Cases - The Legislative Department (2nd Set)

The Legislative Department
Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 189793 April 7, 2010
SENATOR BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III and MAYOR JESSE ROBREDO, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS represented by its Chairman JOSE A.R. MELO and its
Commissioners, RENE V. SARMIENTO, NICODEMO T. FERRER, LUCENITO N. TAGLE, ARMANDO
VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH AND GREGORIO LARRAZABAL, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PEREZ, J.:
This case comes before this Court by way of a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court. In this original action, petitioners Senator Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III and
Mayor Jesse Robredo, as public ofcers, taxpayers and citizens, seek the nullication as
unconstitutional of Republic Act No. 9716, entitled "An Act Reapportioning the Composition of the
First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby
Creating a New Legislative District From Such Reapportionment." Petitioners consequently pray
that the respondent Commission on Elections be restrained from making any issuances and from
taking any steps relative to the implementation of Republic Act No. 9716.
Republic Act No. 9716 originated from House Bill No. 4264, and was signed into law by President
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on 12 October 2009. It took effect on 31 October 2009, or fteen (15)
days following its publication in the Manila Standard, a newspaper of general circulation.
1
In
substance, the said law created an additional legislative district for the Province of Camarines Sur
by reconguring the existing rst and second legislative districts of the province.
Prior to Republic Act No. 9716, the Province of Camarines Sur was estimated to have a population
of 1,693,821,
2
distributed among four (4) legislative districts in this wise:

Following the enactment of Republic Act No. 9716, the rst and second districts of Camarines Sur
were recongured in order to create an additional legislative district for the province. Hence, the
rst district municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were
combined with the second district municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new second
legislative district. The following table
3
illustrates the reapportionment made by Republic Act No.
9716:
Republic Act No. 9716 is a well-milled legislation. The factual recitals by both parties of the origins
of the bill that became the law show that, from the ling of House Bill No. 4264 until its approval by
the Senate on a vote of thirteen (13) in favor and two (2) against, the process progressed step by
step, marked by public hearings on the sentiments and position of the local ofcials of Camarines
Sur on the creation of a new congressional district, as well as argumentation and debate on the
issue, now before us, concerning the stand of the oppositors of the bill that a population of at least
250,000 is required by the Constitution for such new district.
4

Petitioner Aquino III was one of two senators who voted against the approval of the Bill by the
Senate. His co-petitioner, Robredo, is the Mayor of Naga City, which was a part of the former
second district from which the municipalities of Gainza and Milaor were taken for inclusion in the
new second district. No other local executive joined the two; neither did the representatives of the
former third and fourth districts of the province.
Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716, runs afoul of
the explicit constitutional standard that requires a minimum population of two hundred fty
thousand (250,000) for the creation of a legislative district.
5
The petitioners claim that the
reconguration by Republic Act No. 9716 of the rst and second districts of Camarines Sur is
unconstitutional, because the proposed rst district will end up with a population of less than
250,000 or only 176,383.
Petitioners rely on Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution as basis for the cited 250,000
minimum population standard.
6
The provision reads:
Article VI
Section 5. (1) x x x x
(2) x x x x
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent
territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fty thousand, or each province, shall
have at least one representative.
(4) x x x x (Emphasis supplied).
The petitioners posit that the 250,000 gure appearing in the above-cited provision is the
minimum population requirement for the creation of a legislative district.
7
The petitioners theorize
that, save in the case of a newly created province, each legislative district created by Congress
must be supported by a minimum population of at least 250,000 in order to be valid.
8
Under this
view, existing legislative districts may be reapportioned and severed to form new districts,
provided each resulting district will represent a population of at least 250,000. On the other hand,
if the reapportionment would result in the creation of a legislative seat representing a populace of
less than 250,000 inhabitants, the reapportionment must be stricken down as invalid for non-
compliance with the minimum population requirement.
In support of their theory, the petitioners point to what they claim is the intent of the framers of the
1987 Constitution to adopt a population minimum of 250,000 in the creation of additional
legislative seats.
9
The petitioners argue that when the Constitutional Commission xed the original
number of district seats in the House of Representatives to two hundred (200), they took into
account the projected national population of fty ve million (55,000,000) for the year 1986.
10

According to the petitioners, 55 million people represented by 200 district representatives
translates to roughly 250,000 people for every one (1) representative.
11
Thus, the 250,000
population requirement found in Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution is actually based
on the population constant used by the Constitutional Commission in distributing the initial 200
legislative seats.
Thus did the petitioners claim that in reapportioning legislative districts independently from the
creation of a province, Congress is bound to observe a 250,000 population threshold, in the same
manner that the Constitutional Commission did in the original apportionment.
Verbatim, the submission is that:
1. Republic Act 9716 is unconstitutional because the newly apportioned rst district of Camarines
Sur failed to meet the population requirement for the creation of the legislative district as explicitly
provided in Article VI, Section 5, Paragraphs (1) and (3) of the Constitution and Section 3 of the
Ordinance appended thereto; and
2. Republic Act 9716 violates the principle of proportional representation as provided in Article VI,
Section 5 paragraphs (1), (3) and (4) of the Constitution.
12

The provision subject of this case states:
Article VI
Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and
fty members, unless otherwise xed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts
apportioned among the provinces, cities and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the
number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and
those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national,
regional and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) x x x x
(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a
reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section.
On the other hand, the respondents, through the Ofce of the Solicitor General, seek the dismissal
of the present petition based on procedural and substantive grounds.
On procedural matters, the respondents argue that the petitioners are guilty of two (2) fatal
technical defects: rst, petitioners committed an error in choosing to assail the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 9716 via the remedy of Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court; and second, the petitioners have no locus standi to question the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 9716.
On substantive matters, the respondents call attention to an apparent distinction between cities
and provinces drawn by Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The respondents concede
the existence of a 250,000 population condition, but argue that a plain and simple reading of the
questioned provision will show that the same has no application with respect to the creation of
legislative districts in provinces.
13
Rather, the 250,000 minimum population is only a requirement
for the creation of a legislative district in a city.
In sum, the respondents deny the existence of a xed population requirement for the
reapportionment of districts in provinces. Therefore, Republic Act No. 9716, which only creates an
additional legislative district within the province of Camarines Sur, should be sustained as a
perfectly valid reapportionment law.
We rst pass upon the threshold issues.
The respondents assert that by choosing to avail themselves of the remedies of Certiorari and
Prohibition, the petitioners have committed a fatal procedural lapse. The respondents cite the
following reasons:
1. The instant petition is bereft of any allegation that the respondents had acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion.1avvphi1
2. The remedy of Certiorari and Prohibition must be directed against a tribunal, board, ofcer or
person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions. Respondents maintain
that in implementing Republic Act No. 9716, they were not acting as a judicial or quasi-judicial
body, nor were they engaging in the performance of a ministerial act.
3. The petitioners could have availed themselves of another plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law. Considering that the main thrust of the instant petition is the
declaration of unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716, the same could have been ventilated
through a petition for declaratory relief, over which the Supreme Court has only appellate, not
original jurisdiction.
The respondents likewise allege that the petitioners had failed to show that they had sustained, or
is in danger of sustaining any substantial injury as a result of the implementation of Republic Act
No. 9716. The respondents, therefore, conclude that the petitioners lack the required legal
standing to question the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716.
This Court has paved the way away from procedural debates when confronted with issues that, by
reason of constitutional importance, need a direct focus of the arguments on their content and
substance.
The Supreme Court has, on more than one occasion, tempered the application of procedural rules,
14
as well as relaxed the requirement of locus standi whenever confronted with an important issue
of overreaching signicance to society.
15

Hence, in Del Mar v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR)
16
and Jaworski v.
PAGCOR,
17
this Court sanctioned momentary deviation from the principle of the hierarchy of
courts, and took original cognizance of cases raising issues of paramount public importance. The
Jaworski case ratiocinates:
Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for prohibition,
the transcendental importance of the issues involved in this case warrants that we set aside the
technical defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One cannot deny that the
issues raised herein have potentially pervasive inuence on the social and moral well being of this
nation, specially the youth; hence, their proper and just determination is an imperative need. This
is in accordance with the well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not inexible tools
designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their strict
and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than
promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. (Emphasis supplied)
Anent the locus standi requirement, this Court has already uniformly ruled in Kilosbayan v.
Guingona,
18
Tatad v. Executive Secretary,
19
Chavez v. Public Estates Authority
20
and Bagong
Alyansang Makabayan v. Zamora,
21
just to name a few, that absence of direct injury on the part of
the party seeking judicial review may be excused when the latter is able to craft an issue of
transcendental importance. In Lim v. Executive Secretary,
22
this Court held that in cases of
transcendental importance, the cases must be settled promptly and denitely, and so, the standing
requirements may be relaxed. This liberal stance has been echoed in the more recent decision on
Chavez v. Gonzales.
23

Given the weight of the issue raised in the instant petition, the foregoing principles must apply.
The beaten path must be taken. We go directly to the determination of whether or not a
population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the creation of a new
legislative district in a province.
We deny the petition.
We start with the basics. Any law duly enacted by Congress carries with it the presumption of
constitutionality.
24
Before a law may be declared unconstitutional by this Court, there must be a
clear showing that a specic provision of the fundamental law has been violated or transgressed.
When there is neither a violation of a specic provision of the Constitution nor any proof showing
that there is such a violation, the presumption of constitutionality will prevail and the law must be
upheld. To doubt is to sustain.
25

There is no specic provision in the Constitution that xes a 250,000 minimum population that
must compose a legislative district.
As already mentioned, the petitioners rely on the second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the
1987 Constitution, coupled with what they perceive to be the intent of the framers of the
Constitution to adopt a minimum population of 250,000 for each legislative district.
The second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution, succinctly provides: "Each city
with a population of at least two hundred fty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative."
The provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a district on
one hand, and the entitlement of a province to a district on the other. For while a province is
entitled to at least a representative, with nothing mentioned about population, a city must rst
meet a population minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly entitled.
The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase "each city with a population of
at least two hundred fty thousand" from the phrase "or each province" point to no other
conclusion than that the 250,000 minimum population is only required for a city, but not for a
province.
26

Plainly read, Section 5(3) of the Constitution requires a 250,000 minimum population only for a city
to be entitled to a representative, but not so for a province.
The 250,000 minimum population requirement for legislative districts in cities was, in turn, the
subject of interpretation by this Court in Mariano, Jr. v. COMELEC.
27

In Mariano, the issue presented was the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7854, which was the
law that converted the Municipality of Makati into a Highly Urbanized City. As it happened,
Republic Act No. 7854 created an additional legislative district for Makati, which at that time was a
lone district. The petitioners in that case argued that the creation of an additional district would
violate Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution, because the resulting districts would be
supported by a population of less than 250,000, considering that Makati had a total population of
only 450,000. The Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of the law and the validity of the
newly created district, explaining the operation of the Constitutional phrase "each city with a
population of at least two hundred fty thousand," to wit:
Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord
with section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the
population of Makati stands at only four hundred fty thousand (450,000). Said section provides,
inter alia, that a city with a population of at least two hundred fty thousand (250,000) shall have at
least one representative. Even granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood
at four hundred fty thousand (450,000), its legislative district may still be increased since it has
met the minimum population requirement of two hundred fty thousand (250,000). In fact, Section
3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides that a city whose population has
increased to more than two hundred fty thousand (250,000) shall be entitled to at least one
congressional representative.
28
(Emphasis supplied)
The Mariano case limited the application of the 250,000 minimum population requirement for
cities only to its initial legislative district. In other words, while Section 5(3), Article VI of the
Constitution requires a city to have a minimum population of 250,000 to be entitled to a
representative, it does not have to increase its population by another 250,000 to be entitled to an
additional district.
There is no reason why the Mariano case, which involves the creation of an additional district within
a city, should not be applied to additional districts in provinces. Indeed, if an additional legislative
district created within a city is not required to represent a population of at least 250,000 in order to
be valid, neither should such be needed for an additional district in a province, considering
moreover that a province is entitled to an initial seat by the mere fact of its creation and regardless
of its population.
Apropos for discussion is the provision of the Local Government Code on the creation of a
province which, by virtue of and upon creation, is entitled to at least a legislative district. Thus,
Section 461 of the Local Government Code states:
Requisites for Creation. (a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as
certied by the Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00)
based on 1991 constant prices and either of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certied by the
Lands Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certied by
the National Statistics Ofce.
Notably, the requirement of population is not an indispensable requirement, but is merely an
alternative addition to the indispensable income requirement.
Mariano, it would turn out, is but a reection of the pertinent ideas that ran through the
deliberations on the words and meaning of Section 5 of Article VI.
The whats, whys, and wherefores of the population requirement of "at least two hundred fty
thousand" may be gleaned from the records of the Constitutional Commission which, upon
framing the provisions of Section 5 of Article VI, proceeded to form an ordinance that would be
appended to the nal document. The Ordinance is captioned "APPORTIONING THE SEATS OF
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES TO THE DIFFERENT
LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS IN PROVINCES AND CITIES AND THE METROPOLITAN MANILA AREA."
Such records would show that the 250,000 population benchmark was used for the 1986
nationwide apportionment of legislative districts among provinces, cities and Metropolitan Manila.
Simply put, the population gure was used to determine how many districts a province, city, or
Metropolitan Manila should have. Simply discernible too is the fact that, for the purpose,
population had to be the determinant. Even then, the requirement of 250,000 inhabitants was not
taken as an absolute minimum for one legislative district. And, closer to the point herein at issue, in
the determination of the precise district within the province to which, through the use of the
population benchmark, so many districts have been apportioned, population as a factor was not
the sole, though it was among, several determinants.
From its journal,
29
we can see that the Constitutional Commission originally divided the entire
country into two hundred (200) districts, which corresponded to the original number of district
representatives. The 200 seats were distributed by the Constitutional Commission in this manner:
rst, one (1) seat each was given to the seventy-three (73) provinces and the ten (10) cities with a
population of at least 250,000;
30
second, the remaining seats were then redistributed among the
provinces, cities and the Metropolitan Area "in accordance with the number of their inhabitants on
the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio."
31
Commissioner Davide, who later became a
Member and then Chief Justice of the Court, explained this in his sponsorship remark
32
for the
Ordinance to be appended to the 1987 Constitution:
Commissioner Davide: The ordinance xes at 200 the number of legislative seats which are, in
turn, apportioned among provinces and cities with a population of at least 250, 000 and the
Metropolitan Area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio. The population is based on the 1986 projection, with the 1980
ofcial enumeration as the point of reckoning. This projection indicates that our population is more
or less 56 million. Taking into account the mandate that each city with at least 250, 000 inhabitants
and each province shall have at least one representative, we rst allotted one seat for each of the
73 provinces, and each one for all cities with a population of at least 250, 000, which are the Cities
of Manila, Quezon, Pasay, Caloocan, Cebu, Iloilo, Bacolod, Cagayan de Oro, Davao and
Zamboanga. Thereafter, we then proceed[ed] to increase whenever appropriate the number of
seats for the provinces and cities in accordance with the number of their inhabitants on the basis of
a uniform and progressive ratio. (Emphasis supplied).
Thus was the number of seats computed for each province and city. Differentiated from this, the
determination of the districts within the province had to consider "all protests and complaints
formally received" which, the records show, dealt with determinants other than population as
already mentioned.
Palawan is a case in point. Journal No. 107 of the Constitutional Commission narrates:
INTERPELLATION OF MR. NOLLEDO:
Mr. Nolledo inquired on the reason for including Puerto Princesa in the northern towns when it was
more afnity with the southern town of Aborlan, Batarasa, Brookes Point, Narra, Quezon and
Marcos. He stated that the First District has a greater area than the Second District. He then
queried whether population was the only factor considered by the Committee in redistricting.
Replying thereto, Mr. Davide explained that the Committee took into account the standards set in
Section 5 of the Article on the Legislative Department, namely: 1) the legislative seats should be
apportioned among the provinces and cities and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with
their inhabitants on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio; and 2) the legislative district must
be compact, adjacent and contiguous.
Mr. Nolledo pointed out that the last factor was not met when Puerto Princesa was included with
the northern towns. He then inquired what is the distance between Puerto Princesa from San
Vicente.
x x x x
Thereupon, Mr. Nolledo stated that Puerto Princesa has a population of 75,480 and based on the
apportionment, its inclusion with the northern towns would result in a combined population of
265,000 as against only 186,000 for the south. He added that Cuyo and Coron are very important
towns in the northern part of Palawan and, in fact, Cuyo was the capital of Palawan before its
transfer to Puerto Princesa. He also pointed out that there are more potential candidates in the
north and therefore if Puerto Princesa City and the towns of Cuyo and Coron are lumped together,
there would be less candidates in the south, most of whose inhabitants are not interested in
politics. He then suggested that Puerto Princesa be included in the south or the Second District.
Mr. Davide stated that the proposal would be considered during the period of amendments. He
requested that the COMELEC staff study said proposal.
33

"PROPOSED AMENDMENT OF MR. NOLLEDO
On the districting of Palawan, Mr. Nolledo pointed out that it was explained in the interpellations
that District I has a total population of 265,358 including the City of Puerto Princesa, while the
Second District has a total population of 186,733. He proposed, however, that Puerto Princesa be
included in the Second District in order to satisfy the contiguity requirement in the Constitution
considering that said City is nearer the southern towns comprising the Second District.
In reply to Mr. Monsods query, Mr. Nolledo explained that with the proposed transfer of Puerto
Princesa City to the Second District, the First District would only have a total population of 190,000
while the Second District would have 262,213, and there would be no substantial changes.
Mr. Davide accepted Mr. Nolledos proposal to insert Puerto Princesa City before the Municipality
of Aborlan.
There being no objection on the part of the Members the same was approved by the Body.
APPROVAL OF THE APPORTIONMENT AND DISTRICTING OF PALAWAN
There being no other amendment, on motion of Mr. Davide, there being no objection, the
apportionment and districting for the province of Palawan was approved by the Body.
34

The districting of Palawan disregarded the 250,000 population gure. It was decided by the
importance of the towns and the city that eventually composed the districts.
Benguet and Baguio are another reference point. The Journal further narrates:
At this juncture, Mr. Davide informed the Body that Mr. Regalado made a reservation with the
Committee for the possible reopening of the approval of Region I with respect to Benguet and
Baguio City.
REMARKS OF MR. REGALADO
Mr. Regalado stated that in the formulation of the Committee, Baguio City and Tuba are placed in
one district. He stated that he was toying with the idea that, perhaps as a special consideration for
Baguio because it is the summer capital of the Philippines, Tuba could be divorced from Baguio
City so that it could, by itself, have its own constituency and Tuba could be transferred to the
Second District together with Itogon. Mr. Davide, however, pointed out that the population of
Baguio City is only 141,149.
Mr. Regalado admitted that the regular population of Baguio may be lower during certain times of
the year, but the transient population would increase the population substantially and, therefore,
for purposes of business and professional transactions, it is beyond question that population-wise,
Baguio would more than qualify, not to speak of the ofcial business matters, transactions and
ofces that are also there.
Mr. Davide adverted to Director de Limas statement that unless Tuba and Baguio City are united,
Tuba will be isolated from the rest of Benguet as the place can only be reached by passing through
Baguio City. He stated that the Committee would submit the matter to the Body.
Upon inquiry of the Chair whether he is insisting on his amendment, Mr. Regalado stated that the
Body should have a say on the matter and that the considerations he had given are not on the
demographic aspects but on the fact that Baguio City is the summer capital, the venue and situs of
many government ofces and functions.
On motion of Mr. Davide, there being no objection, the Body approved the reconsideration of the
earlier approval of the apportionment and districting of Region I, particularly Benguet.
Thereafter, on motion of Mr. Davide, there being no objection, the amendment of Mr. Regalado
was put to a vote. With 14 Members voting in favor and none against, the amendment was
approved by the Body.
Mr. Davide informed that in view of the approval of the amendment, Benguet with Baguio City will
have two seats. The First District shall comprise of the municipalities of Mankayan, Buguias, Bakun,
Kabayan, Kibungan, Bokod, Atok, Kapangan, Tublay, La Trinidad, Sablan, Itogon and Tuba. The
Second District shall comprise of Baguio City alone.
There being no objection, the Body approved the apportionment and districting of Region I.
35

Quite emphatically, population was explicitly removed as a factor.
It may be additionally mentioned that the province of Cavite was divided into districts based on
the distribution of its three cities, with each district having a city: one district "supposed to be a
shing area; another a vegetable and fruit area; and the third, a rice growing area," because such
consideration "fosters common interests in line with the standard of compactness."
36
In the
districting of Maguindanao, among the matters discussed were "political stability and common
interest among the people in the area" and the possibility of "chaos and disunity" considering the
"accepted regional, political, traditional and sectoral leaders."
37
For Laguna, it was mentioned that
municipalities in the highland should not be grouped with the towns in the lowland. For Cebu,
Commissioner Maambong proposed that they should "balance the area and population."
38

Consistent with Mariano and with the framer deliberations on district apportionment, we stated in
Bagabuyo v. COMELEC
39
that:
x x x Undeniably, these gures show a disparity in the population sizes of the districts. The
Constitution, however, does not require mathematical exactitude or rigid equality as a standard in
gauging equality of representation. x x x. To ensure quality representation through commonality of
interests and ease of access by the representative to the constituents, all that the Constitution
requires is that every legislative district should comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous,
compact and adjacent territory. (Emphasis supplied).
This 2008 pronouncement is fresh reasoning against the uncompromising stand of petitioner that
an additional provincial legislative district, which does not have at least a 250,000 population is not
allowed by the Constitution.
The foregoing reading and review lead to a clear lesson.
Neither in the text nor in the essence of Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution can, the petition
nd support. And the formulation of the Ordinance in the implementation of the provision, nay,
even the Ordinance itself, refutes the contention that a population of 250,000 is a constitutional
sine qua non for the formation of an additional legislative district in a province, whose population
growth has increased beyond the 1986 numbers.
Translated in the terms of the present case:
1. The Province of Camarines Sur, with an estimated population of 1,693,821 in 2007 is based
on the formula and constant number of 250,000 used by the Constitutional Commission in
nationally apportioning legislative districts among provinces and cities entitled to two (2)
districts in addition to the four (4) that it was given in the 1986 apportionment. Signicantly,
petitioner Aquino concedes this point.
40
In other words, Section 5 of Article VI as clearly written
allows and does not prohibit an additional district for the Province of Camarines Sur, such as that
provided for in Republic Act No. 9786;
2. Based on the pith and pitch of the exchanges on the Ordinance on the protests and complaints
against strict conformity with the population standard, and more importantly based on the nal
districting in the Ordinance on considerations other than population, the reapportionment or the
recomposition of the rst and second legislative districts in the Province of Camarines Sur that
resulted in the creation of a new legislative district is valid even if the population of the new district
is 176,383 and not 250,000 as insisted upon by the petitioners.
3. The factors mentioned during the deliberations on House Bill No. 4264, were:
(a) the dialects spoken in the grouped municipalities;
(b) the size of the original groupings compared to that of the regrouped municipalities;
(c) the natural division separating the municipality subject of the discussion from the recongured
District One; and
(d) the balancing of the areas of the three districts resulting from the redistricting of Districts One
and Two.
41

Each of such factors and in relation to the others considered together, with the increased
population of the erstwhile Districts One and Two, point to the utter absence of abuse of
discretion, much less grave abuse of discretion,
42
that would warrant the invalidation of Republic
Act No. 9716.
To be clear about our judgment, we do not say that in the reapportionment of the rst and second
legislative districts of Camarines Sur, the number of inhabitants in the resulting additional district
should not be considered. Our ruling is that population is not the only factor but is just one of
several other factors in the composition of the additional district. Such settlement is in accord with
both the text of the Constitution and the spirit of the letter, so very clearly given form in the
Constitutional debates on the exact issue presented by this petition.1avvphi1
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. Republic Act No. 9716 entitled "An Act
Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the
Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative District From Such
Reapportionment" is a VALID LAW.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
(On Ofcial Leave)
ROBERTO A. ABAD
*

Associate Justice
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certied that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes
*
On Ofcial Leave.
1
Republic Act No. 9716 was published in the 15 October 2009 issue of the Manila Standard.
2
Figures based on the 2007 Census of Population conducted by the National Statistics Ofce.
3
Figures based on the 2007 Census of Population conducted by the National Statistics Ofce.
4
Rollo, p. 40.
5
Id. at 12.
6
Id. at 14-15.
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
Id. at 16.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Id. at 12-13.
13
Id. at 96.
14
Del Mar v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, 400 Phil. 307 (2000); Fortich v. Corona, 352 Phil.
461 (1998).
15
Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, 433 Phil. 506, 528 (2002); Bagong Alyansang Makabayan v. Zamora, 396
Phil. 623, 646 (2000); Lim v. Executive Secretary, 430 Phil. 555, 580 (2002).
16
Id.
17
464 Phil. 375, 385 (2004).
18
G.R. No. 113375, 5 May 1994, 232 SCRA 110.
19
346 Phil. 321 (1997).
20
Supra note 15.
21
Id.
22
Supra note 15 at 580.
23
G.R. No. 168338, 15 February 2008, 545 SCRA 441.
24
Alvarez v. Guingona, 322 Phil. 774, 789 (1996).
25
The Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, G.R. No. 105371, 11 November 1993, 227 SCRA 703, 705-706.
26
Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, pp. 136-138.
27
312 Phil. 259 (1995).
28
Id. at 272-273.
29
Journal of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. III, pp. 1859-1881.
30
Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. V, p. 949.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Journal of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. III, p. 1861.
34
Id. at 1867.
35
Id. at 1872.
36
Id. at 1867-1868.
37
Id. at 1861.
38
Id. at 1874.
39
G.R. No. 176970, 8 December 2008, 573 SCRA 290, 309-310.
40
Rollo, p. 4.
41
Sen. Aquino, Mr. President, we have to respond to the last statement. The others that have been recommended
together with the Camarines Sur bill were all tested based on one standard, not separate standards for
everybody. It is our opinion and that is the source of this discussion and of this debate; that we hold that there is
a 250,000-rule embodied in so many provisions of the Constitution. Our distinguished collegue from the Bicol
and Makati areas does not agree. I think we have established that we do not agree on our interpretation of the
Constitution.
With his permission, Mr. President, since I am against of his time, may we move on to the next point so as not to
be accused of delaying the passage of the bill any further?
May we ask: Why was Libmanan not considered to be a portion of the proposed rst district? Because having
done the same, instead of having the 170,000-gure, we would have a 269,222 population gure.
Sen. Arroyo. All right. Look at that map.
Sen. Aquino. May we just move to another rostrum, Mr. President. We cannot view the details from this particular
rostrum, with the indulgence of our distinguished colleague.
Sen. Arroyo. x x x.
x x x x.
Now, the rst district of Camarines Sur is so big that it consists of 40% of the province, area-wise. Libmanan is the
biggest municipality in the entire or present rst district. It stuck in the middle. We cannot move that no matter
what because that is the biggest. Anyway, we move it left, we move it right, it would change the conguration.
Those are the practical difculties in trying to gure out how. That is the situation. As we see, there is a water
extension of the gulf. We cannot connect them because they are separated by water. So it is no longer
contiguous because it is separated by water and there is nothing we can do about it. That is what I was saying
about mathematical formula. We cannot have mathematical formula when a natural boundary like water cannot
make the municipalities contiguous. That is the picture. It is all there.
The violet is the tagalog-speaking province. The green is the Bicol-speaking province so that is the only way to
divide it. So much has been done in the Lower House in trying to gure it out. But as long as the three
Congressman do not agree, then there is nothing we can do about it. That Representative, what the
Congressman say in his district is "king". He is the king there, there is nothing we can do about it. We respect
that.
Libmanan is the biggest one. We cannot move that anyway. (TSN, Senate Plenary Debates on H.B. No. 4264, 22
September 2009).
42
Grave abuse of discretion contemplates a situation where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive
duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by, or to act at all in contemplation of law. (Cabrera v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 182084, 6 October 2008, 567 SCRA 686, 691).

