution, a decision,
resolution or order which: contained no analysis of the
evidence of the parties nor reference to any legal basis in
reaching its conclusions; contained nothing more than a
summary of the testimonies of the witnesses of both
parties; 41 convicted the accused of libel but failed to cite any
legal authority or principle to support conclusions that the
letter in question was libelous; 42 consisted merely of one (1)
paragraph with mostly sweeping generalizations and failed to
support its conclusion of parricide; 43 consisted of five (5)
pages, three (3) pages of which were quotations from the
labor arbiter's decision including the dispositive portion and
barely a page (two [2] short paragraphs of two [2] sentences
each) of its own discussion or reasonings; 44 was merely based
on the findings of another court sans transcript of
stenographic notes; 45 or failed to explain the factual and legal
bases for the award of moral damages. 46
In the same vein do we strike down as a nullity the RTC
decision in question.
In sum, we agree with YAO that he was denied due process but not on
the grounds he ardently invoked but on the reasons already
extensively discussed above. While he indeed resorted to the wrong
mode of appeal and his right to appeal is statutory, it is still an
essential part of the judicial system that courts should proceed with
caution so as not to deprive a party of the prerogative, but instead
afford every party-litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and
just disposition of his case, freed from the constraints of
technicalities. 47
In the interest of substantial justice, procedural rules of the most
mandatory character in terms of compliance, may be relaxed. 48 In
other words, if strict adherence to the letter of the law would result in
absurdity and manifest injustice 49 or where the merit of a party's
cause is apparent and outweighs consideration of non-compliance
with certain formal requirements, 50 procedural rules should
definitely be liberally construed. A party-litigant is to be given the
fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his complaint or defense
rather than for him to lose life, liberty, honor or property on mere
technicalities. 51 We therefore withhold legal approbation on the RTC
decision at bar for its palpable failure to comply with the
constitutional and legal mandates thereby denying YAO of his day in
court. We also remind all magistrates to heed the demand of Section
14, Article VIII of the Constitution. It is their solemn and paramount
duty to uphold the Constitution and the principles enshrined therein,
lest they be lost in the nitty-gritty of their everyday judicial
work. DHACES
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition in this case is
GRANTED. The questioned 25 April 1995 resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 16893 is hereby SET ASIDE and the 27 July 1994
decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 121 of Kalookan City
rendered in its appellate jurisdiction is NULLIFIED. The records are
hereby remanded to said Regional Trial Court for further proceedings
and for the rendition of judgment in accordance with the mandate of
Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. RTJ-96-1338 September 5, 1997
[Formerly OCA IPI-95-21-RTJ]
ENGINEER FERNANDO S. DIZON, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE LILIA C. LOPEZ, Regional Trial Court, Branch 109, Pasay
City, respondent.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a complaint charging Judge Lilia C. Lopez of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 109, Pasay City, with violation of the
Constitution, serious misconduct, inefficiency, and falsification
in connection with her decision in Criminal Case No. 91-0716
entitled "People of the Philippines v. Engineer Fernando S.
Dizon."
It appears that on April 22, 1993, judgment was rendered,
convicting complainant of falsification of private document.
The promulgation of the judgment consisted of reading the
dispositive portion of the decision sentencing him to
imprisonment, without serving a copy of the decision on him.
The accused and his counsel were told to return in a few days
for their copy of the decision, but although petitioner and his
father by turns went to the court to obtain a copy of the
decision they were not able to do so. To protect his right,
complainant filed a partial motion for reconsideration on May
5, 1993, expressly reserving his light to submit a more
elaborate one upon receipt of the decision. The hearing of the
motion for reconsideration was scheduled on May 12, 1993,
but the case was not called as complainant's counsel was told
that the decision had not yet been finished. On November 29,
1994, complainant filed an "Omnibus Motion to Annul
Promulgation of Sentence and to Dismiss" the case. On
December 16, 1994, the date set for hearing the motion,
complainant was served a copy of the decision, dated April 22,
1993, the dispositive portion of which states:
In view of all the foregoing, the Court finds the accused
Fernando Dizon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Falsification of Private Document as defined and penalized
under Art. 172, par. 2 in relation to Art. 171 par. 2 and 4
thereof and hereby sentences him to imprisonment of two (2)
Years, Four (4) Months and One (1) Day to Six (6) Years and a
fine of P5,000.00.
Complainant alleges that the failure of respondent judge to
furnish him a copy of the decision until almost one year and
eight months after the promulgation of its dispositive portion
on April 22, 1993 constitutes a violation of Art. VIII, 14 of the
Constitution which prohibits courts from rendering decisions
without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and
law on which they are based and 15 of the same Art. VIII,
which provides that in all cases lower courts must render their
decisions within three months from the date of their
submission. He alleges further that he was denied the right to
a speedy trial in violation of Art. III, 14(2) of the Constitution
and that Judge Lopez falsified her decision by antedating it and
including therein, as additional penalty, a fine of P5,000.00.
On December 26, 1994, complainant filed another motion for
reconsideration after receiving a copy of the full decision of
the court. On January 3, 1995, he moved to disqualify
respondent from hearing the motions for reconsideration
which he had filed. Respondent judge responded by
voluntarily inhibiting herself from further consideration of the
case and ordered it forwarded to the Office of the Clerk of
Court for re-raffle. The case was eventually assigned to Judge
Manuel F. Dumatol of Branch 113 of the Pasay City RTC.
Judge Lopez claims that on April 22, 1993, when the judgment
was promulgated with the reading of the dispositive portion,
her decision was already prepared, although to prevent
leakage in the process of preparing it, she withheld its
dispositive portion until the day of its promulgation.
Respondent judge states that after the dispositive portion had
been read to complainant, respondent gave it to Ma. Cleotilde
Paulo (Social Worker II, presently OIC of Branch 109) for typing
and incorporation into the text of the decision. The court
found complainant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
falsification of private document under Art. 172, par. 2 of the
Revised Penal Code. Respondent states that the delay in
furnishing complainant with a copy of the decision was
unintentional.
Respondent judge referred to difficulties she had in preparing
her decision and to a series of personal problems which
contributed to this delay in the release of her decision, to wit:
she has only two (2) stenographers to attend to daily trials in
her court, making it necessary for her to make use of the
Social Worker assigned to her to type her decisions. During the
period January to December 1993 she had to dispose of 285
cases, apart from the fact that there was an unusually big
number of criminal, civil, and land registration cases as well as
special proceedings filed in her court which required the
holding of hearings in the mornings and in the afternoons.
During the same period, she went through some personal
tragedies. She lost her niece, Gloria Lopez Roque, whom she
had raised from childhood, due to a hospital accident. This was
followed by the death on March 1, 1992 of her mother,
Margarita Lopez, who had been under respondent's care for
the past eight years after suffering a stroke. On September 17,
1993, respondent's father died of diabetes, renal failure,
pneumonia, and cardiac arrest. Respondent was the one who
single-handedly brought them in and out of the hospital
because all her able-bodied relatives are abroad. Respondent
herself was found to be suffering from diabetes and
hypertension, necessitating her treatment and leave of
absence from September 27, 1994 to December 12, 1994, in
addition to her other leaves of absence. Aside from these,
respondent's family suffered financial reverses because of
estafa committed against them.
On February 19, 1996, Deputy Court Administrator Bernardo
P. Abesamis submitted a memorandum, finding the charge of
violation of the Constitution to be without merit. He called
attention to the written decision of respondent judge, which,
albeit delivered to complainant late, nonetheless states the
facts and law on which it is based. He likewise finds the charge
of serious misconduct and falsification to be without basis in
view of the absence of malice. However, he finds the charge of
inefficiency to be well founded on the basis of respondent's
failure to furnish complainant or his counsel a copy of the
decision within a reasonable time after its promulgation.
Hence, the Deputy Court Administration believes that Judge
Lopez should be given admonition for her negligence, but
recommends that the other charges against her for violation of
the Constitution, serious misconduct, and falsification be
dismissed for lack of merit.
The Court finds that respondent violated Art. VIII, 15(1) of the
Constitution which provides:
All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this
Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-four
months from date of submission for the Supreme Court, and,
unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all
lower collegiate courts and three months for all other lower
courts.
Although respondent judge promulgated her decision within
three months of the submission of the case for decision, the
fact is that only the dispositive portion was read at such
promulgation. She claims that on April 22, 1993 the text of her
decision, containing her findings and discussion of
complainant's liability, had already been prepared although it
had to be put in final form by incorporating the dispositive
portion. However, the fact is that it took a year and eight
months more before this was done and a copy of the complete
decision furnished the complainant on December 16, 1994.
Rule 120 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
1. Judgment defined. The term judgment as used in this
Rule means the adjudication by the court that the accused is
guilty or is not guilty of the offense charged, and the
imposition of the proper penalty and civil liability provided for
by law on the accused.
2. Form and contents of judgment. The judgment must be
written in the official language, personally and directly
prepared by the judge and signed by him and shall contain
clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts proved or
admitted by the accused and the law upon which the
judgment is based.
. Promulgation of judgment. The judgment is promulgated
by reading the same in the presence of the accused and any
judge of the court in which it was rendered. However, if the
conviction is for a light offense, the judgment may be
pronounced in the presence of his counsel or representative.
When the judge is absent or outside of the province or city,
the judgment may be promulgated by the clerk of court.
It is clear that merely reading the dispositive portion of the
decision to the accused is not sufficient. It is the judgment that
must be read to him, stating the facts and the law on which
such judgment is based. Since this was done only on
December 16, 1994 when a copy of the complete decision was
served on complainant, it is obvious that the respondent failed
to render her decision within three months as required by Art.
VIII, 15 of the Constitution.
If indeed all that had to be done after the dispositive portion
had been read in open court on April 22, 1993 was to
incorporate it in the text of the decision allegedly then already
prepared, it is difficult to see why it took respondent judge
one year and eight more months before she was able to do so.
Respondent claims that she was prevented from putting out
her decision by a series of personal and other problems which
leads the Court to believe that when she promulgated her
sentence she had not finished the preparation of the entire
decision. At all events, she could have applied for extension of
time to decide the case and put off the promulgation of
judgment until she had finished it.
What respondent did in this case was to render what is known
as a "sin perjuicio" judgment, which is a judgment without a
statement of the facts in support of its conclusion to be later
supplemented by the final judgment.
1
That is why, in answer
to complainant's charge that the dispositive portion of the
judgment read to him did not impose a fine, respondent
contends that the addition of the fine of P5,000.00 was within
her power to do even if no such fine had been included in the
oral sentence given on April 22, 1993. As respondent judge
states, because the decision was not complete it could be
modified and cites in support of her contention the case
of Abay, Sr. v. Garcia.
2
Respondent only succeeds in showing
that the judgment promulgated on April 22, 1993 was a "sin
perjuicio" judgment which was incomplete and needed a
statement of the facts and law upon which the judgment was
based. As early as 1923, this Court already expressed its
disapproval of the practice of rendering "sin perjuicio"
judgments, what with all the uncertainties entailed because of
the implied reservation that it is subject to modification when
the decision is finally rendered.
3
This Court has expressed
approval of the practice of some judges of withholding the
dispositive portion from their opinions until the very last
moment of promulgation of their judgment in order to
prevent leakage,
4
but that refers to the preparation of their
decision, not itspromulgation. What must be promulgated
must be the complete decision. There would be no more
reason to keep the dispositive portion a secret at the stage of
promulgation of judgment.
However, the Court finds the other charges against
respondent to be without merit.
First, the claim that complainant was deprived of his right to a
speedy trial by reason of respondent's failure to furnish him
with a copy of the decision until after one year and eight
months is without basis. It appears that despite the
destruction of records by fire in the Pasay City Hall on January
18, 1992 the parties were required to submit simultaneously
their memoranda on August 18, 1992. The delay, if any, was
not such "vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delay"
5
as to
justify finding a denial of the right to a speedy trial. The fact is
that the reading of the sentence on April 22, 1993, albeit not
in compliance with the requirement for promulgation of
judgments, nonetheless put an end to trial.
Second, the delay in furnishing complainant a copy of the
complete decision did not prejudice his right to appeal or file a
motion for reconsideration. It is true that an accused must be
given a copy of the decision in order to apprise him of the
basis of such decision so that he can intelligently prepare his
appeal or motion for reconsideration. However, in accordance
with the ruling in Director of Lands v. Sanz,
6
complainant's
period to appeal or file a motion for reconsideration did not
begin to run until after he actually received a copy of the
judgment on December 16, 1994. He therefore suffered no
prejudice. If at all, complainant suffered from the anxiety to
refute a conviction which he could not do for lack of a
statement of the basis of the conviction.
Nonetheless, certain factors mitigate respondent judge's
culpability. Except for this incident, respondent's record of
public service as legal officer and agent of the National Bureau
of Investigation, as State Prosecutor, and later Senior State
Prosecutor, of the Department of Justice for 17 years and as
Regional Trial Judge for more than 13 years now is unmarred
by malfeasance, misfeasance or wrongdoing. This is the first
time she is required to answer an administrative complaint
against her. Her failure to decide the case of complainant was
brought about by factors not within her control, to wit, lack of
stenographers and unusually big number of cases; and her
personal loss as a result of the death of her niece and both her
parents, financial reverses of the family, and poor health as a
result of diabetes and hypertension.
In Mangulabnan v. Tecson,
7
a joint decision in two criminal
cases was rendered by respondent judge on February 24,
1978, six months and eight days from submission of the case,
and a copy was delivered to complainant on September 28,
1979, over 19 months after rendition of the decision. Two
complaints were filed for violation of the constitutional
provision requiring submitted cases to be decided by lower
courts within three months and for violation of complainant's
right to a speedy trial. Respondent judge blamed the delay in
deciding the cases on the fact that his clerks had misfiled the
records. As to the delay in furnishing complainant with a copy
of the decision, the judge attributed this to the mistake of his
clerk who did not think complainant was entitled to receive
the same. The judge was reprimanded. The reason for the
delay in that case was even less excusable than the difficulties
experienced by respondent Judge Lopez, i.e., deaths in
respondent's family, her own poor state of health, financial
reverses suffered by her family, and the volume of work done
within the period in question, which somewhat mitigate her
liability. The Court believes that a similar penalty would be
appropriate.
In view of the foregoing, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED
with WARNING that repetition of the same acts complained of
will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Romero, Puno and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Regalado J., is on leave.

A.M. No. 00-7-09-CA March 27, 2001
IN RE: DEROGATORY NEWS ITEMS CHARGING COURT OF
APPEALS ASSOCIATE JUSTICE DEMETRIO DEMETRIA WITH
INTERFERENCE ON BEHALF OF A SUSPECTED DRUG QUEEN:
COURT OF APPEALS ASSOCIATE JUSTICE DEMETRIO G.
DEMETRIA, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
Men and women of the courts must conduct themselves with
honor, probity, fairness, prudence and discretion. Magistrates
of justice must always be fair and impartial. They should avoid
not only acts of impropriety, but all appearances of
impropriety. Their influence in society must be consciously and
conscientiously exercised with utmost prudence and
discretion. For, theirs is the assigned role of preserving the
independence, impartiality and integrity of the Judiciary.
The Code of Judicial Conduct mandates a judge to "refrain
from influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or
dispute pending before another court or administrative
agency."
1
The slightest form of interference cannot be
countenanced. Once a judge uses his influence to derail or
interfere in the regular course of a legal or judicial proceeding
for the benefit of one or any of the parties therein, public
confidence in the judicial system is diminished, if not totally
eroded.
Such is this administrative charge triggered by newspaper
accounts which appeared on the 21 July 2000 issues ofThe
Manila Standard, The Manila Times, Malaya, The Philippine
Daily Inquirer and Today. The national dailies collectively
reported that Court of Appeals Associate Justice Demetrio G.
Demetria tried to intercede on behalf of suspected Chinese
drug queen Yu Yuk Lai, alias Sze Yuk Lai, who went in and out
of prison to play in a Manila casino.
2

That same day, 21 July 2000, Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.,
issued a Memorandum to Justice Demetria directing him to
comment on the derogatory allegations in the news items.
3
On
24 July 2000, Justice Demetria submitted his Compliance.
Subsequently, Chief State Prosecutor (CSP) Jovencito R. Zuo,
who disclosed to the media the name of Justice Demetria, and
State Prosecutor (SP) Pablo C. Formaran III, a member of the
Task Force on Anti-Narcotics Cases of the Department of
Justice (DOJ) prosecuting the case of the suspected Chinese
drug queen, filed their respective Comments on
the Compliance of Justice Demetria.
4

On 8 August 2000, the Court En Banc ordered an investigation
and designated Mme. Justice Carolina C. Grio-Aquino as
Investigator and Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo as
Prosecutor. An investigation then commenced on 22 August
2000 and continued until 16 November 2000.
The Prosecution presented four (4) witnesses, namely, CSP
Zuo, SP Formaran III, Agnes P. Tuason, secretary of SP
Formaran, III, and Jose H. Afalla, an employee from the Office
of Asst. CSP (ACSP) Leonardo Guiyab, Jr. The defense on the
other hand presented ten (10) witnesses: respondent Justice
Demetria, Asst. Chief State Prosecutor (ACSP) Severino Gaa,
Jr., Senior State Prosecutor (SSP) Romeo Daosos, Go Teng
Kok, Yu Yuk Lai, MTC Judge Orlando Siapno, Peter Young, Atty.
Reinerio Paas, lawyer of Go Teng Kok, Danilo J. Mijares,
bodyguard of Go Teng Kok, and Luisito Artiaga, official of the
Philippine Amateur Track and Field Association (PATAFA).
The facts as borne out by the evidence presented by the
prosecution are quite clear. In an Information dated 9
December 1998, SP Formaran III charged Yu Yuk Lai, together
with her supposed nephew, a certain Kenneth Monceda y Sy
alias William Sy, before the RTC of Manila, Br. 18,
5
with
violation of Sec. 15, Art. III, RA 6425, as amended, for
"conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another,
with deliberate intent and without authority of law . . . (to)
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and deliver to a
poseur-buyer three (3) kilograms, more or less, of
methylamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), which is a
regulated drug."
6
Accused of non-bailable offense, both Yu Yuk
Lai and Kenneth Monceda were held at the detention cell of
the PNP Narcotics Group in Camp Crame, Quezon City. On 25
June 1999, accused Yu Yuk Lai filed a Petition for Bail on the
ground that the evidence of her guilt was not strong.
On 10 November 1999, upon receiving information that the
accused, especially Yu Yuk Lai, had been seen regularly playing
in the casinos of Heritage Hotel and the Holiday Inn Pavilion,
SP Formaran III filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Transfer the
Detention of the Accused to the City Jail.
7
On the same day,
Judge Perfecto A. S. Laguio, Jr., granted the motion and
ordered the immediate transfer of the two (2) accused to the
Manila City Jail.
8

On 18 January 2000, Judge Laguio, Jr., concluded that "the
evidence standing alone and unrebutted, is strong and
sufficient to warrant conviction of the two accused for the
crime charged" and denied the petition for bail of accused Yu
Yuk Lai for lack of merit.
9
Consequently, both accused filed a
Joint Motion for Inhibition arguing that the trial court's
actuation "do not inspire the belief that its decision would be
just and impartial."
10
On 28 January 2000, Judge Laguio, Jr.,
believing that the joint motion was utterly without merit but
considering the gravity of the offense and for the peace of
mind of the accused, inhibited himself.
11

The case was re-raffled to Branch 53, presided by Judge Angel
V. Colet. Accused Yu Yuk Lai then filed a Motion to Order the
Confinement of the Accused in a Hospital. Before Judge Colet
could resolve the motion, the case was handled by the
Branch's Pairing Judge Manuel T. Muro.
On 15 May 2000 Judge Muro granted accused Yu Yuk Lai's
motion and allowed her to be confined at the Manila Doctors
Hospital for a period not exceeding seven (7) days,
12
contrary
to the recommendation of Dr. Jose Estrada Rosal, Chief of the
Health Services of the Manila City Jail, that Yu Yuk Lai be
confined at the Philippine General Hospital.
13

On 5 June 2000 Judge Muro granted Yu Yuk Lai's Urgent
Motion for Extension of Medical Confinement "for a period of
one (1) month, or until such time that she is fit to be
discharged from the said hospital."
14
On 7 July 2000 Judge
Muro also granted Yu Yuk Lai's Motion for Leave of Court to
File Demurrer to Evidence with Motion to Admit Demurrer to
Evidence.
15
Soon, rumors circulated in the Manila City Hall that
Judge Muro was partial towards accused Yu Yuk Lai.
The rumors did not end there. On 6 July 2000 unidentified
employees of the RTC Manila calling themselves "CONCERNED
COURT EMPLOYEES" wrote the Secretary of Justice, copy
furnished the Chief State Prosecutor, the Ombudsman, and
Judge Muro. The letter alleged that Judge Muro ordered the
hospitalization of Yu Yuk Lai "even if she (was) not sick and
there (was) already a rumor circulating around the City Hall,
that the notorious Judge had given the go signal to the counsel
of the accused to file the Motion to Quash, which (would) be
granted for a consideration of millions of pesos and the
contact person (was) allegedly the daughter of the Judge, who
is an employee in the said branch."
16

Accordingly on 14 July 2000, SP Formaran III filed a Motion for
Inhibition praying that Judge Muro inhibit himself "from
further handling this case and/or from resolving the demurrer
to evidence filed by the accused Yu Yuk Lai as well as any other
pending incidents therein."
17

On 16 July 2000, at around 7:30 o'clock in the morning, while
she was supposed to be confined at the Manila Doctors
Hospital, accused Yu Yuk Lai was arrested inside the VIP room
of the Casino Filipino at the Holiday Inn Pavilion, Manila, while
playing baccarat. She was unescorted at the time of her arrest.
On 18 July 2000, at 9:00 o'clock in the morning, the Motion for
Inhibition of Judge Muro was heard and submitted for
resolution. Later, at around 11:30 o'clock, when SP Formaran
III arrived in his office from the hearing, he was informed by
his secretary, Agnes Tuason, that the staff of Court of Appeals
Justice Demetrio Demetria had called earlier and said that the
Justice wanted to speak with him. The caller requested for a
return call. As requested, SP Formaran III immediately
returned the call of Justice Demetria but the Justice had
already gone out for lunch.
Later in the afternoon, between 1:30 and 2:00 o'clock, Justice
Demetria, PATAFA President Go Teng Kok and Atty. Reinerio
Paas, lawyer of Go Teng Kok and a close friend of Justice
Demetria, went to the office of SP Formaran III in the DOJ
which SP Formaran III shares with SP Albert Fonacier.
Apparently, Justice Demetria was not familiar with SP
Formaran III as he greeted SP Fonacier "Kamusta ka,
Prosecutor Formaran?"
18

Soon the visitors were seated. Go Teng Kok immediately
pleaded with SP Formaran III to withdraw his motion to inhibit
Judge Muro as this would purportedly delay the resolution of
the case. Go Teng Kok also expressed his apprehension that if
Judge Muro would inhibit, a new judge might convict his
friend, accused Yu Yuk Lai, who was then already receiving bad
publicity.
Justice Demetria then asked about the status of the case. SP
Formaran III informed the Justice that a motion for inhibition
has been submitted for resolution, one basis of which was the
unsigned letter of the concerned court employees. Justice
Demetria opined that it was a bit dangerous to anchor the
inhibition of a judge on an unsigned, anonymous letter. The
Justice then advised Go Teng Kok who was becoming
persistent to "keep his cool" and asked SP Formaran III if he
could do something to help Go Teng Kok. Apparently, prior to
18 July 2000, Go Teng Kok had already been asking SP
Formaran III to go slow in prosecuting accused Yu Yuk Lai.
19
SP
Formaran III at first politely declined the request. But later,
"just to put an end to (the) conversation," 20 he told them
that he would bring the matter to CSP Zuo. "Iyon pala,"
Justice Demetria replied. The Justice then stood up, bade good
bye and left. Atty. Paas and Go Teng Kok followed closely
behind.
21

Thereafter, SP Formaran III went to see CSP Zuo and
informed the latter of what had transpired. CSP Zuo replied,
"No way!" SP Formaran III also told ACSP Guiyab, Jr., who gave
the same reply.
22

At around 3:00 o'clock that same afternoon, CSP Zuo
received a call from Justice Demetria who requested him to
instruct SP Formaran III to withdraw the motion for inhibition
of Judge Muro so that the Judge could already issue an order.
"Pakisabi mo nga kay State Prosecutor Formaran na i-
withdraw na iyong kanyang Motion to Inhibit para naman
makagawa na ng Order si Judge Muro," Justice Demetria was
quoted as saying.
23
Politely, CSP Zuo said that he would see
what he could do. "Tingnan ko po kung ano ang magagawa
ko."
24

On 20 July 2000, The Philippine Daily Inquirer reported that a
"Supreme Court Justice . . . and an outspoken sports person
and leader"
25
had been exerting "undue pressure" on the DOJ
to go slow in prosecuting re-arrested drug queen Yu Yuk Lai.
That same afternoon, the names of Justice Demetria and Mr.
Go Teng Kok were disclosed to the media to clear the name of
the Supreme Court justices who might have been affected by
the erroneous news report. The following day, 21 July 2000,
several newspapers named Justice Demetria and Go Teng Kok
as "drug lawyers."
Also on 20 July 2000 the DOJ received a copy of an Order
dated 19 July 2000 of Judge Muro inhibiting himself from
further hearing the case of Yu Yuk Lai and Kenneth Monceda.
26

Respondent Justice Demetria, for his part, vehemently denied
having interceded for Yu Yuk Lai. While he admitted that he
indeed visited the DOJ on 18 July 2000, he went there to "visit
old friends" and his meeting Go Teng Kok whom he did not
know until that time was purely accidental. Expectedly, Atty.
Paas and Go Teng Kok corroborated the claim of respondent
Justice.
Justice Demetria explained that he merely requested SP
Formaran III "to do something to help Go Teng Kok about the
case" without ever specifying the kind of "help" that he
requested. He averred that it was purely on the basis of
erroneous impression and conjecture on the part of SP
Formaran III that he impliedly asked him to withdraw the
motion "because that is what Mr. Go Teng Kok was appealing
and requesting."
27
Respondent claimed that the "help" he was
requesting could well be "within legal bounds or line of duty."
Justice Demetria claimed that if ever he said anything else
during the discussion between Go Teng Kok and SP Formaran
III, such was not a form of intervention. He only admonished
Go Teng Kok "to cool it" when the discussion between the
prosecutor and Go Teng Kok became heated. While he asked
about the status of the case this, he said, demonstrated his
lack of knowledge about the case and bolstered his claim that
he could not have possibly interceded for Yu Yuk Lai.
Respondent Justice likewise argued that the bases of his
identification by CSP Zuo as the Justice exerting undue
pressure on the DOJ were all hearsay. Respondent submitted
that CSP Zuo based his identification from a newspaper
account, from the statement of his secretary that it was he
(Justice Demetria) who was on the other end of the telephone
and from SP Formaran III when the latter consulted the Chief
State Prosecutor about the visit of the Justice and Go Teng Kok
impliedly asking him to withdraw the motion.
In defense of respondent Justice, Atty. Paas stated that it was
actually he, not Justice Demetria, who later called up CSP Zuo
to inquire about the latter's decision regarding the withdrawal
of the motion to inhibit since SP Formaran III had earlier told
Go Teng Kok that the matter would be taken up with his
superiors.
In fine, respondent Justice Demetria maintains that it is
inconceivable for him to ask SP Formaran III whom he just met
for the first time to do something for Go Teng Kok whom he
claims he just likewise met for the first time. Neither did he
know Yu Yuk Lai, a claim Yu Yuk Lai herself corroborated. It
would be unthinkable for him to intercede in behalf of
someone he did not know. Indeed respondent Justice asserted
that his meeting Go Teng Kok on 18 July 2000 at the DOJ was
purely coincidence, if not accidental.
So, did respondent Justice Demetria really intercede in behalf
of suspected drug queen Yu Yuk Lai?
Investigating Justice Carolina C. Grio-Aquino believes so. In
her Report dated 5 January 2001, she found respondent
Justice Demetria "guilty of violating Rule 2.04, Canon 2, Code
of Judicial Conduct" and recommended that "appropriate
disciplinary action be taken against him by this Honorable
Court."
28

Only rightly so. The evidence is clear, if not overwhelming, and
damning. Thus, even the Senate Committee on Justice and
Human Rights, after a hearing, found that "there was a
conspiracy to commit the following offenses on the part of CA
Associate Justice Demetrio Demetria and PATAFA President Go
Teng Kok and Miss Yu Yuk Lai: obstruction of justice
punishable under PD No. 1829 and Article 3(a) of RA 3019, or
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act."
29

While Justice Demetria vehemently denied interfering with the
criminal case, his denial cannot stand against the positive
assertions of CSP Zuo and SP Formaran III,
30
which are
consistent with natural human experience. To accept the
testimony of the defense witnesses that it was Atty. Paas who
telephoned CSP Zuo, and not Justice Demetria, and that the
"help" the respondent Justice was requesting SP Formaran III
was something "within legal bounds or line of duty" other than
the withdrawal of the motion is to strain too far one's
imagination.
The testimony of CSP Zuo is plainly unambiguous and
indubitably consistent with the other facts and circumstances
surrounding the case
CSP Zuo: As far as I could recall Justice Demetria
said, "Pakisabi mo nga kay State Prosecutor
Formaran na iwithdraw na iyong kanyang Motion to
Inhibit para naman makagawa ng Order si Judge
Muro."
31

In his discussion with Go Teng Kok and Justice Demetria, SP
Formaran III said that he would consult his superiors regarding
the proposal to withdraw the motion. The timely telephone
call to CSP Zuo was thus a logical follow-up. And no one could
have made the call except respondent Justice since it is not
uncommon for anyone to believe that CSP Zuo would
recognize the voice of respondent Justice who was CSP Zuo's
former superior in the DOJ. Thus, the confident
utterance "[p]akisabi mo nga kay State Prosecutor Formaran
na iwithdraw na iyong kanyang Motion to Inhibit para naman
makagawa ng Order si Judge Muro" could not have come from
anyone else but from respondent Justice who had moral
ascendancy over CSP Zuo, he being a Justice of the Court of
Appeals and a former Undersecretary and at one time Acting
Secretary of the DOJ.
Even the requested "help" for Go Teng Kok, whom respondent
Justice claims he did not know and met only that time, could
not have meant any other assistance but the withdrawal of the
motion to inhibit Judge Muro. True, Justice Demetria never
categorically asked SP Formaran III to withdraw his Motion.
But when respondent Justice Demetria asked the state
prosecutor at that particular time "to do something . . . to help
Mr. Go Teng Kok," the latter was pleading for the withdrawal
of the motion, and nothing else. That was the only form of
"help" that Go Teng Kok wanted. The subtle pressure exerted
simply pointed to one particular act. Thus, subsequently
respondent Justice called CSP Zuo to ask for just that the
withdrawal of the motion to inhibit Judge Muro.
Justice Demetria also claimed that he, together with Atty.
Paas, went to the DOJ, first, to see Secretary Artemio Tuquero
and seek assistance in the appointment of Atty. Paas to the
Court of Appeals, and second, to "visit old friends,"
32
and that
the meeting with Go Teng Kok was purely accidental. But
respondent Justice never mentioned in his earlier Compliance
to the Memorandum of the Chief Justice that his primary
purpose in going to the DOJ was to see Sec. Tuquero, and since
Sec. Tuquero was not in, he instead decided to see some
officials/prosecutors whom he had not visited for a long time.
We find this assertion difficult to accept. For, even his very
own witnesses belied his alibi. ACSP Gaa, Jr. testified and
confirmed that Justice Demetria only said "hi."
33
SSP Daosos,
denied seeing him and claimed that it was only Atty. Paas who
peeped into his room.
34
Suspiciously, it was really in the office
of SP Formaran III, whom respondent Justice Demetria did not
know, where Justice Demetria, Atty. Paas and Go Teng Kok
decided to "stay a while."
35

Thus, as found by Mme. Justice Carolina C. Grio-Aquino, the
Investigating Justice, Justice Demetria and company could not
have been there to exchange pleasantries with SPs Formaran
III and Fonacier since they were not acquainted with each
other. Prior to this incident, Justice Demetria did not
personally know either SP Formaran III or SP Fonacier, a fact
corroborated by respondent himself.
36

All of these contradict and belie respondent Justice Demetria's
earlier Compliance to the Memorandum of the Chief
Justice that "[b]ecause Prosecutor Formaran is also a friend,
we decided to drop by his office . . . (and) I stayed a while."
37

As pointed out by the Investigating Justice, respondent Justice
was there "to join forces with Go Teng Kok in arguing for the
withdrawal of Formaran's Motion for Inhibition of Judge Muro,
which was the real purpose of their visit to SP Formaran and to
the DOJ. The uncanny coincidence in the timing of Justice
Demetria's visit to SP Formaran's office, and that of Go Teng
Kok, could not have been 'accidental' but pre-
arranged."
38
And, "visiting old friends" only came as an
afterthought. The circumstances simply show that Justice
Demetria and Atty. Paas, together with Go Teng Kok, did not
go to the DOJ to see Sec. Tuquero, but to visit, if not
"pressure," CSP Zuo and SP Formaran III.
Justice Demetria also claimed that it is inconceivable for him
to help Yu Yuk Lai and Go Teng Kok, both of whom he did not
personally know, and more unthinkable that he would be
asking help from SP Formaran III whom he had just met for the
first time.
The argument cannot be sustained. It is admitted that
respondent is a very close friend of Atty. Paas, lawyer of Go
Teng Kok. And, it is not necessary that respondent Justice
Demetria be acquainted with Go Teng Kok, Yu Yuk Lai or SP
Formaran III for him to intercede in behalf of the accused. It is
enough that he is a close friend of the lawyer of Go Teng Kok,
who has been helping the accused, and that he wields
influence as a former DOJ Undersecretary and later, Acting
Secretary, and now, a Justice of the Court of Appeals.
In sum, we find the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
convincing and trustworthy, as compared to those of the
defense which do not only defy natural human experience but
are also riddled with major inconsistencies which create well-
founded and overriding doubts.
The conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an
office charged with the dispensation of justice is circumscribed
with the heavy of responsibility. His at all times must be
characterized with propriety and must be above
suspicion.
39
His must be free of even a whiff of impropriety,
not only with respect to the performance of his judicial duties,
but also his behavior outside the courtroom and as a private
individual.
Unfortunately, respondent Justice Demetrio Demetria failed
failed to live up to this expectation. Through his indiscretions,
Justice Demetria did not only make a mockery of his high
office, but also caused incalculable damage to the entire
Judiciary. The mere mention of his name in the national
newspapers, allegedly lawyering for a suspected drug queen
and interfering with her prosecution seriously undermined the
integrity of the entire Judiciary.
Although every office in the government service is a public
trust, no position exacts a greater demand on moral
righteousness and uprightness tha a seat in the
Judiciary.
40
High ethical principles and a sense of propriety
should be maintained, without which the faith of the people in
the Judiciary so indispensable in orderly society cannot be
preserved.
41
There is simply no place in the Judiciary for those
who cannot meet the exacting standards of judicial conduct
and integrity.
42

WHEREFORE, we sustain the findings of the Investigating
Justice and hold Justice Demetrio G. Demetria GUILTY of
violating Rule 2.04 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. He is
ordered DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all
benefits and with prejudice to his appointment or
reappointment to any government office, agency or
instrumentality, including any government owned or
controlled corporation or institution.
SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. 08-8-11-CA September 9, 2008
RE: LETTER OF PRESIDING JUSTICE CONRADO M. VASQUEZ,
JR. ON CA-G.R. SP NO. 103692 [Antonio Rosete, et al. v.
Securities and Exchange Commission, et al.]
D E C I S I O N
PER CURIAM:
The Judiciary, which is acclaimed as the firmest pillar of our
democratic institutions, is vested by the Constitution with the
power to settle disputes between parties and to determine
their rights and obligations under the law. For judicial
decisions, which form part of the law of the land, to be
credible instruments in the peaceful and democratic
resolution of conflicts, our courts must be perceived to be and,
in fact be, impartial, independent, competent and just. To
accomplish this end, it is imperative that members of the
Judiciary from its highest magistrates to its humblest
employees adhere to the strictest code of ethics and the
highest standards of propriety and decorum. Indeed, it is
unfortunate that one of the countrys second highest courts,
the Court of Appeals, should be presently embroiled in scandal
and controversy. It is this Courts bounden duty to determine
the culpability or innocence of the members of the Judiciary
involved in the said controversy and to discipline any one
whose conduct has failed to conform to the canons of judicial
ethics, which uphold integrity, independence, impartiality,
competence and propriety in the performance of official
functions.
The present administrative matter arose from the Letter dated
August 1, 2008 of Court of Appeals Presiding Justice Conrado
M. Vasquez, Jr. (Presiding Justice Vasquez), referring to this
Court for appropriate action the much publicized dispute and
charges of impropriety among the justices of the Court of
Appeals (CA) involved in CA-G.R. SP No. 103692 entitled
"Antonio Rosete, et al. v. Securities and Exchange Commission,
et al."
To assist in its investigation of this sensitive matter, the Court
in its Resolution dated August 4, 2008 constituted a three-
person panel (the "Panel of Investigators") composed of
retired Justices of the Court; namely, Mme. Justice Carolina
Grio-Aquino as Chairperson, Mme. Justice Flerida Ruth P.
Romero and Mr. Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. as Members. The
Panel of Investigators was tasked to investigate the (a) alleged
improprieties of the actions of the Justices of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 103692 (Antonio V. Rosete, et al. v.
SEC, et al.); and (b) alleged rejected offer or solicitation of
bribe disclosed respectively by Mr. Justice Jose Sabio and Mr.
Francis de Borja.
A narration of relevant events and facts, as found by the
Investigating Panel, follows:
On April 15, 2008, Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes (Justice Reyes),
then Chairperson of the Ninth Division of the CA, filed an
application for leave from May 15, 2008 to June 5, 2008.
1

In Office Order No. 149-08-CMV dated May 14, 2008 issued by
Presiding Justice Vasquez, Justice Jose C. Mendoza (Justice
Mendoza) was designated by the Raffle Committee as Acting
Chairman of the Ninth Division during the absence of Justice
Reyes. Apart from his duties as regular senior member of the
Fifth Division, Justice Mendoza was authorized "to act on all
cases submitted to the Ninth Division for final resolution
and/or appropriate action, except ponencia, from May 15,
2008 to June 5, 2008 or until Justice Reyes reports back for
duty." The said office order likewise applied to the other
Division(s) where Justice Reyes had "participated or took part
as regular member or in an acting capacity."
2

On May 29, 2008, Antonio V. Rosete, Manuel M. Lopez, Felipe
B. Alfonso, Jesus P. Francisco, Christian S. Monsod, Elpidio L.
Ibaez, and Francis Giles B. Puno, as officers, directors and/or
representatives of the Manila Electric Company (hereinafter to
be collectively referred to as "Meralco"), filed with the Court
of Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and
temporary restraining order (TRO) against the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), Commissioner Jesus Enrique G.
Martinez, Commissioner Hubert B. Guevarra, and the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS).
3
Aside from the
application for immediate issuance of a TRO, petitioners
prayed for the issuance of a preliminary injunction that should
thereafter be declared permanent, as well as a declaration of
nullity of the cease and desist and show cause orders issued by
the SEC through Commissioner Martinez. The petition was
received by the CA at 10:49 a.m. on May 29, 2008 and
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 103692.
On the same day, petitioners simultaneously filed at 10:48
a.m. an urgent motion for a special raffle. Presiding Justice
Vasquez granted the motion in a handwritten note on the face
of the urgent motion,
4
and CA-G.R. No. 103692 was raffled to
Justice Vicente Q. Roxas (Justice Roxas).
5
At 3:10 p.m., the
Office of Presiding Justice Vasquez received a letter from Atty.
Estrella C. Elamparo (Atty. Elamparo), Chief Legal Counsel of
the GSIS, requesting the re-raffling of the case "in the
presence of the parties in the interest of transparency and
fairness."
6
At 4:10 p.m. on that day, the GSIS filed anex-
parte motion to defer action on any incident in the petition
pending the resolution of their motion for the re-raffle of the
case.
7

Atty. Elamparo, accompanied by Atty. Orlando P. Polinar, also
of the GSIS Law Office, personally filed the urgent motion to
defer action on the petition pending the resolution of their
motion to re-raffle the case. Since the receiving clerk of the
Court of Appeals could not assure them that the motion would
be transmitted to the Court of Appeals Division, Attys.
Elamparo and Polinar allegedly went to the office of Justice
Roxas "for the sole purpose of personally furnishing him a
copy" of the motion.
8
They initially talked to a male clerk who
referred them to one of the lawyers, who, however, told them
that it was not possible for them to personally hand a copy of
the motion to Justice Roxas. Thus, Attys. Elamparo and Polinar
left a copy of the motion to the staff but no one wanted to
sign and acknowledge receipt of the copy.
9

On May 30, 2008, Justice Reyes filed an application for the
extension of his leave until June 6, 2008.
10
In the meantime,
Justice Mendoza, who had been designated to replace Justice
Reyes during the latters absence, informed Justice Roxas
through a letter that he (Justice Mendoza) was inhibiting from
the case on the ground that he used to be a lawyer of the
Meralco.
11
Hence, in an "Emergency Request for Raffle,"
Justice Roxas informed the Raffle Committee about the
inhibition.
12

Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr. (Justice Sabio) was assigned as Acting
Chairman of the Ninth Division by raffle, "in lieu of Justice
Mendoza."
13
At 11:30 a.m., the office of Justice Myrna
Dimaranan-Vidal (Justice Dimaranan-Vidal) received a notice
of emergency deliberation with the new Acting Chairman of
the Special Ninth Division, apparently sent by Justice Roxas,
stating that her presence and that of Justice Sabio, Jr. were
"indispensable" on account of the "national interest" involved
in CA-G.R. SP No. 103692.
14

Meanwhile, Atty. Elamparo "received a telephone call from
somebody who did not identify herself but (who) said that she
had important information regarding the Meralco case." The
unidentified caller told Atty. Elamparo that "a TRO was already
being prepared and that certain Meralco lawyers had in fact
been talking to Justice Roxas." The caller warned Atty.
Elamparo against Justice Roxas who had "administrative cases
and was very notorious," but when prodded, the caller would
not disclose more details.
15

At about 1:30 p.m. also on May 30, 2008, Justice Sabio
received a telephone call in his chambers from his older
brother, Chairman Camilo Sabio (Chairman Sabio) of the
Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG).
16
Chairman Sabio informed his brother that he (Justice
Sabio) had been named the "third member" of the division to
which the MERALCO-GSIS case had been raffled. Justice Sabio
was surprised as he had not yet been "officially informed"
about the matter. Chairman Sabio likewise informed him that
a TRO had been prepared. Chairman Sabio then tried to
convince Justice Sabio "of the rightness of the stand of the
GSIS and the SEC," and asked his brother to help the GSIS,
which "represents the interest of the poor people." Justice
Sabio told his brother that he would "vote according to [his]
conscience" and that the most that he could do was "to have
the issuance of the TRO and the injunctive relief scheduled for
oral arguments," at which the respondents "must be able to
convince" him that the TRO indeed had no legal basis.
In his signed testimony,
17
which he read before the Panel of
Investigators, Chairman Sabio narrated the circumstances of
this call to his brother on May 30, 2008. It appears to have
been prompted by a call from a member of the Board of
Trustees of GSIS. To quote from Chairman Sabios testimony:
Last May 30, 2008 I was in Davao City Airport with
my wife, Marlene, waiting for our 1:25 P.M. PAL
flight to Manila. xxx xxx xxx.
As we were boarding, I received a call from Atty. Jesus I.
Santos, a Member of the Board of Trustees of GSIS. We had
known each other and had become friends since before
Martial Law because as Chief Counsel of the Federation of
Free Farmers (FFF) we were opposing counsel in various cases
in Bulacan.
Attorney Santos informed me that the dispute between the
GSIS and MERALCO was now in the Court of Appeals; and, that
as a matter of fact, my brother, Justice Sabio, was chair of the
Division to which the case had been assigned. Being a Trustee,
Attorney Santos requested me to help. I readily welcomed the
request for help and thanked him. There was no mystery
about his having known of the results of the raffle because the
lawyers are notified thereof and are present thereat. As a
Trustee, Attorney Santos should be concerned and involved.
As such it is his duty to seek assistance for the GSIS where he
could legitimately find it. He was right in seeking my
assistance.
I was aware of the controversy between the GSIS and
MERALCO. In essence this was in fact a controversy between
the long suffering public and the mighty - financially and
politically - controlling owners of MERALCO. MERALCO is not
only a public utility but also a monopoly. Fortunately, GSIS had
taken up the cudgels for the long suffering public, who are at
the mercy of MERALCO.
x x x x x x x x x.
Immediately, I tried to contact Justice Sabio. But due to the
noise I could not hear him. So I waited until we would arrive in
Manila.
As we were leaving the Airport, I again got in touch with
Justice Sabio. After, he confirmed that he was in fact in the
Division to which the petition of MERALCO had been raffled. I
impressed upon him the character and essence of the
controversy. I asked him to help GSIS if the legal situation
permitted. He said he would decide according to his
conscience. I said: of course.
x x x x x x x x x.
On the same day, May 30, 2008, GSIS filed an urgent ex-parte
motion to inhibit Justice Roxas from CA-G.R. No. SP
103692.
18
The Special Cases Section of the Court of Appeals
received a copy of the motion at 11:58 a.m.
19

Claiming that the TRO was issued "to pre-empt the hearing"
scheduled in the afternoon of that day before the SEC, the
GSIS Law Office, through Atty. Marcial C. Pimentel, Jr., set
forth its reason for the motion for inhibition as follows:
3. Unfortunately, reports have reached respondent GSIS that
the Honorable ponente has been in contact with certain
lawyers of MERALCO and has in fact already prepared a draft
resolution granting the TRO without affording respondents
even a summary hearing. The records of this case was (sic), per
information, immediately transmitted to the Honorable
ponente upon his instructions. The worries of the respondent
were exacerbated when it learned that there are supposedly
two administrative cases pending against the Honorable
ponente, both of which involve allegations of bias and
prejudice.
It turned out, however, that at that time, Justice Roxas had not
yet been officially notified by the Raffle Committee that the
case was raffled to him.
20
Moreover, contrary to the allegation
of Atty. Elamparo that the raffle was rigged, Justice Roxas had
no hand in the raffle proceeding, which was handled by the
Division chaired by Justice Mariano del Castillo with the use of
a "fool-proof Las Vegas tambiolo, like the lotto machine."
21

Justice Roxas brought to the office of Justice Sabio, for the
latters signature, the TRO which he had prepared, already
signed by himself and Justice Dimaranan-Vidal. Convinced of
the urgency of the TRO, Justice Sabio signed it on condition
that the case will be set for oral arguments.
Thus, at 2:08 p.m. on May 30, 2008,
22
the Special Ninth
Division composed of Justices Sabio, Roxas, and Dimaranan-
Vidal, issued the Resolution granting the TRO prayed for by the
petitioners and directing the respondents to file their
respective comments (not a motion to dismiss) to the petition
within ten days from notice, with the petitioners given five
days from receipt of that comment within which to file their
reply. The Special Ninth Division also set the hearing on the
application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
for 10:00 a.m. on June 23 and 24, 2008. In the same
Resolution, parties were directed to file their respective
memorandum of authorities in connection with the
application for a writ of preliminary injunction together with
their comments/reply. After the parties had filed their
memorandum of authorities relative to the application for a
writ of preliminary injunction, the prayer for the said writ
would be considered submitted for resolution "forty five (45)
days from promulgation of this Resolution." The SEC received
a copy of the Resolution at 4:03 p.m. on that day.
23

For Justice Roxas, the issuance of the TRO was an implied
denial of the motion for inhibition filed against him. There was
no need to put in writing the action on the motion for
inhibition.
24

At 3:00 p.m., the Special Cases Section of the Court of Appeals
received the Urgent Motion to Lift Temporary Restraining
Order and To Hold Its Enforcement in Abeyance filed by the
GSIS.
25
Justice Roxas did not act on the Urgent Motion because
he did not consider it meritorious.
26

On May 31, 2008, Justice Sabio received a cellular phone call
from Mr. Francis De Borja (Mr. De Borja), a person he had lost
contact with for almost a year already.
27
Mr. De Borja greeted
him with:"Mabuhay ka, Justice." When Justice Sabio, Jr. asked
Mr. De Borja why he said that, Mr. De Borja told him that the
Makati Business Club was happy with his having signed the
TRO, to which Justice Sabio retorted, "I voted according to my
conscience."
On June 5, 2008, the GSIS Law Office received a letter dated
June 2, 2008 of Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr. informing GSIS
Chief Legal Counsel, Atty. Elamparo, that the Court of Appeals
could not grant her request for the re-raffling of CA-G.R. SP
No. 103692 "in the presence of the parties in the interest of
transparency and fairness," as the case had been raffled in
accordance with the procedure under the IRCA.
28

On June 10, 2008, Justice B. L. Reyes reported back to work.
29

On June 11, 2008, at 3:50 p.m.,
30
the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), appearing for the SEC, filed a manifestation
and motion praying for the admission of the comment (to the
petition) attached thereto, as well as the advance and
additional copies of the memorandum of authorities.
On June 12, 2008, at 4:53 p.m., the GSIS filed its
comment/opposition to the petition in CA-G.R. SP No.
103692,
31
as well as its memorandum of authorities.
On June 16, 2008, the Division Clerk of Court, Atty. Teresita
Custodio (Atty. Custodio), delivered to Justice Reyes
the cartilla of the Meralco case, and informed him that a
hearing on the prayer for the issuance of a preliminary
injunction had been scheduled at 10:00 a.m. on June 23 and
24, 2008.
32
However, on the same day, the Division Clerk of
Court came back to retrieve the cartilla upon instructions of
Justice Sabio. Justice Reyes instructed his staff to return
the cartilla and when he asked the Division Clerk of Court why
she was retrieving it, she said that Justice Sabio "demanded"
that it be returned back to him. "Personally affronted" by the
"domineering and superior stance" of Justice Sabio, Justice
Reyes "read and re-read Secs. 1, 2(d) & 5, Rule VI (Process of
Adjudication)" until he was satisfied that he should sit as
Division Chairman in the Meralco case.
33

On either June 17 or 18, 2008, Justice Sabio requested
the rollo of CA-G.R. SP No. 103692 from Justice Roxas so that
he could study the case before the hearing.
34
Justice Roxas
asked him whether Justice Reyes would preside over the
hearing. Justice Sabio explained the reason why he, not Justice
Reyes, should preside. Justice Roxas promised to instruct the
Division Clerk of Court to send the rollo over to Justice Sabio.
The next day, the Division Clerk of Court told Justice Sabio that
the rollo was with Justice Reyes. When the rollo was
eventually transmitted to Justice Sabio, the Division Clerk of
Court asked him whether the rollo should be with Justice
Reyes. Justice Sabio explained why the rollo should be with
him.
On June 18, 2008, petitioners filed a motion for an extension
of five days or until June 23, 2008 within which to file their
consolidated memoranda of authorities and reply to the
comment of the SEC.
35

On June 19, 2008, MERALCO filed an ex-parte manifestation
together with their reply to the comment of the
GSIS.
36
Meanwhile, Justice B. L. Reyes asked Atty. Custodio to
report on "what transpired between her and Justice Sabio"
when she returned the cartilla. "Teary-eyed," Atty. Custodio
begged off from making a report.
37

Justice Reyes decided to consult the Presiding Justice "to avoid
an ugly confrontation" with the Justices on the "highly
politicized case involving giants of the Philippine society." He
explained to the Presiding Justice his understanding of the
relevant IRCA rules and "the actual practice in similar
situations in the past." The Presiding Justice promised to talk
with Justice Sabio and, "for the sake of transparency and
future reference," Justice Reyes requested permission to write
an inquiry on the matter.
38

On the same day, Justice Reyes wrote Presiding Justice
Vasquez a letter
39
calling the attention of Justice Edgardo P.
Cruz ("Justice Cruz"), Chairperson of the Committee on Rules,
to the "dilemma" as to who between him and Justice Sabio
should "receive" CA-G.R. SP No. 103692. Justice Reyes posed
these questions before the Presiding Justice:
Will the case remain with Justice Jose Sabio, Jr. as
Acting Chairman of the Special 9th Division and who
participated in the initial Resolution of the case?
Will the case revert to the regular 9th Division with
the undersigned as Chairman?
For Justice Reyes, the "dilemma" was engendered by this
provision of Section 2 of Rule VI of the IRCA:
(2) When, in an original action or petition for review,
any of these actions or proceedings, namely: (1)
giving due course; (2) granting writ of preliminary
injunction; (3) granting new trial; and (4) granting
execution pending appeal have been taken, the case
shall remain with the Justice to whom the case is
assigned for study and report and the Justices who
participated therein, regardless of their transfer to
other Divisions in the same station.
The hearing on the application for preliminary injunction
having been scheduled for June 23 and 24, 2008, Justice Reyes
considered it "necessary" that the issues be resolved before
that date. Moreover, the referral of the controversy to the
Presiding Justice would give him sufficient time to seriously
study the case before the hearing.
40

On June 20, 2008, Presiding Justice Vasquez referred the letter
of Justice Reyes to Justice Cruz, Chairperson of the Committee
on Rules, noting "some urgency involved as the hearing of the
case is on Monday, June 23, 2008."
41

On that same day, Justice Cruz wrote Justice Reyes a
letter
42
quoting Section 2 (d), Rule VI of the IRCA and stating
that the "[i]ssuance of a TRO is not among the instances where
the Justices who participated in the case shall remain
therein." Hence, Justice Cruz opined that "[n]otwithstanding
the issuance of the TRO (not writ of preliminary injunction),
the case reverted to the regular Chairman (Justice Reyes) of
the Ninth Division upon his return." Justice Reyes received a
copy of the letter of Justice Cruz in the afternoon of that day.
43

During the hearings of this case, Justice Cruz explained his
opinion before the Panel. He opined that the motion to lift the
TRO is not a motion for reconsideration because Rule 52 of the
Rules of Court states that a motion for reconsideration may be
filed with respect to a decision or a final resolution. A TRO is
not a final resolution but an interlocutory order. Moreover,
since the subject of the hearing on June 23, 2008 was on the
application for preliminary injunction, Justice Sabio had no
right to participate in the hearing because as an Acting
Chairman, his authority was only to act on the motion to lift
the TRO. Under the IRCA, the position of Justice Sabio invoked
the exception to the general rule in the IRCA. However, the
settled principle is to construe a rule strictly against the
exception. The participation of Justice Sabio in the hearing on
June 23, 2008 was a "passport" to participation in the
decision-making process, in violation of the IRCA.
44

Justice Reyes having consulted with him, the Presiding Justice
referred the matter to Justice Sabio who in turn, opined that
"a temporary restraining order is part of the injunctive relief or
at least its initial action such that he should be the one to chair
the Division."
45
In his office after that consultation with the
Presiding Justice, Justice Reyes found that the Division Clerk of
Court had given him a copy of the cartilla just in case he would
preside over the hearing.In the evening, the Presiding Justice
called up Justice Reyes to inform him that Justice Sabio
"insisted that he would preside over the hearing of the case,"
and that the opinion of Justice Cruz, who was "junior" to
Justice Sabio "was no better than his own opinion."
46

It turned out that, upon receipt of a copy of the letter of
Justice Cruz, Justice Sabio told the Presiding Justice by
telephone that he disagreed with the opinion of Justice Cruz
"because he did not sign in an official capacity as Chairman of
the Rules Committee, but in his personal capacity" and hence,
the opinion of Justice Sabio "was as good as his, as in fact I
(Justice Sabio, Jr.) am even more senior than he."
47
Justice
Sabio told the Presiding Justice that he "smelled something
fishy" about the move to transfer the case to the Ninth
Division especially because Justice Reyes did not inform him
about it despite the fact that they were seated together on
three occasions.
Justice Sabio "smelled something fishy" because a couple or so
weeks ago, he attended a Chairpersons meeting regarding the
leakage of the ponencia of Justice Bato, with Justice Reyes as
Chairperson and Justice Jose Mendoza as senior member. The
meeting was called because prior to the promulgation of the
decision of Justice Bato, the losing party already filed a motion
for the inhibition of the ponente. According to Justice Sabio
information on the decision could not have been leaked by
Justice Bato but by a member of the Division.
48

The Presiding Justice "did not do anything anymore" to
prevent an "unpalatable" situation at the scheduled June 23,
2008 hearing, notwithstanding the "conflicting opinions" of
Justices Reyes and Sabio. The "personal view" of the Presiding
Justice was at the time "with Justice Cruz" but Justice Sabio
had a "different interpretation." Neither did the Presiding
Justice suggest that the Rules Committee be convened
because the Committee then had only two members. He felt
that it would be "better" if Justices Reyes and Sabio "could
settle it between themselves." The Presiding Justice was
seeing the Justices "practically" everyday because he did not
want "these things to blow up." However, neither did it enter
the mind of the Presiding Justice that the hearing on June 23
could be reset. Had he known that there was a motion to
inhibit Justice Roxas, he would have changed his position "that
it should be the Sabio group."
49

Also on June 20, 2008, the GSIS requested permission to
conduct a power-point presentation during the
hearing.
50
Likewise the SEC, through the OSG prayed that it be
allowed the use of Microsoft Powerpoint Application at the
June 23 and 24, 2008 hearings.
51
Justice Roxas did not act on
the motions.
On June 21, 2008, Justice Sabio came to know that it was the
Division chaired by Justice Reyes that would handle the case
on account of the opinion of Justice Cruz.
52

