G.R. No.

88211 September 15, 1989

FERDINAND E. MARCOS, IMELDA R. MARCOS, FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR., IRENE M.
ARANETA, IMEE MANOTOC, TOMAS MANOTOC, GREGORIO ARANETA, PACIFICO E.
MARCOS, NICANOR YIGUEZ and PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA),
represented by its President, CONRADO F. ESTRELLA, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE RAUL MANGLAPUS, CATALINO MACARAIG, SEDFREY ORDOEZ, MIRIAM
DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, FIDEL RAMOS, RENATO DE VILLA, in their capacity as Secretary of
Foreign Affairs, Executive Secretary, Secretary of Justice, Immigration Commissioner,
Secretary of National Defense and Chief of Staff, respectively, respondents.
Facts:
Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency and was forced into exile. Corazon Aquinos
ascension into presidency was challenged by failed coup attempts as well as by plots of Marcos loyalists
and the Marcoses themselves. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philippines
to die. But President Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return has stood
firmly on the decision to bar the return of Mr. Marcos and his family. Hence, this petition for mandamus
and prohibition asks the Courts to order the respondents to issue travel documents to Mr. Marcos and the
immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's decision to bar their
return to the Philippines.
The case for the petitioners is founded on the assertion that their right to return to the Philippines
is guaranteed by the following provisions of the Constitution:
Art. 3. Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life liberty or property without due process of
law, nor shall any person be denied equal protection of the laws.
Art. 3. Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by
law shall not be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety or public
health, as may be provided by law.
The petitioners contend that the President has no power to impair the liberty of abode of the
Marcoses because only the Courts may do so within the limits prescribed by law. Nor may the
President impair the right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so.
Also, the petitioners claim that under international law, particularly the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights guaranteed the right of the Marcoses to return to the Philippines. Thus:
Art. 13 (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of
each state.
(2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, AND TO RETURN TO HIS
COUNTRY.
Likewise, under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which had been ratified
by the Philippines, provides:
Art. 12 4) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country.
The respondents argue that the issue in this case involves a political question which is therefore
beyond the jurisdiction of the Court. Furthermore, they argue that the right of the state to
national security prevails over individual rights, citing Section 4, Art. II of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution.

Issues:
Whether or not the President has the power to bar the return of Marcos to the Philippines. Assuming that
she has the power to bar, was there a finding made that there is a clear and present danger to the public
due to the return? And have the requirements of due process been complied with in the making of the
finding?

HELD:
The request of the Marcoses must not be treated only in the light of constitutional provisions, it must be
treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of the President
which are implicit in to the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare.
Such request or demand should submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the President
to determine whether it must be granted or denied.

It is found by the Court that from the pleadings filed by the parties, from their oral arguments, and the
facts revealed during the briefing in chambers by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
and the National Security Adviser, wherein petitioners and respondents were represented, that there exist
factual bases for the President's decision. Hence, this act cannot be said to have been done arbitrarily or
capriciously. Further, the ponencia (the coups, the communist threat, peace and order issues especially
in Mindanao, Marcos loyalists plotting) bolsters the conclusion that the return of Marcos will only
exacerbate the situation in the country.

Another reason of the Court...We cannot also lose sight of the fact that the country is only now beginning
to recover from the hardships brought about by the plunder of the economy attributed to the Marcoses
and their close associates and relatives, many of whom are still here in the Philippines in a position to
destabilize the country, while the Government has barely scratched the surface, so to speak, in its efforts
to recover the enormous wealth stashed away by the Marcoses in foreign jurisdictions. Then, We cannot
ignore the continually increasing burden imposed on the economy by the excessive foreign borrowing
during the Marcos regime, which stifles and stagnates development and is one of the root causes of
widespread poverty and all its attendant ills. The resulting precarious state of our economy is of common
knowledge and is easily within the ambit of judicial notice.
The President has determined that the destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses would wipe
away the gains achieved during the past few years and lead to total economic collapse. Given what is
within our individual and common knowledge of the state of the economy, we cannot argue with that
determination.
WHEREFORE, and it being our well-considered opinion that the President did not act arbitrarily or with
grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of former President Marcos and his family at the
present time and under present circumstances poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and
in prohibiting their return to the Philippines, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.