DISSENTING OPINION
CARPIO, J.:
I dissent. The majority opinion wreaks havoc on the bedrock principle of our "democratic and
republican State"
1
that all votes are equal. Instead, the majority opinion introduces the Orwellian
concept that some votes are more equal than others. The majority opinion allows, for the rst time
under the 1987 Constitution, voters in a legislative district created by Congress to send one
representative to Congress even if the district has a population of only 176,383. In sharp contrast,
all other legislative districts created by Congress send one representative each because they all
meet the minimum population requirement of 250,000.
The assailed Republic Act No. 9716 (RA 9716) is unconstitutional for being utterly repugnant to the
clear and precise "standards" prescribed in Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution for the
creation of legislative districts. Section 5(4)
2
of Article VI mandates that "Congress shall make a
reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards" xed in Section 5. These
constitutional standards, as far as population is concerned, are: (1) proportional representation; (2)
minimum population of 250,000 per legislative district; (3) progressive ratio in the increase of
legislative districts as the population base increases; and (4) uniformity in apportionment of
legislative districts "in provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area." The assailed RA 9716
grossly violates these constitutional standards.
Legislators Represent People, Not Provinces or Cities
There was never any debate
3
in the design of our government that the members of the House of
Representatives, just like the members of the Senate, represent people not provinces, cities, or
any other political unit.
4
The only difference is that the members of the Senate represent the
people at large while the members of the House represent the people in legislative districts. Thus,
population or the number of inhabitants in a district is the essential measure of representation
in the House of Representatives.
5
Section 5(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, just like in the
previous Constitutions,
6
could not be any clearer:
The House of Representatives shall be composed of x x x members, x x x, who shall be elected
from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila
area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform
and progressive ratio x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Evidently, the idea of the people, as individuals, electing their representatives under the principle
of "one person, one vote,"
7
is the cardinal feature of any polity, like ours, claiming to be a
"democratic and republican State."
8
A democracy in its pure state is one where the majority of the
people, under the principle of "one person, one vote," directly run the government.
9
A republic is
one which has no monarch, royalty or nobility,
10
ruled by a representative government elected by
the majority of the people under the principle of "one person, one vote," where all citizens are
equally subject to the laws.
11
A republic is also known as a representative democracy. The
democratic and republican ideals are intertwined, and converge on the common principle of
equality -- equality in voting power, and equality under the law.
The constitutional standard of proportional representation is rooted in equality in voting power --
that each vote is worth the same as any other vote,
not more or less. Regardless of race, ethnicity, religion, sex, occupation, poverty, wealth or literacy,
voters have an equal vote. Translated in terms of legislative redistricting, this means equal
representation for equal numbers of people
12
or equal voting weight per legislative district. In
constitutional parlance, this means representation for every legislative district "in accordance with
the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio"
13

or proportional representation. Thus, the principle of "one person, one vote" or equality in voting
power is inherent in proportional representation.
It was in obedience to the rule on proportional representation that this Court unanimously struck
down an apportionment law which:
(a) x x x gave Cebu seven members, while Rizal with a bigger number of inhabitants got four only;
(b) x x x gave Manila four members, while Cotabato with a bigger population got three only; (c)
[gave] Pangasinan with less inhabitants than both Manila and Cotabato x x x more than both, ve
members having been assigned to it; (d) [gave] Samar (with 871,857) four members while Davao
with 903,224 got three only; (e) [gave] Bulacan with 557,691 x x x two only, while Albay with less
inhabitants (515,691) got three, and (f) [gave] Misamis Oriental with 387,839 x x x one member
only, while Cavite with less inhabitants (379,904) got two.
14
x x x x
for being repugnant to the constitutional edict under the 1935 Constitution that the Members of
the House of Representatives "shall be apportioned among the several provinces as nearly as may
be according to the number of their respective inhabitants."
15

Section 5(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution is even more precise by providing that the
Members of the House "shall be elected from legislative districts
apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the
number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio x x x."
The phrase "as nearly as may be according to the number of their respective inhabitants" in the
1935 Constitution has been changed in the 1987 Constitution to the more precise "in accordance
with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio
x x x." The addition of the phrase "on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio" was meant to
stress that the rule on proportional representation shall apply uniformly in the apportionment of
every legislative district.
The phrase "in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants," which precedes the
phrase "provinces, cities and the Metropolitan Manila area," means that legislative districts in
provinces, cities and the Metropolitan Manila area shall be apportioned according to proportional
representation or equal representation for equal numbers of people. Thus, there shall be one
legislative district for every given number of people, whether inhabiting in provinces, cities or the
Metropolitan Manila area.
The phrase "on the basis of a uniform x x x ratio" means that the ratio of one legislative district for
every given number of people shall be applied uniformly in all apportionments, whether in
provinces, cities or the Metropolitan Manila area. Section 5(3) of Article VI mandates that "[e]ach
city with a population of at least two hundred fty thousand x x x shall have at least one
representative." Consequently, a population of 250,000 serves as the default minimum population
applicable to every legislative district following the rule on uniformity in the apportionment of
legislative districts, whether in provinces, cities or in the Metropolitan Manila area.
The phrase "progressive ratio" means that the number of legislative districts shall increase as the
number of the population increases, whether in provinces, cities or the Metropolitan Manila area.
Thus, a province shall have one
legislative district if it has a population of 250,000, and two legislative districts if it has 500,000.
This insures that proportional representation is maintained if there are increases in the population
of a province, city, or the Metropolitan Manila area. This is what is meant by a "progressive ratio" in
the apportionment of legislative districts, a ratio that must also be uniformly applied.
Obviously, the 1987 Constitution has laid down clear and precise standards in the apportionment
of legislative districts compared to the 1935 Constitution. What is inescapable is that the 1987
Constitution has strengthened and tightened the requirement of uniformity in the apportionment
of legislative districts, whether in provinces, cities or the Metropolitan Manila area.
To now declare, as the majority opinion holds, that apportionment in provinces can disregard the
minimum population requirement because the Constitution speaks of a minimum population only
in cities is logically awed, constitutionally repulsive, and fatally corrosive of the bedrock notion
that this country is a "democratic and republican State."
16
This ruling of the majority strikes a
debilitating blow at the heart of our democratic and republican system of government.
Under the majoritys ruling, Congress can create legislative districts in provinces without regard to
any minimum population. Such legislative districts can have a population of 150,000, 100,000,
50,000 or even 100, thus throwing out of the window the constitutional standards of proportional
representation and uniformity in the creation of legislative districts. To disregard the minimum
population requirement of 250,000 in provincial legislative districts while
maintaining it in city legislative districts is to disregard, as a necessary consequence, the
constitutional standards of proportional representation and uniformity in the creation of legislative
districts in "provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area." This means that legislative districts
in provinces can have a minimum population of anywhere from 100 (or even less) to 250,000,
while legislative districts in cities will always have a minimum population of 250,000. This will spell
the end of our democratic and republican system of government as we know it and as envisioned
in the 1987 Constitution.
Constitutional Standards for Reapportionment:
Population and Territory
The Constitution itself provides the "standards" against which reapportionment laws like RA 9716
will be tested, following its command that "Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative
districts based on the standards provided in this section,"
17
referring to Section 5, Article VI. These
standards relate to rst, population, and second, territory. Section 5 admits of no other standards.
On population, the standards of the 1987 Constitution have four elements. First is the rule on
proportional representation, which is the universal standard in direct representation in legislatures.
Second is the rule on a minimum population of 250,000 per legislative district, which was not
present in our previous Constitutions. Third is the rule on progressive ratio, which means that the
number of legislative districts shall increase as the number of the population increases in
accordance with the rule on proportional representation. Fourth is the rule on uniformity, which
requires that the rst three rules shall apply uniformly in all apportionments in provinces, cities and
the Metropolitan Manila area.
The Constitution
18
and the Ordinance
19
appended to the 1987 Constitution xes the minimum
population of a legislative district at 250,000. Although textually relating to cities, this minimum
population requirement applies equally to legislative districts apportioned in provinces and the
Metropolitan Manila area because of the constitutional command that "legislative districts [shall
be] apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with
the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio." To
reiterate, the Constitution commands that this rule on uniformity shall apply to legislative districts
in "provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area." Otherwise, districts apportioned in
provinces, if freed from the minimum population requirement, will have constituencies two, four,
ten times lower than in districts apportioned in cities, violating the constitutional command that
apportionment shall be based on a uniform ratio in "provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila
area."
In short, the constitutional "standards" in the apportionment of legislative districts under Section 5
of Article VI, as far as population is concerned, are: (1) proportional representation; (2) a minimum
"population of at least two hundred fty thousand" per legislative district; (3) progressive ratio in
the increase of legislative districts as the population base increases; and (4) uniformity in the
apportionment of legislative districts in "provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area."
For territory, the Constitution prescribes the "standards" that a legislative district must be, "as far as
practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent."
To repeat, other than population and territory, there are no other standards prescribed in Section 5
of Article VI. This Court cannot add other standards not found in Section 5.
The Malapportionment of RA 9716 Flouts
the Constitutional Standards on Population
RA 9716 grossly malapportions Camarines Surs proposed ve legislative districts by outing the
standards of proportional representation among legislative districts and the minimum population
per legislative district.
Based on the 2007 census, the proposed First District under RA 9716 will have a population of only
176,383, which is 29% below the constitutional minimum population of 250,000 per legislative
district. In contrast, the remaining four proposed districts have populations way above the
minimum with the highest at 439,043 (proposed Third District), lowest at 276,777 (proposed
Second District) and an average of 379,359. Indeed, the disparity is so high that three of the
proposed districts (Third, Fourth, and Fifth Districts) have populations more than double that of the
proposed First District.
20
This results in wide variances among the districts populations. Still using
the 2007 census, the ideal per district population for Camarines Sur is 338,764.
21
The populations
of the proposed districts swing from this ideal by a high of positive 29.6% (Third
District) to a low of negative 47.9% (First District).
22
This means that the smallest proposed district
(First District) is underpopulated by nearly 50% of the ideal and the biggest proposed district
(Third District) is overpopulated by nearly 30% of the ideal.
The resulting vote undervaluation (for voters in the disfavored districts) and vote overvaluation (for
voters in the First District) fails even the most liberal application of the constitutional standards.
Votes in the proposed First District are overvalued by more than 200% compared to votes from the
Third, Fourth, and Fifth Districts and by more than 60% compared to votes in the Second District.
Conversely, votes from the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Districts are undervalued by more than 200%
compared to votes in the First District while those in the Second District suffer more than 60%
undervaluation.
Proportional representation in redistricting does not mean exact numbers of population, to the last
digit, for every legislative district. However, under the assailed RA 9716, the variances swing from
negative 47.9% to positive 29.6%. Under any redistricting yardstick, such variances are grossly
anomalous and destructive of the concept of proportional representation. In the United States, the
Supreme Court there ruled that a variance of even less than 1% is unconstitutional in the absence
of proof of a good faith effort to achieve a mathematically exact apportionment.
23

Signicantly, petitioner Senator Aquinos attempt to redraw districting lines to make all ve
proposed districts compliant with the minimum population requirement (and thus lessen the wide
variances in population among the districts) was thwarted chiey for political expediency: his
colleagues in the Senate deemed the existing districts in Camarines Sur "untouchable" because "[a
Congressman] is king [in his district]."
24
This shows a stark absence of a good faith effort to
achieve a more precise proportional representation in the redistricting under the assailed RA 9716.
Clearly, RA 9716 tinkers with vote valuation, and consequently with the constitutional standard of
proportional representation, based solely on the whims of incumbent Congressmen, an invalid
standard for redistricting under Section 5 of Article VI.
Equally important, RA 9716 violates the minimum population requirement of 250,000 in creating
the proposed First District, which will have a population of only 176,383. The minimum population
of 250,000 per legislative district admits of no variance and must be complied with to the last digit.
The Constitution mandates a population of "at least two hundred fty thousand" for a legislative
district in a city, and under the principle of "uniform and progressive ratio," for every legislative
district in provinces and in the Metropolitan Manila area.
Entitlement of "Each Province" to "at Least One Representative"
No Basis to Ignore Standard of Uniform Population Ratio
The directive in Section 5(3) of Article VI that "each province, shall have at least one representative"
means only that when a province is created, a legislative district must also be created with it.
25
Can
this district have a population below 250,000? To answer in the afrmative is to ignore the
constitutional mandate that districts in provinces be apportioned "in accordance with the number
of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio." That the
Constitution never meant to exclude provinces from the requirement of proportional
representation is evident in the opening provision of Section 5(1), which states:
The House of Representatives shall be composed of x x x members, x x x, who shall be elected
from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila
area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform
and progressive ratio x x x." (Boldfacing and underscoring supplied)
In short, the Constitution clearly mandates that the creation of legislative districts in provinces,
cities and the Metropolitan Manila area must comply with proportional representation, on the basis
of a uniform and progressive ratio.
26

Apportionment in the Ordinance Appended to the 1987 Constitution
Distinct from Legislative Reapportionments
It will not do to hoist the apportionment under the Ordinance appended to the Constitution or
Mariano v. COMELEC
27
and Bagabuyo v. COMELEC
28
as normative props to shore up the hollow
proposition that reapportionment in provinces can dispense with the minimum population of
250,000 as prescribed in Section 5 of Article VI. In the rst place, the Constitutional Commission,
exercising constituent powers, enjoyed absolute discretion to relax the standards it textualized in
Section 5, Article VI, in the interest of creating legislative districts en masse cognizant of legitimate
concerns.
29
Only the people, through the instrument of ratication, possessed the greater
sovereign power to overrule the Constitutional Commission. By overwhelmingly ratifying the 1987
Constitution, the people in the exercise of their sovereign power sanctioned the Constitutional
Commissions discretionary judgments.
In contrast, Congress enacted RA 9716 in the exercise of its legislative powers under the 1987
Constitution and subject to the reapportionment standards in Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution. Congress is strictly bound by the reapportionment standards in Section 5, unlike the
Constitutional Commission which could create one-time exceptions subject to ratication by the
sovereign people. Until it enacted RA 9716, Congress never deviated from the minimum
population requirement of 250,000 in creating a legislative district. Thus, in Republic Act No. 7854
(RA 7854) which doubled the legislative districts in Makati City, the Court in Mariano v. COMELEC
took note of the certication by the National Statistics Ofce that at the time of the enactment of
RA 7854, the population of Makati City was 508,174, entitling it to two representatives.
30

Footnote 13 in Mariano v. COMELEC states: "As per the certicate issued by Administrator Tomas
Africa of the National Census and Statistics Ofce, the population of Makati as of 1994 stood at
508,174; August 4, 1994, Senate Deliberations on House Bill No. 12240 (converting Makati into a
highly urbanized city) x x x."
Similarly, in Republic Act No. 9371 (RA 9371) which also doubled the legislative districts in
Cagayan de Oro City, the two districts created complied with the minimum population of 250,000
(254,644 and 299,322, respectively), as the Court noted in Bagabuyo v. COMELEC.
31
Contrary to
the assertion of the majority opinion, neither Mariano v. COMELEC nor Bagabuyo v. COMELEC
supports the claim that Congress can create a legislative district with a population of less than
250,000. On the contrary, these cases conrm that every legislative district must have a minimum
population of 250,000. Only very recently, this Court in Aldaba v. COMELEC
32
struck down a law
creating a legislative district in the City of Malolos, which has a population just short of the 250,000
minimum requirement.
RA 9716 Harbinger for Wave of Malapportionments
More than 20 years after the 1987 Constitution took effect, Congress has yet to comply with the
Constitutions mandate that "[w]ithin three years following the return of every census, the Congress
shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this
section."
33
Instead, Congress has contented itself with enacting piecemeal reapportionment laws
for individual areas, either for this sole purpose
34
or ancillary to the conversion
35
or creation
36
of a
local government unit, at the behest of legislators representing the area. As movements
of district lines spell doom or salvation for entrenched political interests, this process subjects
Congress to intense pressure to keep off certain districts.
Until RA 9716 came along, Congress was able to balance political exigency with constitutional
imperatives. RA 9716 marks a tectonic shift by tilting the balance in favor of entrenched interests,
sacricing the Constitution and ultimately, the ideals of representative democracy, at the altar of
political expediency. If left unchecked, laws like RA 9716 will ll the House of Representatives with
two breeds of legislators, one, representing districts two, four, ten times more populous than other
favored districts, elected by voters holding "mickey mouse votes" and another, representing small,
favored districts, elected by voters holding "premium votes" two, four, ten times more valuable
than the votes in disfavored districts.
Our oath of ofce as Justices of this Court forbids us from legitimizing this constitutionally
abhorrent scheme, a scheme that for the rst time under the 1987 Constitution creates a new
politically privileged class of legislators in what is supposed to be a "democratic and republican
State."
37
To uphold RA 9716 is to uphold the blatant violation of the constitutional standards
requiring proportional representation and a minimum population in the creation of legislative
districts. This will derail our one person, one vote representative democracy from the tracks clearly
and precisely laid down in the 1987 Constitution.
And for what end -- to create a special class of legislative districts represented by a new political
elite exercising more legislative power than their votes command? Such a grant of privileged
political status is the modern day equivalent of a royalty or nobility title, which is banned under the
1987 Constitution. History will not be kind to those who embark on a grotesquely anomalous
constitutional revision that is repulsive to our ideals of a "democratic and republican State."
The ruling of the majority today could sound the death knell for the principle of "one person, one
vote" that insures equality in voting power. All votes are equal, and there is no vote more equal
than others. This equality in voting power is the essence of our democracy. This Court is supposed
to be the last bulwark of our democracy. Sadly, here the Court, in ruling that there are some votes
more equal than others, has failed in its primordial constitutional duty to protect the essence of our
democracy.
Accordingly, I vote to GRANT the petition and to DECLARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL Republic Act
No. 9716 for grossly violating the standards of proportional representation and minimum
population in the creation of legislative districts as prescribed in Section 5, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

Footnotes
1
Section 1, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides: "The Philippines is a democratic and republican State.
Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them." (Emphasis supplied)
2
Section 5(4), Article VI of the Constitution provides: "Within three years following the return of every census, the
Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this
section." (Emphasis supplied)
3
The creation of the union of the United States of America was nearly aborted because of the bitter controversy
in the drafting of the US Constitution on the manner of representation to the US Congress. The debate pitted, on
the one hand, small States which wanted representation by State and, on the other hand, delegates who insisted
on direct representation, consistent with democratic ideals. The impasse was broken by what is popularly known
as the Great Compromise, allowing States to send two representatives to the US Senate (regardless of
population) and reserving membership in the US House of Representatives to Congressmen directly elected by
the people in legislative districts based on proportional representation. (See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1
[1964].)
4
Or as a parallel ruling in another jurisdiction puts it:
Legislators represent people, not trees or acres. Legislators are elected by voters, not farms or cities or economic
interests. As long as ours is a representative form of government, and our legislatures are those instruments of
government elected directly by and directly representative of the people, the right to elect legislators in a free
and unimpaired fashion is a bedrock of our political system. (Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 [1964].)
5
Save for those elected under the part-list system who represent sectors.
6
Substantially identical provisions are found in Section 2, Article VIII (1973 Constitution) and Section 5, Article VI
(1935 Constitution).
7
Section 1, Article V of the Constitution provides: "Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not
otherwise disqualied by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided in the
Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months
immediately preceding the election. No literacy, property, or other substantive requirement shall be imposed on
the exercise of suffrage."
8
Section 1, Article II, 1987 Constitution.
9
The 1935 and 1973 Constitutions described the Philippines as a "republican State." During the deliberations of
the Constitutional Commission, Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna explained that the word "democratic" was added
"to emphasize that in this new Constitution there are instances where the people would act directly, and not
through their representatives." IV Record of the Constitutional Commission, p. 735, 17 September 1986.
10
Section 31, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides: "No law granting a title of royalty or nobility shall be
enacted."
11
John Adams wrote in 1787 that the "only true denition of a republic" is "a government, in which all men, rich
and poor, magistrates and subjects, ofcers and people, masters and servants, the rst citizen and the last, are
equally subject to the laws." The Founders Constitution, Republican Government, Chapter 4, Document 10,
http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch4s10.html, accessed 3 April 2010.
12
Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 11 [1964].
13
Section 5(1), Article VI, 1987 Constitution.
14
Macias v. COMELEC, No. L-18684, 14 September 1961, 3 SCRA 1, 5-6. The Court took note of the following
addition malapportionments: "These were not the only instances of unequal apportionment. We see that
Mountain Province has 3 whereas Isabela, Laguna and Cagayan with more inhabitants have 2 each. And then,
Capiz, La Union and Ilocos Norte got 2 each, whereas Sulu that has more inhabitants got 1 only. And Leyte with
967,323 inhabitants got 4 only, whereas Iloilo with less inhabitants (966,145) was given 5." (Id. at 6.)
15
Section 5, Article VI, 1935 Constitution.
16
17
Section 5(4), Article VI, 1987 Constitution.
18
Section 5(3), Article VI provides: "Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous,
compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fty thousand, or each
province, shall have at least one representative." (Emphasis supplied)
19
Section 3, which provides:
Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose population may hereafter increase to more than
two hundred fty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one Member or such
number of Members as it may be entitled to on the basis of the number of its inhabitants and according to the
standards set forth in paragraph (3), Section 5 of Article VI of the Constitution. The number of Members
apportioned to the province out of which such new province was created or where the city, whose population
has so increased, is geographically located shall be correspondingly adjusted by the Commission on Elections
but such adjustment shall not be made within one hundred and twenty days before the election.
20
See note 22.
21
Based on Camarines Surs total population of 1,693,821.
22
The range of deviations is shown below (based on the 2007 census):
District No. Population % Variation
From Ideal
1 176,383 - 47.9
2 276,777 - 18.3
3 439,043 + 29.6
4 372,548 + 9.9
5 429,070 + 26.6
23
Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983). The U.S. Supreme Court declared:
Article I, 2 establishes a "high standard of justice and common sense" for the apportionment of congressional
districts: "equal representation for equal numbers of people." x x x. Precise mathematical equality, however, may
be impossible to achieve in an imperfect world; therefore the "equal representation" standard is enforced only to
the extent of requiring that districts be apportioned to achieve population equality "as nearly as is practicable." x
x x As we explained further in Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, supra:
"[T]he as nearly as practicable standard requires that the State make a good-faith effort to achieve precise
mathematical equality. x x x. Unless population variances among congressional districts are shown to have
resulted despite such effort, the State must justify each variance, no matter how small."
Article I, 2, therefore, "permits only the limited population variances which are unavoidable despite a good-
faith effort to achieve absolute equality, or for which justication is shown."
x x x
x x x Adopting any standard other than population equality, using the best census data available, x x x would
subtly erode the Constitution's ideal of equal representation. If state legislators knew that a certain de minimis
level of population differences were acceptable, they would doubtless strive to achieve that level rather than
equality. x x x Furthermore, choosing a different standard would import a high degree of arbitrariness into the
process of reviewing apportionment plans. x x x. In this case, appellants argue that a maximum deviation of
approximately 0.7% should be considered de minimis. If we accept that argument, how are we to regard
deviations of 0.8%, 0.95%, 1%, or 1.1%? (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied)
24
As evident in the following exchange between petitioner and Senator Joker Arroyo (Petition, pp. 23-24):
Sen. Aquino. Mr. President, we have to respond to the last statement. The others that have been recommended
together with the Camarines Sur bill were all tested based on one standard, not separate standards for
everybody. It is our opinion and that is the source of this discussion and of this debate, that we hold that there is
a 250,000-rule embodied in so many provisions of the Constitution. Our distinguished colleague from the Bicol
and Makati areas does not agree. I think we have established that we do not agree on our interpretation of the
Constitution.
With his permission, Mr. President, since I am against of his time, may we move on to the next point so as not be
accused of delaying the passage of the bill any further?
May we ask: Why was Libmanan not considered to be a portion of the proposed rst district? Because having
done the same, instead of having the 170,000-gure, we would have a 269,222 population gure. O achieve
Sen. Arroyo. All right. Look at that map.
Sen. Aquino. May we just move to another rostrum, Mr. President. We cannot view the details from this particular
rostrum, with the indulgence of our distinguished colleague.
Sen. Arroyo. As I have said, the brown portion in that map of Camarines Sur I do not know what district it is but
it is - represented by Congressman Fuentebella. He does not want this district touched. There is nothing we can
do about it since he does not want it to be touched.
The red portion is represented by Congressman Alfelor. He does not want his district to be touched. The green
portion is represented by Congressman Villafuerte. He does not also want it touched. Even if they have a
pregnant populace or inhabitants, he does not want it touched.
Now, the rst district of Camarines Sur is so big that it consists of 40% of the province, area-wise. Libmanan is the
biggest municipality in the entire or present rst district. It stuck in the middle. We cannot move that no matter
what because that is the biggest. Anyway, we move it left, we move it right, it would change the conguration.
Those are the practical difculties in trying to gure out how. That is the situation. As we see, there is a water
extension of the gulf. We cannot connect them because they are separated by water. So it is no longer
contiguous because it is separated by water and there is nothing we can do about it. That is what I was saying
about mathematical formula. We cannot have mathematical formula when a natural boundary like water cannot
make the municipalities contiguous. That is the picture. It is all there.
The violet is the Tagalog-speaking province. The green is the Bicol-speaking province so that is the only way to
divide it. So much has been done in the Lower House in trying to gure it out. But as long as the three
Congressmen do not agree, then there is nothing we can do about it. That is the power. For those of us who have
served in the House of Representative, what the Congressman says in his district is "king". He is the king there,
there is nothing we can do about it. We respect that.
Libmanan is the biggest one. We cannot move that anyway.
Sen. Aquino. Mr. President, the question is, why not include Libmanan in the proposed rst district? The
proposed rst district has the towns of Del Gallego which is, I am not sure, in the northernmost tip of Camarines
Sur, Ragay, Lupi, Sipocot, they are all adjacent to each other on the map previously shown and that can be done.
That can be recongured if we were just using geography and the test of territoriality.
Now, in sequel to that, the proposed second district of Magarao, Panaman (sic) and Camaligan can be placed in
the proposed second district and it will have a population of 258,000. The body of water alluded to by our
distinguished colleague, it seems in our map that the municipalities mentioned are all on the same side of the
waterway. We do not see where the issue of contiguousness comes in to play. The proposed third district, with
these changes, would still be having a population of 364,187.
The only point we are trying to raise is that if it just a question of territory and population, there seems to be
other ways of having congured these districts to enable Camarines Sur to have its entire complement of six
districts. If the answer is, that the congressmen there who are now representing Camarines Sur cannot agree on
the other modes of conguring their district, then that is another. But will our distinguished colleague agree that
there is no constitutional prohibition for us to recongure these districts on a different formula.
Sen. Arroyo. Mr. President, this is where the Senate must differ to the House of Representatives. Redistricting is a
local bill and it cannot emanate from the Senate. It will emanate only from the House of Representatives. This has
been debated in the House of Representatives over and over and no one could agree. So, in its wisdom, the
House of Representatives agreed to what has been presented here. If we agree now it to recongure it, the
Senate now will be intruding into what is purely a House of Representatives business. This is redistricting. Quite
frankly, what business does the Senate have in trying to recongure out the provinces when we do not represent
any particular district? Only congressmen who are familiar with their own districts can discuss this. (Emphasis
supplied)
25
Thus, in Sema v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 177597, 16 July 2008, 558 SCRA 700) we struck down a statutory
provision authorizing a regional legislative assembly to create provinces because the creation of provinces
entails the creation of legislative districts which is the sole prerogative of Congress.
26
Although extant legislation allows creation of provinces with population of less than 250,000 (Section 461(a) of
Republic Act No. 7160), this is no reason to validate RA 9716 because Section 5(1) of Article VI trumps any
statute. At any rate, the constitutionality of Section 461(a) is not before the Court.
27
312 Phil 259 (1995).
28
G.R. No. 176970, 8 December 2008, 573 SCRA 290.
29
Thus, the Constitutional Commissions decision to relax the population threshold in Palawan, Benguet, and
Baguio and consider other standards in apportioning legislative districts in Cavite (urbanization and livelihood),
Maguindanao (political stability), and Laguna (topography), as noted in the Decision.
30
312 Phil 259 (1995).
31
G.R. No. 176970, 8 December 2008, 573 SCRA 290, 309.
32
G.R. No. 188078, 15 March 2010.
33
Section 5(4), Article VI.
34
E.g., RA 9371.
35
E.g., RA 7854.
36
E.g., Republic Act No. 4695 creating the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao and Kalinga- Apayao
and providing for their legislative districts.
37