In the morning of June 23, 2008, Justice Sabio consulted with
Justice Martin Villarama, Jr. ("Justice Villarama") who advised
him, "in no uncertain terms," that his stand was "correct" and
that he should remain in the case.
53
Justice Villarama said that
the case should remain with the Special Ninth Division
"regardless of the transfer of the ponente to the Eighth
Division because of the pending motion to lift TRO," which the
Special Ninth Division should resolve "following the general
rule that when a decision or resolution is rendered by a
division, a motion for reconsideration thereof should be acted
upon by all the Members of that division, whether regular or
special, which participated in the rendition of the decision or
resolution, except in case of death, retirement or resignation
of such Member."
54

That morning, Justice Roxas also consulted Justice Villarama.
The latter told the former that since there was a motion to lift
the TRO, Justice Roxas should first rule on the motion. He also
advised Justice Roxas to inhibit himself from the case, as there
might be a problem (mag-inhibit ka baka magka-
problema). Justice Roxas told Justice Villarama that he would
follow his "suggestion."
55

Justice Reyes also went to the office of Justice Villarama to tell
him of his "strong conviction that the issuance of a TRO is not
among the instances provided in Sec. 2 (d), Rule VI when the
case shall remain with those Justices who participated in the
case regardless of their transfer to other division(s)." Justice
Villarama told Justice Reyes that per his "understanding and
interpretation of said provision, x x x the case should remain
with the Special Ninth Division."
56

At 9:50 a.m., the Office of the Division Clerk of Court called
Justice Reyes to inform him that the parties and their counsels
were already in the hearing room. Justice Reyes informed the
caller that he could not preside as Justice Sabio had
"apparently hardened his position" and he wanted to avoid an
"ugly spectacle." His name plate was displayed in the hearing
room but Justice Sabio moved to another hearing
room.
57
Allegedly, the removal of the nameplate of Justice
Reyes was the talk of the Court of Appeals for weeks.
58

Villaraza Cruz Marcelo and Angangco entered its appearance
as counsel for Meralco.
59
At the hearing, Justice Sabio presided
with Justices Roxas and Dimaranan-Vidal in attendance. Justice
Roxas, the ponente, did not ask a single question.
60
Not one of
the Justices in attendance brought up the motion for inhibition
filed by the GSIS against Justice Roxas.
61
In open court, the
parties in CA-G.R. SP No. 103692 agreed to submit, within 15
days, simultaneous memoranda on the injunctive relief prayed
for by the petitioners, after which the application for
preliminary injunction would be deemed submitted for
resolution.
62

On June 25, 2008, or about two days after the separate
conversations of Justice Villaram with Justices Sabio and
Reyes, the Presiding Justice also consulted Justice Villarama
about the letter-queries of Justices Roxas and Reyes on which
Division should resolve "the matter of injunctive relief or issue
the decision" in CA-G.R. SP No. 103692.
63

The Presiding Justice issued Office Order No. 196-08-CMV
reconstituting the Committee on Rules and designating Justice
Cruz as the Chairperson, with Justices Rebecca De Guia-
Salvador, Reyes, Hakim Abdulwahid, and Noel G. Tijam, as
members.
64
The Committee on Rules was tasked to propose
amendments to the IRCA on or before August 15, 2008 "for
submission and adoption of the Court en banc." (The office
order was later amended by Office Order No. 196-08-CMV on
August 4, 2008 to include as members Justices Mario L.
Guaria III, Lucas P. Bersamin, and Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores.
65
)
The Rules Committee used to be composed of only three
members, namely: Justices Cruz, Abdulwahid, and Roberto
Barrios, now deceased, as members, with Justice Cruz as
chairperson.
66

It was also on June 25, 2008 that Presiding Justice Vasquez
issued Office Order No. 200-08-CMV stating that, in view of
the retirement of Justices Enrique Lanzanas, Lucenito N. Tagle,
Agustin S. Dizon, and Rodrigo Cosico, and the appointments of
Justices Ruben C. Ayson and Edgardo L. delos Santos, the
Divisions would have a new composition effective July 4,
2008.
67
Under that office order, Justice Sabio became the
Chairman of the Sixth Division, with Justice Dimaranan-Vidal as
a member. Justice Reyes became the Chairman of the Eighth
Division, with Justices Roxas and Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr.
("Justice Bruselas") as members.
On June 29, 2008, Justice Reyes went on official leave of
absence to use a business class airplane ticket to Sydney,
Australia that he had won in an APT Golf Tournament in
January 2008. He was still on official leave when the
reorganization of the Court of Appeals took place on July 4,
2008.
68

On July 1, 2008, Justice Roxas told Justice Sabio that he did not
attend the Access to Courts (sic) summit on June 30 and July 1,
2008 at the Court of Appeals Auditorium because he was busy
with the Meralco case. Justice Sabio was taken aback because
at that time the parties had not yet submitted their
memoranda.
69

That same afternoon, Mr. De Borja again called up Justice
Sabio, seeking to meet with him for an "important" matter.
Because Justice Sabio had 6-8 p.m. classes at the Ateneo Law
School, they agreed to meet after his classes but not for long
because his wife and his daughter, Atty. Silvia Jo Sabio who is
an Attorney VI in the Office of the Chief Justice,
70
would be
waiting for him.
71
According to Justice Sabio, the conversation
at that meeting with Francis de Borja went as follows:
17. By the time my class was finished at 8 pm, Mr. De Borja
was already waiting for me at the Lobby Lounge of the 3rd
Floor of the Ateneo Law School. His first words to me
were: Alam mo Justice kung sino ang kasama ko sa kotse? Si
Manolo Lopez. Then he said: Noong tinatawagan kita at sinabi
kong "Mabuhay ka Justice," si Manolo Lopez ang katabi ko
noon. Nasa Amerika siya, kaya ako na lang ang pumunta dito
para makiusap sa yo. Alam mo, itong kaso na ito is a matter
of life and death for the Lopezes. And alam mo naman what
the Marcoses did to them, which is being done now by the
Arroyos.
At that point he mentioned the impasse between Justice
Bienvenido Reyes and myself. He said: Alam naming may
problema kayo ni Justice Reyes tungkol sa chairmanship.
I was surprised how he came to know about it, as this was an
internal matter of the Court of Appeals which only happened
fairly recently and many associate justices of the CA were not
even aware of this. Just the same, I explained my stand and
why I could not relinquish the chairmanship to Justice Reyes.
He then replied: Alam mo, Justice ang opinion dito ni Nonong
Cruz ay i-challenge ang stand mo. Kaya lang, mayroon namang
nagsabi na it might become messy.
Then he bragged to me: Ako din ang responsible sa pag-
recommend at pag-hire ng Villaraza Law Firm.
Then he explained that he was there to offer me a win-win
situation.
He said: Justice, mayroon kaming P10 million. Ready. Just give
way to Justic Reyes.
Then I said: Bakit ganun. Nakasisiguro sila sa kanya, sa akin
hindi?
He said: Mas komportable lang sila sa kanya.
At that point, I was shocked that he had a very low regard for
me. He was treating me like there was a price on my person. I
could not describe my feelings. I was stunned. But at the same
time, hindi ko rin magawang bastusin siya because I had
known him since 1993 and this was the first time that he had
ever treated me like this, or shown that he believed I could be
bought.
So I just told him: Francis, I cannot in conscience agree to
that.
His answer was: Sabi ko nga sa kanila, mahirap ka talaga
papayag. Kasi may anak iyang Opus Dei. Numerary pa.
At this point, I just wanted to leave, so I told him I could not
stay long. I told him my wife and lawyer daughter were
waiting.
Even then, he was already insistent. His parting words before
I left were: Just think about it, Justice.
72

At that time, Mr. De Borja was carrying a "sealed" brown
paper bag, which he was handling "as if something important"
was inside. However, Justice Sabio did not know if the bag
contained P10million.
73

In his car, Justice Sabio told his wife and his daughter, Silvia Jo,
about the offer of Mr. De Borja for Meralco.
74

In his affidavit submitted to the Panel of Investigators, Mr. De
Borja describes himself as a businessman, a deal maker, and
project packager. On July 1, 2008, he invited Justice Sabio for
dinner "to touch base" and for chismis about the MERALCO-
GSIS case. As the latter would have evening classes at the
Ateneo Law School, and his wife and daughter would be
waiting in their car after his classes, they just agreed to meet
at the lobby-lounge of the School. What Mr. De Borja knew
about the MERALCO case allegedly came from news reports
but he was interested in the news because he is a "confirmed
free-enterpriser." Moreover, De Borja thought that there was
"*n+othing like hearing things directly from the horses
mouth."
75

When Mr. De Borja and Justice Sabio met, Mr. De Borja
averred he was indeed carrying a bag, not an expensive
looking luggage. After parking his car at the Rockwell
basement, he took the escalator, intending to walk out of the
mall. On his way, he passed by the Kenneth Cole shop and,
since it was still early, he looked in and saw a T-shirt he liked.
He bought the T-shirt, which he brought before the Panel of
Investigators in the grey "Kenneth Cole Reaction" bag. The
photographs of the bag and the T-shirt costing P1,650.00 are
marked Exhibits "A-De Borja" and "A-1-De Borja" and attached
to therollo of A.M. No. 08-8-11-CA, while the photograph of
the receipt issued by the Kenneth Cole Boutique, marked as
Exhibit "A-2-De Borja," shows that the purchase was made on
July 1, 2008 at 19:47. He stressed the bag did not contain P10
million.
Before the Panel, Justice Sabio claimed that the bag Mr. De
Borja brought during the hearing was not the bag that Mr. De
Borja was carrying when Justice Sabio saw him on July 1, 2008.
What Mr. De Borja allegedly brought with him to the lobby-
lounge of the Ateneo Law School was a brown bag with paper
handle "about 2/3 (of the Kenneth Cole bag) in size." Justice
Sabio was told by the Panel that it could be the subject of
rebuttal evidence but he did not present such evidence.
According to Mr. De Borja, Manolo Lopez (Mr. Lopez), the
owner of MERALCO whose wife was a member of Marthas
Vineyard just like Mr. De Borjas wife, was also an
acquaintance of Mr. De Borja at the Ateneo grade school. Mr.
Lopez did not ask him (Mr. De Borja) to contact Justice Sabio.
At a party where Mr. De Borja met Mr. Lopez, Mr. De Borja
informed him that he knew Justice Sabio but Mr. Lopez did not
say anything.
Mr. De Borja denied having offered P10 million to Justice
Sabio. Instead, he claimed that Justice Sabio informed him that
the government has offered him (Justice Sabio) money and a
promotion to the Supreme Court to favor GSIS. When Mr. De
Borja asked what would it take for Justice Sabio to resist the
governments offer, Justice Sabio allegedly replied: "Fifty
Million."
76
He alleged that it was Justice Sabio who called up
after that July 1, 2008 meeting to "feel" his reaction to the
"P50 million solicitation." Justice Sabio asked him: "O, ano,
kumusta, ano ang nangyayari."
Mr. De Borja admitted having given P300,000 to Justice Sabio,
some 15 years ago, as a balatobecause he came to value the
friendship of Justice Sabio that developed while the latter was
helping the Roa family in a business transaction. Mr. De Borja
earned "more than P25 million" although he received only P3
million as down payment out of the sale of 100 hectares of the
Roa property. He gave the balato of 10% of the P3 million to
Justice Sabio in cash at the Roa-owned bank in Cagayan de
Oro. Since the Roas had a lot of "legal problems," Justice Sabio
rendered advice and consultation at the time that he was an
RTC judge in Cagayan de Oro. After the promotion of Justice
Sabio to the Court of Appeals, Mr. De Borja invited him for
dinner. They would see each other at get-togethers of the
Roas with whom Mr. De Borja is related, even at a gathering in
the house of Mr. De Borjas mother.
77

On July 2, 2008, Justice Sabio that informed Presiding Justice
Vasquez that he (Justice Sabio) was offered a bribe (which he
rejected) to have him ousted from the Meralco case. The news
allegedly shocked the Presiding Justice. Justice Sabio also went
to Justice Villarama who was both "shocked and amused."
Justice Sabio. did not tell them who the "offeror" was.
However, a day or two later, Justice Sabio found out that Mr.
De Borja had called their mutual friend, Mrs. Evelyn Clavano,
who was also shocked that Mr. De Borja had "the gall to ask
her" to convince Justice Sabio to accept the bribe.
78

Although Justice Sabio told the Presiding Justice that the offer
of P10 million to a Justice was, in the words of Justice
Sabio, bastusan na ito, and he knew that bribing a Justice is a
criminal act, the Presiding Justice did nothing because he
could not "advise a fellow Justice on what to do" - the Justice
would know what he should do. Neither did he think of
consulting Justices Roxas and Dimaranan-Vidal on the
chairmanship impasse.
79

On July 3, 2008, to stop Mr. De Borja from pestering him with
phone calls and text messages, Justice Sabio called up Mr. De
Borja who told him: Mabuti naman Justice tumawag ka, kasi
malapit na ang deadline ng submission ng memorandum.
Pinag-isipan mo bang mabuti ang offer namin? Kasi sayang din
kung di mo tatanggapin, Kasi kahit aabot itong kaso sa
Supreme Court, matatalo ka din. Sayang lang yung P10
million. Baka sisihin ka pa ng mga anak mo. Shocked by what
he heard, Justice Sabio said "No." Since Mr. De Borja did not
seem to understand why he kept saying "No," Justice Sabio
explained to him: If I accept that, my conscience will bother me
forever. How can I face my wife and two daughters? One a
lawyer and the other a Numerary member of Opus Dei? And
besides, how can I reconcile my being a member of PHILJAs
Ethics and Judicial Conduct Department; being a lecturer of the
MCLE; and being a pre-bar reviewer of the Ateneo Law School
on Legal and Judicial Ethics? Mr. De Borja retorted: Wala
naman kaming pinapagawa sa iyo na illegal, eh. Then he
added: You know Justice, after two or three weeks,
makakalimutan na ito ng mga tao. Meron naman diyang mga
Atenista na tumatanggap. Justice Sabio said: I dont know
about them, but I am different. Mr. De Borja then said: Well, if
you will not accept, we will be forced to look for other ways. To
this, Justice Sabio said: But they will have to contend with
me. In parting, Mr. De Borja said:Justice, no matter what,
saludo talaga ako sa iyo.
Mr. De Borja admitted that Justice Sabio called him up, but
denied the above conversation with Justice Sabio.
On July 4, 2008, the reorganization of the Court of Appeals
became effective and brought Justices Reyes, Roxas and
Bruselas to the Eighth Division. Justice Reyes went to see the
Presiding Justice about the urgent motion for him to assume
the chairmanship of the Division, which shows on its face that
the Urgent Motion dated July 10, 2008 was received by the
Court of Appeals at 2:08 p.m. on July 10, 2008 and by Atty.
Teresita C. Custodio on July 9, 2008. Justice Reyes expressed to
the Presiding Justice his apprehension that should he fail to
assume the chairmanship, he would face administrative
liability for nonfeasance or dereliction of duty. The Presiding
Justice suggested that the respondents in the case be required
to comment on the Urgent Motion "in a resolution to be
issued by the former 9th Division of Justice J.L. Sabio, Jr. since
to allow the new Division of Justice B.L. Reyes to issue the
resolution x x x would render moot and academic" the same
motion. Justice Reyes agreed and told the Presiding Justice
that he would be sending over the records to him so that the
Presiding Justice could place a note thereon as to what had
been agreed upon. However, the records of the case did not
reach the Presiding Justice.
80

For Justice Roxas, the July 4, 2008 reorganization was
mandatory and the Meralco case followed him as
its ponente to the Eighth Division. By the reorganization,
Justice Sabio was moved from the disbanded Special Ninth
Division to the Sixth Division, as the reorganization did not
spare any Justice.
81
Moreover, the IRCA does not require that
the Justices that issued a TRO be the same Justices that will
render the decision.
82
This is because the TRO does not appear
in Section 2 (d), Rule VII of the IRCA. Accordingly, only the
issuance of a preliminary injunction could be an exception to
the July 4, 2008 reorganization of the CA.
83
He believes the
IRCA does not require that the Justices who heard the case
should also decide it because the CA is a court of record and
Justices may rely on the transcript of stenographic
notes.
84
And so, once the three Justices have signed the
decision, the ponente has the "pressing duty" to promulgate
the decision.
85

Since July 4, 2008, Justice Bruselas alleged that he acted "on all
the ponencias" of Justices Reyes and Roxas, "just as they had
acted" on his ponencias.
86

On July 7, 2008, the GSIS filed its memorandum.
On or about July 8, 2008, Atty. Silvia Sabio, to help her father,
sought the advice of Atty. Jose Midas Marquez ("Atty.
Marquez") regarding the bribery attempt. Atty. Marquez
advised that Justice Sabio should write the Chief Justice about
the incident, detailing not only the bribery attempt but all that
has transpired relative to the chairmanship issue. Atty. Silvia
Sabio immediately called her father and relayed Atty.
Marquezs advice. Later that date, Justice Sabio handed his
daughter, Silvia, a handwritten letter for her to deliver to the
Chief Justice.
87
The handwritten letter, in essence, requested
permission for Justice Sabio to "unburden" himself before the
Chief Justice on the Meralco case.
88

At around 2:30 p.m., Justice Reyes went to see Justice Sabio.
The conversation between them, as recalled by Justice Sabio,
was as follows:
As soon as he came in, I said: "Why did you stab me behind
my back?" He said, "Why, what did I do? I asked him Why is it
that you have to resort to that strategy of seeking the opinion
of Ed Cruz, in his personal capacity, when we could have
discussed the matter with the PJ?
I reminded him that we were seated three times near each
other on different occasions only recently and he never
mentioned to me about the plan to oust me.
He said: Perhaps that was my fault. I should have talked to
you.
I told him, that all the while I thought we were friends. Why
did you have to do these things behind my back and not
discuss the matter with me face to face?
Then he said it just came about due to the urgent motion;
that he was afraid Meralco would take action against him for
nonfeasance for not doing his job.
It was then that I said: Are you aware that I was offered 10M
for me to give way to you?
I further asked him the following: In the first place, how was
the Meralco emissary able to know that there was an impasse
between you and me when that was supposed to be an
internal matter?
If you will now insist on assuming the chairmanship after I
told you of the 10Million offer, what will I think of you?
Are you a Trojan horse? Can you blame me if I think you are
part of this whole scheme or shenanigan?
Does not the timing alone stink of corruption? After they
failed to convince me of their offer, now they will use you to
oust me? Is it because they are certain of your loyalty and they
are uncertain with mine?
And why did they file this stupid urgent motion to assume?
In my nine years in this court, I have never seen such an animal
as this. This is a cowardly act, and whoever advised this stupid
motion is also stupid. Why do you have to dignify such a foolish
motion? They should file a motion for me to inhibit or recuse
myself.
Why is it that Meralco actively participated in the hearing
on the 23rd and never raised any question on the alleged
irregularity of my having presided over the hearing?
Why do you insist on assuming the case? Are you not aware
that several days after the issuance of the TRO, respondents
filed a motion for inhibition of Justice Vicente Roxas and a
motion to lift the TRO. Who then had the right to resolve such
motion?
Under the circumstances, anong iisipin ko sa yo? Ano ang
tingin ko ngayon sa iyo?
His feeble answer was: you. He then said he did not know of
those pending motions. (Incidentally, these motions were
never resolved.) He also said, wala talaga akong interest dito
kundi ayaw ko lang ma charge ng non-feasance for failing to
do my duty.
I answered him: Malayo yung non-feasance. Hindi ito
nonfeasance. I taught the subject for many years and this is
not one of them.
So I told him, I have made my decision on the matter.Bahala
ka na. Then I stood up to show him to the door. He was silent
after that and before he left, he put his arm around me.
For his part, Justice Reyes kept on repeating: "Wala talaga ako
dito, wala akong interest kung di yun lang hindi ako ma non-
feasance. Justice Sabio thought otherwise.
Meanwhile, Justice Roxas brought to the office of Justice
Dimaranan-Vidal "the final decision on the MERALCO case"
bearing his signature, which he gave to Justice Dimaranan-
Vidal for "concurrence/dissent." According to Justice
Dimaranan-Vidal, Justice Roxas explained to her the "rationale
for his conclusion." Justice Roxas went out for a while and
returned "with an expensive looking travelling bag" from
where he pulled out the "purported final decision." Before the
close of office hours, Justice Roxas returned to the chambers
of Justice Dimaranan-Vidal to check if he (Justice Roxas) had
signed his decision. When she replied that yes, he had signed
it, Justice Roxas said he would pick it up the next day.
89

Justice Dimaranan-Vidal signed the decision notwithstanding
that on July 8, 2008 the Court of Appeals had been
reorganized because she believed that the Special Ninth
Division was still existing on account of its having issued the
TRO.
90
She also concurred with the portion of the decision
recommending administrative sanctions against the GSIS
lawyers because she believed the OSG or the OGCC should
have appeared for the GSIS.
91

Also late that day, Justice Villarama told Justice Sabio that he
had advised Justice Reyes to "lay off the case" and allow
Justice Sabio "to continue" and to resolve the urgent motion
for Justice Reyes to assume the chairmanship. Justice
Villarama recalled that Justice Reyes repeatedly said: "Wala
talaga ako dito Jun, Wala akong personal interest dito."
After "a careful and judicious study" of the more than 56-page
decision of Justice Roxas, Justice Dimaranan-Vidal signed it.
True to his word, Justice Roxas personally picked up the
decision that day "purportedly for the action of the Acting
Chairman, Justice Sabio," who was then on leave of absence
until July 11, 200.
92
Notwithstanding the fact that the parties
had not submitted their respective memoranda, Justice
Dimaranan-Vidal signed the "convincing" ponencia, including
three copies of the signature page, because Justice Roxas was
insistent of the urgency of the signing of the decision due to
the impending lapse of the TRO on July 29, 2008.
93
Justice
Sabio thought otherwise.
94

However, Justice Roxas denied that the decision he gave to
Justice Dimaranan-Vidal was the final decision. He denied that
he gave it to her for her signature. He said it was only for her
to read because she asked to read it. He said it was a mere
draft as "everything was unofficial" - there was no rollo or
logbook with it, it was not placed in an envelope, and it did not
have the "special seal" of Justice Roxas. It allegedly "was
thrown in the garbage can."
On July 9, 2008, the OSG filed the memorandum for the SEC.
On July 10, 2008, Meralco filed an urgent motion praying that
Justice Reyes assume the chairmanship of the
Division,
95
alleging the reasons for the urgent motion as
follows:
5. At the scheduled oral arguments on 23 June 2008 in the
instant case, the parties were first directed to one of the
Hearing Rooms of the Court of Appeals. At the said room, the
name plate of Justice Reyes was already placed on the table
for the justices. Thus, petitioners were of the impression that
the leave of absence of Justice Reyes was over and that he
would be presiding over the oral arguments as Chairman of
the Ninth Division of the Honorable Court.
6. However, when the parties were directed to transfer to
another Room of the Court of Appeals for the oral arguments
in the instant case, petitioners saw that the name plates on
the table for the justices included that of Justice Sabio, Jr.,
together with that (sic) of Justices Roxas and Dimaranan-Vidal.
Thereafter, Justice Sabio presided over the oral arguments as
Chairman of the Special Ninth Division of the Honorable Court.
Petitioners were, thus, of the impression that the regular
Chairman of the Ninth Division, Justice Reyes, was still on
temporary leave of absence.
7. Subsequently, it has come to the attention of the
petitioners that Justice Reyes has already returned from his
temporary leave of absence and has resumed his duties as
Chairman of the Ninth Division of the Honorable Court.
8. Under the Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals, Justice
Sabio, Jr. should now refrain from acting as the chairman of
the Division hearing the instant case as he is already
disqualified from acting as such upon the return of Justice
Reyes.
8.1. With due respect, Justice Reyes cannot shirk from his
bounden judicial responsibility of performing his duties and
functions as Chairman of the Ninth Division of the Honorable
Court.
8.2. Specifically, under Section 3 (d), Rule IV of the 2002
Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals, a case can remain with
the justices who participated therein only when any of the
following actions have been taken: (a) giving due course;
(b) granting of a writ of preliminary injunction; (c) granting of a
new trial; or (d) granting of execution pending appeal:
x x x x x x x x x.
9. None of the foregoing instances apply with respect to
Justice Sabio, Jr.s continuing hold on the case. Although
Justice Sabio, Jr. was one of the Justices who issued the
temporary restraining order in favour of the petitioners in the
instant case, this circumstance is not among the grounds as
above-quoted, when a justice of the Court of Appeals may
remain in the Division.
10. As above-quoted, the rule is categorical that it is not the
grant of a temporary restraining order but rather the grant of
a writ of preliminary injunction that sanctions a justices
remaining with the Division. Thus, the continued participation
of Justice Sabio, Jr., in the instant case, considering the clear
Rules of the Honorable Court, is not only irregular but may
lead one to conclude that he is exhibiting undue interest in the
instant case.
On this day, Justice Reyes reported back to work after his trip
to Australia.
96

On July 11, 2008, Justice Sabio was on leave when Justice
Roxas called him up for a meeting to discuss the case. Justice
Sabio told him that he needed ample time to read the
memoranda of the parties. Justice Roxas promised to send to
Justice Sabio the memoranda immediately.
97

At 4:00 p.m., Justice Reyes received from the Eighth Division
Clerk of Court a copy of Meralcos Urgent Motion for him to
assume the chairmanship of the Ninth Division.
On Monday, July 14, 2008 at the flag ceremony, Justice Sabio
requested Justice Roxas to meet with him as he had by then
read the memoranda of the parties. Justice Roxas initially
agreed to the meeting but he later informed Justice Sabio that
he had another matter to attend to; neither was he available
in the afternoon. Justice Roxas had become scarce. Justice
Sabio learned that Justice Dimaranan-Vidal was also looking
for Justice Roxas.
98

Justice Sabio prepared a resolution on the motion for the
reconsideration of the TRO and informed Justices Roxas and
Dimaranan-Vidal that he wanted to discuss it with them. The
resolution he prepared "never saw light."
99

At 10 a.m., Justice Roxas, with his messenger, brought
the rollo of CA G.R. SP No. 103692 to Justice Reyes, and told
the latter that he and Justice Bruselas would be coming over
to deliberate on the case. Ten minutes later, the Eighth
Division deliberated on the case.
100
After a cursory
examination of the rollo, Justice Reyes found that the decision
had been signed by Justices Roxas and Bruselas but Justice
Reyes asked for more time to study the case.
101

A transcript of the "Final Deliberation" on July 14, 2008 is
attached to page 1926 of Volume III of therollo of CA-G.R. SP
No. 103692 and marked as Exh. 2- Roxas on page 279 of
the rollo of A.M. No. 08-8-11-CA. According to Justice Roxas, it
was he who prepared the transcript from memory to "lend
credence" to the certification of Justice Reyes at the end of the
decision pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the
Constitution.
102
Justice Reyes denied having seen it or having
authorized its transcription. Justice Bruselas did not sign any
transcript of the deliberation as he was not aware that a
transcript was being taken. There was no stenographer
present, as only the three of them, Justices Reyes, Roxas, and
Bruselas were present at the deliberation. Neither was there a
recording machine. Justice Roxas admittedly prepared the
transcript "from memory."
103

The statement attributed to Justice Reyes in the transcript that
there were "previous deliberations" were "really meetings,"
which they had twice, in the office of Justice Reyes, according
to Justice Roxas.
104

On July 15, 2008, when she felt that the timing was right, Atty.
Silvia Sabio testified that she handed her fathers letter to the
Chief Justice through his private secretary, Ms. Jasmin
Mateo.
105
A few days later, however, Presiding Justice Vasquez
told Justice Sabio that the Chief Justice would no longer meet
with him, as the Presiding Justice had apprised the Chief
Justice about the matter.
106

According to Justice Reyes, at 2:00 p.m. that day, the Office of
the Presiding Justice informed him that Justice Sabio was
waiting for him in his office. As soon as Justice Reyes was
seated, Justice Sabio "berated" him and accused him of
"orchestrating matters." Justice Sabio told him that an
emissary of MERALCO had offered him P10 million to drop off
the case, hence, he asked that if he was offered that much,
how much could have been offered "to the principals?"
107

On July 17, 2008, Justice Reyes went back to the office of the
Presiding Justice and informed him of the episode in the office
of Justice Sabio. He also went to ask Justice Villarama for his
opinion as to who was "the rightful claimant" to the
chairmanship of the Division that should decide the Meralco
case. Justice Villarama allegedly replied that they "were both
correct."
On July 18, 2008, at the pre-launching meeting for the CA-
CMIS, Justice Villarama had a "brief chat" with Justice
Bruselas. The former told the latter that "both Justices Sabio
and Reyes are correct in the sense that one (1) [of] them can
properly assume chairmanship either under the exception
provided in Sec. 2 (d), Rule VI of the 2002 IRCA depending on
the final disposition of the prayer for injunctive relief, or
pursuant to the general rule enshrined in Sec. 7 (b), Rule
VI."
108

On July 21, 2008, Justice Roxas personally filed with the
Presiding Justice
109
an "Interpleader Petition"
110
praying that
Presiding Justice Vasquez "decide which division Chairman
(Justice Sabios Former Special 9th Division or Justice B. L.
Reyes 8th Division) should sign the Preliminary Injunction or
Decision."
111
Justice Roxas averred that "[t]he impasse
between two Chairmen from two Divisions has to be resolved
much earlier than July 30, 2008 because July 30, 2008 is the
expiration date of the TRO issued by the Special 9th Division
(signed by Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr., Justice Vicente Q. Roxas
[ponente] and Justice Myrna Dimaranan-Vidal)." He opined
that the two Chairpersons differed in the interpretation of
Sections 1 and 2 (d) in relation to Section 5 of Rule VI on
Process of Adjudication of the Internal Rules of the Court of
Appeals (IRCA).
112
His stand was that the IRCA "should
be strictly applied" because "[w]hen the provisions are clear,
there is no room for interpretation."
Justice Roxas endorsed his "Interpleader Petition" to Justice
Reyes for his "signature or dissent" to the "finalized MERALCO
Decision," which had been in Justice Reyes possession since
July 14, 2008.
113
He also gave the rollo of the case to Justice
Reyes.
114

Presiding Justice Vasquez allegedly told Justice Roxas that as
Presiding Justice, he had no authority to rule on the
Interpleader Petition, which is not an administrative concern
over which the Presiding Justice must intervene. Nevertheless,
to avoid further discussion, the Presiding Justice told Justice
Roxas that he would study the matter.
115

On July 22, 2008, Justice Reyes wrote the Presiding Justice a
letter on "what was discussed between us last 17 July 2008 at
around 3:30 p.m."
116
Apparently the Presiding Justice had
suggested "to endorse the case and have the Special Ninth
Division direct the respondents to file their simultaneous
comments on the petitioners Urgent Motion (For Honorable
BIENVENIDO L. REYES to Assume Chairmanship of the Division
in the Instant Case) dated 10 July 2008."
Justice Reyes expressed "doubts" that the suggestion was
"most prudent," as the dispute "revolves around the correct
interpretation" of the IRCA. He believed that since the
question was "purely internal," the CA should not seek
"enlightenment" from the litigants for it would only be
construed against its "competence." He shared Justice Cruzs
and Roxas interpretation of the IRCA. Hence, he urged the
Presiding Justice to decide the matter; otherwise, he would
interpret the rules according to his "best lights and act
accordingly."
On July 23, 2008, Presiding Justice Vasquez asked for
the rollo of CA G. R. No. SP No. 103692 so he could "properly
submit the requested opinion." It was then that he came
across the unresolved motion praying for the inhibition of
Justice Roxas and the pending urgent motion to lift the TRO or
to hold its enforcement in abeyance. The Presiding Justice
considered the latter as a motion for reconsideration of the
Resolution issuing the TRO.
117

Meanwhile, at noon of that day, as Justice Reyes had not yet
received "any reaction" from the Presiding Justice, he signed
the decision as well as the Certification. It was promulgated on
the same day.
The decision was promulgated without waiting for the
Presiding Justices opinion on whether it was the Eighth or
Special Ninth Division that should decide the case. Justice
Roxas alleged that he did not expect the Presiding Justice to
"answer" or resolve the matter anyway.
On July 24, 2008, Presiding Justice Vasquez issued his reply to
Justice Reyes letter and Justice Roxas "Interpleader-Petition."
The Presiding Justice claimed having doubts on whether he
possessed "the authority to decide the subject conflict" simply
because under the IRCA, the Presiding Justice has control and
supervision only over administrative affairs of the Court. The
controversy was certainly not an administrative matter but
Section 11 of Rule VIII of the IRCA provides that the Presiding
Justice "has the authority to act on any matter not covered" by
the Rules although such action should be reported to the
Court en banc.
The Presiding Justice expressed in his letter the view that "the
(Special Ninth) Division that issued the temporary restraining
order should continue resolving the injunctive prayer in the
petition" because it was the Division that issued the
Resolution granting the TRO and setting the hearing on the
application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction,
aside from the fact that the parties did not contest the
authority of Justice Sabio as Division Chairman at the time,
although Justice Reyes had reported back to work. Moreover,
the motion for inhibition and the urgent motion to lift the TRO
"have a bearing" on the application of Section 2 of Rule VI of
the IRCA, especially because Section 7 (b) of Rule VI
118
points
to the retention of the case by the Special Ninth Division.
Furthermore, the new Division headed by Justice Reyes may
not be allowed to resolve the pending incidents because two
of its members, Justices Reyes and Bruselas did not participate
in the hearing on June 23, 2008. He did not believe that Justice
Reyes would be charged with dereliction of duty should he not
assume the chairmanship. The Presiding Justice ended his
letter with the hope that the matter would be "laid to rest"
and that whoever would be dissatisfied "with its outcome may
elevate the matter to the Supreme Court."
At 2:00 p.m. that day, Justice Sabio informed the Presiding
Justice that a decision had been promulgated in the Meralco
case the previous day. The Presiding Justice was surprised
because Justices Roxas and Reyes had asked him to resolve the
impasse on the Division chairmanship. Upon inquiry, the
Presiding Justice found that the decision had indeed been
promulgated at 4:10 p.m. on July 23, 2008.
119

It was also on July 24, 2008 that Justice Dimaranan-Vidal
received a call from Justice Sabio, informing her that Meralco
had offered him a bribe of P10 million "in exchange for his
voluntary stepping out from the Meralco case in order to give
way to Justice B. L. Reyes," and that the decision in the
Meralco case had been promulgated by the Eighth
Division.
120
Shocked that Justice Roxas did not inform her "as a
matter of judicial courtesy" of the scrapping of the decision
which she signed on July 8, 2008, Justice Dimaranan-Vidal
wrote a letter to the Presiding Justice dated July 24,
2008,
121
bringing to his attention "the apparent and obvious
irregularities in the handing of CA-G.R. SP No. 103692," and
complaining about Justice Roxas "lack of judicial courtesy" in
discarding for reasons she would not know, his "purported
final Decision" that he had asked her to sign and which she
signed "after a judicious study of the records
and rollo thereof." Justice Roxas gave the lame excuse that he
had "to incorporate therein some ten pages which he forgot to
include in his Decision."
Justice Dimaranan-Vidal expressed "surprise and
consternation" when she learned "on even date that a
Decision" in the case had been promulgated on July 23, 2008
by the Eighth Division chaired by Justice Reyes, with Justices
Roxas and Bruselas as members. She said:
My deepest regret is that the undersigned who already signed
the supposed final draft of the Decision in the instant case
which bears the signature of the ponente, was not even
informed by the latter as a judicial courtesy at least, of the
hurried easing out of the undersigned from the case. This
inevitably posed even to an unprejudiced mind the following
questions: under what basis was the case suddenly transferred
to the 8th Division and why is it that neither the undersigned
nor the Acting Chairman Justice SABIO, of the Special 9th
Division not consulted thereof? and, foremost, what happened
to the Decision which the undersigned signed after devoting
her precious time and effort in carefully and laboriously
examining the voluminous records and rollo of the case?
Sad to say the circumstance obtaining herein constitute a
flagrant violation of the provision of Canon 5 particularly
Sections 2 and 3 thereof of the New Code of Judicial Conduct
for the Philippine Judiciary (A.M. No. 03-05-01-SC).
On July 25, 2008, Justice Bruselas wrote the Presiding Justice a
letter,
122
which was "prompted by a disturbing telephone call"
he received from Justice Sabio in the morning of July 24, 2008.
Justice Sabio informed Justice Bruselas that, "after the
injunction hearing" on June 23, 2008, Meralco offered him P10
Million "to either favor them or yield the chair" to Justice
Reyes. Justice Sabio told Justice Bruselas that he had informed
the Presiding Justice of the "bribery incident" and that he "was
disgusted over the turn of events because he should have
remained chair of the Special 9th Division that issued the TRO
on the case." Justice Bruselas informed Justice Sabio that it
was the first time that he heard of the matter and that he had
"participated in the deliberation on the case and concurred
with the ponencia" of Justice Roxas "without such information
ever being taken up." Justice Sabio told Justice Bruselas that
he would not leave the matter "as it is" because he would
bring it up in the "open, to media, etc." Justice Sabio asked
Justice Bruselas that if P10M was offered to him, how much
would have been offered to the "others."
Troubled by the information, Justice Bruselas went to the
Presiding Justice where Justice Dimaranan-Vidal, who had
received the same call from Justice Sabio, joined them. After
that meeting with the Presiding Justice, Justice Bruselas called
up Justice Reyes who confirmed that he had heard about the
"bribe offer" but that he did not reveal the same to Justice
Bruselas as it "escaped" his mind. The effort of Justice Bruselas
"to get in touch" with Justice Roxas proved futile.
Allegedly prompted by "the manner by which the decision x x x
was arrived at, and how the decision was promulgated," and
that unless an "immediate and thorough investigation thereon
be undertaken" by the Court of Appeals, "both the individual
and institutional integrity of the justices" and of the Court of
Appeals would "undoubtedly be tarnished," Justice Sabio
wrote on July 26, 2008 a letter
123
to the Presiding Justice,
which precipitated the present investigation.
On July 28, 2008, the Philippine Daily Inquirer "carried an
account" of the letter of Justice Dimaranan-Vidal to the
Presiding Justice, without her knowing how her confidential
letter to the Presiding Justice leaked out.
124

Before Justice Bruselas delivered his letter to the Presiding
Justice, he received a copy of the letter of Justice Sabio and,
through a telephone call, reiterated his "full agreement with
his desired investigation."
The Presiding Justice called the Court of Appeals to an
"emergency en banc session at 10:00 a.m. on July 31, 2008 at
the Session Hall to elicit the reaction of the Court and on the
"possible effect" on the decision rendered. The session was
also called in order that the "predicament experienced in CA-
G.R. SP No. 103692" could be deliberated upon by the
Committee on Rules with a view to amending the IRCA on the
reorganization of the Court of Appeals. The Executive Justices
of Cebu and Cagayan de Oro, Justices Antonio L. Villamor and
Romulo V. Borja, respectively, were instructed to attend
the en banc session to report to the other Justices in their
stations what transpired at the session, and to "collect the
personal reaction, comment or view" of the Justices on the
matter.
125

In its closed door en banc session on July 31, 2008, "after a
torrid discussion of all the issues," the Court of Appeals
decided, as follows:
(1) Refer the propriety of the actions of the Justices
concerned to the Supreme Court, through the Office of the
Court Administrator;
(2) Leave the matter regarding the validity of the decision
rendered in the above-entitled case to the parties for them to
take whatever legal steps they may deem appropriate in the
usual course of procedure; and
(3) Refer the conflict in the interpretation of our Internal Rules
to the Committee on Rules of the Court of Appeals in order to
prevent the recurrence of a similar situation.
126

After the en banc session, Justice Dimaranan-Vidal expressed
in a letter for the Presiding Justice
127
her "strong reaction" to
the paper of Justice Roxas "falsely" imputing to her
"grandstanding before the media or resorting to media-
recourse instead of just filing an administrative complaint
before the Supreme Court," and taking exception to "the
equally outrageous, revolting and baseless accusation that she
is allegedly clinging" to the case. She asserted that she never
leaked a copy of her letter to the Philippine Daily Inquirer, as
her letter was only intended to bring to the attention of the
Presiding Justice "the impropriety done by Justice Roxas in the
MERALCO case" that resulted in her having been eased out of
the case notwithstanding that she "carefully and judiciously"
examined theponencia with more than 50 pages, after
devoting her "precious time" to such study, and affixing her
concurrence thereto. Justice Dimaranan-Vidal reiterated her
prayer for an investigation of the matter.
Meanwhile, on that day, Mr. De Borja, executed an affidavit
admitting that he was the businessman referred to by Justice
Sabio, Jr. in his letter to Presiding Justice Vasquez. Mr. De
Borja publicly claimed having learned "from the news" that
Justice Sabio was "one of the justices" in the case arising from
the order of the SEC to nullify the proxies issued in favor of the
MERALCO management. He also alleged that Justice Sabio told
him about the "blandishments coming from the government
side," that he was being offered a promotion to the Supreme
Court and money to favor the GSIS position. Mr. De Borja
asked Justice Sabio, Jr., "What would it take for you to resist
the governments offer?" and that the response of Justice
Sabio, Jr. was "Fifty Million."
Justice Sabio asked permission from the Presiding Justice to
hold a press conference the next day on account of the
publicized affidavit of Mr. De Borja. The Presiding Justice told
Justice Sabio that "this is a matter of self-defense on his part,"
hence, the Presiding Justice cannot stop him from doing so.
Justice Sabio issued a signed statement as an "initial response"
to the affidavit of Mr. De Borja, "vehemently" denying that Mr.
De Borja asked him what it would take for him to inhibit from
the case, and that he "never asked for money" from him.
128

On August 1, 2008, Justice Sabio called the press conference to
read a signed statement entitled "My Reaction to Mr. Francis
De Borjas Affidavit dated July 31, 2008 on the Meralco-SEC
Case."
Expressing anger at the "filthy lie" of Mr. De Borja, Justice
Sabio decided to narrate "almost word for word" his
"conversations" with Mr. De Borja.
In an affidavit dated August 1, 2008, which Evelyn
Clavano
129
executed in Davao City, she stated that -
Francis de Borja requested me if I have the cell phone number
of Justice Jose L. Sabio Jr. He related that because he was very
close to the Lopezes of Meralco, he wanted to call him
regarding his possible inhibition in a certain Meralco case,
wherein he was designated as a substitute member of the
division vice a justice who was temporarily on leave by reason
of sickness. He further said that the Lopezes desire that the
same Justice, with whom the Lopezes are more comfortable,
to sit in the division.
So, I gave Francis de Borja the cell phone number of Justice
Jose. L. Sabio, Jr. through business card.
x x x x x x x x x.
On August 4, 2008, the Supreme Court constituted the Panel
of Investigators to investigate "(1) alleged improprieties of the
actions of the Justices of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 103692 (Antonio V. Rosete, et al. v. SEC, et al.) and (2) the
alleged rejected offer or solicitation of bribe disclosed
respectively by Mr. Justice Jose Sabio and Mr. Francis de
Borja."
The Panel of Investigators held hearings from August 8 to 23,
2008. Affidavits were submitted to the Panel to serve as the
parties direct testimonies upon which they were cross-
examined by the Panel and the other parties.
On September 4, 2008, the Panel of Investigators submitted its
Report of even date to the Court en banc.
According to the Report, "the investigation has revealed
irregularities and improprieties committed by the Court of
Appeals Justices in connection with the MERALCO case, CA-
G.R. SP No. 103692, which are detrimental to the proper
administration of justice and damaging to the institutional
integrity, independence and public respect for the
Judiciary."
130

Findings regarding the conduct of Associate Justice Vicente Q.
Roxas
Justice Roxas inexcusably failed to act on a number of motions
of the parties prior to the promulgation of the Decision.
As found by the Panel of Investigators, several motions were
not resolved or acted upon by Justice Roxas. These were
enumerated in the Report as follows:
(a) The "Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Defer Action on any
Incident of the Petition Pending Resolution of Re-Raffle" filed
by GSIS on May 29, 2008 soon after this case was filed on that
date (Rollo, pp. 185-186).
b) GSIS "Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Inhibit" Justice Roxas,
which was filed on May 30, 2008.As the motion raised a
prejudicial question, Justice Roxas should have resolved it
before issuing the TRO sought by Meralco, but he never
did (Rollo, pp. 220-223).
(c) GSIS Motion to Lift TRO which was filed on May 30, 2008
(Rollo, pp. 187-210)
(d) GSIS Motion filed on June 18, 2008, praying that it be
allowed to use Power point at the hearing on June 23, 2008 .
On June 20, 2008, the SEC filed a similar motion. Both motions
were not acted upon by Justice Roxas (Rollo, pp. 593-621,)
(e) Meralcos "Motion for Extension of Time to file their
Consolidated Memorandum of Authorities and Reply to
Repondent SECs Comment" filed on June 25, 2008 (Rollo, pp.
981- 987).
(f) Meralcos "Urgent Motion for Honorable Justice Bienvenido
L. Reyes to Assume Chairmanship of the Division in the Instant
Case," which was filed on July 10, 2008 (Rollo, pp. 1262-
1274).
131
(emphasis supplied)
We agree with the Panel of Investigators that "by ignoring or
refusing to act on the motion for his inhibition, Justice Roxas
violated Rule V, Section 3, third paragraph of the IRCA, which
provides that he should resolve such motion in writing with
copies furnished the other members of the Division, the
Presiding Justice, the Raffle Committee, and the Division Clerk
of Court." The pertinent portion of the said provision states:
Sec. 3. Motion to Inhibit a Division or a Justice. - x x x
x x x
A motion for voluntary inhibition of a Justice shall be acted
upon by him alone in writing, copy furnished the other
members of the Division, the Presiding Justice, the Raffle
Committee and the Division Clerk of Court.
This Court cannot agree with Justice Roxas proposition that
the issuance of the TRO constitutes an implied denial of the
motion to inhibit since under IRCA the obligation of the Justice
to act on such a motion is mandatory.
Furthermore, the Court finds well-taken the Panels finding
that "Justice Roxas failure to act on the other motions of the
parties violated Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the 1989 Code of Judicial
Conduct (which applies in a suppletory manner to the New
Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary) providing
that:
"Rule 3.05. - A judge shall dispose of the courts business
promptly and decide cases within the required periods."
Even Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct mandates that "[j]udges shall perform all judicial
duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently,
fairly and with reasonable promptness." Thus, it has become
well-settled in jurisprudence that even just undue delay in the
resolving pending motions or incidents within the
reglamentary period fixed by law is not excusable and
constitutes gross inefficiency.
132
With more reason, this Court
finds suspicious and reprehensible the failure of Justice Roxas
to act at all on pending motions and incidents in CA-G.R. SP
No. 103692.
This is in fact not the first time that Justice Roxas has been
cited administratively for failure to resolve pending incidents
in cases assigned to him. In Orocio v. Roxas, A.M. Nos. 07-115-
CA-J and CA-08-46-J, this Court imposed a P15,000 fine on
Justice Roxas for unwarranted delay in resolving two motions
for reconsideration in another case and sternly warned him
that future commission any act of impropriety will be dealt
with more severely.
Justice Roxas is guilty of gross dishonesty.
Apart from Justice Roxas inexcusable inaction on pending
incidents in the Meralco case, the Panel of Investigators found
that he had been dishonest and untruthful in relation to the
said case. The Court adopts the following findings of the Panel:
2. Justice Roxas was dishonest and untruthful.
(a) Justice Roxas admitted that the "Transcript of Final
Decision," which is supposed to be a transcript of the
deliberation on July 14, 2008 of the Eighth Division on the final
decision in the Meralco case was not a true "transcript" of the
minutes of the meeting, but purely a "transcript from
memory" because no notes were taken, no stenographer was
present, and no tape recorder was used. It was in fact a drama
which he composed "from my recollection" to comply with
Sec. 9, Rule VI of the IRCA which requires that "minutes of the
meeting, i.e., deliberation, shall be kept." The so-called
"transcript" is a fabrication designed to deceive that there had
been compliance - when actually there was none -- with the
prerequisite of the IRCA that consultation and/or deliberation
among the members of the Division must precede the drafting
of a decision.
(b) The statement in the "transcript" that it was a "recap from
our previous deliberations" was another falsehood because
there had been no previous deliberations.
(c) The reference in the "transcript" to a "Final Report of
Justice Roxas" was also false for Justice Roxas admittedly did
not submit a "report" as ponente, as required by Sec. 9, Rule VI
of the IRCA, for deliberation by the Eighth Division on July 14,
2008. The "Final Report" which he submitted was admittedly
the decision itself which he and Justice Bruselas, Jr. had
already signed. The "Final Report" was merely the title of the
page that served as the cover of the decision. Hence, Justice
B.L. Reyes supposed closing statement in the "transcript" that
-- "We have covered every angle of the Final Report of Justice
Roxas extensively" is also false. Justice B.L. Reyes testified at
the investigation that he had not seen the "transcript" until
the copy in therollo was shown to him by Justice Callejo, Sr.
during his cross-examination of Justice B. L. Reyes on August
26, 2008.
xxx xxx xxx
(e) Justice Roxas testimony that when he brought the Meralco
decision to Justice Dimaranan-Vidal on July 8, 2008, it was only
a draft for her to read, because she asked if she may read it,
not for her to sign it, is completely false. This testimony was
labelled by Justice Dimaranan-Vidal as a lie, and she called
Justice Roxas a liar, because she did not ask to borrow the
decision for her reading pleasure, but Justice Roxas personally
brought it to her office for her to sign as a member of the
Special Ninth Division. After poring over it the whole night, she
signed it, as well as three (3) additional signature pages which
were to be attached to three (3) other copies of the
decision.
133

xxx xxx xxx
Indeed, the fabrications and falsehoods that Justice Roxas
blithely proferred to the Panel in explanation/justification of
his questioned handling of the Meralco case demonstrated
that he lacks the qualification of integrity and honesty
expected of a magistrate and a member of the appellate court.
Under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, dishonesty is considered
a serious offense that may warrant the penalty of dismissal
from the service. Under the Rule IV, Section 52 of the Uniform
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, dishonesty is
likewise considered a grave offense and warrants the penalty
of dismissal even for the first offense. In the past, the Court
has had the occasion to rule that:
dishonesty and falsification are considered grave offenses
warranting the penalty of dismissal from service upon the
commission of the first offense. On numerous occasions, the
Court did not hesitate to impose such extreme punishment on
employees found guilty of these offenses.
Dishonesty, being in the nature of a grave offense, carries the
extreme penalty of dismissal from the service with forfeiture
of retirement benefits except accrued leave credits, and
perpetual disqualification for re-employment in the
government service. Dishonesty has no place in the
judiciary.
134

Justice Roxas showed a lack of courtesy and respect for his
colleagues in the Court of Appeals.
The Panel of Investigators reported on this matter in this wise:
xxx xxx xxx
(f) Justice Roxas was thoughtlessly disrespectful to a
colleague and a lady at that, when he
unceremoniously discarded, shredded, and burned
the decision that Justice Dimaranan-Vidal had
signed, because he allegedly forgot that Justice
Dimaranan-Vidal and Justice Sabio, Jr. had already
been "reorganized out" of the Special Ninth Division
as of July 4, 2008, hence, out of the Meralco case.
Out of courtesy, he should have explained to Justice
Dimaranan-Vidal the reason why he was not
promulgating the decision which she had signed.
The truth, it seems, is that Justice Roxas, who had
consulted Justice Villarama, Jr. on which Division
should decide the Meralco case, may have been
convinced that it should be the Special Ninth
Division. That is why he brought his decision to
Justice Dimaranan-Vidal for her signature. However,
somehow, somewhere, during the night, while
Justice Dimaranan-Vidal was patiently poring over
his decision, Justice Roxas was persuaded to bring
his decision to the Eighth Division (to which he and
Justice B.L. Reyes belong after the July 4, 2008
reorganization of the Court), it may have dawned on
him that if the case remained in the Special Ninth
Division, Justice Sabio, Jr. might dissent, requiring
the Presiding Justice to constitute a special division
of five. If he (Justice Roxas) should fail to obtain a
majority of the Division on his side, he would lose his
ponencia; someone else would become the ponente
(perhaps Justice Sabio, Jr.). That may be the reason
why he junked Justices Sabio, Jr. and Dimaranan-
Vidal (even if the latter concurred with his decision)
because he was unsure of Justice Sabio, Jr. He chose
to cast his lot with his companions in the Eighth
Division -- Justices B. L. Reyes and Bruselas, Jr. -- with
whom he and Meralco were "comfortable".
(g) J. Roxas was disrespectful to Presiding Justice
Vasquez, Jr. whose ruling on his "Interpleader
Petition" he sought on July 21, 2008, but he
promulgated the Meralco decision two (2) days later,
on July 23, 2008, without waiting for Presiding
Justice Vasquez, Jr.s ruling which came out on July
24, 2008, only three (3) days after the Interpleader
Petition was filed by him, and two (2) days after
Justice B.L. Reyes also reiterated in writing his
request for Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr. to resolve
the same chairmanship issue raised in the
Interpleader. Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr. was
embarrassed and humiliated by Justices B.L. Reyes
and Roxas lack of courtesy and respect for his
position as head of the Court.
xxx xxx xxx
There is an old adage which says to gain respect one must
learn to give it. If judges and justices are expected to treat
litigants, counsels and subordinates with respect and fairness,
with more reason, that judges and justices should give their
fellow magistrates the courtesy and professional regard due to
them as their colleagues in the Judiciary. Thus, in Canon 5,
Section 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, judges are
expected to "carry out judicial duties with appropriate
consideration for all persons, such as the parties, witnesses,
lawyers, court staff and judicial colleagues, without
differentiation on any irrelevant ground, immaterial to the
proper performance of such duties."
This Court cannot view lightly the discourteous manner that
Justice Roxas, in his apparent haste to promulgate his decision
in the Meralco case, treated his colleagues in the Court of
Appeals. It behooves the Court to remind all magistrates that
their high office demands compliance with the most exacting
standards of propriety and decorum.
Justice Roxas questionable handling of the Meralco case
demonstrates his undue interest therein.
In the Report, the Panel of Investigators observed that Justice
Roxas in fact began drafting his decision even prior to the
submission of the parties memoranda. As discussed in the
Report:
xxx xxx xxx
(d) Although the parties were given 15 days after the
hearing on June 23, 2008, or up to July 8, 2008, to
simultaneously submit their memoranda and
memoranda of authorities, and actually submitted:
On July 7, 2008 - GSISs 39 page- memorandum
On July 9, 2008 - SECs 62 page-memorandum
On July 10, 2008 - MERALCOs 555 page- memorandum (by
messenger) with memorandum of authorities
Justice Roxas prepared the decision before the parties had
filed their memoranda in the case and submitted it to Justice
Dimaranan-Vidal for her signature on July 8, 2008. His "rush to
judgment" was indicative of "undue interest and unseemly
haste," according to J.Romero.
He cheated the parties counsel of the time, effort, and energy
that they invested in the preparation of their ponderous
memoranda which, as it turned out, neither he nor the other
members of the Eighth Division bothered to read before
signing his decision. He made a mockery of his own order for
the parties to submit memoranda, and rendered their
compliance a futile exercise.
xxx xxx xxx
(underscoring supplied)
We agree with Mme. Justice Romeros observation that the
"rush to judgment" (even before the filing of the parties
memoranda) was indicative of Justice Roxas undue
interest and unseemly haste, especially when taken together
with other circumstances. This inexplicable haste in resolving
the case on the merits is likewise apparent in Justice Roxas
failure to resolve the several pending incidents and instead
jumping ahead to deciding the case on the merits; his
"rushing" of Justice Dimaranan-Vidal into signing his draft
Decision on July 8, 2008 when the parties memoranda have
not yet all been filed with the CA; his precipitate transfer of
the case to the Eighth Division for promulgation of decision,
without notice to Justice Dimaranan-Vidal of the Special Ninth
Division who had already signed his draft Decision and despite
the unresolved Chairmanship dispute between Justice Reyes
and Justice Sabio which he (Justice Roxas) even submitted to
the Presiding Justice for appropriate action, just a few days
before the promulgation.
We reiterate here that as the visible representation of the law
and justice, judges are expected to conduct themselves in a
manner that would enhance respect and confidence of the
people in the judicial system. The New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary mandates that judges
must not only maintain their independence, integrity and
impartiality; but they must also avoid any appearance of
impropriety or partiality, which may erode the peoples faith in
the judiciary. This standard applies not only to the decision
itself, but also to the process by which the decision is
made.
135
This Court will not hesitate to sanction with the
highest penalty magistrates who exhibit manifest undue
interest in their assigned cases.
136

In sum, this Court finds that Justice Roxas multiple violations
of the canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct constitute grave
misconduct, compounded by dishonesty, undue interest and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, which
warrant his DISMISSAL from the service.
Findings regarding the conduct of Associate Justice Jose L.
Sabio, Jr.
In the Report, the Panel found that Justice Sabio likewise
committed improprieties in relation to the Meralco case.
The circumstances of the telephone call of Chairman Sabio to
his brother Justice Sabio showed that Justice Sabio failed to
uphold the standard of independence and propriety expected
of him as a magistrate of the appellate court.
In his testimony before the Panel, Chairman Sabio admits that
he called up Justice Sabio on May 30, 2008 from Davao City, in
response to a resquest for help from a member of the Board
of Trustees of Meralco. Notwithstanding the fact that
Chairman Sabio called to relay to Justice Sabio the "rightness"
of the GSIS cause and asked him "to help GSIS" and that
Justice Sabio allegedly told his brother that he would act in
accordance with his conscience, the same still constituted a
violation of Canon 13 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility for lawyers, which provides that:
"A lawyer shall x x x refrain from any impropriety which
tends to influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the
Court."
As they were both members of the Bar, it is incomprehensible
to this Court how the brothers can justify their improper
conversation regarding the Meralco case. As the Panel
observed in its Report:
Ironically, both of them found nothing wrong with brother
Camilos effort to influence his younger brothers action in the
Meralco case, because both believe that our Filipino culture
allows brother-to-brother conversation, even if the purpose of
one is to influence the other, provided the latter does not
agree to do something illegal.
137