CAUNCA VS SALAZAR
Facts: This is an action for habeas corpus brought by Bartolome Caunca in
behalf of his cousin Estelita Flores who was employed by the Far Eastern
Employment Bureau, owned by Julia Salazar, respondent herein. An advanced
payment has already been given to Estelita by the employment agency, for her to
work as a maid. However, Estelita wanted to transfer to another residence, which
was disallowed by the employment agency. Further she was detained and her
liberty was restrained. The employment agency wanted that the advance payment,
which was applied to her transportation expense from the province should be paid
by Estelita before she could be allowed to leave.


Issue: Whether or Not an employment agency has the right to restrain and
detain a maid without returning the advance payment it gave?


Held: An employment agency, regardless of the amount it may advance to a
prospective employee or maid, has absolutely no power to curtail her freedom of
movement. The fact that no physical force has been exerted to keep her in the
house of the respondent does not make less real the deprivation of her personal
freedom of movement, freedom to transfer from one place to another, freedom to
choose ones residence. Freedom may be lost due to external moral compulsion, to
founded or groundless fear, to erroneous belief in the existence of an imaginary
power of an impostor to cause harm if not blindly obeyed, to any other
psychological element that may curtail the mental faculty of choice or the
unhampered exercise of the will. If the actual effect of such psychological spell is to
place a person at the mercy of another, the victim is entitled to the protection
of courts of justice as much as the individual who is illegally deprived of liberty by
duress or physical coercion.

RUBI ET AL VS PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO
G.R. No. L-14078 March 7, 1919

Facts:
Rubi and various other Manguianes (Mangyans) in the province of Mindoro were ordered by the
provincial governor of Mindoro to remove their residence from their native habitat and to established
themselves on areservation in Tigbao, still in the province of Mindoro, and to remain there, or be
punished by imprisonment if they escaped. Manguianes had been ordered to live in
a reservation made to that end and for purposes of cultivation under certain plans. The Manguianes
are a Non-Christian tribe who were considered to be of very low culture.
One of the Manguianes, a certain Dabalos, escaped from the reservation but was later caught and
was placed in prison at Calapan, solely because he escaped from the reservation. An application for
habeas corpus was made on behalf by Rubi and other Manguianes of the province, alleging that by
virtue of the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro creating the reservation, they had been
illegally deprived of their liberty. In this case, the validity of Section 2145 of the Administrative Code,
which provides:
With the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any province in which
non-Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the
interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied
public lands to be selected by him and approved by the provincial board.
was challenged.
ISSUE: 1. Whether or not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code constitutes undue delegation.
2. Whether or not the Manguianes are being deprived of their liberty.
HELD:
I. No. By a vote of five to four, the Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of this section of the
Administrative Code. Under the doctrine of necessity, who else was in a better position to determine
whether or not to execute the law but the provincial governor. It is optional for the provincial governor
to execute the law as circumstances may arise. It is necessary to give discretion to the provincial
governor. The Legislature may make decisions of executive departments of subordinate official
thereof, to whom it has committed the execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact.
II. No. Among other things, the term non-Christian should not be given a literal meaning or a
religious signification, but that it was intended to relate to degrees of civilization. The term non-
Christian it was said, refers not to religious belief, but in a way to geographical area, and more
directly to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization. In this case, the Manguianes
were being reconcentrated in the reservation to promote peace and to arrest their seminomadic
lifestyle. This will ultimately settle them down where they can adapt to the changing times.
The Supreme Court held that the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro was neither
discriminatory nor class legislation, and stated among other things: . . . one cannot hold that the
liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered with when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is
considered. They are restrained for their own good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor can
one say thatdue process of law has not been followed. To go back to our definition of due process of
law and equal protection of the laws, there exists a law; the law seems to be reasonable; it is
enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a
class.