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
I concur with the ponencias discussion on the procedural issue.
"Transcendental importance" doctrine aside, petitioners have the requisite locus standi. Petitioners
are suing not only as lawmakers but as taxpayers and citizens as well. At the initiative of a taxpayer,
a statute may be nullied, on the supposition that expenditure of public funds for the purpose of
administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds.
1
Republic Act No.
9716 (R.A. 9716) mandates the creation of another legislative district and indubitably involves the
expenditure of public funds.
I DISSENT, however, on the ponencias conclusion, on the substantive issue, that a population of
250,000 is not an indispensable constitutional requirement for the creation of a new legislative
district in a province.
Contrary to the ponencias assertion, petitioners do not merely rely on Article VI, Section 5 (3) but
also on Section 5 (1) of the same Article.
2
Both provisions must be read together in light of the
constitutional requirements of population and contiguity.
Section 5 (3) of Article VI disregards the 250,000 population requirement only with respect to
existing provinces whose population does not exceed 250,000 or to newly created provinces
under the Local Government Code (as long as the income and territory requirements are met).
The ponencia misinterprets Mariano v. Comelec.
3
The actual population of the City of Makati
during the Senate deliberations in 1994 on House Bill (H.B.) No. 4264 that was to be enacted into
R.A. No. 7854 was 508,174.
4
That is why the Court in Mariano declared:
Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord
with Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the
population of Makati stands at only four hundred fty thousand (450,000). Said section provides,
inter alia, that a city with a population of at least two hundred fty thousand (250,000) shall have
at least one representative. Even granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990 census
stood at four hundred fty thousand (450,000), its legislative district may still be increased since it
has met the minimum population requirement of two hundred fty thousand (250,000). In fact,
Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides that a city whose population
has increased to more than two hundred fty thousand (250,000) shall be entitled to at least one
congressional representative.
5
(emphasis in the original)
Nothing in Mariano reects that the Court disregarded the 250,000 population requirement as it
merely stated that Makatis legislative district may still be increased as long as the minimum
population requirement is met. The permissive declaration at that time presupposes that Makati
must still meet the constitutional requirements before it can have another congressional district.
The Local Government Code likewise is not in point since Section 461 thereof tackles the creation
of a province and not the reapportioning of a legislative district based on increasing population.
There is thus no point in asserting that population is merely an alternative addition to the income
requirement.
The ponencia likewise misinterprets Bagabuyo v. Comelec.
6
Notably, the ponencia spliced that
portion of the decision in Bagabuyo which it cited to suit its argument. Thus the ponencia quotes:
x x x Undeniably, these gures show a disparity in the population sizes of the districts. The
Constitution, however, does not require mathematical exactitude or rigid equality as a standard
in gauging equality of representation. x x x To ensure quality representation through commonality
of interests and ease of access by the representative to the constituents, all that the Constitution
requires is that every legislative district should comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous,
compact and adjacent territory. (emphasis and underscoring in the original by the ponente)
It omitted that portion which specied the respective total population of the two districts as above
250,000. Thus the full text of the pertinent portion of the decision reads:
The petitioner, unfortunately, did not provide information about the actual population of Cagayan
de Oro City. However, we take judicial notice of the August 2007 census of the National Statistics
Ofce which shows that barangays comprising Cagayan de Oros rst district have a total
population of 254,644 while the second district has 299,322 residents. Undeniably, these gures
show a disparity in the population sizes of the districts. The Constitution, however, does not require
mathematical exactitude or rigid equality as a standard in gauging equality of representation. x x x
(emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The two legislative districts of Cagayan de Oro subject of Bagabuyo met the minimum population
requirement at the time of reappportionment. The ponencias construal of the disparity in
population sizes of the districts involved in Bagabuyo clearly differs from the disparity of
population in the present case.
The Record of the Constitutional Commission itself declares that the 250,000 benchmark was used
in apportioning the legislative districts in the country. The sponsorship speech of Commissioner
Hilario Davide, Jr.
7
reects so.
x x x x. Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and
adjacent territory. Each city or each province with a population of at least 250,000 shall have at
least one Representative. This is Section 5 of the Article on the Legislative. x x x x The ordinance
xes at 200 the number of legislative seats which are, in turn, apportioned among the provinces
and cities with a population of at least 250,000 and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance
with the number of their respective inhabitants on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio. The
population is based on the 1986 projection, with the 1980 ofcial enumeration as the point of
reckoning. This projection indicates that our population is more or less 56 million. Taking into
account the mandate that each city with at least 250,000 inhabitants and each province shall have
at least one representative, we at rst allotted one seat for each of the 73 provinces; and one each
for all cities with a population of at least 250,000, which are the Cities of Manila, Quezon, Pasay,
Caloocan, Cebu, Iloilo, Bacolod, Cagayan de Oro, Davao and Zamboanga. Thereafter, we
then proceeded to increase whenever appropriate the number of seats for the provinces and cities
in accordance with number of their inhabitants on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio. x x
x x. (capitalization, emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)
The framers of the Constitution intended to apply the minimum population requirement of
250,000 to both cities and provinces in the initial apportionment, in proportion to the countrys
total population at that time (56 million).
Yet the ponencia asserts that the 250,000 benchmark was used only for the purpose of the 1986
initial apportionment of the legislative districts, and now disregards the benchmarks application in
the present petition. It is eerily silent, however, on what the present population yardstick is. If the
present estimated population of 90 million is to be the dividend,
8
then there would roughly be one
legislative district representative for every 450,000.
Following the constitutional mandate, the population requirement cannot fall below 250,000. This
is the average "uniform and progressive ratio" that should prevail. Thus, using the present
population gure, the benchmark should be anywhere between 250,000-450,000 persons per
district. Using anything less than 250,000 is illogical, for it would operate to allow more than 360
representatives of legislative districts alone on some capricious basis other than the variable of
population.
A case in point is the congressional reapportionment done in the provinces of Sultan Kudarat and
Zamboanga Sibugay effected through Republic Act No. 9357
9
and Republic Act No. 9360,
10

respectively. At the time of the congressional deliberations and effectivity of these laws, the
population count in these provinces more than met the basic standard. Sultan Kudarat already had
a population of 522,187 during the 1995 census year,
11
while Zamboanga Sibugay met the
population threshold in 2001 with an estimated 503,700 headcount.
12

The ponencia sweepingly declares that "population was explicitly removed as a factor."
13
Far from
it. Population remains the controlling factor. From the discussions in the initial apportionment and
districting of Puerto Princesa, Baguio, Cavite, Laguna, Maguindanao and Cebu in 1986, it is clear
that population and contiguity were the primary considerations, and the extraneous factors
considered were circumspectly subsumed thereto.
The ponencia harps on petitioners admission that Camarines Sur is actually entitled to SIX
legislative districts, given its population of 1,693,821, to justify its conclusion that there is nothing
wrong in the creation of another legislative district in the province. This is a wrong premise. It bears
noting that petitioners raised the legislative entitlement to underscore the GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION committed in the enactment of R.A. 9716.
R.A. 9716 created one legislative district by reconguring the rst and second districts. It did not,
however, touch the third and fourth districts which, when properly reapportioned, can easily form
another district. No reasons were offered except Senator Joker Arroyos during the Senate Plenary
Debates on H.B. No. 4264, viz: "When it comes to their district, congressmen are kings. We cannot
touch them. He [referring to Rep. Villafuerte] does not also want it [referring to the district of Rep.
Villafuerte] touched... even if they have a pregnant populace or inhabitants, he does not want it
touched."
14

The resulting population distribution in the present case violates the uniform and progressive
ratio prescribed in the Constitution.
Prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 9716, the tally of population percentage per district in
Camarines Sur based on its population of 1,693,821 was as follows:
District 1: 24.6%
District 2: 28.03%
District 3: 21.99%
District 4: 25.33%
Compare now the population percentage per district after the passage of R.A. 9716:
District 1: 10.4%
District 2: 16.34%
District 3: 25.9%
District 4: 21.99% (former District 3)
District 5: 25.33% (former District 4)
Remarkably, before R.A. No. 9716, the rst district met the 250,000 minimum. After R.A. No. 9716,
it suffered a very signicant drop in its population from 416,680 to 176,157.
The extraneous factors
15
cited by the ponencia do not sufce to justify the redistricting, particularly
the inclusion of the municipality of Libmanan in the second district. Linguistic difference is a weak
basis to segregate the municipalities in the redistricting. To sanction that as basis would see a
wholesale redistricting of the entire country, given the hundreds of dialects being spoken. Imagine
Binondo being segregated from the Tagalog-speaking district of Tondo or Sta. Cruz in Manila on
the ground that Fookien is largely spoken in Binondo.
The former rst district supposedly occupied 40% of the total land area of Camarines Sur. But the
former fourth district (which is now the fth) comprises the same percentage of land area, if not
bigger. If land area was a factor, then the former fourth district should have been re-districted also
since it is endowed with a big area like the former rst district.
The municipality of Libmanan is supposedly isolated by a body of water from the rst district. But
so is the municipality of Cabusao which is situated northeast of Libmanan and which is bordered
by the same body of water. Yet Cabusao is part of the new rst district. Considering the similar
geographical location of the two municipalities, there is no compelling reason to segregate
Libmanan from the rst district and tack it to the newly created second district.
The seminal case of Reynolds v. Sims
16
had already ruled that these factors cannot be permissively
considered in legislative reapportionment.
x x x Population is, of necessity, the starting point for consideration and the controlling criterion for
judgment in legislative apportionment controversies. x x x [We] hold that, as a basic constitutional
standard, [equal protection] requires that the seats in both houses of a bicameral state legislature
must be apportioned on a population basis. Simply stated, an individuals right to vote for state
legislators is unconstitutionally impaired when its weight is in a substantial fashion diluted when
compared with votes of citizens living in other parts of the [State].
x x x x
[Equal protection] requires that a State make an honest and good faith effort to construct districts,
in both houses of its legislature, as nearly of equal population as is practicable. We realize that it is
a practical impossibility to arrange legislative districts so that each one has an identical number of
residents, citizens, or voters. Mathematical exactness or precision is hardly a workable
constitutional requirement. So long as the divergences from a strict population principle are
constitutionally permissible, but neither history alone, nor economic or other sorts of group
interests, are permissible factors in attempting to justify disparities from population-based
representation. Citizens, not history or economic interests, cast votes. Considerations of area alone
provide an insufcient justication for deviations from the equal-population principle. Again,
people, not land or trees or pastures, vote. x x x (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Undoubtedly, Camarines Surs malapportionment largely partakes of gerrymandering.
17

A nal word. By pronouncing that "other factors," aside from population, should be considered in
the composition of additional districts, thereby adding other requisites despite the Constitutions
clear limitation to population and contiguity, the ponencia effectively opens the oodgates to
opportunistic lawmakers to recongure their own principalia and bantam districts. Leaving open
Section 5 of Article VI to arbitrary factors, such as economic, political, socio-cultural, racial and even
religious ones, is an invitation to a free-for-all.
In light of the foregoing, I vote to GRANT the petition and DECLARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Republic Act No. 9716.
Associate Justice
Footnotes
1
Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works, 110 Phil. 331, 342-343 (1960).
2
Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred
and fty members, unless otherwise xed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts
apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the
number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and
those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) x x x x
3
312 Phil. 259 (1995).
4
Id. at 272 at footnote 13 which reads: As per the certicate issued by Administrator Tomas Africa
of the National Census and Statistics Ofce, the population of Makati as of 1994 stood at 508, 174
x x x.
5
Id. at 272-273.
6
573 SCRA 290 (2008).
7
Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. V, p. 949.
8
As of August 2007, the ofcial population was 88,574,614 Filipinos. The population count was
made ofcial with the signing by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo of Proclamation No. 1498 on
April 16, 2008.
9
Entitled "An Act Reapportioning the Province of Sultan Kudarat into Two Legislative Districts" and
passed on October 10, 2006.
10
Entitled "An Act Creating Another Congressional District In The Province of Zamboanga Sibugay,
Amending For The Purpose [Ra No. 8973], Otherwise Known As The Charter Of The Province Of
Zamboanga Sibugay" and passed on July 24, 2006.
11
http://www.census.gov.ph/data/census2007/index.html. Last visited March 30, 2010.
12
http://www.census.gov.ph/data/census2007/index.html. Last visited March 30, 2010.
Zamboanga Sibugays population during the 2000 Census was at 497,239 with an annual growth
rate of 1.30%. Thus, the following year (2001), the province met the 500,000 minimum
requirement.
13
Decision, p. 20.
14
TSN, Senate Plenary Debates, H.B. 4264, September 22, 2009..
15
Decision, p. 23. These are dialects spoken, size of the original groupings, natural division of the
Municipality of Libmanan from the recongured rst district and the balancing of the areas of the
rst three districts.
16
377 U.S. 533 (1964).
17
A name given to the process of dividing a state or other territory into the authorized civil or
political divisions, but with such a geographical arrangement as to accomplish an ulterior or
unlawful purpose, as, for instance, to secure a majority for a given political party in districts where
the result would be otherwise if they were divided according to obvious natural lines. (Blacks Law
Dictionary, 5th Ed., p. 618).

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 178831-32 July 30, 2009
JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, NAPOLEON N. CAMERO and RENALD F. VILLANDO,
Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 179120 July 30, 2009
LOUIS C. BIRAOGO, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. PROSPERO NOGRALES, Speaker of the House of Representatives of the Congress of the
Philippines, and JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. Nos. 179132-33 July 30, 2009
OLIVIA P. PARAS, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. PROSPERO NOGRALES, in his capacity as Speaker of the House of Representatives; HON.
ROBERTO NAZARENO, in his capacity as Secretary General of the House of Representatives;
HON. RHODORA SEVILLA, in her capacity as Deputy Secretary General for Finance of the House
of Representatives; THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG,
Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. Nos. 179240-41 July 30, 2009
RENALD F. VILLANDO, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG, Respondents.
R E S O L U T I O N
PERALTA, J.:
The instant motion with prayer for oral argument led by Louis C. Biraogo, petitioner in G.R. No.
179120, seeks a reconsideration of the Courts April 1, 2009 Decision, which granted Jocelyn D. Sy
Limkaichongs petition for certiorari in G.R. Nos. 178831-32. The Court dismissed all the other
petitions, including Biraogos petition, and reversed the Joint Resolution of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) Second Division dated May 17, 2007 in SPA Nos. 07-247 and 07-248
disqualifying Limkaichong from running as a congressional candidate in the First District of Negros
Oriental due to lack of citizenship requirement.
Biraogo prefaced his motion by stating that justice and constitutionalism must remain entrenched
in Philippine case law. To achieve this end, he maintained that the Court should reconsider its April
1, 2009 Decision. He also prayed for an oral argument, which he posited, would help the Court in
the just and proper disposition of the pending incident.
After an assiduous review of the motion for reconsideration, we resolve that the same should be
denied for lack of merit.
Most of the arguments advanced by Biraogo are a mere rehash of his previous arguments, which
we have all considered and found without merit in the Decision dated April 1, 2009. Nonetheless,
in order to lay to rest once and for all Biraogo's misgivings, we shall discuss only the relevant issues
and revalidate our Decision by ruling on his motion as follows:
The core issue in the consolidated petitions is the qualication of Limkaichong to run for, be
elected to, and assume and discharge, the position of Representative for the First District of
Negros Oriental. The contention of the parties who sought her disqualication is that she is not a
natural-born citizen, hence, she lacks the citizenship requirement in Section 6,
1
Article VI of the
1987 Constitution. In the election that ensued, she was voted for by the constituents of Negros
Oriental and garnered the highest votes. She was eventually proclaimed as the winner and has
since performed her duties and responsibilities as Member of the House of Representatives.
Indeed, the citizenship requirement was enshrined in our Constitution in order to ensure that our
people and country do not end up being governed by aliens.
2
With this principle in mind, we have
said in Aquino v. COMELEC
3
that if one of the essential qualications for running for membership
in the House of Representatives is lacking, then not even the will of a majority or plurality of the
voters would substitute for a requirement mandated by the fundamental law itself. Hence
assuming, time constraints notwithstanding, and after proper proceedings before the proper
tribunal be had, that Limkaichong would prove to be an alien, the court of justice would tilt against
her favor and would not sanction such an imperfection in her qualication to hold ofce. But, rst
things rst.
The proponents against Limkaichong's qualication stated that she is not a natural-born citizen
because her parents were Chinese citizens at the time of her birth. They went on to claim that the
proceedings for the naturalization of Julio Ong Sy, her father, never attained nality due to
procedural and substantial defects.
In our Decision, We held that:
However, in assailing the citizenship of the father, the proper proceeding should be in accordance
with Section 18 of Commonwealth Act No. 473 which provides that:
Sec. 18. Cancellation of Naturalization Certicate Issued. - Upon motion made in the proper
proceedings by the Solicitor General or his representative, or by the proper provincial scal, the
competent judge may cancel the naturalization certicate issued and its registration in the Civil
Register:
1. If it is shown that said naturalization certicate was obtained fraudulently or illegally;
2. If the person naturalized shall, within ve years next following the issuance of said naturalization
certicate, return to his native country or to some foreign country and establish his permanent
residence there: Provided, That the fact of the person naturalized remaining more than one year in
his native country or the country of his former nationality, or two years in any other foreign country,
shall be considered as prima facie evidence of his intention of taking up his permanent residence
in the same:
3. If the petition was made on an invalid declaration of intention;
4. If it is shown that the minor children of the person naturalized failed to graduate from a public or
private high school recognized by the Ofce of Private Education [now Bureau of Private Schools]
of the Philippines, where Philippine history, government or civics are taught as part of the school
curriculum, through the fault of their parents either by neglecting to support them or by
transferring them to another school or schools. A certied copy of the decree canceling the
naturalization certicate shall be forwarded by the Clerk of Court of the Department of Interior
[now Ofce of the President] and the Bureau of Justice [now Ofce of the Solicitor General];
5. If it is shown that the naturalized citizen has allowed himself to be used as a dummy in violation
of the constitutional or legal provisions requiring Philippine citizenship as a requisite for the
exercise, use or enjoyment of a right, franchise or privilege. (Emphasis supplied)
As early as the case of Queto v. Catolico, where the Court of First Instance judge motu propio and
not in the proper denaturalization proceedings called to court various grantees of certicates of
naturalization (who had already taken their oaths of allegiance) and cancelled their certicates of
naturalization due to procedural inrmities, the Court held that:
x x x It may be true that, as alleged by said respondents, that the proceedings for naturalization
were tainted with certain inrmities, fatal or otherwise, but that is beside the point in this case.
The jurisdiction of the court to inquire into and rule upon such inrmities must be properly invoked
in accordance with the procedure laid down by law. Such procedure is the cancellation of the
naturalization certicate. [Section 1(5), Commonwealth Act No. 63], in the manner xed in Section
18 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, hereinbefore quoted, namely, "upon motion made in the
proper proceedings by the Solicitor General or his representatives, or by the proper provincial
scal." In other words, the initiative must come from these ofcers, presumably after previous
investigation in each particular case. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, under law and jurisprudence, it is the State, through its representatives designated by
statute, that may question the illegally or invalidly procured certicate of naturalization in the
appropriate denaturalization proceedings. It is plainly not a matter that may be raised by private
persons in an election case involving the naturalized citizens descendant.
Accordingly, it is not enough that one's qualication, or lack of it, to hold an ofce requiring one to
be a natural-born citizen, be attacked and questioned before any tribunal or government
institution. Proper proceedings must be strictly followed by the proper ofcers under the law.
Hence, in seeking Limkaichong's disqualication on account of her citizenship, the rudiments of
fair play and due process must be observed, for in doing so, she is not only deprived of the right to
hold ofce as a Member of the House of Representative but her constituents would also be
deprived of a leader in whom they have put their trust on through their votes. The obvious
rationale behind the foregoing ruling is that in voting for a candidate who has not been
disqualied by nal judgment during the election day, the people voted for her bona de, without
any intention to misapply their franchise, and in the honest belief that the candidate was then
qualied to be the person to whom they would entrust the exercise of the powers of government.
4
lavvphil
These precepts, notwithstanding, Biraogo remained rm in his belief that this Court erred in its
Decision and that the COMELEC Joint Resolution dated May 17, 2007 disqualifying Limkaichong
should have been afrmed. He even went to a great extent of giving a dichotomy of the said Joint
Resolution by stating that it was composed of two parts, the rst part of which is the substantive
part, and the second, pertains to the injunctive part. For this purpose, the dispositive portion of the
said COMELEC Joint Resolution is reproduced below:
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are GRANTED and Jocelyn D. Sy-Limkaichong is declared as
DISQUALIFIED from her candidacy for Representative of the First District of Negros Oriental.
The Provincial Supervisor of the Commission on Elections of Negros Oriental is hereby directed to
strike out the name JOCELYN SY-LIMKAICHONG from the list of eligible candidates for the said
position, and the concerned Board of Canvassers is hereby directed to hold and/or suspend the
proclamation of JOCELYN SY-LIMKAICHONG as winning candidate, if any, until this decision has
become nal.
SO ORDERED.
5

Biraogo maintained that the Motion for Reconsideration led by Limkaichong suspended only the
execution of the substantive relief or the rst part of the above-quoted COMELEC Joint Resolution.
However, it did not suspend the execution of the injunctive part and, accordingly, the Provincial
Supervisor of the COMELEC should not have proceeded with Limkaichong's proclamation as the
winning candidate in the elections.
His argument has no leg to stand on. We cannot take a decision or resolution on a piece-meal
basis and apply only that part which is seemingly benecial to one's cause and discard the
prejudicial part which, obviously, would just be a hindrance in advancing one's stance or interests.
Besides, the COMELEC Joint Resolution which Biraogo dichotomized was effectively suspended
when Limkaichong timely led her Motion for Reconsideration pursuant to Section 13(c),
6
Rule 18
and Section 2,
7
Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Hence, it cannot as yet be
implemented for not having attained its nality.
Nevertheless, events have already transpired after the COMELEC has rendered its Joint Resolution.
Limkaichong was proclaimed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers, she had taken her oath of
ofce, and she was allowed to ofcially assume the ofce on July 23, 2007. Accordingly, we ruled in
our April 1, 2009 Decision that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), and no
longer the COMELEC, should now assume jurisdiction over the disqualication cases. Pertinently,
we held:
x x x The Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his
oath, and assumed ofce as a Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC's
jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualications ends, and the
HRET's own jurisdiction begins.
8
It follows then that the proclamation of a winning candidate
divests the COMELEC of its jurisdiction over matters pending before it at the time of the
proclamation. The party questioning his qualication should now present his case in a proper
proceeding before the HRET, the constitutionally mandated tribunal to hear and decide a case
involving a Member of the House of Representatives with respect to the latter's election, returns
and qualications. The use of the word "sole" in Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution and in
Section 250
9
of the OEC underscores the exclusivity of the Electoral Tribunals' jurisdiction over
election contests relating to its members.
10

Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which
shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualications of their
respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom
shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining
six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall
be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or
organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the
Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
x x x x
Petitioners (in G.R. Nos. 179120, 179132-33, and 179240-41) steadfastly maintained that
Limkaichongs proclamation was tainted with irregularity, which will effectively prevent the HRET
from acquiring jurisdiction.
The fact that the proclamation of the winning candidate, as in this case, was alleged to have been
tainted with irregularity does not divest the HRET of its jurisdiction.
11
The Court has shed light on
this in the case of Vinzons-Chato,
12
to the effect that:
In the present case, it is not disputed that respondent Unico has already been proclaimed and
taken his oath of ofce as a Member of the House of Representatives (Thirteenth Congress); hence,
the COMELEC correctly ruled that it had already lost jurisdiction over petitioner Chato's petition.
The issues raised by petitioner Chato essentially relate to the canvassing of returns and alleged
invalidity of respondent Unico's proclamation. These are matters that are best addressed to the
sound judgment and discretion of the HRET. Signicantly, the allegation that respondent Unico's
proclamation is null and void does not divest the HRET of its jurisdiction:
x x x [I]n an electoral contest where the validity of the proclamation of a winning candidate who
has taken his oath of ofce and assumed his post as congressman is raised, that issue is best
addressed to the HRET. The reason for this ruling is self-evident, for it avoids duplicity of
proceedings and a clash of jurisdiction between constitutional bodies, with due regard to the
people's mandate.
Further, for the Court to take cognizance of petitioner Chato's election protest against respondent
Unico would be to usurp the constitutionally mandated functions of the HRET.
In ne, any allegations as to the invalidity of the proclamation will not prevent the HRET from
assuming jurisdiction over all matters essential to a members qualication to sit in the House of
Representatives.
The 1998 HRET Rules, as amended, provide for the manner of ling either an election protest or a
petition for quo warranto against a Member of the House of Representatives. In our Decision, we
ruled that the ten-day prescriptive period under the 1998 HRET Rules does not apply to
disqualication based on citizenship, because qualications for public ofce are continuing
requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or
assumption of ofce but during the ofcer's entire tenure. Once any of the required qualications
is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged.
13
Accordingly, the 1987 Constitution requires that
Members of the House of Representatives must be natural-born citizens not only at the time of
their election but during their entire tenure. Being a continuing requirement, one who assails a
member's citizenship or lack of it may still question the same at any time, the ten-day prescriptive
period notwithstanding.lavvphi1
In ne, we hold that Biraogo had not successfully convinced us to reconsider our Decision and
grant his motion for reconsideration.
In a last-ditched attempt to muddle the issues, Biraogo observed that the Decision dated April 1,
2009 is a complete turn-around from the ruling embodied in the Decision written by Justice Ruben
T. Reyes which, although unpromulgated, was nonetheless signed by fourteen (14) Associate
Justices and approved by the Court en banc on July 15, 2008. He decried the absence of an
explanation in the Decision dated April 1, 2009 for the said departure or turn-around.
Such a position deserves scant consideration.
The Court in Belac v. Commision on Elections,
14
held that a decision must not only be signed by
the Justices who took part in the deliberation, but must also be promulgated to be considered a
Decision, to wit:
[A] true decision of the Court is the decision signed by the Justices and duly promulgated. Before
that decision is so signed and promulgated, there is no decision of the Court to speak of. The vote
cast by a member of the Court after the deliberation is always understood to be subject to
conrmation at the time he has to sign the decision that is to be promulgated. The vote is of no
value if it is not thus conrmed by the Justice casting it. The purpose of this practice is apparent.
Members of this Court, even after they have cast their votes, wish to preserve their freedom of
action till the last moment when they have to sign the decision, so that they may take full
advantage of what they may believe to be the best fruit of their most mature reection and
deliberation. In consonance with this practice, before a decision is signed and promulgated, all
opinions and conclusions stated during and after the deliberation of the Court, remain in the
breasts of the Justices, binding upon no one, not even upon the Justices themselves. Of course,
they may serve for determining what the opinion of the majority provisionally is and for
designating a member to prepare the decision of the Court, but in no way is that decision binding
unless and until signed and promulgated.
We add that at any time before promulgation, the ponencia may be changed by the ponente.
Indeed, if any member of the court who may have already signed it so desires, he may still
withdraw his concurrence and register a qualication or dissent as long as the decision has not yet
been promulgated. A promulgation signies that on the date it was made the judge or judges
who signed the decision continued to support it.
Thus, an unpromulgated decision is no decision at all. At the very least, they are part of the
condential internal deliberations of the Court which must not be released to the public. A
decision becomes binding only after it is validly promulgated.
15
Until such operative act occurs,
there is really no decision to speak of, even if some or all of the Justices have already afxed their
signatures thereto. During the intervening period from the time of signing until the promulgation
of the decision, any one who took part in the deliberation and had signed the decision may, for a
reason, validly withdraw one's vote, thereby preserving one's freedom of action.
In sum, we hold that Biraogos Motion for Reconsideration with Prayer for Oral Argument must be
denied. This Court did not err in ruling that the proper remedy of those who may assail
Limkaichong's disqualication based on citizenship is to le before the HRET the proper petition at
any time during her incumbency.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration with Prayer for Oral Argument led by petitioner
Louis C. Biraogo in G.R. No. 179120 is DENIED with FINALITY.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
On Ofcial Leave
ARTURO D. BRION
*

Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certied that the conclusions in
the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes
*
On ofcial leave.
1
Sect. 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-ve years of age, able to
read and write, and, except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which
he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately
preceding the day of the election.
2
Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, 327 Phil. 521, 551 (1996).
3
G.R. No. 120265, September 18, 1995, 248 SCRA 400, 429.
4
Ocampo v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 158466, June 14, 2004, 432
SCRA 144, 149.
5
Rollo, pp. 30-35. (Emphasis supplied)
6
Sec. 13. Finality of Decisions or Resolutions. - x x x
(c) Unless a motion for reconsideration is seasonably led, a decision or resolution of a Division
shall become nal and executory after the lapse of ve (5) days in Special actions and Special
cases and after fteen (15) days in all other actions or proceedings, following its promulgation.
7
Sec. 2. Period for Filing Motions for Reconsideration. - A motion to reconsider a decision,
resolution, order, or ruling of a Division shall be led within ve (5) days from the promulgation
thereof. Such motion, if not pro forma, suspends the execution or implementation of the decision,
resolution, order or ruling.
8
Vinzons-Chato v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 172131, April 2, 2007, 520 SCRA 166, 179,
citing Aggabao v. Commission on Elections, 449 SCRA 400, 404-405 (2005); Guerrero v.
Commission on Elections, 391 Phil. 344, 352 (2000).
9
Sec. 250. Election Contests for Batasang Pambansa, Regional, Provincial and City Ofces. - A
sworn petition contesting the election of any Member of the Batasang Pambansa or any regional,
provincial or city ofcial shall be led with the Commission by any candidate who has duly led a
certicate of candidacy and has been voted for the same ofce, within ten days after the
proclamation of the results of the election.
10
Vinzons-Chato v. Commission on Elections, supra note 8, at 178, citing Rasul v. Commission on
Elections, 371 Phil. 760, 766 (1999).
11
Lazatin v. Commission on Elections, 241 Phil. 343, 344 (1988).
12
Supra note 8, at 180.
13
Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 87193, June 23, 1989, 174 SCRA 245, 255.
14
408 Phil. 511, 525-526 (2001). (Underscoring and emphasis supplied)
15
Jamil v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 123648, December 15, 1997, 283 SCRA 349, 371.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995
IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CIRILO ROY MONTEJO, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:
A constitutional provision should be construed as to give it effective operation and suppress the
mischief at which it is aimed.
1
The 1987 Constitution mandates that an aspirant for election to the
House of Representatives be "a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a
resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the election."
2
The
mischief which this provision reproduced verbatim from the 1973 Constitution seeks to
prevent is the possibility of a "stranger or newcomer unacquainted with the conditions and needs
of a community and not identied with the latter, from an elective ofce to serve that community."
3

Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos led her Certicate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte with the Provincial Election Supervisor on March 8,
1995, providing the following information in item no. 8:
4

RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING
THE ELECTION: __________ Years and seven Months.
On March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the
First District of Leyte and a candidate for the same position, led a "Petition for Cancellation and
Disqualication"
5
with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the
constitutional requirement for residency. In his petition, private respondent contended that Mrs.
Marcos lacked the Constitution's one year residency requirement for candidates for the House of
Representatives on the evidence of declarations made by her in Voter Registration Record 94-No.
3349772
6
and in her Certicate of Candidacy. He prayed that "an order be issued declaring
(petitioner) disqualied and canceling the certicate of candidacy."
7

On March 29, 1995, petitioner led an Amended/Corrected Certicate of Candidacy, changing the
entry "seven" months to "since childhood" in item no. 8 of the amended certicate.
8
On the same
day, the Provincial Election Supervisor of Leyte informed petitioner that:
[T]his ofce cannot receive or accept the aforementioned Certicate of Candidacy on the ground
that it is led out of time, the deadline for the ling of the same having already lapsed on March
20, 1995. The Corrected/Amended Certicate of Candidacy should have been led on or before
the March 20, 1995 deadline.
9

Consequently, petitioner led the Amended/Corrected Certicate of Candidacy with the
COMELEC's Head Ofce in Intramuros, Manila on
March 31, 1995. Her Answer to private respondent's petition in SPA No. 95-009 was likewise led
with the head ofce on the same day. In said Answer, petitioner averred that the entry of the word
"seven" in her original Certicate of Candidacy was the result of an "honest misinterpretation"
10

which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected
Certicate of Candidacy and that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or
residence.
11
Impugning respondent's motive in ling the petition seeking her disqualication, she
noted that:
When respondent (petitioner herein) announced that she was intending to register as a voter in
Tacloban City and run for Congress in the First District of Leyte, petitioner immediately opposed
her intended registration by writing a letter stating that "she is not a resident of said city but of
Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. After respondent had registered as a voter in Tolosa following
completion of her six month actual residence therein, petitioner led a petition with the COMELEC
to transfer the town of Tolosa from the First District to the Second District and pursued such a
move up to the Supreme Court, his purpose being to remove respondent as petitioner's opponent
in the congressional election in the First District. He also led a bill, along with other Leyte
Congressmen, seeking the creation of another legislative district to remove the town of Tolosa out
of the First District, to achieve his purpose. However, such bill did not pass the Senate. Having
failed on such moves, petitioner now led the instant petition for the same objective, as it is
obvious that he is afraid to submit along with respondent for the judgment and verdict of the
electorate of the First District of Leyte in an honest, orderly, peaceful, free and clean elections on
May 8, 1995.
12

On April 24, 1995, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), by a vote of 2
to 1,
13
came up with a Resolution 1) nding private respondent's Petition for Disqualication in
SPA 95-009 meritorious; 2) striking off petitioner's Corrected/Amended Certicate of Candidacy of
March 31, 1995; and 3) canceling her original Certicate of Candidacy.
14
Dealing with two primary
issues, namely, the validity of amending the original Certicate of Candidacy after the lapse of the
deadline for ling certicates of candidacy, and petitioner's compliance with the one year
residency requirement, the Second Division held:
Respondent raised the afrmative defense in her Answer that the printed word "Seven" (months)
was a result of an "honest misinterpretation or honest mistake" on her part and, therefore, an
amendment should subsequently be allowed. She averred that she thought that what was asked
was her "actual and physical" presence in Tolosa and not residence of origin or domicile in the
First Legislative District, to which she could have responded "since childhood." In an
accompanying afdavit, she stated that her domicile is Tacloban City, a component of the First
District, to which she always intended to return whenever absent and which she has never
abandoned. Furthermore, in her memorandum, she tried to discredit petitioner's theory of
disqualication by alleging that she has been a resident of the First Legislative District of Leyte
since childhood, although she only became a resident of the Municipality of Tolosa for seven
months. She asserts that she has always been a resident of Tacloban City, a component of the First
District, before coming to the Municipality of Tolosa.
Along this point, it is interesting to note that prior to her registration in Tolosa, respondent
announced that she would be registering in Tacloban City so that she can be a candidate for the
District. However, this intention was rebuffed when petitioner wrote the Election Ofcer of
Tacloban not to allow respondent since she is a resident of Tolosa and not Tacloban. She never
disputed this claim and instead implicitly acceded to it by registering in Tolosa.
This incident belies respondent's claim of "honest misinterpretation or honest mistake." Besides,
the Certicate of Candidacy only asks for RESIDENCE. Since on the basis of her Answer, she was
quite aware of "residence of origin" which she interprets to be Tacloban City, it is curious why she
did not cite Tacloban City in her Certicate of Candidacy. Her explanation that she thought what
was asked was her actual and physical presence in Tolosa is not easy to believe because there is
none in the question that insinuates about Tolosa. In fact, item no. 8 in the Certicate of Candidacy
speaks clearly of "Residency in the CONSTITUENCY where I seek to be elected immediately
preceding the election." Thus, the explanation of respondent fails to be persuasive.
From the foregoing, respondent's defense of an honest mistake or misinterpretation, therefore, is
devoid of merit.
To further buttress respondent's contention that an amendment may be made, she cited the case
of Alialy v. COMELEC (2 SCRA 957). The reliance of respondent on the case of Alialy is misplaced.
The case only applies to the "inconsequential deviations which cannot affect the result of the
election, or deviations from provisions intended primarily to secure timely and orderly conduct of
elections." The Supreme Court in that case considered the amendment only as a matter of form.
But in the instant case, the amendment cannot be considered as a matter of form or an
inconsequential deviation. The change in the number of years of residence in the place where
respondent seeks to be elected is a substantial matter which determines her qualication as a
candidacy, specially those intended to suppress, accurate material representation in the original
certicate which adversely affects the ler. To admit the amended certicate is to condone the evils
brought by the shifting minds of manipulating candidate, of the detriment of the integrity of the
election.
Moreover, to allow respondent to change the seven (7) month period of her residency in order to
prolong it by claiming it was "since childhood" is to allow an untruthfulness to be committed
before this Commission. The arithmetical accuracy of the 7 months residency the respondent
indicated in her certicate of candidacy can be gleaned from her entry in her Voter's Registration
Record accomplished on January 28, 1995 which reects that she is a resident of Brgy. Olot,
Tolosa, Leyte for 6 months at the time of the said registration (Annex A, Petition). Said accuracy is
further buttressed by her letter to the election ofcer of San Juan, Metro Manila, dated August 24,
1994, requesting for the cancellation of her registration in the Permanent List of Voters thereat so
that she can be re-registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. The dates of these three (3)
different documents show the respondent's consistent conviction that she has transferred her
residence to Olot, Tolosa, Leyte from Metro Manila only for such limited period of time, starting in
the last week of August 1994 which on March 8, 1995 will only sum up to 7 months. The
Commission, therefore, cannot be persuaded to believe in the respondent's contention that it was
an error.
xxx xxx xxx
Based on these reasons the Amended/Corrected Certicate of Candidacy cannot be admitted by
this Commission.
xxx xxx xxx
Anent the second issue, and based on the foregoing discussion, it is clear that respondent has not
complied with the one year residency requirement of the Constitution.
In election cases, the term "residence" has always been considered as synonymous with "domicile"
which imports not only the intention to reside in a xed place but also personal presence in-that
place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. Domicile denotes a xed permanent
residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return.
(Perfecto Faypon vs. Eliseo Quirino, 96 Phil 294; Romualdez vs. RTC-Tacloban, 226 SCRA 408). In
respondent's case, when she returned to the Philippines in 1991, the residence she chose was not
Tacloban but San Juan, Metro Manila. Thus, her animus revertendi is pointed to Metro Manila and
not Tacloban.
This Division is aware that her claim that she has been a resident of the First District since
childhood is nothing more than to give her a color of qualication where she is otherwise
constitutionally disqualied. It cannot hold ground in the face of the facts admitted by the
respondent in her afdavit. Except for the time that she studied and worked for some years after
graduation in Tacloban City, she continuously lived in Manila. In 1959, after her husband was
elected Senator, she lived and resided in San Juan, Metro Manila where she was a registered voter.
In 1965, she lived in San Miguel, Manila where she was again a registered voter. In 1978, she
served as member of the Batasang Pambansa as the representative of the City of Manila and later
on served as the Governor of Metro Manila. She could not have served these positions if she had
not been a resident of the City of Manila. Furthermore, when she led her certicate of candidacy
for the ofce of the President in 1992, she claimed to be a resident of San Juan, Metro Manila. As a
matter of fact on August 24, 1994, respondent wrote a letter with the election ofcer of San Juan,
Metro Manila requesting for the cancellation of her registration in the permanent list of voters that
she may be re-registered or transferred to Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. These facts manifest that
she could not have been a resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to the time she led her
certicate of candidacy because she became a resident of many places, including Metro Manila.
This debunks her claim that prior to her residence in Tolosa, Leyte, she was a resident of the First
Legislative District of Leyte since childhood.
In this case, respondent's conduct reveals her lack of intention to make Tacloban her domicile. She
registered as a voter in different places and on several occasions declared that she was a resident
of Manila. Although she spent her school days in Tacloban, she is considered to have abandoned
such place when she chose to stay and reside in other different places. In the case of Romualdez
vs. RTC (226 SCRA 408) the Court explained how one acquires a new domicile by choice. There
must concur: (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality; (2) intention to remain there; and
(3) intention to abandon the old domicile. In other words there must basically be animus manendi
with animus non revertendi. When respondent chose to stay in Ilocos and later on in Manila,
coupled with her intention to stay there by registering as a voter there and expressly declaring that
she is a resident of that place, she is deemed to have abandoned Tacloban City, where she spent
her childhood and school days, as her place of domicile.
Pure intention to reside in that place is not sufcient, there must likewise be conduct indicative of
such intention. Respondent's statements to the effect that she has always intended to return to
Tacloban, without the accompanying conduct to prove that intention, is not conclusive of her
choice of residence. Respondent has not presented any evidence to show that her conduct, one
year prior the election, showed intention to reside in Tacloban. Worse, what was evident was that
prior to her residence in Tolosa, she had been a resident of Manila.
It is evident from these circumstances that she was not a resident of the First District of Leyte "since
childhood."
To further support the assertion that she could have not been a resident of the First District of Leyte
for more than one year, petitioner correctly pointed out that on January 28, 1995 respondent
registered as a voter at precinct No. 18-A of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. In doing so, she placed in her
Voter Registration Record that she resided in the municipality of Tolosa for a period of six months.
This may be inconsequential as argued by the respondent since it refers only to her residence in
Tolosa, Leyte. But her failure to prove that she was a resident of the First District of Leyte prior to
her residence in Tolosa leaves nothing but a convincing proof that she had been a resident of the
district for six months only.
15

In a Resolution promulgated a day before the May 8, 1995 elections, the COMELEC en banc
denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration
16
of the April 24, 1995 Resolution declaring her
not qualied to run for the position of Member of the House of Representatives for the First
Legislative District of Leyte.
17
The Resolution tersely stated:
After deliberating on the Motion for Reconsideration, the Commission RESOLVED to DENY it, no
new substantial matters having been raised therein to warrant re-examination of the resolution
granting the petition for disqualication.
18

On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner's proclamation should the
results of the canvass show that she obtained the highest number of votes in the congressional
elections in the First District of Leyte. On the same day, however, the COMELEC reversed itself and
issued a second Resolution directing that the proclamation of petitioner be suspended in the
event that she obtains the highest number of votes.
19

In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, petitioner averred that she was the overwhelming
winner of the elections for the congressional seat in the First District of Leyte held May 8, 1995
based on the canvass completed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers on May 14, 1995. Petitioner
alleged that the canvass showed that she obtained a total of 70,471 votes compared to the 36,833
votes received by Respondent Montejo. A copy of said Certicate of Canvass was annexed to the
Supplemental Petition.
On account of the Resolutions disqualifying petitioner from running for the congressional seat of
the First District of Leyte and the public respondent's Resolution suspending her proclamation,
petitioner comes to this court for relief.
Petitioner raises several issues in her Original and Supplemental Petitions. The principal issues may
be classied into two general areas:
I. The issue of Petitioner's qualications
Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of Leyte for a
period of one year at the time of the May 9, 1995 elections.
II. The Jurisdictional Issue
a) Prior to the elections
Whether or not the COMELEC properly exercised its jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioner outside
the period mandated by the Omnibus Election Code for disqualication cases under Article 78 of
the said Code.
b) After the Elections
Whether or not the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal assumed exclusive jurisdiction
over the question of petitioner's qualications after the May 8, 1995 elections.
I. Petitioner's qualication
A perusal of the Resolution of the COMELEC's Second Division reveals a startling confusion in the
application of settled concepts of "Domicile" and "Residence" in election law. While the COMELEC
seems to be in agreement with the general proposition that for the purposes of election law,
residence is synonymous with domicile, the Resolution reveals a tendency to substitute or mistake
the concept of domicile for actual residence, a conception not intended for the purpose of
determining a candidate's qualications for election to the House of Representatives as required
by the 1987 Constitution. As it were, residence, for the purpose of meeting the qualication for an
elective position, has a settled meaning in our jurisdiction.
Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "[f]or the exercise of civil rights and the fulllment of civil
obligations, the domicile of natural persons is their place of habitual residence." In Ong vs.
Republic
20
this court took the concept of domicile to mean an individual's "permanent home", "a
place to which, whenever absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and depends
on facts and circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent."
21
Based on the foregoing,
domicile includes the twin elements of "the fact of residing or physical presence in a xed place"
and animus manendi, or the intention of returning there permanently.
Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual to a certain
place. It is the physical presence of a person in a given area, community or country. The essential
distinction between residence and domicile in law is that residence involves the intent to leave
when the purpose for which the resident has taken up his abode ends. One may seek a place for
purposes such as pleasure, business, or health. If a person's intent be to remain, it becomes his
domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is established it is residence.
22
It is thus,
quite perfectly normal for an individual to have different residences in various places. However, a
person can only have a single domicile, unless, for various reasons, he successfully abandons his
domicile in favor of another domicile of choice. In Uytengsu vs. Republic,
23
we laid this distinction
quite clearly:
There is a difference between domicile and residence. "Residence" is used to indicate a place of
abode, whether permanent or temporary; "domicile" denotes a xed permanent residence to
which, when absent, one has the intention of returning. A man may have a residence in one place
and a domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the
intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for the same purpose
at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence. His place of residence is generally his
place of domicile, but it is not by any means necessarily so since no length of residence without
intention of remaining will constitute domicile.
For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the peculiar criteria
of political laws. As these concepts have evolved in our election law, what has clearly and
unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for election purposes is used synonymously with
domicile.
In Nuval vs. Guray,
24
the Court held that "the term residence. . . is synonymous with domicile which
imports not only intention to reside in a xed place, but also personal presence in that place,
coupled with conduct indicative of such intention."
25
Larena vs. Teves
26
reiterated the same
doctrine in a case involving the qualications of the respondent therein to the post of Municipal
President of Dumaguete, Negros Oriental. Faypon vs. Quirino,
27
held that the absence from
residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter other than in the
place where one is elected does not constitute loss of residence.
28
So settled is the concept (of
domicile) in our election law that in these and other election law cases, this Court has stated that
the mere absence of an individual from his permanent residence without the intention to abandon
it does not result in a loss or change of domicile.
The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the residence qualication for certain elective
positions have placed beyond doubt the principle that when the Constitution speaks of
"residence" in election law, it actually means only "domicile" to wit:
Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional Convention,
there was an attempt to require residence in the place not less than one year immediately
preceding the day of the elections. So my question is: What is the Committee's concept of
residence of a candidate for the legislature? Is it actual residence or is it the concept of domicile or
constructive residence?
Mr. Davide: Madame President, insofar as the regular members of the National Assembly are
concerned, the proposed section merely provides, among others, "and a resident thereof", that is,
in the district for a period of not less than one year preceding the day of the election. This was in
effect lifted from the 1973 Constitution, the interpretation given to it was domicile.
29

xxx xxx xxx
Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on Section 7, page 2. I think Commissioner Nolledo has
raised the same point that "resident" has been interpreted at times as a matter of intention rather
than actual residence.
Mr. De los Reyes: Domicile.
Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentleman consider at the proper time to go back to actual
residence rather than mere intention to reside?
Mr. De los Reyes: But we might encounter some difculty especially considering that a provision in
the Constitution in the Article on Suffrage says that Filipinos living abroad may vote as enacted by
law. So, we have to stick to the original concept that it should be by domicile and not physical
residence.
30

In Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives,
31
this Court concluded that the framers
of the 1987 Constitution obviously adhered to the denition given to the term residence in
election law, regarding it as having the same meaning as domicile.
32

In the light of the principles just discussed, has petitioner Imelda Romualdez Marcos satised the
residency requirement mandated by Article VI, Sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution? Of what
signicance is the questioned entry in petitioner's Certicate of Candidacy stating her residence in
the First Legislative District of Leyte as seven (7) months?
It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certicate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in
determining whether or not and individual has satised the constitution's residency qualication
requirement. The said statement becomes material only when there is or appears to be a
deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate
ineligible. It would be plainly ridiculous for a candidate to deliberately and knowingly make a
statement in a certicate of candidacy which would lead to his or her disqualication.
It stands to reason therefore, that petitioner merely committed an honest mistake in jotting the
word "seven" in the space provided for the residency qualication requirement. The circumstances
leading to her ling the questioned entry obviously resulted in the subsequent confusion which
prompted petitioner to write down the period of her actual stay in Tolosa, Leyte instead of her
period of residence in the First district, which was "since childhood" in the space provided. These
circumstances and events are amply detailed in the COMELEC's Second Division's questioned
resolution, albeit with a different interpretation. For instance, when herein petitioner announced
that she would be registering in Tacloban City to make her eligible to run in the First District,
private respondent Montejo opposed the same, claiming that petitioner was a resident of Tolosa,
not Tacloban City. Petitioner then registered in her place of actual residence in the First District,
which is Tolosa, Leyte, a fact which she subsequently noted down in her Certicate of Candidacy. A
close look at said certicate would reveal the possible source of the confusion: the entry for
residence (Item No. 7) is followed immediately by the entry for residence in the constituency where
a candidate seeks election thus:
7. RESIDENCE (complete Address): Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
POST OFFICE ADDRESS FOR ELECTION PURPOSES: Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
8. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO
BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION:_________ Years and Seven Months.
Having been forced by private respondent to register in her place of actual residence in Leyte
instead of petitioner's claimed domicile, it appears that petitioner had jotted down her period of
stay in her legal residence or domicile. The juxtaposition of entries in Item 7 and Item 8 the rst
requiring actual residence and the second requiring domicile coupled with the circumstances
surrounding petitioner's registration as a voter in Tolosa obviously led to her writing down an
unintended entry for which she could be disqualied. This honest mistake should not, however, be
allowed to negate the fact of residence in the First District if such fact were established by means
more convincing than a mere entry on a piece of paper.
We now proceed to the matter of petitioner's domicile.
In support of its asseveration that petitioner's domicile could not possibly be in the First District of
Leyte, the Second Division of the COMELEC, in its assailed Resolution of April 24,1995 maintains
that "except for the time when (petitioner) studied and worked for some years after graduation in
Tacloban City, she continuously lived in Manila." The Resolution additionally cites certain facts as
indicative of the fact that petitioner's domicile ought to be any place where she lived in the last few
decades except Tacloban, Leyte. First, according to the Resolution, petitioner, in 1959, resided in
San Juan, Metro Manila where she was also registered voter. Then, in 1965, following the election
of her husband to the Philippine presidency, she lived in San Miguel, Manila where she as a voter.
In 1978 and thereafter, she served as a member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro
Manila. "She could not, have served these positions if she had not been a resident of Metro
Manila," the COMELEC stressed. Here is where the confusion lies.
We have stated, many times in the past, that an individual does not lose his domicile even if he has
lived and maintained residences in different places. Residence, it bears repeating, implies a factual
relationship to a given place for various purposes. The absence from legal residence or domicile to
pursue a profession, to study or to do other things of a temporary or semi-permanent nature does
not constitute loss of residence. Thus, the assertion by the COMELEC that "she could not have
been a resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to the time she led her certicate of
candidacy because she became a resident of many places" ies in the face of settled
jurisprudence in which this Court carefully made distinctions between (actual) residence and
domicile for election law purposes. In Larena vs. Teves,
33
supra, we stressed:
[T]his court is of the opinion and so holds that a person who has his own house wherein he lives
with his family in a municipality without having ever had the intention of abandoning it, and
without having lived either alone or with his family in another municipality, has his residence in the
former municipality, notwithstanding his having registered as an elector in the other municipality in
question and having been a candidate for various insular and provincial positions, stating every
time that he is a resident of the latter municipality.
More signicantly, in Faypon vs. Quirino,
34
We explained that:
A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for "greener pastures," as the saying goes, to
improve his lot, and that, of course includes study in other places, practice of his avocation, or
engaging in business. When an election is to be held, the citizen who left his birthplace to improve
his lot may desire to return to his native town to cast his ballot but for professional or business
reasons, or for any other reason, he may not absent himself from his professional or business
activities; so there he registers himself as voter as he has the qualications to be one and is not
willing to give up or lose the opportunity to choose the ofcials who are to run the government
especially in national elections. Despite such registration, the animus revertendi to his home, to his
domicile or residence of origin has not forsaken him. This may be the explanation why the
registration of a voter in a place other than his residence of origin has not been deemed sufcient
to constitute abandonment or loss of such residence. It nds justication in the natural desire and
longing of every person to return to his place of birth. This strong feeling of attachment to the
place of one's birth must be overcome by positive proof of abandonment for another.
From the foregoing, it can be concluded that in its above-cited statements supporting its
proposition that petitioner was ineligible to run for the position of Representative of the First
District of Leyte, the COMELEC was obviously referring to petitioner's various places of (actual)
residence, not her domicile. In doing so, it not only ignored settled jurisprudence on residence in
election law and the deliberations of the constitutional commission but also the provisions of the
Omnibus Election Code (B.P. 881).
35

What is undeniable, however, are the following set of facts which establish the fact of petitioner's
domicile, which we lift verbatim from the COMELEC's Second Division's assailed Resolution:
36

In or about 1938 when respondent was a little over 8 years old, she established her domicile in
Tacloban, Leyte (Tacloban City). She studied in the Holy Infant Academy in Tacloban from 1938 to
1949 when she graduated from high school. She pursued her college studies in St. Paul's College,
now Divine Word University in Tacloban, where she earned her degree in Education. Thereafter,
she taught in the Leyte Chinese School, still in Tacloban City. In 1952 she went to Manila to work
with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel Z. Romualdez in his ofce in the House of Representatives.
In 1954, she married ex-President Ferdinand E. Marcos when he was still a congressman of Ilocos
Norte and registered there as a voter. When her husband was elected Senator of the Republic in
1959, she and her husband lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In
1965, when her husband was elected President of the Republic of the Philippines, she lived with
him in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel, Manila.
[I]n February 1986 (she claimed that) she and her family were abducted and kidnapped to
Honolulu, Hawaii. In November 1991, she came home to Manila. In 1992, respondent ran for
election as President of the Philippines and led her Certicate of Candidacy wherein she
indicated that she is a resident and registered voter of San Juan, Metro Manila.
Applying the principles discussed to the facts found by COMELEC, what is inescapable is that
petitioner held various residences for different purposes during the last four decades. None of
these purposes unequivocally point to an intention to abandon her domicile of origin in Tacloban,
Leyte. Moreover, while petitioner was born in Manila, as a minor she naturally followed the
domicile of her parents. She grew up in Tacloban, reached her adulthood there and eventually
established residence in different parts of the country for various reasons. Even during her
husband's presidency, at the height of the Marcos Regime's powers, petitioner kept her close ties
to her domicile of origin by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and
other important personal milestones in her home province, instituting well-publicized projects for
the benet of her province and hometown, and establishing a political power base where her
siblings and close relatives held positions of power either through the ballot or by appointment,
always with either her inuence or consent. These well-publicized ties to her domicile of origin are
part of the history and lore of the quarter century of Marcos power in our country. Either they were
entirely ignored in the COMELEC'S Resolutions, or the majority of the COMELEC did not know
what the rest of the country always knew: the fact of petitioner's domicile in Tacloban, Leyte.
Private respondent in his Comment, contends that Tacloban was not petitioner's domicile of origin
because she did not live there until she was eight years old. He avers that after leaving the place in
1952, she "abandoned her residency (sic) therein for many years and . . . (could not) re-establish
her domicile in said place by merely expressing her intention to live there again." We do not agree.
First, minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once acquired is retained until a new
one is gained, it follows that in spite of the fact of petitioner's being born in Manila, Tacloban, Leyte
was her domicile of origin by operation of law. This domicile was not established only when her
father brought his family back to Leyte contrary to private respondent's averments.
Second, domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must
demonstrate:
37

1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
2. A bona de intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one;
and
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.
In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin should
be deemed to continue. Only with evidence showing concurrence of all three requirements can
the presumption of continuity or residence be rebutted, for a change of residence requires an
actual and deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two legal residences at the same time.
38
In the case at bench, the evidence adduced by private respondent plainly lacks the degree of
persuasiveness required to convince this court that an abandonment of domicile of origin in favor
of a domicile of choice indeed occurred. To effect an abandonment requires the voluntary act of
relinquishing petitioner's former domicile with an intent to supplant the former domicile with one
of her own choosing (domicilium voluntarium).
In this connection, it cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by
operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952. For
there is a clearly established distinction between the Civil Code concepts of "domicile" and
"residence."
39
The presumption that the wife automatically gains the husband's domicile by
operation of law upon marriage cannot be inferred from the use of the term "residence" in Article
110 of the Civil Code because the Civil Code is one area where the two concepts are well
delineated. Dr. Arturo Tolentino, writing on this specic area explains:
In the Civil Code, there is an obvious difference between domicile and residence. Both terms imply
relations between a person and a place; but in residence, the relation is one of fact while in
domicile it is legal or juridical, independent of the necessity of physical presence.
40