For the Panel, Justice Sabio violated Sections 1, 4, and 5,
Canon 1 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary, which provide that -
Sec. 1. Judges shall exercise the judicial function
independently x x x free from extraneous influence,
inducement, pressure, threat or interference, direct or
indirect, from any quarter or for any reason.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 4. Judges shall not allow family, social, or other
relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment. The
prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance
the private interests of others, nor convey or permit others
to convey the impression that they are in a special position to
influence the judge.
Sec. 5. Judges shall not only be free from inappropriate
connections with, and influence by, the executive and
legislative branches of government, but must also appear to
be free therefrom to a reasonable observer.
In the Investigators mind, although Justice Sabio signed the
TRO in favour of Meralco contrary to his brothers advice,
Justice Sabios "unusual interest in holding on to the Meralco
case," seemed to indicate that he may have been actually
influenced by his brother "to help GSIS." In arriving at this
conclusion, the Panel noted the following circumstances: (1)
Justice Sabio adamantly refused to yield the chairmanship of
the Special Ninth Division although the regular chairman,
Justice Reyes had returned to duty on June 10, 2008; and, (2)
Justice Sabio officiously prepared and signed a resolution (a
chore for the ponente Justice V. Roxas to perform), requiring
the GSIS and the SEC to comment on Meralcos "Motion for
Justice B. Reyes to Assume the Chairmanship of the 9th
Division," which he probably intended to delay the decision on
the preliminary injunction beyond the life of the TRO to the
prejudice of Meralco and the advantage of the GSIS.
Based on the facts on record, the Court is wary of declaring
that Justice Sabio had been influenced by his brother by
speculating that he would have favored GSIS had he been a
part of the division which rendered the decision in the
Meralco case. However, we do find that it was improper for
Justice Sabio to hold on to the chairmanship of the Ninth
Division the despite the return of Justice Reyes, when Justice
Sabios designation as acting chairman was clearly only for the
duration of Justice Reyes leave of absence. We likewise note
with disfavor his stubborn insistence on his own interpretation
of the IRCA and hostile, dismissive attitude towards equally
well-reasoned positions of his colleagues on the proper
interpretation of their rules. Such conduct on the part of
Justice Sabio did nothing to aid in the swift and amicable
resolution of his dispute with Justice Reyes but rather fanned
the flames of resentment between them. We deem this sort of
behavior unbecoming for a magistrate of his stature.
Justice Sabios conversations with Mr. De Borja were improper
and indiscreet.
On this matter, the Court accepts the following findings in the
Report:
Knowing the nature of De Borjas profession, Justice Sabio, Jr.
should have been wary of the former. He should have
foreseen that De Borja had the Meralco case on his mind when
he called Justice Sabio, Jr. True enough, De Borja mentioned
the Meralco case and congratulated Justice Sabio, Jr. for
having signed the TRO in favour of Meralco.
But that was not the last time Justice Sabio, Jr. would hear
from De Borja. A month later, after Justice Sabio, Jr. had
presided at the hearing of Meralcos prayer for preliminary
injunction on June 23, 2008, and the case was ripening for
decision or resolution, De Borja again called up Justice Sabio,
Jr. and asked to meet him over dinner to "chit chat" about the
Meralco case.
Instead of telling off De Borja that he could not, and would
not, talk about the Meralco case, Justice Sabio, Jr. agreed to
meet De Borja in the lobby-lounge of the Ateneo Law School
after his evening class in Legal Ethics in said school.
Justice Sabio Jr.s action of discussing the Meralco case with
De Borja was highlyinappropriate and indiscreet. First, in talks
with his brother; the second time in conversation with De
Borja, Justice Sabio, Jr. broke the shield of confidentiality that
covers the disposition of cases in the Court in order to
preserve and protect the integrity and independence of the
Court itself. He ignored the injunction in Canon 1, Section 8 of
the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary that: "Judges shall exhibit and promote high
standards of judicial conduct (and discretion) in order to
reinforce public confidence in the judiciary which is
fundamental to the maintenance of judicial independence."
It was during that meeting with De Borja in the lobby-lounge
of the Ateneo Law School, that De Borja allegedly offered him
P10 million, in behalf of Meralco, to step out of the case and
allow Justice Bienvenido Reyes to assume the chairmanship of
the Special Ninth Division because Meralco was "not
comfortable" with him (Justice Sabio, Jr.). He rejected the
bribe offer because he "could not in conscience accept it."
Justice Sabio, Jr. was allegedly shocked and insulted that De
Borja would think that he (Justice Sabio, Jr.) could be bribed or
bought. The Panel is, however, honestly perplexed why in
spite of his outraged respectability, Justice Sabio, Jr. called up
De Borja two (2) days later (on July 3, 2008), to tell De Borja to
stop "pestering" him with his calls. The Panel is nonplussed
because, normally, a person who has been insulted would
never want to see, much less speak again, to the person who
had disrespected him. He could have just shut off his cell
phone to De Borjas calls. De Borja denied that he reiterated
his offer of P10 million to Justice Sabio, Jr. He denied saying
that even if the case should go up to the Supreme Court, GSIS
would still lose, hence, "saying lang yung P10 million; baka
sisihin ka pa ng mga anak mo." He testified that his reply to
Justice Sabio, Jr.s call was "deadma" or indifference. Justice
Sabio, Jr. blamed that call of his to a "lapse in judgment" on his
part.
Be that as it may, the Investigating Panel finds more credible
Justice Sabio, Jr.s story about De Borjas P10 million-bribe-
offer on behalf of Meralco, than De Borjas denial that he
made such an offer. Why does the Panel believe him, and not
De Borja?
First, because Justice Sabio, Jr. verbally reported the rejected
bribe offer to CA Presiding Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. the
next day - a fact admitted by Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr.
Second, even though Justice Sabio, Jr. did not mention the
bribe-offerors name in both his verbal and written reports to
Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr., De Borja identified himself to
the media as the person alluded to.
Third, De Borjas allegation, that Justice Sabio, Jr. wanted P50
million, not P10 million, is not believable, for, if Justice Sabio,
Jr. quoted P50 million as his price, he would not have reported
the P10 million bribe offer to Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr. He
would have waited for Meralcos reply to his counter-offer.
138

xxx xxx xxx
Indeed, the Court agrees with the Panel that the allegation of
solicitation on the part of Justice Sabio is not credible.
Nevertheless, the continued communications between Justice
Sabio and Mr. De Borja even after the latters rejected bribery
attempt is highly inappropriate and shows poor judgment on
the part of Justice Sabio who should have acted in
preservation of the dignity of his judicial office and the
institution to which he belongs.
Premises considered, this Court is of the view that Justice
Sabios indiscreet and imprudent conversations regarding the
Meralco case with his brother and Mr. De Borja and his
actuations in the chairmanship dispute with Justice Reyes
constitute simple misconduct and conduct unbecoming of a
justice of the Court of Appeals which warrant the penalty of
two (2) months suspension without pay.
Findings regarding the conduct of Associate Justice
Bienvenido L. Reyes.
As previously discussed, Justice Reyes appealed to Presiding
Justice Vazquez in a letter dated July 22, 2008, reiterating his
(Justice Reyes) request that the Presiding Justice render an
opinion which Division of the Court of Appeals - the Eighth
Division with him as chairman, or the Special Ninth Division
chaired by Justice Sabio should resolve the Meralco case. This
was in conjunction with an Interpleader filed by Justice Roxas
on the same issue with the Presiding Justice. Yet, despite the
fact that the Presiding Justice informed Justices Reyes and
Roxas that he would study the matter, Justices Reyes and
Justice Roxas, together with Justice Bruselas, promulgated the
decision in the Meralco case on July 23, 2008. Justice Reyes
and Justice Roxas did not withdraw their request for a ruling
nor did either of them advise the Presiding Justice beforehand
of their intention to proceed with the resolution of the
Meralco case. Thus, when the Presiding Justice issued his
ruling on the chairmanship dispute on July 24, 2008, he was
unaware of the promulgation of the Meralco decision on July
23, 2008, under the aegis of Justice Reyes Eighth Division. As
found by the Panel, "Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr. was
completely taken aback when he learned about it on July 24,
2008, the same day that he issued his opinion on the
chairmanship issue which by then had become functus
oficio. He felt belittled and humiliated by the discourtesy of
the two justices to him."
It bears repeating here that under Canon 5, Section 3 of the
New Code of Judicial Conduct, judges are mandated to show
the appropriate consideration and respect for their colleagues
in the Judiciary.
Thus, we adopt the finding of the Panel on this point and find
Justice Reyes guilty of simple misconduct, which is mitigated
by the fact that he repeatedly asked Presiding Justice Vasquez
to act on his request to rule on the conflicting interpretation of
the IRCA. However, Justice Reyes should be reprimanded for
taking part in the decision of the subject case without awaiting
the ruling of the Presiding Justice.
Findings regarding the conduct of Justice Myrna Dimaranan-
Vidal
The Court finds well-taken and adopts the findings of the Panel
of Investigators, to wit:
Justice Dimaranan-Vidal deviated from the IRCA
when she allowed herself to be rushed by Justice
Roxas to sign the Meralco decision on July 8, 2008,
without reading the parties memoranda and
without the deliberation among members of the
Division required by the IRCA. She knew that the
TRO would not expire until July 30, 2008 - some
three (3) weeks away from July 8, 2008 - yet she
allowed herself to believe Justice Roxas
misrepresentation that signing the decision was
urgent. Her compliance with certain dissembling
practices of other justices of the Court, in violation
of the IRCA, showed weakness and lack of
independence on her part.
139

The following sections of Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct are instructive in this regard:
SEC. 1. Judges shall exercise the judicial function
independently on the basis of their assessment of
the facts and in accordance with a conscientious
understanding of the law, free of any extraneous
influence, inducement, pressure, threat or
interference, direct or indirect, from any quarter or
for any reason.
SEC. 2. In performing judicial duties, judges shall be
independent from judicial colleagues in respect of
decisions which the judge is obliged to make
independently.
Allowing a fellow justice to induce her to deviate from
established procedure constitutes conduct unbecoming a
justice for which Justice Dimaranan-Vidal should be
ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in the performance of
her judicial duties.
Findings regarding the conduct of Presiding Justice Conrado
M. Vasquez
It is the view of the Panel of Investigators that Presiding Justice
Vasquez failed to provide the leadership expected of him as
head of the Court of Appeals. The following quote from the
Report summarizes the perceived lapses on the part of the
Presiding Justice:
Clearly, Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr. had been indecisive in
dealing with the turmoil arising from the Meralco case.
He vacillated and temporized on resolving the impasse
between Justice Sabio, Jr. and Justice B. L. Reyes over the
chairmanship of the Division that should hear and decide the
Meralco case. He failed to take action on the reported bribe-
offer by Meralco to J. Sabio, Jr. He hesitated to assert his
leadership of the Court even when the parties repeatedly
urged him to lay down the rule for them to follow. Was he
hampered by the fact that he has relatives - two daughters -
employed in the GSIS, and a sister who is a consultant thereof?
He pleaded lack of authority. Was he not aware then, or did he
discover too late, that under Section 11, Rule VIII of the IRCA,
he is in fact authorized to act "on any matter" involving the
Court and its members? That Rule provides:
Sec. 11. x xx the Presiding Justice or any one acting in his
place is authorized to act on any matter not covered by these
Rules. Such action shall, however, be reported to the
Court en banc.
He should have convened the Court en banc as soon asthe
alleged bribery attempt on Justice Sabio, Jr. was reported to
him, for it was an attempt to corrupt a member of the Court,
calling for the "protection and preservation of the integrity of
the judicial processes" of the Court, hence, an administrative
matter cognizable by the Court en banc. Section 5 (c), Rule I of
the IRCA, provides:
Sec. 5. Matters cognizable by the Court en banc.- The
Court en banc
shall, inter alia:
(a) x x x
(b) Adopt uniform administrative measures, procedures, and
policies for the protection and preservation of the integrity
of the judicial processes, x x x.
Presiding Justice Vasquez admitted his "lapses in judgment."
140

In the light of the foregoing observations of the Panel, this
Court is of the view that much of the trouble now being faced
by the Court of Appeals could have been averted by timely,
judicious and decisive action on the part of the Presiding
Justice. Certainly, this unpleasant and trying episode in failure
to act in the early part of his tenure as Presiding Justice has
indelibly impressed upon him what is required of him as leader
of the second highest court in the land. Nevertheless,
Presiding Justice Vasquez is hereby severely reprimanded for
his failure to act promptly and decisively on the controversy as
required of him by the IRCA.
Findings regarding other personalities involved in the
Meralco case
Although the Presiding Justice in his letter dated August 1,
2008 only referred to this Court "the propriety of the actions
of the Justices concerned" in the Meralco case, we cannot
simply turn a blind eye to the facts brought to light during the
investigation that relate to potential liabilities of other
personalities in the Meralco case.
With respect to Chairman Sabio, this Court has the power to
discipline members of the Bar and his attempt to influence a
member of the Judiciary, his brother at that, should be
referred to the Bar Confidant for appropriate action.
With respect to Mr. De Borja, the present investigation has
given this Court reason to believe that Mr. De Borja may be
criminally liable for his attempt to bribe a magistrate of the
Court of Appeals. This matter should be referred to the
Department of Justice for appropriate action.
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, this per
curiam decision was reached after deliberation of the Court en
banc. At the outset, the offer of three (3) members of the
Court to recuse themselves was denied by the Court. Except
for two members of the Court who were allowed to inhibit
themselves from the case, the Justices voted as follows:
Twelve Justices voted for the dismissal from service of
Associate Justice Vicente Q. Roxas and one (1) voted for his
suspension from the service for six (6) months. Ten (10)
Justices voted for two (2) month suspension from service
without pay of Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, one (1) voted
for six-month suspension, one (1) for reprimand only as he
should be credited for being a "whistle blower" and one (1) for
his dismissal from the service. Eight (8) Justices voted to
reprimand Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes and five (5)
for his suspension from the service for one (1) month. As to
the rest, the voting was unanimous.
WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES as follows:
(1) Associate Justice Vicente Q. Roxas is found guilty of
multiple violations of the canons of the Code of Judicial
Conduct, grave misconduct, dishonesty, undue interest and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and is
DISMISSED from the service, with FORFEITURE of all benefits,
except accrued leave credits if any, with prejudice to his re-
employment in any branch or service of the government
including government-owned and controlled corporations;
(2) Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr. is found guilty of simple
misconduct and conduct unbecoming of a justice of the Court
of Appeals and is SUSPENDED for two (2) months without pay,
with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar
acts will warrant a more severe penalty;
(3) Presiding Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. is SEVERELY
REPRIMANDED for his failure to act promptly and decisively in
order to avert the incidents that damaged the image of the
Court of Appeals, with a stern warning that a repetition of the
same or similar acts will warrant a more severe penalty;
(4) Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes is found
guilty of simple misconduct with mitigating
circumstance and is REPRIMANDED, with a stern
warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts
will warrant a more severe penalty;
(5) Associate Justice Myrna Dimaranan-Vidal is found
guilty of conduct unbecoming a Justice of the Court
of Appeals and is ADMONISHED to be more
circumspect in the discharge of her judicial duties.
(6) PCGG Chairman Camilo L. Sabios act to influence
the judgment of a member of the Judiciary in a
pending case is hereby referred to the Bar Confidant
for appropriate action;
(7) Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr.s charge against Mr.
Francis R. De Borja for attempted bribery of a
member of the Judiciary is hereby referred to the
Department of Justice for appropriate action.
This Decision shall take effect immediately.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 175888. February 11, 2009.]
SUZETTE NICOLAS y SOMBILON, petitioner, vs. ALBERTO
ROMULO, in his capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs; RAUL
GONZALEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of Justice; EDUARDO
ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary; RONALDO
PUNO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Interior and Local
Government; SERGIO APOSTOL, in his capacity as Presidential
Legal Counsel; and L/CPL. DANIEL SMITH, respondents.
[G.R. No. 176051. February 11, 2009.]
JOVITO R. SALONGA, WIGBERTO E. TAADA, JOSE
DE LA RAMA, EMILIO C. CAPULONG, H. HARRY L.
ROQUE, JR., FLORIN HILBAY, and BENJAMIN
POZON, petitioners, vs. DANIEL SMITH, SECRETARY
RAUL GONZALEZ, PRESIDENTIAL LEGAL COUNSEL
SERGIO APOSTOL, SECRETARY RONALDO PUNO,
SECRETARY ALBERTO ROMULO, The Special 16th
Division of the COURT OF APPEALS, and all persons
acting in their capacity, respondents.
[G.R. No. 176222. February 11, 2009.]
BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN (BAYAN),
represented by Dr. Carol Araullo; GABRIELA,
represented by Emerenciana de Jesus; BAYAN
MUNA, represented by Rep. Satur Ocampo;
GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY, represented by Rep.
Liza Maza; KILUSANG MAYO UNO (KMU),
represented by Elmer Labog; KILUSANG
MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS (KMP), represented by
Willy Marbella; LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS
(LFS), represented by Vencer Crisostomo; and THE
PUBLIC INTEREST LAW CENTER, represented by
Atty. Rachel Pastores, petitioners, vs. PRESIDENT
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, in her capacity as
concurrent Defense Secretary, EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, FOREIGN AFFAIRS
SECRETARY ALBERTO ROMULO, JUSTICE SECRETARY
RAUL GONZALEZ, AND INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT SECRETARY RONALDO PUNO,
respondents.
D E C I S I O N
AZCUNA, J p:

These are petitions for certiorari, etc. as special civil actions
and/or for review of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in
Lance Corporal Daniel J. Smith v. Hon. Benjamin T. Pozon, et
al., in CA-G.R. SP No. 97212, dated January 2, 2007. HSEcTC
The facts are not disputed.
Respondent Lance Corporal (L/CPL) Daniel Smith is a member
of the United States Armed Forces. He was charged with the
crime of rape committed against a Filipina, petitioner herein,
sometime on November 1, 2005, as follows:
The undersigned accused LCpl. Daniel Smith, Ssgt.
Chad Brian Carpentier, Dominic Duplantis, Keith
Silkwood and Timoteo L. Soriano, Jr. of the crime of
Rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended by Republic Act 8353, upon a complaint
under oath filed by Suzette S. Nicolas, which is
attached hereto and made an integral part hereof as
Annex "A", committed as follows:
"That on or about the First (1st) day of November
2005, inside the Subic Bay Freeport Zone, Olongapo
City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused's (sic), being then
members of the United States Marine Corps, except
Timoteo L. Soriano, Jr., conspiring, confederating
together and mutually helping one another, with
lewd design and by means of force, threat and
intimidation, with abuse of superior strength and
taking advantage of the intoxication of the victim,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously sexually abuse and have sexual
intercourse with or carnal knowledge of one Suzette
S. Nicolas, a 22-year old unmarried woman inside a
Starex Van with Plate No. WKF-162, owned by
Starways Travel and Tours, with Office address at
8900 P. Victor St., Guadalupe, Makati City, and
driven by accused Timoteo L. Soriano, Jr., against the
will and consent of the said Suzette S. Nicolas, to her
damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW." 1
Pursuant to the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) between the
Republic of the Philippines and the United States, entered into
on February 10, 1998, the United States, at its request, was
granted custody of defendant Smith pending the proceedings.
During the trial, which was transferred from the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Zambales to the RTC of Makati for security
reasons, the United States Government faithfully complied
with its undertaking to bring defendant Smith to the trial court
every time his presence was required.
On December 4, 2006, the RTC of Makati, following the end of
the trial, rendered its Decision, finding defendant Smith guilty,
thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, for failure of the
prosecution to adduce sufficient evidence against
accused S/SGT. CHAD BRIAN CARPENTER, L/CPL.
KEITH SILKWOOD AND L/CPL. DOMINIC DUPLANTIS,
all of the US Marine Corps assigned at the USS Essex,
are hereby ACQUITTED to the crime charged. EcTIDA
The prosecution having presented sufficient
evidence against accused L/CPL. DANIEL J. SMITH,
also of the US Marine Corps at the USS Essex, this
Court hereby finds him GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of RAPE defined
under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 (a) of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 8353, and, in
accordance with Article 266-B, first paragraph
thereof, hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua together with the accessory
penalties provided for under Article 41 of the same
Code.
Pursuant to Article V, paragraph No. 10, of the
Visiting Forces Agreement entered into by the
Philippines and the United States, accused L/CPL.
DANIEL J. SMITH shall serve his sentence in the
facilities that shall, thereafter, be agreed upon by
appropriate Philippine and United States authorities.
Pending agreement on such facilities, accused L/CPL.
DANIEL J. SMITH is hereby temporarily committed to
the Makati City Jail.
Accused L/CPL. DANIEL J. SMITH is further sentenced
to indemnify complainant SUZETTE S. NICOLAS in the
amount of P50,000.00 as compensatory damages
plus P50,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED. 2
As a result, the Makati court ordered Smith detained at the
Makati jail until further orders.
On December 29, 2006, however, defendant Smith was taken
out of the Makati jail by a contingent of Philippine law
enforcement agents, purportedly acting under orders of the
Department of the Interior and Local Government, and
brought to a facility for detention under the control of the
United States government, provided for under new
agreements between the Philippines and the United States,
referred to as the Romulo-Kenney Agreement of December 19,
2006 which states: SEAHcT
The Government of the Republic of the Philippines
and the Government of the United States of America
agree that, in accordance with the Visiting Forces
Agreement signed between our two nations, Lance
Corporal Daniel J. Smith, United States Marine
Corps, be returned to U.S. military custody at the
U.S. Embassy in Manila.
(SGD.) KRISTIE A. KENNEY (SGD.)
ALBERTO G. ROMULO
Representative of the
United Representative of the Republic
States of America of the Philippines
DATE: 12-19-06 DATE: December 19,
2006
and the Romulo-Kenney Agreement of December 22,
2006 which states:
The Department of Foreign Affairs of the
Republic of the Philippines and the
Embassy of the United States of America
agree that, in accordance with the
Visiting Forces Agreement signed
between the two nations, upon transfer
of Lance Corporal Daniel J. Smith, United
States Marine Corps, from the Makati
City Jail, he will be detained at the first
floor, Rowe (JUSMAG) Building, U.S.
Embassy Compound in a room of
approximately 10 x 12 square feet. He
will be guarded round the clock by U.S.
military personnel. The Philippine police
and jail authorities, under the direct
supervision of the Philippine
Department of Interior and Local
Government (DILG) will have access to
the place of detention to ensure the
United States is in compliance with the
terms of the VFA.
The matter was brought before the Court of Appeals which
decided on January 2, 2007, as follows:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, we
resolved to DISMISS the petition for having become
moot. 3
Hence, the present actions.
The petitions were heard on oral arguments on September 19,
2008, after which the parties submitted their memoranda.
Petitioners contend that the Philippines should have custody
of defendant L/CPL Smith because, first of all, the VFA is void
and unconstitutional. EHSAaD
This issue had been raised before, and this Court resolved in
favor of the constitutionality of the VFA. This was in Bayan v.
Zamora, 4 brought by Bayan, one of petitioners in the present
cases.
Against the barriers of res judicata vis--vis Bayan, and stare
decisis vis--vis all the parties, the reversal of the previous
ruling is sought on the ground that the issue is of primordial
importance, involving the sovereignty of the Republic, as well
as a specific mandate of the Constitution.
The provision of the Constitution is Art. XVIII, Sec. 25 which
states:
Sec. 25. After the expiration in 1991 of
the Agreement between the Philippines
and the United States of America
concerning Military Bases, foreign
military bases, troops, or facilities shall
not be allowed in the Philippines except
under a treaty duly concurred in by the
Senate and, when the Congress so
requires, ratified by a majority of the
votes cast by the people in a national
referendum held for that purpose, and
recognized as a treaty by the other
contracting State.
The reason for this provision lies in history and the Philippine
experience in regard to the United States military bases in the
country.
It will be recalled that under the Philippine Bill of 1902, which
laid the basis for the Philippine Commonwealth and,
eventually, for the recognition of independence, the United
States agreed to cede to the Philippines all the territory it
acquired from Spain under the Treaty of Paris, plus a few
islands later added to its realm, except certain naval ports
and/or military bases and facilities, which the United States
retained for itself.
This is noteworthy, because what this means is that Clark and
Subic and the other places in the Philippines covered by the
RP-US Military Bases Agreement of 1947 were not Philippine
territory, as they were excluded from the cession and retained
by the US.
Accordingly, the Philippines had no jurisdiction over these
bases except to the extent allowed by the United States.
Furthermore, the RP-US Military Bases Agreement was never
advised for ratification by the United States Senate, a disparity
in treatment, because the Philippines regarded it as a treaty
and had it concurred in by our Senate. TSIDEa
Subsequently, the United States agreed to turn over these
bases to the Philippines; and with the expiration of the RP-US
Military Bases Agreement in 1991, the territory covered by
these bases were finally ceded to the Philippines.
To prevent a recurrence of this experience, the provision in
question was adopted in the 1987 Constitution.
The provision is thus designed to ensure that any agreement
allowing the presence of foreign military bases, troops or
facilities in Philippine territory shall be equally binding on the
Philippines and the foreign sovereign State involved. The idea
is to prevent a recurrence of the situation in which the terms
and conditions governing the presence of foreign armed forces
in our territory were binding upon us but not upon the foreign
State.
Applying the provision to the situation involved in these cases,
the question is whether or not the presence of US Armed
Forces in Philippine territory pursuant to the VFA is allowed
"under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate . . . and
recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State".
This Court finds that it is, for two reasons. aEIcHA
First, as held in Bayan v. Zamora, 5 the VFA was duly
concurred in by the Philippine Senate and has been recognized
as a treaty by the United States as attested and certified by
the duly authorized representative of the United States
government.
The fact that the VFA was not submitted for advice and
consent of the United States Senate does not detract from its
status as a binding international agreement or treaty
recognized by the said State. For this is a matter of internal
United States law. Notice can be taken of the internationally
known practice by the United States of submitting to its
Senate for advice and consent agreements that are
policymaking in nature, whereas those that carry out or
further implement these policymaking agreements are merely
submitted to Congress, under the provisions of the so-called
Case-Zablocki Act, within sixty days from ratification. 6
The second reason has to do with the relation between the
VFA and the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty of August 30, 1951.
This earlier agreement was signed and duly ratified with the
concurrence of both the Philippine Senate and the United
States Senate.
The RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty states: 7
MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY BETWEEN
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.
Signed at Washington, August 30, 1951.
The Parties of this Treaty
Reaffirming their faith in the purposes
and principles of the Charter of the
United Nations and their desire to live in
peace with all peoples and all
governments, and desiring to strengthen
the fabric of peace in the Pacific area.
Recalling with mutual pride the historic
relationship which brought their two
peoples together in a common bond of
sympathy and mutual ideals to fight
side-by-side against imperialist
aggression during the last war. CEHcSI
Desiring to declare publicly and
formally their sense of unity and their
common determination to defend
themselves against external armed
attack, so that no potential aggressor
could be under the illusion that either of
them stands alone in the Pacific area.
Desiring further to strengthen their
present efforts for collective defense
for the preservation of peace and
security pending the development of a
more comprehensive system of regional
security in the Pacific area.
Agreeing that nothing in this present
instrument shall be considered or
interpreted as in any way or sense
altering or diminishing any existing
agreements or understandings between
the Republic of the Philippines and the
United States of America.
Have agreed as follows:
ARTICLE I. The parties undertake, as set
forth in the Charter of the United
Nations, to settle any international
disputes in which they may be involved
by peaceful means in such a manner
that international peace and security
and justice are not endangered and to
refrain in their international relation
from the threat or use of force in any
manner inconsistent with the purposes
of the United Nations. IDAESH
ARTICLE II. In order more effectively to
achieve the objective of this Treaty, the
Parties separately and jointly by self-
help and mutual aid will maintain and
develop their individual and collective
capacity to resist armed attack.
ARTICLE III. The Parties, through their
Foreign Ministers or their deputies, will
consult together from time to time
regarding the implementation of this
Treaty and whenever in the opinion of
either of them the territorial integrity,
political independence or security of
either of the Parties is threatened by
external armed attack in the Pacific.
ARTICLE IV. Each Party recognizes that
an armed attack in the Pacific area on
either of the parties would be
dangerous to its own peace and safety
and declares that it would act to meet
the common dangers in accordance with
its constitutional processes.
Any such armed attack and all measures
taken as a result thereof shall be
immediately reported to the Security
Council of the United Nations. Such
measures shall be terminated when the
Security Council has taken the measures
necessary to restore and maintain
international peace and security.
ARTICLE V. For the purpose of Article IV,
an armed attack on either of the Parties
is deemed to include an armed attack on
the metropolitan territory of either of
the Parties, or on the island territories
under its jurisdiction in the Pacific
Ocean, its armed forces, public vessels
or aircraft in the Pacific.
ARTICLE VI. This Treaty does not affect
and shall not be interpreted as affecting
in any way the rights and obligations of
the Parties under the Charter of the
United Nations or the responsibility of
the United Nations for the maintenance
of international peace and security.
ARTICLE VII. This Treaty shall be ratified
by the Republic of the Philippines and
the United Nations of America in
accordance with their respective
constitutional processes and will come
into force when instruments of
ratification thereof have been
exchanged by them at Manila.
ARTICLE VIII. This Treaty shall remain in
force indefinitely. Either Party may
terminate it one year after notice has
been given to the other party. HScDIC
IN WITHNESS * WHEREOF the
undersigned Plenipotentiaries have
signed this Treaty.
DONE in duplicate at Washington this
thirtieth day of August, 1951.
For the Republic of the Philippines:
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8

Clearly, therefore, joint RP-US military exercises for the
purpose of developing the capability to resist an armed attack
fall squarely under the provisions of the RP-US Mutual Defense
Treaty. The VFA, which is the instrument agreed upon to
provide for the joint RP-US military exercises, is simply an
implementing agreement to the main RP-US Military Defense
Treaty. The Preamble of the VFA states: EIDTAa
The Government of the United States of
America and the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines,
Reaffirming their faith in the purposes
and principles of the Charter of the
United Nations and their desire to
strengthen international and regional
security in the Pacific area;
Reaffirming their obligations under the
Mutual Defense Treaty of August 30,
1951;
Noting that from time to time elements
of the United States armed forces may
visit the Republic of the Philippines;
Considering that cooperation between
the United States and the Republic of
the Philippines promotes their common
security interests;
Recognizing the desirability of defining
the treatment of United States
personnel visiting the Republic of the
Philippines;
Have agreed as follows: 9
Accordingly, as an implementing agreement of the RP-US
Mutual Defense Treaty, it was not necessary to submit the VFA
to the US Senate for advice and consent, but merely to the US
Congress under the Case Zablocki Act within 60 days of its
ratification. It is for this reason that the US has certified that it
recognizes the VFA as a binding international agreement, i.e., a
treaty, and this substantially complies with the requirements
of Art. XVIII, Sec. 25 of our Constitution. 10
The provision of Art. XVIII, Sec. 25 of the Constitution, is
complied with by virtue of the fact that the presence of the US
Armed Forces through the VFA is a presence "allowed under"
the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty. Since the RP-US Mutual
Defense Treaty itself has been ratified and concurred in by
both the Philippine Senate and the US Senate, there is no
violation of the Constitutional provision resulting from such
presence. IcDESA
The VFA being a valid and binding agreement, the parties are
required as a matter of international law to abide by its terms
and provisions.
The VFA provides that in cases of offenses committed by the
members of the US Armed Forces in the Philippines, the
following rules apply:
Article V
Criminal Jurisdiction
xxx xxx xxx
6. The custody of any United States
personnel over whom the Philippines is
to exercise jurisdiction shall immediately
reside with United States military
authorities, if they so request, from the
commission of the offense until
completion of all judicial proceedings.
United States military authorities shall,
upon formal notification by the
Philippine authorities and without delay,
make such personnel available to those
authorities in time for any investigative
or judicial proceedings relating to the
offense with which the person has been
charged. In extraordinary cases, the
Philippine Government shall present its
position to the United States
Government regarding custody, which
the United States Government shall take
into full account. In the event Philippine
judicial proceedings are not completed
within one year, the United States shall
be relieved of any obligations under this
paragraph. The one year period will not
include the time necessary to appeal.
Also, the one year period will not
include any time during which scheduled
trial procedures are delayed because
United States authorities, after timely
notification by Philippine authorities to
arrange for the presence of the accused,
fail to do so.

Petitioners contend that these undertakings violate another
provision of the Constitution, namely, that providing for the
exclusive power of this Court to adopt rules of procedure for
all courts in the Philippines (Art. VIII, Sec. 5[5]). They argue
that to allow the transfer of custody of an accused to a foreign
power is to provide for a different rule of procedure for that
accused, which also violates the equal protection clause of the
Constitution (Art. III, Sec. 1.).
Again, this Court finds no violation of the Constitution.
The equal protection clause is not violated, because there is a
substantial basis for a different treatment of a member of a
foreign military armed forces allowed to enter our territory
and all other accused. 11 cda
The rule in international law is that a foreign armed forces
allowed to enter one's territory is immune from local
jurisdiction, except to the extent agreed upon. The Status of
Forces Agreements involving foreign military units around the
world vary in terms and conditions, according to the situation
of the parties involved, and reflect their bargaining power. But
the principle remains, i.e., the receiving State can exercise
jurisdiction over the forces of the sending State only to the
extent agreed upon by the parties. 12
As a result, the situation involved is not one in which the
power of this Court to adopt rules of procedure is curtailed or
violated, but rather one in which, as is normally encountered
around the world, the laws (including rules of procedure) of
one State do not extend or apply except to the extent
agreed upon to subjects of another State due to the
recognition of extraterritorial immunity given to such bodies
as visiting foreign armed forces.
Nothing in the Constitution prohibits such agreements
recognizing immunity from jurisdiction or some aspects of
jurisdiction (such as custody), in relation to long-recognized
subjects of such immunity like Heads of State, diplomats and
members of the armed forces contingents of a foreign State
allowed to enter another State's territory. On the contrary, the
Constitution states that the Philippines adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of
the land. (Art. II, Sec. 2). HCEaDI
Applying, however, the provisions of VFA, the Court finds that
there is a different treatment when it comes to detention as
against custody. The moment the accused has to be detained,
e.g., after conviction, the rule that governs is the following
provision of the VFA:
Article V
Criminal Jurisdiction
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 10. The confinement or detention
by Philippine authorities of United
States personnel shall be carried out in
facilities agreed on by appropriate
Philippines and United States
authorities. United States personnel
serving sentences in the Philippines shall
have the right to visits and material
assistance.
It is clear that the parties to the VFA recognized the difference
between custody during the trial and detention after
conviction, because they provided for a specific arrangement
to cover detention. And this specific arrangement clearly
states not only that the detention shall be carried out in
facilities agreed on by authorities of both parties, but also that
the detention shall be "by Philippine authorities". Therefore,
the Romulo-Kenney Agreements of December 19 and 22,
2006, which are agreements on the detention of the accused
in the United States Embassy, are not in accord with the VFA
itself because such detention is not "by Philippine authorities".
Respondents should therefore comply with the VFA and
negotiate with representatives of the United States towards
an agreement on detention facilities under Philippine
authorities as mandated by Art. V, Sec. 10 of the VFA.
Next, the Court addresses the recent decision of the United
States Supreme Court in Medellin v. Texas (552 US ____ No.
06-984, March 25, 2008), which held that treaties entered into
by the United States are not automatically part of their
domestic law unless these treaties are self-executing or there
is an implementing legislation to make them enforceable.
TAESDH
On February 3, 2009, the Court issued a Resolution, thus:
"G.R. No. 175888 (Suzette Nicolas y
Sombilon v. Alberto Romulo, et al.); G.R.
No. 176051 (Jovito R. Salonga, et al. v.
Daniel Smith, et al.); and G.R. No.
176222 (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan
[BAYAN], et al. v. President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, et al.).
The parties, including the Solicitor
General, are required to submit within
three (3) days a
Comment/Manifestation on the
following points:
1. What is the implication on the RP-US
Visiting Forces Agreement of
the recent US Supreme Court
decision in Jose Ernesto
Medellin v. Texas, dated
March 25, 2008, to the effect
that treaty stipulations that
are not self-executory can only
be enforced pursuant to
legislation to carry them into
effect; and that, while treaties
may comprise international
commitments, they are not
domestic law unless Congress
has enacted implementing
statutes or the treaty itself
conveys an intention that it be
"self-executory" and is ratified
on these terms?
2. Whether the VFA is enforceable in the
US as domestic law, either
because it is self-executory or
because there exists
legislation to implement it.
3. Whether the RP-US Mutual Defense
Treaty of August 30, 1951 was
concurred in by the US Senate
and, if so, is there proof of the
US Senate advice and consent
resolution? Peralta, J., no
part."
After deliberation, the Court holds, on these points, as follows:
First, the VFA is a self-executing Agreement, as that term is
defined in Medellin itself, because the parties intend its
provisions to be enforceable, precisely because the Agreement
is intended to carry out obligations and undertakings under
the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty. As a matter of fact, the VFA
has been implemented and executed, with the US faithfully
complying with its obligation to produce L/CPL Smith before
the court during the trial.
Secondly, the VFA is covered by implementing legislation,
namely, the Case-Zablocki Act, USC Sec. 112 (b), inasmuch as it
is the very purpose and intent of the US Congress that
executive agreements registered under this Act within 60 days
from their ratification be immediately implemented. The
parties to these present cases do not question the fact that
the VFA has been registered under the Case-Zablocki Act.
DaCTcA
In sum, therefore, the VFA differs from the Vienna Convention
on Consular Relations and the Avena decision of the
International Court of Justice (ICJ), subject matter of the
Medellin decision. The Convention and the ICJ decision are not
self-executing and are not registrable under the Case-Zablocki
Act, and thus lack legislative implementing authority.
Finally, the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty was advised and
consented to by the US Senate on March 20, 1952, as reflected
in the US Congressional Record, 82nd Congress, Second
Session, Vol. 98 Part 2, pp. 2594-2595.
The framers of the Constitution were aware that the
application of international law in domestic courts varies from
country to country.
As Ward N. Ferdinandusse states in his Treatise, DIRECT
APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW IN
NATIONAL COURTS, some countries require legislation
whereas others do not.
It was not the intention of the framers of the 1987
Constitution, in adopting Article XVIII, Sec. 25, to require the
other contracting State to convert their system to achieve
alignment and parity with ours. It was simply required that the
treaty be recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.
With that, it becomes for both parties a binding international
obligation and the enforcement of that obligation is left to the
normal recourse and processes under international law.
Furthermore, as held by the US Supreme Court in Weinberger
v. Rossi, 13 an executive agreement is a "treaty" within the
meaning of that word in international law and constitutes
enforceable domestic law vis--vis the United States. Thus, the
US Supreme Court in Weinberger enforced the provisions of
the executive agreement granting preferential employment to
Filipinos in the US Bases here.
Accordingly, there are three types of treaties in the American
system:
1. Art. II, Sec. 2 treaties These are
advised and consented to by
the US Senate in accordance
with Art. II, Sec. 2 of the US
Constitution. HScAEC
2. Executive-Congressional Agreements:
These are joint agreements of
the President and Congress
and need not be submitted to
the Senate.
3. Sole Executive Agreements. These
are agreements entered into
by the President. They are to
be submitted to Congress
within sixty (60) days of
ratification under the
provisions of the Case-Zablocki
Act, after which they are
recognized by the Congress
and may be implemented.
As regards the implementation of the RP-US Mutual Defense
Treaty, military aid or assistance has been given under it and
this can only be done through implementing legislation. The
VFA itself is another form of implementation of its provisions.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED, and the
Court of Appeals' Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 97212 dated
January 2, 2007 is MODIFIED. The Visiting Forces Agreement
(VFA) between the Republic of the Philippines and the United
States, entered into on February 10, 1998, is UPHELD as
constitutional, but the Romulo-Kenney Agreements of
December 19 and 22, 2006 are DECLARED not in accordance
with the VFA, and respondent Secretary of Foreign Affairs is
hereby ordered to forthwith negotiate with the United States
representatives for the appropriate agreement on detention
facilities under Philippine authorities as provided in Art. V, Sec.
10 of the VFA, pending which the status quo shall be
maintained until further orders by this Court.
The Court of Appeals is hereby directed to resolve without
delay the related matters pending therein, namely, the
petition for contempt and the appeal of L/CPL Daniel Smith
from the judgment of conviction.

No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Corona, Tinga, Chico-Nazario,
Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-de Castro and Brion, JJ., concur.
Puno, C.J., see dissenting opinion.
Carpio, J., see dissenting opinion.
Austria-Martinez, J., I join the Chief Justice and Justice Carpio
in their dissenting opinions.
Carpio-Morales, J., I join the dissents of Chief Justice Puno and
Justice Carpio.
Nachura, J., took no part. Signed pleading as Solicitor General.
Peralta, J., took no part.
||| (Nicolas y Sombilon v. Romulo, G.R. No. 175888, 176051,
176222, February 11, 2009)






EN BANC
[A.C. No. 198-J. May 31, 1971.]
PAZ M. GARCIA, complainant, vs. HON.
CATALINO MACARAIG, JR., respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. JUDICIAL ETHICS; ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT AGAINST
JUDGE; IN CASE AT BAR, RESPONDENT'S RECEIPT OF SALARIES
WITHOUT ACTUALLY PERFORMING HIS DUTIES AS JUDGE NOT
DISHONESTY. Complainant's theory is that respondent
collected or received salaries as judge when in fact he has
never acted as such, since the date he took his oath up to the
filing of the complaint. In the sense that respondent has not
yet performed any judicial function, it may be admitted that
respondent has not really performed the duties of judge. What
is lost sight of, however, is that after taking his oath and
formally assuming his position as judge, respondent had a
perfect right to earn the salary of a judge even in the extreme
supposition that he did not perform any judicial function for
he could, while preparing himself for his new job or for any
good reason, take a leave, as in fact, he had planned to do,
were it not for the request of the Secretary of Justice for him
to forego the idea and, instead, help the Department in
whatever way possible which would not, it must be presumed
impair his position as a judge. This is more so, when, as in this
case, the government offices or officers in duty bound to
furnish him the necessary place and facilities for his court and
the performance of his functions have failed to provide him
therewith without any fault on his part. That respondent took
it upon himself to personally work for early action on the part
of the corresponding officials in this direction and, in his spare
time made himself available to the Department of Justice to
assist the Secretary, what with his vast experience, having
worked therein for sixteen years, is, far from being dishonesty,
to his credit. In the circumstances, it was certainly not
improper that he rendered some kind of service to the
government, since he was receiving salaries, while being
unable to perform his regular duties as judge without any fault
on his part.
2. ID.; ID.; SECTIONS 5, 55 AND 58 OF THE JUDICIARY ACT AND
CIRCULAR NO. 10 DATED FEBRUARY 6, 1952 OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; APPLICABLE ONLY TO JUDGES
ACTUALLY HOLDING TRIALS AND HEARINGS AND MAKING
DECISIONS AND ORDERS. Admittedly respondent has not
prepared and submitted any of the reports of
accomplishments and status of cases in his sala which are
usually required of judges under existing laws as well as the
corresponding circulars of the Department of Justice. The
reason is simple. He has not yet started performing any judicial
functions. None of those laws and circulars apply to him, for all
of them contemplate judges who are actually holding trials
and hearings and making decisions and orders. On the other
hand, respondent could not be blamed for taking his oath as
he did, for he had a valid confirmed appointment in his favor.
In other words, he simply made himself available for the
purposes for which he was appointed. That he could not
actually hold office in the court to which he was appointed
was not of his making. The other officials in charge of
providing him therewith seem to have been caught
unprepared and have not had enough time to have it ready.
Conceivably, under the law, with the permission of this Court,
respondent could have been assigned to another court
pending all these preparations, but that is something within
the initiative and control of the Secretary of Justice and not of
the respondent.
3. POLITICAL LAW; DOCTRINE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS;
LIMITS OF COLLABORATION OF JUDGE WITH OFFICERS OR
OFFICES UNDER THE OTHER GREAT DEPARTMENTS OF THE
GOVERNMENT. Of course, none of these is to be taken as
meaning that this Court looks with favor at the practice of long
standing, to be sure, of judges being detailed in the
Department of Justice to assist the Secretary even if it were
only in connection with his work of exercising administrative
authority over the courts. The line between what a judge may
do and what he may not do in collaborating or working with
other offices or officers under the other great departments of
the government must always be kept clear and jealously
observed, lest the principle of separation of powers on which
our government rests by mandate of the people thru the
Constitution be gradually eroded by practices purportedly
motivated by good intentions in the interest of the public
service. The fundamental advantages and the necessity of the
independence of said three departments from each other,
limited only by the specific constitutional precepts on check
and balance between and among them, have long been
acknowledged as more paramount than the serving of any
temporary or passing governmental conveniences or
exigencies. It is thus of grave importance to the judiciary under
our present constitutional scheme of government that no
judge of even the lowest court in this Republic should place
himself in a position where his actuations on matters
submitted to him for action or resolution would be subject to
review and prior approval and, worst still, reversal, before
they can have legal effect, by any authority other than the
Court of Appeals or this Supreme Court, as the case may be.
Needless to say, this Court feels very strongly that it is best
that this practice is discontinued.
FERNANDO, J., concurring:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; DOCTRINE OF SEPARATION OF
POWERS; PRINCIPLE EMBODIED IN DOCTRINE; REASON FOR
DOCTRINE. The doctrine of separation of powers, a basic
concept under our Constitution, embodies the principle of a
tripartite division of governmental authority entrusted to
Congress, the President, and the Supreme Court as well as
such inferior courts as may be created by law. Three
departments of government are thus provided for, the
legislative vested with the lawmaking function, the executive
with the enforcement of what has been thus enacted, and the
judiciary with the administration of justice, deciding cases
according to law. The reason for such a doctrine is to assure
liberty, no one branch being enabled to arrogate unto itself
the whole power to govern and thus in a position to impose its
unfettered will. If it were so, the rights of the individual could
with impunity be disregarded; he could be placed at its mercy.
The three departments are coordinate and coequal, each
having exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction
and supreme in its own sphere. That is to guarantee
independence, no interference being allowed on matters left
to the exclusive concern of each. Much less is control by only
one of the three departments of any or both of the others
permissible.
2. ID.; ID.; MEMBER OF JUDICIARY SHOULD NOT ASSUME A
POSITION OR PERFORM A DUTY NON-JUDICIAL IN CHARACTER;
RATIONALE THEREFOR. While the doctrine of separation of
powers is a relative theory not to be enforced with pedantic
rigor, the practical demands of government precluding its
doctrinaire application, it cannot justify a member of the
judiciary being required to assume a position or perform a
duty non-judicial in character. That is implicit in the principle.
Otherwise there is a plain departure from its command. The
essence of the trust reposed in him is to decide. Only a higher
court, as was emphasized by Justice Barredo, can pass on his
actuation. He is not a subordinate of an executive or legislative
official, however eminent. It is indispensable that there be no
exception to the rigidity of such a norm if he is, as expected, to
be confined to the task of adjudication. Fidelity to his sworn
responsibility no less than the maintenance of respect for the
judiciary can be satisfied with nothing less . . . Our holding
today has been foreshadowed in Noblejas v. Teehankee, a
1968 decision. Justice J.B.L. Reyes who penned the opinion,
first referred to the above Richardson decision as well as to
Federal Radio Commission v. General Electric Co. It went on to
state: "In this spirit, it has been held that the Supreme Court of
the Philippines and its members should not and cannot be
required to exercise any power or to perform any trust or to
assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with the
administration of judicial functions, and a law requiring the
Supreme Court to arbitrate disputes between public utilities
was pronounced void in Manila Electric Co. vs. Pasay
Transportation Co. (57 Phil. 600)." It is clear from the above
Noblejas decision that even prior to the Constitution, there
was a commitment to the principle that a member of the
judiciary cannot be asked to discharge non-judicial functions.
For in Manila Electric Co. v. Pasay Transportation Co.,
mentioned therein, Justice Malcolm, speaking for this Court,
was quite explicit. Thus: "The Supreme Court and its members
should not and cannot be required to exercise any power or to
perform any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or
connected with the administering of judicial functions."
R E S O L U T I O N
BARREDO, J p:
Administrative complaint filed by one Paz M. Garcia against
the Honorable Catalino Macaraig, Jr., formerly Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Laguna, Branch VI, now
Undersecretary of Justice, in his former capacity as judge, for
alleged "dishonesty, violation of his oath of office as judge . . .
gross incompetence, violation of Republic Act 296 or the
Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, (particularly) Sections 5, 55
and 58 thereof, committed (allegedly) as follows:
"2. That from July 1, 1970 up to February 28, 1971
inclusive, as such incumbent Judge, respondent
herein, has not submitted his monthly reports
containing the number of cases filed, disposed of,
decided and/or resolved, the number of cases
pending decisions for one month, two months to
over three months, together with the title, number,
number of hours of court session held a day, etc., as
evidenced by the certificate issued by Hon. Eulalio D.
Pichay, Judicial Superintendent, Dept. of Justice,
copy of which is hereto attached as Annex 'A', Item
No. 1, in violation of Circular No. 10 of the Dept. of
Justice dated February 6, 1952, copy of which is
hereto attached as Annex 'B';
"3. That he has not submitted his certificate of
service (New Judicial Form No. 86, Revised 1966)
from July to December, 1970 and from January to
February, 1971 inclusive as evidenced by the
certificate issued by Judge Pichay, Judicial
Superintendent, Dept. of Justice Annex 'A', Item No.
2 thereof;
"4. That as incumbent Judge of Branch VI, Court of
First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo and knowing
fully well that he has never performed his official
duties or discharged the duties appertaining to his
office, he has collected and was paid his salaries
from July to December, 1970 and from January to
February 1971 as evidenced by the certificate issued
by the cashier Mrs. Santos of the Department of
Justice hereto attached as Annex 'C' and the
certificate of Mr. Pichay Annex 'A', last paragraph
thereof, aggravated by his repeated failure to submit
the certificate of service in flagrant violation of
section 5 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 as amended
which provides as follows:
'. . . District judges, judges of City Courts, and
municipal Judges shall certify on their application for
leave, and upon salary vouchers presented by them
for payment, or upon the payrolls upon which their
salaries are paid, that all special proceedings,
applications, petitions, motions, and all civil and
criminal cases which have been under submission for
decision or determination for a period of ninety days
or more have been determined and decided on or
before the date of making the certificate and . . . x
no salary shall be paid without such certificate'
(Emphasis supplied).
"5. That his deliberate failure to submit the monthly
reports from July to December, 1970 and from
January, 1971 to February, 1971 stating therein the
number of hours of session that the Court holds
daily, the accomplishments of the Court constitutes
a clear violation of Sections 55 and 58 of the
Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended.
"6. That by his deliberate violation of his Oath of
Office as a District Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Laguna and San Pablo, Branch VI he has
manifested such moral bankruptcy as to deny his
fitness to perform or discharge official duties in the
administration of justice.
"7. That on June 29, 1970, respondent Judge wrote
to the Honorable Secretary of Justice informing him
that he was entering upon the performance of his
duties, which letter of his reads in full:
'I have the honor to inform you that I am entering
upon the performance of the duties of the office of
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Laguna and
San Pablo City (Branch VI) today, June 29, 1970.'
"That such actuation of deliberately telling a
deliberate falsehood aggravates his moral
bankruptcy incompatible to the requirements of the
highest degree of honesty, integrity and good moral
character appertaining to holding the position of
Judge in the administration of justice."
Upon being so required, in due time, respondent filed an
answer alleging pertinently that:
"THE FACTS
"Respondent took his oath as Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo City with
station at Calamba on June 29, 1970. The court,
being one of the 112 newly created CFI branches,
had to be organized from scratch. After
consultations with the officials of the province of
Laguna, the municipality of Calamba and the
Department of Justice, respondent decided to accept
the offer of the Calamba Municipal Government to
supply the space for the courtroom and offices of
the court; to utilize the financial assistance promised
by the Laguna provincial government for the
purchase of the necessary supplies and materials;
and to rely on the national government for the
equipment needed by the court (Under Section 190
of the Revised Administrative Code, all these items
must be furnished by the provincial government. The
provincial officials of Laguna, however, informed the
respondent that the province was not in a position
to do so).
"As to the space requirements of the court, the
Municipal Mayor of Calamba assured the
respondent that the court could be accommodated
in the west wing of the Calamba municipal building
as soon as the office of the municipal treasurer and
his personnel are transferred to another location.
When the projected transfer of the municipal
treasurer's office was about to be effected, the
treasurer and several municipal councilors objected.
The municipal mayor then requested the respondent
to look over some of the office spaces for rent in
Calamba, with the commitment that the municipal
government will shoulder the payment of the
rentals. Respondent's first choice was the second
floor of the Republic Bank branch in Calamba, but
the negotiations failed when the owner of the
building refused to reduce the rent to P300 a month.
The next suitable space selected by respondent was
the second floor of the Laguna Development Bank.
After a month's negotiations, the municipality finally
signed a lease agreement with the owner on
October 26, 1970. Another month passed before the
municipal government could release the amount
necessary for the improvements to convert the
space that was rented, which was a big hall without
partitions, into a courtroom and offices for the
personnel of the court and for the assistant
provincial fiscal. Thereafter, upon respondent's
representations, the provincial government
appropriated the amount of P5,000 for the purchase
of the supplies and materials needed by the court.
Early in December, 1970 respondent also placed his
order for the necessary equipment with the Property
Officer of the Department of Justice but,
unfortunately, the appropriation for the equipment
of courts of first instance was released only on
December 23, 1970 and the procurement of the
equipment chargeable against this allotment is still
under way (please see enclosed certification of the
Financial Officer of the Department of Justice
marked Annex 'A').
"When respondent realized that it would be
sometime before he could actually preside over his
court, he applied for an extended leave (during the
16 years he had worked in the Department of
Justice, respondent had, due to pressure of duties,
never gone on extended leave, resulting in his
forfeiting all the leave benefits he had earned
beyond the maximum ten months allowed by the
law). The Secretary of Justice, however, prevailed
upon respondent to forego his leave and instead to
assist him, without being extended a formal detail,
whenever respondent was not busy attending to the
needs of his court.
"Charges Have No Basis
"Complainant has charged respondent with
dishonesty, violation of his oath of office, grave
incompetence and violation of Sections 5, 55 and 58
of the Judiciary Act.
"It is respectfully submitted that
"A. Respondent's inability to perform his judicial
duties under the circumstances mentioned above
does not constitute incompetence. Respondent was,
like every lawyer who gets his first appointment to
the bench, eager to assume his judicial duties and rid
himself of the stigma of being 'a judge without a
sala', but forces and circumstances beyond his
control prevented him from discharging his judicial
duties.
"B. Respondent's collection of salaries as judge does
not constitute dishonesty because aside from the
time, effort and money he spent in organizing the
CFI at Calamba, he worked in the Department of
Justice (please see enclosed certification of
Undersecretary of Justice Guillermo S. Santos
marked Annex 'B'). Indeed, even if respondent did
no more than exert efforts to organize his court, he
could, as other judges have done, have collected his
salaries as judge without being guilty of dishonesty.
"Incidentally, when respondent took his oath as CFI
judge which position then carried a salary of P19,000
per annum, he automatically ceased to be Chief of
the Technical Staff of the Department of Justice and
Member of the Board of Pardons and Parole,
positions from which he was receiving P16,200 and
P8,000 per annum, respectively. Also, in anticipation
of the judicial duties which he was about to assume,
respondent took a leave of absence from his
professorial lecturer's duties in the U.P. College of
Law where he was receiving approximately P600 a
month.
"C. Sections 5, 55 and 58 of the Judiciary Act and
Circular No. 10 dated February 6, 1952 of the
Department of Justice are not applicable to a Judge
not actually discharging his judicial duties.
"The Department of Justice has never required
judges who have not actually started to perform
their judicial duties to comply with the
abovementioned statutory provisions and circular
(please see enclosed certification of Judge Eulalio D.
Pichay, Judicial Superintendent, marked Annex 'C').
"Moreover, a reading of these sections and circular
makes evident the folly of requiring a judge who has
not entered into the performance of his judicial
duties to comply with them. Taking Section 5, how
could a judge who has not started to discharge his
judicial duties certify that 'all special proceedings,
applications, petitions, motions, and all civil and
criminal cases, which have been under submission
for decision or determination for a period of ninety
days or more have been determined and decided on
or before the date of making the certificate.' And
how could such a judge hold court in his place of
permanent station as required by Section 55;
observe the hours of daily sessions of the court as
prescribed by Section 58: and render the reports
required by Circular No. 10 when his court is not yet
in physical existence. Clearly, therefore, Sections 5,
55 and 58 of the Judiciary Act and Circular No. 10
cannot apply to such a judge."
In view of the nature of the allegations of complainant and
respondent in their respective complaint and answer and
considering, in the light thereof, that the material facts are
more or less undisputed, the Court feels that this case can be
disposed of without any further proceeding.
After mature study and deliberation, the Court is convinced
that the complaint must be dismissed. To begin with, We
cannot discern any tinge of dishonesty in the actuations of the
respondent complained of. As We see it, the situation is not
exactly as complainant has attempted to portray it.
Complainant's theory is that respondent collected or received
salaries as judge when in fact he has never acted as such, since
the date he took his oath up to the filing of the complaint. In
the sense that respondent has not yet performed any judicial
function, it may be admitted that respondent has not really
performed the duties of judge. What is lost sight of, however,
is that after taking his oath and formally assuming this position
as judge, respondent had a perfect right to earn the salary of a
judge even in the extreme supposition that he did not perform
any judicial function for he could, while preparing himself for
his new job or for any good reason, take a leave, as in fact, he
had planned to do, were it not for the request of the Secretary
of Justice for him to forego the idea and, instead, help the
Department in whatever way possible which would not, it
must be presumed, impair his position as a judge. This is more
so, when, as in this case, the government offices or officers in
duty bound to furnish him the necessary place and facilities for
his court and the performance of his functions have failed to
provide him therewith without any fault on his part. That
respondent took it upon himself to personally work for early
action on the part of the corresponding officials in this
direction and, in his spare time, made himself available to the
Department of Justice to assist the Secretary, what with his
vast experience, having worked therein for sixteen years, is,
far from being dishonesty, to his credit. In the circumstances,
it was certainly not improper that he rendered some kind of
service to the government, since he was receiving salaries,
while being unable to perform his regular duties as judge
without any fault on his part. As to whether or not in doing so
he placed in jeopardy the independence of the judiciary and
failed to act according to the correct norm of conduct which a
judge should observe vis-a-vis service to the other
departments of the government will be discussed anon. At this
juncture, the only point We settle is that complainant's theory
of dishonesty cannot hold water.