Article 110 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 110. The husband shall x the residence of the family. But the court may exempt the wife
from living with the husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of the Republic.
A survey of jurisprudence relating to Article 110 or to the concepts of domicile or residence as
they affect the female spouse upon marriage yields nothing which would suggest that the female
spouse automatically loses her domicile of origin in favor of the husband's choice of residence
upon marriage.
Article 110 is a virtual restatement of Article 58 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 which states:
La mujer esta obligada a seguir a su marido donde quiera que je su residencia. Los Tribunales, sin
embargo, podran con justa causa eximirla de esta obligacion cuando el marido transende su
residencia a ultramar o' a pais extranjero.
Note the use of the phrase "donde quiera su je de residencia" in the aforequoted article, which
means wherever (the husband) wishes to establish residence. This part of the article clearly
contemplates only actual residence because it refers to a positive act of xing a family home or
residence. Moreover, this interpretation is further strengthened by the phrase "cuando el marido
translade su residencia" in the same provision which means, "when the husband shall transfer his
residence," referring to another positive act of relocating the family to another home or place of
actual residence. The article obviously cannot be understood to refer to domicile which is a xed,
fairly-permanent concept when it plainly connotes the possibility of transferring from one place to
another not only once, but as often as the husband may deem t to move his family, a
circumstance more consistent with the concept of actual residence.
The right of the husband to x the actual residence is in harmony with the intention of the law to
strengthen and unify the family, recognizing the fact that the husband and the wife bring into the
marriage different domiciles (of origin). This difference could, for the sake of family unity, be
reconciled only by allowing the husband to x a single place of actual residence.
Very signicantly, Article 110 of the Civil Code is found under Title V under the heading: RIGHTS
AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE. Immediately preceding Article 110 is Article
109 which obliges the husband and wife to live together, thus:
Art. 109. The husband and wife are obligated to live together, observe mutual respect and
delity and render mutual help and support.
The duty to live together can only be fullled if the husband and wife are physically together. This
takes into account the situations where the couple has many residences (as in the case of the
petitioner). If the husband has to stay in or transfer to any one of their residences, the wife should
necessarily be with him in order that they may "live together." Hence, it is illogical to conclude that
Art. 110 refers to "domicile" and not to "residence." Otherwise, we shall be faced with a situation
where the wife is left in the domicile while the husband, for professional or other reasons, stays in
one of their (various) residences. As Dr. Tolentino further explains:
Residence and Domicile Whether the word "residence" as used with reference to particular
matters is synonymous with "domicile" is a question of some difculty, and the ultimate decision
must be made from a consideration of the purpose and intent with which the word is used.
Sometimes they are used synonymously, at other times they are distinguished from one another.
xxx xxx xxx
Residence in the civil law is a material fact, referring to the physical presence of a person in a place.
A person can have two or more residences, such as a country residence and a city residence.
Residence is acquired by living in place; on the other hand, domicile can exist without actually
living in the place. The important thing for domicile is that, once residence has been established in
one place, there be an intention to stay there permanently, even if residence is also established in
some other
place.
41

In fact, even the matter of a common residence between the husband and the wife during the
marriage is not an iron-clad principle; In cases applying the Civil Code on the question of a
common matrimonial residence, our jurisprudence has recognized certain situations
42
where the
spouses could not be compelled to live with each other such that the wife is either allowed to
maintain a residence different from that of her husband or, for obviously practical reasons, revert to
her original domicile (apart from being allowed to opt for a new one). In De la Vina vs. Villareal
43

this Court held that "[a] married woman may acquire a residence or domicile separate from that of
her husband during the existence of the marriage where the husband has given cause for
divorce."
44
Note that the Court allowed the wife either to obtain new residence or to choose a
new domicile in such an event. In instances where the wife actually opts, .under the Civil Code, to
live separately from her husband either by taking new residence or reverting to her domicile of
origin, the Court has held that the wife could not be compelled to live with her husband on pain of
contempt. In Arroyo vs. Vasques de Arroyo
45
the Court held that:
Upon examination of the authorities, we are convinced that it is not within the province of the
courts of this country to attempt to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with, and render
conjugal rights to, the other. Of course where the property rights of one of the pair are invaded, an
action for restitution of such rights can be maintained. But we are disinclined to sanction the
doctrine that an order, enforcible (sic) by process of contempt, may be entered to compel the
restitution of the purely personal right of consortium. At best such an order can be effective for no
other purpose than to compel the spouses to live under the same roof; and he experience of those
countries where the courts of justice have assumed to compel the cohabitation of married people
shows that the policy of the practice is extremely questionable. Thus in England, formerly the
Ecclesiastical Court entertained suits for the restitution of conjugal rights at the instance of either
husband or wife; and if the facts were found to warrant it, that court would make a mandatory
decree, enforceable by process of contempt in case of disobedience, requiring the delinquent
party to live with the other and render conjugal rights. Yet this practice was sometimes criticized
even by the judges who felt bound to enforce such orders, and in Weldon v. Weldon (9 P.D. 52),
decided in 1883, Sir James Hannen, President in the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division of the
High Court of Justice, expressed his regret that the English law on the subject was not the same as
that which prevailed in Scotland, where a decree of adherence, equivalent to the decree for the
restitution of conjugal rights in England, could be obtained by the injured spouse, but could not
be enforced by imprisonment. Accordingly, in obedience to the growing sentiment against the
practice, the Matrimonial Causes Act (1884) abolished the remedy of imprisonment; though a
decree for the restitution of conjugal rights can still be procured, and in case of disobedience may
serve in appropriate cases as the basis of an order for the periodical payment of a stipend in the
character of alimony.
In the voluminous jurisprudence of the United States, only one court, so far as we can discover, has
ever attempted to make a preemptory order requiring one of the spouses to live with the other;
and that was in a case where a wife was ordered to follow and live with her husband, who had
changed his domicile to the City of New Orleans. The decision referred to (Bahn v. Darby, 36 La.
Ann., 70) was based on a provision of the Civil Code of Louisiana similar to article 56 of the
Spanish Civil Code. It was decided many years ago, and the doctrine evidently has not been fruitful
even in the State of Louisiana. In other states of the American Union the idea of enforcing
cohabitation by process of contempt is rejected. (21 Cyc., 1148).
In a decision of January 2, 1909, the Supreme Court of Spain appears to have afrmed an order of
the Audiencia Territorial de Valladolid requiring a wife to return to the marital domicile, and in the
alternative, upon her failure to do so, to make a particular disposition of certain money and effects
then in her possession and to deliver to her husband, as administrator of the ganancial property,
all income, rents, and interest which might accrue to her from the property which she had brought
to the marriage. (113 Jur. Civ., pp. 1, 11) But it does not appear that this order for the return of the
wife to the marital domicile was sanctioned by any other penalty than the consequences that
would be visited upon her in respect to the use and control of her property; and it does not
appear that her disobedience to that order would necessarily have been followed by
imprisonment for contempt.
Parenthetically when Petitioner was married to then Congressman Marcos, in 1954, petitioner was
obliged by virtue of Article 110 of the Civil Code to follow her husband's actual place of
residence xed by him. The problem here is that at that time, Mr. Marcos had several places of
residence, among which were San Juan, Rizal and Batac, Ilocos Norte. There is no showing which
of these places Mr. Marcos did x as his family's residence. But assuming that Mr. Marcos had xed
any of these places as the conjugal residence, what petitioner gained upon marriage was actual
residence. She did not lose her domicile of origin.
On the other hand, the common law concept of "matrimonial domicile" appears to have been
incorporated, as a result of our jurisprudential experiences after the drafting of the Civil Code of
1950, into the New Family Code. To underscore the difference between the intentions of the Civil
Code and the Family Code drafters, the term residence has been supplanted by the term domicile
in an entirely new provision (Art. 69) distinctly different in meaning and spirit from that found in
Article 110. The provision recognizes revolutionary changes in the concept of women's rights in
the intervening years by making the choice of domicile a product of mutual agreement between
the spouses.
46

Without as much belaboring the point, the term residence may mean one thing in civil law (or
under the Civil Code) and quite another thing in political law. What stands clear is that insofar as
the Civil Code is concerned-affecting the rights and obligations of husband and wife the term
residence should only be interpreted to mean "actual residence." The inescapable conclusion
derived from this unambiguous civil law delineation therefore, is that when petitioner married the
former President in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home, not a
domicilium necessarium.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner gained a new "domicile" after her marriage
and only acquired a right to choose a new one after her husband died, petitioner's acts following
her return to the country clearly indicate that she not only impliedly but expressly chose her
domicile of origin (assuming this was lost by operation of law) as her domicile. This "choice" was
unequivocally expressed in her letters to the Chairman of the PCGG when petitioner sought the
PCGG's permission to "rehabilitate (our) ancestral house in Tacloban and Farm in Olot, Leyte. . . to
make them livable for the Marcos family to have a home in our homeland."
47
Furthermore,
petitioner obtained her residence certicate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte, while living in her brother's
house, an act which supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested in her letters to the
PCGG Chairman. She could not have gone straight to her home in San Juan, as it was in a state of
disrepair, having been previously looted by vandals. Her "homes" and "residences" following her
arrival in various parts of Metro Manila merely qualied as temporary or "actual residences," not
domicile. Moreover, and proceeding from our discussion pointing out specic situations where the
female spouse either reverts to her domicile of origin or chooses a new one during the
subsistence of the marriage, it would be highly illogical for us to assume that she cannot regain her
original domicile upon the death of her husband absent a positive act of selecting a new one
where situations exist within the subsistence of the marriage itself where the wife gains a domicile
different from her husband.
In the light of all the principles relating to residence and domicile enunciated by this court up to
this point, we are persuaded that the facts established by the parties weigh heavily in favor of a
conclusion supporting petitioner's claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte.
II. The jurisdictional issue
Petitioner alleges that the jurisdiction of the COMELEC had already lapsed considering that the
assailed resolutions were rendered on April 24, 1995, fourteen (14) days before the election in
violation of Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.
48
Moreover, petitioner contends that it is
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and not the COMELEC which has jurisdiction over
the election of members of the House of Representatives in accordance with Article VI Sec. 17 of
the Constitution. This is untenable.
It is a settled doctrine that a statute requiring rendition of judgment within a specied time is
generally construed to be merely directory,
49
"so that non-compliance with them does not
invalidate the judgment on the theory that if the statute had intended such result it would have
clearly indicated it."
50
The difference between a mandatory and a directory provision is often
made on grounds of necessity. Adopting the same view held by several American authorities, this
court in Marcelino vs. Cruz held that:
51

The difference between a mandatory and directory provision is often determined on grounds of
expediency, the reason being that less injury results to the general public by disregarding than
enforcing the letter of the law.
In Trapp v. Mc Cormick, a case calling for the interpretation of a statute containing a limitation of
thirty (30) days within which a decree may be entered without the consent of counsel, it was held
that "the statutory provisions which may be thus departed from with impunity, without affecting the
validity of statutory proceedings, are usually those which relate to the mode or time of doing that
which is essential to effect the aim and purpose of the Legislature or some incident of the essential
act." Thus, in said case, the statute under examination was construed merely to be directory.
The mischief in petitioner's contending that the COMELEC should have abstained from rendering
a decision after the period stated in the Omnibus Election Code because it lacked jurisdiction, lies
in the fact that our courts and other quasi-judicial bodies would then refuse to render judgments
merely on the ground of having failed to reach a decision within a given or prescribed period.
In any event, with the enactment of Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation to Section 78 of B.P.
881,
52
it is evident that the respondent Commission does not lose jurisdiction to hear and decide
a pending disqualication case under Section 78 of B.P. 881 even after the elections.
As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal's supposed assumption of jurisdiction over
the issue of petitioner's qualications after the May 8, 1995 elections, sufce it to say that HRET's
jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualications of
members of Congress begins only after a candidate has become a member of the House of
Representatives.
53
Petitioner not being a member of the House of Representatives, it is obvious
that the HRET at this point has no jurisdiction over the question.
It would be an abdication of many of the ideals enshrined in the 1987 Constitution for us to either
to ignore or deliberately make distinctions in law solely on the basis of the personality of a
petitioner in a case. Obviously a distinction was made on such a ground here. Surely, many
established principles of law, even of election laws were outed for the sake perpetuating power
during the pre-EDSA regime. We renege on these sacred ideals, including the meaning and spirit
of EDSA ourselves bending established principles of principles of law to deny an individual what
he or she justly deserves in law. Moreover, in doing so, we condemn ourselves to repeat the
mistakes of the past.
WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualications
to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's
questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE.
Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim
petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.
Separate Opinions
PUNO, J., concurring:
It was Aristotle who taught mankind that things that are alike should be treated alike, while things
that are unalike should be treated unalike in proportion to their unalikeness.
1
Like other
candidates, petitioner has clearly met the residence requirement provided by Section 6, Article VI
of the Constitution.
2
We cannot disqualify her and treat her unalike, for the Constitution
guarantees equal protection of the law. I proceed from the following factual and legal
propositions:
First. There is no question that petitioner's original domicile is in Tacloban, Leyte. Her parents were
domiciled in Tacloban. Their ancestral house is in Tacloban. They have vast real estate in the place.
Petitioner went to school and thereafter worked there. I consider Tacloban as her initial domicile,
both her domicile of origin and her domicile of choice. Her domicile of origin as it was the
domicile of her parents when she was a minor; and her domicile of choice, as she continued living
there even after reaching the age of majority.
Second. There is also no question that in May, 1954, petitioner married the late President
Ferdinand E. Marcos. By contracting marriage, her domicile became subject to change by law, and
the right to change it was given by Article 110 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 110. The husband shall x the residence of the family. But the court may exempt the wife from
living with the husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of the Republic.
3
(Emphasis
supplied)
In De la Via v. Villareal and Geopano,
4
this Court explained why the domicile of the wife ought to
follow that of the husband. We held: "The reason is founded upon the theoretic identity of person
and interest between the husband and the wife, and the presumption that, from the nature of the
relation, the home of one is the home of the other. It is intended to promote, strengthen, and
secure their interests in this relation, as it ordinarily exists, where union and harmony prevail."
5
In
accord with this objective, Article 109 of the Civil Code also obligated the husband and wife "to
live together."
Third. The difcult issues start as we determine whether petitioner's marriage to former President
Marcos ipso facto resulted in the loss of her Tacloban domicile. I respectfully submit that her
marriage by itself alone did not cause her to lose her Tacloban domicile. Article 110 of the Civil
Code merely gave the husband the right to x the domicile of the family. In the exercise of the
right, the husband may explicitly choose the prior domicile of his wife, in which case, the wife's
domicile remains unchanged. The husband can also implicitly acquiesce to his wife's prior
domicile even if it is different. So we held in de la Via,
6

. . . . When married women as well as children subject to parental authority live, with the
acquiescence of their husbands or fathers, in a place distinct from where the latter live, they have
their own independent domicile. . . .
It is not, therefore, the mere fact of marriage but the deliberate choice of a different domicile by
the husband that will change the domicile of a wife from what it was prior to their marriage. The
domiciliary decision made by the husband in the exercise of the right conferred by Article 110 of
the Civil Code binds the wife. Any and all acts of a wife during her coverture contrary to the
domiciliary choice of the husband cannot change in any way the domicile legally xed by the
husband. These acts are void not only because the wife lacks the capacity to choose her domicile
but also because they are contrary to law and public policy.
In the case at bench, it is not disputed that former President Marcos exercised his right to x the
family domicile and established it in Batac, Ilocos Norte, where he was then the congressman. At
that particular point of time and throughout their married life, petitioner lost her domicile in
Tacloban, Leyte. Since petitioner's Batac domicile has been xed by operation of law, it was not
affected in 1959 when her husband was elected as Senator, when they lived in San Juan, Rizal and
where she registered as a voter. It was not also affected in 1965 when her husband was elected
President, when they lived in Malacaang Palace, and when she registered as a voter in San
Miguel, Manila. Nor was it affected when she served as a member of the Batasang Pambansa,
Minister of Human Settlements and Governor of Metro Manila during the incumbency of her
husband as President of the nation. Under Article 110 of the Civil Code, it was only her husband
who could change the family domicile in Batac and the evidence shows he did not effect any such
change. To a large degree, this follows the common law that "a woman on her marriage loses her
own domicile and by operation of law, acquires that of her husband, no matter where the wife
actually lives or what she believes or intends."
7

Fourth. The more difcult task is how to interpret the effect of the death on September 28, 1989 of
former President Marcos on petitioner's Batac domicile. The issue is of rst impression in our
jurisdiction and two (2) schools of thought contend for acceptance. One is espoused by our
distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Davide, Jr., heavily relying on American authorities.
8
He
echoes the theory that after the husband's death, the wife retains the last domicile of her husband
until she makes an actual change.
I do not subscribe to this submission. The American case law that the wife still retains her dead
husband's domicile is based on ancient common law which we can no longer apply in the
Philippine setting today. The common law identied the domicile of a wife as that of the husband
and denied to her the power of acquiring a domicile of her own separate and apart from him.
9

Legal scholars agree that two (2) reasons support this common law doctrine. The rst reason as
pinpointed by the legendary Blackstone is derived from the view that "the very being or legal
existence of the woman is suspended during
the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband."
10
The second
reason lies in "the desirability of having the interests of each member of the family unit governed
by the same law."
11
The presumption that the wife retains the domicile of her deceased husband is
an extension of this common law concept. The concept and its extension have provided some of
the most iniquitous jurisprudence against women. It was under common law that the 1873
American case of Bradwell v. Illinois
12
was decided where women were denied the right to
practice law. It was unblushingly ruled that "the natural and proper timidity and delicacy which
belongs to the female sex evidently unts it for many of the occupations of civil life . . . This is the
law of the Creator." Indeed, the rulings relied upon by Mr. Justice Davide in CJS
13
and AM JUR 2d

14
are American state court decisions handed down between the years 1917
15
and 1938,
16
or
before the time when women were accorded equality of rights with men. Undeniably, the women's
liberation movement resulted in far-ranging state legislations in the United States to eliminate
gender inequality.
17
Starting in the decade of the seventies, the courts likewise liberalized their
rulings as they started invalidating laws infected with gender-bias. It was in 1971 when the US
Supreme Court in Reed v. Reed,
18
struck a big blow for women equality when it declared as
unconstitutional an Idaho law that required probate courts to choose male family members over
females as estate administrators. It held that mere administrative inconvenience cannot justify a
sex-based distinction. These signicant changes both in law and in case law on the status of women
virtually obliterated the iniquitous common law surrendering the rights of married women to their
husbands based on the dubious theory of the parties' theoretic oneness. The Corpus Juris
Secundum editors did not miss the relevance of this revolution on women's right as they observed:
"However, it has been declared that under modern statutes changing the status of married women
and departing from the common law theory of marriage, there is no reason why a wife may not
acquire a separate domicile for every purpose known to the law."
19
In publishing in 1969 the
Restatement of the Law, Second (Conict of Laws 2d), the reputable American Law Institute also
categorically stated that the view of Blackstone ". . . is no longer held. As the result of statutes and
court decisions, a wife now possesses practically the same rights and powers as her unmarried
sister."
20

In the case at bench, we have to decide whether we should continue clinging to the anachronistic
common law that demeans women, especially married women. I submit that the Court has no
choice except to break away from this common law rule, the root of the many degradations of
Filipino women. Before 1988, our laws particularly the Civil Code, were full of gender
discriminations against women. Our esteemed colleague, Madam Justice Flerida Ruth Romero,
cited a few of them as follows:
21

xxx xxx xxx
Legal Disabilities Suffered by Wives
Not generally known is the fact that under the Civil Code, wives suffer under certain restrictions or
disabilities. For instance, the wife cannot accept gifts from others, regardless of the sex of the giver
or the value of the gift, other than from her very close relatives, without her husband's consent. She
may accept only from, say, her parents, parents-in-law, brothers, sisters and the relatives within the
so-called fourth civil degree. She may not exercise her profession or occupation or engage in
business if her husband objects on serious grounds or if his income is sufcient to support their
family in accordance with their social standing. As to what constitutes "serious grounds" for
objecting, this is within the discretion of the husband.
xxx xxx xxx
Because of the present inequitable situation, the amendments to the Civil Law being proposed by
the University of the Philippines Law Center would allow absolute divorce which severes the
matrimonial ties, such that the divorced spouses are free to get married a year after the divorce is
decreed by the courts. However, in order to place the husband and wife on an equal footing
insofar as the bases for divorce are concerned, the following are specied as the grounds for
absolute divorce: (1) adultery or having a paramour committed by the respondent in any of the
ways specied in the Revised Penal Code or (2) an attempt by the respondent against the life of
the petitioner which amounts to attempted parricide under the Revised Penal Code; (3)
abandonment of the petitioner by the respondent without just cause for a period of three
consecutive years; or (4) habitual maltreatment.
With respect to property relations, the husband is automatically the administrator of the conjugal
property owned in common by the married couple even if the wife may be the more astute or
enterprising partner. The law does not leave it to the spouses to decide who shall act as such
administrator. Consequently, the husband is authorized to engage in acts and enter into
transactions benecial to the conjugal partnership. The wife, however, cannot similarly bind the
partnership without the husband's consent.
And while both exercise joint parental authority over their children, it is the father whom the law
designates as the legal administrator of the property pertaining to the unemancipated child.
Taking the lead in Asia, our government exerted efforts, principally through legislations, to
eliminate inequality between men and women in our land. The watershed came on August 3, 1988
when our Family Code took effect which, among others, terminated the unequal treatment of
husband and wife as to their rights and responsibilities.
22

The Family Code attained this elusive objective by giving new rights to married women and by
abolishing sex-based privileges of husbands. Among others, married women are now given the
joint right to administer the family property, whether in the absolute community system or in the
system of conjugal partnership;
23
joint parental authority over their minor children, both over their
persons as well as their properties;
24
joint responsibility for the support of the family;
25
the right to
jointly manage the household;
26
and, the right to object to their husband's exercise of profession,
occupation, business or activity.
27
Of particular relevance to the case at bench is Article 69 of the
Family Code which took away the exclusive right of the husband to x the family domicile and gave
it jointly to the husband and the wife, thus:
Art. 69. The husband and wife shall x the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the court shall
decide.
The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter should live abroad or
there are other valid and compelling reasons for the exemption. However, such exemption shall
not apply if the same is not compatible with the solidarity of the family. (Emphasis supplied)
Article 69 repealed Article 110 of the Civil Code. Commenting on the duty of the husband and wife
to live together, former Madam Justice Alice Sempio-Diy of the Court of Appeals specied the
instances when a wife may now refuse to live with her husband, thus:
28

(2) The wife has the duty to live with her husband, but she may refuse to do so in certain cases like:
(a) If the place chosen by the husband as family residence is dangerous to her Life;
(b) If the husband subjects her to maltreatment or abusive conduct or insults, making common life
impossible;
(c) If the husband compels her to live with his parents, but she cannot get along with her mother-
in-law and they have constant quarrels (Del Rosario v. Del Rosario, CA, 46 OG 6122);
(d) Where the husband has continuously carried illicit relations for 10 years with different women
and treated his wife roughly and without consideration. (Dadivas v. Villanueva, 54 Phil. 92);
(e) Where the husband spent his time in gambling, giving no money to his family for food and
necessities, and at the same time insulting his wife and laying hands on her. (Panuncio v. Sula, CA,
34 OG 129);
(f) If the husband has no xed residence and lives a vagabond life as a tramp (1 Manresa 329);
(g) If the husband is carrying on a shameful business at home (Gahn v. Darby, 38 La. Ann. 70).
The inescapable conclusion is that our Family Code has completely emancipated the wife from the
control of the husband, thus abandoning the parties' theoretic identity of interest. No less than the
late revered Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes who chaired the Civil Code Revision Committee of the UP Law
Center gave this insightful view in one of his rare lectures after retirement:
29

xxx xxx xxx
The Family Code is primarily intended to reform the family law so as to emancipate the wife from
the exclusive control of the husband and to place her at parity with him insofar as the family is
concerned. The wife and the husband are now placed on equal standing by the Code. They are
now joint administrators of the family properties and exercise joint authority over the persons and
properties of their children. This means a dual authority in the family. The husband will no longer
prevail over the wife but she has to agree on all matters concerning the family. (Emphasis supplied)
In light of the Family Code which abrogated the inequality between husband and wife as started
and perpetuated by the common law, there is no reason in espousing the anomalous rule that the
wife still retains the domicile of her dead husband. Article 110 of the Civil Code which provides the
statutory support for this stance has been repealed by Article 69 of the Family Code. By its repeal,
it becomes a dead-letter law, and we are not free to resurrect it by giving it further effect in any way
or manner such as by ruling that the petitioner is still bound by the domiciliary determination of
her dead husband.
Aside from reckoning with the Family Code, we have to consider our Constitution and its rm
guarantees of due process and equal protection of
law.
30
It can hardly be doubted that the common law imposition on a married woman of her dead
husband's domicile even beyond his grave is patently discriminatory to women. It is a gender-
based discrimination and is not rationally related to the objective of promoting family solidarity. It
cannot survive a constitutional challenge. Indeed, compared with our previous fundamental laws,
the 1987 Constitution is more concerned with equality between sexes as it explicitly commands that
the State ". . . shall ensure fundamental equality before the law of women and men." To be exact,
section 14, Article II provides: "The State recognizes the role of women in nation building, and shall
ensure fundamental equality before the law of women and men. We shall be transgressing the
sense and essence of this constitutional mandate if we insist on giving our women the caveman's
treatment.
Prescinding from these premises, I respectfully submit that the better stance is to rule that
petitioner reacquired her Tacloban domicile upon the death of her husband in 1989. This is the
necessary consequence of the view that petitioner's Batac dictated domicile did not continue after
her husband's death; otherwise, she would have no domicile and that will violate the universal rule
that no person can be without a domicile at any point of time. This stance also restores the right of
petitioner to choose her domicile before it was taken away by Article 110 of the Civil Code, a right
now recognized by the Family Code and protected by the Constitution. Likewise, I cannot see the
fairness of the common law requiring petitioner to choose again her Tacloban domicile before she
could be released from her Batac domicile. She lost her Tacloban domicile not through her act but
through the act of her deceased husband when he xed their domicile in Batac. Her husband is
dead and he cannot rule her beyond the grave. The law disabling her to choose her own domicile
has been repealed. Considering all these, common law should not put the burden on petitioner to
prove she has abandoned her dead husband's domicile. There is neither rhyme nor reason for this
gender-based burden.
But even assuming arguendo that there is need for convincing proof that petitioner chose to
reacquire her Tacloban domicile, still, the records reveal ample evidence to this effect. In her
afdavit submitted to the respondent COMELEC, petitioner averred:
xxx xxx xxx
36. In November, 1991, I came home to our beloved country, after several requests for my return
were denied by President Corazon C. Aquino, and after I led suits for our Government to issue me
my passport.
37. But I came home without the mortal remains of my beloved husband, President Ferdinand E.
Marcos, which the Government considered a threat to the national security and welfare.
38. Upon my return to the country, I wanted to immediately live and reside in Tacloban City or in
Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, even if my residences there were not livable as they had been destroyed and
cannibalized. The PCGG, however, did not permit and allow me.
39. As a consequence, I had to live at various times in the Westin Philippine Plaza in Pasay City, a
friend's apartment on Ayala Avenue, a house in South Forbes Park which my daughter rented, and
Pacic Plaza, all in Makati.
40. After the 1992 Presidential Elections, I lived and resided in the residence of my brother in San
Jose, Tacloban City, and pursued my negotiations with PCGG to recover my sequestered
residences in Tacloban City and Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte.
40.1 In preparation for my observance of All Saints' Day and All Souls' Day that year, I renovated
my parents' burial grounds and entombed their bones which had been excalvated, unearthed and
scattered.
41. On November 29, 1993, I formally wrote PCGG Chairman Magtanggol Gunigundo for
permissions to
. . . rehabilitate . . . (o)ur ancestral house in Tacloban and farmhouse in Olot, Leyte . . . to make them
livable for us the Marcos family to have a home in our own motherland.
xxx xxx xxx
42. It was only on 06 June 1994, however, when PCGG Chairman Gunigundo, in his letter to Col.
Simeon Kempis, Jr., PCGG Region 8 Representative, allowed me to repair and renovate my Leyte
residences. I quote part of his letter:
Dear Col. Kempis,
Upon representation by Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos to this Commission, that she intends to visit our
sequestered properties in Leyte, please allow her access thereto. She may also cause repairs and
renovation of the sequestered properties, in which event, it shall be understood that her
undertaking said repairs is not authorization for her to take over said properties, and that all
expenses shall be for her account and not reimbursable. Please extend the necessary courtesy to
her.
xxx xxx xxx
43. I was not permitted, however, to live and stay in the Sto. Nio Shrine residence in Tacloban City
where I wanted to stay and reside, after repairs and renovations were completed. In August 1994, I
transferred from San Jose, Tacloban City, to my residence in Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, when
PCGG permitted me to stay and live there.
It is then clear that in 1992 petitioner reestablished her domicile in the First District of Leyte. It is not
disputed that in 1992, she rst lived at the house of her brother in San Jose, Tacloban City and
later, in August 1994, she transferred her residence in Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. Both Tacloban
City and the municipality of Olot are within the First District of Leyte. Since petitioner reestablished
her old domicile in 1992 in the First District of Leyte, she more than complied with the
constitutional requirement of residence
". . . for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election," i.e., the
May 8, 1995 elections.
The evidence presented by the private respondent to negate the Tacloban domicile of petitioner is
nil. He presented petitioner's Voter's Registration Record led with the Board of Election
Inspectors of Precinct 10-A of Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte wherein she stated that her period of
residence in said barangay was six (6) months as of the date of her ling of said Voter's
Registration Record on January 28, 1995.
31
This statement in petitioner's Voter's Registration
Record is a non-prejudicial admission. The Constitution requires at least one (1) year residence in
the district in which the candidate shall be elected. In the case at bench, the reference is the First
District of Leyte. Petitioner's statement proved that she resided in Olot six (6) months before
January 28, 1995 but did not disprove that she has also resided in Tacloban City starting 1992. As
aforestated, Olot and Tacloban City are both within the First District of Leyte, hence, her six (6)
months residence in Olot should be counted not against, but in her favor. Private respondent also
presented petitioner's Certicate of Candidacy led on March 8, 1995
32
where she placed seven
(7) months after Item No. 8 which called for information regarding "residence in the constituency
where I seek to be elected immediately preceding the election." Again, this original certicate of
candidacy has no evidentiary value because an March 1, 1995 it was corrected by petitioner. In her
Amended/Corrected Certicate of Candidacy,
33
petitioner wrote "since childhood" after Item No.
8. The amendment of a certicate of candidacy to correct a bona de mistake has been allowed by
this Court as a matter of course and as a matter of right. As we held in Alialy v. COMELEC,
34
viz.:
xxx xxx xxx
The absence of the signature of the Secretary of the local chapter N.P in the original certicate of
candidacy presented before the deadline September 11, 1959, did not render the certicate
invalid. The amendment of the certicate, although at a date after the deadline, but before the
election, was substantial compliance with the law, and the defect was cured.
It goes without saying that petitioner's erroneous Certicate of Candidacy led on March 8, 1995
cannot be used as evidence against her. Private respondent's petition for the disqualication of
petitioner rested alone on these two (2) brittle pieces of documentary evidence petitioner's
Voter's Registration Record and her original Certicate of Candidacy. Ranged against the evidence
of the petitioner showing her ceaseless contacts with Tacloban, private respondent's two (2) pieces
of evidence are too insufcient to disqualify petitioner, more so, to deny her the right to represent
the people of the First District of Leyte who have overwhelmingly voted for her.
Fifth. Section 10, Article IX-C of the Constitution mandates that "bona de candidates for any
public ofce shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination."
35
A detached reading
of the records of the case at bench will show that all forms of legal and extra-legal obstacles have
been thrown against petitioner to prevent her from running as the people's representative in the
First District of Leyte. In petitioner's Answer to the petition to disqualify her, she averred:
36