Admittedly respondent has not prepared and submitted any of
the reports of accomplishments and status of cases in his sala
which are usually required of judges under existing laws as
well as the corresponding circulars of the Department of
Justice. The reason is simple. He has not yet started
performing any judicial functions. None of those laws and
circulars apply to him, for all of them contemplate judges who
are actually holding trials and hearings and making decisions
and others. On the other hand, respondent could not be
blamed for taking his oath as he did, for he had a valid
confirmed appointment in his favor. In other words, he simply
made himself available for the purpose for which he was
appointed. That he could not actually hold office in the court
to which he was appointed was not of his making. The other
officials in charge of providing him there with seem to have
been caught unprepared and have not had enough time to
have it ready. Conceivably, under the law, with the permission
of this Court, respondent could have been assigned to another
court pending all these preparations, but that is something
within the initiative and control of the Secretary of Justice and
not of the respondent.
Of course, none of these is to be taken as meaning that this
Court looks with favor at the practice of long standing, to be
sure, of judges being detailed in the Department of Justice to
assist the Secretary even if it were only in connection with his
work of exercising administrative authority over the courts.
The line between what a judge may do and what he may not
do in collaborating or working with other offices or officers
under the other great departments of the government must
always be kept clear and jealously observed, lest the principle
of separation of powers on which our government rests by
mandate of the people thru the Constitution be gradually
eroded by practices purportedly motivated by good intentions
in the interest of the public service. The fundamental
advantages and the necessity of the independence of said
three departments from each other, limited only by the
specific constitutional precepts on check and balance between
and among them, have long been acknowledged as more
paramount than the serving of any temporary or passing
governmental conveniences or exigencies. It is thus of grave
importance to the judiciary under our present constitutional
scheme of government that no judge of even the lowest court
in this Republic should place himself in a position where his
actuations on matters submitted to him for action or
resolution would be subject to review and prior approval and,
worst still, reversal, before they can have legal effect, by any
authority other than the Court of Appeals or this Supreme
Court, as the case may be. Needless to say, this Court feels
very strongly that it is best that this practice is discontinued.
WHEREFORE, the herein administrative complaint is hereby
dismissed. Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the
Secretary of Justice.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar and
Villamor, JJ., concur.
Castro and Teehankee, JJ., took no part




SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. L-35377-78. July 31, 1975.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
plaintiff-appellee, vs. CAMILO PILOTIN,
VINCENT CRISOLOGO, ISIDRO PUGAL
and ERNING ABAO, defendants-
appellants.
SYNOPSIS
Defendant-appellant Vincent Crisologo sought the transfer of
Criminal Case No. 3949 of the municipal court of Vigan, Ilocos
Sur to the New Bilibid Prisons or, alternatively, to Camps
Crame, Aguinaldo or Olivas on the ground that if he were to be
confined in the Vigan municipal jail during the trial, his life
would be in jeopardy.
Finding the motion meritorious and applying Sec. 5(4), Article
X of the Constitution, the Supreme Court directed the transfer
of the record of the case to the City Court of Quezon City and
the holding of the trial at Camp Crame.
SYLLABUS
1. SUPREME COURT; POWERS; POWER TO ORDER CHANGE OF
VENUE. Section 5(4) Article X of the Constitution expressly
empowers the Supreme Court to "order a change of venue or
place of trial to void a miscarriage of justice."
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. Where what is involved is not
merely a miscarriage of justice but the personal safety of the
accused, it would be absurd to compel him to undergo trial in
a place where his life would be imperilled. Present hostile
sentiment against the accused at the place of trial is a
justification for transfer of venue.
3. REMEDIAL LAW; VENUE; CHANGE INVOLVES TRANSFER OF
EXPEDIENTE. The change of venue involves not merely the
change of the place of hearing but also the transfer of the
expediente to another court. Thus where the alleged evidence
against the accused is in the custody of the authorities at
Camp Crame, Quezon City, the transfer of the case to the City
Court of Quezon City and the holding of the trial at Camp
Crame appear to be the most convenient.
R E S O L U T I O N
AQUINO, J p :
Vincent Crisologo through counsel filed a verified motion
praying for the transfer to the New Bilibid Prisons or,
alternatively, to Camps Crame, Aguinaldo or Olivas, of the
place of trial of Criminal Case No. 3949 of the municipal court
of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, wherein he, as sole defendant, is charged
with illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions.
As justificatory ground, he alleged that his life would be in
jeopardy if he were to be confined in the Vigan municipal jail
during the trial because there are many political enemies of
the Crisologo family in that vicinity; some of the adherents of
the Crisologos had in fact been murdered in Ilocos Sur, and his
father, Congressman Floro Crisologo, was shot to death while
hearing mass at the Vigan cathedral.
Bluntly, he affirmed that inside that jail he would be a sitting
duck for a gunwielder or grenade-thrower who wants to
assassinate him. He could even be lynched or shot to death on
the specious pretext that he was trying to escape.
Asked to comment on the motion, the Provincial Fiscal of
Ilocos Sur signified his conformity to the transfer of the venue
of the trial to the New Bilibid Prisons.
Section 5(4), Article X of the Constitution expressly empowers
this Court to "order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid
a miscarriage of justice". Here, what is involved is not merely a
miscarriage of justice but the personal safety of movant
Crisologo, the accused. It would be absurd to compel him to
undergo trial in a place where his life would be imperilled.
Present hostile sentiment against the accused at the place of
trial is a justification for transfer of venue (See State vs. Siers,
136 S. E. 503, 103, W. Va. 30; 22 C.J.S. 310).
We find Crisologo's motion to be meritorious. The change of
venue involves not merely the charge of the place of hearing
but also the transfer of the expediente of Criminal Case No.
3349 to another court. According to Crisologo's motion, the
alleged evidence against him is in the custody of the
authorities at Camp Crame, Quezon City. The transfer of
Criminal Case N. 3949 to the City Court of Quezon City and the
holding of the trial at Camp Crame appear to be the most
convenient arrangement.
WHEREFORE, the municipal court of Vigan is directed to
transfer the record of Criminal Case No. 3949 to the City Court
of Quezon City where it should be re-docketed and raffled to
any Judge thereof. The case may be tried at Camp Crame. The
usual precautions and security measures should be adopted in
bringing defendant Crisologo to Camp Crame on the occasion
of the hearing.
SO ORDERED.
Makalintal, C . J ., Fernando, Barredo and Concepcion, Jr., JJ .,
concur.
Antonio, J ., did not take part.


SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-41313. November 6, 1975.]
ALIPIO MONDIGUING and ANDRES
DUNUAN, petitioners, vs. HON.
FRANCISCO MEN ABAD, as Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Ifugao;
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES; MARIANO
PACTIW, alias Bugbug; DULMOG
ABLUYEN and ANGELINA ABLUYEN,
respondents.
Jose W . Diokno for petitioners.
Acting Solicitor General Santiago M . Kapunan and Solicitor
Oscar C . Fernandez for respondents.
SYNOPSIS
Petitioners, two of the ten defendants accused of double
murder, frustrated murder and attempted murder in the
Ifugao Court of First Instance, sought a transfer of the venue of
the case to Baguio City or Quezon City, on the ground that
they could not expect a fair and impartial trial in said court,
because respondent Judge is a protegee of the Ifugao
Provincial Governor, one of the victims mentioned in the
information. They further claimed that their witnesses are
afraid to testify for fear of harassment and reprisals, and that
their lives and those of their witnesses and lawyers are in
grave danger in Ifugao because of the tensions and
antagonisms spawned by the case and political rivalry
between the Governor's faction and that to which petitioner
belong. In fact, in an election case involving the Governor, the
Supreme Court disqualified respondent judge, who was found
to be a political leader of, and was recommended to his
present position by, the governor and his brother.
Upon these facts, the Supreme Court granted the petition for a
transfer of venue, and ordered the case tried by the Circuit
Criminal Court of Baguio.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: VENUE; GROUNDS FOR TRANSFER
OF. A change of the place of trial in criminal cases should
not be granted for whimsical or flimsy reasons. The interests
of the public require that, to secure the best results and
effects in the punishment of crime, it is necessary to prosecute
and punish the criminal in the very place as near as may be,
where he committed his crime.
2. SUPREME COURT; VESTED WITH PREROGATIVE TO ORDER
CHANGE OF VENUE. The Supreme Court is invested with the
prerogative of ordering a change of venue or place of trial to
avoid a miscarriage of justice. It possesses inherent power and
jurisdiction to decree that the trial and disposition of a case
pending in a Court of First Instance be transferred to another
Court of First Instance with the same district whenever the
interest of justice and truth so demand, and there are serious
and weighty reasons to believe that a trial by the court that
originally had jurisdiction over the case would not result in a
fair and impartial trial and lead to a miscarriage of justice.
3. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; VENUE; GROUNDS FOR. A change
of venue may be ordered by the Supreme Court where it is
shown that the accused might be liquidated by his enemies in
the place where the trial was originally scheduled to be held.
R E S O L U T I O N
AQUINO, J p:
Alipio Mondiguing and Andres Dunuan are two
of the ten defendants accused of double murder,
frustrated murder and attempted murder in Criminal
Case No. 140 of the Court of First Instance of Ifugao
Province (People vs. George Bayucca et al.). That case was
filed in connection with an ambuscade which was
perpetuated on July 23, 1970 at Baag, Banaue, Ifugao. As
a result of that incident, Governor Gualberto Lumauig of
Ifugao was wounded and his executive assistant and his
driver were killed. Up to this time the accused in that case
have not been arraigned.
On September 4, 1975 Mondiguing and Dunuan
filed in this Court a petition to transfer the venue of the
case to Baguio City or Quezon City. They claimed that
they could not expect a fair and impartial trial in Lagawe,
Ifugao because Judge Francisco Men Abad of the Court of
First Instance of that province is a proteg of Governor
Lumauig and his brother, former Congressman Romulo
Lumauig, and because their witnesses would be afraid to
testify for fear of harassment and reprisals. The
petitioners further claimed that, as may be inferred from
previous incidents recounted in the petition, their lives
and the lives of their witnesses and lawyers would be in
grave danger in Ifugao because of the tensions and
antagonisms spawned by the case and the political rivalry
between the Lumauig and Mondiguing factions. (The
accused, George Bayucca, was killed on October 28,1970
and Alipio Mondiguing resigned as mayor of Banaue and
took refuge in Baguio City).
The Acting Solicitor General interposed no
objection to the change of venue but he invited the
Court's attention to the suggestion of Governor Lumauig
that the case may be transferred to the proper court in
Isabela in view of its proximity to Ifugao.
Respondent Judge Francisco Men Abad in his
comment disputed the correctness or truth of the
grounds relied upon for the change of venue and prayed
that the petition be dismissed. He said that, if there
would be bias on his part, he would be biased in favor of
the People of the Philippines. He said that the crime
charged was not "committed personally against"
Governor Lumauig. That statement is not correct since
the governor is one of the victims mentioned in the
information.
Judge Abad revealed that petitioner Dunuan
sent to the court a letter dated August 30, 1975 wherein
he declined the services of Atty. Jose W. Diokno (who
filed the instant petition for transfer of venue). In view of
that disclosure, the petition herein should be regarded as
having been filed only by Alipio Mondiguing.
The fact is that this Court in Paredes vs. Abad, L-
36927-28, April 15, 1974, 56 SCRA 522, 534, disqualified
Judge Abad from trying the electoral protests filed by
Crescencio Paredes and Venancio Uyan against Gualberto
Lumauig and John Laugbayan. In that case it was alleged
that Judge Abad was a political leader of Governor
Lumauig and was recommended to his present position
by the Lumauig brothers.
The issue is whether Mondiguing's plea for a
change of venue is justified. A change of the place of trial
in criminal cases should not be granted for whimsical or
flimsy reasons. "The interests of the public require that,
to secure the best results and effects in the punishment
of crime, it is necessary to prosecute and punish the
criminal in the very place, as near as may be, where he
committed his crime" (Manila Railroad Co. vs. Attorney
General, 20 Phil. 523, 562).
This Court is invested with the prerogative of
ordering "a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a
miscarriage of justice" (Sec. 5[4], Art. X of the
Constitution). It "possesses inherent power and
jurisdiction to decree that the trial and disposition of a
case pending in a Court of First Instance be transferred to
another Court of First Instance within the same district
whenever the interest of justice and truth so demand,
and there are serious and weighty reasons to believe that
a trial by the court that originally had jurisdiction over the
case would not result in a fair and impartial trial and lead
to a miscarriage of justice" (People vs. Gutierrez, L-32282-
83, November 26, 1970, 36 SCRA 172, 185.)
A change of venue was ordered by this Court in
a case where it was shown that the accused might be
liquidated by his enemies in the place where the trial was
originally scheduled to be held (People vs. Pilotin; Vincent
Crisologo, movant, L-3537778, July 31, 1975).
After a careful consideration of the
circumstances recited in Mondiguing's petition to support
his request for a change of the place of trial, we have
reached the conclusion that his petition is meritorious.
In the interest of a fair and impartial trial and to
avoid a miscarriage of justice and considering that his life
would be in danger if he were to be tried in Lagawe,
Ifugao, he should be tried by the Circuit Criminal Court in
the City of Baguio.
The other relief sought by Mondiguing, which is
that he be transferred from the Philippine Constabulary
headquarters at Lagawe, Ifugao to Camp Crame should be
submitted for the consideration of the Circuit Criminal
Court.
WHEREFORE, the petition of Alipio Mondiguing
for the transfer of the venue of Criminal Case No. 140 of
the Court of First Instance of Ifugao is granted. The said
case should be transferred to the Circuit Criminal Court of
the Second Judicial District so that it may be heard in
Baguio City.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo, Antonio, Concepcion, Jr. and Martin, JJ ., concur.
Fernando, J ., is on leave.
Martin, J ., was designated to sit in the Second Division.


||| (Mondiguing v. Abad, G.R. No. L-41313, November 06,
1975)






















EN BANC
[G.R. No. 56158-64. March 17, 1981.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs. MAYOR PABLO SOLA,
SANGGUNIANG BAYAN MEMBER
FRANCISCO (ECOT) GARCIA, RICARDO
(CADOY) GARCIA, JOSE BETHOVEN
(ATSONG) CABRAL, CAPTAIN
FLORENDO BALISCAO, JOHN, PETER,
OSCAR, OMAR, JACK, RICHARD, JAMES,
DONALD, WILLIAM, ROBERT, HOMER,
JESSIE, ANDY, PAUL, all surnamed
DOE's, respondents.
Renecio R. Espiritu, Juan Hagad and Francisco Cruz as private
prosecutors for petitioner.
Francisco Tagamolila for respondent P. Sola.
Gregorio Andres for respondent F . Garcia.
Vicente M . Tagac for respondent F . Baliscao.
Cirilo Anigan for respondent R. Garcia.
SYNOPSIS
By virtue of a warrant for the search and seizure of the
deceased bodies of seven persons believed in the possession
of accused Pablo Sola in his hacienda at Sta. Isabel,
Kabankalan, Negros Occidental, the 332nd PC/INP company
made diggings in the area that yielded two common graves.
Seven separated murder charges were filed against Pablo Sola
and his companions at the municipal court of Kabankalan. An
order of their arrest was issued but without giving the
prosecution the opportunity to prove that the evidence of
guilt of the accused is strong, the court granted them the right
to post bail for their temporary release. Meanwhile, the
witnesses in the murder cases informed the prosecution of
their fears that if trial is held at the Court of First Instance
branch in Himamaylan, 10 km. from Kabankalan, their safety
could be jeopardized. Hence, this petition to set aside the
order granting bail to the accused and for a change of venue
or place of trial of the same criminal cases to avoid a
miscarriage of justice.
The Supreme Court, in a resolution issued the following day,
transferred the venue of the aforesaid criminal cases to
Branch V of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental at
Bacolod City and after respondents had submitted their
comments, which were considered as Answer, ruled that there
was failure to abide by the basic requirement that the
prosecution be heard in a case where the accused is charged
with a capital offense prior to bail being granted necessitating
cancellation of the bail bonds and the remand of the case for
such hearing.
The order granting bail was nullified and set aside. The
executive Judge of the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental to whose sala the cases were transferred was
directed to hear the petitions for bail of private respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; JUDICIARY; POWER OF THE
SUPREME COURT TO CHANGE THE VENUE OF CRIMINAL
ACTIONS TO AVOID A MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE. Article X,
Sec. 5(4) of the Constitution is quite explicit. The Supreme
Court could order "a change of venue or place of trial to avoid
a miscarriage of justice." In the landmark decision of People v.
Gutierrez, L-32282-83, Nov. 26, 1970, the Supreme Court held:
". . . to compel the prosecution to proceed to trial in a locality
where its witnesses will not be at liberty to reveal what they
know is to make a mockery of the judicial process, and to
betray the very purpose for which courts have been
established."
2. ID.; RIGHT TO LIBERTY; BAIL; GRANT THEREOF MUST BE IN
ACCORDANCE WITH DUE PROCESS. Whether the motion for
bail of a defendant who is in custody for a capital offense be
resolved in a summary proceeding or in the course of a regular
trial, the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present,
within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may desire to
introduce before the court should resolve the motion for bail.
If, as in the criminal case involved in the instant special civil
action, the prosecution should be denied such an opportunity,
there would be a violation of procedural due process, and the
order of the court granting bail should be considered void on
that ground.
D E C I S I O N
FERNANDO, C.J p:
The power of this Tribunal, constitutionally mandated, 1 to
order a change of venue to avoid any miscarriage of justice as
well as the procedure ordained in the implementation of the
right to bail 2 are involved in this petition which, even if not so
denominated, partakes of the nature of a certiorari. It must
have been the zeal of private prosecutors Francisco Cruz and
Renecio Espiritu, 3 no doubt under the conviction that there
was no time to lose, that must have led them to devote less
than that full measure of attention to certain fundamentals.
They ignored the principle that the responsibility for the
conduct of the prosecution is with the public officials
concerned. Nonetheless, the importance of the questions
raised, the need for a change of venue and the cancellation of
the bail bonds, necessitated that further action be taken.
Accordingly, in a resolution dated February 12, 1981, one day
after the filing of the petition, the Court required the
comment of the Solicitor General as well as of the private
respondents, 4 the accused in six pending criminal cases
before the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental. cdphil
On March 4, 1981, the Comment was submitted by Solicitor
General Estelito P. Mendoza. 5 It opened with this preliminary
statement: "The present petition was filed by the private
prosecutors in Criminal Cases Nos. 1700-1706, People v. Pablo
Sola, et al., pending trial before the Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental. Rightly, any petition before this Honorable
Court on behalf of the People of the Philippines can, under the
law, be instituted only by the Solicitor General. The assertion
of the petitioner private prosecutors that they are instituting
the action `subject to the control and supervision of the Fiscal'
will not, therefore, improve their legal standing." 6
Nonetheless, it did not press the legal point but instead
adopted "the two-pronged thrusts of the petition: 1. the
setting aside, by certiorari, of the order of the Municipal Court
of Kabankalan, presided over by Judge Rafael Gasataya,
granting bail to the accused in the criminal cases mentioned
above, and 2. the petition for a change of venue or place of
trial of the same criminal cases to avoid a miscarriage of
justice." 7
The facts were therein narrated thus: "On September 15,
1980, acting on the evidence presented by the Philippine
Constabulary commander at Hinigaran, Negros Occidental, the
Court of First Instance of that province issued a search warrant
for the search and seizure of the deceased bodies of seven
persons believed in the possession of the accused Pablo Sola
in his hacienda at Sta. Isabel, Kabankalan, Negros Occidental. .
. . On September 16, 1980, armed with the above warrant,
elements of the 332nd PC/INP Company proceeded to the
place of Sola. Diggings made in a canefield yielded two
common graves containing the bodies of Fernando Fernandez,
Mateo Olimpos, Alfredo Perez, Custodio Juanica, Arsolo
Juanica, Rollie Callet and Bienvenido Emperado. On September
23 and October 1, 1980, the PC provincial commander of
Negros Occidental filed seven (7) separate complaints for
murder against the accused Pablo Sola, Francisco Garcia,
Ricardo Garcia, Jose Bethoven Cabral, Florendo Baliscao and
fourteen (14) other persons of unknown names. The cases
were docketed as Criminal Cases No. 4129, 4130, 4131, 4137,
4138, 4139 and 4140 of the Municipal Court of Kabankalan.
After due preliminary examination of the complainant's
witnesses and his other evidence, the municipal court found
probable cause against the accused. It thus issued an order for
their arrest. However, without giving the prosecution the
opportunity to prove that the evidence of guilt of the accused
is strong, the court granted them the right to post bail for their
temporary release. The accused Pablo Sola, Francisco Garcia,
and Jose Bethoven Cabral availed themselves of this right and
have since been released from detention. In a parallel
development, the witnesses in the murder cases informed the
prosecution of their fears that if the trial is held at the Court of
First Instance branch in Himamaylan which is but 10
kilometers from Kabankalan, their safety could be jeopardized.
At least two of the accused are officials with power and
influence in Kabankalan and they have been released on bail.
In addition, most of the accused remained at large. Indeed,
there have been reports made to police authorities of threats
made on the families of the witnesses." 8 The facts alleged
argue strongly for the remedies sought, namely a change of
venue and the cancellation of the bail bonds. LLpr
On the very next day, March 15, 1981, this Court issued the
following resolution: "The Court Resolved to: (a) [Note] the
comment of the Solicitor General on the urgent petition for
change of venue and cancellation of bail bonds, adopting the
plea of the petition, namely, (1) the setting aside, by certiorari,
of the order of the Municipal Court of Kabankalan, presided
over by Judge Rafael Gasataya, granting bail to the accused in
Criminal Cases Nos. 4129, 4130, 4131, 4137, 4138, 4139 and
4140, all entitled `People of the Philippines v. Mayor Pablo
Sola, et al.; (2) the petition for a change of venue or place of
trial of the same criminal cases to avoid a miscarriage of
justice; (b) [Transfer] the venue of the aforesaid criminal cases
to Branch V of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental
at Bacolod City, presided by Executive Judge Alfonso Baguio,
considering that District Judge Ostervaldo Emilia of the Court
of First Instance, Negros Occidental, Branch VI at Himamaylan
has an approved leave of absence covering the period from
January 12 to March 12, 1981 due to a mild attack of cerebral
thrombosis and that the said Branch V is the nearest court
station to Himamaylan; and (c) [Await] the comment of
respondents on the petition to cancel bail, without prejudice
to the public officials concerned taking the necessary
measures to assure the safety of the witnesses of the
prosecution." 9 Thus, the issue of a change of venue has
become moot and academic. The comments respectively
submitted by respondent Florendo Baliscao on March 5, 1981,
respondent Francisco Garcia on March 11, 1981 and
respondent Pablo Sola on March 16, 1981, dealt solely with
the question of the cancellation of the bail bonds. Such
comments were considered as answers, with the case
thereafter deemed submitted for decision.

The sole remaining issue of the cancellation of the bail bonds
of respondents, there being a failure to abide by the basic
requirement that the prosecution be heard in a case where
the accused is charged with a capital offense, prior to bail
being granted, must be decided in favor of petitioner. The bail
bonds must be cancelled and the case remanded to the sala of
Executive Judge Alfonso Baguio for such hearing. So we rule.
1. It may not be amiss to say a few words on the question of
transferring the place of trial, in this case, from Himamaylan to
Bacolod City. The constitution is quite explicit. The Supreme
Court could order "a change of venue or place of trial to avoid
a miscarriage of justice." 10 The Constitutional Convention of
1971 wisely incorporated the ruling in the landmark decision
of People v. Gutierrez, 11 where Justice J.B.L. Reyes as ponente
vigorously and categorically affirmed: "In the particular case
before Us, to compel the prosecution to proceed to trial in a
locality where its witnesses will not be at liberty to reveal what
they know is to make a mockery of the judicial process, and to
betray the very purpose for which courts have been
established." 12 Why a change of venue is imperative was
made clear in the Comment of the Solicitor General. Thus:
"The exercise by this Honorable Court of its above
constitutional power in this case will be appropriate. The
witnesses in the case are fearful for their lives. They are afraid
they would be killed on their way to or from Himamaylan
during any of the days of trial. Because of this fear, they may
either refuse to testify or testify falsely to save their lives." 13
Respondent Florendo Baliscao was not averse to such transfer,
but his preference is for a court anywhere in Metro Manila. 14
Respondent Francisco Garcia confined his comment to the
question of the cancellation of the bail bonds. Respondent
Pablo Sola made clear that he had "no objection to the
transfer." 15 It may be added that there may be cases where
the fear, objectively viewed, may, to some individuals, be less
than terrifying, but the question must always be the effect it
has on the witnesses who will testify. The primordial aim and
intent of the Constitution must ever be kept in mind. In case of
doubt, it should be resolved in favor of a change of venue, As a
matter of fact, there need not be a petition of this character
filed before this Court. Such a plea could have been done
administratively. In this particular case, however, there is
justification for the procedure followed in view of the fact that
along with the change of venue, the cancellation of the bail
bonds was also sought. LLphil
2. Equally so the cancellation of the bail bonds is more than
justified. Bail was granted to the accused in the Order of the
Municipal Court without hearing the prosecution. That is to
disregard the authoritative doctrine enunciated in People v.
San Diego. 16 As pointed out by Justice Capistrano, speaking
for the Court: "The question presented before us is, whether
the prosecution was deprived of procedural due process. The
answer is in the affirmative. We are of the considered opinion
that whether the motion for bail of a defendant who is in
custody for a capital offense be resolved in a summary
proceeding or in the course of a regular trial, the prosecution
must be given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable
time, all the evidence that it may desire to introduce before
the court should resolve the motion for bail. If, as in the
criminal case involved in the instant special civil action, the
prosecution should be denied such an opportunity, there
would be a violation of procedural due process, and the order
of the court granting bail should be considered void on that
ground." 17 These words of Justice Cardozo come to mind:
"The law, as we have seen, is sedulous in maintaining for a
defendant charged with crime whatever forms of procedure
are of the essence of an opportunity to defend. Privileges so
fundamental as to be inherent in every concept of a fair trial
that could be acceptable to the thought of reasonable men
will be kept inviolate and inviolable, however crushing may be
the pressure of incriminating proof. But justice, though due to
the accused, is due to the accuser also. The concept of fairness
must not be strained till it is narrowed to a filament. We are to
keep the balance true." 18 This norm which is of the very
essence of due process as the embodiment of justice requires
that the prosecution be given the opportunity to prove that
there is strong evidence of guilt. It does not suffice, as
asserted herein, that the questions asked by the municipal
judge before bail was granted could be characterized as
searching. The fact did not cure an infirmity of a jurisdictional
character. 19
WHEREFORE, the assailed order of judge Rafael Gasataya
granting bail to private respondents is nullified, set aside, and
declared to be without force and effect. Executive Judge
Alfonso Baguio of the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental, to whose sala the cases had been transferred by
virtue of the resolution of this Court of March 5, 1981, is
directed forthwith to hear the petitions for bail of private
respondents, with the prosecution being duly heard on the
question of whether or not the evidence of guilt against the
respondents is strong. This decision is immediately executory.
No costs.
Teehankee, Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez,
Guerrero, De Castro and Melencio-Herrera, JJ ., concur.
Barredo and Abad Santos, JJ ., are on official leave.
Footnotes
1.According to Article X, Section 5(4) of the Constitution:
"The Supreme Court shall have the following
powers: (4) Order of a change of venue or place of
trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice."
2.According to Article IV, Section 18 of the Constitution: "All
persons, except those charged with capital
offenses when evidence of guilt is strong, shall
before conviction, be bailable by sufficient
sureties. Excessive bail shall not be required."
3.The name of the highly-experienced counsel Juan Hagad
was included in the list of private prosecutors, but
he did not sign the petition.
4.The private respondents are Francisco (Ecot) Garcia and
Ricardo (Cadoy) Garcia.
5.He was assisted by Assistant Solicitor General Roberto E.
Soberano and Solicitor Roberto A. Abad.
6.Comment, 1-2.
7.Ibid., 2.
8.Ibid., 2-4.
9.Resolution of the Court dated March 5, 1981.
10.Article X, Section 5(4) of the Constitution.
11.L-32282-83, November 26, 1970, 36 SCRA 172.
12.Ibid., 180.
13.Comment of Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, 9.
14.Comment of respondent Florendo Baliscao, erroneously
entitled Rejoinder to the Petition, 1.
15.Comment of respondent Pablo Sola, erroneously entitled
Opposition of respondent Mayor Sola, 1.
16.L-29676, December 24, 1968, 26 SCRA 522.
17.Ibid., 524.
18.Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 122 (1933).
19.Cf. Inocencio v. Alconcel, G.R. No. 55658, February 5,
1981.
||| (People v. Sola, G.R. No. 56158-64, March 17, 1981)







EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. 79690-707. October 7, 1988.]
ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner, vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN
and HONORABLE RAUL M. GONZALES,
claiming to be and acting as
Tanodbayan-Ombudsman under the
1987 Constitution, respondents.
[G.R. Nos. 80578. October 7, 1988.]
ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner, vs.
HON. RAUL M. GONZALES, claiming to
be and acting as Tanodbayan-
Ombudsman under the 1987
Constitution, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PER CURIAM p:
The following are the subjects of this Resolution:
1) a Motion, dated 9 February 1988, to Cite in Contempt filed
by a petitioner Enrique A. Zaldivar against public respondent
Special Prosecutor (formerly Tanodbayan) Raul M. Gonzales, in
connection with G.R. Nos. 79690-707 and G.R. No. 80578, and
2) a Resolution of this Court dated 2 May 1988 requiring
respondent Hon. Raul Gonzalez to show cause why he should
not be punished for contempt and/or subjected to
administrative sanctions for making certain public statements.
I
The pertinent facts are as follows:
Petitioner Zaldivar is one of several defendants in Criminal
Cases Nos. 12159-12161 and 12163-12177 (for violation of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) pending before the
Sandiganbayan. The Office of the Tanodbayan conducted the
preliminary investigation and filed the criminal informations in
those cases (originally TBP Case No. 86-00778).
On 10 September 1987, petitioner filed with this Court a
Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus (G.R. Nos.
79690-707) naming as respondents both the Sandiganbayan
and Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez. Among other things, petitioner
assailed: (1) the 5 February 1987 Resolution 1 of the
Tanodbayan" recommending the filing of criminal informations
against petitioner Zaldivar and his co-accused in TBP Case No.
86-00778; and (2) the 1 September 1987 Resolution 2 of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 12159-12161 and 12163-
12177 denying his Motion to Quash the criminal informations
filed in those cases by the "Tanodbayan." In this respect,
petitioner alleged that respondent Gonzales, as Tanodbayan
and under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, was no
longer vested with power and authority independently to
investigate and to institute criminal cases for graft and
corruption against public officials and employees, and hence
that the informations filed in Criminal Cases Nos. 12159-12161
and 12163-12177 were all null and void.
On 11 September 1987, this Court issued a Resolution, which
read:
"G.R. Nos. 79690-707 (Enrique A.
Zaldivar vs. The Honorable
Sandiganbayan and Honorable Raul M.
Gonzalez, Claiming To Be and Acting as
Tanodbayan-Ombudsman under the
1987 Constitution). Acting on the
special civil action for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court, with urgent
motion for preliminary injunction, the
Court Resolved, without giving due
course to the petition, to require the
respondents to COMMENT thereon,
within ten (10) days from notice.
The Court further Resolved to ISSUE a
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER,
effective immediately and continuing
until further orders from this Court,
ordering respondent Sandiganbayan to
CEASE and DESIST from hearing and
trying Criminal cases Nos. 12159 to
12161 and 12163 to 12177 insofar as
petitioner Enrique Zaldivar is concerned
and from hearing and resolving the
Special Prosecutor's motion to suspend
dated September 3, 1987."
The parties later filed their respective pleadings.
Petitioner Zaldivar filed with the Court a second Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition (G.R. No. 80578) on 19 November
1987, initially naming only Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez as
respondent. The Petition assailed the 24 September 1987
Resolution 3 of the "Tanodbayan" in TBP Case No. 87-01304
recommending that additional criminal charges for graft and
corruption be filed against petitioner Zaldivar and five (5)
other individuals. Once again, petitioner raised the argument
of the Tanodbayan's lack of authority under the 1987
Constitution to file such criminal cases and to investigate the
same. Petitioner also moved for the consolidation of that
petition with G.R. No. 79690-707.
In a Resolution dated 24 November 1987, 4 this Court, without
giving due course to the second petition: (1) required
respondent Gonzalez to submit a comment thereon: and (2)
issued a temporary restraining order "ordering respondent
Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez to CEASE and DESIST from further
acting in TBP Case No. 87-01394 . . . and particularly, from
filing the criminal information consequent thereof and from
conducting preliminary investigation therein." In a separate
resolution of the same date, 5 G.R. Nos. 79690-707 and G.R.
No. 80578 were ordered consolidated by the Court.
In the meantime, however, on 20 November 1987 or four (4)
days prior to issuance by this Court of a temporary restraining
order in G.R. No. 80578, the Office of the Tanodbayan
instituted Criminal Case No. 12570 6 with the Sandiganbayan,
which issued on 23 November 1987 an Order of Arrest 7 for
petitioner Zaldivar and his co-accused in Criminal Case No.
12570. Upon Motion 8 of petitioner Zaldivar, this Court issued
the following Resolution on 8 December 1987.
"G.R. No. 80578 (Enrique A. Zaldivar vs.
Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez and
Sandiganbayan). The motion filed by the
Solicitor General for respondents for
extensions of thirty (30) days from the
expiration of the original period within
which to file comment on the petition
for certiorari and prohibition with prayer
for a writ of preliminary injunction or
restraining order is GRANTED:
Acting on the manifestation with motion
to treat the Sandiganbayan as party-
respondent, the Court Resolved to (a)
Consider IMPLEADED the Sandiganbayan
as party respondent; and (b) In
pursuance of and supplementing the
Temporary Restraining Order of
November 24, 1987 ordering
respondent Hon Raul M. Gonzalez to
CEASE and DESIST from further acting
TBP No. 87-01304 entitled, "Commission
on Audit vs. Gov. Enrique Zaldivar, et al.,
and particularly, from filing the criminal
information consequent thereof and
from conducting preliminary
investigation therein" ISSUE a
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
effective immediately and continuing
until further orders from this Court,
ordering respondents Hon. Raul M.
Gonzalez and Sandiganbayan to CEASE
and DESIST from further acting in
Criminal case No. 12570, entitled,
"People of the Philippines vs. Enrique M.
Zaldivar, et al. and from enforcing the
order of arrest issued by the
Sandiganbayan in said case."
The Solicitor general filed a Comment 9 on the petition in G.R.
No. 80578, and we required the petitioner to submit a Reply
10 thereto.
On 9 February 1988, petitioner Zaldivar filed with the Court a
Motion to Cite in Contempt 11 directed at respondent
Gonzalez. The Motion cited as bases the acts of respondent
Gonzalez in: (1) having caused the filing of the information
against petitioner in Criminal Case No. 12570 before the
Sandiganbayan; and (2) issuing certain allegedly contemptuous
statements to the media in relation to the proceedings in G.R.
No. 80578. In respect of the latter, petitioner annexed to his
Motion a photocopy of a news article, reproduced here in
toto, which appeared in the 30 November 1987 issue of the
"Philippine Daily Globe."
Tanod Scores SC for Quashing Graft Case
TANODBAYAN Justice Raul M. Gonzalez
said yesterday the Supreme Court order
stopping him from investigating graft
cases involving Antique Gov. Enrique
Zaldivar 'can aggravate the thought that
affluent persons can prevent the
progress of a trial.'
'What I am afraid of (with the issuance
of the order) is that it appears that while
rich and influential persons get favorable
actions from the Supreme Court, it is
difficult for an ordinary litigant to get his
petition to be given due course.'
Gonzales told the Daily Globe in an
exclusive interview.
Gonzalez said the high tribunal's order
'heightens the people's apprehension
over the justice system in this country,
especially because the people have been
thinking that only the small fry can get it
while big fishes go scot-free.'
Gonzalez was reacting to an order
issued by the tribunal last week after
Zaldivar petitioned the court to stop the
Tanodbayan from investigating graft
cases filed against him.
Zaldivar had charged that Gonzalez was
biased in his investigations because the
latter wanted to help promote the
political fortunes of a friend from
Antique, lawyer Bonifacio Alentajan.
Acting on Zaldivar's petition, the high
court stopped Gonzalez from
investigating a graft charge against the
governor, and from instituting any
complaint with the Sandiganbayan.
'While President Aquino had been
prodding me to prosecute graft cases
even if they involve the high and mighty,
the Supreme Court had been restraining
me.' Gonzalez said.
In accordance with the President's
order, Gonzalez said he had filed graft
cases against two 'very powerful'
officials of the Aquino government
Commissioner Quintin Doromal of the
Presidential Commission on Good
Government and Secretary Jiamil I.M.
Dialan of the Office of Muslim Affairs
and Cultural Communities.
'While I don't wish to discuss the merits
of the Zaldivar petition before the
Supreme Court, I am a little bit disturbed
that (the order) can aggravate the
thinking of some people that affluent
persons can prevent the progress of a
trial,' he said.
He disclosed that he had a talk with the
Chief Executive over the weekend and
that while she sympathizes with local
officials who are charged in court during
election time, 'she said that it might be a
disservice to the people and the voters
who are entitled to know their
candidates.'
Gonzalez said that while some cases
against local against local officials during
election time could be mere harassment
suits, the Constitution makes it a right of
every citizen to be informed of the
character of the candidate, who should
be subject to scrutiny."(Emphasis
supplied)
Acting on petitioner's Motion to Cite in Contempt, the Court
on 16 February 1988 required respondent Gonzalez "to
COMMENT on aforesaid Motion within ten (10) days from
notice." 12

On 27 April 1988 , the Court rendered its Decision 13 (per
curiam) in the Consolidated Petitions. The dispositive portion
thereof read:
"WHEREFORE, We hereby:
(1) GRANT the consolidated petitions
filed by petitioner Zaldivar and hereby
NULLIFY the criminal informations filed
against him in the Sandiganbayan; and
(2) ORDER respondent Raul Gonzalez ro
cease and desist from conducting
investigations and filing criminal cases
with the Sandiganbayan or otherwise
exercising the powers and functions of
the Ombudsman.
SO ORDERED."
A Motion for Reconsideration 14 was filed by respondent
Gonzalez the next day, 28 April 1988. In his Motion,
respondent Gonzalez, after having argued the legal merits of
his position, made the following statements totally unrelated
to any legal issue raised either in the Court's Decision or in his
own Motion:
1. That he "ha(d) been approached twice by a leading member
of the court . . . and he was asked to 'go slow' on Zaldivar and
'not to be too hard on him;'"
2. That he "was approached and asked to 'refrain' from
investigating the COA report on illegal disbursements in the
Supreme Court because 'it will embarrass the Court; '" and
3. That "(i)n several instances, the undersigned respondent
was called over the phone by a leading member of the Court
and was asked to dismiss the cases against (two Members of
the Court)."
Respondent Gonzalez also attached three (3) handwritten
notes 15 which he claimed were sent by "some members
of this Honorable Court, interceding for cases pending
before this office (i. e., the Tanodbayan)." He either
released his Motion for Reconsideration with facsimiles of
said notes to the press or repeated to the press the above
extraneous statements: the metropolitan papers for the
next several days carried long reports on those
statements and variations and embellishments thereof.
On 2 May 1988, the Court issued the following Resolution in
the Consolidated Petitions:
"G.R. No. 79690-707 (Enrique Zaldivar
vs. The Hon. Sandiganbayan, et al.); G.R.
No. 80578 (Enrique A. Zaldivar vs. Hon.
Raul M. Gonzalez, etc.).
1. Acting on the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by respondent
Gonzalez under date of April 28, 1988,
the Court Resolved to REQUIRE the
petitioner to COMMENT thereon within
ten (10) days from notice hereof.
2. It appearing that respondent Raul M.
Gonzalez has made public statements to
the media which not only deal with
matters sub-judice but also appear
offensive to and disrespectful of the
Court and its individual members and
calculated, directly or indirectly, to bring
the Court into disrepute, discredit and
ridicule and to denigrate and degrade
the administration of justice, the Court
Resolved to require respondent
Gonzalez to explain in writing within ten
(10) days from notice hereof, why he
should not be punished for contempt of
court and/or subjected to administrative
sanctions for making such public
statements reported in the media,
among others, in the issues of the 'Daily
Inquirer,' the 'Journal,' the 'Manila
Times,' the 'Philippine Star,' the 'Manila
Chronicle,' the 'Daily Globe' and the
'Manila Standard' of April 29 and 30, and
May 1, 1988, to wit:
(a) That the Court
resolution in question is
merely 'an offshoot of the
position he had taken that SC
Justices cannot claim
immunity from suit or
investigation by government
prosecutors,' or motivated by
a desire to stop him 'from
investigating cases against
some of their porteges or
friends;'
(b) That no less than
six of the members of the
Court 'interceded for and on
behalf of persons with
pending cases before the
Tanodbayan,' or sought 'to
pressure him to render
decisions favorable to their
colleagues and friends;'
(c) That attempts
were made to influence him
'to go slow' on Zaldivar and
'not to be too hard on him,'
and 'to refrain' from
investigating the Commission
on Audit report on illegal
disbursements in the Supreme
Court because 'it will
embarrass the Court;'
(d) That there were
also attempts to cause the
dismissal of cases against two
Associate Justices; and
(e) That the Court
had dismissed judges 'without
rhyme or reason' and
disbarred lawyers 'without
due process.'
3. It further appearing that three (3)
affidavits relative to the purpose of and
circumstances attendant upon the notes
written to said public respondent by
three (3) members of the Court have
since been submitted to the Court and
now form part of its official records, the
Court further Resolved to require the
Clerk of Court to ATTACH to this
Resolution copies of said sworn
statements and the annexes thereto
appended, and to DIRECT respondent
Gonzalez also to comment thereon
within the same period of ten(10) days.
4. It finally appearing that notice of the
Resolution of February 16, 1988
addressed to respondent Gonzalez was
misdelivered and therefore not served
on him, the Court Resolved to require
the Clerk of Court to CAUSE SERVICE of
said Resolution on the respondent and
to REQUIRE the latter to comply
therewith."
Respondent Gonzalez subsequently filed with this Court
on 9 May 1988 an Omnibus Motion for Extension and
Inhibition 16 alleging, among other things: that the above
quoted 2 May 1988 Resolution of the Court "appears to
have overturned that presumption [of innocence] against
him;" and that "he gravely doubts whether that 'cold
neutrality [of an impartial judge]' is still available to him"
there being allegedly "at least 4 members of this Tribunal
who will not be able to sit in judgment with substantial
sobriety and neutrality." Respondent Gonzalez closed out
his pleading with a prayer that the four (4) Members of
the Court identified and referred to there by him inhibit
themselves in the deliberation and resolution of the
Motion to Cite in Contempt.
On 19 may 1988, 17 after receipt of
respondent's Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration,
18 this Court in an extended per curiam Resolution 19
denied the Motion and Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration. That denial was made "final and
immediately executory."
Respondent Gonzalez has since then filed the following
pleadings of record:
1. Manifestation with Supplemental
Motion to Inhibit, 20 dated 23 May
1988;
2. Motion to Transfer Administrative
Proceedings to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, 21 dated 20 May 1988;
3. Urgent Motion for Additional
Extension of Time to File Explanation Ex
Abundante Cautelam, 22 dated 26 May
1988;
4. Urgent Ex-Parte Omnibus Motion
(a) For Extension of
Time
(b) For Inhibition,
and
(c) For Transfer of
Administrative Proceedings to
the IBP, Under Rule 139-B, 23
dated 4 June 1988 (with Annex
"A"; 24 an anonymous letter
dated 27 May 1988 from the
alleged Concerned Employees
of the Supreme Court" and
addressed to respondent);
5. Ex-Parte Manifestation, 25 dated 7
June 1988;
6. Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for
Reconsideration, 26 dated 6 June 1988;
and
7. Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation with
Motion 27 dated 23 September 1988.
In compliance with the 2 May 1988 Resolution of this Court
quoted earlier, respondent Gonzalez submitted on 17 June
1988 an Answer with Explanation and Comment 28 offering
respondent's legal arguments and defenses against the
contempt and disciplinary charges presently pending before
this Court. Attached to that pleading as Annex "A" thereof was
respondent's own personal Explanation/Compliance. 29 A
second explanation called "Compliance," 30 with annexes, was
also submitted by respondent on 22 July 1988.
II
We begin by referring to the authority of the Supreme Court
to discipline officers of the court and members of the court
and members of the Bar. The Supreme Court, as regular and
guardian of the legal profession, has plenary disciplinary
authority over attorneys. The authority to discipline lawyers
stems from the Court's constitutional mandate to regulate
admission to the practice of law, which includes as well
authority to regulate the practice itself of law. 31 Quite apart
from this constitutional mandate, the disciplinary authority of
the Supreme Court over members of the Bar is an inherent
power incidental to the proper administration of justice and
essential to an orderly discharge of judicial functions. 32
Moreover, the Supreme Court has inherent power to punish
for contempt, to control in the furtherance of justice the
conduct of ministerial officers of the Court including lawyers
and all other persons connected in any manner with a case
before the Court. 33 The power to punish for contempt is
"necessary for its own protection against an improper
interference with the due administration of justice, " "(it) is
not dependent upon the complaint of any of the parties
litigant." 34
There are, in other words, two (2) related powers which come
into play in cases like that before us here; the Court's inherent
power to discipline attorneys and the contempt power. The
disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the Bar is
broader that the power to punish for contempt. Contempt of
court may be committed both by lawyers and non-lawyers,
both in and out of court. Frequently, where the contemnor is a
lawyer, the contumacious conduct also constitutes
professional misconduct which calls into play the disciplinary
authority of the Supreme Court. 35 Where the respondent is a
lawyer, however, the Supreme Court's disciplinary authority
over lawyers may come into play whether or not the
misconduct with which the respondent is charged also
constitutes contempt of court. The power to punish for
contempt of court does not exhaust the scope of disciplinary
authority of the Court over lawyers. 36 The disciplinary
authority of the Court over members of the Bar is but corollary
to the Court's exclusive power of admission to the Bar. A
lawyers is not merely a professional but also an officer of the
court and as such, he is called upon to share in the task and
responsibility of dispensing justice and resolving disputes in
society. Any act on his part which visibly tends to obstruct,
pervert, or impede and degrade the administration of justice
constitutes both professional misconduct calling for the
exercise of disciplinary action against him and contumacious
conduct warranting application of the contempt power.
It is sometimes asserted that in the exercise of the power to
punish for contempt or to the disciplinary authority of the
Court over members of the Bar, the Court is acting as offended
party, prosecutor and arbiter at one and the same time. Thus,
in the present case, respondent Gonzalez first sought to get
some members of the Court to inhibit themselves in the
resolution of this case for alleged bias and prejudice against
him. A little later, he in effect asked the whole Court to inhibit
itself from passing upon the issues involved in this proceeding
and to pass on responsibility for this matter to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, upon the ground that respondent
cannot expect due process from this Court, that the Court has
become incapable of judging him impartially and fairly.
Respondent Gonzalez misconceives the nature of the
proceeding at bar as well as the function of the members of
the Court in such proceeding. Respondent's contention is
scarcely an original one. In In Re Almacen, 37 then Associate
(later Chief) Justice Fred Fruiz Castro had occasion to deal with
this contention in the following lucid manner:
"xxx xxx xxx
It is not accurate to say, nor is it an
obstacle to the exercise of our authority
in the premises, that, as Atty. Almacen
would have it appear, the members of
the Court are the 'complainants,
prosecutors and judges' all rolled up into
one in this instance. This is an utter
misapprehension, if not a total
distortion, not only of the nature of the
proceeding at hand but also of our role
therein.
Accent should be laid on the fact that
disciplinary proceedings like the present
are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor
purely criminal, this proceeding is not
and does not involve a trial of an
action or a suit, but is rather an
investigation by the Court into the
conduct of its officers. Not being
intended to inflict punishment, it is in no
sense a criminal prosecution.
Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff
nor a prosecutor there. It may be
initiated by the Court motu proprio.
Public interest is its primary objective,
and the real question for determination
is whether or not the attorney is still a fit
person to be allowed the privileged as
such. Hence, in the exercise of its
disciplinary powers, the Court merely
calls upon a member of the Bar to
account for his actuations as an officer
of the Court with the end in view of
preserving the purity of the legal
profession and the proper and honest
administration of justice by purging the
profession of members who by their
misconduct have proved themselves no
longer worthy to be entrusted with the
duties and responsibilities pertaining to
the office of an attorney. In such
posture, there can thus be no occasion
to speak of a complainant or a
prosecutor.
Undeniably, the members of the Court
are, to a certain degree, aggrieved
parties. Any tirade against the individual
members thereof. But in the exercise of
its disciplinary powers, the Court acts as
an entity separate and distinct from the
individual personalities of its members.
Consistently with the intrinsic nature of
a collegiate court, the individual
members act not as such individuals but
only as a duly constituted court. The
distinct individualities are lost in the
majesty of their office. So that, in a very
real sense, if there be any complainant
in the case at bar, it can only be the
Court itself, not the individual members
thereof as well as the people
themselves whose rights, fortunes and
properties, may, even lives, would be
placed at grave hazard should the
administration of justice be threatened
by the retention in the Bar of men unfit
to discharge the solemn responsibilities
of membership in the legal fraternity.
Finally, the power to exclude persons
from the practice of law is but a
necessary incident of the power to admit
persons to said practice. By
constitutional precept, this power is
vested exclusively in this Court. This duty
it cannot abdicate just as much as it
cannot unilaterally renounce jurisdiction
legally invested upon it. So that even if it
be conceded that the members
collectively are in a sense the aggrieved
parties, that fact alone does not and
cannot disqualify them from the
exercise of the power because public
policy demands that they, acting as a
Court, exercise the power in all cases
which call for disciplinary action. The
present is such a case. In the end, the
imagined anomaly of the merger in one
entity of the personalities of
complainant, prosecutor and judge is
absolutely inexistent.
xxx xxx xxx." 38
It should not be necessary for the members of this Court
expressly to disclaim any bias or prejudice against the
respondent that would prevent them from acting in
accordance with the exacting requirements of their oaths of
office. It also appears to the Court that for all the members to
inhibit themselves from sitting on this case is to abdicate the
responsibility with which the Constitution has burdened them.
Reference of complaints against attorneys either to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines or to the Solicitor General is
not mandatory upon the Supreme Court; such reference to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines or to the Solicitor General is
certainly not an exclusive procedure under the terms of Rule
139-B of the Revised Rules of Court, especially where the
charge consists of acts done before the Supreme Court. There
is no need for further investigation of facts in the present case
for it is not substantially disputed by respondent Gonzalez that
he uttered or wrote certain statements attributed to him. In
any case, respondents had the amplest opportunity to present
his defense; his defense is not that he did not make the
statements ascribed to him but that those statements give rise
to no liability on his part, having been made in the exercise of
his freedom of speech. The issues which thus need to be
resolved here are issues of law and of basic policy and the
Court, not any other agency, is compelled to resolve such
issues.
III
It is necessary to become very explicit as to what respondent
Gonzalez was saying in his statements set out above.
Respondent has not denied making the above statements;
indeed, he acknowledges that the newspaper reports of the
statements attributed to him are substantially correct. 39
Respondent Gonzalez was in effect saying,
firstly, that the Supreme Court deliberately rendered an
erroneous or wrong decision when it rendered its per
curiam Decision dated 27 April 1988 in G.R. Nos. 79690-
707 and 80578. That decision according to respondent
Gonzales, was issued as an act of retaliation by the Court
against him for the position he had taken "that the
(Supreme Court) Justices cannot claim immunity from suit
or investigation by government prosecutors," and in
order to stop respondent from investigating cases against
"some of (the) proteges or friends (of some Supreme
Court Justices)." The Court cannot, of course, and will not
debate the correctness of its Decision of 27 April 1988
and of its Resolution dated 19 May 1988 (denying
respondent Gonzalez' Motion for Reconsideration) in the
consolidated Zaldivar case. Respondent Gonzalez, and
anyone else for that matter, is free intellectually to accept
or not accept the reasoning of the Court set out in its per
curiam Decision and Resolution in the consolidated
Zaldivar cases. This should not, however, obscure the
seriousness of the assault thus undertaken by respondent
against the Court and the appalling implications of such
assault for the integrity of the system of administration of
justice in our country. Respondent has said that the Court
rendered its Decision and Resolution without regard to
the legal merits of the Zaldivar cases and had used the
judicial process to impose private punishment upon
respondent for positions he had taken (unrelated to the
Zaldivar cases) in carrying out his duties. It is very difficult
to imagine a more serious affront to, or greater outrage
upon, the honor and dignity of this Court than this.
Respondent's statements is also totally baseless.
Respondent's statements were made in complete
disregard of the fact that his continuing authority to act
as Tanodbayan or Ombudsman after the effectivity of the
1987 Constitution, had been questioned before this Court
as early as 10 September 1987 in the Petition for
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus filed against him in
these consolidated Petitions, 40 that is more than seven
(7) months before the Court rendered its Decision.
Respondent also ignores the fact that one day later, this
Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order effective
immediately ordering the Sandiganbayan to cease and
desist from hearing the criminal cases filed against
petitioner Zaldivar by respondent Gonzalez. Respondent
also disregards the fact that on 24 November 1987, upon
the filing of a second Petition for Certiorari for Prohibition
by Mr. Zaldivar, the Court issued a Temporary Restraining
Order this time requiring the respondent to cease and
desist from further acting in TBP Case No. 87-0934. Thus,
the decision finally reached by this Court in April 1988 on
the constitutional law issue pending before the Court for
the preceding eight (8) months, could scarcely have been
invented as a reprisal simply against respondent.
A second charge that respondent Gonzalez hurled against
members of the Supreme Court is that they have improperly
"pressured" him to render decisions favorable to their
"colleagues and friends," including dismissal of "cases" against
two (2) members of the Court. This particularly deplorable
charge too is entirely baseless, as even a cursory examination
of the contents of the handwritten notes of three (3) members
of this Court addressed to respondent (which respondent
attached to his Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of
this Court of 27 April 1988 in the consolidated Petitions) will
show. It is clear, and respondent Gonzalez does not pretend
otherwise, that the subject matters of the said notes had no
relation at all to the issues in G.R. Nos. 79690-707 and 80578.
This charge appears to have made in order to try to impart
some substance (at least in the mind of respondent) to the
first accusation made by respondent that the Court had
deliberately rendered a wrong decision to get even with
respondent who had, with great fortitude, resisted "pressure"
from some members of the Court. Once again, in total effect,
the statements made by respondent appear designed to cast
the Court into gross disrepute, and to cause among the
general public scorn for and distrust in the Supreme Court and,
more generally, the judicial institutions of the Republic.
Respondent Gonzalez has also asserted that the Court was
preventing him from prosecuting "rich and powerful persons,"
that the Court was in effect discriminating between the rich
and powerful on the one hand and the poor and defenseless
upon the other, and allowing "rich and powerful" accused
persons to go "scot-free" while presumably allowing or
affirming the conviction of poor and small offenders. This
accusation can only be regarded as calculated to present the
Court in an extremely bad light. It may be seen as intended to
foment hatred against the Supreme Court; it is also suggestive
of the divisive tactics of revolutionary class war.
Respondents, finally, assailed the Court
for having allegedly "dismissed judges
'without rhyme or reason' and disbarred
lawyers 'without due process.'" The
Court notes that this last attack is not
without relation to the other statements
made by respondent against the Court.
The total picture that respondent clearly
was trying to paint of the Court is that of
an "unjudicial" institution able and
willing to render "clearly erroneous"
decisions by way of reprisal against its
critics, as a body that acts arbitrarily and
capriciously denying judges and lawyers
due process of law. Once again, the
purport of respondent's attack against
the Court as an institution unworthy of
the people's faith and trust, is
unmistakable. Had respondent
undertaken to examine the records of
the two(2) judges and the attorney he
later identified in one of his Explanations
he would have discovered that the
respondents in those administrative
cases had ample opportunity to explain
their side and submit evidence in
support thereof. 41 He would have also
found that there were both strong
reasons for and an insistent rhyme in
the disciplinary measures there
administered by the Court in the
continuing effort to strengthen the
judiciary and upgrade the membership
of the Bar. It is appropriate to recall in
this connection that due process as a
constitutional precept does not, always
and in all situations, require the trial-
type proceeding, 42 that the essence of
due process is to be found in the
reasonable opportunity to be heard and
to submit any evidence one may have in
support' of one's defense. 43 "To be
heard" does not only mean verbal
arguments in court; one may be heard
also through pleadings. Where
opportunity to be heard, either through
oral arguments or pleadings, is
accorded, there is no denial of
procedural due process. 44
As noted earlier, respondent Gonzalez was required by the
Court to explain why he should not be punished for contempt
and/or subjected to administrative discipline for making the
statements adverted to above. In his subsequent pleadings
where he asked the full Court to inhibit itself and to transfer
the administrative proceedings to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, respondent made, among others, the following
allegations:
(a) That the Members of the
Court "should inhibit
[themselves] in the contempt
and administrative charges
against the respondent, in the
light of the manifest prejudice
and anger they hold against
respondent as shown in the
language of the resolution on the
Motion for Reconsideration;" (b)
That "the entire membership of
the court has already lost that
'cold neutrality of an impartial
judge' [to] be able to allow
fairness and due process in the
contempt citation as well as in
the possible administrative
charge;"
(c) That "respondent honestly
feels that this court as angry and
prejudiced as it is, respondent
has no china man's chance to get
fair hearing in the contempt and
possible administrative charges;"
(d) That one must consider
"the milieu before this Tribunal
with, perhaps passion and
obfuscation running riot;"
(e) That respondent, "after
having been castigated with such
venom by the entire Court in its
decision denying the Motion for
Reconsideration, does not have
confidence in the impartiality of
the entire Court" and that he
"finds it extremely difficult to
believe that the members of this
Tribunal can still act with
unbiased demeanor towards
him; and
(f) That "the Tribunal is
determined to disbar
[respondent] without due
process" and that a specified
Member of the court "has been
tasked to be the ponente, or at
least prepare the decision."
(Emphasis in the original)
Thus, instead of explaining or seeking to mitigate his
statements earlier made, respondent sought to heap still more
opprobrium upon the Court, accusing it of being incapable of
judging his acts and statements justly and according to law.
Once again, he paints this Court as a body not only capable of
acting without regard to due process but indeed determined
so to act. A grand design to hold up this Court to public scorn
and disrespect as an unworthy tribunal, one obfuscated by
passion and anger at respondent, emerges once more. It is
very difficult for members of this Court to understand how
respondent Gonzalez could suppose that judges on the highest
tribunal of the land would be ready and willing to violate their
most solemn oath of office merely to gratify any imagined
private feelings aroused by respondent. The universe of the
Court revolves around the daily demands of law and justice
and duty, not around respondent nor any other person or
group of persons.
Whether or not the statements made by respondent Gonzalez
may reasonably be regarded by this Court as contumacious or
as warranting exercise of the disciplinary authority of this
Court over members of the Bar, may best be assayed by
examining samples of the kinds of statements which have
been held in our jurisdiction as constituting contempt or
otherwise warranting the exercise of the court's authority.
1. In Montecillo v. Gica, 45 Atty. Quirino del Mar as counsel for
Montecillo, who was accused in a slander case, moved to
reconsider a decision of the Court of Appeals in favor of the
complainant with a veiled threat that he should interpose his
next appeal to the President of the Philippines. In his Motion
for Reconsideration, he referred to the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code on "knowingly rendering an unjust
judgment," and "judgment rendered through negligence" and
implied that the Court of Appeals had allowed itself to be
deceived. Atty. del Mar was held guilty of contempt of court
by the Court of Appeals. He then sued the three (3) justices of
the Court of Appeals for damages before the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, seeking to hold them liable for their decision
in the appealed slander case. This suit was terminated,
however, by compromise agreement after Atty. del Mar
apologized to the Court of Appeals and the justices concerned
and agreed to pay moral damages to the justices. Atty. del Mar
some time later filed with this Court a Petition for Review on
Certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals in a slander
case. This Court denied the Petition for review. Atty. del Mar
then filed a Motion for Reconsideration and addressed a letter
to the Clerk of the Supreme Court asking for the names of the
justices of this Court who had voted in favor of and those who
had voted against his Motion for Reconsideration. After his
Motion for Reconsideration was denied fore lack of merit,
Atty. del Mar filed a Manifestation in this Court saying:
"I can at this time reveal to you that, had
your Clerk of Court furnished me with
certified true copies of the last two
Resolutions of the Supreme Court
confirming the decision of the Court of
Appeals in the case entitled Francisco M.
Gica vs. Jorge Montecillo, I would have
filed against the Justices supporting the
same, civil and criminal suits as I did to
the justices of the Court of Appeals who,
rewarding the abhorrent falsification
committed by Mr. Gica, reversed for him
the decisions of the City Court and the
Court of First Instance of Cebu, not with
a view to obtaining a favorable
judgment therein but for the purpose of
exposing to the people the corroding
evils extant in our Government, so that
they may well know them and work for
their extermination." (60 SCRA at 240;
Emphasis supplied)
Counsel was asked to explain why he should not be
administratively dealt with for making the above
statements. In his additional explanation, Atty. del Mar
made the following statements:
". . . Graft, corruption and injustice are
rampant in and outside of the
Government. It is this state of things
that convinced me that all human
efforts to correct and/or reform the said
evils will be fruitless and as stated in my
manifestation to you, I have already
decided to retire from a life of militancy
to a life of seclusion, leaving to God the
filling-up deficiencies." (60 SCRA at 242)
The Court suspended Atty. del Mar, "until further orders,"
from the practice of law saying:
". . . Respondent is utilizing what exists
in his mind as state of graft, corruption
and injustice allegedly rampant in and
outside of the government as
justification for his contemptuous
statements. In other words, he already
assumed by his own contemptuous
utterances that because there is an
alleged existence of rampant corruption,
graft and injustice in and out of the
government, We, by Our act in G.R. No.
L-36800, are among the corrupt , the
grafters and those allegedly committing
injustice. We are at a complete loss to
follow respondent del Mar's logic. . .
xxx xxx xxx
"To aged brethren of the bar it may
appear belated to remind them that
second only to the duty of maintaining
allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and to support the
Constitution and obey the laws of the
Philippines, is the duty of all attorneys to
observe and maintain the respect due to
the courts of justice and judicial officers
(Sec. 20 (b) Rule 138, Rules of Court).
But We do remind them of said duty to
emphasize to their younger brethren its
paramount importance. A lawyer must
always remember that he is an officer of
the court exercising a high privilege and
serving in the noble mission of
administering justice."

xxx xxx xxx
As already stated, the decision of the
Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. No. 45604-
R was based on its evaluation of the
evidence on only one specific issue. We
in turn denied in G.R. No. L-36800 the
petition for review on certiorari of the
decision because We found no reason
for disturbing the appellate court's
finding and conclusion. In both
instances, both the Court of Appeals and
this Court exercised judicial discretion in
a case under their respective
jurisdiction. The intemperate and
imprudent act of respondent del Mar in
resorting to veiled threats to make both
Courts reconsider their respective stand
in the decision and the resolution that
spelled disaster for his client cannot be
anything but pure contumely for said
tribunals.
It is manifest that respondent del Mar
has scant respect for the two highest
court of the land when on the flimsy
ground of alleged error in deciding a
case, he proceeded to challenge the
integrity of both Courts by claiming that
they knowingly rendered unjust
judgment. In short, his allegation is that
they acted with intent and malice, if not
with gross ignorance of the law, in
disposing of the case of his client.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . To those who are in the practice of
law and those who in the future will
choose to enter this profession, We wish
to point to this case as a reminder for
them to imprint in their hearts and
minds that an attorney owes it to
himself to respect the courts of justice
and its officers as a fealty for the
stability of our democratic institutions.":
(60 SCRA at 242-247; emphasis supplied)
2. In Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v. Cloribel, 46 four (4)
members of the bar, acting as counsels for MacArthur
International Minerals Company were required by this Court
to explain certain statements made in MacArthur's third
Motion for Reconsideration:
"d. ' . . .; and the Supreme Court has
overlooked the applicable law due to
the misrepresentation and obfuscation
of the petitioners' counsel.' (Last
sentence, par. 1, Third Motion for
Reconsideration dated Sept. 10, 1968).
e. '. . . Never has any civilized
democratic tribunal ruled that such a
gimmick (referring to the "right to reject
any and all bids") can be used by
vulturous executives to cover and
excuse losses to the public, a
government agency or just plain fraud . .
. and it is thus difficult, in the light of our
upbringing and schooling, even under
many of the incumbent justices, that the
Honorable Supreme Court intends to
create a decision that in effect does
precisely that in a most absolute
manner.' (Second sentence, par. 7, Third
Motion for Reconsideration dated Sept.
10, 1968)." (31 SCRA at 6)
They were also asked to explain the statements made in
their Motion to Inhibit filed on 21 September 1968 asking

"Mr. Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion
and Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro to
inhibit themselves from considering,
judging and resolving the case or any
issue or aspect thereof retroactive to
January 11, 1967. The motion charges
'[t]hat the brother of the Honorable
Associate Justice Castro is a vice-
president of the favored party who is
the chief beneficiary of the false,
erroneous and illegal decision dated
January 31, 1968' and the ex-parte
preliminary injunction rendered in the
above entitled case, the latter in effect
prejudging and predetermining this case
even before the joining of an issue. As to
the Chief Justice, the motion states
'[t]hat the son of the Honorable Chief
Justice Roberto to Conception was given
a significant appointment in the
Philippine Government by the President
a short time before the decision of July
31, 1968 was rendered in this case.' The
appointment referred to was as
secretary of the newly-created Board of
Investments. The motion presents a
lengthy discourse on judicial ethics,
makes a number of side comments
projecting what is claimed to be the
patent wrongfulness of the July 31, 1968
decision. It enumerates 'incidents'
which, according to the motion, brought
about respondent MacArthur's belief
that 'unjudicial prejudice' had been
caused it and that there was 'unjudicial
favoritism' in favor of 'petitioners, their
appointing authority and a favored party
directly benefited by the said decision.'"
(31 SCRA at 6-7)
Another attorney entered his appearance as new counsel
for MacArthur and filed a fourth Motion for
Reconsideration without leave of court, which Motion
contained the following paragraphs:
"4. The said decision is illegal because it
was penned by the Honorable Chief
Justice Roberto Concepcion when in fact
he was outside the borders of the
Republic of the Philippines at the time of
the Oral Argument of the above-entitled
case which condition is prohibited by
the new Rules of Court - Section 1, Rule
51, and we quote" '
'Justices; who may take part. . . . Only
those members present when any
matter is submitted for oral argument
will take part in its consideration and
adjudication . . .' This requirement is
especially significant in the present
instance because the member who
penned the decision was the very
member who was absent for
approximately four months or more.
This provision also applies to the
Honorable Justices Claudio Teehankee
and Antonio Barredo.
xxx xxx xxx
6. That if the respondent MacArthur
International Minerals Company
abandons its quest for justice in the
judiciary of the Philippine Government,
it will inevitably either raise the graft
and corruption of Philippine
Government Officials in the bidding of
May 12, 1965, required by the Nickel
Law to determine the operator of the
Surigao nickel deposits, to the World
Court on grounds of deprivation of
justice and confiscation or property
and/or to the United States
Government, either its executive or
judicial branches or both, on the
grounds of confiscation of respondent's
proprietary vested rights by the
Philippine Government without either
compensation or due process of law
and invoking the Hickenlooper
Amendment requiring the cutting off of
all aid and benefits to the Philippine
Government, including the sugar price
premium, amounting to more than fifty
million dollars annually, until restitution
or compensation is made." (31 SCRA at
10-11)
Finding their explanations unsatisfactory, the Court,
speaking through Mr. Justice Sanchez, held three (3)
attorneys guilty of contempt:
"1. We start with the case of Atty.
Vicente L. Santiago. In his third motion
for reconsideration, we indeed, find
language that is not to be expected of
an officer of the courts. He pictures
petitioners as 'vulturous executives.' He
speaks of this Court as a 'civilized,
democratic tribunal,' but by innuendo
would suggest that it is not.
In his motion to inhibit, his first
paragraph categorizes our decision of
July 31, 1968 as 'false, erroneous and
illegal' in a presumptuous manner. He
then charges that the ex parte
preliminary injunction we issued in this
case prejudiced and predetermined the
case even before the joining of an issue.
He accuses in a reckless manner two
justices of this Court for being interested
in the decision of this case: Associate
Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, because his
brother is the vice president of the
favored party who is the chief
beneficiary of the decision, and Chief
Justice Roberto Concepcion, whose son
was appointed secretary of the newly-
created Board of Investments, 'a
significant appointment in the Philippine
Government by the President, a short
time before the decision of July 31 1968
was rendered.' In this backdrop, he
proceeds to state that 'it would seem
that the principles thus established [the
moral and ethical guidelines for
inhibition of any judicial authority] by
the Honorable Supreme Court should
first apply to itself.' He puts forth the
claim that lesser and further removed
conditions have been known to create
favoritism, only to conclude that there is
no reason for a belief that the conditions
obtaining in the case of the Chief Justice
and Justice Castro 'would be less likely
to engender favoritism and prejudice for
or against a particular cause or party.'
Implicit in this at least is that the Chief
Justice and Justice Castro are insensible
to delicadeza, which could make their
actuation suspect. He makes it plain in
the motion that the Chief Justice and
Justice Castro not only were not free
from the appearance of impropriety but
did arouse suspicion that their
relationship did affect their judgment.
He points out that courts must be above
suspicion at all times like Ceasar's wife,
warns that loss of confidence for the
Tribunal or a member thereof should
not be allowed to happen in our
country, 'although the process has
already begun.'
xxx xxx xxx
What is disconcerting is that Atty.
Santiago's accusations have no basis in
fact and in law. The slur made is not
limited to the Chief Justice and Justice
Castro. It sweepingly casts aspersion on
the whole court. For, inhibition is also
asked if, we repeated, 'any other justices
who have received favors or benefits
directly or indirectly from any of the
petitioners or any members of any
board-petitioner or their agents or
principals, including the president.' The
absurdity of this posture is at once
apparent. For one thing, the justices of
this Court are appointed by the
President and in that sense may be
considered to have each received a
favor from the President. Should these
justices inhibit themselves every time a
case involving the Administration crops
up? Such a thought may not certainly be
entertained. The consequence thereof
would be to paralyze the machinery of
this Court. We would in fact, be
wreaking havoc on the tripartite system
of government operating in this country.
Counsel is presumed to know this. But
why the unfounded charge? There is the
not-too-well concealed effort on the part
of a losing litigant's attorney to
downgrade this Court.
The mischief that stems from all of the
foregoing gross disrespect is easy to
discern. Such disrespect detracts much
from the dignity of a court of justice.
Decidedly not an expression of faith,
counsel's words are intended to create
an atmosphere of distrust, of disbelief.

xxx xxx xxx
The precepts, the teachings, the
injunctions just recited are not
unfamiliar to lawyers. And yet, this Court
finds in the language of Atty. Santiago a
style that undermines and degrades the
administration of justice. The stricture in
Section 3 (d) of Rule 71 of the Rules
against improper conduct tending to
degrade the administration of justice
is thus transgressed. Atty. Santiago is
guilty of contempt of court.
xxx xxx xxx
Third. The Motion contained an express
threat to take the case to the World
Court and/or the United States
government. It must be remembered
that respondent MacArthur at that time
was still trying to overturn the decision
of this Court of July 31, 1968. In doing
so, unnecessary statements were
injected. More specifically, the motion
announced that MacArthur 'will
inevitably . . . raise the graft and
corruption of [the] Philippine
government officials in the bidding of
May 12, 1965 . . . to the World Court'
and would invoke 'the Hickenlooper
Amendment requiring the cutting off of
all aid and benefits to the Philippine
Government, including the sugar price
premium, amounting to more than fifty
million dollars annually . . .'
This is a clear attempt to influence or
bend the mind of this Court to decide the
case in its favor. A notice of appeal to
the World Court has even been
embodied in Meads' return. There is a
gross inconsistency between the appeal
and the move to reconsider the
decision. An appeal from a decision
presupposes that a party has already
abandoned any move to reconsider that
decision. And yet, it would appear that
the appeal to the World Court is being
dangled as threat to effect a change of
the decision of this Court. Such act has
no aboveboard explanation.
xxx xxx xxx
The dignity of the court, experience
teaches, can never be protected where
infraction of ethics meets with
complacency rather than punishment.
The people should not be given cause to
break faith with the belief that a judge is
the epitome of honor amongst men. To
preserve its dignity, a court of justice
should not yield to the assaults of
disrespect. Punctilio of honor, we prefer
to think, is standard of behavior so
desirable in a lawyer pleading a cause
before a court of justice." (31 SCRA at
13-23; emphasis supplied)
3. In In re Almacen, supra, Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen, in
protest against what he asserted was "a great injustice
committed his client by the Supreme Court," filed a Petition to
Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title. He alleged that his
client was deeply aggrieved by this Court's "unjust judgment,"
and had become "one of the sacrificial victims before the altar
of hypocrisy," saying that "justice as administered by the
presents members of the Supreme Court [was] not only blind,
but also deaf and dumb." Atty. Almacen vowed to argue the
cause of his client "in the people's forum" so that "the people
may know of this silent injustice committed by this Court" and
that "whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were
committed [may] never be repeated." Atty. Almacen released
to the press the contents of his Petition and on 26 September
1967, the "Manila Times" published statements attributed to
him as follows:
"Vicente Raul Almacen, in an
unprecedented petition, said he did not
expose the tribunal's unconstitutional
and obnoxious practice of arbitrarily
denying petitions or appeals without any
reason.
Because of the tribunal's 'short-cut
justice,' Almacen deplored, his client
was condemned to pay P120, 000,
without knowing why he lost the case.
xxx xxx xxx
There is no use continuing his law
practice, Almacen said in this petition,
'where our Supreme Court is composed
of men who are calloused to our pleas of
justice, who ignore without reason their
own applicable decisions and commit
culpable violations of the Constitution
with impunity.'
xxx xxx xxx
He expressed the hope that by divesting
himself of his title by which he earns his
living, the present members of the
Supreme Court 'will become responsible
to all cases brought to its attention
without discrimination, and will purge
itself of those unconstitutional and
obnoxious "lack of merit" or denied
resolutions.'" (31 SCRA at 565-566;
emphasis supplied)
Atty. Almacen was required by this Court to show cause
why disciplinary action should not be taken against him.
His explanation which in part read:
"xxx xxx xxx
The phrase, Justice is blind is symbolized
in paintings that can be found in all
courts and government offices. We have
added only two more symbols, that it is
also deaf and dumb. Deaf in the sense
that no members of this Court has ever
heard our cries for charity, generosity,
fairness, understanding, sympathy and
for justice; dumb in the sense, that
inspite of or beggings, supplications, and
pleadings to give us reasons why our
appeals has been DENIED, not one word
was spoken or given . . . We refer to no
human defect or ailment in the above
statement. We only described the
impersonal state of things and nothing
more.
xxx xxx xxx
As we have stated, we have lost our
faith and confidence in the members of
this Court and for which reason we
offered to surrender our lawyer's
certificate, IN TRUST ONLY. Because
what has been lost today may be
regained tomorrow. As the offer was
intended as our self-imposed sacrifice,
then we alone may decide as to when
we must end our self-sacrifice. If we
have to choose between forcing
ourselves to have faith and confidence in
the members of the Court but disregard
our Constitution and to uphold the
Constitution and be condemned by the
members of this Court, there is no
choice, we must uphold the latter." (31
SCRA at 572; emphasis supplied)
was found by the Court to be "undignified and cynical"
and rejected. The Court indefinitely suspended Almacen
from the practice of law holding through Mr. Justice Fred
Ruiz Castro, that Almacen had exceeded the boundaries
of "fair criticism."
4. In Paragas v. Cruz, 47 counsel, whose Petition for Certiorari
was dismissed by this Court, made the following statements in
his Motion for Reconsideration:
"The petitioner respectfully prays for a
reconsideration of the resolution of this
Honorable Court dated April 20, 1965 on
the ground that it constitutes a violation
of Section 14 of Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court promulgated by this very Hon.
Supreme Court, and on the further
ground that is likewise a violation of the
most important right in the Bill of Rights
of the Constitution of the Philippines, a
culpable violation which is a ground for
impeachment.
. . . The rule of law in a democracy
should always be upheld and protected
by all means, because the rule of law
creates and preserves peace and order
and gives satisfaction and contentment
to all concerned. But when the laws and
the rules are violated, the victims resort,
sometimes, to armed force and to the
ways of the cave-men! We do not want
Verzosa and Reyes repeated again and
again, killed in the premises of the
Supreme Court and in those of the City
Hall of Manila. Educated people should
keep their temper under control at all
times! But justice should be done to all
concerned to perpetuate the very life of
Democracy on the face of the earth.'"
(14 SCRA at 810; emphasis supplied)
The Court considered the above statements as
derogatory to the dignity of the Court and required
counsel to show cause why administrative action should
not be taken against him. Counsel later explained that he
had merely related factual events (i.e., the killing of
Verzosa and Reyes) and to express his desire to avoid
repetition of such acts. The Court, through Mr. Justice
J.B.L. Reyes, found these explanations unsatisfactory and
the above statements contumacious:
". . . The expressions contained in the
motion fore reconsideration . . . are
plainly contemptuous and disrespectful,
and reference to the recent killing of two
employees is but a covert threat upon
the members of the Court. . . That such
treats and disrespectful language
contained in a pleading filed in courts
are constitutive of direct contempt has
been repeatedly decided(Salcedo vs.
Hernandez, 61 Phil,. 724; People vs.
Venturanza, 52 Off. Gaz. 769; Medina vs.
Rivera, 66 Phil. 151; De Joya vs. Court of
First Instance of Rizal , L-9785,
September 19, 1956; Sison vs. Sandejas,
L-9270, April 29, 1959; Lualhati vs.
Albert, 57 Phil. 86). What makes the
present case more deplorable is that the
guilty party is a member of the bar; for,
as remarked in People vs. Carillo, 77
Phil. 580
'Counsel should
conduct himself towards the
judges who try his cases with
that courtesy all have a right
to expect. As an officer of the
court, it is his sworn and moral
duty to help build and not
destroy unnecessarily that
high esteem and regard
towards the courts so essential
to the proper administration of
justice.'
It is right and plausible that an attorney
in defending the cause and rights of his
client, should do so with all the fervor
and energy of which he is capable, but it
is not, and never will be so, for him to
exercise said right by resorting to
intimidation or proceeding without the
propriety and respect which the dignity
of the courts require. (Salcedo vs.
Hernandez, [In re Francisco], 61 Phil.
729)" (14 SCRA at 811-812; emphasis
supplied)
5. In In re Sotto, 48 a newspaper reporter, Mr.
Angel Parazo, invoking the Press Freedom Law, refused to
divulge the source of the news item which carried his by-
line and was sent to jail for so refusing. Atty. Vicente
Sotto, a senator and author of said law, caused the
publication of the following item in a number of daily
newspapers in Manila:
"As author of the Press Freedom Law
(Republic Act No. 53), interpreted by the
Supreme Court in the case of Angel
Parazo, reporter of a local daily, who
now has to suffer 30 days imprisonment,
for his refusal to divulge the source of a
news published in his paper, I regret to
say that our high Tribunal has not only
erroneously interpreted said law, but
that it is once more putting in evidence
the incompetency or narrow mindedness
of the majority of its members. In the
wake of so many blunders and injustices
deliberately committed during these last
years, I believe that the only remedy to
put an end to so much evil, is to change
the members of the Supreme Court. To
this effect, I announce that one of the
first measures, which I will introduce in
the coming congressional sessions, will
have as its object the complete
reorganization of the Supreme Court. As
it is now constituted, the Supreme Court
of today constitutes a constant peril to
liberty and democracy. It need be said
loudly,, very loudly, so that even the
deaf may hear: The supreme Court of
today is a far cry from the impregnable
bulwark of justice of those memorable
times of Cayetano Arellano, Victorino
Mapa, Manuel Araullo and other
learned jurists who were the honor and
glory of the Philippine Judiciary." (82
Phil. at 597-598; Emphasis supplied)

In finding Atty. Sotto in contempt, despite his avowals of
good faith his invocation of the constitutional guarantee
of free speech and in requiring to show why he should
not be disbarred, the Court, through Mr. Justice Feria,
said
"To hurl the false charge that this Court
has been for the last years committing
deliberately 'so many blunders and
injustices,' that is to say, that it has been
deciding in favor of one party knowing
that the law and justice is on the part of
the adverse party and not on the one in
whose favor the decision was rendered,
in may cases decided during the last
years, would tend necessarily to
undermine the confidence of the people
in the honesty and integrity of the
members of this Court, and consequently
to lower and degrade the administration
of justice by this Court. The Supreme
Court of the Philippine is, under the
Constitution, the last bulwark to which
the Filipino people may repair to obtain
relief for their grievances or protection
of their rights when these are trampled
upon, and if the people lose their
confidence in the honesty and integrity
of the members of this court and believe
that they cannot expect justice
therefrom, they might be driven to take
the law into their hands, and disorder
and perhaps chaos might be the result.
As a member of the bar and an officer of
the courts Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any
other, is in duty bound to uphold the
dignity and authority of this Court, to
which he owes fidelity according to the
oath he has taken as such attorney, and
not to promote distrust in the
administration of justice. Respect to the
courts guarantees the stability of other
institutions, which without such
guaranty would be resting on a very
shaky foundation." (82 Phil. at 601-602;
emphasis supplied)
6. In Salcedo v. Hernandez, 49 Atty. Vicente Francisco filed a
Motion before the Supreme Court which contained the
following paragraph (in translation):
"We should like frankly and respectfully
to make it of record that the resolution
of this court, denying our motion for
reconsideration is absolutely erroneous
and constitutes an outrage to the rights
of the petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a
mockery of the popular will expressed at
the polls in the municipality of Tiaong,
Tayabas. We wish to exhaust all the
means within our power in order that
this error may be corrected by the very
court which has committed it, because
we should not want that some citizen,
particularly some voter of the
municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas, resort
to the press publicly to denounce, as he
has a right to do, the judicial outrage of
which the herein petitioner has been
the victim, and because it is our utmost
desire to safeguard the prestige of this
honorable court and of each and every
member thereof in the eyes of the
public. But, at the same time we wish to
state sincerely that erroneous decisions
like these, which the affected party and
his thousands of voters will necessarily
consider unjust, increase the proselytes
of 'sakdalism' and make the public lose
confidence in the administration of
justice." (61 Phil. at 726; emphasis
supplied)
When required by the Court to show cause why he should
not be declared in contempt, Atty. Francisco responded
by saying that it was not contempt to tell the truth.
Examining the statement made above, the Court held:
'. . . [they] disclose, in the opinion of this
court, an inexcusable disrespect of the
authority of the court and an intentional
contempt of its dignity, because the
court is thereby charged with no less
than having proceeded in utter disregard
of the laws, the rights of the parties, and
of the untoward consequences, or with
having abused its power and mocked
and flouted the rights of Attorney
Vicente J. Francisco's client, because the
acts of outraging and mocking from
which the words 'outrage' and mockery'
used therein are derived, means exactly
the same as all these, according to the
Dictionary of the Spanish Language
published by the Spanish Academy
(Dictionary of the Spanish Language,
15th ed., pages 132-513).
The insertion of the phrases in question
in said motion of Attorney Vicente J.
Francisco, for many years a member of
the Philippine bar, was neither justified
nor in the least necessary, because in
order to call the attention of the court in
a special way to the essential points
relied upon in his argument and to
emphasize the force thereof, the many
reasons stated in his said motion were
sufficient and the phrases in question
were superfluous. In order to appeal to
reason and justice, it is highly improper
and amiss to make trouble and resort to
threats, as Attorney Vicente J. Francisco
has done, because both means are
annoying and good practice can ever
sanction them by reason of their natural
tendency to disturb and hinder the free
exercise of serene and impartial
judgment, particularly in judicial
matters, in the consideration of question
submitted for resolution.
There is no question that said paragraph
of Attorney Vicente Francisco's motion
contains a more or less veiled threat to
the court because it is insinuated
therein, after the author shows the
course which the voters of Tiaong
should follow in case he fails in his
attempt, that they will resort to the
press for the purpose of denouncing,
what he claims to be judicial outrage of
which his client has been victim; and
because he states in a threatening
manner with the intention of
predisposing the mind of the reader
against the court, thus creating an
atmosphere of prejudices against it in
order to make it odious in the public eye,
that decisions of the nature of that
referred to in his motion to promote
distrust in the administration of justice
an increase the proselytes of sakdalism,
a movement with seditious and
revolutionary tendencies the activities
of which, as is of public knowledge,
occurred in this country a few days ago.
This cannot mean otherwise than
contempt of the dignity of the court and
disrespect of the authority thereof on
the part of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco,
because he presumes that the court is so
devoid of the sense of justice that, if he
did not resort to intimidation, it would
maintain its error notwithstanding the
fact that it may be proven, with good
reasons, that it has acted erroneously.
As a member of the bar and an officer of
this court, Attorney Vicente J. Francisco,
as any attorney, is in duty bound to
uphold its dignity and authority and to
defend its integrity, not only because it
has conferred upon him the high
privilege, not a right (Malcolm, Legal
Ethics, 158 and 160), of being what he
now is: a priest of justice (In re Thatcher,
80 Ohio St., Rep., 492, 669), but also
because in so doing, he neither creates
nor promotes distrust in the
administration of justice, and prevents
anybody from harboring and
encouraging discontent which, in many
cases, is the source of disorder, thus
undermining the foundation upon which
rests that bulwark called judicial power
to which those who are aggrieved turn
for protection and relief." (61 Phil. at
727-728; emphasis supplied)
It should not be supposed that the six (6) cases above
discussed exhaust our case law on this matter. In the following
cases, among others, the Supreme Court punished for
contempt or administratively disciplined lawyers who had
made statements not very different from those made in the
cases discussed above:
1) In re Wenceslao Laureta, 148 SCRA
382 (1987);
2) Borromeo v. Court of Appeals, 87
SCRA 67 (1978);
3) Rheem of the Philippines v. Ferrer, 20
SCRA 441 (1967);
4) Malolos v. Reyes, 1 SCRA 559 (1961);
5) De Joya, et al. v. Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Pasay City Branch, 99
Phil. 907 (1956);
6) People v. Venturanza, et al., 98 Phil.
211 (1956);
7) In re Suzano A. Velasquez, per curiam
Resolution (unreported), Promulgated
29 April 1955;
8) Cornejo v. Tan, 85 Phil. 772 (1950);
9) People v. Carillo, 77 Phil. 572 (1946);
10) Intestate Estate of Rosario Olba;
Contempt Proceedings against Antonio
Franco, 67 Phil. 312 (1939); and
11) Lualhati v. Albert, 57 Phil. 86 (1932).
Considering the kinds of statements of lawyers discussed
above which the Court has in the past penalized as
contemptuous or as warranting application of disciplinary
sanctions, this Country is compelled to hold that the
statements here made by respondent Gonzalez clearly
constitute contempt and call for the exercise of the
disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court. Respondent's
statements, especially the charge that the Court deliberately
rendered an erroneous and unjust decisions in the
Consolidated Petitions, necessarily implying that the justices of
this Court betrayed their oath of office, merely to wreak
vengeance upon the respondent here, constitute the grossest
kind of disrespect for the Court. Such statements ever clearly
debase and degrade the Supreme Court and, through the
Court, the entire system of administration of justice in the
country. That respondent's baseless charges have had some
impact outside the internal world of subjective intent, is
clearly demonstrated by the filing of a complaint for
impeachment of thirteen (13) out of the then fourteen (14)
incumbent members of this Court, a complaint the centerpiece
of which is a repetition of the appalling claim of respondent
that this Court deliberately rendered a wrong decision as an
act of reprisal against the respondent.
IV
The principal defense of respondent Gonzalez is that he was
merely exercising his constitutional right of free speech. He
also invokes the related doctrines of qualified privileged
communications and fair criticism in the public interest.
Respondent Gonzalez is entitled to the constitutional
guarantee of free speech. No one seeks to deny him that right,
least of all this Court. What respondent seems unaware of is
that freedom of speech and of expression, like all
constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of
expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and
accommodated with the requirements of equally important
public interest. One of these fundamental public interests is
the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of the
administration of justice. There is no antinomy between free
expression and the integrity of the system of administering
justice. For the protection and maintenance of freedom of
expression itself can be secured only within the context of a
functioning and orderly system of dispensing justice, within
the context, in other words, of viable independent institutions
for delivery of justice which are accepted by the general
community. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter put it:

". . . A free press is not to be preferred
to an independent judiciary, nor an
independent judiciary to a free press.
Neither has primacy over the other;
both are indispensable to a free society.
The freedom of the press in itself
presupposes an independent judiciary
through which that freedom may, if
necessary, be vindicated. And one of the
potent means for assuring judges their
independence is a free press." 50
Mr. Justice Malcolm of this Court expressed the same thought
in the following:
"The Organic Act wisely guarantees
freedom of speech and press. This
constitutional right must be protected in
its fullest extent. The Court has
heretofore given evidence of its tolerant
regard for charges under the Libel Law
which come dangerously close to its
violation. We shall continue in this
chosen path. The liberty of the citizens
must be preserved in all of its
completeness. But license or abuse of
liberty of the press and of the citizens
should not be confused with liberty in its
true sense. As important as is the
maintenance of unmuzzled press and the
free exercise of the rights of the citizens
is the maintenance of the independence
of the Judiciary. Respect for the Judiciary
cannot be had if persons are privileged
to scorn a resolution of the court
adopted for good purposes, and if such
persons are to be permitted by
subterranean means to diffuse
inaccurate accounts of confidential
proceedings to the embarrassment of
the parties and the courts." 51
(Emphasis supplied)
Only slightly (if at all) less important is the public interest in
the capacity of the Court effectively to prevent and control
professional misconduct on the part of lawyers who are, first
and foremost, indispensable participants in the task of
rendering justice to every man. Some courts have held,
persuasively it appears to us, that a lawyer's right of free
expression may have to be more limited than that of a layman.
52
It is well to recall that respondent Gonzalez, apart from being
a lawyer and an officer of the court, is also a Special
Prosecutor who owes duties of fidelity and respect to the
Republic and to this Court as the embodiment and the
repository of the judicial power in the government of the
republic. The responsibility of the respondent "to uphold the
dignity and authority of this Court" and "not to promote
distrust in the administration of justice " 53 is heavier than
that of a private practicing lawyer.
Respondent Gonzalez claims to be and he is, of course,
entitled to criticize the rulings of this court, to point out where
he feels the Court may have lapsed into error. Once more,
however, the right of criticism is not unlimited. Its limits were
marked out by Mr. Justice Castro in In re Almacen which are
worth noting:
"But it is the cardinal condition of all
such criticism that it shall be bona fide,
and shall not spill over the walls of
decency and propriety. A wide chasm
exists between fair criticism, on the one
hand, and abuse and slander of courts
and the judges thereof, on the other.
Intemperate and unfair criticism is a
gross violation of the duty of respect to
courts. It is such a misconduct that
subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action."
The lawyer's duty to render
respectful subordination to the
courts is essential to the orderly
administration of justice. Hence,
in the assertion of their clients'
rights, lawyers even those
gifted with superior intellect
are enjoined to rein up their
tempers.
. . . " 54 (Emphasis supplied)
The instant proceeding is not addressed to the fact that
respondent has criticized the Court; it is addressed rather to
the nature of that criticism or comment and the manner in
which it was carried out.
Respondent Gonzalez disclaims an intent to attack and
denigrate the court. The subjectivities of the respondent are
irrelevant so far as characterization of his conduct or
misconduct is concerned. He will not, however, be allowed to
disclaim the natural and plain import of his words and acts. 55
It is, upon the other hand, not irrelevant to point out that
respondent offered no apology in his two (2) explanations and
exhibited no repentance. 56
Respondent Gonzalez also defends himself contending that no
injury to the judiciary has been shown, and points to the fact
that this Court denied his Motion for Reconsideration of its per
curiam Decision of 27 April 1988 and reiterated and amplified
that Decision in its Resolution of 19 May 1988. In the first
place, proof of actual damage sustained by a court or the
judiciary in general is not essential for a finding of contempt or
for the application of the disciplinary authority of the Court.
Insofar as the Consolidated Petitions are concerned this Court
after careful review of the bases of its 27 April 1988 Decision,
denied respondent's Motion for Reconsideration thereof and
rejected the public pressures brought to bear upon this Court
by the respondent through his much publicized acts and
statements for which he is here being required to account.
Obstructing the free and undisturbed resolution of a particular
case is not the only species of injury that the Court has a right
and a duty to prevent and redress. What is at stake in cases of
this kind is the integrity of the judicial institutions of the
country in general and of the Supreme Court in particular.
Damage to such institutions might not be quantifiable at a
given moment in time but damage there will surely be if acts
like those of respondent Gonzalez are not effectively stopped
and countered. The level of trust and confidence of the
general public in the courts, including the court of last resort,
is not easily measured; but few will dispute that a high level of
such trust and confidence is critical for the stability of
democratic government.
Respondent Gonzalez lastly suggest that punishment for
contempt is not the proper remedy in this case and suggests
that the members of this Court have recourse to libel suits
against him. While the remedy of libel suits by individual
members of this Court may well be available against
respondent Gonzalez, such is by no means an exclusive
remedy. Moreover, where as in the instant case, it is not only
the individual members of the Court but the Court itself as an
institution that has been falsely attacked, libel suits cannot be
an adequate remedy. 57
The Court concludes that respondent Gonzalez is guilty both of
contempt of court in facie curiae and of gross misconduct as
an officer of the court and member of the Bar.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND Atty. Raul M.
Gonzalez from the practice of law indefinitely and until further
others from this Court, the suspension to take effect
immediately.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Sandiganbayan,
the Ombudsman, the Secretary of Justice, the Solicitor General
and the Court of Appeals for their information and guidance.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz,
Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes,
Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
||| (Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 79690-707, 80578,
October 07, 1988)























IN RE: CUNANAN, ET AL
SECOND DIVISION
[Resolution. March 18, 1954.]
In the Matter of the Petitions for
Admission to the Bar of Unsuccessful
Candidates of 1946 to 1953; ALBINO
CUNANAN ET AL., petitioners.
Jose M. Aruego, M. H. de Joya, Miguel R.
Cornejo, and Antonio Enrile Inton for petitioners.
Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag for respondent.
SYLLABUS
1.ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW; ADMISSION; RELATION
TO COURT AND PUBLIC. By its declared objective,
Republic act No. 972 is contrary to public interest because
it qualifies 1,094 law graduates who confessedly had
inadequate preparation for the practice of the profession,
as was exactly found by this Tribunal in the aforesaid
examinations. The public interest demands of the legal
profession adequate preparation and efficiency, precisely
more so as legal problems evolved by the times become
more difficult.
2.ID.; ID.; A JUDICIAL FUNCTION. In the
judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the
admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of
attorneys-at-law in the practice of the profession and
their supervision have been indisputably a judicial
function and responsibility. Because of this attribute, its
continuous and zealous possession and exercise by the
judicial power have been demonstrated during more than
six centuries, which certainly "constitutes the most solid
of titles."
3.ID.; ID.; POWER OF CONGRESS TO REPEAL,
ALTER OR SUPPLEMENT RULES. The Constitution has
not conferred on Congress and this Tribunal equal
responsibilities governing the admission to the practice of
law. The primary power and responsibility which the
Constitution recognizes, continue to reside in this court.
Congress may repeal, alter and supplement the rules
promulgated by this court, but the authority and
responsibility over the admission, suspension, disbarment
and reinstatement of attorneys-at-law and their
supervision remain vested in the Supreme Court.
4.ID.; ID.; ID.; POWER OF CONGRESS AND THAT
OF SUPREME COURT MAY BE HARMONIZED. Being
coordinate and independent branches the power to
promulgate and enforce rules for the admission to the
practice of law and the concurrent power to repeal, alter
and supplement them may and should be exercised with
the respect that each owes to the other, giving careful
consideration to the responsibility which the nature of
each department requires. These powers have existed
together for centuries without diminution on each part;
the harmonious delimitation being found in that the
legislature may and should examine if the existing rules
on the admission to the Bar respond to the demands
which public interest requires of a Bar endowed with high
virtues, culture, training and responsibility. The
legislature may, by means of repeal, amendment or
supplemental rules, fill up any deficiency that it may find,
and the judicial power, which has the inherent
responsibility for a good and efficient administration of
justice and the supervision of the practice of the legal
profession, should consider these reforms as the
minimum standards for the elevation of the profession,
and see to it that with these reforms the lofty objective
that is desired in the exercise of its traditional duty of
admitting, suspending, disbarring and reinstating
attorneys-at-law is realized. They are powers which,
exercise within their proper constitutional limits, are not
repugnant, but rather complementary to each other in
attaining the establishment of a Bar that would respond
to the increasing and exacting necessities of the
administration of justice.
5.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CLASS LEGISLATION.
Republic act No. 972 is a class legislation. There is no
actual nor reasonable basis to classify unsuccessful bar
candidates by years nor to exclude those of other years.
6. ID.; TITLE OF LAW MUST EMBRACE ALL ITS
PROVISIONS. - Article 2 of Republic act No. 972 is not
embraced in the title of the law, contrary to what the
Constitution enjoins. Being inseparable from the
provisions of article 1, the entire law is void.
7.ID.; Republic act No. 972, PART OF SECTION 1
DECLARED TO BE IN FORCE. There being no unanimity
in the eight Justices who constitute the majority of the
court in this case, that part of article 1 Republic act No.
972 which refers to the examinations of 1953 to 1955
shall continue in force.
D E C I S I O N
DIOKNO, J p:
In recent years few controversial issues have
aroused so much public interest and concern as Republic
act No. 972, popularly known as the "Bar Flunkers' Act of
1953." Under the Rules of Court governing admission to
the bar, "in order that a candidate (for admission to the
Bar) may be deemed to have passed his examinations
successfully, he must have obtained a general average of
75 per cent in all subjects, without falling below 50 per
cent in any subject." (Rule 127, sec. 14, Rules of Court).
Nevertheless, considering the varying difficulties of the
different bar examinations held since 1946 and the
varying degree of strictness with which the examination
papers were graded, this court passed and admitted to
the bar those candidates who had obtained an average of
only 72 per cent was raised to 75 per cent.
Believing themselves as fully qualified to
practice law as those reconsidered and passed by this
court, and feeling conscious of having been discriminated
against (See Explanatory Note to R.A. No. 972),
unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages of a few
percentage lower than those admitted to the Bar agitated
in Congress for, and secured in 1951 the passage of
Senate Bill No. 12 which, among others, reduced the
passing general average in bar examinations to 70 per
cent effective since 1946. The President requested the
views of this court on the bill. Complying with that
request, seven members of the court subscribed to and
submitted written comments adverse thereto, and
shortly thereafter the President vetoed it. Congress did
not override the veto. Instead, it approved Senate Bill No.
371, embodying substantially the provisions of the vetoed
bill. Although the members of this court reiterated their
unfavorable views on the matter, the President allowed
the bill to become a law on June 21, 1953 without his
signature. The law, which incidentally was enacted in an
election year, reads in full as follows:
Republic act No. 972.
AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR
BAR EXAMINATIONS FROM NINETEEN
HUNDRED AND FORTY-SIX UP TO AND
INCLUDING NINETEEN HUNDRED AND
FIFTY-FIVE.
Be it enacted by the Senate
and House of Representatives of the
Philippines in Congress assembled:
SECTION 1.Notwithstanding
the provisions of section fourteen, Rule
numbered on hundred twenty-seven of
the Rules of Court, any bar candidate
who obtained a general average of
seventy per cent in any bar
examinations after July fourth, nineteen
hundred and forty-six up to the August
nineteen hundred and fifty-one bar
examinations; seventy-one per cent in
the nineteen hundred and fifty-two bar
examinations; seventy-two per cent in
the nineteen hundred and fifty-three
bar examinations; seventy-three per
cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-
four bar examinations; seventy-four per
cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-
five bar examinations without a
candidate obtaining a grade below fifty
per cent in any subject, shall be allowed
to take and subscribe the corresponding
oath of office as member of the
Philippine Bar: Provided, however, That
for the purpose of this Act, any exact
one-half or more of a fraction, shall be
considered as one and included as part
of the next whole number.
SEC. 2.Any bar candidate who
obtained a grade of seventy-five per
cent in any subject in any bar
examination after July fourth, nineteen
hundred and forty-six shall be deemed
to have passed in such subject or
subjects and such grade or grades shall
be included in computing the passing
general average that said candidate may
obtain in any subsequent examinations
that he may take.
SEC. 3.This Act shall take effect
upon its approval.
Enacted on June 21, 1953,
without the Executive approval.
After its approval, many of the unsuccessful
postwar candidates filed petitions for admission to the
bar invoking its provisions, while others motions for the
revision of their examination papers were still pending
also invoked the aforesaid law as an additional ground for
admission. There are also others who have sought simply
the reconsideration of their grades without, however,
invoking the law in question. To avoid injustice to
individual petitioners, the court first reviewed the
motions for reconsideration, irrespective of whether or
not they had invoked Republic act No. 972.
Unfortunately, the court has found no reason to revise
their grades. If they are to be admitted to the bar, it must
be pursuant to Republic act No. 972 which, if declared
valid, should be applied equally to all concerned whether
they have filed petitions or not. A complete list of the
petitioners, properly classified, affected by this decision,
as well as a more detailed account of the history of
Republic act No. 972, are appended to this decision as
Annexes I and II. And to realize more readily the effects of
the law, the following statistical data are set forth:
(1)The unsuccessful bar candidates who are to
be benefited by section 1 of Republic act No. 972 total
1,168, classified as follows:
1946 (August)20612118
1946 (November)47722843
19477493400
194889940911
19491,218532164
19501,31689326
19512,0688791964
19522,7381,033426
19532,555986284
Total12,2305,4211,168.
Of the aforesaid 1,168 candidates, 92 have
passed in subsequent examination, and only 586 have
filed either motions for admission to the bar pursuant to
said Republic Act, or mere motions for reconsideration.
(2)In addition, some other 10 unsuccessful
candidates are to be benefited by section 2 of said
Republic Act. These candidates had each taken from two
to five different examinations, but failed to obtain a
passing average in any of them. Consolidating, however,
their highest grades in different subjects in previous
examinations, with their latest marks, they would be
sufficient to reach the passing average as provided for by
Republic Act 972.

(3)The total number of candidates to be
benefited by this Republic Acts is therefore 1,094, of
which only 604 have filed petitions. Of these 604
petitioners, 33 who failed in 1946 to 1951 had
individually presented motions for reconsideration which
were denied, while 125 unsuccessful candidates of 1952,
and 56 of 1953, had presented similar motions, which ar
still pending because they could be favorably affected by
Republic act No. 972, - although as has been already
stated, this tribunal finds no sufficient reasons to
reconsider their grades.
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF Republic act No. 972.
Having been called upon to enforce a law of far-
reaching effects on the practice of the legal profession
and the administration of justice, and because some
doubts have been expressed as to its validity, the court
set the hearing of the afore-mentioned petitions for
admission on the sole question of whether or not
Republic act No. 972 is constitutional.
We have been enlightened in the study of this
question by the brilliant assistance of the members of the
bar who have amply argued, orally and in writing, on the
various aspects in which the question may be gleaned.
The valuable studies of Messrs. E. Voltaire Garcia, Vicente
J. Francisco, Vicente Pelaez and Buenaventura
Evangelista, in favor of the validity of the law, and of the
U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle, the Solicitor General,
Messrs. Arturo A. Alafriz, Enrique M. Fernando, Vicente
Abad Santos, Carlos A. Barrios, Vicente del Rosario, Juan
de Blancaflor, Mamerto V. Gonzales, and Roman Ozaeta
against it, aside from memoranda of counsel for
petitioners, Messrs. Jose M. Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel
R. Cornejo and and Antonio Enrile Inton, and of
petitioners Cabrera, Macasaet and Galema, themselves,
has greatly helped us in this task. The legal researchers of
the court have exhausted almost all Philippine and
American jurisprudence on the matter. The question has
been the object of intense deliberation for along time by
the Tribunal, and finally, after the voting, the preparation
of the majority opinion was assigned to a new member in
order to place it as humanly as possible above all
suspicion of prejudice or partiality.
Republic act No. 972 has for its object,
according to its author, to admit to the Bar, those
candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading
materials and inadequate preparation. Quoting a portion
of the Explanatory Note of the proposed bill, its author
Honorable Senator Pablo Angeles David stated:
"The reason for relaxing the
standard 75 per cent passing grade is
the tremendous handicap which
students during the years immediately
after the Japanese occupation has to
overcome such as the insufficiency of
reading materials and the inadequacy of
the preparation of students who took up
law soon after the liberation."
Of the 9,675 candidates who took the
examinations from 1946 to 1952, 5,236 passed. And now
it is claimed that in addition 604 candidates be admitted
(which in reality total 1,094), because they suffered from
"insufficiency of reading materials" and of "inadequacy of
preparation."
By its declared objective, the law is contrary to
public interest because it qualifies 1,094 law graduates
who confessedly had inadequate preparation for the
practice of the profession, as was exactly found by this
Tribunal in the aforesaid examinations. The public
interest demands of legal profession adequate
preparation and efficiency, precisely more so as legal
problem evolved by the times become more difficult. An
adequate legal preparation is one of the vital requisites
for the practice of law that should be developed
constantly and maintained firmly. To the legal profession
is entrusted the protection of property, life, honor and
civil liberties. To approve officially of those inadequately
prepared individuals to dedicate themselves to such a
delicate mission is to create a serious social danger.
Moreover, the statement that there was an insufficiency
of legal reading materials is grossly exaggerated. There
were abundant materials. Decisions of this court alone in
mimeographed copies were made available to the public
during those years and private enterprises had also
published them in monthly magazines and annual digests.
The Official Gazette has been published continuously.
Books and magazines published abroad have entered
without restriction since 1945. Many law books, some
even with revised and enlarged editions have been
printed locally during those periods. A new set of
Philippine Reports began to be published since 1946,
which continued to be supplemented by the addition of
new volumes. Those are facts of public knowledge.
Notwithstanding all these, if the law in question
is valid, it has to be enforced.
The question is not new in its fundamental
aspect or from the point of view of applicable principles,
but the resolution of the question would have been
easier had an identical case of similar background been
picked out from the jurisprudence we daily consult. Is
there any precedent in the long Anglo-Saxon legal history,
from which has been directly derived the judicial system
established where with its lofty ideals by the Congress of
the United States, and which we have preserved and
attempted to improve, or in our contemporaneous
juridical history of more than half a century? From the
citations of those defending the law, we can not find a
case in which the validity of a similar law had been
sustained, while those against its validity cite, among
others, the cases of Day (In re Day, 54 NE 646), of Cannon
(State vs. Cannon, 240 NW, 441), the opinion of the
President which is expressed in his vote of the original bill
and which the proponent of the contested law respects.
This law has no precedent in its favor. When
similar laws in other countries had been promulgated, the
judiciary immediately declared them without force or
effect. It is not within our power to offer a precedent to
uphold the disputed law.
To be exact, we ought to state here that we
have examined carefully the case that has been cited to
us as a favorable precedent of the law that of Cooper
(22 NY, 81), where the Court of Appeals of New York
revoked the decision of the Supreme Court of that State,
denying the petition of Cooper to be admitted to the
practice of law under the provisions of a statute
concerning the school of law of Columbia College
promulgated on April 7, 1860, which was declared by the
Court of Appeals to be consistent with the Constitution of
the state of New York.
It appears that the Constitution of New York at
that time provided:
"They (i.e., the judges) shall
not hold any other office of public trust.
All votes for either of them for any
elective office except that of the Court
of Appeals, given by the Legislature or
the people, shall be void. They shall not
exercise any power of appointment to
public office. Any male citizen of the age
of twenty- one years, of good moral
character, and who possesses the
requisite qualifications of learning and
ability, shall be entitled to admission to
practice in all the courts of this State."
(p. 93)
According to the Court of Appeals, the object of
the constitutional precept is as follows:
"Attorneys, solicitors, etc.,
were public officers; the power of
appointing them had previously rested
with the judges, and this was the
principal appointing power which they
possessed. The convention was
evidently dissatisfied with the manner in
which this power had been exercised,
and with the restrictions which the
judges had imposed upon admission to
practice before them. The prohibitory
clause in the section quoted was aimed
directly at this power, and the insertion
of the provision respecting the
admission of attorneys, in its particular
section of the Constitution, evidently
arose from its connection with the
object of this prohibitory clause. There is
nothing indicative of confidence in the
courts or of a disposition to preserve
any portion of their power over this
subject, unless the Supreme Court is
right in the inference it draws from the
use of the word 'admission' in the action
referred to. It is urged that the
admission spoken of must be by the
court; that to admit means to grant
leave, and that the power of granting
necessarily implies the power of
refusing, and of course the right of
determining whether the applicant
possesses the requisite qualifications to
entitle him to admission.
"These positions may all be
conceded, without affecting the validity
of the act." (p. 93.)
Now, with respect to the law of April 7, 1860,
the decision seems to indicate that it provided that the
possession of a diploma of the school of law of Columbia
College conferring the degree of Bachelor of Laws was
evidence of the legal qualifications that the constitution
required of applicants for admission to the Bar. The
decision does not however quote the text of the law,
which we cannot find in any public or accessible private
library in the country.
In the case of Cooper, supra, to make the law
consistent with the Constitution of New York, the Court
of Appeals said of the object of the law:
"The motive for passing the
act in question is apparent. Columbia
College being an institution of
established reputation, and having a law
department under the charge of able
professors, the students in which
department were not only subjected to
a formal examination by the law
committee of the institution, but to a
certain definite period of study before
being entitled to a diploma as
graduates, the Legislature evidently, and
no doubt justly, considered this
examination together with the
preliminary study required by the act, as
fully equivalent as a test of legal
requirements, to the ordinary
examination by the court; and as
rendering the latter examination, to
which no definite period of preliminary
study was essential, unnecessary and
burdensome.
"The act was obviously passed
with reference to the learning and
ability of the applicant, and for the mere
purpose of substituting the examination
by the law committee of the college for
that of the court. It could have had no
other object, and hence no greater
scope should be given to its provisions.
We cannot suppose that the Legislature
designed entirely to dispense with the
plain and explicit requirements of the
Constitution; and the act contains
nothing whatever to indicate an
intention that the authorities of the
college should inquire as to the age,
citizenship, etc., of the students before
granting a diploma. The only rational
interpretation of which the act admits is,
that it was intended to make the college
diploma competent evidence as to the
legal attainments of the applicant, and
nothing else. To this extent alone it
operates as a modification of pre-
existing statutes, and it is to be read in
connection with these statutes and with
the Constitution itself in order to
determine the present condition of the
law on the subject." (p. 89)

xxx xxx xxx
"The Legislature has not taken
from the court its jurisdiction over the
question of admission, that has simply
prescribed what shall be competent
evidence in certain cases upon that
question." (p. 93)
From the foregoing, the complete
inapplicability of the case of Cooper with that at bar may
be clearly seen. Please note only the following
distinctions:
(1)The law of New York does not require that
any candidate of Columbia College who failed in the bar
examinations be admitted to the practice of law.
(2)The law of New York according to the very
decision of Cooper, has not taken from the court its
jurisdiction over the question of admission of attorney at
law; in effect, it does not decree the admission of any
lawyer.
(3)The Constitution of New York at the time and
that of the Philippines are entirely different on the matter
of admission to the practice of law.
In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the
admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of
attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their
supervision have been indisputably a judicial function and
responsibility. Because of this attribute, its continuous and
zealous possession and exercise by the judicial power have
been demonstrated during more than six centuries, which
certainly "constitutes the most solid of titles." Even
considering the power granted to Congress by our
Constitution to repeal, alter and supplement the rules
promulgated by this Court regarding the admission to the
practice of law, to our judgment the proposition that the
admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of
attorneys at law is a legislative function, properly belonging
to Congress, is unacceptable. The function requires (1)
previously established rules and principles, (2) concrete
facts, whether past or present, affecting determinate
individuals. and (3) decision as to whether these facts are
governed by the rules and principles; in effect, a judicial
function of the highest degree. And it becomes more
undisputably judicial, and not legislative, if previous judicial
resolutions on the petitions of these same individuals are
attempted to be revoked or modified.
We have said that in the judicial system from which ours has
been derived, the act of admitting, suspending, disbarring
and reinstating attorneys at law in the practice of the
profession is concededly judicial. A comprehensive and
conscientious study of this matter had been undertaken in
the case of State vs. Cannon (1932) 240 NW 441, in which
the validity of a legislative enactment providing that Cannon
be permitted to practice before the courts was discussed.
From the text of this decision we quote the following
paragraphs:
"This statute presents an assertion of legislative
power without parallel in the history of the English
speaking people so far as we have been able to
ascertain. There has been much uncertainty as to
the extent of the power of the Legislature to
prescribe the ultimate qualifications of attorneys at
law, but in England and in every state of the Union
the act of admitting an attorney at law has been
expressly committed to the courts, and the act of
admission has always been regarded as a judicial
function. This act purports to constitute Mr. Cannon
an attorney at law, and in this respect it stands alone
as an assertion of legislative power. (p. 444)
"No greater responsibility rests upon this court than
that of preserving in form and substance the exact
form of government set up by the people. (p. 444)
"Under the Constitution all legislative power is
vested in a Senate and Assembly. (Section 1, art. 4.)
In so far as the prescribing of qualifications for
admission to the bar are legislative in character, the
Legislature is acting within its constitutional
authority when it sets up and prescribes such
qualifications. (p. 444)
"But when the Legislature has
prescribed those qualifications which in
its judgment will serve the purpose of
legitimate legislative solicitude, is the
power of the court to impose other and
further exactions and qualifications
foreclosed or exhausted? (p. 444)
"Under our Constitution the
judicial and legislative departments are
distinct, independent, and coordinate
branches of the government. Neither
branch enjoys all the powers of
sovereignty, but each is supreme in that
branch of sovereignty which properly
belongs to its department. Neither
department should so act as to
embarrass the other in the discharge of
its respective functions. That was the
scheme and thought of the people
setting upon the form of government
under which we exist. State vs. Hastings,
10 Wis., 525; Attorney General ex rel.
Bashford vs. Barstow, 4 Wis., 567. (p.
445)
"The judicial department of
government is responsible for the plane
upon which the administration of justice
is maintained. Its responsibility in this
respect is exclusive. By committing a
portion of the powers of sovereignty to
the judicial department of our state
government, under a scheme which it
was supposed rendered it immune from
embarrassment or interference by any
other department of government, the
courts cannot escape responsibility for
the manner in which the powers of
sovereignty thus committed to the
judicial department are exercised. (p.
445)
"The relation of the bar to the
courts is a peculiar and intimate
relationship. The bar is an attach of the
courts. The quality of justice dispensed
by the courts depends in no small
degree upon the integrity of its bar. An
unfaithful bar may easily bring scandal
and reproach to the administration of
justice and bring the courts themselves
into disrepute. (p. 445)
"Through all time courts have
exercised a direct and severe
supervision over their bars, at least in
the English speaking countries." (p. 445)
After explaining the history of the case,
the Court ends thus:
"Our conclusion may be
epitomized as follows: For more than six
centuries prior to the adoption of our
Constitution, the courts of England,
concededly subordinate to Parliament
since the Revolution of 1688, had
exercised the right of determining who
should be admitted to the practice of
law, which, as was said in Matter of the
Sergeants at Law, 6 Bingham's New
Cases 235, 'constitutes the most solid of
all titles.' If the courts and the judicial
power be regarded as an entity, the
power to determine who should be
admitted to practice law is a constituent
element of that entity. It may be difficult
to isolate that element and say with
assurance that it is either a part of the
inherent power of the court, or an
essential element of the judicial power
exercised by the court, but that it is a
power belonging to the judicial entity
cannot be denied. Our people borrowed
from England this judicial entity and
made of not only a sovereign institution,
but made of it a separate independent,
and coordinate branch of the
government. They took this institution
along with the power traditionally
exercised to determine who should
constitute its attorneys at law. There is
no express provision in the Constitution
which indicates an intent that this
traditional power of the judicial
department should in any manner be
subject to legislative control. Perhaps
the dominant thought of the framers of
our constitution was to make the three
great departments of government
separate and independent of one
another. The idea that the Legislature
might embarrass the judicial
department by prescribing inadequate
qualifications for attorneys at law is
inconsistent with the dominant purpose
of making the judicial independent of
the legislative department, and such a
purpose should not be inferred in the
absence of express constitutional
provision. While the Legislature may
legislate with respect to the
qualifications of attorneys, its power in
that respect does not rest upon any
power possessed by it to deal
exclusively with the subject of the
qualifications of attorneys, but is
incidental merely to its general and
unquestioned power to protect the
public interest. When it does legislate
fixing a standard of qualifications
required of attorneys at law in order
that public interests may be protected,
such qualifications constitute only a
minimum standard and limit the class
from which the court must make its
selection. Such legislative qualifications
do not constitute the ultimate
qualifications beyond which the court
cannot go in fixing additional
qualifications deemed necessary by the
course for the proper administration of
judicial functions. There is no legislative
power to compel courts to admit to
their bars persons deemed by them
unfit to exercise the prerogatives of an
attorney at law." (p. 450)
"Furthermore it is an unlawful
attempt to exercise the power of
appointment. It is quite likely true that
the Legislature may exercise the power
of appointment when it is in pursuance
of a legislative functions. However, the
authorities are well-nigh unanimous that
the power to admit attorneys to the
practice of law is a judicial function. In
all of the states, except New Jersey (In
re Reisch, 83 N. J. Eq. 82, 90 A. 12), so
far as our investigation reveals,
attorneys receive their formal license to
practice law by their admission as
members of the bar of the court so
admitting. Cor. Jur. 572; Ex parte
Secombe, 19 How. 9, 15 L. Ed. 565; Ex
parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 18 L. Ed. 366;
Randall vs. Brigham, 7 Wall. 52, 19 L. Ed.
285; Hanson vs. Grattan, 48 Kan, 843,
115 P. 646, 34 L.R.A. 519; Danforth vs.
Egan, 23 S. D. 43, 119 N. W. 1021, 130
Am. St. Rep. 1030, 20 Ann. Cas. 413.
"The power of admitting an
attorney to practice having been
perpetually exercised by the courts, it
having been so generally held that the
act of a court in admitting an attorney to
practice is the judgment for the court,
and an attempt as this on the part of the
Legislature to confer such right upon
any one being most exceedingly
uncommon, it seems clear that the
licensing of an attorney is and always
has been a purely judicial function, no
matter where the power to determine
the qualifications may reside." (p. 451)