xxx xxx xxx
10. Petitioner's (herein private respondent Montejo) motive in ling the instant petition is devious.
Tacloban City and run for Congress in the First District of Leyte, petitioner (Montejo) immediately
opposed her intended registration by writing a letter stating that "she is not a resident of said city
but of Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte." (Annex "2" of respondent's afdavit, Annex "2"). After
respondent (petitioner herein) had registered as a voter in Tolosa following completion of her six-
month actual residence therein, petitioner (Montejo) led a petition with the COMELEC to transfer
the town of Tolosa from the First District to the Second District and pursued such move up to the
Supreme Court in G.R. No. 118702, his purpose being to remove respondent (petitioner herein) as
petitioner's (Montejo's) opponent in the congressional election in the First District. He also led a
bill, along with other Leyte Congressmen, seeking to create another legislative district, to remove
the town of Tolosa out of the First District and to make it a part of the new district, to achieve his
purpose. However, such bill did not pass the Senate. Having, failed on such moves, petitioner now
led the instant petition, for the same objective, as it is obvious that he is afraid to submit himself
along with respondent (petitioner herein) for the judgment and verdict of the electorate of the First
District of Leyte in an honest, orderly, peaceful, free and clean elections on May 8, 1995.
These allegations which private respondent did not challenge were not lost
to the perceptive eye of Commissioner Maambong who in his Dissenting Opinion,
37
held:
xxx xxx xxx
Prior to the registration date January 28, 1995 the petitioner (herein private respondent Montejo)
wrote the Election Ofcer of Tacloban City not to allow respondent (petitioner herein) to register
thereat since she is a resident of Tolosa and not Tacloban City. The purpose of this move of the
petitioner (Montejo) is not lost to (sic) the Commission. In UND No. 95-001 (In the matter of the
Legislative Districts of the Provinces of Leyte, Iloilo, and South Cotabato, Out of Which the New
Provinces of Biliran, Guimaras and Saranggani Were Respectively Created), . . . Hon. Cirilo Roy G.
Montejo, Representative, First District of Leyte, wanted the Municipality of Tolosa, in the First
District of Leyte, transferred to the Second District of Leyte. The Hon. Sergio A.F. Apostol,
Representative of the Second District of Leyte, opposed the move of the petitioner (Montejo).
Under Comelec Resolution No. 2736 (December 29, 1994), the Commission on Elections refused
to make the proposed transfer. Petitioner (Montejo) led "Motion for Reconsideration of Resolution
No. 2736" which the Commission denied in a Resolution promulgated on February 1, 1995.
Petitioner (Montejo) led a petition for certiorari before the Honorable Supreme Court (Cirilo Roy
G. Montejo vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 118702) questioning the resolution of the
Commission. Believing that he could get a favorable ruling from the Supreme Court, petitioner
(Montejo) tried to make sure that the respondent (petitioner herein) will register as a voter in
Tolosa so that she will be forced to run as Representative not in the First but in the Second District.
It did not happen. On March 16, 1995, the Honorable Supreme Court unanimously promulgated a
"Decision," penned by Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno, the dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, Section 1 of Resolution No. 2736 insofar as it transferred the municipality of
Capoocan of the Second District and the municipality of Palompon of the Fourth District to the
Third District of the province of Leyte, is annulled and set aside. We also deny the Petition praying
for the transfer of the municipality of Tolosa from the First District to the Second District of the
province of Leyte. No costs.
Petitioner's (Montejo's) plan did not work. But the respondent (petitioner herein) was constrained
to register in the Municipality of Tolosa where her house is instead of Tacloban City, her domicile.
In any case, both Tacloban City and Tolosa are in the First Legislative District.
All these attempts to misuse our laws and legal processes are forms of rank harassments and
invidious discriminations against petitioner to deny her equal access to a public ofce. We cannot
commit any hermeneutic violence to the Constitution by torturing the meaning of equality, the end
result of which will allow the harassment and discrimination of petitioner who has lived a
controversial life, a past of alternating light and shadow. There is but one Constitution for all
Filipinos. Petitioner cannot be adjudged by a "different" Constitution, and the worst way to
interpret the Constitution is to inject in its interpretation, bile and bitterness.
Sixth. In Gallego v. Vera,
38
we explained that the reason for this residence requirement is "to
exclude a stranger or newcomer, unacquainted, with the conditions and needs of a community
and not identied with the latter, from an elective ofce to serve that community . . . ." Petitioner's
lifetime contacts with the First District of Leyte cannot be contested. Nobody can claim that she is
not acquainted with its problems because she is a stranger to the place. None can argue she
cannot satisfy the intent of the Constitution.
Seventh. In resolving election cases, a dominant consideration is the need to effectuate the will of
the electorate. The election results show that petitioner received Seventy Thousand Four Hundred
Seventy-one (70,471) votes, while private respondent got only Thirty-Six Thousand Eight Hundred
Thirty-Three (36,833) votes. Petitioner is clearly the overwhelming choice of the electorate of the
First District of Leyte and this is not a sleight of statistics. We cannot frustrate this sovereign will on
highly arguable technical considerations. In case of doubt, we should lean towards a rule that will
give life to the people's political judgment.
A nal point. The case at bench provides the Court with the rare opportunity to rectify the
inequality of status between women and men by rejecting the iniquitous common law precedents
on the domicile of married women and by redening domicile in accord with our own culture, law,
and Constitution. To rule that a married woman is eternally tethered to the domicile dictated by her
dead husband is to preserve the anachronistic and anomalous balance of advantage of a husband
over his wife. We should not allow the dead to govern the living even if the glories of yesteryears
seduce us to shout long live the dead! The Family Code buried this gender-based discrimination
against married women and we should not excavate what has been entombed. More importantly,
the Constitution forbids it.
I vote to grant the petition.
Bellosillo and Melo, JJ., concur.
FRANCISCO, J., concurring:
I concur with Mr. Justice Kapunan's ponencia nding petitioner qualied for the position of
Representative of the First Congressional District of Leyte. I wish, however, to express a few
comments on the issue of petitioner's domicile.
Domicile has been dened as that place in which a person's habitation is xed, without any
present intention of removing therefrom, and that place is properly the domicile of a person in
which he has voluntarily xed his abode, or habitation, not for a mere special or temporary
purpose, but with a present intention of making it his permanent home (28 C.J.S. 1). It denotes a
xed permanent residence to which when absent for business, or pleasure, or for like reasons one
intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances, in the sense that they disclose intent.
(Ong Huan Tin v. Republic, 19 SCRA 966, 969)
Domicile is classied into domicile of origin and domicile of choice. The law attributes to every
individual a domicile of origin, which is the domicile of his parents, or of the head of his family, or
of the person on whom he is legally dependent at the time of his birth. While the domicile of origin
is generally the place where one is born or reared, it maybe elsewhere (28 C.J.S. 5). Domicile of
choice, on the other hand, is the place which the person has elected and chosen for himself to
displace his previous domicile; it has for its true basis or foundation the intention of the person (28
C.J.S. 6). In order to hold that a person has abandoned his domicile and acquired a new one
called domicile of choice, the following requisites must concur, namely, (a) residence or bodily
presence in the new locality, (b) intention to remain there or animus manendi, and (c) an intention
to abandon the old domicile or animus non revertendi (Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, 226
SCRA 408, 415). A third classication is domicile by operation of law which attributes to a person a
domicile independent of his own intention or actual residence, ordinarily resulting from legal
domestic relations, as that of the wife arising from marriage, or the relation of a parent and a child
(28 C.J.S. 7).
In election law, when our Constitution speaks of residence for election purposes it means domicile
(Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 199 SCRA 692, 713; Nuval v. Guray, 52
Phil. 645, 651). To my mind, public respondent Commission on Elections misapplied this concept,
of domicile which led to petitioner's disqualication by ruling that petitioner failed to comply with
the constitutionally mandated one-year residence requirement. Apparently, public respondent
Commission deemed as conclusive petitioner's stay and registration as voter in many places as
conduct disclosing her intent to abandon her established domicile of origin in Tacloban, Leyte. In
several decisions, though, the Court has laid down the rule that registration of a voter in a place
other than his place of origin is not sufcient to constitute abandonment or loss of such residence
(Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294, 300). Respondent Commission offered no cogent reason to depart
from this rule except to surmise petitioner's intent of abandoning her domicile of origin.
It has been suggested that petitioner's domicile of origin was supplanted by a new domicile due
to her marriage, a domicile by operation of law. The proposition is that upon the death of her
husband in 1989 she retains her husband's domicile, i.e., Batac, Ilocos Norte, until she makes an
actual change thereof. I nd this proposition quite untenable.
Tacloban, Leyte, is petitioner's domicile of origin which was involuntarily supplanted with another,
i.e., Batac, Ilocos Norte, upon her marriage in 1954 with then Congressman Marcos. By legal ction
she followed the domicile of her husband. In my view, the reason for the law is for the spouses to
fully and effectively perform their marital duties and obligations to one another.
1
The question of
domicile, however, is not affected by the fact that it was the legal or moral duty of the individual to
reside in a given place (28 C.J.S. 11). Thus, while the wife retains her marital domicile so long as
the marriage subsists, she automatically loses it upon the latter's termination, for the reason behind
the law then ceases. Otherwise, petitioner, after her marriage was ended by the death of her
husband, would be placed in a quite absurd and unfair situation of having been freed from all
wifely obligations yet made to hold on to one which no longer serves any meaningful purpose.
It is my view therefore that petitioner reverted to her original domicile of Tacloban, Leyte upon her
husband's death without even signifying her intention to that effect. It is for the private respondent
to prove, not for petitioner to disprove, that petitioner has effectively abandoned Tacloban, Leyte
for Batac, Ilocos Norte or for some other place/s. The clear rule is that it is the party (herein private
respondent) claiming that a person has abandoned or lost his residence of origin who must show
and prove preponderantly such abandonment or loss (Faypon v. Quirino, supra at 298; 28 C.J.S.
16), because the presumption is strongly in favor of an original or former domicile, as against an
acquired one (28 C.J.S. 16). Private respondent unfortunately failed to discharge this burden as
the record is devoid of convincing proof that petitioner has acquired whether voluntarily or
involuntarily, a new domicile to replace her domicile of origin.
The records, on the contrary, clearly show that petitioner has complied with the constitutional one-
year residence requirement. After her exile abroad, she returned to the Philippines in 1991 to
reside in Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, but the Presidential Commission on Good Government which
sequestered her residential house and other properties forbade her necessitating her transient
stay in various places in Manila (Afdavit p.6, attached as Annex I of the Petition). In 1992, she ran
for the position of president writing in her certicate of candidacy her residence as San Juan,
Metro Manila. After her loss therein, she went back to Tacloban City, acquired her residence
certicate
2
and resided with her brother in San Jose. She resided in San Jose, Tacloban City until
August of 1994 when she was allowed by the PCGG to move and reside in her sequestered
residential house in Olot, Tolosa, Leyte (Annex I, p. 6).
3
It was in the same month of August when
she applied for the cancellation of her previous registration in San Juan, Metro Manila in order to
register anew as voter of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, which she did on January 28, 1995. From this
sequence of events, I nd it quite improper to use as the reckoning period of the one-year
residence requirement the date when she applied for the cancellation of her previous registration
in San Juan, Metro Manila. The fact which private respondent never bothered to disprove is that
petitioner transferred her residence after the 1992 presidential election from San Juan, Metro
Manila to San Jose, Tacloban City, and resided therein until August of 1994. She later transferred to
Olot, Tolosa, Leyte (Annex I, p. 7). It appearing that both Tacloban City and Tolosa, Leyte are within
the First Congressional District of Leyte, it indubitably stands that she had more than a year of
residence in the constituency she sought to be elected. Petitioner, therefore, has satisfactorily
complied with the one-year qualication required by the 1987 Constitution.
ROMERO, J., separate opinion:
Petitioner has appealed to this Court for relief after the COMELEC ruled that she was disqualied
from running for Representative of her District and that, in the event that she should, nevertheless,
muster a majority vote, her proclamation should be suspended. Not by a straightforward ruling did
the COMELEC pronounce its decision as has been its unvarying practice in the past, but by a
startling succession of "reverse somersaults." Indicative of its shifting stance vis-a-vis petitioner's
certicate of candidacy were rst, the action of its Second Division disqualifying her and canceling
her original Certicate of Candidacy by a vote of 2-1 on April 24, 1995; then the denial by the
COMELEC en banc of her Motion for Reconsideration on May 7, 1995, a day before the election;
then because she persisted in running, its decision on
May 11, 1995 or three days after the election, allowing her proclamation in the event that the
results of the canvass should show that she obtained the highest number of votes (obviously
noting that petitioner had won overwhelmingly over her opponent), but almost simultaneously
reversing itself by directing that even if she wins, her proclamation should nonetheless be
suspended.
Crucial to the resolution of the disqualication issue presented by the case at bench is the
interpretation to be given to the one-year residency requirement imposed by the Constitution on
aspirants for a Congressional seat.
1

Bearing in mind that the term "resident" has been held to be synonymous with "domicile" for
election purposes, it is important to determine whether petitioner's domicile was in the First
District of Leyte and if so, whether she had resided there for at least a period of one year.
Undisputed is her domicile of origin, Tacloban, where her parents lived at the time of her birth.
Depending on what theory one adopts, the same may have been changed when she married
Ferdinand E. Marcos, then domiciled in Batac, by operation of law. Assuming it did, his death
certainly released her from the obligation to live with him at the residence xed by him during his
lifetime. What may confuse the layman at this point is the fact that the term "domicile" may refer to
"domicile of origin," "domicile of choice," or "domicile by operation of law," which subject we shall
not belabor since it has been amply discussed by the ponente and in the other separate opinions.
In any case, what assumes relevance is the divergence of legal opinion as to the effect of the
husband's death on the domicile of the widow. Some scholars opine that the widow's domicile
remains unchanged; that the deceased husband's wishes perforce still bind the wife he has left
behind. Given this interpretation, the widow cannot possibly go far enough to sever the
domiciliary tie imposed by her husband.
It is bad enough to interpret the law as empowering the husband unilaterally to x the residence or
domicile of the family, as laid down in the Civil Code,
2
but to continue giving obeisance to his
wishes even after the rationale underlying the mutual duty of the spouses to live together has
ceased, is to close one's eyes to the stark realities of the present.
At the other extreme is the position that the widow automatically reverts to her domicile of origin
upon the demise of her husband. Does the law so abhor a vacuum that the widow has to be
endowed somehow with a domicile? To answer this question which is far from rhetorical, one will
have to keep in mind the basic principles of domicile. Everyone must have a domicile. Then one
must have only a single domicile for the same purpose at any given time. Once established, a
domicile remains until a new one is acquired, for no person lives who has no domicile, as dened
by the law be is subject to.
At this juncture, we are confronted with an unexplored legal terrain in this jurisdiction, rendered
more murky by the conicting opinions of foreign legal authorities. This being the state of things, it
is imperative as it is opportune to illumine the darkness with the beacon light of truth, as dictated
by experience and the necessity of according petitioner her right to choose her domicile in
keeping with the enlightened global trend to recognize and protect the human rights of women,
no less than men.
Admittedly, the notion of placing women at par with men, insofar as civil, political and social rights
are concerned, is a relatively recent phenomenon that took seed only in the middle of this century.
It is a historical fact that for over three centuries, the Philippines had been colonized by Spain, a
conservative, Catholic country which transplanted to our shores the Old World cultures, mores and
attitudes and values. Through the imposition on our government of the Spanish Civil Code in
1889, the people, both men and women, had no choice but to accept such concepts as the
husband's being the head of the family and the wife's subordination to his authority. In such role,
his was the right to make vital decisions for the family. Many instances come to mind, foremost
being what is related to the issue before us, namely, that "the husband shall x the residence of the
family."
3
Because he is made responsible for the support of the wife and the rest of the family,
4
he
is also empowered to be the administrator of the conjugal property, with a few exceptions
5
and
may, therefore, dispose of the conjugal partnership property for the purposes specied under the
law;
6
whereas, as a general rule, the wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the
husband's consent.
7
As regards the property pertaining to the children under parental authority,
the father is the legal administrator and only in his absence may the mother assume his powers.
8

Demeaning to the wife's dignity are certain strictures on her personal freedoms, practically
relegating her to the position of minors and disabled persons. To illustrate a few: The wife cannot,
without the husband's consent, acquire any gratuitous title, except from her ascendants,
descendants, parents-in-law, and collateral relatives within the fourth degree.
9
With respect to her
employment, the husband wields a veto power in the case the wife exercises her profession or
occupation or engages in business, provided his income is sufcient for the family, according to its
social standing and his opposition is founded on serious and valid grounds.
10
Most offensive, if
not repulsive, to the liberal-minded is the effective prohibition upon a widow to get married till
after three hundred days following the death of her husband, unless in the meantime, she has
given birth to a child.
11
The mother who contracts a subsequent marriage loses the parental
authority over her children, unless the deceased husband, father of the latter, has expressly
provided in his will that his widow might marry again, and has ordered that in such case she should
keep and exercise parental authority over their children.
12
Again, an instance of a husband's
overarching inuence from beyond the grave.
All these indignities and disabilities suffered by Filipino wives for hundreds of years evoked no
protest from them until the concept of human rights and equality between and among nations and
individuals found hospitable lodgment in the United Nations Charter of which the Philippines was
one of the original signatories. By then, the Spanish "conquistadores" had been overthrown by the
American forces at the turn of the century. The bedrock of the U.N. Charter was rmly anchored on
this credo: "to reafrm faith in the fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the
human person, in the equal rights of men and women." (Emphasis supplied)
It took over thirty years before these egalitarian doctrines bore fruit, owing largely to the
burgeoning of the feminist movement. What may be regarded as the international bill of rights for
women was implanted in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women (CEDAW) adopted by the U.N. General Assembly which entered into force as an
international treaty on September 3, 1981. In ratifying the instrument, the Philippines bound itself
to implement its liberating spirit and letter, for its Constitution, no less, declared that "The
Philippines. . . adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of
the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with
all nations."
13
One such principle embodied in the CEDAW is granting to men and women "the
same rights with regard to the law relating to the movement of persons and the freedom to choose
their residence and domicile."
14
(Emphasis supplied).
CEDAW's pro-women orientation which was not lost on Filipino women was reected in the 1987
Constitution of the Philippines and later, in the Family Code,
15
both of which were speedily
approved by the rst lady President of the country, Corazon C. Aquino. Notable for its emphasis on
the human rights of all individuals and its bias for equality between the sexes are the following
provisions: "The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for
human rights"
16
and "The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure
the fundamental equality before the law of women and men."
17

A major accomplishment of women in their quest for equality with men and the elimination of
discriminatory provisions of law was the deletion in the Family Code of almost all of the
unreasonable strictures on wives and the grant to them of personal rights equal to that of their
husbands. Specically, the husband and wife are now given the right jointly to x the family
domicile;
18
concomitant to the spouses' being jointly responsible for the support of the family is
the right and duty of both spouses to manage the household;
19
the administration and the
enjoyment of the community property shall belong to both spouses jointly;
20
the father and
mother shall now jointly exercise legal guardianship over the property of their unemancipated
common child
21
and several others.
Aware of the hiatus and continuing gaps in the law, insofar as women's rights are concerned,
Congress passed a law popularly known as "Women in Development and Nation Building Act"
22