In that same year of 1932, the Supreme Court
of Massachusetts, in answering a consultation of the
Senate of that State, 180 NE 725, said:
"It is indispensable to the
administration of justice and to
interpretation of the laws that there be
members of the bar of sufficient ability,
adequate learning and sound moral
character. This arises from the need of
enlightened assistance to the honest,
and restraining authority over the
knavish, litigant. It is highly important,
also that the public be protected from
incompetent and vicious practitioners,
whose opportunity for doing mischief is
wide. It was said by Cardoz, C. L., in
People ex rel. Karlin vs. Culkin, 242 N. Y.
456, 470, 471, 162 N. E. 487, 489, 60 A.
L. R. 851: 'Membership in the bar is a
privilege burden with conditions.' One is
admitted to the bar 'for something more
than private gain.' He becomes 'an
officer of the court, and, like the court
itself, an instrument or agency to
advance the ends of justice. His
cooperation with the court is due
'whenever justice would be imperiled if
cooperation was withheld." Without
such attorneys at law the judicial
department of government would be
hampered in the performance of its
duties. That has been the history of
attorneys under the common law, both
in this country and in England.
Admission to practice as an attorney at
law is almost without exception
conceded to be a judicial function.
Petition to that end is filed in courts, as
are other proceedings invoking judicial
action. Admission to the bar is
accomplish and made open and
notorious by a decision of the court
entered upon its records. The
establishment by the Constitution of the
judicial department conferred authority
necessary to the exercise of its powers
as a coordinate department of
government. It is an inherent power of
such a department of government
ultimately to determine the
qualifications of those to be admitted to
practice in its courts, for assisting in its
work, and to protect itself in this respect
from the unfit, those lacking in sufficient
learning, and those not possessing good
moral character. Chief Justice Taney
stated succinctly and with finality in Ex
parte Secombe, 19 How. 9, 13, 15 L. Ed.
565, 'It has been well settled, by the
rules and practice of common-law
courts, that it rests exclusively with the
court to determine who is qualified to
become one of its officers, as an
attorney and counsellor, and for what
cause he ought to be removed.'" (p.
727)
In the case of Day and others who collectively
filed a petition to secure license to practice the legal
profession by virtue of a law of state (In re Day, 54 NE
646), the court said in part:
"In the case of Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 333, 18 L.
Ed. 366, the court, holding the test oath for
attorneys to be unconstitutional, explained the
nature of the attorney's office as follows: "They are
officers of the court, admitted as such by its order,
upon evidence of their possessing sufficient legal
learning and fair private character. It has always
been the general practice in this country to obtain
this evidence by an examination of the parties. In
this court the fact of the admission of such officers in
the highest court of the states to which they,
respectively, belong, for three years preceding their
application, is regarded as sufficient evidence of the
possession of the requisite legal learning, and the
statement of counsel moving their admission
sufficient evidence that their private and
professional character is fair. The order of admission
is the judgment of the court that the parties possess
the requisite qualifications as attorneys and
counselors, and are entitled to appear as such and
conduct causes therein. From its entry the parties
become officers of the court, and are responsible to
it for professional misconduct. They hold their office
during good behavior, and can only be deprived of it
for misconduct ascertained and declared by the
judgment of the court after opportunity to be heard
has been afforded. Ex parte Hoyfron, 7 How. (Miss.
127; Fletcher vs. Daingerfield, 20 Cal. 430. Their
admission or their exclusion is not the exercise of a
mere ministerial power. It is the exercise of judicial
power, and has been so held in numerous cases. It
was so held by the court of appeals of New York in
the matter of the application of Cooper for
admission. Re Cooper 22 N. Y. 81. 'Attorneys and
Counsellors,' said that court, 'are not only officers of
the court, but officers whose duties relate almost
exclusively to proceedings of a judicial nature; and
hence their appointment may, with propriety, be
intrusted to the court, and the latter, in performing
his duty, may very justly considered as engaged in
the exercise of their appropriate judicial functions."
(pp. 650- 651).
We quote from other cases, the following
pertinent portions:
"Admission to practice of law
is almost without exception conceded
everywhere to be the exercise of a
judicial function, and this opinion need
not be burdened with citations in this
point. Admission to practice have also
been held to be the exercise of one of
the inherent powers of the court." Re
Bruen, 102 Wash. 472, 172 Pac. 906.
"Admission to the practice of
law is the exercise of a judicial function,
and is an inherent power of the court."
A. C. Brydonjack, vs. State Bar of
California, 281 Pac. 1018; See
Annotation on Power of Legislature
respecting admission to bar, 65, A. L. R.
1512.
On this matter there is certainly a clear
distinction between the functions of the judicial and
legislative departments of the government.
"The distinction between the
functions of the legislative and the
judicial departments is that it is the
province of the legislature to establish
rules that shall regulate and govern in
matters of transactions occurring
subsequent to the legislative action,
while the judiciary determines rights
and obligations with reference to
transactions that are past or conditions
that exist at the time of the exercise of
judicial power, and the distinction is a
vital one and not subject to alteration or
change either by legislative action or by
judicial decrees.
"The judiciary cannot consent
that its province shall be invaded by
either of the other departments of the
government." 16 C. J. S.,
Constitutional Law, p. 229.
"If the legislature cannot thus indirectly control the
action of the courts by requiring of them
construction of the law according to its own views, it
is very plain it cannot do so directly, by settling aside
their judgments, compelling them to grant new
trials, ordering the discharge of offenders, or
directing what particular steps shall be taken in the
progress of a judicial inquiry." Cooley's
Constitutional Limitations, 192.
In decreeing that bar candidates who obtained
in the bar examinations of 1946 to 1952, a general
average of 70 per cent without falling below 50 per cent
in any subject, be admitted in mass to the practice of law,
the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a judgment a
judgment revoking those promulgated by this Court
during the aforecited year affecting the bar candidates
concerned; and although this Court certainly can revoke
these judgments even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no
less certain that only this Court, and not the legislative
nor executive department, that may be so. Any attempt
on the part of any of these departments would be a clear
usurpation of its functions, as is the case with the law in
question.
That the Constitution has conferred on
Congress the power to repeal, alter or supplement the
rules promulgated by this Tribunal, concerning the
admission to the practice of law, is no valid argument.
Section 13, article VIII of the Constitution provides:
"Section 13.The Supreme
Court shall have the power to
promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts,
and the admission to the practice of law.
Said rules shall be uniform for all courts
of the same grade and shall not diminish
increase or modify substantive rights.
The existing laws on pleading, practice,
and procedure are hereby repealed as
statutes, and are declared Rules of
Courts, subject to the power of the
Supreme Court to alter and modify the
same. The Congress shall have the
power to repeal, alter, or supplement
the rules concerning pleading, practice,
and procedure, and the admission to the
practice of law in the Philippines."
Constitution of the Philippines, Art. VIII,
sec. 13.
It will be noted that the Constitution has not
conferred on Congress and this Tribunal equal
responsibilities concerning the admission to the practice
of law. The primary power and responsibility which the
Constitution recognizes continue to reside in this Court.
Had Congress found that this Court has not promulgated
any rule on the matter, it would have nothing over which
to exercise the power granted to it. Congress may repeal,
alter and supplement the rules promulgated by this
Court, but the authority and responsibility over the
admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of
attorneys at law and their supervision remain vested in
the Supreme Court. The power to repeal, alter and
supplement the rules does not signify nor permit that
Congress substitute or take the place of this Tribunal in
the exercise of its primary power on the matter. The
Constitution does not say nor mean that Congress may
admit, suspend, disbar or reinstate directly attorneys at
law, or a determinate group of individuals to the practice
of law. Its power is limited to repeal, modify or
supplement the existing rules on the matter, if according
to its judgment the need for a better service of the legal
profession requires it. But this power does not relieve this
Court of its responsibility to admit, suspend, disbar and
reinstate attorneys at law and supervise the practice of
the legal profession.
Being coordinate and independent branches,
the power to promulgate and enforce rules for the
admission to the practice of law and the concurrent
power to repeal, alter and supplement them may and
should be exercised with the respect that each owes to
the other, giving careful consideration to the
responsibility which the nature of each department
requires. These powers have existed together for
centuries without diminution on each part; the
harmonious delimitation being found in that the
legislature may and should examine if the existing rules
on the admission to the Bar respond to the demands
which public interest requires of a Bar endowed with high
virtues, culture, training and responsibility. The
legislature may, by means of repeal, amendment or
supplemental rules, fill up any deficiency that it may find,
and the judicial power, which has the inherent
responsibility for a good and efficient administration of
justice and the supervision of the practice of the legal
profession, should consider these reforms as the
minimum standards for the elevation of the profession,
and see to it that with these reforms the lofty objective
that is desired in the exercise of its traditional duty of
admitting, suspending, disbarring and reinstating
attorneys at law is realized. They are powers which,
exercised within their proper constitutional limits, are not
repugnant, but rather complementary to each other in
attaining the establishment of a Bar that would respond
to the increasing and exacting necessities of the
administration of justice.

The case of Guaria (1913) 24 Phil., 37,
illustrates our criterion. Guaria took the examination
and failed by a few points to obtain the general average.
A recently enacted law provided that one who had been
appointed to the position of Fiscal may be admitted to
the practice of law without a previous examination. The
Government appointed Guaria and he discharged the
duties of Fiscal in a remote province. This Tribunal
refused to give his license without previous examinations.
The court said:
"Relying upon the provisions
of section 2 of Act No. 1597, the
applicant in this case seeks admission to
the bar, without taking the prescribed
examination, on the ground that he
holds the office of provincial fiscal for
the Province of Batanes. Section 2 of Act
No. 1597, enacted February 28, 1907, is
as follows:
"SEC. 2.Paragraph one of
section thirteen of Act Numbered One
Hundred and ninety, entitled 'An Act
providing a Code of Procedure in Civil
Actions and Special Proceedings in the
Philippine Islands,' is hereby amended
to read as follows:
"1.Those who have been duly
licensed under the laws and orders of
the Islands under the sovereignty of
Spain or of the United States and are in
good and regular standing as members
of the bar of the Philippine Islands at the
time of the adoption of this code;
Provided, That any person who, prior to
the passage of this Act, or at any time
thereafter, shall have held, under the
authority of the United States, the
position of justice of the Supreme Court,
judge of the Court of First Instance, or
judge or associate judge of the Court of
Land Registration, of the Philippine
Islands, or the position of Attorney
General, Solicitor General, Assistant
Attorney General, assistant attorney in
the office of the Attorney General,
prosecuting attorney for the City of
Manila, assistant prosecuting attorney
for the City of Manila, city attorney of
Manila, assistant city attorney of Manila,
provincial fiscal, attorney for the Moro
Province, or assistant attorney for the
Moro Province, may be licensed to
practice law in the courts of the
Philippines Islands without an
examination, upon motion before the
Supreme Court and establishing such
fact to the satisfaction of said court."
"The records of this court disclose that on a former
occasion this appellant took, and failed to pass the
prescribed examination. The report of the examining
board, dated March 23, 1907, shows that he
received an average of only 71 per cent in the
various branches of legal learning upon which he
was examined, thus falling four points short of the
required percentage of 75. We would be delinquent
in the performance of our duty to the public and to
the bar, if, in the face of this affirmative indication of
the deficiency of the applicant in the required
qualifications of learning in the law at the time when
he presented his former application for admission to
the bar, we should grant him a license to practice
law in the courts of these Islands, without first
satisfying ourselves that despite his failure to pass
the examination on that occasion, he now 'possesses
the necessary qualifications of learning and ability.'
"But it is contended that under the provisions of the
above-cited statute the applicant is entitled as of
right to be admitted to the bar without taking the
prescribed examination 'upon motion before the
Supreme Court' accompanied by satisfactory proof
that he has held and now holds the office of
provincial fiscal of the Province of Batanes. It is
urged that having in mind the object which the
legislator apparently sought to attain in enacting the
above-cited amendment to the earlier statute, and
in view of the context generally and especially of the
fact that the amendment was inserted as a proviso
in that section of the original Act which specifically
provides for the admission of certain candidates
without examination, the clause may be licensed to
practice law in the courts of the Philippine Islands
without any examination.' It is contended that this
mandatory construction is imperatively required in
order to give effect to the apparent intention of the
legislator, and to the candidate's claim de jure to
have the power exercised."
And after copying article 9 of Act of July 1, 1902
of the Congress of the United States, articles 2, 16 and 17
of Act No. 136, and articles 13 to 16 of Act 190, the Court
continued:
"Manifestly, the jurisdiction thus conferred upon this
court by the commission and confirmed to it by the
Act of Congress would be limited and restricted, and
in a case such as that under consideration wholly
destroyed, by giving the word 'may,' as used in the
above citation from Act No. 1597, a mandatory
rather than a permissive effect. But any act of the
commission which has the effect of setting at naught
in whole or in part the Act of Congress of July 1,
1902, or of any Act of Congress prescribing, defining
or limiting the power conferred upon the
commission is to that extent invalid and void, as
transcending its rightful limits and authority.
Speaking on the application of the law to those
who were appointed to the positions enumerated, and
with particular emphasis in the case of Guaria, the Court
held:
"In the various cases wherein
applications for admission to the bar
under the provisions of this statute have
been considered heretofore, we have
accepted the fact that such
appointments had been made as
satisfactory evidence of the
qualifications of the applicant. But in all
of those cases we had reason to believe
that the applicants had been practicing
attorneys prior to the date of their
appointment.
"In the case under
consideration, however, it affirmatively
appears that the applicant was not and
never had been practicing attorney in
this or any other jurisdiction prior to the
date of his appointment as provincial
fiscal, and it further affirmatively
appears that he was deficient in the
required qualifications at the time when
he last applied for admission to the bar.
"In the light of this affirmative
proof of his deficiency on that occasion,
we do not think that his appointment to
the office of provincial fiscal is in itself
satisfactory proof of his possession of
the necessary qualifications of learning
and ability. We conclude therefore that
this application for license to practice in
the courts of the Philippines, should be
denied.
"In view, however, of the fact
that when he took the examination he
fell only four points short of the
necessary grade to entitle him to a
license to practice; and in view also of
the fact that since that time he has held
the responsible office of the governor of
the Province of Sorsogon and
presumably gave evidence of such
marked ability in the performance of the
duties of that office that the Chief
Executive, with the consent and
approval of the Philippine Commission,
sought to retain him in the Government
service by appointing him to the office
of provincial fiscal, we think we would
be justified under the above-cited
provisions of Act No. 1597 in waiving in
his case the ordinary examination
prescribed by general rule, provided he
offers satisfactory evidence of his
proficiency in a special examination
which will be given him by a committee
of the court upon his application
therefor, without prejudice to his right,
if he desires so to do, to present himself
at any of the ordinary examinations
prescribed by general rule." (In re
Guaria, pp. 48-49.)
It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power
to grant license for the practice of law belongs exclusively
to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the
matter is of permissive character, or as other authorities
say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license.
The law in question, like those in the Case of
Day and Cannon, has been found also to suffer from the
fatal defect of being a class legislation, and that if it has
intended to make a classification, it is arbitrary and
unreasonable.
In the case of Day, a law enacted on February 21, 1899
required of the Supreme Court, until December 31 of that
year, to grant license for the practice of law to those
students who began studying before November 4, 1897,
and had studied for two years and presented a diploma
issued by a school of law, or to those who had studied in
a law office and would pass an examination, or to those
who had studied for three years if they commenced their
studies after the aforementioned date. The Supreme
Court declared that this law was unconstitutional being,
among others, a class legislation. The Court said:
"This is an application to this
court for admission to the bar of this
state by virtue of diplomas from law
schools issued to the applicants. The act
of the general assembly passed in 1899,
under which the application is made, is
entitled 'An act to amend section 1 of an
act entitled "An act to revise the law in
relation to attorneys and counselors,'
approved March 28, 1894, in force July
1, 1874.' The amendment, as far as it
appears in the enacting clause, consists
in the addition to the section of the
following: 'And every applicant for a
license who shall comply with the rules
of the supreme court in regard to
admission to the bar in force at the time
such applicant commend the study of
law, either in a law office or a law school
or college, shall be granted a license
under this act notwithstanding any
subsequent changes in said rules'." In
re Day et al, 54 N. Y., p. 646.
. . . "After said provision there
is a double proviso, one branch of which
is that up to December 31, 1899, this
court shall grant a license of admittance
to the bar to the holder of every
diploma regularly issued by any law
school regularly organized under the
laws of this state, whose regular course
of law studies is two years, and requiring
an attendance by the student of at least
36 weeks in each of such years, and
showing that the student began the
study of law prior to November 4, 1897,
and accompanied with the usual proofs
of good moral character. The other
branch of the proviso is that any student
who has studied law for two years in a
law office, or part of such time in a law
office, 'and part in the aforesaid law
school,' and whose course of study
began prior to November 4, 1897, shall
be admitted upon a satisfactory
examination by the examining board in
the branches now required by the rules
of this court. If the right to admission
exists at all, it is by virtue of the proviso,
which, it is claimed, confers substantial
rights and privileges upon the persons
named therein, and establishes rules of
legislative creation for their admission
to the bar." (p. 647.)

"Considering the proviso,
however, as an enactment, it is clearly a
special legislation, prohibited by the
constitution, and invalid as such. If the
legislature had any right to admit
attorneys to practice in the courts and
take part in the administration of
justice, and could prescribe the
character of evidence which should be
received by the court as conclusive of
the requisite learning and ability of
persons to practice law, it could only be
done by a general law, and not by
granting special and exclusive privileges
to certain persons or classes of persons.
Const. art 4, section 2. The right to
practice law is a privilege, and a license
for that purpose makes the holder an
officer of the court, and confers upon
him the right to appear for litigants, to
argue causes, and to collect fees
therefor, and creates certain
exemptions, such as from jury services
and arrest on civil process while
attending court. The law conferring such
privileges must be general in its
operation. No doubt the legislature, in
framing an enactment for that purpose,
may classify persons so long as the law
establishing classes in general, and has
some reasonable relation to the end
sought. There must be some difference
which furnishes a reasonable basis for
different legislation as to the different
classes, and not a purely arbitrary one,
having no just relation to the subject of
the legislation. Braceville Coal Co. vs.
People, 147 III. 66, 35 N. E. 62; Ritchie
vs. People, 155 III. 98, 40 N. E. 454;
Railroad Co. vs. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150, 17
Sup. Ct. 255.
"The length of time a physician
has practiced, and the skill acquired by
experience, may furnish a basis for
classification (Williams vs. People 121 Ill.
48, II N. E. 881); but the place where
such physician has resided and practiced
his profession cannot furnish such basis,
and is an arbitrary discrimination,
making an enactment based upon it void
(State vs. Pennyeor, 65 N. E. 113, 18 Atl.
878). Here the legislature undertakes to
say what shall serve as a test of fitness
for the profession of the law and plainly,
any classification must have some
reference to learning, character, or
ability to engage in such practice. The
proviso is limited, first, to a class of
persons who began the study of law
prior to November 4, 1897. This class is
subdivided into two classes - First, those
presenting diplomas issued by any law
school of this state before December 31,
1899; and, second, those who studied
law for the period of two years in a law
office, or part of the time in a law school
and part in a law office, who are to be
admitted upon examination in the
subjects specified in the present rules of
this court, and as to this latter
subdivision there seems to be no limit of
time for making application for
admission. As to both classes, the
conditions of the rules are dispensed
with, and as between the two different
conditions and limits of time are fixed.
No course of study is prescribed for the
law school, but a diploma granted upon
the completion of any sort of course its
managers may prescribe is made all-
sufficient. Can there be anything with
relation to the qualifications or fitness of
persons to practice law resting upon the
mere date of November 4, 1897, which
will furnish a basis of classification.
Plainly not. Those who began the study
of law November 4th could qualify
themselves to practice in two years as
well as those who began on the 3rd. The
classes named in the proviso need
spend only two years in study, while
those who commenced the next day
must spend three years, although they
would complete two years before the
time limit. The one who commenced on
the 3d. If possessed of a diploma, is to
be admitted without examination
before December 31, 1899, and without
any prescribed course of study, while as
to the other the prescribed course must
be pursued, and the diploma is utterly
useless. Such classification cannot rest
upon any natural reason, or bear any
just relation to the subject sought, and
none is suggested. The proviso is for the
sole purpose of bestowing privileges
upon certain defined persons. (pp. 647-
648.)
In the case of Cannon above cited, State vs.
Cannon, 240 N. W. 441, where the legislature attempted
by law to reinstate Cannon to the practice of law, the
court also held with regards to its aspect of being a class
legislation:
"But the statute is invalid for
another reason. If it be granted that the
legislature has power to prescribe
ultimately and definitely the
qualifications upon which courts must
admit and license those applying as
attorneys at law, that power can not be
exercised in the manner here
attempted. That power must be
exercised through general laws which
will apply to all alike and accord equal
opportunity to all. Speaking of the right
of the Legislature to exact qualifications
of those desiring to pursue chosen
callings, Mr. Justice Field in the case of
Dent. vs. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 114,
121, 9 S. Ct. 232, 233, 32 L. Ed. 626, said:
'It is undoubtedly the right of every
citizen of the United States to follow any
lawful calling, business or profession he
may choose, subject only to such
restrictions as are imposed upon all
persons of like age, sex, and condition.
This right may in many respects be
considered as a distinguishing feature of
our republican institutions. Here all
vocations are all open to every one on
like conditions. All may be pursued as
sources of livelihood, some requiring
years of study and great learning for
their successful prosecution. The
interest, or, as it is sometimes termed,
the 'estate' acquired in them - that is,
the right to continue their prosecution -
is often of great value to the possessors
and cannot be arbitrarily taken from
them, any more than their real or
personal property can be thus taken. It
is fundamental under our system of
government that all similarly situated
and possessing equal qualifications shall
enjoy equal opportunities. Even statutes
regulating the practice of medicine,
requiring examinations to establish the
possession on the part of the application
of his proper qualifications before he
may be licensed to practice, have been
challenged, and courts have seriously
considered whether the exemption from
such examinations of those practicing in
the state at the time of the enactment
of the law rendered such law
unconstitutional because of
infringement upon this general
principle. State vs. Thomas Call, 121 N.
C. 643, 28 S. E. 517; see, also, The State
ex rel. Winkler vs. Rosenberg, 101 Wis.
172, 76 N. W. 345; State vs. Whitcom,
122 Wis. 110, 99 N. W. 468.
"This law singles out Mr.
Cannon and assumes to confer upon
him the right to practice law and to
constitute him an officer of this Court as
a mere matter of legislative grace or
favor. It is not material that he had once
established his right to practice law and
that one time he possessed the requisite
learning and other qualifications to
entitle him to that right. That fact in no
manner affect the power of the
Legislature to select from the great body
of the public an individual upon whom it
would confer its favors.
"A statute of the state of
Minnesota (Laws 1929, c. 424)
commanded the Supreme Court to
admit to the practice of law without
examination, all who had 'serve in the
military or naval forces of the United
States during the World War and
received an honorable discharge
therefrom and who (were disabled
therein or thereby within the purview of
the Act of Congress approved June 7th,
1924, known as 'World War Veteran's
Act, 1924 and whose disability is rated
at least ten per cent thereunder at the
time of the passage of this Act." This Act
was held unconstitutional on the ground
that it clearly violated the quality
clauses of the constitution of that state.
In re Application of George W.
Humphrey, 178 Minn. 331, 227 N. W.
179.
A good summary of a classification
constitutionally acceptable is explained in 12 Am. Jur.
151-153 as follows:
"The general rule is well
settled by unanimity of the authorities
that a classification to be valid must rest
upon material differences between the
person included in it and those excluded
and, furthermore, must be based upon
substantial distinctions. As the rule has
sometimes avoided the constitutional
prohibition, must be founded upon
pertinent and real differences, as
distinguished from irrelevant and
artificial once. Therefore, any law that is
made applicable to one class of citizens
only must be based on some substantial
difference between the situation of that
class and other individuals to which it
does not apply and must rest on some
reason on which it can be defended. In
other words, there must be such a
difference between the situation and
circumstances of all the members of the
class and the situation and
circumstances of all other members of
the state in relation to the subjects of
the discriminatory legislation as
presents a just and natural reason for
the difference made in their liabilities
and burdens and in their rights and
privileges. A law is not general because
it operates on all within a clause unless
there is a substantial reason why it is
made to operate on that class only, and
not generally on all." (12 Am Jur. pp.
151-153.)
Pursuant to the law in question, those who,
without a grade below 50 per cent in any subject, have
obtained a general average of 69.5 per cent in the bar
examinations in 1946 to 1951, 70.5 per cent in 1952, 71.5
per cent in 1953, and those will obtain 72.5 per cent in
1954, and 73.5 per cent in 1955, will be permitted to take
and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as
members of the Bar, notwithstanding that the rules
require a minimum general average of 75 per cent, which
has been invariably followed since 1950. Is there any
motive of the nature indicated by the abovementioned
authorities, for this classification? If there is none, and
none has been given, then the classification is fatally
defective.
It was indicated that those who failed in 1944,
1941 or the years before, with the general average
indicated, were not included because the Tribunal has no
record of the unsuccessful candidates of those years. This
fact does not justify the unexplained classification of
unsuccessful candidates by years, from 1946-1951, 1952,
1953, 1954, 1955. Neither is the exclusion of those who
failed before said years under the same conditions
justified. The fact that this Court has no record of
examinations prior to 1946 does not signify that no one
concerned may prove by some other means his right to
an equal consideration.

To defend the disputed law from being declared
unconstitutional on account of its retroactivity, it is
argued that it is curative, and that in such form it is
constitutional. What does Rep. Act 972 intend to cure?
Only from 1946 to 1949 were there cases in which the
Tribunal permitted admission to the bar of candidates
who did not obtain the general average of 75 per cent: in
1946 those who obtained only 72 per cent; in the 1947
and those who had 69 per cent or more; in 1948, 70 per
cent and in 1949, 74 per cent; and in 1950 to 1953, those
who obtained 74 per cent, which was considered by the
Court as equivalent to 75 per cent as prescribed by the
Rules, by reason of circumstances deemed to be
sufficiently justifiable. These changes in the passing
averages during those years were all that could be
objected to or criticized. Now, is it desired to undo what
had been done cancel the license that was issued to
those who did not obtain the prescribed 75 per cent?
Certainly not. The disputed law clearly does not propose
to do so. Concededly, it approves what has been done by
this Tribunal. What Congress lamented is that the Court
did not consider 69.5 per cent obtained by those
candidates who failed in 1946 to 1952 as sufficient to
qualify them to practice law. Hence, it is the lack of will or
defect of judgment of the Court that is being cured, and
to complete the cure of this infirmity, the effectivity of
the disputed law is being extended up to the years 1953,
1954 and 1955, increasing each year the general average
by one per cent, with the order that said candidates be
admitted to the Bar. This purpose, manifest in the said
law, is the best proof that what the law attempts to
amend and correct are not the rules promulgated, but
the will or judgment of the Court, by means of simply
taking its place. This is doing directly what the Tribunal
should have done during those years according to the
judgment of Congress. In other words, the power
exercised was not to repeal, alter or supplement the
rules, which continue in force. What was done was to
stop or suspend them. And this power is not included in
what the Constitution has granted to Congress, because it
falls within the power to apply the rules. This power
corresponds to the judiciary, to which such duty been
confided.
Article 2 of the law in question permits partial
passing of examinations, at indefinite intervals. The grave
defect of this system is that it does not take into account
that the laws and jurisprudence are not stationary, and
when a candidate finally receives his certificate, it may
happen that the existing laws and jurisprudence are
already different, seriously affecting in this manner his
usefulness. The system that the said law prescribes was
used in the first bar examinations of this country, but was
abandoned for this and other disadvantages. In this case,
however, the fatal defect is that the article is not
expressed in the title of the Act. While this law according
to its title will have temporary effect only from 1946 to
1955, the text of article 2 establishes a permanent system
for an indefinite time. This is contrary to Section 21(1),
article VI of the Constitution, which vitiates and annuls
article 2 completely; and because it is inseparable from
article 1, it is obvious that its nullity affects the entire law.
Laws are unconstitutional on the following
grounds: first, because they are not within the legislative
powers of Congress to enact, or Congress has exceeded
its powers; second, because they create or establish
arbitrary methods or forms that infringe constitutional
principles; and third, because their purposes or effects
violate the Constitution or its basic principles. As has
already been seen, the contested law suffers from these
fatal defects.
Summarizing, we are of the opinion and hereby
declare that Republic act No. 972 is unconstitutional and
therefore, void, and without any force nor effect for the
following reasons, to wit:
1.Because its declared purpose is to admit 810
candidates who failed in the bar examinations of 1946-
1952, and who, it admits, are certainly inadequately
prepared to practice law, as was exactly found by this
Court in the aforesaid years. It decrees the admission to
the Bar of these candidates, depriving this Tribunal of the
opportunity to determine if they are at present already
prepared to become members of the Bar. It obliges the
Tribunal to perform something contrary to reason and in
an arbitrary manner. This is a manifest encroachment on
the constitutional responsibility of the Supreme Court.
2.Because it is, in effect, a judgment revoking
the resolution of this Court on the petitions of these 810
candidates, without having examined their respective
examination papers, and although it is admitted that this
Tribunal may reconsider said resolution at any time for
justifiable reasons, only this Court and no other may
revise and after them. In attempting to do it directly
Republic act No. 972 violated the Constitution.
3.By the disputed law, Congress has exceeded
its legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement the
rules on admission to the Bar. Such additional or
amendatory rules are, as they ought to be, intended to
regulate acts subsequent to its promulgation and should
tend to improve and elevate the practice of law, and this
Tribunal shall consider these rules as minimum norms
towards that end in the admission, suspension,
disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers to the Bar,
inasmuch as a good bar assists immensely in the daily
performance of judicial functions and is essential to a
worthy administration of justice. It is therefore the
primary and inherent prerogative of the Supreme Court
to render the ultimate decision on who may be admitted
and may continue in the practice of law according to
existing rules.
4.The reason advanced for the pretended
classification of candidates, which the law makes, is
contrary to facts which are of general knowledge and
does not justify the admission to the Bar of law students
inadequately prepared. The pretended classification is
arbitrary. It is undoubtedly a class legislation.
5.Article 2 of Republic act No. 972 is not
embraced in the title of the law, contrary to what the
Constitution enjoins, and being inseparable from the
provisions of article 1, the entire law is void..
6.Lacking in eight votes to declare the nullity of
that part of article 1 referring to the examinations of
1953 to 1955, said part of article 1, insofar as it concerns
the examinations in those years, shall continue in force.
RESOLUTION
Upon mature deliberation by this Court, after
hearing and availing of the magnificent and impassioned
discussion of the contested law by our Chief Justice at the
opening and close of the debate among the members of
the Court, and after hearing the judicious observations of
two of our beloved colleagues who since the beginning
have announced their decision not to take part in voting,
we, the eight members of the Court who subscribe to this
decision have voted and resolved, and have decided for
the Court, and under the authority of the same:
1.That (a) the portion of article 1 of Republic act
No. 972 referring to the examinations of 1946 to 1952,
and (b) all of article 2 of said law are unconstitutional
and, therefore, void and without force and effect.
2.That, for lack of unanimity in the eight
Justices, that part of article 1 which refers to the
examinations subsequent to the approval of the law, that
is from 1953 to 1955 inclusive, is valid and shall continue
to be in force, in conformity with section 10, article VII of
the Constitution.
Consequently, (1) all the above-mentioned
petitions of the candidates who failed in the
examinations of 1946 to 1952 inclusive are denied, and
(2) all candidates who in the examinations of 1953
obtained a general average of 71.5 per cent or more,
without having a grade below 50 per cent in any subject,
are considered as having passed, whether they have filed
petitions for admission or not. After this decision has
become final, they shall be permitted to take and
subscribe the corresponding oath of office as members of
the Bar on the date or dates that the Chief Justice may
set. So ordered..
Bengzon, Montemayor, Jugo, Labrador, Pablo,
Padilla and Reyes, JJ., concur.
ANNEX I
PETITIONERS UNDER Republic
act No. 972
A resume of pertinent facts
concerning the bar examinations of
1946 to 1953 inclusive follows:
August, 1946 1
Board of Examiners: Hon.
Pedro Tuason, Chairman, Prof. Gerardo
Florendo, Atty. Bernardino Guerrero,
Atty. Joaquin Ramirez, Atty. Crispin
Oben, Hon. Jose Teodoro, Atty. Federico
Agrava, Atty. Jose Perez Cardenas, and
Hon. Bienvenido A. Tan, members.
Number of candidates206
Number of candidates whose grades
were raised12
73's6
72's6
Number of candidates who passed85
Number of candidates who failed121
Number of those affected by Republic
act No. 97218
Percentage of success(per cent)41.62
Percentage of failure(per cent)58.74
Passing grade(per cent)72
November, 1946
Board of Examiners: The same
as that of August, 1946, except Hon.
Jose Teodoro who was substituted by
Atty. Honesto K. Bausan.
Number of candidates481
Number of candidates whose grades
were raised19
(72 per cent and above but
below 73 per cent
Minutes of March 31, 1947).
Number of candidates who passed249
Number of candidates who failed228
Number of those affected by Republic
act No. 97243
Percentage of success(per cent)52.20
Percentage of failure(per cent)47.80
Passing grade(per cent)72.
(By resolution of the Court).
October, 1947
Board of Examiners: Hon.
Cesar Bengzon, Chairman, Hon.
Guillermo B. Guevara, Atty. Antonio
Araneta, Atty. Simon Cruz, Hon. Sixto de
la Costa, Atty. Celso B. Jamora, Hon.
Emilio Pea, Atty. Federico Agrava, Atty.
Carlos B. Hilado, Members.
Number of candidates749
Number of candidates whose grades
were raised43
70.55 per cent with 2 subjects
below 50 per cent1
69 per cent40
68 per cent2

Number of candidates who passed409
Number of candidates who failed340
Number of those affected by Rep. Act
No. 972972
Percentage of success(per cent)54.59
Percentage of failure(per cent)45.41
Passing grade(per cent)69.
(By resolution of the Court).
NOTE. In passing the 2
whose grades were 68.95 per
cent and 68.1 per cent
respectively, the Court found
out that they were not
benefited at all by the bonus
of 12 points given by the
Examiner in Civil Law.
August, 1948
Board of Examiners: Hon.
Marceliano R. Montemayor, Chairman
Hon. Luis P. Torres, Hon. Felipe
Natividad, Hon. Jose Teodoro, Sr., Atty.
Federico Agrava, Atty. Macario Peralta,
Sr., Hon. Jesus G. Barrera, Hon. Rafael
Amparo, Atty. Alfonso Ponce Enrile,
Members.
Number of candidates899
Number of candidates whose grades
were raised64
71's29
70's35
Number of candidates who passed490
Number of candidates who failed409
Number of those affected by Rep. Act
No. 97211
Percentage of success(per cent)62.40
Percentage of failure(per cent)37.60
Passing grade(per cent)70
(By Resolution of the Court).
August, 1949
Board of Examiners: Hon.
Sabino Padilla, Chairman, Hon. Fernando
Jugo, 1 Hon. Enrique Filamor, Atty.
Salvador Araneta, Hon. Pastor M.
Endencia, Atty. Federico Agrava, Hon.
Mariano H. de Joya, Hon. Felipe
Natividad, Atty. Emeterio Rarcelon,
Members.
Number of candidates1,218
Number of candidates whose grades
were raised (74's)55
Number of candidates who passed686
Number of candidates who failed532
Number of those affected by Republic
act No. 972164
Percentage of success(per cent)56.28
Percentage of failure(per cent)43.72
Passing grades(per cent)74
(By resolution of the Court).
August, 1950
Board of Examiners: Hon.
Fernando Jugo, 1 Chairman, Hon.
Guillermo B. Guevara, Atty. Enrique
Altavas, Atty. Marcial P. Lichauco, Atty.
Carlos B. Hilado, Atty. J. Antonio
Araneta, Hon. Enrique V. Filamor, Hon.
Francisco A. Delgado, Hon. Antonio
Horrilleno, Members.
Number of candidates1,316
Number of candidates whose grades
were raised38
(The grade of 74 was raised to
75 per cent by
recommendation and
authority of the examiner in
Remedial Law, Atty. Francisco
Delgado).
Number of candidates who passed423
Number of candidates who failed894
Number of those affected by Republic
act No. 97226
Percentage of success(per cent)32.14
Percentage of failure(per cent)67.86
Passing grade(per cent)75
August, 1951
Board of Examiners: Hon.
Guillermo F. Pablo, Chairman, Hon.
Pastor M. Endencia, Atty. Enrique
Altavas, Hon. Manuel Lim, Hon. Felipe
Natividad, Hon. Vicente Albert, Atty.
Arturo Alafriz, Hon. Enrique V. Filamor,
Hon, Alfonso Felix, Members.
Number of candidates2,068
Number of candidates whose grades
were raised (74's)112
Number of candidates who passed1,189
Number of candidates who failed879
Number of those affected by Republic
act No. 972196
Percentage of success(per cent)57.49
Percentage of failure(per cent)42.51
Passing grade(per cent)75
August, 1952
Board of Examiners: Hon.
Sabino Padilla, Chairman, Hon. Pastor
M. Endencia, Hon. Enrique V. Filamor,
Atty. Francisco Ortigas, Hon. Emilio
Pea, Atty. Emilio P. Virata, Hon. Alfonso
Felix, Hon. Felipe Natividad, Atty.
Macario Peralta, Sr., Members.
Number of candidates2,733
Number of candidates whose grades
were raised (74's)163
Number of candidates who passed1,705
Number of candidates who failed1,033
Number of those affected by Republic
act No. 972426
Percentage of success(per cent)62.27
Percentage of failure(per cent)37.73
Passing grade(per cent)75
August, 1953
Board of Examiners: Hon.
Fernando Jugo, Chairman, Hon. Pastor
M. Endencia, Atty. Enrique Altavas, Atty.
Francisco Ortigas, Jr., Hon. Emilio Pea,
Atty. Jose S. de la Cruz, Hon. Alfonso
Felix, Hon. Felipe Natividad, Hon.
Mariano L. de la Rosa, Members.
Number of candidates2,555
Number of candidates whose grades
were raised (74's)100
Number of candidates who passed1,570
Number of candidates who failed986
Number of those affected by Republic
act No. 972284
Percentage of success(per cent)61.04
Percentage of failure(per cent)38.96
Passing grade(per cent)75
A list of petitioners for admission to the Bar
under Republic act No. 972, grouped by the years in
which they took the bar examinations, with annotations
as to who had presented motions for reconsideration
which were denied (MRD), and who filed mere motions
for reconsideration without invoking said law, which are
still pending, follows:
PETITIONERS UNDER THE BAR
FLUNKERS' LAW
Civ.LandMerc.Int.Pol.Crim.Rem.Leg.Gen.
Av.
MRD-1.Agunod, Filemon
L667161768083737571.4
MRD-2.Cunanan,
Albino767274757070657271.45
3.Mejia, Flaviano
V.646465688374688069.85
1948
MRD-4.Orlina, Soledad
R.716866756375708869.9
MRD-5.Vivero, Antonio
Lu.757373656366658069.95
MRD-6.Gatchalian, Salud72667175786865
5069.65
1949
7.Abaya, Jesus
A.697975757189557570.8
MRD-8.Advincula, David
D.768062868172606570.5
9.Agraviador, Alfredo
L.638570778081658071.8
10.Alacar, Pascual
C.616383797185658072.05
11.Amog, Pedro
M.756676788174558572.2
12.Apolinario, Miguel
S.758478787070607571.95
13.Aquino, Maximo
G.827771777677607573.15
14.Asinas, Candido
D.758369808183558572.65
15.Baldivino, Jose
B.756572828269608071.95
16.Balintona,
Bernardo758064787467657070
17.Banawa, Angel
L.787070758183606072.3
18.Bandala, Anacleto
A.668066719372557069.6
19.Bandon, Alawadin
L.747969779173608073.35
20.Baquero,
Benjamin767964778572657572.5
21.Blanco,
Jose757570757776609072.5
22.Buenaluz, Victoriano
T.757172786782607570.85
23.Canda, Benjamin
S.757275827677657573.55
24.Canon,
Guillermo778667887569708573.9
25.Carlos, Estela
S.758181797273657073.8
26.Cerezo, Gregorio
O.697676797180558070.4
27.Clarin, Manuel
L.758276817369707573.95
28.Claudio, Conrado
O.766278777372607071.4
29.Condevillamar, Antonio
V.686574808575607571.6
MRD-30.Cornejo, Crisanto
R.727569828379658073.4
31.Corona, Olvido
D.687673818172607571.15
32.Dizon, Marcial
C.768669837574658073.1
33.Enriquez, Agustin
P.757770818177658073.75
34.Espiritu, Ireneo
E..808869757677657573.8
35.Fernandez, Macario
J.638276758184657572.95
36.Gallardo, Amando
C.787967777675606570.95
37.Garcia, Freidrich
M.768066757270607569.7
38.Garcia, Julian
L.647768828977657572.15
39.Garcia, Leon
Mo.778671806082657571.85
40.Garcia, Pedro
V.768273817483608573.6
41.Garcia, Santiago
C.629179757275658071.8
42.Genoves,
Pedro758370788776558072.7
43.Gonzales, Amado
P.757171758675607572.65
44.Guia, Odon R.
de777666817476607570.9
45.Fernandez,
Simeon626871807490657570.85
46.Jakosalem,
Filoteo828373826187657073.6
47.Jesus, Felipe D.
de758367797885607572.45
48.Jocom, Jacobo
M.777774777464558570.65
49.Juares,
Nicolas778456767382608570
50.Kalalang,
Remegio657574807070658570.3
51.Layumas, Vicente
L.678465758966608070.3
52.Leyson, Amancio
F.698375768175657573.15
53.Libanan,
Marcelino718361778081658571.75
54.Lim, Jose
E.777772767264657071.15
55.Lim, Jose
F.707562838071658070.4
56.Linao, Mariano
M.668476788075607571.75
57.Lopez, Angelo
P.678175727981558071
58.Lopez, Eliezar
M.777560757785607570.7
59.Lopez, Nicanor
S.727170787784607571.55
60.Manoleto, Proceso
D.727065788190608071.95
61.Mancao, Alfredo
P.676471837676658070.95
62.Manera, Mariano
A.757875756879606571
63.Mercado, Arsenio
N.676471837676658070.95
64.Miranda, Benjamin
G.768167827477658072.55
65.Manad, Andres
B.777568826972657571.15
1949
66.Orosco, Casimiro
P.728469817082657571.9
67.Padua, Manuel
C.767668807979507570.1
68.Palang, Basilio
S.717582715587557569.6
69.Palma,
Cuadrato627569938079558069.5
70.Paganiban, Jose
V.678361819174607570.6
71.Pareja,
Felipe667175816774607068.75
72.Patalinjug,
Eriberto737778737871557571.25
73.Paulin, Jose
C.666971778382657572.1
4.Pido, Serafin
C.727863807185708072.05
75.Pimentel, Luis
P.777576817668558071.6
76.Plantilla, Rodrigo
C.727868897981658573.55
77.Regalario, Benito
B.728064807581558069.55
78.Robis, Casto
P.627774736880708070.9
79.Rodil, Francisco
C.686970817675657570.75
80.Rodriguez, Mariano
I.807569807280658073.35
81.Romero, Crispulo
P.787566777683657572.85
82.Saez, Porfirio
D.757572816977607571
83.Saliguma, Crisogono
D.797974786965657071.8
84.Samano, Fortunato
A.758472777082607571.9
85.Santos, Faustina
C.716868767585557569.5
86.Santos, Josefina
R.686976717782657572.3
87.Seludo, Ananias
G.758069797782657573.25
88.Semilia, Rafael
I.688555838979658071.25
89.Telan,
Gaudencio777970757075607570.85
90.Tesorero, Leocadio
T.757163758262656369.65
91.Torre, Valentin S. de
la858171766965557070.4
92.Torres, Ariston
L.787172816184558570.4
93.Veyra, Zosimo C.
de707571796580658070.65
94.Viado,
Jose677074757590558070.7
95.Villacarlos, Delfin
A.738771826970758573.85
96.Villamil, Leonor
S.738176868673558573.6
97.Zabala, Amando
A.767067757676607570.6
1950
MRD-98.Cruz, Filomeno de
la707178817672649673.4
99.Espaola, Pablo
S.717855768569659370.2
100.Foronda, Clarencio
J.607868798488629371.9
101.Hechanova,
Vicente597675756968759671.3
MRD-102.Pealosa, Osias
R.807861766177668570.2
103.Sarmiento, Floro A.
658663828972607270.15