Among the rights given to married women evidencing their capacity to act in contracts equal to
that of men are:
(1) Women shall have the capacity to borrow and obtain loans and execute security and credit
arrangements under the same conditions as men;
(2) Women shall have equal access to all government and private sector programs granting
agricultural credit, loans and non material resources and shall enjoy equal treatment in agrarian
reform and land resettlement programs;
(3) Women shall have equal rights to act as incorporators and enter into insurance contracts; and
(4) Married women shall have rights equal to those of married men in applying for passports,
secure visas and other travel documents, without need to secure the consent of their spouses.
As the world draws the curtain on the Fourth World Conference of Women in Beijing, let this Court
now be the rst to respond to its clarion call that "Women's Rights are Human Rights" and that "All
obstacles to women's full participation in decision-making at all levels, including the family" should
be removed. Having been herself a Member of the Philippine Delegation to the International
Women's Year Conference in Mexico in 1975, this writer is only too keenly aware of the unremitting
struggle being waged by women the world over, Filipino women not excluded, to be accepted as
equals of men and to tear down the walls of discrimination that hold them back from their proper
places under the sun.
In light of the inexorable sweep of events, local and global, legislative, executive and judicial,
according more rights to women hitherto denied them and eliminating whatever pockets of
discrimination still exist in their civil, political and social life, can it still be insisted that widows are
not at liberty to choose their domicile upon the death of their husbands but must retain the same,
regardless?
I submit that a widow, like the petitioner and others similarly situated, can no longer be bound by
the domicile of the departed husband, if at all she was before. Neither does she automatically
revert to her domicile of origin, but exercising free will, she may opt to reestablish her domicile of
origin. In returning to Tacloban and subsequently, to Barangay Olot, Tolosa, both of which are
located in the First District of Leyte, petitioner amply demonstrated by overt acts, her election of a
domicile of choice, in this case, a reversion to her domicile of origin. Added together, the time
when she set up her domicile in the two places sufced to meet the one-year requirement to run
as Representative of the First District of Leyte.
In view of the foregoing expatiation, I vote to GRANT the petition.
VITUG, J., separate opinion:
The case at bench deals with explicit Constitutional mandates.
The Constitution is not a pliable instrument. It is a bedrock in our legal system that sets up ideals
and directions and render steady our strides hence. It only looks back so as to ensure that mistakes
in the past are not repeated. A compliant transience of a constitution belittles its basic function and
weakens its goals. A constitution may well become outdated by the realities of time. When it does,
it must be changed but while it remains, we owe it respect and allegiance. Anarchy, open or subtle,
has never been, nor must it ever be, the answer to perceived transitory needs, let alone societal
attitudes, or the Constitution might lose its very essence.
Constitutional provisions must be taken to be mandatory in character unless, either by express
statement or by necessary implication, a different intention is manifest (see Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121
SCRA 51).
The two provisions initially brought to focus are Section 6 and Section 17 of Article VI of the
fundamental law. These provisions read:
Sec. 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born
The Commission on Election (the "COMELEC") is constitutionally bound to enforce and administer
"all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of election . . ." (Art. IX, C, Sec. 2, Constitution) that,
there being nothing said to the contrary, should include its authority to pass upon the qualication
and disqualication prescribed by law of candidates to an elective ofce. Indeed, pre-proclamation
controversies are expressly placed under the COMELEC's jurisdiction to hear and resolve (Art. IX,
C, Sec. 3, Constitution).
The matter before us specically calls for the observance of the constitutional one-year residency
requirement. The issue (whether or not there is here such compliance), to my mind, is basically a
question of fact or at least inextricably linked to such determination. The ndings and judgment of
the COMELEC, in accordance with the long established rule and subject only to a number of
exceptions under the basic heading of "grave abuse of discretion," are not reviewable by this
Court.
I do not nd much need to do a complex exercise on what seems to me to be a plain matter.
Generally, the term "residence" has a broader connotation that may mean permanent (domicile),
ofcial (place where one's ofcial duties may require him to stay) or temporary (the place where he
sojourns during a considerable length of time). For civil law purposes, i.e., as regards the exercise
of civil rights and the fulllment of civil obligations, the domicile of a natural person is the place of
his habitual residence (see Article 50, Civil Code). In election cases, the controlling rule is that
heretofore announced by this Court in Romualdez vs. Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Tacloban City
(226 SCRA 408, 409); thus:
In election cases, the Court treats domicile and residence as synonymous terms, thus: "(t)he term
"residence" as used in the election law is synonymous with "domicile," which imports not only an
intention to reside in a xed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct
indicative of such intention." "Domicile" denotes a xed permanent residence to which when
absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. . . . . Residence thus
acquired, however, may be lost by adopting another choice of domicile. In order, in turn, to
acquire a new domicile by choice, there must concur (1) residence or bodily presence in the new
locality, (2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile. In other
words, there must basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose
to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indenite period of time; the change of
residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be
actual.
Using the above tests, I am not convinced that we can charge the COMELEC with having
committed grave abuse of discretion in its assailed resolution.
The COMELEC's jurisdiction, in the case of congressional elections, ends when the jurisdiction of
the Electoral Tribunal concerned begins. It signies that the protestee must have theretofore been
duly proclaimed and has since become a "member" of the Senate or the House of
Representatives. The question can be asked on whether or not the proclamation of a candidate is
just a ministerial function of the Commission on Elections dictated solely on the number of votes
cast in an election exercise. I believe, it is not. A ministerial duty is an obligation the performance of
which, being adequately dened, does not allow the use of further judgment or discretion. The
COMELEC, in its particular case, is tasked with the full responsibility of ascertaining all the facts and
conditions such as may be required by law before a proclamation is properly done.
The Court, on its part, should, in my view at least, refrain from any undue encroachment on the
ultimate exercise of authority by the Electoral Tribunals on matters which, by no less than a
constitutional at, are explicitly within their exclusive domain. The nagging question, if it were
otherwise, would be the effect of the Court's peremptory pronouncement on the ability of the
Electoral Tribunal to later come up with its own judgment in a contest "relating to the election,
returns and qualication" of its members.
Prescinding from all the foregoing, I should like to next touch base on the applicability to this case
of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, in relation to Section 72 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, each
providing thusly:
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6646
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualication Case. Any candidate who has been declared by nal judgment to
be disqualied shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any
reason a candidate is not declared by nal judgment before an election to be disqualied and he
is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission
shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the
complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 881
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 72. Effects of disqualication cases and priority. The Commission and the courts shall give
priority to cases of disqualication by reason of violation of this Act to the end that a nal decision
shall be rendered not later than seven days before the election in which the disqualication is
sought.
Any candidate who has been declared by nal judgment to be disqualied shall not be voted for,
and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. Nevertheless, if for any reason, a candidate is not
declared by nal, judgment before an election to be disqualied, and he is voted for and receives
the winning number of votes in such election, his violation of the provisions of the preceding
sections shall not prevent his proclamation and assumption to ofce.
I realize that in considering the signicance of the law, it may be preferable to look for not so much
the specic instances they ostensibly would cover as the principle they clearly convey. Thus, I will
not scoff at the argument that it should be sound to say that votes cast in favor of the disqualied
candidate, whenever ultimately declared as such, should not be counted in his or her favor and
must accordingly be considered to be stray votes. The argument, nevertheless, is far outweighed
by the rationale of the now prevailing doctrine rst enunciated in the case of Topacio vs. Paredes
(23 Phil. 238 [1912]) which, although later abandoned in Ticzon vs. Comelec (103 SCRA 687
[1981]), and Santos vs. COMELEC (137 SCRA 740 [1985]), was restored, along with the interim case
of Geronimo vs. Ramos (136 SCRA 435 [1985]), by the Labo (176 SCRA 1 (1989]), Abella (201 SCRA
253 [1991]), Labo (211 SCRA 297 [1992]) and, most recently, Benito (235 SCRA 436 [1994]) rulings.
Benito vs. Comelec was a unanimous decision penned by Justice Kapunan and concurred in by
Chief Justice Narvasa, Justices Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Romero, Melo, Quiason,
Puno, Vitug and Mendoza (Justices Cruz and Bellosillo were on ofcial leave). For easy reference,
let me quote from the rst Labo decision:
Finally, there is the question of whether or not the private respondent, who led the quo warranto
petition, can replace the petitioner as mayor. He cannot. The simple reason is that as he obtained
only the second highest number of votes in the election, he was obviously not the choice of the
people of Baguio City.
The latest ruling of the Court on this issue is Santos v. Commission on Elections, (137 SCRA 740)
decided in 1985. In that case, the candidate who placed second was proclaimed elected after the
votes for his winning rival, who was disqualied as a turncoat and considered a non-candidate,
were all disregard as stray. In effect, the second placer won by default. That decision was
supported by eight members of the Court then, (Cuevas, J., ponente, with Makasiar, Concepcion,
Jr., Escolin, Relova, De la Fuente, Alampay and Aquino, JJ., concurring.) with three dissenting
(Teehankee, Acting C.J., Abad Santos and Melencio-Herrera, JJ.) and another two reserving their
vote. (Plana and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ.) One was on ofcial leave. (Fernando, C.J.)
Re-examining that decision, the Court nds, and so holds, that it should be reversed in favor of the
earlier case of Geronimo v. Ramos, (136 SCRA 435) which represents the more logical and
democratic rule. That case, which reiterated the doctrine rst announced in 1912 in Topacio v.
Paredes, (23 Phil. 238) was supported by ten members of the Court, (Gutierrez, Jr., ponente, with
Teehankee, Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Relova, De la Fuente, Cuevas and
Alampay, JJ., concurring) without any dissent, although one reserved his vote, (Makasiar, J.)
another took no part, (Aquino, J.) and two others were on leave. (Fernando, C.J. and Concepcion,
Jr., J.) There the Court held:
. . . it would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right
to suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a
winner and imposed as the representative of a constituency, the majority of which have positively
declared through their ballots that they do not choose him.
Sound policy dictates that public elective ofces are lled by those who have received the highest
number of votes cast in the election for that ofce, and it is a fundamental idea in all republican
forms of government that no one can be declared elected and no measure can be declared
carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the election. (20
Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676.)
The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to be
disqualied or not eligible for the ofce to which he was elected does not necessarily entitle the
candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes to be declared the winner of the
elective ofce. The votes cast for a dead, disqualied, or non-eligible person may not be valid to
vote the winner into ofce or maintain him there. However, in the absence of a statute which clearly
asserts a contrary political and legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in the sincere
belief that the candidate was alive, qualied, or eligible, they should not be treated as stray, void or
meaningless. (at pp. 20-21)
Considering all the foregoing, I am constrained to vote for the dismissal of the petition.
MENDOZA, J., separate opinion:
In my view the issue in this case is whether the Commission on Elections has the power to
disqualify candidates on the ground that they lack eligibility for the ofce to which they seek to be
elected. I think that it has none and that the qualications of candidates may be questioned only in
the event they are elected, by ling a petition for quo warranto or an election protest in the
appropriate forum, not necessarily in the COMELEC but, as in this case, in the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal. That the parties in this case took part in the proceedings in the
COMELEC is of no moment. Such proceedings were unauthorized and were not rendered valid by
their agreement to submit their dispute to that body.
The various election laws will be searched in vain for authorized proceedings for determining a
candidate's qualications for an ofce before his election. There are none in the Omnibus Election
Code (B.P. Blg. 881), in the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 (R.A. No. 6646), or in the law providing
for synchronized elections (R.A. No. 7166). There are, in other words, no provisions for pre-
proclamation contests but only election protests or quo warranto proceedings against winning
candidates.
To be sure, there are provisions denominated for "disqualication," but they are not concerned
with a declaration of the ineligibility of a candidate. These provisions are concerned with the
incapacity (due to insanity, incompetence or conviction of an offense) of a person either to be a
candidate or to continue as a candidate for public ofce. There is also a provision for the denial or
cancellation of certicates of candidacy, but it applies only to cases involving false representations
as to certain matters required by law to be stated in the certicates.
These provisions are found in the following parts of the Omnibus Election Code:
12. Disqualications. Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or
incompetent, or has been sentenced by nal judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for
any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a
crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualied to be a candidate and to hold any ofce,
unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.
The disqualications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon the
declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been removed or after
the expiration of a period of ve years from his service of sentence, unless within the same period
he again becomes disqualied. (Emphasis added)
68. Disqualications. Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is
declared by nal decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a)
given money or other material consideration to inuence, induce or corrupt the voters or public
ofcials performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy;
(c) spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited,
received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e)
violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6, shall
be disqualied from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the ofce.
Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be
qualied to run for any elective ofce under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as
permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence
requirement provided for in the election laws. (Emphasis added)
78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certicate of
candidacy. A veried petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certicate of candidacy
may be led by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained
therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be led at any time not later
than twenty-ve days from the time of the ling of the certicate of candidacy and shall be
decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fteen days before the election. (Emphasis
added)
the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 (R.A. No. 6646):
6. Effect of Disqualication Case. Any candidate who has been declared by nal judgment to
reason a candidate is not declared by nal judgment before an election to be disqualied and he is
voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall
continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and; upon motion for the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. (Emphasis added).
7. Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel a Certicate of Candidacy. The procedure
hereinabove provided shall apply to petitions to deny due course to or cancel a certicate of
candidacy as provided in Section 78 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.
and the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160):
40. Disqualications. The following persons are disqualied from running for any elective local
position:
(a) Those sentenced by nal judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense
punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;
(b) Those removed from ofce as a result of on administrative case;
(c) Those convicted by nal judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic;
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
(e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here or abroad;
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside abroad
and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code; and
(g) The insane or feeble-minded.
The petition led by private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo in the COMELEC, while entitled "For
Cancellation and Disqualication," contained no allegation that private respondent Imelda
Romualdez-Marcos made material representations in her certicate of candidacy which were false,
it sought her disqualication on the ground that "on the basis of her Voter Registration Record and
Certicate of Candidacy, [she] is disqualied from running for the position of Representative,
considering that on election day, May 8, 1995, [she] would have resided less than ten (10) months
in the district where she is seeking to be elected." For its part, the COMELEC's Second Division, in
its resolution of April 24, 1995, cancelled her certicate of candidacy and corrected certicate of
candidacy on the basis of its nding that petitioner is "not qualied to run for the position of
Member of the House of Representatives for the First Legislative District of Leyte" and not because
of any nding that she had made false representations as to material matters in her certicate of
candidacy.
Montejo's petition before the COMELEC was therefore not a petition for cancellation of certicate
of candidacy under 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, but essentially a petition to declare
private respondent ineligible. It is important to note this, because, as will presently be explained,
proceedings under 78 have for their purpose to disqualify a person from being a candidate,
whereas quo warranto proceedings have for their purpose to disqualify a person from holding
public ofce. Jurisdiction over quo warranto proceedings involving members of the House of
Representatives is vested in the Electoral Tribunal of that body.
Indeed, in the only cases in which this Court dealt with petitions for the cancellation of certicates
of candidacy, the allegations were that the respondent candidates had made false representations
in their certicates of candidacy with regard to their citizenship,
1
age,
2
or residence.
3
But in the
generality of cases in which this Court passed upon the qualications of respondents for ofce, this
Court did so in the context of election protests
4
or quo warranto proceedings
5
led after the
proclamation of the respondents or protestees as winners.
Three reasons may be cited to explain the absence of an authorized proceeding for determining
before election the qualications of a candidate.
First is the fact that unless a candidate wins and is proclaimed elected, there is no necessity for
determining his eligibility for the ofce. In contrast, whether an individual should be disqualied as
a candidate for acts constituting election offenses (e.g., vote buying, over spending, commission of
prohibited acts) is a prejudicial question which should be determined lest he wins because of the
very acts for which his disqualication is being sought. That is why it is provided that if the grounds
for disqualication are established, a candidate will not be voted for; if he has been voted for, the
votes in his favor will not be counted; and if for some reason he has been voted for and he has
won, either he will not be proclaimed or his proclamation will be set aside.
6

Second is the fact that the determination of a candidate's eligibility, e.g., his citizenship or, as in this
case, his domicile, may take a long time to make, extending beyond the beginning of the term of
the ofce. This is amply demonstrated in the companion case (G.R. No. 120265, Agapito A. Aquino
v. COMELEC) where the determination of Aquino's residence was still pending in the COMELEC
even after the elections of May 8, 1995. This is contrary to the summary character of proceedings
relating to certicates of candidacy. That is why the law makes the receipt of certicates of
candidacy a ministerial duty of the COMELEC and its ofcers.
7
The law is satised if candidates
state in their certicates of candidacy that they are eligible for the position which they seek to ll,
leaving the determination of their qualications to be made after the election and only in the event
they are elected. Only in cases involving charges of false representations made in certicates of
candidacy is the COMELEC given jurisdiction.
Third is the policy underlying the prohibition against pre-proclamation cases in elections for
President, Vice President, Senators and members of the House of Representatives. (R.A. No. 7166,
15) The purpose is to preserve the prerogatives of the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal and the other Tribunals as "sole judges" under the Constitution of the election, returns
and qualications of members of Congress or of the President and Vice President, as the case may
be.
By providing in 253 for the remedy of quo warranto for determining an elected ofcial's
qualications after the results of elections are proclaimed, while being conspicuously silent about a
pre-proclamation remedy based on the same ground, the Omnibus Election Code, or OEC, by its
silence underscores the policy of not authorizing any inquiry into the qualications of candidates
unless they have been elected.
Apparently realizing the lack of an authorized proceeding for declaring the ineligibility of
candidates, the COMELEC amended its rules on February 15, 1993 so as to provide in Rule 25, 1
the following:
Grounds for disqualication. Any candidate who does not possess all the qualications of a
candidate as provided for by the Constitution or by existing law or who commits any act declared
by law to be grounds for disqualication may be disqualied from continuing as a candidate.
The lack of provision for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, however, cannot be supplied by a
mere rule. Such an act is equivalent to the creation of a cause of action which is a substantive
matter which the COMELEC, in the exercise of its rulemaking power under Art. IX, A, 6 of the
Constitution, cannot do. It is noteworthy that the Constitution withholds from the COMELEC even
the power to decide cases involving the right to vote, which essentially involves an inquiry into
qualications based on age, residence and citizenship of voters. (Art. IX, C, 2(3))
The assimilation in Rule 25 of the COMELEC rules of grounds for ineligibility into grounds for
disqualication is contrary to the evident intention of the law. For not only in their grounds but also
in their consequences are proceedings for "disqualication" different from those for a declaration
of "ineligibility." "Disqualication" proceedings, as already stated, are based on grounds specied
in 12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code and in 40 of the Local Government Code and are
for the purpose of barring an individual from becoming a candidate or from continuing as a
candidate for public ofce. In a word, their purpose is to eliminate a candidate from the race either
from the start or during its progress. "Ineligibility," on the other hand, refers to the lack of the
qualications prescribed in the Constitution or the statutes for holding public ofce and the
purpose of the proceedings for declaration of ineligibility is to remove the incumbent from ofce.
Consequently, that an individual possesses the qualications for a public ofce does not imply that
he is not disqualied from becoming a candidate or continuing as a candidate for a public ofce
and vice versa. We have this sort of dichotomy in our Naturalization Law. (C.A. No. 473) That an
alien has the qualications prescribed in 2 of the law does not imply that he does not suffer from
any of disqualications provided in 4.
Indeed, provisions for disqualications on the ground that the candidate is guilty of prohibited
election practices or offenses, like other pre-proclamation remedies, are aimed at the detestable
practice of "grabbing the proclamation and prolonging the election protest,"
8
through the use of
"manufactured" election returns or resort to other trickery for the purpose of altering the results of
the election. This rationale does not apply to cases for determining a candidate's qualications for
ofce before the election. To the contrary, it is the candidate against whom a proceeding for
disqualication is brought who could be prejudiced because he could be prevented from
assuming ofce even though in end he prevails.
To summarize, the declaration of ineligibility of a candidate may only be sought in an election
protest or action for quo warranto led pursuant to 253 of the Omnibus Election Code within 10
days after his proclamation. With respect to elective local ofcials (e.g., Governor, Vice Governor,
members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, etc.) such petition must be led either with the
COMELEC, the Regional Trial Courts, or Municipal Trial Courts, as provided in Art. IX, C, 2(2) of
the Constitution. In the case of the President and Vice President, the petition must be led with the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal (Art. VII, 4, last paragraph), and in the case of the Senators, with the
Senate Electoral Tribunal, and in the case of Congressmen, with the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal. (Art. VI, 17) There is greater reason for not allowing before the election the
ling of disqualication proceedings based on alleged ineligibility in the case of candidates for
President, Vice President, Senators and members of the House of Representatives, because of the
same policy prohibiting the ling of pre-proclamation cases against such candidates.
For these reasons, I am of the opinion that the COMELEC had no jurisdiction over SPA No. 95-009;
that its proceedings in that case, including its questioned orders, are void; and that the eligibility of
petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos for the ofce of Representative of the First District of Leyte
may only be inquired into by the HRET.
Accordingly, I vote to grant the petition and to annul the proceedings of the Commission on
Elections in SPA No. 95-009, including its questioned orders doted April 24, 1995, May 7, 1995,
May 11, 1995 and May 25, 1995, declaring petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos ineligible and
ordering her proclamation as Representative of the First District of Leyte suspended. To the extent
that Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure authorizes proceedings for the disqualication of
candidates on the ground of ineligibility for the ofce, it should considered void.
The provincial board of canvassers should now proceed with the proclamation of petitioner.
Narvasa, C.J., concurs.
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
I regret that I cannot join the majority opinion as expressed in the well-written ponencia of Mr.
Justice Kapunan.
As in any controversy arising out of a Constitutional provision, the inquiry must begin and end with
the provision itself. The controversy should not be blurred by what, to me, are academic
disquisitions. In this particular controversy, the Constitutional provision on point states that "no
person shall be a member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, and on the day of the election, is at least twenty-ve (25) years of age, able to read and
write, and except the party list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be
elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the
day of the election." (Article VI, section 6)
It has been argued that for purposes of our election laws, the term residence has been understood
as synonymous with domicile. This argument has been validated by no less than the Court in
numerous cases
1
where signicantly the factual circumstances clearly and convincingly proved
that a person does not effectively lose his domicile of origin if the intention to reside therein is
manifest with his personal presence in the place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
With this basic thesis in mind, it would not be difcult to conceive of different modalities within
which the phrase "a resident thereof (meaning, the legislative district) for a period of not less than
one year" would t.
The rst instance is where a person's residence and domicile coincide in which case a person only
has to prove that he has been domiciled in a permanent location for not less than a year before the
election.
A second situation is where a person maintains a residence apart from his domicile in which case
he would have the luxury of district shopping, provided of course, he satises the one-year
residence period in the district as the minimum period for eligibility to the position of
congressional representative for the district.
In either case, one would not be constitutionally disqualied for abandoning his residence in order
to return to his domicile of origin, or better still, domicile of choice; neither would one be
disqualied for abandoning altogether his domicile in favor of his residence in the district where
he desires to be a candidate.
The most extreme circumstance would be a situation wherein a person maintains several
residences in different districts. Since his domicile of origin continues as an option as long as there
is no effective abandonment (animus non revertendi), he can practically choose the district most
advantageous for him.
All these theoretical scenarios, however, are tempered by the unambiguous limitation that "for a
period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election", he must be a
resident in the district where he desires to be elected.
To my mind, the one year residence period is crucial regardless of whether or not the term
"residence" is to be synonymous with "domicile." In other words, the candidate's intent and actual
presence in one district must in all situations satisfy the length of time prescribed by the
fundamental law. And this, because of a denite Constitutional purpose. He must be familiar with
the environment and problems of a district he intends to represent in Congress and the one-year
residence in said district would be the minimum period to acquire such familiarity, if not versatility.
In the case of petitioner Imelda R. Marcos, the operative facts are distinctly set out in the now
assailed decision of the Comelec 2nd Division dated 24 April 1995 (as afrmed by the Comelec en
banc)
now Divine Word University of Tacloban, where she earned her degree in Education. Thereafter,
she taught in the Leyte Chinese High School, still in Tacloban City. In 1952 she went to Manila to
work with her cousin, the late Speaker Daniel Z. Romualdez in his ofce in the House of
Representatives. In 1954, she married ex-president Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a
congressman of Ilocos Norte. She lived with him in Batac, Ilocos Norte and registered there as a
voter. When her husband was elected Senator of the Republic in 1959, she and her husband lived
together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965 when her husband was elected
President of the Republic of the Philippines, she lived with him in Malacanang Palace and
registered as a voter in San Miguel, Manila.
During the Marcos presidency, respondent served as a Member of the Batasang Pambansa,
Minister of Human Settlements and Governor of Metro Manila. She claimed that in February 1986,
she and her family were abducted and kidnapped to Honolulu, Hawaii. In November 1991, she
came home to Manila. In 1992 respondent ran for election as President of the Philippines and led
her Certicate of Candidacy wherein she indicated that she is a resident and registered voter of
San Juan, Metro Manila. On August 24, 1994, respondent led a letter with the election ofcer of
San Juan, Metro Manila, requesting for cancellation of her registration in the Permanent List of
Voters in Precinct No. 157 of San Juan, Metro Manila, in order that she may be re-registered or
transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. (Annex 2-B, Answer). On August 31, 1994, respondent led
her Sworn Application for Cancellation of Voter's Previous Registration (Annex 2-C, Answer) stating
that she is a duly registered voter in 157-A, Brgy. Maytunas, San Juan, Metro that she intends to
register at Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte.
On January 28, 1995 respondent registered as a voter at Precinct No. 18-A of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte.
She led with the Board of Election Inspectors CE Form No. 1, Voter Registration Record No.
94-3349772, wherein she alleged that she has resided in the municipality of Tolosa for a period of
6 months (Annex A, Petition).
On March 8, 1995, respondent led with the Ofce of the Provincial Election Supervisor, Leyte, a
Certicate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte wherein she
also alleged that she has been a resident in the constituency where she seeks to be elected for a
period of 7 months. The pertinent entries therein are as follows:
7. PROFESSION OR OCCUPATION: House-wife/ Teacher/ Social Worker
8. RESIDENCE (complete address): Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
Post Ofce Address for election purposes: Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
9. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHEREIN I SEEK TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY
PRECEDING ELECTION: ________ Years Seven Months
10. I AM NOT A PERMANENT RESIDENT OF, OR IMMIGRANT TO, A FOREIGN COUNTRY.
THAT I AM ELIGIBLE for said ofce; That I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic
of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; That I will obey the laws, legal
orders and decrees promulgated by the duly-constituted authorities; That the obligation imposed
by my oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and That the
facts stated herein are true to the best of my knowledge.
(Sgd.) Imelda Romualdez-Marcos
(Signature of Candidate)
2

Petitioner's aforestated certicate of candidacy led on 8 March 1995 contains the decisive
component or seed of her disqualication. It is contained in her answer under oath of "seven
months" to the query of "residence in the constituency wherein I seek to be elected immediately
preceding the election."
It follows from all the above that the Comelec committed no grave abuse of discretion in holding
that petitioner is disqualied from the position of representative for the 1st congressional district
of Leyte in the elections of
8 May 1995, for failure to meet the "not less than one-year residence in the constituency (1st
district, Leyte) immediately preceding the day of election
(8 May 1995)."
Having arrived at petitioner's disqualication to be a representative of the rst district of Leyte, the
next important issue to resolve is whether or not the Comelec can order the Board of Canvassers
to determine and proclaim the winner out of the remaining qualied candidates for representative
in said district.
I am not unaware of the pronouncement made by this Court in the case of Labo vs. Comelec, G.R.
86564, August 1, 1989, 176 SCRA 1 which gave the rationale as laid down in the early 1912 case of
Topacio vs. Paredes, 23 Phil. 238 that:
. . . . Sound policy dictates that public elective ofces are lled by those who have received the
highest number of votes cast in the election for that ofce, and it is a fundamental idea in all
republican forms of government that no one can be declared elected and no measure can be
declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the
election. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676)
meaningless.
Under Sec. 6 RA 6646, (An Act Introducing Additional Reforms in the Electoral System and for
other purposes) (84 O.G. 905, 22 February 1988) it is provided that:
. . . Any candidate who has been declared by nal judgment to be disqualied shall not be voted
for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by
nal judgment before an election to be disqualied and he is voted for and receives the winning
number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing
of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may,
during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate
whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
There is no need to indulge in legal hermeneutics to sense the plain and unambiguous meaning of
the provision quoted above. As the law now stands, the legislative policy does not limit its concern
with the effect of a nal judgement of disqualication only before the election, but even during or
after the election. The law is clear that in all situations, the votes cast for a disqualied candidate
SHALL NOT BE COUNTED. The law has also validated the jurisdiction of the Court or Commission
on Election to continue hearing the petition for disqualication in case a candidate is voted for and
receives the highest number of votes, if for any reason, he is not declared by nal judgment before
an election to be disqualied.
Since the present case is an after election scenario, the power to suspend proclamation (when
evidence of his guilt is strong) is also explicit under the law. What happens then when after the
elections are over, one is declared disqualied? Then, votes cast for him "shall not be counted"
and in legal contemplation, he no longer received the highest number of votes.
It stands to reason that Section 6 of RA 6646 does not make the second placer the winner simply
because a "winning candidate is disqualied," but that the law considers him as the candidate who
had obtained the highest number of votes as a result of the votes cast for the disqualied
candidate not being counted or considered.
As this law clearly reects the legislative policy on the matter, then there is no reason why this
Court should not re-examine and consequently abandon the doctrine in the Jun Labo case. It has
been stated that "the qualications prescribed for elective ofce cannot be erased by the
electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of
ineligibility" most especially when it is mandated by no less than the Constitution.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition and to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers of
Leyte to proclaim the candidate receiving the highest number of votes, from among the qualied
candidates, as the duly elected representative of the 1st district of Leyte.
Hermosisima, Jr. J., dissent.
REGALADO, J., dissenting:
While I agree with same of the factual bases of the majority opinion, I cannot arrive conjointly at
the same conclusion drawn therefrom Hence, this dissent which assuredly is not formulated "on
the basis of the personality of a petitioner in a case."
I go along with the majority in their narration of antecedent facts, insofar as the same are pertinent
to this case, and which I have simplied as follows:
1. Petitioner, although born in Manila, resided during her childhood in the present Tacloban City,
she being a legitimate daughter of parents who appear to have taken up permanent residence
therein. She also went to school there and, for a time, taught in one of the schools in that city.
2. When she married then Rep. Ferdinand E. Marcos who was then domiciled in Batac, Ilocos
Norte, by operation of law she acquired a new domicile in that place in 1954.
3. In the successive years and during the events that happened thereafter, her husband having
been elected as a Senator and then as President, she lived with him and their family in San Juan,
Rizal and then in Malacanang Palace in San Miguel, Manila.
4. Over those years, she registered as a voter and actually voted in Batac, Ilocos Norte, then in San
Juan, Rizal, and also in San Miguel, Manila, all these merely in the exercise of the right of suffrage.
5. It does not appear that her husband, even after he had assumed those lofty positions
successively, ever abandoned his domicile of origin in Batac, Ilocos Norte where he maintained his
residence and invariably voted in all elections.
6. After the ouster of her husband from the presidency in 1986 and the sojourn of the Marcos
family in Honolulu, Hawaii, U.S.A., she eventually returned to the Philippines in 1991 and resided in
different places which she claimed to have been merely temporary residences.
7. In 1992, petitioner ran for election as President of the Philippines and in her certicate of
candidacy she indicated that she was then a registered voter and resident of San Juan, Metro
Manila.
8. On August 24, 1994, she led a letter for the cancellation of her registration in the Permanent
List of Voters in Precinct No. 157 of San Juan, Metro Manila in order that she may "be re-registered
or transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte." On August 31, 1994, she followed this up with her
Sworn Application for Cancellation of Voter's Previous Registration wherein she stated that she was
a registered voter in Precinct No. 157-A, Brgy. Maytunas, San Juan, Metro Manila and that she
intended to register in Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte.
9. On January 28, 1995, petitioner registered as a voter at Precinct No. 18-A of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte,
for which purpose she led with the therein Board of Election Inspectors a voter's registration
record form alleging that she had resided in that municipality for six months.
10. On March 8, 1995, petitioner led her certicate of candidacy for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte wherein she alleged that she had been a resident for
"Seven Months" of the constituency where she sought to be elected.
11. On March 29, 1995, she led an "Amended/Corrected Certicate of Candidacy" wherein her
answer in the original certicate of candidacy to item "8. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY
WHERE I SEEK, TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION:" was changed or
replaced with a new entry reading "SINCE CHILDHOOD."
The sole issue for resolution is whether, for purposes of her candidacy, petitioner had complied
with the residency requirement of one year as mandated by no less than Section 6, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution.
I do not intend to impose upon the time of my colleagues with a dissertation on the difference
between residence and domicile. We have had enough of that and I understand that for purposes
of political law and, for that matter of international law, residence is understood to be synonymous
with domicile. That is so understood in our jurisprudence and in American Law, in contradistinction
to the concept of residence for purposes of civil, commercial and procedural laws whenever an
issue thereon is relevant or controlling.
Consequently, since in the present case the question of petitioner's residence is integrated in and
inseparable from her domicile, I am addressing the issue from the standpoint of the concept of the
latter term, specically its permutations into the domicile of origin, domicile of choice and domicile
by operation of law, as understood in American law from which for this case we have taken our
jurisprudential bearings.
My readings inform me that the domicile of the parents at the time of birth, or what is termed the
"domicile of origin," constitutes the domicile of an infant until abandoned, or until the acquisition
of a new domicile in a different place.
1
In the instant case, we may grant that petitioner's domicile
of origin,
2
at least as of 1938, was what is now Tacloban City.
Now, as I have observed earlier, domicile is said to be of three kinds, that is, domicile by birth,
domicile by choice, and domicile by operation of law. The rst is the common case of the place of
birth or domicilium originis, the second is that which is voluntarily acquired by a party or
domicilium propio motu; the last which is consequential, as that of a wife arising from marriage,
3
is
sometimes called domicilium necesarium. There is no debate that the domicile of origin can be
lost or replaced by a domicile of choice or a domicile by operation of law subsequently acquired
by the party.
When petitioner contracted marriage in 1954 with then Rep. Marcos, by operation of law, not only
international or American but of our own enactment,
4
she acquired her husband's domicile of
origin in Batac, Ilocos Norte and correspondingly lost her own domicile of origin in Tacloban City.
Her subsequent changes of residence to San Juan, Rizal, then to San Miguel, Manila, thereafter to
Honolulu, Hawaii, and back to now San Juan, Metro Manila do not appear to have resulted in her
thereby acquiring new domiciles of choice. In fact, it appears that her having resided in those
places was by reason of the fortunes or misfortunes of her husband and his peregrinations in the
assumption of new ofcial positions or the loss of them. Her residence in Honolulu and, of course,
those after her return to the Philippines were, as she claimed, against her will or only for transient
purposes which could not have invested them with the status of domiciles of choice.
5