MRD-104.Torre, Catalino
P.758568786967656970.25
105.Ungson, Fernando
S.618775705785838272.8
1951
106.Abasolo,
Romulo777064657670766471.7
107.Adeva, Daniel
G.755974656951786770.4
108.Aguilar, Vicente
Z.736368757069757571.25
109.Amodia, Juan
T.757666757660777672.35
MRD-110.Aosa, Pablo
S.767863757461757971.6
111.Antiola, Anastacio R.
687675707170816673.05
112.Aquino, S. Rey
A.707171607462767771.1
113.Atienza, Manuel
G.7868808651827573.85
114.Avancea,
Alfonso717165757072788071.8
MRD-115.Balacuit, Camilo
N.757375707265757673.25
116.Barinaga, Jeremias
L.686973707450807971.2
MRD-117.Barrientos, Ambrosio
D.766067557463776270.25
MRD-118.Benitez, Tomas
P.677575607372757872.2
119.Biason, Sixto
F.738267656672776871.25
MRD-120. Brias, Isagani,
A.716974707652797271.95
121. Buela, Arcadio
P.727761707158797169.75
122.Cabilao, Leonardo
S.735075757560717971.25
123.Cabrera, Ireneo
M.75667065728170792.4
124.Cacacho, Emilio V.
125.Calilung, Soledad
C.647373807357755969.65
MRD-126.Calimlim, Jose
B.647373807357755969.65
127.Calimlim, Pedro
B.668269606952837570
128.Camello, Sotero
H.707763657566846471.55
129.Campos, Juan
A.718870756469716270.15
130.Castillo, Antonio
del787870607967697672.65
MRD-131.Castillo, Dominador
Ad.756172757471676671.1
MRD-132.Castro, Jesus
B.728672756575767172.85
133.Casuga, Bienvenido
B.757272706961756070.95
134.Cabangbang, Santiago B.
776761807359837672.2
135.Cruz, Federico S.
697475756865767071.65
136.Dacanay, Eufemio
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V.637163857061857970.55
156.Lavilles, Cesar
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U.647065607265927571.75
158.Leon, Marcelo D. de
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MRD-162.Maligaya, Demetrio
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Gregorio676769807167757570.65
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MRD-165.Marcial, Meynardo
R.667574707567817573.15
166.Martin, Benjamin
S.687263756963846270.1
MRD-167.Monterroyo, Catalina
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MRD-168.Montero, Leodegario
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MRD-171.Navallo, Capistrano
C.707268858166717472.1
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MRD-175.Perez, Cesario
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MRD-179.Redor, Fransisco,
K.627773756964766970
MRD-180.Regis, Deogracias
A.767468656565887573.35
181.Rigor, Estelita
C.677861807177796570.9
MRD-182.Rimorin-Gordo,
Estela707262608866677970.15
183.Rosario, Prisco
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184.Rosario, Vicente D.
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185.Saavedra,
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186.Salazar, Alfredo
N.667273756768776970.85
187.Salem, Romulo
R.778172657360767573
188.Foz, Julita
A.757275756570766472.5
189.Santa Ana, Candido
T.776965758175707573
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V.7672756862767973.1
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Samuel737972757159846573.3
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195.Tapayan, Domingo
A.697269707673827973.75
MRD-196.Tiausas, Miguel
V.676071757967846072.7
197.Torres, Carlos
P.687171707063827171.6
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A.657275757167787672.1
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C.658073756879657570.2
201.Villagonzalo, Job
R.786774657251697170.25
202.Villarama, Jr.,
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1952
203.Abacon,
Pablo757278817872645572.7
MRP-204.Abad,
Agapito737673857563627570.95
MRP-205.Abella, Ludovico
B.708176817066775872.7
MRP-206.Abellera, Geronimo
F.7579798776516370717
MRP-207.Abenojar, Agapito
N.7278847075697072.9
208.Alandy, Doroteo
R.648393916859606071.2
209.Alano, Fabian
T.708361837287727071.9
MRP-210.Alcantara, Pablo
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211.Arcangel, Agustin
Ag.758571737665686571.85
212.Acosta, Dionisio
N.758178875665777072.8
MRP-213.Abinguna, Agapito
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214.Adove, Nehemias
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215.Adrias, Inocencio
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R.758373887262726272.65
217.Andrada, Mariano
L.768566876377757773
MRP-218.Almeda, Serafin V.72
7275816167736570.75
219.Almonte-Peralta,
Felicidad737172917567655370.7
MRP-220.Almodia, Juan
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MRP-221.Antonio, Felino
A.717681837952727073.3
MRP-222.Antonio, Jose
S.759290686564686073.75
223.Aonuevo, Ramos
B.718778816463747672.7
224.Aquino, S. Rey
A.677757786970698067.7
225.Arteche, Filomeno
D.788350897677707070.8
MRP-226.Arribas, Isaac
M.757870817370677872.2
MRP-227.Azucena, Ceferino
D.726778897267776573.95
228.Atienza,
Ricardo728770796655757570.85
229.Balacuit, Camilo
N.757889757054667573.3
MRP-230.Baclig, Cayetano
S.778483806970616573
231.Balcita, Oscar
C.757779906460675070.65
232.Barilea, Dominador
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MRP-233.Banta, Jose
Y.758077817563717573.95
MRP-234. Barrientos, Ambrosio
D.767067806765708170.7
235.Batucan, Jose
M.667678886276677871.2
236.Bautista, Atilano
C.708284855861716271.25
237.Bautista, Celso
J.716863878067807072.75
238.Belderon, Jose
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MRP-239.Belo, Victor
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MRP-240.Bejec, Conseso
D.798073826377755073.15
MRP-241.Beltran, Gervasio
M.727581737557758073.95
MRP-242.Benaojan, Robustiano
O.748477847563686272.85
MRP-243.Beria, Roger
C.708079796872647871.85
MRP-244.Bihis, Marcelo
M.758665926464847573.45
MRP-245.Binaoro, Vicente
M.736978837359708272.75
MRP-246.Bobila, Rosalio
B.768676836859717873.05
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248.Bueno, Anastacio
F.737871787167716071.15
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L.678562917263768070.9
MRP-250.Cabegin, Cesar
V.727176757470716072.2
MRP-251.Cabello, Melecio
F.727878895870677170.5
MRP-252.Cabrera, Irineo
M.798853917185757673.3
253.Cabreros, Paulino N.7179
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254.Calayag, Florentino
R.697966886975687670.6
MRP-255.Calzada, Cesar de
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Isabel708281777851757573.7
MRP-257.Cabugao, Pablo
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258.Calagi, Mateo
C.739371877066696271.8
259.Canda, Benjamin
S.727177906275668271.95260.Canto
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262.Capitulo, Alejandro
P.757053877863769171.2
MRP-263.Calupitan, Jr., Alfredo
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MRP-264.Caluya, Arsenio
V.758670877752778273.9
MRP-265.Campanilla, Mariano B.
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MRP-266.Campos, Juan A.
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267.Cardoso, Angelita G.
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268.Cartagena, Herminio R.
....717265896473807071.65
MRP-269.Castro, Daniel
T.657577768560756973.15
270.Cauntay, Gaudencio
V.707872737769648071.2
271.Castro, Pedro L.
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272.Cerio, Juan
A.758275866054767571.75
273.Colorado, Alfonso
R.687580747766678072.6
274.Chavez, Doroteo
M.736579847369668473.1
275.Chavez, Honorato
A.777679867453717573.65
MRP-276.Cobangbang, Orlando
B.698174827661788073.85
277.Cortez, Armando
R.786088866066696473.1
278.Crisostomo, Jesus
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MRP-279.Cornejo, Crisanto
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MRP-280.Cruz, Raymundo
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MRP-281.Cunanan, Jose
C.789263837672686572.4
282.Cunanan, Salvador
F.708264926775737671.45
283.Cimafranca, Agustin
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284.Crisol, Getulio
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MRP-285.Dusi, Felicisimo
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MRP-286.Datu, Alfredo
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287.Dacuma, Luis
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MRP-290.Diolazo, Ernesto
A.758386735454757572.25
291.Dionisio, Jr.,
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MRP-292.Dichoso, Alberto
M.717771816975807073.65
MRP-293.Dipasupil, Claudio
R.707682737970725673.9
MRP-294.Delgado,
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MRP-295.Domingo, Dominador
T.706981826863717572.2
296.Ducusin, Agapito B.7078
53887577627668.05
MRP-297.Duque, Antonio
S.757778867672647573.9
298.Duque,
Castulo758073836667656670.65
299.Ebbah, Percival
B.708085766663767573.95
300.Edisa,
Sulpicio657775897562756572
301.Edradan, Rosa
C.707584847159698673.4
MRP-302.Enage, Jacinto
N.667088937267657573.2
MRP-303.Encarnacion, Alfonso
B.758673816377697572.65
304.Encarnacion,
Cesar657858686664757867.1
305.Estoista, Agustin
A.7876748658677707671.7
MRP-306.Fabros, Jose
B.667580828071677073.05
MRP-307.Fajardo, Balbino
P776982836560757573.9
308.Fajardo, Genaro
P.707977797950737572.5
309.Evangelita, Felicidad
P.757572876363777072.15
310.Familara, Raymundo
Z.687587836465686571.85
311.Farias,
Dionisio707889666575705072.75
312.Favila, Hilario
B.718474707567735972.2
MRP-313.Feliciano, Alberto
I.716970856981727072.25
MRP-314.Fernando, Lope
F.737786797076645073
MRP-315.Flores, Dionisio
S.787277836760687372.05
MRP-316. Fortich, Benjamin
B.708270707865647570.35
MRP-317.Fuente, Jose S. de
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318.Fohmantes, Nazario
S.727971776861766070.9
MRP-319.Fuggan, Lorenzo
B.768174697171736072.85
320.Gabuya, Jesus
S.708382837063756573.75
321.Galang, Victor
N.698384767057716071.95
322.Gaerlan, Manuel
L.738777906761727573.15
323.Galem, Nestor
R.727986786061757073.05
324.Gallardo, Jose Pe
B.758875756370706571.85
MRP-325.Gallos, Cirilo
B.707884918051657072.85
326.Galindo, Eulalio
D.708987657871626273.4
327.Galman, Patrocino
G.727280857156705371.15
328.Gamalinda, Carlos
S.767981866763695572.55
329.Gamboa, Antonio
G.716770727660756870.95
330.Gannod, Jose
A.698075816862736871.25
MRP-331.Garcia, Matias
N.677874907959766572.8
MRP-332.Ganete,
Carmelo758777827457688173.3
333.Gilbang, Gaudioso
R.756780826757647070.5
334.Gofredo, Claro
C.687872867852707670.9
335.Gomez, Jose
S.717671817663696270.85
MRP-336.Gosiaoco, Lorenzo
V.689385786469705472.35
MRP-337.Gonzales, Rafael
C.777571895570706070.05
MRP-338.Gracia, Eulalia L.
de666890847759696573.3
339.Grageda, Jose M.
A.708572677060737370.75
340.Guzman, Juan
de758669846479757673.6
MRP-341.Guzman, Mateo
de767979737269688073.9
342.Guzman, Salvador B.
716174726166787570.75
343.Guzman, Salvador T. de
758464817461785871.75
344.Habelito, Geronimo
E.717671877360675569.65
345.Hedriana, Naterno
G.756884766658766072.9
346.Hernandez, Quintin
B.677572817272667670.6
1952
347.Homeres, Agustin
R.738465867077637670.7
348.Ines, Leonilo
F.658871887773617070.55
349.Jamer, Alipio
S.687583898061655072
MRP-350.Ibasco, Jr., Emiliano
M.756568857670835473.8
MRP-351.Jardinico, Jr.,
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MRP-352.Jaen, Justiniano
F.767578847166707773.85
353. Jaring, Antonio
S.727779707257715070.75
MRP-354.Javier, Aquilino
M.758479787761666673.05
355.Jomuad,
Francisco7575728878587674
356.Jose, Nestor
L.786164736876648069.7
357.La O, Jose
M.757175727067815973.5
358.Leon, Brigido C.
de677578927851728072.55
359.Leones, Constante
B.688179847360776073
360.Liboro, Horacio
T.726980877362706172.4
361.Llanera, Cesar
L.778180786459756373
362.Lomontod, Jose
P.757669707376747573.2
363.Luna,
Lucito707569835953747568.4
MRP-364.Luz, Lauro
L.769078886458757773.95
MRP-365.Macasaet, Tomas
S.738172836675727072.5
366.Magbiray, Godofredo
V.806784767062656873.05
367.Majarias, Rodolfo
P706264828875717972.85
MRP-368.Makabenta,
Eduardo759077835971727873.3
MRP-369.Malapit, Justiniano
S.748374895860727671.1
370.Maloles, Iluminado
M.708773767750767672.3
371.Maniquis, Daniel
R.758073916971657072.1
372.Maraa,
Arsenio657960727351758667.9
373.Marasigan,
Napoleon757183756962697072.75
MRP-374.Marco, Jaime
P.756774766475755771.9
MRP-375.Martir, Osmundo
P.708676787271755372.95
MRP-376.Masancay, Amando
E.738775777250788073.2
MRP-377.Mati-ong, Ignacio
T.628772797376697771.3
378.Mara, Guillermo
L.707878897567666572.35
MRP-379.Mercado, Felipe
A.737782827852698573.9
MRP-380.Miculob, Eugenio
P.708273867752796572.8
381.Mison, Rafael M.
Jr.,797873757168695371.95
MRP-382.Monponbanua, Antonio
D.797968886478698373.1
MRP-383.Montero, Leodegario
C.728969897068707572.15
384.Morada, Servillano
S.757667716566757670.9
385.Morocco,
Generoso788478846073687073
MRP-386.Mosquera, Estanislao
L.757875857255776673.15
387.Motus, Rodentor
P.807870947275705773.75
388.Macario, Pedro
R.706774867863726672.15
MRP-389.Nadela, Geredion
T.726464817350757569.15
MRP-390.Nazareno, Romeo
P.677071767679755772.05
391.Nieto, Benedicto
S.697977777262767672.9
MRP-392.Noguera,
Raymundo718681807356727073.15
MRP-393.Nodado, Domiciano R.
707069735737647263.6
394.Nono, Pacifico
G.677778677559717671.35
MRP-395.Nuval, Manuel
R.787267907268786773.65
396.Ocampo,
Augusto759077726955656760.7
397.Oliveros, Amado
A.727568728450757971.9
398.Opia, Jr.,
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MRP-399. Olaviar, Jose
O.706285817450687971.8
MRP-400.Olandesca, Per
O.709176877266707973.45
401.Orden, Apolonio
J.726584866650726871.45
402.Ortiz, Melencio
T.717578816667707872.1
MRP-403.Pablo, Fedelino
S.726476867261767572.95
404.Pacifico, Vicente
V.767969807652728071.95
MRP-405.Paderna, Perfecto
D.756972757858757072.6
406.Padlan, Crispin
M.716676796867746671.65
407.Padilla, Jose
C.706567827875787573.3
408.Padilla, Jr., Estanislao
E.718878865975785072.95
MRP-409.Palma,
Bartolome678180827175697573.25
MRP-410.Papa, Angel
A.757285857759637173.45
MRP-411.Parayno, Mario
V.718874896966767373.65
412.Paria, Santos
L.708785776467637671.85
MRP-413.Pasion,
Anastacio638068818279765872.55
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R.697671766863778371.65
MRP-415.Paulin, Jose
O.706680877550658070.9
MRP-416.Pelaez, Jr., Vicente
C.798773836971686573.2
417.Pea,
Jesus757575627570606670.4
418.Perez, Toribio
R.716481926958677071.25
419.Pestao,
Melquiades778174875968767573.2
MRP-420. Pido, Serafin
C.778172826971607571.15
421.Pinlac,
Filemon677674866579657270.55
422.Poblete, Celso
B.727982766664745072.15
MRP-423.Piza, Luz68707587746647570.8
424.Puzon, Eduardo
S.728081697253677071.05
425.Quetulio, Josefina
D.759060936478768372.9
MRP-426.Qupanes, Melchor
V.698879826562716671.55
MRP-427.Quietson, Bayani
R.737576777081715372.85
428.Racho, Macario
D.687581827853665470.55
429.Ramirez, Sabas P.
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MRP-430.Raffian, Jose
A.808379796272686573.25
MRP-431.Ramos, Patricio
S.758776757272617572.25
MRP-432.Ramos-Balmori,
Manuela788476904875806573.45
MRP-433.Raro,
Celso758176677577557771.4
MRP-434.Rayos, Victor
S.758679917167677073.9
435.Revilla, Mariano
S.757881907054698173.35
436.Reyes, Abdon
L.726481787673695372.85
437.Reyes, Domingo
B.728778837275627072.7
38.Reyes, Francisco
M.758584687571685073.9
439Reyes, Lozano
M.805778797865647973.35
MRP-440.Reyes, Oscar
R.757582827664686073.65
441.Rigonan, Cesar
V.718565867570767072.7
442. Rivera,
Honorio715670907165757171.2
MRP-443. Rivero, Buenaventura
A.728872946873668072.6
MRP-444. Robles,
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445.Rodriguez, Orestes
Arellano767576636977657872.25
446.Roldan, Jose
V.678079837371757073.9
447.Rosario, Adelaida R.
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48.Rosario, Restituto F.
del757579906865666372.1
MRP-449.Sabelino, Conrado
S.718169757771757072.95
450.San Juan,
Damaso778672895976657271.6
451.Saiel, Felix
L.729376806775666272.1
452.Samaniego, Jesus
B.758076726067687070.6
MRP-453.Sandoval, Emmanuel
M.758370837767776073.95
MRP-454.Sanidad, Emmanuel
Q.717581906264766872.95
455.Santiago, Jr.,
Cristobal757684936365597071.8
456.Santillan, Juanito
Ll768983836358655271.25
MRP-457.Santos, Rodolfo
C.757578827376667073.7
MRP-458.Santos, Ruperto
M.675469766364716066.75
MRP-459.Santos, Aquilino
C.727173797379718573.8
MRP-460.Santos, Rufino
A.758179857472665473.3
461.Suanding,
Bantas756767927959767673.1
MRP-462.Sulit, Feliz
M.767976787275686773.5
463.Songco, Felicisimo,
G.706882846069766573.35
464.Soriano, Aniceto
S.647977808053706570.7
465.Suarez, Pablo
D.738570877670647071.9

MRP-466.Sybico, Jesus
L.797070727575726073.05
467.Tabaque, Benjamin
R.696877797468726071.85
MRP-468. Tan Kiang,
Clarita817972806275738073.95
MRP-469.Tando, Amado
T.718278837161716072
470.Tasico, Severo
E.716975897075676371.65
471.Tiburcio, Ismael
P.738272937657685471.15
MRP-472.Tiongson, Federico
T.707076847775755073.45
MRP-473.Tolentino, Jesus
C.758963848573735073.4
474.Torrijas, Alfredo
A.776667836875716371.3
MRP-475.Tobias, Artemio
M.695874817155655767.55
MRP-476.Trillana, Jr., Apolonio
768676867068755073.8
MRP-477.Trinidad, Manuel
O.669183756366676570.8
478.Trinidad, Pedro
O.667878857851647570.3
MRP-479.Urdarbe, Flavio
J.808277826756687572.6
480.Umali, Osmundo
C.687581807169686071.7
481.Umayam, Juanito
C.77758785565666 6071
MRP-482.Usita, Gelacio U.7572757473
76717073.55
483.Valino, Francisco
M.728180846278717573.7
484.Varela, Dominador
M.677581867257817073.85
485.Vega, Macairog L.
de786279877070716573.8
MRP-486. Velasco, Emmanuel
D.718074856066767671.85
487.Velez, Maria
E.737089805650726771.05
MRP-488.Venal, Artemio
V.789158677655757373.65
489.Venus, Conrado
B.698174856266727777.05
MRP-490.Verzoza, Federico
B.757972887668745973.7
MRP-491.Villafuerte, Eduardo
V.758370766464756571.2
MRP-492.Villanueva, Cecilio
C.758579886677677073.95
493.Villar, Custodio
R.736970887666695070.75
MRP-494.Villaseor, Leonidas
F.808567776275767373.15
495.Viterbo, Jose
H.807765937065656570.65
496.Yaranon,
Pedro707776857250757571.85
MRP-497.Yasay, Mariano
R.757572766377706071.1
MRP-498.Ygay, Venancio
M.738083846259727772.65
499.Yulo, Jr.,
Teodoro738278756081757673.95
500.Zamora,
Alberto706576796277698271.3
501.Rigonan, Felipe
C.707969897662716471.2
A list of those who petitioned for the
consolidation of their grades in subjects passed in
previous examinations, showing the years in which they
took the examinations together with their grades and
averages, and those who had filed motions for
reconsideration which were denied, indicated by the
initials MRD, follows:
PETITIONERS UNDER Republic act No. 972
Civ.LandMerc.Int.Pol.Crim.Rem.Leg.Gen.Ave.
1.Amao, Sulpicio M.
194668677676737349 5066.5
1950598067776280715767.4
2.Baldo, Olegario Ga.
1951657658555963757264.9
1952656875847259735769.75
1953577468687652717666.7
3.Blanco ,Jose B.
MRD-1949757570757776609072.15
1951647158656870757166.95
4.Condeno, Mateo
1950718062757581559269.3
195170606165776764678167.85
5.Ducusin, Agapito B.
MRD-1949697076737671556068.65
1950607155676775568963.1
6.Garcia, Manuel N.
MRD-1949607082797069608069.25
1950576551695485568460.3
7.Luna, Lucito A.
1946635369767576576966.55
1952707569835953747568.4
8.Maraa, Arsenio S.
1949726868757572607569.35
1952657960727351758667.9
9.Montano, Manuel
M.1951616058607063756464.8
1952707765796652705066.4
1953786466688150717870.65
10.Pea, Jesus S.
1950257545754552467146.2
1951746162656965755768.2
1952757575627570606670.4
11.Placido, Sr., Isidro
1950687870756970586967.75
1951656275607357757166.8
12.Rementizo, Filemon S.
1949657572756075558566.65
1951685748609166557564.05
1952685368675856756465.7
13.Rivera, Eulogio
J.1952678051696977735366.35
1953656778747562698070.9
14.Rodulfa, Juan T.
1951676070656856756667.75
1952707167786775717070.1
15.Sanchez, Juan J.
1948396982757672555063.5
MRD-1949675669757277607568
1951705955606857786765.8
16.Santos, Constantino
1952627654827277666566.65
1953737170657864657870.4
17.Santos, Salvador H.
1951606455706852707562.85
1952756470817655617569.1195370717965725
4668070
18.Sevilla, Macario C.
MRD-1948506476666669605263.1
MRD-1949476678647186658568
1950356540756357247945
MRD-1951685972556965757569.3
1953707374708156697171.05.
Finally, with regards to the examinations of
1953, while some candidates 85 in all presented
motions for reconsideration of their grades, others
invoked the provisions of Republic act No. 972. A list of
those candidates separating those who filed mere
motions for reconsideration (56) from those who invoked
the aforesaid Republic Act, is as follows:
1953 PETITIONERS FOR RECONSIDERATION.
Civ.LandMerc.Int.Pol.Crim.Rem.Leg.
1.Acenas, Calixto R.737068628251677773.45
2.Alcantara, Pedro N.677075858754718072.8
3.Alejandro, Exequiel677271758076757773.4
4.Andres, Gregorio M.707386587950717872.7
5.Arnaiz, Antonio E.668076587968778173.4
6.Asis, Floriano U. de667875817755736971.25
7.Bacaiso, Celestino
M.716576687650757070.95
8.Bala, Florencio F.648247708258758267
9.Baldo, Olegario A.67746868765277666.7
10.Barrios, Benjamin
O.657176758062837373.95
11.Buhay, Eduardo L.737671917661747873.35
12.Burgos, Dominador
C.728089616637696870.05
13.Cario, Eldo J.798160757474767473
14.Casar, Dimapuro 677384797761717473.35
15.Castaeda,
Gregorio707380717570737873.95
16.Estrellado, Benjamin
R.677964738262717470.2
17.Fabunan, Edilberto
C.707268697760767471.1
18.Feril, Domingo B.757184657060657071.6
19.Fernandez, Alejandro
G.657587808163618072.8
20.Gapus, Rosita S. (Miss)
768086776474666973.9
21.Garcia, Rafael B.708670757363737571.65
22.Gracia, Miguel L. de736875598051727171
23.Gungon, Armando
G.687676847757778373.6
24.Gutierrez, Antonio
S.687766707259717469.1
25.Ilejay, Abraham I.777076778162706873.7
26.Leon, Benjamin La.
de666675707755718270.35
27.Lugtu, Felipe L.627078657856698169.9
28.Lukman, Abdul-
Hamid766467697359737570.45
29.Maloles, Jr., Benjamin
G.777668687151757870.85
30.Maloles, Julius G.777160717962687269.75
31.Mandi, Santiago P.657670617968757271.1
32.Margete, Rufino C.707666758573717572.75
33.Melocoton, Nestorio
B.708173788352727572.35
34.Molina, Manuel C.757870617563668570.95
35.Muoz, Mariano A.758086677457687673.75
36.Navarro, Buenaventura
M.807565758355737973
37.Nodado, Domiciano
R.606767507050567561.7
38.Papas, Sisenando B.656271617056666766
39.Pagulayan-Sy,
Fernando637571628367707270.4
40.Padula, Benjamin
C.707754627478756869.05
41.Pasno, Enrique M.787266547158727869.85
42.Pea, Jr., Narciso709581786766677372.55
43.Peralta, Rodolfo P.707052816863596963.7
44.Pigar, Leopoldo R.767578617272717973.75
45.Publico, Paciano L.686976767059746770.6
46.Radaza, Leovigildo757876617750718672.2
47.Ramos, Bernardo M.646275938152668070.1
48.Rabaino, Andres D.687275737855697670.65
49.Ravanera, Oscar N. 707780718262697873.6
50.Renovilla, Jose M.657580687952627869.5
51.Sabaot, Solomon B.697380698269697973.85
52.Sumaway, Ricardo S.667669767456726869.1
53.Torrefiel, Sofronio
O.707774757350687269.55
54.Vera, Federico V. de606147776950677760.9
55.Viray, Venancio Bustos
656767527364716567.15
56.Ylaya, Angela P. (Miss)
637056756854707764.5
PETITIONERS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT. NO. 972
1.Ala, Narciso707173597374817773.5
2.Alcantara, Pedro N.677075858754718072.8
3.Arellano, Antonio L.746673607863787272.9
4.Buhay, Eduardo L.737671917661747873.35
5.Calautit, Celestino R.717884757561687273.2
6.Casuncad, Sulvio P.617382698168718473.05
7.Enriquez, Pelagio y
Cocepcion846976758250587972.05
8.Estonina, Severino807464898156688272.4
9.Fernandez, Alejandro
Q.657587808163618072.8
10.Fernandez, Luis N.707577757867727373.35
11.Figueroa, Alfredo A.707587787550686872.3
12.Formilleza, Pedro657589688351707573.25
13.Garcia, Manuel M.696883837362627071
14.Grospe, Vicente E.686578667961698271.6
15.Galema, Nestor R.
(1952)727986786061757073.05
16.Jacobo, Rafael F.767675747650727672.3
17.Macalindong, Reinerio
L.677779797472687772.75
18Mangubat, Antonio
M.707078618074627071.45
19.Montano, Manuel
M.786466688150717870.65
20.Plomantes, Marcos736774586870767171.6
21.Ramos, Eugenio R.708076677269727972.6
22.Reyes, Juan R.717377768159727473.2
23.Reyes, Santiago R.657883607675707072.9
24.Rivera, Eulogio J. 656778747562698070.9
25.Santos, Constantino
P.737170657864657870.4
26.Santos, Salvador H.707179657254668070
27.Sevilla, Macario C.707374708156697171.05
28.Villavicencio, Jose A. .....
787570676977647773.2
29.Viray, Ruperto G.767376738058688373.25
These are the unsuccessful candidates totaling
604 directly affected by this resolution. Adding 490
candidates who have not presented any petition, they
reach a total of 1,094.
The Enactment of Republic act No. 972
As will be observed from Annex I, this Court
reduced to 72 per cent the passing general average in the
bar examination of August and November of 1946; 69 per
cent in 1947; 70 per cent in 1948; 74 per cent in 1949;
maintaining the prescribed 75 per cent since 1950, but
raising to 75 per cent those who obtained 74 per cent
since 1950. This caused the introduction in 1951, in the
Senate of the Philippines of Bill No. 12 which was
intended to amend Sections 5, 9, 12, 14 and 16 of Rule
127 of the Rules of Court, concerning the admission of
attorneys-at-law to the practice of the profession. The
amendments embrace many interesting matters, but
those referring to sections 14 and 16 immediately
concern us. The proposed amendment is as follows:

"SEC. 14.Passing average. In
order that a candidate may be deemed
to have passed the examinations
successfully, he must have obtained a
general average of 70 per cent without
falling below 50 per cent in any subject.
In determining the average, the
foregoing subjects shall be given the
following relative weights: Civil Law, 20
per cent; Land Registration and
Mortgages, 5 per cent; Mercantile Law,
15 per cent; Criminal Law, 10 per cent;
Political Law, 10 per cent; International
Law, 5 per cent; Remedial Law, 20 per
cent; Legal Ethics and Practical
Exercises, 5 per cent; Social Legislation,
5 per cent; Taxation, 5 per cent.
Unsuccessful candidates shall not be
required to take another examination in
any subject in which they have obtained
a rating of 70 per cent or higher and
such rating shall be taken into account
in determining their general average in
any subsequent examinations: Provided,
however, That if the candidate fails to
get a general average of 70 per cent in
his third examination, he shall lose the
benefit of having already passed some
subjects and shall be required to the
examination in all the subjects.
"SEC. 16.Admission and oath
of successful applicants. Any
applicant who has obtained a general
average of 70 per cent in all subjects
without falling below 50 per cent in any
examination held after the 4th day of
July, 1946, or who has been otherwise
found to be entitled to admission to the
bar, shall be allowed to take and
subscribe before the Supreme Court the
corresponding oath of office.(Arts. 4 and
5, 8, No. 12).
With the bill was an Explanatory Note, the
portion pertinent to the matter before us being:
"It seems to be unfair that
unsuccessful candidates at bar
examinations should be compelled to
repeat even those subjects which they
have previously passed. This is not the
case in any other government
examination. The Rules of Court have
therefore been amended in this
measure to give a candidate due credit
for any subject which he has previously
passed with a rating of 75 per cent or
higher."
Senate Bill No. 12 having been approved by
Congress on May 3, 1951, the President requested the
comments of this Tribunal before acting on the same. The
comment was signed by seven Justices while three chose
to refrain from making any and one took no part. With
regards to the matter that interests us, the Court said:
"The next amendment is of
section 14 of Rule 127. One part of this
amendment provides that if a bar
candidate obtains 70 per cent or higher
in any subject, although failing to pass
the examination, he need not be
examined in said subject in his next
examination. This is a sort of passing the
Bar Examination on the installment plan,
one or two or three subjects at a time.
The trouble with this proposed system is
that although it makes it easier and
more convenient for the candidate
because he may in an examination
prepare himself on only one or two
subjects so as to insure passing them, by
the time that he has passed the last
required subject, which may be several
years away from the time that he
reviewed and passed the first subjects,
he shall have forgotten the principles
and theories contained in those subjects
and remembers only those of the one or
two subjects that he had last reviewed
and passed. This is highly possible
because there is nothing in the law
which requires a candidate to continue
taking the Bar examinations every year
in succession. The only condition
imposed is that a candidate, on this
plan, must pass the examination in no
more than three installments; but there
is no limitation as to the time or number
of years intervening between each
examination taken. This would defeat
the object and the requirements of the
law and the Court in admitting persons
to the practice of law. When a person is
so admitted, it is to be presumed and
presupposed that he possesses the
knowledge and proficiency in the law
and the knowledge of all law subjects
required in bar examinations, so as
presently to be able to practice the legal
profession and adequately render the
legal service required by prospective
clients. But this would not hold true of
the candidates who may have obtained
a passing grade on any five subjects
eight years ago, another three subjects
one year later, and the last two subjects
the present year. We believe that the
present system of requiring a candidate
to obtain a passing general average with
no grade in any subject below 50 per
cent is more desirable and satisfactory.
It requires one to be all around, and
prepared in all required legal subjects at
the time of admission to the practice of
law.
xxx xxx xxx.
"We now come to the last
amendment, that of section 16 of Rule
127. This amendment provides that any
applicant who has obtained a general
average of 70 per cent in all subjects
without failing below 50 per cent in any
subject in any examination held after
the 4th day of July, 1946, shall be
allowed to take and subscribe the
corresponding oath of office. In other
words, Bar candidates who obtained not
less than 70 per cent in any examination
since the year 1946 without failing
below 50 per cent in any subject,
despite their non-admission to the Bar
by the Supreme Court because they
failed to obtain a passing general
average in any of those years, will be
admitted to the Bar. This provision is not
only prospective but retroactive in its
effects.
"We have already stated in
our comment on the next preceding
amendment that we are not exactly in
favor of reducing the passing general
average from 75 per cent to 70 per cent
to govern even in the future. As to the
validity of making such reduction
retroactive, we have serious legal
doubts. We should not lose sight of the
fact that after every bar examinations,
the Supreme Court passes the
corresponding resolution not only
admitting to the Bar those who have
obtained a passing general average
grade, but also rejecting and denying
the petitions for reconsideration of
those who have failed. The present
amendment would have the effect of
repudiating, reversing and revoking the
Supreme Court's resolution denying and
rejecting the petitions of those who may
have obtained an average of 70 per cent
or more but less than the general
passing average fixed for that year. It is
clear that this question involves legal
implications, and this phase of the
amendment if finally enacted into law
might have to go thru a legal test. As
one member of the Court remarked
during the discussion, when a court
renders a decision or promulgate a
resolution or order on the basis of and
in accordance with a certain law or rule
then in force, the subsequent
amendment or even repeal of said law
or rule may not affect the final decision,
order, or resolution already
promulgated, in the sense of revoking or
rendering it void and of no effect.
"Another aspect of this
question to be considered is the fact
that members of the bar are officers of
the courts, including the Supreme Court.
When a Bar candidate is admitted to the
Bar, the Supreme Court impliedly
regards him as a person fit, competent
and qualified to be its officer.
Conversely, when it refused and denied
admission to the Bar to a candidate who
in any year since 1946 may have
obtained a general average of 70 per
cent but less than that required for that
year in order to pass, the Supreme Court
equally and impliedly considered and
declared that he was not prepared,
ready, competent and qualified to be its
officer. The present amendment giving
retroactivity to the reduction of the
passing general average runs counter to
all these acts and resolutions of the
Supreme Court and practically and in
effect says that a candidate not
accepted, and even rejected by the
Court to be its officer because he was
unprepared, undeserving and
unqualified, nevertheless and in spite of
all, must be admitted and allowed by
this Court to serve as its officer. We
repeat, that this is another important
aspect of the question to be carefully
and seriously considered."
The President vetoed the bill on June 16, 1951,
stating the following:
"I am fully in accord with the
avowed objection of the bill, namely, to
elevate the standard of the legal
profession and maintain it on a high
level. This is not achieved, however, by
admitting to practice precisely a special
class who have failed in the bar
examination. Moreover, the bill contains
provisions to which I find serious
fundamental objections.
"Section 5 provides that any
applicant who has obtained a general
average of 70 per cent in all subjects
without failing below 50 per cent in any
subject in any examination held after
the 4th day of July, 1946, shall be
allowed to take and subscribed the
corresponding oath of office. This
provision constitutes class legislation,
benefiting as it does specifically one
group of persons, namely, the
unsuccessful candidates in the 1946,
1947, 1948, 1949 and 1950 bar
examinations.
"The same provision
undertakes to revoke or set aside final
resolutions of the Supreme Court made
in accordance with the law then in force.
It should be noted that after every bar
examination the Supreme Court passes
the corresponding resolution not only
admitting to the Bar those who have
obtained a passing general average but
also rejecting and denying the petitions
for reconsideration of those who have
failed. The provision under
consideration would have the effect of
revoking the Supreme Court's resolution
denying and rejecting the petitions of
those who may have failed to obtain the
passing average fixed for that year. Said
provision also sets a bad precedent in
that the Government would be morally
obliged to grant a similar privilege to
those who have failed in the
examinations for admission to other
professions such as medicine,
engineering, architecture and certified
public accountancy."
Consequently, the bill was returned to the
Congress of the Philippines, but it was not repassed by
2/3 vote of each House as prescribed by section 20,
article VI of the Constitution. Instead Bill No. 371 was
presented in the Senate. It reads as follows:

AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS
FOR BAR EXAMINATIONS FROM 1946 UP TO
AND INCLUDING 1953
Be it enacted by the Senate and House
of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled:
Section 1.Notwithstanding the
provisions of section 14, Rule 127 of the
Rules of Court, any bar candidate who
obtained a general average of 70 per
cent in any bar examinations after July
4, 1946 up to the August 1951 bar
examinations; 71 per cent in the 1952
bar examinations; 72 per cent in the
1953 bar examinations; 73 per cent in
the 1964 bar examinations; 74 per cent
in 1955 bar examinations without a
candidate obtaining a grade below 50
per cent in any subject, shall be allowed
to take and subscribe the corresponding
oath of office as member of the
Philippine Bar: Provided, however, That
75 per cent passing general average
shall be restored in all succeeding
examinations; and Provided, finally, That
for the purpose of this Act, any exact
one-half or more of a fraction, shall be
considered as one and included as part
of the next whole number.
SEC. 2.Any bar candidate who
obtained a grade of 75 per cent in any
subject in any bar examination after July
4, 1946 shall be deemed to have passed
in such subject or subjects and such
grade or grades shall be included in
computing the passing general average
that said candidate may obtain in any
subsequent examinations that he may
take.
SEC. 3.This bill shall take effect
upon its approval.
With the following explanatory note:
"This is a revised Bar bill to
meet the objections of the President
and to afford another opportunity to
those who feel themselves
discriminated by the Supreme Court
from 1946 to 1951 when those who
would otherwise have passed the bar
examination but were arbitrarily not so
considered by altering its previous
decisions of the passing mark. The
Supreme Court has been altering the
passing mark from 69 in 1947 to 74 in
1951. In order to cure the apparent
arbitrary fixing of passing grades and to
give satisfaction to all parties concerned,
it is proposed in this bill a gradual
increase in the general averages for
passing the bar examinations as follows;
For 1946 to 1951 bar examinations, 70
per cent; for 1952 bar examination, 71
per cent; for 1953 bar examination, 72
per cent; for 1954 bar examination, 73
percent; and for 1955 bar examination,
74 per cent. Thus in 1956 the passing
mark will be restored with the condition
that the candidate shall not obtain in
any subject a grade of below 50 per
cent. The reason for relaxing the
standard 75 per cent passing grade, is
the tremendous handicap which
students during the years immediately
after the Japanese occupation has to
overcome such as the insufficiency of
reading materials and the inadequacy of
the preparation of students who took up
law soon after the liberation. It is
believed that by 1956 the preparation of
our students as well as the available
reading materials will be under normal
conditions, if not improved from those
years preceding the last world war.
In this bill we eliminated
altogether the idea of having our
Supreme Court assumed the supervision
as well as the administration of the
study of law which was objected to by
the President in the Bar Bill of 1951.
"The President in vetoing the
Bar Bill last year stated among his
objections that the bill would admit to
the practice of law 'a special class who
failed in the bar examination'. He
considered the bill a class legislation.
This contention, however, is not, in good
conscience, correct because Congress is
merely supplementing what the
Supreme Court have already established
as precedent by making as low as 69 per
cent the passing mark of those who took
the Bar examination in 1947. These bar
candidates for whom this bill should be
enacted, considered themselves as
having passed the bar examination on
the strength of the established
precedent of our Supreme Court and
were fully aware of the insurmountable
difficulties and handicaps which they
were unavoidably placed. We believe
that such precedent cannot or could not
have been altered, constitutionally, by
the Supreme Court, without giving due
consideration to the rights already
accrued or vested in the bar candidates
who took the examination when the
precedent was not yet altered, or in
effect, was still enforced and without
being inconsistent with the principles of
their previous resolutions.
"If this bill would be enacted,
it shall be considered as a simple
curative act or corrective statute which
Congress has the power to enact. The
requirement of a 'valid classification' as
against class legislation, is very
expressed in the following American
Jurisprudence:
"'A valid classification must
include all who naturally belong to the
class, all who possess a common
disability, attribute, or classification, and
there must be a "natural" and
substantial differentiation between
those included in the class and those it
leaves untouched. When a class is
accepted by the Court as "natural" it
cannot be again split and then have the
dissevered factions of the original unit
designated with different rules
established for each.'" (Fountain Park
Co. vs. Rensier, 199 Ind. 95, N. E. 465
(1926).
"Another case penned by
Justice Cardozo: "Time with its tides
brings new conditions which must be
cared for by new laws. Sometimes the
new conditions affect the members of a
class. If so, the correcting statute must
apply to all alike. Sometimes the
condition affect only a few. If so, the
correcting statute may be as narrow as
the mischief. The constitution does not
prohibit special laws inflexibly and
always. It permits them when there are
special evils with which the general laws
are incompetent to cope. The special
public purpose will sustain the special
form. *** The problem in the last
analysis is one of legislative policy, with
a wide margin of discretion conceded to
the lawmakers. Only in the case of plain
abuse will there be revision by the court.
(In Williams vs. Mayor and City Council
of Baltimore, 286 U. S. 36, 71 L. Ed.
1015, 63 Sup. Ct. 431). (1932).
"This bill has all the earmarks
of a corrective statute which always
retroact to the extent of the care or
correction only as in this case from 1946
when the Supreme Court first deviated
from the rule of 75 per cent in the Rules
of Court.
"For the foregoing purposes
the approval of this bill is earnestly
recommended.
(Sgd.) "PABLO ANGELES DAVID
"Senator"
Without much debate, the revised bill was
passed by Congress as above transcribed. The President
again asked the comments of this Court, which endorsed
the following:
Respectfully returned to the
Honorable, the Acting Executive
Secretary, Manila, with the information
that, with respect to Senate Bill No. 371,
the members of the Court are taking the
same views they expressed on Senate
Bill No. 12 passed by Congress in May,
1951, contained in the first indorsement
of the undersigned dated June 5, 1951,
to the Assistant Executive Secretary.
(Sgd.) RICARDO PARAS.
The President allowed the period within which
the bill should be signed to pass without vetoing it, by
virtue of which it became a law on June 21, 1953 (Sec. 20,
Art. VI, Constitution) numbered 972 (many times
erroneously cited as No. 974).
It may be mentioned in passing that 1953 was
an election year, and that both the President and the
author of the Bill were candidates for re-election,
together, however, they lost in the polls.




EN BANC
[B.M. No. 1036. June 10, 2003.]
DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE,
complainant, vs. EDWIN L. RANA,
respondent.
Percival D. Castillo for complainant.
Raul Tito A. Estrella for respondent.
SYNOPSIS
Complainant charged respondent for unauthorized practice of
law, violation of law, grave misconduct and grave
misrepresentation. The Court referred the case to the Office of
the Bar Confidant ("OBC").
The Supreme Court agreed with the findings of the OBC that
respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and
does not deserve admission to the Philippine Bar. Respondent
was engaged in the practice of law when he appeared in the
proceedings before the Municipal Board of Election
Canvassers and filed various pleadings without license to do
so. Respondent called himself "counsel," knowing fully well
that he was not a member of the Bar. Having held himself out
as "counsel" knowing that he had no authority to practice law,
respondent has shown moral unfitness to be a member of the
Philippine Bar. The Court however, ruled, that the two other
charges of violation of law and grave misconduct were not
supported by evidence. HCacTI
SYLLABUS
1. LEGAL ETHICS; ATTORNEYS; PRACTICE OF LAW; RIGHT TO
PRACTICE LAW IS NOT A NATURAL OR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
BUT IS A PRIVILEGE. The right to practice law is not a natural
or constitutional right but is a privilege. It is limited to persons
of good moral character with special qualifications duly
ascertained and certified. The exercise of this privilege
presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge,
educational attainment, and even public trust since a lawyer is
an officer of the court. A bar candidate does not acquire the
right to practice law simply by passing the bar examinations.
The practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld even
from one who has passed the bar examinations, if the person
seeking admission had practiced law without a license.
2. ID.; ID.; ADMISSION TO THE BAR; REQUISITES THEREOF.
Respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took
the lawyer's oath. However, it is the signing in the Roll of
Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact
that respondent passed the bar examinations is immaterial.
Passing the bar is not the only qualification to become an
attorney-at-law. Respondent should know that two essential
requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed,
namely: his lawyer's oath to be administered by this Court and
his signature in the Roll of Attorneys. TEDAHI
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO, J p:
The Case
Before one is admitted to the Philippine Bar, he must possess
the requisite moral integrity for membership in the legal
profession. Possession of moral integrity is of greater
importance than possession of legal learning. The practice of
law is a privilege bestowed only on the morally fit. A bar
candidate who is morally unfit cannot practice law even if he
passes the bar examinations.
The Facts
Respondent Edwin L. Rana ("respondent") was among those
who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations.
On 21 May 2001, one day before the scheduled mass oath-
taking of successful bar examinees as members of the
Philippine Bar, complainant Donna Marie Aguirre
("complainant") filed against respondent a Petition for Denial
of Admission to the Bar. Complainant charged respondent with
unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct, violation of
law, and grave misrepresentation.
The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a member of
the Bar during the scheduled oath-taking on 22 May 2001 at
the Philippine International Convention Center. However, the
Court ruled that respondent could not sign the Roll of
Attorneys pending the resolution of the charge against him.
Thus, respondent took the lawyer's oath on the scheduled
date but has not signed the Roll of Attorneys up to now.
Complainant charges respondent for unauthorized practice of
law and grave misconduct. Complainant alleges that
respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a
candidate in the May 2001 elections before the Municipal
Board of Election Canvassers ("MBEC") of Mandaon, Masbate.
Complainant further alleges that respondent filed with the
MBEC a pleading dated 19 May 2001 entitled Formal Objection
to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts
for the Office of Vice-Mayor. In this pleading, respondent
represented himself as "counsel for and in behalf of Vice
Mayoralty Candidate, George Bunan," and signed the pleading
as counsel for George Bunan ("Bunan").
On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that
respondent is a municipal government employee, being a
secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate. As
such, respondent is not allowed by law to act as counsel for a
client in any court or administrative body.
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation,
complainant accuses respondent of acting as counsel for vice
mayoralty candidate George Bunan ("Bunan") without the
latter engaging respondent's services. Complainant claims that
respondent filed the pleading as a ploy to prevent the
proclamation of the winning vice mayoralty candidate.
On 22 May 2001, the Court issued a resolution allowing
respondent to take the lawyer's oath but disallowed him from
signing the Roll of Attorneys until he is cleared of the charges
against him. In the same resolution, the Court required
respondent to comment on the complaint against him.
In his Comment, respondent admits that Bunan sought his
"specific assistance" to represent him before the MBEC.
Respondent claims that "he decided to assist and advice
Bunan, not as a lawyer but as a person who knows the law."
Respondent admits signing the 19 May 2001 pleading that
objected to the inclusion of certain votes in the canvassing. He
explains, however, that he did not sign the pleading as a
lawyer or represented himself as an "attorney" in the
pleading.
On his employment as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan,
respondent claims that he submitted his resignation on 11
May 2001 which was allegedly accepted on the same date. He
submitted a copy of the Certification of Receipt of Revocable
Resignation dated 28 May 2001 signed by Vice-Mayor
Napoleon Relox. Respondent further claims that the complaint
is politically motivated considering that complainant is the
daughter of Silvestre Aguirre, the losing candidate for mayor
of Mandaon, Masbate. Respondent prays that the complaint
be dismissed for lack of merit and that he be allowed to sign
the Roll of Attorneys.
On 22 June 2001, complainant filed her Reply to respondent's
Comment and refuted the claim of respondent that his
appearance before the MBEC was only to extend specific
assistance to Bunan. Complainant alleges that on 19 May 2001
Emily Estipona-Hao ("Estipona-Hao") filed a petition for
proclamation as the winning candidate for mayor. Respondent
signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in this petition. When
respondent appeared as counsel before the MBEC,
complainant questioned his appearance on two grounds: (1)
respondent had not taken his oath as a lawyer; and (2) he was
an employee of the government.
Respondent filed a Reply (Re: Reply to Respondent's Comment)
reiterating his claim that the instant administrative case is
"motivated mainly by political vendetta."
On 17 July 2001, the Court referred the case to the Office of
the Bar Confidant ("OBC") for evaluation, report and
recommendation.
OBC's Report and Recommendation
The OBC found that respondent indeed appeared before the
MBEC as counsel for Bunan in the May 2001 elections. The
minutes of the MBEC proceedings show that respondent
actively participated in the proceedings. The OBC likewise
found that respondent appeared in the MBEC proceedings
even before he took the lawyer's oath on 22 May 2001. The
OBC believes that respondent's misconduct casts a serious
doubt on his moral fitness to be a member of the Bar. The OBC
also believes that respondent's unauthorized practice of law is
a ground to deny his admission to the practice of law. The OBC
therefore recommends that respondent be denied admission
to the Philippine Bar.
On the other charges, OBC stated that complainant failed to
cite a law which respondent allegedly violated when he
appeared as counsel for Bunan while he was a government
employee. Respondent resigned as secretary and his
resignation was accepted. Likewise, respondent was
authorized by Bunan to represent him before the MBEC.
The Court's Ruling
We agree with the findings and conclusions of the OBC that
respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and
thus does not deserve admission to the Philippine Bar.
Respondent took his oath as lawyer on 22 May 2001.
However, the records show that respondent appeared as
counsel for Bunan prior to 22 May 2001, before respondent
took the lawyer's oath. In the pleading entitled Formal
Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some
Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor dated 19 May 2001,
respondent signed as "counsel for George Bunan." In the first
paragraph of the same pleading respondent stated that he was
the "(U)ndersigned Counsel for, and in behalf of Vice
Mayoralty Candidate, GEORGE T. BUNAN." Bunan himself
wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he had "authorized Atty.
Edwin L. Rana as his counsel to represent him" before the
MBEC and similar bodies.
On 14 May 2001, mayoralty candidate Emily Estipona-Hao also
"retained" respondent as her counsel. On the same date, 14
May 2001, Erly D. Hao informed the MBEC that "Atty. Edwin L.
Rana has been authorized by REFORMA LM-PPC as the legal
counsel of the party and the candidate of the said party."
Respondent himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he
was entering his "appearance as counsel for Mayoralty
Candidate Emily Estipona-Hao and for the REFORMA LM-PPC."
On 19 May 2001, respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-
Hao in the petition filed before the MBEC praying for the
proclamation of Estipona-Hao as the winning candidate for
mayor of Mandaon, Masbate.

All these happened even before respondent took the lawyer's
oath. Clearly, respondent engaged in the practice of law
without being a member of the Philippine Bar.
In Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava, 1 the Court
elucidated that:
The practice of law is not limited to the
conduct of cases or litigation in court; it
embraces the preparation of pleadings
and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, the management of
such actions and proceedings on behalf
of clients before judges and courts, and
in addition, conveyancing. In general, all
advice to clients, and all action taken for
them in matters connected with the law,
incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services contemplating
an appearance before a judicial body,
the foreclosure of a mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor's claim in
bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings,
and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate
and guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice, as do the
preparation and drafting of legal
instruments, where the work done
involves the determination by the
trained legal mind of the legal effect of
facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262,
263). (Italics supplied) . . .
In Cayetano v. Monsod, 2 the Court held that "practice of law"
means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform acts
which are usually performed by members of the legal
profession. Generally, to practice law is to render any kind of
service which requires the use of legal knowledge or skill.
Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he
appeared in the proceedings before the MBEC and filed
various pleadings, without license to do so. Evidence clearly
supports the charge of unauthorized practice of law.
Respondent called himself "counsel" knowing fully well that he
was not a member of the Bar. Having held himself out as
"counsel" knowing that he had no authority to practice law,
respondent has shown moral unfitness to be a member of the
Philippine Bar. 3
The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right
but is a privilege. It is limited to persons of good moral
character with special qualifications duly ascertained and
certified. The exercise of this privilege presupposes possession
of integrity, legal knowledge, educational attainment, and
even public trust 4 since a lawyer is an officer of the court. A
bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply
by passing the bar examinations. The practice of law is a
privilege that can be withheld even from one who has passed
the bar examinations, if the person seeking admission had
practiced law without a license. 5
The regulation of the practice of law is unquestionably strict.
In Beltran, Jr. v. Abad, 6 a candidate passed the bar
examinations but had not taken his oath and signed the Roll of
Attorneys. He was held in contempt of court for practicing law
even before his admission to the Bar. Under Section 3 (e) of
Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a person who engages in the
unauthorized practice of law is liable for indirect contempt of
court. 7
True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and
took the lawyer's oath. However, it is the signing in the Roll of
Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact
that respondent passed the bar examinations is immaterial.
Passing the bar is not the only qualification to become an
attorney-at-law. 8 Respondent should know that two essential
requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed,
namely: his lawyer's oath to be administered by this Court and
his signature in the Roll of Attorneys. 9
On the charge of violation of law, complainant contends that
the law does not allow respondent to act as counsel for a
private client in any court or administrative body since
respondent is the secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan.
Respondent tendered his resignation as secretary of the
Sangguniang Bayan prior to the acts complained of as
constituting unauthorized practice of law. In his letter dated
11 May 2001 addressed to Napoleon Relox, vice mayor and
presiding officer of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent stated
that he was resigning "effective upon your acceptance." 10
Vice-Mayor Relox accepted respondent's resignation effective
11 May 2001. 11 Thus, the evidence does not support the
charge that respondent acted as counsel for a client while
serving as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan.
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation,
evidence shows that Bunan indeed authorized respondent to
represent him as his counsel before the MBEC and similar
bodies. While there was no misrepresentation, respondent
nonetheless had no authority to practice law.
WHEREFORE, respondent Edwin L. Rana is DENIED admission
to the Philippine Bar.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Panganiban,
Quisumbing Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-
Martinez, Corona, Carpio Morales, Callejo, Sr. and Azcuna, JJ.,
concur.
Footnotes
||| (Aguirre v. Rana, B.M. No. 1036, June 10, 2003)





EN BANC
[A.C. No. 1928. August 3, 1978.]
In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues
Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILLON (IBP
Administrative Case No. MDD - 1).
SYNOPSIS
For respondent's stubborn refusal to pay his memebership
dues to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since the latter's
constitution, notwithstanding due notice, the Board of
Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
unanimously adopted and submitted to the Supreme Court a
resolution recommending the removal of respondent's name
from its Roll of Attorneys, pursuant to Par. 2, Sec. 24, Art. III of
the By-Laws of the IBP.
Respondent, although conceding the propriety and necessity
of the integration of the Bar of the Philippines, questions the
all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership therein
and the obligation to pay membership dues arguing that the
provisions therein (Section 1 and 9 of the Court Rule 139-A)
constitute an invasion of his constitutional right in the sense
that he is being compelled, as a precondition to maintaining
his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the
IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a
consequence of this compelled financial support of the said
organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic,
he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property
guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Respondent likewise
questions the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike his
name from the Roll of Attorneys, contending that this matter
is not among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but is of
an administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body.
The Supreme Court unanimously held that all legislation
directing the integration of the Bar are valid exercise of the
police power over an important profession; that to compel a
lawyer to be a member of the IBP is not violative of his
constitutional freedom to associate; that the requirement to
pay membership fees is imposed as a regulatory measure
designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and
purposes of integration; that the penalty provisions for non-
payment are not void as unreasonable or arbitrary; that the
Supreme Court's jurisdiction and power to strike the name of a
lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys is expressly provided by Art.X,
Section 5(5) of the Constitution and held as an inherent
judicial function by a host of decided cases; and that the
provisions of Rules of Court 139-A ordaining the integration of
the Bar of the Philippines and the IBP By-Laws complained of
are neither unconstitutional nor illegal.
Respondent disbarred and his name ordered stricken from the
Roll of Attorneys.
SYLLABUS
1. ATTORNEYS; BAR INTEGRATION; NATURE AND PURPOSE.
An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every
lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar associations
organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in
which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is essentially a
process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an
opportunity to do his share in carrying out the objectives of
the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its
responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of the
State, an integrated Bar is an official national body of which all
lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore,
subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the
Bar, including the requirement of payment of a reasonable
annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the
Bar, and adherence to a code of professional ethics or
professional responsibility breach of which constitutes
sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper
cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or
disbarment of the offending member.
2. ID.; ID.; INTEGRATION OF THE BAR, A VALID EXERCISE OF
POLICE POWER; PRACTICE OF LAW NOT A VESTED RIGHT BUT
A PRIVILEGE. All legislation directing the integration of the
Bar have been uniformly and universally sustained as a valid
exercise of the police power over an important profession. The
practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege
moreover clothed with public interest because a lawyer owes
substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his
brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation,
and takes part in one of the most important functions of the
State the administration of justice as an officer of the
Court. The practice of law being clothed with public interest,
the holder of this privilege must submit to a degree of control
for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has
created. The expression "affected with a public interest" is the
equivalent of "subject to the exercise of the police power"
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; LEGISLATION TO EFFECT THE INTEGRATION OF
THE PHILIPPINE BAR. The Congress in enacting Republic Act
No. 6397, approved on September 17, 1971, authorizing the
Supreme Court to "adopt rules of court to effect the
integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it
shall see fit," it did so in the exercise of the paramount police
power of the State. The Act's avowal is to "raise the standards
of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice,
and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more
effectively," the Supreme Court in ordaining the integration of
the Bar through its Resolution promulgated on January 9,
1973, and the President of the Philippines in decreeing the
constitution of the IBP into a body corporate through
Presidential Decree No. 181 dated May 4, 1973, were
prompted by fundamental considerations of public welfare
and motivated by a desire to meet the demands of pressing
public necessity.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; IMPOSITION OF RESTRAINTS JUSTIFIED. The
State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere
with and regulate personal liberty, property and occupations.
Persons and property may be subjected to restraints and
burdens in order to secure the general prosperity and welfare
of the State (U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil. 218), for, as the
Latin maxim goes, "Salus populi est supreme lex." The public
welfare is the supreme law. To this fundamental principle of
government the rights of individuals are subordinated. Liberty
is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should
not be made to prevail over authority because then society
will fall into anarchy (Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726). It is
an undoubted power of the State to restrain some individuals
from all freedom, and all individuals from some freedom.
5. ID.; ID.; CONSTITUTION VESTS SUPREME COURT WITH
PLENARY POWER IN ALL CASES REGARDING ADMISSION TO
AND SUPERVISION OF THE PRACTICE OF LAW. Even without
the enabling Act (Republic Act No. 6397), and looking solely to
the language of the provision of the Constitution granting the
Supreme Court the power "to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the
admission to the practice of law, "(Sec. 5[5], Art. X, 1973
Costitution) it at once becomes indubitable that this
constitutional declaration vests the Supreme Court with
plenary power in all cases regarding the admission to and
supervision of the practice of law.
6. ID.; ID.; COMPULSORY MEMBERSHIP THEREIN NOT
VIOLATIVE OF A LAWYER'S CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOM TO
ASSOCIATE. To compel a lawyer to be a member of the
Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to
associate. Integration does not make a lawyer a member of
any group of which he is not already a member. He becomes a
member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. All
that integration actually does is to provide an official national
organization for the well-defined but unorganized and
incohesive group of which every lawyer is already a member.
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with
anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his
Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections
as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is
the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to
further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality
of professional legal services, may require that the cost of
improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the
subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program the
lawyers.
7. ID.; ID.; PAYMENT OF MEMBERSHIP FEE; A REGULATORY
MEASURE NOT PROHIBITED BY LAW. There is nothing in the
Constitution that prohibits the Supreme Court, under its
constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules concerning
the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the
Philippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution)
from requiring members of a privileged class, such as lawyers
are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of
regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite
apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory
measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the
objectives and purposes of integration.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; PENALTY PROVISIONS, NOT VOID. If the
power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize,
then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty
may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as
unreasonable or arbitrary. The practice of law is not a property
right but a mere privilege, and as such must bow to the
inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance
with the lawyer s public responsibilities.
9. ID.; POWER TO PASS UPON FITNESS TO REMAIN A MEMBER
OF THE BAR VESTED IN THE SUPREME COURT. The matters
of admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of
lawyers and their regulation and supervision have been and
are indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions and
responsibilities. The power of the Supreme Court to regulate
the conduct and qualifications of its officers does not depend
upon constitutional or statutory grounds. It has limitations no
less real because they are inherent. The very burden of the
duty is itself a guaranty that the power will not be misused or
prostituted.

10. ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. The provisions of Rule 139-A of
the Rules of Court ordaining the integration of the Bar of the
Philippines and the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines is neither unconstitutional nor illegal, and a
lawyer's stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, notwithstanding due notice,
in violation of said Rule and By-Laws, is a ground for
disbarment and striking out of his name from the Roll of
Attorneys of the Court.
R E S O L U T I O N
CASTRO, C.J p:
The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing
attorney in the Philippines.
On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP for short) Board of Governors unanimously adopted
Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the
Matter of the Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial
A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the removal of the
name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for
"stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues" to the IBP
since the latter's constitution notwithstanding due notice.
On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then President
Liliano B. Neri, submitted the said resolution to the Court for
consideration and approval, pursuant to paragraph 2, Section
24, Article III of the By-Laws of the IBP, which reads:
". . . . Should the delinquency further
continue until the following June 29, the
Board shall promptly inquire into the
cause or causes of the continued
delinquency and take whatever action it
shall deem appropriate, including a
recommendation to the Supreme Court
for the removal of the delinquent
member's name from the Roll of
Attorneys. Notice of the action taken
shall be sent by registered mail to the
member and to the Secretary of the
Chapter concerned."
On January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent
to comment on the resolution and letter adverted to
above; he submitted his comment on February 23, 1976,
reiterating his refusal to pay the membership fees due
from him.
On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President and
the IBP Board of Governors to reply to Edillon's comment: on
March 24, 1976, they submitted a joint reply.
Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After
the hearing, the parties were required to submit memoranda
in amplification of their oral arguments. The matter was
thenceforth submitted for resolution.
At the threshold, a painstaking scrutiny of the respondent's
pleadings would show that the propriety and necessity of the
integration of the Bar of the Philippines are in essence
conceded. The respondent, however, objects to particular
features of Rule of Court 139-A (hereinafter referred to as the
Court Rule) 1 in accordance with which the Bar of the
Philippines was integrated and to the provisions of par. 2,
Section 24, Article III of the IBP By-Laws (hereinabove cited).
The authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to
the Supreme Court the removal of a delinquent member's
name from the Roll of Attorneys is found in par. 2 Section 24,
Article III of the IBP By-Laws (supra), whereas the authority of
the Court to issue the order applied for is found in Section 10
of the Court Rule, which reads:
"SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues.
Subject to the provisions of Section
12 of this Rule, default in the payment
of annual dues for six months shall
warrant suspension of membership in
the Integrated Bar, and default in such
payment for one year shall be a ground
for the removal of the name of the
delinquent member from the Roll of
Attorneys."
The all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership in the
IBP is stated in these words of the Court Rule: LLphil
"SECTION 1. Organization. There is
hereby organized an official national
body to be known as the 'Integrated Bar
of the Philippines,' composed of all
persons whose names now appear or
may hereafter be included in the Roll of
Attorneys of the Supreme Court."
The obligation to pay membership dues is couched in the
following words of the Court Rule:
"SEC. 9. Membership dues. Every
member of the Integrated Bar shall pay
such annual dues as the Board of
Governors shall determine with the
approval of the Supreme Court. . . . ."
The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above
provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in
the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to
maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a
member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and
that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of
the said organization to which he is admittedly personally
antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and
property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the
respondent concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule
and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and
effect.
The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the
Court to strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys,
contending that the said matter is not among the justiciable
cases triable by the Court but is rather of an "administrative
nature pertaining to an administrative body."
The case at bar is not the first one that has reached the Court
relating to constitutional issues that inevitably and inextricably
come up to the surface whenever attempts are made to
regulate the practice of law, define the conditions of such
practice, or revoke the license granted for the exercise of the
legal profession.
The matters here complained of are the very same issues
raised in a previous case before the Court, entitled
"Administrative Case No. 526, In the Matter of the Petition for
the Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, Roman Ozaeta, et
al., Petitioners." The Court exhaustively considered all these
matters in that case in its Resolution ordaining the integration
of the Bar of the Philippines, promulgated on January 9, 1973.
The Court there made the unanimous pronouncement that it
was.
". . . . fully convinced, after a
thoroughgoing conscientious study of all
the arguments adduced in Adm. Case
No. 526 and the authoritative materials
and the mass of factual data contained
in the exhaustive Report of the
Commission on Bar Integration, that the
integration of the Philippine Bar is
'perfectly constitutional and legally
unobjectionable' . . ."
Be that as it may, we now restate briefly the posture of the
Court.
An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every
lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar associations
organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in
which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is essentially a
process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an
opportunity to do his share in carrying out the objectives of
the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its
responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of the
State, an integrated Bar is an official national body of which all
lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore,
subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the
Bar, including the requirement of payment of a reasonable
annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the
Bar, and adherence to a code of professional ethics or
professional responsibility breach of which constitutes
sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper
cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or
disbarment of the offending member. 2
The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously dictated by
overriding considerations of public interest and public welfare
to such an extent as more than constitutionally and legally
justifies the restrictions that integration imposes upon the
personal interests and personal convenience of individual
lawyers. 3
Apropos to the above, it must be stressed that all legislation
directing the integration of the Bar have been uniformly and
universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police power
over an important profession. The practice of law is not a
vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with
public interest because a lawyer owes substantial duties not
only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to
the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the
most important functions of the State the administration of
justice as an officer of the Court. 4 The practice of law being
clothed with public interest, the holder of this privilege must
submit to a degree of control for the common good, to the
extent of the interest he has created. As the U. S. Supreme
Court through Mr. Justice Roberts explained, the expression
"affected with a public interest" is the equivalent of "subject
to the exercise of the police power" (Nebbia vs. New York, 291
U.S. 502).
When, therefore, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6397 5
authorizing the Supreme Court to "adopt rules of court to
effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such
conditions as it shall see fit," it did so in the exercise of the
paramount police power of the State. The Act's avowal is to
"raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the
administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its
public responsibility more effectivity." Hence, the Congress in
enacting such Act, the Court in ordaining the integration of the
Bar through its Resolution promulgated on January 9, 1973,
and the President of the Philippines in decreeing the
constitution of the IBP into a body corporate through
Presidential Decree No. 181 dated May 4, 1973, were
prompted by fundamental considerations of public welfare
and motivated by a desire to meet the demands of pressing
public necessity.
The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may
interfere with and regulate personal liberty, property and
occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to
restraints and burdens in order to secure the general
prosperity and welfare of the State (U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31
Phil. 218), for, as the Latin maxim goes, "Salus populi est
supreme lex." The public welfare is the supreme law. To this
fundamental principle of government the rights of individuals
are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a
misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over
authority because then society will fall into anarchy (Calalang
vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726). It is an undoubted power of the
State to restrain some individuals from all freedom, and all
individuals from some freedom.

But the most compelling argument sustaining the
constitutionality and validity of Bar integration in the
Philippines is the explicit unequivocal grant of precise power
to the Supreme Court by Section 5 (5) of Article X of the 1973
Constitution of the Philippines, which reads:
"Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have
the following powers:
xxx xxx xxx
"(5) Promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts, and the admission to the
practice of law and the integration of
the Bar . . .",
and Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6397, which reads:
"SECTION 1. Within two years from the
approval of this Act, the Supreme Court
may adopt rules of Court to effect the
integration of the Philippine Bar under
such conditions as it shall see fit in order
to raise the standards of the legal
profession, improve the administration
of justice, and enable the Bar to
discharge its public responsibility more
effectively."
Quite apart from the above, let it be stated that even
without the enabling Act (Republic Act No. 6397), and
looking solely to the language of the provision of the
Constitution granting the Supreme Court the power "to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice
of law, " it at once becomes indubitable that this
constitutional declaration vests the Supreme Court with
plenary power in all cases regarding the admission to and
supervision of the practice of law.
Thus, when the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal
profession, his practice of law and his exercise of the said
profession, which affect the society at large, were (and are)
subject to the power of the body politic to require him to
conform to such regulations as might be established by the
proper authorities for the common good, even to the extent of
interfering with some of his liberties. If he did not wish to
submit himself to such reasonable interference and regulation,
he should not have clothed the public with an interest in his
concerns.
On this score alone, the case for the respondent must already
fall.
The issues being of constitutional dimension, however, we
now concisely deal with them seriatim. prLL
1. The first objection posed by the respondent is that the
Court is without power to compel him to become a member of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the
Court Rule is unconstitutional for it impinges on his
constitutional right of freedom to associate (and not to
associate). Our answer is: To compel a lawyer to be a member
of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional
freedom to associate. 6
Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of
which he is not already a member. He became a member of
the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. 7 All that
integration actually does is to provide an official national
organization for the well-defined but unorganized and
incohesive group of which every lawyer is already a member. 8
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with
anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his
Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections
as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is
the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to
further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality
of professional legal services, may require that the cost of
improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the
subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program the
lawyers. 9
Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense
compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar, such
compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of
the state. 10
2. The second issue posed by the respondent is that the
provision of the Court Rule requiring payment of a
membership fee is void. We see nothing in the Constitution
that prohibits the Court, under its constitutional power and
duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the
practice of law and the integration of the Philippine Bar
(Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) which power
the respondent acknowledges from requiring members of a
privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee
toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession
to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is
indeed imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise
funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of
integration. 11
3. The respondent further argues that the enforcement of the
penalty provisions would amount to a deprivation of property
without due process and hence infringes on one of his
constitutional rights. Whether the practice of law is a property
right, in the sense of its being one that entitles the holder of a
license to practice a profession, we do not here pause to
consider at length, as it clear that under the police power of
the State, and under the necessary powers granted to the
Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondent's right to
practice law before the courts of this country should be and is
a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to
impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize, then a
penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may
be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable
or arbitrary. 12
But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a
property right but a mere privilege, 13 and as such must bow
to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact
compliance with the lawyer s public responsibilities.
4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court to strike the name of a lawyer from its Roll of
Attorneys, it is sufficient to state that the matters of
admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of
lawyers and their regulation and supervision have been and
are indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions and
responsibilities, and the authorities holding such are legion. 14
In In Re Sparks (267 Ky. 93, 101 S.W. (2d) 194), in which the
report of the Board of Bar Commissioners in a disbarment
proceeding was confirmed and disbarment ordered, the court,
sustaining the Bar Integration Act of Kentucky, said: The power
to regulate the conduct and qualifications of its officers does
not depend upon constitutional or statutory grounds. It is a
power which is inherent in this court as a court appropriate,
indeed necessary, to the proper administration of justice . . .
the argument that this is an arbitrary power which the court is
arrogating to itself or accepting from the legislative likewise
misconceives the nature of the duty. It has limitations no less
real because they are inherent. It is an unpleasant task to sit in
judgment upon a brother member of the Bar, particularly
where, as here, the facts are disputed. It is a grave
responsibility, to be assumed only with a determination to
uphold the ideals and traditions of an honorable profession
and to protect the public from overreaching and fraud. The
very burden of the duty is itself a guaranty that the power will
not be misused or prostituted. . ."
The Court's jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our 1973
Constitution when it explicitly granted to the Court the power
to "promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice . . . and the
admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar
. . ." (Article X, Sec. 5(5) the power to pass upon the fitness of
the respondent to remain a member of the legal profession is
indeed undoubtedly vested in the Court.
We thus reach the conclusion that the provisions of Rule of
Court 139-A and of the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines complained of are neither unconstitutional nor
illegal. cdll
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the
unanimous sense of the Court that the respondent
Marcial A. Edillon should be as he is hereby disbarred,
and his name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of
Attorneys of the Court.
Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Muoz
Palma, Aquino, Concepcion Jr., Santos, Fernandez and
Guerrero, JJ., concur.














EN BANC

[Bar Matter No. 491. October 6, 1989.]

IN THE MATTER OF THE INQUIRY INTO THE 1989 ELECTIONS
OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES.

SYLLABUS

1. LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS; INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES; NON-POLITICAL IN CHARACTER; OFFICERS,
DELEGATES AND GOVERNORS CHOSEN ON THE BASIS OF
PROFESSIONAL MERIT AND ABILITY TO SERVE. A basic
postulate of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), heavily
stressed at the time of its organization and commencement of
existence, is that the IBP shall be non-political in character and
that there shall be no lobbying nor campaigning in the choice
of members of the Board of Governors and of the House of
Delegates, and of the IBP officers, national, or regional, or
chapter. The fundamental assumption was that officers,
delegates and. governors would be chosen on the basis of
professional merit and willingness and ability to serve.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; VIOLATION OF IBP BY-LAWS. It is evident
that the manner in which the principal candidates for the
national positions in the Integrated Bar conducted their
campaign preparatory to the elections on June 3, 1989,
violated Section 14 of the IBP By-Laws and made a travesty of
the idea of a "strictly non-political" Integrated Bar enshrined in
Section 4 of the By-Laws. The setting up of campaign
headquarters by the three principal candidates (Drilon, Nisce
and Paculdo) in five-star hotels: The Philippine Plaza, the
Holiday Inn and The Hyatt the better for them to corral and
entertain the delegates billeted therein; the procurement of
written commitments and the distribution of nomination
forms to be filled up by the delegates; the reservation of
rooms for delegates in three big hotels, at the expense of the
presidential candidates; the use of a PNB plane by Drilon and
some members of her ticket to enable them to "assess their
chances" among the chapter presidents in the Bicol provinces;
all these practices made a political circus of the proceedings
and tainted the whole election process.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; VIOLATION OF THE ETHICS OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION. The candidates and many of the participants
in that election not only violated the By-Laws of the IBP but
also the ethics of the legal profession which imposes on all
lawyers, as a corollary of their obligation to obey and uphold
the constitution and the laws, the duty to "promote respect
for law and legal processes" and to abstain from "activities
aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the
legal system" (Rule 1.02, Canon 1, Code of Professional
Responsibility). Respect for law is gravely eroded when
lawyers themselves, who are supposed to be minions of the
law, engage in unlawful practices and cavalierly brush aside
the very rules that the IBP formulated for their observance.
The unseemly ardor with which the candidates pursued the
presidency of the association detracted from the dignity of the
legal profession. The spectacle of lawyers bribing or being
bribed to vote one way or another, certainly did not uphold
the honor of the profession nor elevate it in the publics
esteem.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ANNULMENT OF IBP ELECTION. The
much coveted "power" erroneously perceived to be inherent
in that office might have caused the corruption of the IBP
elections. To impress upon the participants in that electoral
exercise the seriousness of the misconduct which attended it
and the stern disapproval with which it is viewed by this Court,
and to restore the non-political character of the IBP and
reduce, if not entirely eliminate, expensive electioneering for
the top positions in the organization which, as the recently
concluded elections revealed, spawned unethical practices
which seriously diminished the stature of the IBP as an
association of the practitioners of a noble and honored
profession, the Court hereby ORDERS: The IBP elections held
on June 3, 1989 should be as they are hereby annulled.

5. INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES; IBP BY-LAWS
PROVIDING DIRECT ELECTION BY THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES
OF NATIONAL OFFICERS, REPEALED. The provisions of the
IBP By-Laws for the direct election by the House of Delegates
(approved by this Court in its resolution of July 9, 1980 in Bar
Matter No. 287) of the following national officers: (a) the
officers of the House of Delegates; (b) the IBP president; and
(c) the executive vice-president, are repealed.

6. ID.; FORMER SYSTEM OF HAVING THE IBP PRESIDENT AND
EXECUTIVE VICE-PRESIDENT ELECTED BY THE BOARD OF
GOVERNORS, RESTORED. The former system of having the
IBP President and Executive Vice-President elected by the
Board of Governors (composed of the governors of the nine
[9] IBP regions) from among themselves (as provided in Sec.
47, Art. VII, Original IBP By-Laws) should be restored. The right
of automatic succession by the Executive Vice-President to the
presidency upon the expiration of their two-year term (which
was abolished by this Courts resolution dated July 9, 1985 in
Bar Matter No. 287) should be as it is hereby restored.

7. ID.; RIGHT OF AUTOMATIC SUCCESSION BY THE EXECUTIVE
VICE-PRESIDENT TO THE PRESIDENCY UPON EXPIRATION OF
THEIR TWO-YEAR TERM, RESTORED. At the end of the
Presidents two-year term, the Executive Vice-President shall
automatically succeed to the office of president. The incoming
board of governors shall then elect an Executive Vice-
President from among themselves. The position of Executive
Vice-President shall be rotated among the nine (9) IBP regions.
One who has served as president may not run for election as
Executive Vice-President in a succeeding election until after
the rotation of the presidency among the nine (9) regions shall
have been completed; whereupon, the rotation shall begin
anew.

8. ID.; SPECIAL ELECTIONS FOR THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS IN
THE NINE (9) IBP REGIONS WITHIN THREE (3) MONTHS AFTER
THE PROMULGATION OF THE RESOLUTION IN THE CASE AT
BAR; ORDERED. Special elections for the Board of
Governors shall be held in the nine (9) IBP regions within three
(3) months after the promulgation of the Courts resolution in
this case. Within thirty (30) days thereafter, the Board of
Governors shall meet at the IBP Central Office in Manila to
elect from among themselves the IBP national president and
executive vice-president. In these special elections, the
candidates in the election of the national officers held on June
3, 1989, particularly identified in Sub-Head 3 of this Resolution
entitled "Formation of Tickets and Single Slates," as well as
those identified in this Resolution as connected with any of
the irregularities attendant upon that election, are ineligible
and may not present themselves as candidate for any position.

R E S O L U T I O N

PER CURIAM:

In the election of the national officers of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (hereafter "IBP") held on June 3, 1989 at the
Philippine International Convention Center (or PICC), the
following were elected by the House of Delegates (composed
of 120 chapter presidents or their alternates) and proclaimed
as officers:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

NAME POSITION

Atty. Violeta Drilon President

Atty. Bella Tiro Executive Vice-President

Atty. Salvador Lao Chairman, House of Delegates

Atty. Renato F. Ronquillo Secretary, House of Delegates

Atty. Teodoro Quicoy Treasurer, House of Delegates

Atty. Oscar Badelles Sergeant-at-Arms, House of Delegates

Atty. Justiniano Cortes Governor & Vice-President for
Northern Luzon

Atty. Ciriaco Atienza Governor & Vice-President for

Central Luzon

Atty. Mario Jalandoni Governor & Vice-President for

Metro Manila

Atty. Jose Aguilar Grapilon Governor & Vice-President for

Southern Luzon

Atty. Teodoro Almine Governor & Vice-President for

Bicolandia

Atty. Porfirio Siyangco Governor & Vice-President for

Eastern Visayas

Atty. Ricardo Teruel Governor & Vice-President for

Western Visayas

Atty. Gladys Tiongco Governor & Vice-President for

Eastern Mindanao

Atty. Simeon Datumanong Governor & Vice-President for

Western Mindanao

The newly-elected officers were set to take their oath of office
on July 4, 1989, before the Supreme Court en banc. However,
disturbed by the widespread reports received by some
members of the Court from lawyers who had witnessed or
participated in the proceedings and the adverse comments
published in the columns of some newspapers about the
intensive electioneering and overspending by the candidates,
led by the main protagonists for the office of president of the
association, namely, Attorneys Nereo Paculdo, Ramon Nisce,
and Violeta C. Drilon, the alleged use of government planes,
and the officious intervention of certain public officials to
influence the voting, all of which were done in violation of the
IBP By-Laws which prohibit such activities, the Supreme Court
en banc, exercising its power of supervision over the
Integrated Bar, resolved to suspend the oath-taking of the IBP
officers-elect and to inquire into the veracity of the reports.

It should be stated at the outset that the election process itself
(i.e. the voting and the canvassing of votes on June 3, 1989)
which was conducted by the "IBP Comelec," headed by Justice
Reynato Puno of the Court of Appeals, was unanimously
adjudged by the participants and observers to be above board.
For Justice Puno took it upon himself to device safeguards to
prevent tampering with, and marking of, the ballots.

What the Court viewed with considerable concern was the
reported electioneering and extravagance that characterized
the campaign conducted by the three candidates for president
of the IBP.

I. MEDIA ACCOUNT OF THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN.

Emil Jurado, in his column "IBP Group Questions Drilon
Election" (Manila Standard, Sunday, June 17, 1989), Luis
Mauricio, in two successive columns: "The Invertebrated Bar"
(Malaya, June 10, 1989) and "The Disintegrating Bar" (Malaya,
June 20, 1989), and Teodoro Locsin, Jr. in an article, entitled
"Pam-Pam" (The Philippines Free Press, July 8, 1989), and the
editorial, entitled "Wrong Forum" of the Daily Globe (June 8,
1989), were unanimously critical of the "vote-buying and
pressure tactics" allegedly employed in the campaign by the
three principal candidates: Attys. Violeta C. Drilon, Nereo
Paculdo and Ramon Nisce who reportedly "poured heart, soul,
money and influence to win over the 120 IBP
delegates."cralaw virtua1aw library

Mr. Jurado mentioned the resentment of Atty. Drilons rivals
who felt at a disadvantage because Atty. Drilon allegedly used
PNB helicopters to visit far-flung IBP chapters on the pretext of
distributing Bigay Puso donations, and she had the added
advantage of having regional directors and labor arbiters of
the Department of Labor and Employment (who had been
granted leaves of absence by her husband, the Labor
Secretary) campaigning for her. Jurados informants alleged
that there was rampant vote-buying by some members of the
U.P. Sigma Rho Fraternity (Secretary Drilons fraternity), as
well as by some lawyers of ACCRA (Angara, Concepcion, Cruz,
Regala and Abello Law Office) where Mrs. Drilon is employed,
and that government positions were promised to others by
the office of the Labor Secretary.

Mr. Mauricio in his column wrote about the same matters and,
in addition, mentioned "talk of personnel of the Department
of Labor, especially conciliators and employers, notably
Chinese Filipinos, giving aid and comfort to her (Atty. Drilons)
candidacy," the billeting of out-of-town delegates in plush
hotels where they were reportedly "wined and dined
continuously, womened, and subjected to endless haggling
over the price of their votes . . ." which allegedly "ranged from
P15,000 to P20,000, and, on the day of the election, some
twelve to twenty votes which were believed crucial,
appreciated to P50,000."cralaw virtua1aw library

In his second column, Mr. Mauricio mentioned "how a top
official of the judiciary allegedly involved himself in IBP politics
on election day by closeting himself with campaigners as they
plotted their election strategy in a room of the PICC (the
Philippine International Convention Center where the
convention/election were held) during a recess . . ."cralaw
virtua1aw library

Mr. Locsin in his column and editorial substantially reechoed
Mauricios reports with some embellishments.

II. THE COURTS DECISION TO INVESTIGATE.

Responding to the critical reports, the Court, in its en banc
resolution dated June 15, 1989, directed the outgoing and
incoming members of the IBP Board of Governors, the
principal officers and Chairman of the House of Delegates to
appear before it on Tuesday, June 20, 1989, at 2:00 oclock
p.m., and there to inform the Court on the veracity of the
aforementioned reports and to recommend, for the
consideration of the Court, appropriate approaches to the
problem of confirming and strengthening adherence to the
fundamental principles of the IBP.

In that resolution the Court "call[ed] to mind that a basic
postulate of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), heavily
stressed at the time of its organization and commencement of
existence, is that the IBP shall be non-political in character and
that there shall be no lobbying nor campaigning in the choice
of members of the Board of Governors and of the House of
Delegates, and of the IBP officers, national, or regional, or
chapter. The fundamental assumption was that officers,
delegates and. governors would be chosen on the basis of
professional merit and willingness and ability to serve."cralaw
virtua1aw library

The resolution went on to say that the "Court is deeply
disturbed to note that in connection with the election of
members of the Board of Governors and of the House of
Delegates, there is a widespread belief, based on reports
carried by media and transmitted as well by word of mouth,
that there was extensive and intensive campaigning by
candidates for IBP positions as well as expenditure of
considerable sums of money by candidates, including vote-
buying, direct or indirect."cralaw virtua1aw library

The venerable retired Supreme Court Justice and IBP President
Emeritus, Jose B.L. Reyes, attended the dialogue, upon
invitation of the Court, to give counsel and advice. The
meeting between the Court en banc on the one hand, and the
outgoing and in-coming IBP officers on the other, was an
informal one.

Thereafter, the Court resolved to conduct a formal inquiry to
determine whether the prohibited acts and activities
enumerated in the IBP By-Laws were committed before and
during the 1989 elections of IBPs national officers.

The Court en banc formed a committee and designated Senior
Associate Justice Andres R. Narvasa, as Chairman, and
Associate Justices Teodoro R. Padilla, Emilio A. Gancayco,
Abraham F. Sarmiento, and Carolina C. Grio-Aquino, as
members, to conduct the inquiry. The Clerk of Court, Atty.
Daniel Martinez, acted as the committees Recording
Secretary.

A total of forty-nine (49) witnesses appeared and testified in
response to subpoenas issued by the Court to shed light on
the conduct of the elections. The managers of three five-star
hotels the Philippine Plaza, the Hyatt, and the Holiday Inn
where the three protagonists (Drilon, Nisce and Paculdo)
allegedly set up their respective headquarters and where they
billeted their supporters were summoned. The officer of the
Philippine National Bank and the Air Transport Office were
called to enlighten the Court on the charge that an IBP
presidential candidate and the members of her slate used PNB
planes to ferry them to distant places in their campaign to win
the votes of delegates. The Philippine Airlines officials were
called to testify on the charge that some candidates gave free
air fares to delegates to the convention. Officials of the Labor
Department were also called to enable the Court to ascertain
the truth of the reports that labor officials openly campaigned
or worked for the election of Atty. Drilon.

The newspaper columnists, Messrs. Luis Mauricio, Jesus
Bigornia, and Emil Jurado were subpoenaed to determine the
nature of their sources of information relative to the IBP
elections. Their stories were based, they said, on letters,
phone calls and personal interviews with persons who claimed
to have knowledge of the facts, but whom they, invoking the
Press Freedom Law, refused to
identify.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

The Committee has since submitted its Report after receiving,
and analyzing and assessing evidence given by such persons as
were perceived to have direct and personal knowledge of the
relevant facts; and the Court, after deliberating thereon, has
Resolved to accept and adopt the same.

III. PROHIBITED ACTS AND PRACTICES UNDER IBP BY-LAWS.

Article I, Section 4 of the IBP By-Laws emphasizes the "strictly
non-political" character of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SEC. 4. Non-political Bar. The Integrated Bar is strictly non-
political, and every activity tending to impair this basic feature
is strictly prohibited and shall be penalized accordingly. No
lawyer holding an elective, judicial, quasi-judicial, or
prosecutory office in the Government or any political
subdivision or instrumentality thereof shall be eligible for
election or appointment to any position in the Integrated Bar
or any Chapter thereof. A Delegate, Governor, officer or
employee of the Integrated Bar, or an officer or employee of
any Chapter thereof shall be considered ipso facto resigned
from his position as of the moment he files his certificate of
candidacy for any elective public office or accepts
appointment to any judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory
office in the Government or any political subdivision or
instrumentality thereof."cralaw virtua1aw library

Section 14 of the same By-Laws enumerates the prohibited
acts relative to IBP elections:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SEC. 14. Prohibited acts and practices relative to elections.
The following acts and practices relative to election are
prohibited, whether committed by a candidate for any elective
office in the Integrated Bar or by any other member, directly
or indirectly, in any form or manner, by himself or through
another person:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(a) Distribution, except on election day, of election campaign
material;

(b) Distribution, on election day, of election campaign material
other than a statement of the biodata of a candidate on not
more than one page of a legal-size sheet of paper; or causing
distribution of such statement to be done by persons other
than those authorized by the officer presiding at the elections;

(c) Campaigning for or against any candidate, while holding an
elective, judicial, quasi-judicial or prosecutory office in the
Government or any political subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof;

(d) Formation of tickets, single slates, or combinations of
candidates, as well as the advertisement thereof;

(e) For the purpose of inducing or influencing a member to
withhold his vote, or to vote for or against a candidate, (1)
payment of the dues or other indebtedness of any member;
(2) giving of food, drink, entertainment, transportation or any
article of value, or any similar consideration to any person; or
(3) making a promise or causing an expenditure to be made,
offered or promised to any person."cralaw virtua1aw library

Section 12(d) of the By-Laws prescribes sanctions for violations
of the above rules:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"(d) Any violation of the rules governing elections or
commission of any of the prohibited acts and practices defined
in Section 14 (Prohibited Acts and Practices relative to
elections) of the by-laws of the Integrated Bar shall be a
ground for the disqualification of a candidate or his removal
from office if elected, without prejudice to the imposition of
sanctions upon any erring member pursuant to the By-laws of
the Integrated Bar."cralaw virtua1aw library

At the formal investigation which was conducted by the
investigating committee, the following violations were
established:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(1) Prohibited campaigning and solicitation of votes by the
candidates for president, executive vice-president, the officers
of the House of Delegates and Board of Governors.

The three candidates for IBP president Drilon, Nisce and
Paculdo began travelling around the country to solicit the
votes of delegates as early as April 1989. Upon the invitation
of IBP President, Leon Garcia, Jr. (t.s.n., July 13, 1989, p. 4),
they attended the Bench and Bar dialogues held in Cotabato in
April 1989 (t.s.n., June 29, 1989, p. 123), in Tagaytay City,
Pampanga, and in Baguio City (during the conference of
chapter presidents of Northern Luzon (t.s.n., July 3, 1989, p.
113; t.s.n., July 10, p. 41; t.s.n., July 13, p. 47) where they
announced their candidacies and met the chapter presidents.

Atty. Nisce admitted that he went around the country seeking
the help of IBP chapter officers, soliciting their votes, and
securing their written endorsements. He personally hand-
carried nomination forms and requested the chapter
presidents and delegates to fill up and sign the forms to
formalize their commitment to his nomination for IBP
President. He started campaigning and distributing the
nomination forms in March 1989 after the chapter elections
which determined the membership of the House of Delegates
composed of the 120 chapter presidents (t.s.n., June 29, 1989,
pp. 82-86). He obtained forty (40) commitments. He submitted
photocopies of his nomination forms which
read:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Nomination Form

I Join in Nominating

RAMON M. NISCE

as

National President of the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines



Chapter Signature"

Among those who signed the nomination forms were: Onofre
P. Tejada, Candido P. Balbin, Jr., Conizado V. Posadas, Quirico
L. Quirico, Ernesto S. Salun-at, Gloria C. Agunos, Oscar B.
Bernardo, Feliciano F. Wycoco, Amor L. Ibarra, Jose M.
Atienza, Jose N. Contreras, Romeo T. Mendoza, Leo C.
Medialdea, Jr., Paulino G. Clarin, Julius Z. Neri, Roem J.
Arbolado, Democrito M. Perez, Abelardo Fermin, Diosdado B.
Villarin, Jr., Daniel C. Macaraeg, Confesor R. Sansano, Dionisio
E. Bala, Jr., Ernesto A. Amores, Romeo V. Pefianco, Augurio C.
Pamintuan, Atlee T. Viray, Ceferino C. Cabanas, Jose S. Buban,
Diosdado Z. Reloj, Jr., Cesar C. Viola, Oscar C. Fernandez,
Ricardo B. Teruel, Rodrigo R. Flores, Sixto Marella, Jr., Arsenio
C. Villalon, Renato F. Ronquillo, Antonio G. Nalapo, Romualdo
A. Din, Jr., Jose P. Icaonapo, Jr., and Manuel S. Pecson.

Atty. Nisce admitted that he reserved rooms at the Hyatt Hotel
based on the commitments he had obtained (t.s.n., June 29,
1989, pp. 82-85). Unfortunately, despite those formal
commitments, he obtained only 14 votes in the election (t.s.n.,
June 29, 1989, p. 86). The reason, he said, is that some of
those who had committed their votes to him were
"manipulated, intimidated, pressured, or remunerated" (t.s.n.,
June 29, 1989, pp. 86-95; Exhibit "M-4-Nisce," t.s.n., July 4,
1989, pp. 100-104).

(2) Use of PNB plane in the campaign.

The records of the Philippine National Bank (Exhibit C-1-Crudo
and Exhibit C-2-Crudo) show that Secretary Fulgencio S.
Factoran, Jr. of the Department of Environment & Natural
Resources (DENR) borrowed a plane from the Philippine
National Bank for his Bicol CORD (Cabinet Officers for Regional
Development) Assistant, Undersecretary Antonio Tria. The
plane manifest (Exh. C-2-Crudo) listed Atty. Violeta Drilon,
Arturo Tusi (Tiu), Assistant Secretary for Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) Tony Tria, Atty. Gladys Tiongco, and
Amy Wong. Except for Tony Tria, the rest of the passengers
were IBP candidates.

Atty. Drilon admitted that she "hitched" a ride on a PNB plane.
She said that she was informed by Atty. Tiu about the
availability of a PNB plane (t.s.n., July 3, 1989, pp. 116-118).

Atty. Tiu, who ran for the position of IBP executive vice-
president in the Drilon ticket, testified that sometime in May
1989 he failed to obtain booking from the Philippine Airlines
for the projected trip of his group to Bicol. He went to the
DENR allegedly to follow up some papers for a client. While at
the DENR, he learned that Assistant Secretary Tria was going
on an official business in Bicol for Secretary Fulgencio Factoran
and that he would be taking a PNB plane. As Assistant
Secretary Tria is his fraternity brother, he asked if he, together
with the Drilon group, could hitch a ride on the plane to Bicol.
His request was granted. Their purpose in going to Bicol was to
assess their chances in the IBP elections. The Drilon company
talked with the IBP chapter presidents in Daet, Naga, and
Legaspi, and asked for their support (t.s.n., July 10, 1989, pp.
5-49).

Assistant Secretary Antonio S. Tria confirmed the use of a PNB
plane by Atty. Drilon and her group. He recalled that on May
23, 1989, DENR Secretary Factoran instructed him to go to
Bicol to monitor certain regional development projects there
and to survey the effect of the typhoon that hit the region in
the middle of May. On the same day, Atty. Tiu, a fraternity
brother (meaning that Tiu belongs to the Sigma Rho fraternity)
went to the DENR office and requested the Secretary
(Factoran) if he (Tiu) could be allowed to hitch a ride on the
plane. Assistant Secretary Tria, together with the Drilon group
which included Attorneys Drilon, Grapilon, Amy Wong, Gladys
Tiongco, and Tiu, took off at the Domestic Airport bound for
Naga, Daet and Legaspi. In Legaspi the Drilon group had lunch
with Atty. Vicente Real, Jr., an IBP chapter president (t.s.n.,
July 10, 1989, pp. 54-69).

(3) Formation of tickets and single slates.

The three candidates, Paculdo, Nisce and Drilon, admitted
having formed their own slates for the election of IBP national
officers on June 3, 1989.

Atty. Paculdos slate consisted of himself for President; Bella
D. Tiro, for Executive Vice-President; and for Governors:
Justiniano P. Cortez (Northern Luzon), Oscar C. Fernandez
(Central Luzon), Mario C.V. Jalandoni (Greater Manila),
Petronilo A. de la Cruz (Southern Luzon), Teodorico C. Almine,
Jr. (Bicolandia), Ricardo B. Teruel (Western Visayas), Porfirio P.
Siyangco (Eastern Visayas), Jesus S. Anonat (Western
Mindanao), Guerrero A. Adaza, Jr. (Eastern Mindanao) (Exhibit
M-Nisce).

The Drilon ticket consisted of: Violeta C. Drilon for President,
Arturo Tiu for Executive Vice President, Salvador Lao for
Chairman of the House of Delegates, and, for Governors: Basil
Rupisan (Northern Luzon), Acong Atienza (Central Luzon), Amy
Wong (Metro Manila), Jose Grapilon (Southern Tagalog),
Teodoro Almine (Bicolandia), Baldomero Estenzo (Eastern
Visayas), Joelito Barrera (Western Visayas), Gladys Tiongco
(Eastern Mindanao), Simeon Datumanong (Western
Mindanao) (Exhibit M-1-Nisce).

Atty. Ramon N. Nisces line-up listed himself and Confessor B.
Sansano, Benjamin B. Bernardino, Antonio L. Nalapo, Renato F.
Ronquillo, Gloria C. Agunos, Mario Valderrama, Candido P.
Balbin, Jr., Oscar C. Fernandez, Cesar G. Viola, Leo C.
Medialdea, Jr., Vicente P. Tordilla, Jr., Jose S. Buban, Joel A.
Llosa, Jesus T. Albacite, and Oscar V. Badelles.

(4) Giving free transportation to out-of-town delegates and
alternates.

Atty. Nisce admitted having bought plane tickets for some
delegates to the convention. He mentioned Oscar Badelles to
whom he gave four round-trip tickets (worth about P10,000)
from Iligan City to Manila and back. Badelles was a voting
delegate. Nisce, however, failed to get a written commitment
from him because Atty. Medialdea assured him (Nisce)
"sigurado na yan, hwag mo nang papirmahin."cralaw
virtua1aw library

Badelles won as sergeant-at-arms, not in Nisces ticket, but in
that of Drilon.

Badelles admitted that Nisce sent him three airplane tickets,
but he (Badelles) said that he did not use them, because if he
did, he would be committed to Nisce, and he (Badelles) did not
want to be committed (t.s.n., July 4, 1989, pp. 77-79, 95-96).

Nisce also sent a plane ticket to Atty. Atilano, who was his
candidate, and another ticket to Mrs. Linda Lim of Zamboanga.

Records of the Philippine Airlines showed that Atty. Nisce paid
for the plane tickets of Vicente Real, Jr. (Exh. D-1-Calica),
Romeo Fortes (Exh. D-1-Calica), Cesar Batica (Exh. D-2-Calica),
Jose Buban of Leyte (Exh. D-2-Calica), Delsanto Resuello (Exh.
D-3-Calica), and Ceferino Cabanas (Exh. D-3-Calica).chanrobles
law library : red

In spite of his efforts and expense, only one of Nisces
candidates won: Renato Ronquillo of Manila 4, as Secretary of
the House of Delegates (t.s.n. July 3, p. 161).

(5) Giving free hotel accommodations, food, drinks,
entertainment to delegates.

(a) ATTY. NEREO PACULDO

Atty. Paculdo alleged that he booked 24 regular rooms and
three suites at the Holiday Inn, which served as his
headquarters. The 24 rooms were to be occupied by his staff
(mostly ladies) and the IBP delegates. The three suites were to
be occupied by himself, the officers of the Capitol Bar
Association, and Atty. Mario Jalandoni. He paid P150,000 for
the hotel bills of his delegates at the Holiday Inn, where a
room cost P990 per day with breakfast.

Those listed as guests of Atty. Paculdo at the Holiday Inn were:
Ernesto C. Perez, Tolomeo Ligutan, Judge Alfonso Combong,
Ricardo Caliwag, Antonio Bisnar, Benedicto Balajadia, Jesus
Castro, Restituto Villanueva, Serapio Cribe, Juanito Subia,
Teodorico J. Almine, Rudy Gumban, Roem Arbolado, Ricardo
Teruel, Shirley Moises, Ramon Roco, Alberto Trinidad, Teodoro
Quicoy, Manito Lucero, Fred Cledera, Vicente Tordilla, Julian
Ocampo, Francisco Felizmenio, Marvel Clavecilla, Amador
Capiral, Eufronio Maristela, Porfirio Siyangco, William Llanes,
Jr., Marciano Neri, Guerrero Adaza, Diosdado Peralta, Luis C.
Formilleza, Jr., Democrito Perez, Bruno Flores, Dennis Rendon,
Judge Ceferino Chan, Mario Jalandoni, Kenneth Siruelo, Bella
Tiro, Antonio Santos, Tiburcio Edano, James Tan, Cesilo A.
Adaza, Francisco Roxas, Angelita Gacutan, Jesse Pimentel,
Judge Jaime Hamoy, Jesus Anonat, Carlos Egay, Judge Carlito
Eisma, Judge Jesus Carbon, Joven Zach, and Benjamin Padon.

Noel de Guzman, Holiday Inns credit manager, testified that
Atty. Paculdo booked 52 (not 24) rooms, including the
presidential suite, which was used as the Secretariat. The
group bookings were made by Atty. Gloria Paculdo, the wife of
Nereo Paculdo (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, pp. 63-68). The total sum
of P227,114.89 was paid to Holiday Inn for the use of the
rooms.

(b) ATTY. VIOLETA C. DRILON

The delegates and supporters of Atty. Drilon were billeted at
the Philippine Plaza Hotel where her campaign manager, Atty.
Renato Callanta, booked 40 rooms, 5 of which were suites.
According to Ms. Villanueva, Philippine Plaza banquet and
conventions manager, the contract that Atty. Callanta signed
with the Philippine Plaza was made in the name of the "IBP c/o
Atty. Callanta."cralaw virtua1aw library

Mrs. Lourdes Juco, a sales manager of the Philippine Plaza,
recalled that it was Mr. Mariano Benedicto who first came to
book rooms for the IBP delegates. She suggested that he
obtain a group (or discounted) rate. He gave her the name of
Atty. Callanta who would make the arrangements with her.
Mr. Benedicto turned out to be the Assistant Secretary of the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE).

The total sum of P316,411.53 was paid by Atty. Callanta for
the rooms, food, and beverages consumed by the Drilon
group, with an unpaid balance of P302,197.30. Per Attorney
Daniel Martinezs last telephone conversation with Ms.
Villanueva, Atty. Callanta still has an outstanding account of
P232,782.65 at Philippine Plaza.

Atty. Callanta admitted that he signed the contract for 40
rooms at the Philippine Plaza. He made a downpayment of
P123,000. His "working sheet" showed that the following
persons contributed for that down payment:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library

(a) Nilo Pea (Quasha Law Office) P25,000

(b) Antonio Carpio 20,000

(c) Toto Ferrer (Carpio Law Office) 10,000

(d) Jay Castro 10,000

(e) Danny Deen 20,000

(f) Angangco Tan (Angara Law Office) 10,000

(g) Alfonso Reyno 20,000

(h) Cosme Rossel 15,300

(t.s.n. July 4, 1989, pp. 3-4)

Atty. Callanta explained that the above listed persons have
been contributing money every time the IBP embarks on a
project. This time, they contributed so that their partners or
associates could attend the legal aid seminar and the IBP
convention too.

Atty. Drilon alleged that she did not know that Atty. Callanta
had billeted her delegates at the Philippine Plaza. She allegedly
did not also know in whose name the room she occupied was
registered. But she did ask for a room where she could rest
during the convention. She admitted, however, that she paid
for her hotel room and meals to Atty. Callanta, through Atty.
Loanzon (t.s.n. July 3, 1989).

The following were listed as having occupied the rooms
reserved by Atty. Callanta at the Philippine Plaza: Violeta
Drilon, Victoria A. Verciles, Victoria C. Loanzon, Leopoldo A.
Consulto, Ador Lao, Victoria Borra, Aimee Wong, Callanta,
Pea, Tiu, Gallardo, Acong Atienza, D. Bernardo, Amores, Silao,
Caingat, Manuel Yuson, Simeon Datumanong, Manuel Pecson,
Sixto Marella, Joselito Barrera, Radon, Macalalag, Oscar
Badelles, Antonio Acyatan, Ildefonso C. Puerto, Nestor Atienza,
Gil Batula, Array Corot, Dimakuta Corot, Romeo Fortez, Irving
Petilla, Teodoro Palma, Gil Palma, Danilo Deen, Delsanto,
Resuello, Araneta, Vicente Real, Sylvio Casuncad, Espina,
Guerrero, Julius Neri, Linda Lim, Ben Lim, C. Batica, Luis
Formilleza, Felix Macalag, Mariano Benedicto, II, Atilano,
Araneta, Renato Callanta.

Atty. Nilo Pea admitted that the Quasha Law Office of which
he is a senior partner, gave P25,000 to Callanta for rooms at
the Philippine Plaza so that some members of his law firm
could campaign for the Drilon group (t.s.n. July 5, 1989, pp. 76-
78) during the legal aid seminar and the IBP convention. Most
of the members of his law firm are fraternity brothers of
Secretary Drilon (meaning, members of the Sigma Rho
Fraternity). He admitted being sympathetic to the candidacy of
Atty. Drilon and the members of her slate, two of whom,
Jose Grapilon and Simeon Datumanong are Sigma Rhoans.
They consider Atty. Drilon as a "sigma rho sister," her husband
being a sigma rhoan.

Atty. Antonio Carpio, also a Sigma Rhoan, reserved a room for
the members of his own firm who attended the legal aid
seminar and the convention. He made the reservation through
Atty. Callanta to whom he paid P20,000 (t.s.n. July 6, 1989, pp.
30-34).

Atty. Carpio assisted Atty. Drilon in her campaign during the
convention, by soliciting the votes of delegates he knew, like
Atty. Albacite, his former teacher (but the latter was already
committed to Nisce), and Atty. Romy Fortes, a classmate of his
in the U.P. College of Law (t.s.n. July 6, 1989, pp. 22, 29, 39).

(c) ATTY. RAMON NISCE.

Atty. Nisce, through his brother-in-law, Ricardo Paras, entered
into a contract with the Hyatt Hotel for a total of 29 rooms
plus one (1) seventh-floor room. He made a downpayment of
P20,000 (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, p. 58) on April 20, 1989, and
P37,632.45 on May 10, or a total of P57,632.45.

Ms. Cecile Flores, Ms. Milagros Ocampo, and Mr. Ramon
Jacinto, the sales department manager, credit manager, and
reservation manager, respectively of the Hyatt, testified that
Atty. Nisces bill amounted to P216,127.74 (t.s.n. June 28,
1989, pp. 57-58; Exhibits E-Flores, F-Jacinto, G-Ocampo).

As earlier mentioned, Atty. Nisce admitted that he reserved
rooms for those who committed themselves to his candidacy.

The hotel guests of Atty. Nisce were: Gloria Agunos, Dennis
Habanel, B. Batula, John E. Asuncion, Reynaldo Cortes, Lourdes
Santos, Elmer Datuin, Romualdo Din, Antonio Nalapo, Israel
Damasco, Candido Balbin, Serrano Balot, Ibarra, Joel Llosa,
Eltanal, Ruperto, Asuncion, Q. Pilotin, Reymundo P. Guzman,
Zoilo Aguinaldo, Clarin, R. Ronquillo, Dominador Carillo,
Filomeno Balinas, Ernesto Sabulan, Yusop Pangadapun, A.
Viray, Icampo, Abelardo Fermin, C. Quiaoit, Augurio
Pamintuan, Daniel Macaraeg, Onofre Tejada.

(6) Campaigning by labor officials for Atty. Violeta Drilon

In violation of the prohibition against "campaigning for or
against a candidate while holding an elective, judicial, quasi-
judicial, or prosecutory office in the Government" (Sec. 14[c],
Art. I, IBP By-Laws), Mariano E. Benedicto II, Assistant
Secretary, Department of Labor and Employment, testified
that he took a leave of absence from his office to attend the
IBP convention. He stayed at the Philippine Plaza with the
Drilon group admittedly to give "some moral assistance" to
Atty. Violeta Drilon. He did so because he is a member of the
Sigma Rho Fraternity. When asked about the significance of
Sigma Rho, Secretary Benedicto explained: "More than the
husband of Mrs. Drilon being my boss, the significance there is
that the husband is my brother in the Sigma Rho."cralaw
virtua1aw library

He cheered up Mrs. Drilon when her spints were low. He
talked to her immediate circle which included Art Tiu, Tony
Carpio, Nilo Pea, Amy Wong, Atty. Grapilon, Victor Lazatin,
and Boy Reyno. They assessed the progress of the campaign,
and measured the strengths and weaknesses of the other
groups. The group had sessions as early as the later part of
May.

Room 114, the suite listed in the name of Assistant Secretary
Benedicto toted up a bill of P23,110 during the 2-day IBP
convention/election. A total of 113 phone calls (amounting to
P1,356) were recorded as emanating from his room.

Opposite Room 114, was Room 112, also a suite, listed in the
names of Mrs. Drilon, Gladys Tiongco (candidate for Governor,
Eastern Mindanao) and Amy Wong (candidate for Governor,
Metro Manila). These two rooms served as the "action center"
or "war room" where campaign strategies were discussed
before and during the convention. It was in these rooms
where the supporters of the Drilon group, like Attys. Carpio,
Callanta, Benedicto, the Quasha and the ACCRA lawyers met
to plot their moves.

(7) Playing the dues or other indebtedness of any member
(Sec. 14[e], IBP By-Laws).

Atty. Teresita C. Sison, IBP Treasurer, testified that she has
heard of candidates paying the IBP dues of lawyers who
promised to vote for or support them, but she has no way of
ascertaining whether it was a candidate who paid the
delinquent dues of another, because the receipts are issued in
the name of the member for whom payment is made (t.s.n.
June 28, 1989, pp. 24-28).

She has noticed, though, that there is an upsurge of payments
in March, April, May during any election year. This year, the
collections increased by P100,000 over that of last year (a non-
election year) from P1,413,425 to P1,524,875 (t.s.n. June
28, 1989, p. 25).

(8) Distribution of materials other than bio-data of not more
than one page of legal size sheet of paper (Sec. 14[a], IBP By-
Laws).

On the convention floor on the day of the election, Atty.
Paculdo caused to be distributed his bio-data and copies of a
leaflet entitled "My Quest," as well as, the lists of his slate.
Attys. Drilon and Nisce similarly distributed their tickets and
bio-data.

The campaign materials of Atty. Paculdo cost from P15,000 to
P20,000. They were printed by his own printing shop.

(9) Causing distribution of such statement to be done by
persons other than those authorized by the officer presiding at
the election (Sec. 14[b], IBP By-Laws).

Atty. Paculdo employed uniformed girls to distribute his
campaign materials on the convention floor. Atty. Carpio
noted that there were more campaign materials distributed at
the convention site this year than in previous years. The
election was more heated and expensive (t.s.n. July 6, 1989, p.
39).

Atty. Benjamin Bernardino, the incumbent President of the IBP
Rizal Chapter, and a candidate for chairman of the House of
Delegates on Nisces ticket, testified that campaign materials
were distributed during the convention by girls and by
lawyers. He saw members of the ACCRA law firm campaigning
for Atty. Drilon (t.s.n. July 3, 1989, pp. 142-145).

(10) Inducing or influencing a member to withhold his vote, or
to vote for or against a candidate (Sec. 14[e], IBP By-Laws).

Atty. Bernardino disclosed that his cousin, Atty. Romeo
Capulong, urged him to withdraw his candidacy for chairman
of the House of Delegates and to run as vice-chairman in Violy
Drilons slate, but he declined (t.s.n. July 3, 1989, pp. 137,
149).

Atty. Gloria Agunos, personnel director of the Hyatt Terraces
Hotel in Baguio and president of the Baguio-Benguet IBP
Chapter, recalled that in the third week of May 1989, after the
Tripartite meet of the Department of Labor & Employment at
the Green Valley Country Club in Baguio City, she met Atty.
Drilon, together with two labor officers of Region 1, Attys.
Filomeno Balbin and Atty. Mansala. Atty. Drilon solicited her
(Atty. Agunos) vote and invited her to stay at the Philippine
Plaza where a room would be available for her. Atty Paculdo
also tried to enlist her support during the chapter presidents
meeting to choose their nominee for governor for the
Northern Luzon region (t.s.n. July 13, 1989, pp. 43-
54).chanrobles law library

Atty. Nisce testified that a Manila Chapter 4 delegate, Marcial
Magsino, who had earlier committed his vote to Nisce
changed his mind when he was offered a judgeship (This
statement, however, is admittedly hearsay). When Nisce
confronted Magsino about the alleged offer, the latter denied
that there was such an offer. Nisces informant was Antonio G.
Nalapo, an IBP candidate who also withdrew.

Another Nisce candidate, Cesar Viola, withdrew from the race
and refused to be nominated (t.s.n. June 29, 1989, p. 104).

Vicente P. Tordilla who was Nisces candidate for Governor
became Paculdos candidate instead (t.s.n. June 29, 1989, p.
104).

Nisce recalled that during the Bench and Bar Dialogue in
Cotabato City, Court Administrator Tiro went around saying, "I
am not campaigning, but my wife is a candidate."cralaw
virtua1aw library

Nisce said that the presidents of several IBP chapters informed
him that labor officials were campaigning for Mrs. Drilon (t.s.n.
June 29, 1989, pp. 109-110). He mentioned Ciony de la Cerna,
who allegedly campaigned in La Union (t.s.n. June 29, 1989, p.
111).

Atty. Joel A. Llosa, Nisces supporter and candidate for
governor of the Western Visayas, expressed his
disappointment over the IBP elections because some
delegates flip-flopped from one camp to another. He testified
that when he arrived at the Manila Domestic Airport he was
met by an assistant regional director of the DOLE who offered
to bring him to the Philippine Plaza, but he declined the offer.
During the legal aid seminar, Atty. Drilon invited him to
transfer to the Philippine Plaza where a room had been
reserved for him. He declined the invitation (t.s.n. July 4, 1989,
pp. 102-106).

Atty. Llosa said that while he was still in Dumaguete City, he
already knew that the three candidates had their
headquarters in separate hotels: Paculdo, at the Holiday Inn;
Drilon, at the Philippine Plaza; and Nisce, at the Hyatt. He
knew about this because a week before the elections,
representatives of Atty. Drilon went to Dumaguete City to
campaign. He mentioned Atty. Rodil Montebon of the ACCRA
Law Office, accompanied by Atty. Julve, the Assistant Regional
Director of the Department of Labor in Dumaguete City. These
two, he said, offered to give him two PAL tickets and
accommodations at the Philippine Plaza (t.s.n. July 4, 1989, pp.
101-104). But he declined the offer because he was already
committed to Atty. Nisce.

Atty. Llosa also revealed that before he left for Manila on May
31, 1989, a businessman, Henry Dy, approached him to
convince him to vote for Atty. Paculdo. But Llosa told Dy that
he was already committed to Nisce.

He did not receive any plane tickets from Atty. Nisce because
he and his two companions (Atty. Eltanal and Atty. Ruperto)
had earlier bought their own tickets for Manila (t.s.n. July 4,
1989, p. 101).

SUMMARY OF CAMPAIGN EXPENSES INCURRED

BY THE CANDIDATES

Atty. Paculdo admitted having spent some P250,000 during his
three weeks of campaigning. Of this amount, the Capitol Bar
Association (of which he was the chapter president)
contributed about P150,000. The Capitol Bar Association is a
voluntary bar association composed of Quezon City lawyers.

He spent about P100,000 to defray the expenses of his trips to
the provinces (Bicol provinces, Pampanga, Abra, Mountain
Province and Bulacan) (t.s.n. June 29, 1989, pp. 9-14).

Atty. Nisces hotel bills at the Hyatt amounted to P216,127.74.
This does not include the expenses for his campaign which
began several months before the June 3rd election, and his
purchases of airplane tickets for some delegates.

The records of the Philippine Plaza Hotel, headquarters of
Atty. Drilons camp, showed that her campaign rang up over
P600,000 in hotel bills. Atty. Callanta paid P316,411.53 for the
rooms, food, and beverage consumed by Atty. Drilons
supporters, but still left an unpaid bill of P302,197.30 at
conventions end.

FINDINGS.

From all the foregoing, it is evident that the manner in which
the principal candidates for the national positions in the
Integrated Bar conducted their campaign preparatory to the
elections on June 3, 1989, violated Section 14 of the IBP By-
Laws and made a travesty of the idea of a "strictly non-
political" Integrated Bar enshrined in Section 4 of the By-Laws.

The setting up of campaign headquarters by the three
principal candidates (Drilon, Nisce and Paculdo) in five-star
hotels: The Philippine Plaza, the Holiday Inn and The Hyatt -
the better for them to corral and entertain the delegates
billeted therein; the island-hopping to solicit the votes of the
chapter presidents who comprise the 120-member House of
Delegates that elects the national officers and regional
governors; the formation of tickets, slates, or line-ups of
candidates for the other elective positions aligned with, or
supporting, either Drilon, Paculdo or Nisce; the procurement
of written commitments and the distribution of nomination
forms to be filled up by the delegates; the reservation of
rooms for delegates in three big hotels, at the expense of the
presidential candidates; the use of a PNB plane by Drilon and
some members of her ticket to enable them to "assess their
chances" among the chapter presidents in the Bicol provinces;
the printing and distribution of tickets and bio-data of the
candidates which in the case of Paculdo admittedly cost him
some P15,000 to P20,000; the employment of uniformed girls
(by Paculdo) and lawyers (by Drilon) to distribute their
campaign materials on the convention floor on the day of the
election; the giving of assistance by the Undersecretary of
Labor to Mrs. Drilon and her group; the use of labor arbiters to
meet delegates at the airport and escort them to the
Philippine Plaza Hotel; the giving of pre-paid plane tickets and
hotel accommodations to delegates (and some families who
accompanied them) in exchange for their support; the pirating
of some candidates by inducing them to "hop" or "flip-flop"
from one ticket to another for some rumored consideration;
all these practices made a political circus of the proceedings
and tainted the whole election process.

The candidates and many of the participants in that election
not only violated the By-Laws of the IBP but also the ethics of
the legal profession which imposes on all lawyers, as a
corollary of their obligation to obey and uphold the
constitution and the laws, the duty to "promote respect for
law and legal processes" and to abstain from "activities aimed
at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal
system" (Rule 1.02, Canon 1, Code of Professional
Responsibility). Respect for law is gravely eroded when
lawyers themselves, who are supposed to be minions of the
law, engage in unlawful practices and cavalierly brush aside
the very rules that the IBP formulated for their observance.

The unseemly ardor with which the candidates pursued the
presidency of the association detracted from the dignity of the
legal profession. The spectacle of lawyers bribing or being
bribed to vote one way or another, certainly did not uphold
the honor of the profession nor elevate it in the publics
esteem.

The Court notes with grave concern what appear to be the
evasions, denials and outright prevarications that tainted the
statements of the witnesses, including some of the candidates,
during the initial hearing conducted by it before its fact-finding
committee was created. The subsequent investigation
conducted by this Committee has revealed that those parties
had been less than candid with the Court and seem to have
conspired among themselves to deceive it or at least withhold
vital information from it to conceal the irregularities
committed during the campaign.

CONCLUSIONS.

It has been mentioned with no little insistence that the
provision in the 1987 Constitution (Sec. 8, Art. VIII) providing
for a Judicial and Bar Council composed of seven (7) members
among whom is "a representative of the Integrated Bar,"
tasked to participate in the selection of nominees for
appointment to vacant positions in the judiciary, may be the
reason why the position of IBP president has attracted so
much interest among the lawyers. The much coveted "power"
erroneously perceived to be inherent in that office might have
caused the corruption of the IBP elections. To impress upon
the participants in that electoral exercise the seriousness of
the misconduct which attended it and the stern disapproval
with which it is viewed by this Court, and to restore the non-
political character of the IBP and reduce, if not entirely
eliminate, expensive electioneering for the top positions in the
organization which, as the recently concluded elections
revealed, spawned unethical practices which seriously
diminished the stature of the IBP as an association of the
practitioners of a noble and honored profession, the Court
hereby ORDERS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. The IBP elections held on June 3, 1989 should be as they are
hereby annulled.

2. The provisions of the IBP By-Laws for the direct election by
the House of Delegates (approved by this Court in its
resolution of July 9, 1980 in Bar Matter No. 287) of the
following national officers:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(a) the officers of the House of Delegates;

(b) the IBP president; and

(c) the executive vice-president,

be repealed, this Court being empowered to amend, modify or
repeal the By-Laws of the IBP under Section 77, Art. XI of said
By-Laws.

3. The former system of having the IBP President and
Executive Vice-President elected by the Board of Governors
(composed of the governors of the nine [9] IBP regions) from
among themselves (as provided in Sec. 47, Art. VII, Original IBP
By-Laws) should be restored. The right of automatic succession
by the Executive Vice-President to the presidency upon the
expiration of their two-year term (which was abolished by this
Courts resolution dated July 9, 1985 in Bar Matter No. 287)
should be as it is hereby restored.

4. At the end of the Presidents two-year term, the Executive
Vice-President shall automatically succeed to the office of
president. The incoming board of governors shall then elect an
Executive Vice-President from among themselves. The position
of Executive Vice-President shall be rotated among the nine
(9) IBP regions. One who has served as president may not run
for election as Executive Vice-President in a succeeding
election until after the rotation of the presidency among the
nine (9) regions shall have been completed; whereupon, the
rotation shall begin anew.

5. Section 47 of Article VII is hereby amended to read as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Section 47. National Officers. The Integrated Bar of the
Philippines shall have a President and Executive Vice-President
to be chosen by the Board of Governors from among nine (9)
regional governors, as much as practicable, on a rotation basis.
The governors shall be ex oficio Vice-President for their
respective regions. There shall also be a Secretary and
Treasurer of the Board of Governors to be appointed by the
President with the consent of the Board."cralaw virtua1aw
library

6. Section 33(b), Art. V, IBP By-Laws, is hereby amended as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"(b) The President and Executive Vice President of the IBP shall
be the Chairman and Vice-Chairman, respectively, of the
House of Delegates. The Secretary, Treasurer, and Sergeant-at-
Arms shall be appointed by the President with the consent of
the House of Delegates."cralaw virtua1aw library

7. Section 33(g) of Article V providing for the positions of
Chairman, Vice-Chairman, Secretary-Treasurer and Sergeant-
at-Arms of the House of Delegates is hereby repealed.

8. Section 37, Article VI is hereby amended to read as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Section 37. Composition of the Board. The Integrated Bar
of the Philippines shall be governed by a Board of Governors
consisting of nine (9) Governors from the nine (9) regions as
delineated in Section 3 of the Integration Rule, on the
representation basis of one (1) Governor for each region to be
elected by the members of the House of Delegates from that
region only. The position of Governor should be rotated
among the different Chapters in the region."cralaw virtua1aw
library

9. Section 39, Article V is hereby amended as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Section 39. Nomination and election of the Governors. At
least one (1) month before the national convention the
delegates from each region shall elect the governor for their
region, the choice of which shall as much as possible be
rotated among the chapters in the region."cralaw virtua1aw
library

10. Section 33(a), Article V hereby is amended by adding the
following provision as part of the first
paragraph:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"No convention of the House of Delegates nor of the general
membership shall be held prior to any election in an election
year."cralaw virtua1aw library

11. Section 39, (a), (b), (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), and (7) of
Article VI should be as they are hereby deleted.

All other provisions of the By-Laws including its amendment by
the Resolution en banc of this Court of July 9, 1985 (Bar
Matter No. 287) that are inconsistent herewith are hereby
repealed or modified.

12. Special elections for the Board of Governors shall be held
in the nine (9) IBP regions within three (3) months after the
promulgation of the Courts resolution in this case. Within
thirty (30) days thereafter, the Board of Governors shall meet
at the IBP Central Office in Manila to elect from among
themselves the IBP national president and executive vice-
president. In these special elections, the candidates in the
election of the national officers held on June 3, 1989,
particularly identified in Sub-Head 3 of this Resolution entitled
"Formation of Tickets and Single Slates," as well as those
identified in this Resolution as connected with any of the
irregularities attendant upon that election, are ineligible and
may not present themselves as candidate for any
position.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

13. Pending such special elections, a caretaker board shall be
appointed by the Court to administer the affairs of the IBP.
The Court makes clear that the dispositions here made are
without prejudice to its adoption in due time of such further
and other measures as are warranted in the premises.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco,
Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Grio-Aquino and Regalado,
JJ., concur.

Fernan, C.J. and Medialdea, J., No part.

Gutierrez, Jr., J., On leave.