After petitioner's return to the Philippines in 1991 and up to the present imbroglio over her
requisite residency in Tacloban City or Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, there is no showing that she ever
attempted to acquire any other domicile of choice which could have resulted in the abandonment
of her legal domicile in Batac, Ilocos Norte. On that score, we note the majority's own submission
6

that, to successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate (a) an actual removal or an
actual change of domicile, (b) a bona de intention of abandoning the former place of residence
and establishing a new one, and (c) acts which correspond with the purpose.
We consequently have to also note that these requirements for the acquisition of a domicile of
choice apply whether what is sought to be changed or substituted is a domicile of origin
(domicilium originis) or a domicile by operation of law (domicilium necesarium). Since petitioner
had lost her domicilium originis which had been replaced by her domicilium necesarium, it is
therefore her continuing domicile in Batac, Ilocos Norte which, if at all, can be the object of legal
change under the contingencies of the case at bar.
To get out of this quandary, the majority decision echoes the dissenting opinion of Commissioner
Regalado E. Maambong in SPA 95-009 of the Commission on Elections,
7
and advances this novel
proposition.
It may be said that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her
marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952 (sic, 1954). By operation of law
(domicilium necesarium), her legal domicile at the time of her marriage became Batac, Ilocos
Norte although there were no indications of an intention on her part to abandon her domicile of
origin. Because of her husband's subsequent death and through the operation of the provisions of
the New Family Code already in force at the time, however, her legal domicile automatically
reverted to her domicile of origin. . . . (Emphasis supplied).
Firstly, I am puzzled why although it is conceded that petitioner had acquired a domicilium
necesarium in Batac, Ilocos Norte, the majority insists on making a qualication that she did not
intend to abandon her domicile of origin. I nd this bewildering since, in this situation, it is the law
that declares where petitioner's domicile is at any given time, and not her self-serving or putative
intent to hold on to her former domicile. Otherwise, contrary to their own admission that one
cannot have more than one domicile at a time,
8
the majority would be suggesting that petitioner
retained Tacloban City as (for lack of a term in law since it does not exist therein) the equivalent of
what is fancied as a reserved, dormant, potential, or residual domicile.
Secondly, domicile once lost in accordance with law can only be recovered likewise in accordance
with law. However, we are here being titillated with the possibility of an automatic reversion to or
reacquisition of a domicile of origin after the termination of the cause for its loss by operation of
law. The majority agrees that since petitioner lost her domicile of origin by her marriage, the
termination of the marriage also terminates that effect thereof. I am impressed by the
ingeniousness of this theory which proves that, indeed, necessity is the mother of inventions.
Regretfully, I nd some difculty in accepting either the logic or the validity of this argument.
If a party loses his domicile of origin by obtaining a new domicile of choice, he thereby voluntarily
abandons the former in favor of the latter. If, thereafter, he abandons that chosen domicile, he does
not per se recover his original domicile unless, by subsequent acts legally indicative thereof, he
evinces his intent and desire to establish the same as his new domicile, which is precisely what
petitioner belatedly and, evidently just for purposes of her candidacy, unsuccessfully tried to do.
One's subsequent abandonment of his domicile of choice cannot automatically restore his
domicile of origin, not only because there is no legal authority therefor but because it would be
absurd Pursued to its logical consequence, that theory of ipso jure reversion would rule out the
fact that said party could already very well have obtained another domicile, either of choice or by
operation of law, other than his domicile of origin. Signicantly and obviously for this reason, the
Family Code, which the majority inexplicably invokes, advisedly does not regulate this contingency
since it would impinge on one's freedom of choice.
Now, in the instant case, petitioner not only voluntarily abandoned her domicile of choice (unless
we assume that she entered into the marital state against her will) but, on top of that, such
abandonment was further afrmed through her acquisition of a new domicile by operation of law.
In fact, this is even a case of both voluntary and legal abandonment of a domicile of origin. With
much more reason, therefore, should we reject the proposition that with the termination of her
marriage in 1989, petitioner had supposedly per se and ipso facto reacquired her domicile of
origin which she lost in 1954. Otherwise, this would be tantamount to saying that during the
period of marital coverture, she was simultaneously in possession and enjoyment of a domicile of
origin which was only in a state of suspended animation.
Thus, the American rule is likewise to the effect that while after the husband's death the wife has
the right to elect her own domicile,
9
she nevertheless retains the last domicile of her deceased
husband until she makes an actual change.
10
In the absence of afrmative evidence, to the
contrary, the presumption is that a wife's domicile or legal residence follows that of her husband
and will continue after his death.
11

I cannot appreciate the premises advanced in support of the majority's theory based on Articles 68
and 69 of the Family Code. All that is of any relevance therein is that under this new code, the right
and power to x the family domicile is now shared by the spouses. I cannot perceive how that joint
right, which in the rst place was never exercised by the spouses, could affect the domicile xed by
the law for petitioner in 1954 and, for her husband, long prior thereto. It is true that a wife now has
the coordinate power to determine the conjugal or family domicile, but that has no bearing on this
case. With the death of her husband, and each of her children having gotten married and
established their own respective domiciles, the exercise of that joint power was and is no longer
called for or material in the present factual setting of this controversy. Instead, what is of concern in
petitioner's case was the matter of her having acquired or not her own domicile of choice.
I agree with the majority's discourse on the virtues of the growing and expanded participation of
women in the affairs of the nation, with equal rights and recognition by Constitution and statutory
conferment. However, I have searched in vain for a specic law or judicial pronouncement which
either expressly or by necessary implication supports the majority's desired theory of automatic
reacquisition of or reversion to the domicilium originis of petitioner. Denitely, as between the
settled and desirable legal norms that should govern this issue, there is a world of difference; and,
unquestionably, this should be resolved by legislative articulation but not by the eloquence of the
well-turned phrase.
In sum, petitioner having lost Tacloban City as her domicile of origin since 1954 and not having
automatically reacquired any domicile therein, she cannot legally claim that her residency in the
political constituency of which it is a part continued since her birth up to the present. Respondent
commission was, therefore, correct in rejecting her pretension to that effect in her amended/
corrected certicate of candidacy, and in holding her to her admission in the original certicate
that she had actually resided in that constituency for only seven months prior to the election. These
considerations render it unnecessary to further pass upon the procedural issues raised by
petitioner.
ON THE FOREGOING PREMISES, I vote to DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.
DAVIDE, JR., J., dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the opinion of the majority written by Mr. Justice Santiago M. Kapunan,
more particularly on the issue of the petitioner's qualication.
Under Section 7, Subdivision A, Article IX of the Constitution, decisions, orders, or rulings of the
COMELEC may be brought to this Court only by the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court (Aratuc vs. COMELEC, 88 SCRA 251 [1979]; Dario vs. Mison, 176 SCRA 84
[1989]).
Accordingly, a writ of certiorari may be granted only if the COMELEC has acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion (Section 1, Rule 65, Rules of Court). Since
the COMELEC has, undoubtedly, jurisdiction over the private respondent's petition, the only issue
left is whether it acted with grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying the petitioner.
My careful and meticulous perusal of the challenged resolution of 24 April 1995 of the COMELEC
Second Division and the En Banc resolution of 7 May 1995 discloses total absence of abuse of
discretion, much less grave abuse thereof. The resolution of the Second Division dispassionately
and objectively discussed in minute details the facts which established beyond cavil that herein
petitioner was disqualied as a candidate on the ground of lack of residence in the First
Congressional District of Leyte. It has not misapplied, miscomprehended, or misunderstood facts
or circumstances of substance pertinent to the issue of her residence.
The majority opinion, however, overturned the COMELEC's ndings of fact for lack of proof that
the petitioner has abandoned Tolosa as her domicile of origin, which is allegedly within the First
Congressional District of Leyte.
I respectfully submit that the petitioner herself has provided the COMELEC, either by admission or
by documentary evidence, overwhelming proof of the loss or abandonment of her domicile of
origin, which is Tacloban City and not Tolosa, Leyte. Assuming that she decided to live again in her
domicile of origin, that became her second domicile of choice, where her stay, unfortunately, was
for only seven months before the day of the election. She was then disqualied to be a candidate
for the position of Representative of the First Congressional District of Leyte. A holding to the
contrary would be arbitrary.
It may indeed be conceded that the petitioner's domicile of choice was either Tacloban City or
Tolosa, Leyte. Nevertheless, she lost it by operation of law sometime in May 1954 upon her
marriage to the then Congressman (later, President) Ferdinand E. Marcos. A domicile by operation
of law is that domicile which the law attributes to a person, independently of his own intention or
actual residence, as results from legal domestic relations as that of the wife arising from marriage
(28 C.J.S. Domicile 7, 11). Under the governing law then, Article 110 of the Civil Code, her new
domicile or her domicile of choice was the domicile of her husband, which was Batac, Ilocos Norte.
Said Article reads as follows:
Commenting thereon, civilist Arturo M. Tolentino states:
Although the duty of the spouses to live together is mutual, the husband has a predominant right
because he is empowered by law to x the family residence. This right even predominates over
some rights recognized by law in the wife. For instance, under article 117 the wife may engage in
business or practice a profession or occupation. But because of the power of the husband to x
the family domicile he may x it at such a place as would make it impossible for the wife to
continue in business or in her profession. For justiable reasons, however, the wife may be
exempted from living in the residence chosen by the husband. The husband cannot validly allege
desertion by the wife who refuses to follow him to a new place of residence, when it appears that
they have lived for years in a suitable home belonging to the wife, and that his choice of a different
home is not made in good faith. (Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the
Philippines, vol. 1, 1985 ed., 339).
Under common law, a woman upon her marriage loses her own domicile and, by operation of law,
acquires that of her husband, no matter where the wife actually lives or what she believes or
intends. Her domicile is xed in the sense that it is declared to be the same as his, and subject to
certain limitations, he can change her domicile by changing his own (25 Am Jur 2d Domicile 48,
37).
It must, however, be pointed out that under Article 69 of the Family Code, the xing of the family
domicile is no longer the sole prerogative of the husband, but is now a joint decision of the
spouses, and in case of disagreement the court shall decide. The said article uses the term "family
domicile," and not family residence, as "the spouses may have multiple residences, and the wife
may elect to remain in one of such residences, which may destroy the duty of the spouses to live
together and its corresponding benets" (ALICIA V. SEMPIO-DIY, Handbook on the Family Code of
the Philippines, [1988], 102).
The theory of automatic restoration of a woman's domicile of origin upon the death of her
husband, which the majority opinion adopts to overcome the legal effect of the petitioner's
marriage on her domicile, is unsupported by law and by jurisprudence. The settled doctrine is that
after the husband's death the wife has a right to elect her own domicile, but she retains the last
domicile of her husband until she makes an actual change (28 C.J.S. Domicile 12, 27). Or, on the
death of the husband, the power of the wife to acquire her own domicile is revived, but until she
exercises the power her domicile remains that of the husband at the time of his death (25 Am Jur
2d Domicile 62, 45). Note that what is revived is not her domicile of origin but her power to
acquire her own domicile.
Clearly, even after the death of her husband, the petitioner's domicile was that of her husband at
the time of his death which was Batac, Ilocos Norte, since their residences in San Juan, Metro
Manila, and San Miguel, Manila, were their residences for convenience to enable her husband to
effectively perform his ofcial duties. Their residence in San Juan was a conjugal home, and it was
there to which she returned in 1991 when she was already a widow. In her sworn certicate of
candidacy for the Ofce of the President in the synchronized elections of May 1992, she indicated
therein that she was a resident of San Juan, Metro Manila. She also voted in the said elections in
that place.
On the basis of her evidence, it was only on 24 August 1994 when she exercised her right as a
widow to acquire her own domicile in Tolosa, Leyte, through her sworn statement requesting the
Election Ofcer of San Juan, Metro Manila, to cancel her registration in the permanent list of voters
in Precinct 157 thereat and praying that she be "re-registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa,
Leyte, the place of [her] birth and permanent residence" (photocopy of Exhibit "B," attached as
Annex "2" of private respondent Montejo's Comment). Notably, she contradicted this sworn
statement regarding her place of birth when, in her Voter's Afdavit sworn to on 15 March 1992
(photocopy of Exhibit "C," attached as Annex "3," Id.), her Voter Registration Record sworn to on
28 January 1995 (photocopy of Exhibit "E," attached as Annex "5," Id.), and her Certicate of
Candidacy sworn to on 8 March 1995 (photocopy of Exhibit "A," attached as Annex "1," Id.), she
solemnly declared that she was born in Manila.
The petitioner is even uncertain as to her domicile of origin. Is it Tacloban City or Tolosa, Leyte? In
the afdavit attached to her Answer to the petition for disqualication (Annex "I" of Petition), she
declared under oath that her "domicile or residence is Tacloban City." If she did intend to return to
such domicile or residence of origin why did she inform the Election Ofcer of San Juan that she
would transfer to Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, and indicate in her Voter's Registration Record and in her
certicate of candidacy that her residence is Olot, Tolosa, Leyte? While this uncertainty is not
important insofar as residence in the congressional district is concerned, it nevertheless proves
that forty-one years had already lapsed since she had lost or abandoned her domicile of origin by
virtue of marriage and that such length of time diminished her power of recollection or blurred her
memory.
I nd to be misplaced the reliance by the majority opinion on Faypon vs. Quirino (96 Phil. 294
[1954]), and the subsequent cases which established the principle that absence from original
residence or domicile of origin to pursue studies, practice one's profession, or engage in business
in other states does not constitute loss of such residence or domicile. So is the reliance on Section
117 of the Omnibus Election Code which provides that transfer of residence to any other place by
reason of one's "occupation; profession; employment in private and public service; educational
activities; work in military or naval reservations; service in the army, navy or air force, the
constabulary or national police force; or connement or detention in government institutions in
accordance with law" is not deemed as loss of original residence. Those cases and legal provision
do not include marriage of a woman. The reason for the exclusion is, of course, Article 110 of the
Civil Code. If it were the intention of this Court or of the legislature to consider the marriage of a
woman as a circumstance which would not operate as an abandonment of domicile (of origin or of
choice), then such cases and legal provision should have expressly mentioned the same.
This Court should not accept as gospel truth the self-serving claim of the petitioner in her afdavit
(Annex "A" of her Answer in COMELEC SPA No. 95-009; Annex "I" of Petition) that her "domicile or
residence of origin is Tacloban City," and that she "never intended to abandon this domicile or
residence of origin to which [she] always intended to return whenever absent." Such a claim of
intention cannot prevail over the effect of Article 110 of the Civil Code. Besides, the facts and
circumstances or the vicissitudes of the petitioner's life after her marriage in 1954 conclusively
establish that she had indeed abandoned her domicile of origin and had acquired a new one
animo et facto (KOSSUTH KENT KENNAN, A Treatise on Residence and Domicile, [1934], 214, 326).
Neither should this Court place complete trust on the petitioner's claim that she "merely
committed an honest mistake" in writing down the word "seven" in the space provided for the
residency qualication requirement in the certicate of candidacy. Such a claim is self-serving and,
in the light of the foregoing disquisitions, would be all sound and fury signifying nothing. To me,
she did not commit any mistake, honest or otherwise; what she stated was the truth.
The majority opinion also disregards a basic rule in evidence that he who asserts a fact or the
afrmative of an issue has the burden of proving it (Imperial Victory Shipping Agency vs. NLRC,
200 SCRA 178 [1991]; P.T. Cerna Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 221 SCRA 19 [1993]). Having admitted
marriage to the then Congressman Marcos, the petitioner could not deny the legal consequence
thereof on the change of her domicile to that of her husband. The majority opinion rules or at least
concludes that "[b]y operation of law (domicilium necesarium), her legal domicile at the time of her
marriage automatically became Batac, Ilocos Norte." That conclusion is consistent with Article 110
of the Civil Code. Since she is presumed to retain her deceased husband's domicile until she
exercises her revived power to acquire her own domicile, the burden is upon her to prove that she
has exercised her right to acquire her own domicile. She miserably failed to discharge that burden.
I vote to deny the petition.
Separate Opinions
It was Aristotle who taught mankind that things that are alike should be treated alike, while things
that are unalike should be treated unalike in proportion to their unalikeness.
1
Like other
candidates, petitioner has clearly met the residence requirement provided by Section 6, Article VI
of the Constitution.
2
We cannot disqualify her and treat her unalike, for the Constitution
guarantees equal protection of the law. I proceed from the following factual and legal
propositions:
First. There is no question that petitioner's original domicile is in Tacloban, Leyte. Her parents were
domiciled in Tacloban. Their ancestral house is in Tacloban. They have vast real estate in the place.
Petitioner went to school and thereafter worked there. I consider Tacloban as her initial domicile,
both her domicile of origin and her domicile of choice. Her domicile of origin as it was the
domicile of her parents when she was a minor; and her domicile of choice, as she continued living
there even after reaching the age of majority.
Second. There is also no question that in May, 1954, petitioner married the late President
Ferdinand E. Marcos. By contracting marriage, her domicile became subject to change by law, and
the right to change it was given by Article 110 of the Civil Code provides:
3
(Emphasis
supplied)
In De la Via v. Villareal and Geopano,
4
this Court explained why the domicile of the wife ought to
follow that of the husband. We held: "The reason is founded upon the theoretic identity of person
and interest between the husband and the wife, and the presumption that, from the nature of the
relation, the home of one is the home of the other. It is intended to promote, strengthen, and
secure their interests in this relation, as it ordinarily exists, where union and harmony prevail."
5
In
accord with this objective, Article 109 of the Civil Code also obligated the husband and wife "to
live together."
Third. The difcult issues start as we determine whether petitioner's marriage to former President
Marcos ipso facto resulted in the loss of her Tacloban domicile. I respectfully submit that her
marriage by itself alone did not cause her to lose her Tacloban domicile. Article 110 of the Civil
Code merely gave the husband the right to x the domicile of the family. In the exercise of the
right, the husband may explicitly choose the prior domicile of his wife, in which case, the wife's
domicile remains unchanged. The husband can also implicitly acquiesce to his wife's prior
domicile even if it is different. So we held in de la Via,
6

. . . . When married women as well as children subject to parental authority live, with the
acquiescence of their husbands or fathers, in a place distinct from where the latter live, they have
their own independent domicile. . . .
It is not, therefore, the mere fact of marriage but the deliberate choice of a different domicile by
the husband that will change the domicile of a wife from what it was prior to their marriage. The
domiciliary decision made by the husband in the exercise of the right conferred by Article 110 of
the Civil Code binds the wife. Any and all acts of a wife during her coverture contrary to the
domiciliary choice of the husband cannot change in any way the domicile legally xed by the
husband. These acts are void not only because the wife lacks the capacity to choose her domicile
but also because they are contrary to law and public policy.
In the case at bench, it is not disputed that former President Marcos exercised his right to x the
family domicile and established it in Batac, Ilocos Norte, where he was then the congressman. At
that particular point of time and throughout their married life, petitioner lost her domicile in
Tacloban, Leyte. Since petitioner's Batac domicile has been xed by operation of law, it was not
affected in 1959 when her husband was elected as Senator, when they lived in San Juan, Rizal and
where she registered as a voter. It was not also affected in 1965 when her husband was elected
President, when they lived in Malacaang Palace, and when she registered as a voter in San
Miguel, Manila. Nor was it affected when she served as a member of the Batasang Pambansa,
Minister of Human Settlements and Governor of Metro Manila during the incumbency of her
husband as President of the nation. Under Article 110 of the Civil Code, it was only her husband
who could change the family domicile in Batac and the evidence shows he did not effect any such
change. To a large degree, this follows the common law that "a woman on her marriage loses her
own domicile and by operation of law, acquires that of her husband, no matter where the wife
actually lives or what she believes or intends."
7

Fourth. The more difcult task is how to interpret the effect of the death on September 28, 1989 of
former President Marcos on petitioner's Batac domicile. The issue is of rst impression in our
jurisdiction and two (2) schools of thought contend for acceptance. One is espoused by our
distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Davide, Jr., heavily relying on American authorities.
8
He
echoes the theory that after the husband's death, the wife retains the last domicile of her husband
until she makes an actual change.
I do not subscribe to this submission. The American case law that the wife still retains her dead
husband's domicile is based on ancient common law which we can no longer apply in the
Philippine setting today. The common law identied the domicile of a wife as that of the husband
and denied to her the power of acquiring a domicile of her own separate and apart from him.
9

Legal scholars agree that two (2) reasons support this common law doctrine. The rst reason as
pinpointed by the legendary Blackstone is derived from the view that "the very being or legal
existence of the woman is suspended during
the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband."
10
The second
reason lies in "the desirability of having the interests of each member of the family unit governed
by the same law."
11
The presumption that the wife retains the domicile of her deceased husband is
an extension of this common law concept. The concept and its extension have provided some of
the most iniquitous jurisprudence against women. It was under common law that the 1873
American case of Bradwell v. Illinois
12
was decided where women were denied the right to
practice law. It was unblushingly ruled that "the natural and proper timidity and delicacy which
belongs to the female sex evidently unts it for many of the occupations of civil life . . . This is the
law of the Creator." Indeed, the rulings relied upon by Mr. Justice Davide in CJS
13
and AM JUR 2d

14
are American state court decisions handed down between the years 1917
15
and 1938,
16
or
before the time when women were accorded equality of rights with men. Undeniably, the women's
liberation movement resulted in far-ranging state legislations in the United States to eliminate
gender inequality.
17
Starting in the decade of the seventies, the courts likewise liberalized their
rulings as they started invalidating laws infected with gender-bias. It was in 1971 when the US
Supreme Court in Reed v. Reed,
18
struck a big blow for women equality when it declared as
unconstitutional an Idaho law that required probate courts to choose male family members over
females as estate administrators. It held that mere administrative inconvenience cannot justify a
sex-based distinction. These signicant changes both in law and in case law on the status of women
virtually obliterated the iniquitous common law surrendering the rights of married women to their
husbands based on the dubious theory of the parties' theoretic oneness. The Corpus Juris
Secundum editors did not miss the relevance of this revolution on women's right as they observed:
"However, it has been declared that under modern statutes changing the status of married women
and departing from the common law theory of marriage, there is no reason why a wife may not
acquire a separate domicile for every purpose known to the law."
19
In publishing in 1969 the
Restatement of the Law, Second (Conict of Laws 2d), the reputable American Law Institute also
categorically stated that the view of Blackstone ". . . is no longer held. As the result of statutes and
court decisions, a wife now possesses practically the same rights and powers as her unmarried
sister."
20

In the case at bench, we have to decide whether we should continue clinging to the anachronistic
common law that demeans women, especially married women. I submit that the Court has no
choice except to break away from this common law rule, the root of the many degradations of
Filipino women. Before 1988, our laws particularly the Civil Code, were full of gender
discriminations against women. Our esteemed colleague, Madam Justice Flerida Ruth Romero,
cited a few of them as follows:
21

xxx xxx xxx
Legal Disabilities Suffered by Wives
Not generally known is the fact that under the Civil Code, wives suffer under certain restrictions or
disabilities. For instance, the wife cannot accept gifts from others, regardless of the sex of the giver
or the value of the gift, other than from her very close relatives, without her husband's consent. She
may accept only from, say, her parents, parents-in-law, brothers, sisters and the relatives within the
so-called fourth civil degree. She may not exercise her profession or occupation or engage in
business if her husband objects on serious grounds or if his income is sufcient to support their
family in accordance with their social standing. As to what constitutes "serious grounds" for
objecting, this is within the discretion of the husband.
xxx xxx xxx
Because of the present inequitable situation, the amendments to the Civil Law being proposed by
the University of the Philippines Law Center would allow absolute divorce which severes the
matrimonial ties, such that the divorced spouses are free to get married a year after the divorce is
decreed by the courts. However, in order to place the husband and wife on an equal footing
insofar as the bases for divorce are concerned, the following are specied as the grounds for
absolute divorce: (1) adultery or having a paramour committed by the respondent in any of the
ways specied in the Revised Penal Code or (2) an attempt by the respondent against the life of
the petitioner which amounts to attempted parricide under the Revised Penal Code; (3)
abandonment of the petitioner by the respondent without just cause for a period of three
consecutive years; or (4) habitual maltreatment.
With respect to property relations, the husband is automatically the administrator of the conjugal
property owned in common by the married couple even if the wife may be the more astute or
enterprising partner. The law does not leave it to the spouses to decide who shall act as such
administrator. Consequently, the husband is authorized to engage in acts and enter into
transactions benecial to the conjugal partnership. The wife, however, cannot similarly bind the
partnership without the husband's consent.
And while both exercise joint parental authority over their children, it is the father whom the law
designates as the legal administrator of the property pertaining to the unemancipated child.
Taking the lead in Asia, our government exerted efforts, principally through legislations, to
eliminate inequality between men and women in our land. The watershed came on August 3, 1988
when our Family Code took effect which, among others, terminated the unequal treatment of
husband and wife as to their rights and responsibilities.
22

The Family Code attained this elusive objective by giving new rights to married women and by
abolishing sex-based privileges of husbands. Among others, married women are now given the
joint right to administer the family property, whether in the absolute community system or in the
system of conjugal partnership;
23
joint parental authority over their minor children, both over their
persons as well as their properties;
24
joint responsibility for the support of the family;
25
the right to
jointly manage the household;
26
and, the right to object to their husband's exercise of profession,
occupation, business or activity.
27
Of particular relevance to the case at bench is Article 69 of the
Family Code which took away the exclusive right of the husband to x the family domicile and gave
it jointly to the husband and the wife, thus:
Art. 69. The husband and wife shall x the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the court shall
decide.
The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter should live abroad or
there are other valid and compelling reasons for the exemption. However, such exemption shall
not apply if the same is not compatible with the solidarity of the family. (Emphasis supplied)
Article 69 repealed Article 110 of the Civil Code. Commenting on the duty of the husband and wife
to live together, former Madam Justice Alice Sempio-Diy of the Court of Appeals specied the
instances when a wife may now refuse to live with her husband, thus:
28

(2) The wife has the duty to live with her husband, but she may refuse to do so in certain cases like:
(a) If the place chosen by the husband as family residence is dangerous to her Life;
(b) If the husband subjects her to maltreatment or abusive conduct or insults, making common life
impossible;
(c) If the husband compels her to live with his parents, but she cannot get along with her mother-
in-law and they have constant quarrels (Del Rosario v. Del Rosario, CA, 46 OG 6122);
(d) Where the husband has continuously carried illicit relations for 10 years with different women
and treated his wife roughly and without consideration. (Dadivas v. Villanueva, 54 Phil. 92);
(e) Where the husband spent his time in gambling, giving no money to his family for food and
necessities, and at the same time insulting his wife and laying hands on her. (Panuncio v. Sula, CA,
34 OG 129);
(f) If the husband has no xed residence and lives a vagabond life as a tramp (1 Manresa 329);
(g) If the husband is carrying on a shameful business at home (Gahn v. Darby, 38 La. Ann. 70).
The inescapable conclusion is that our Family Code has completely emancipated the wife from the
control of the husband, thus abandoning the parties' theoretic identity of interest. No less than the
late revered Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes who chaired the Civil Code Revision Committee of the UP Law
Center gave this insightful view in one of his rare lectures after retirement:
29

xxx xxx xxx
The Family Code is primarily intended to reform the family law so as to emancipate the wife from
the exclusive control of the husband and to place her at parity with him insofar as the family is
concerned. The wife and the husband are now placed on equal standing by the Code. They are
now joint administrators of the family properties and exercise joint authority over the persons and
properties of their children. This means a dual authority in the family. The husband will no longer
prevail over the wife but she has to agree on all matters concerning the family. (Emphasis supplied)
In light of the Family Code which abrogated the inequality between husband and wife as started
and perpetuated by the common law, there is no reason in espousing the anomalous rule that the
wife still retains the domicile of her dead husband. Article 110 of the Civil Code which provides the
statutory support for this stance has been repealed by Article 69 of the Family Code. By its repeal,
it becomes a dead-letter law, and we are not free to resurrect it by giving it further effect in any way
or manner such as by ruling that the petitioner is still bound by the domiciliary determination of
her dead husband.
Aside from reckoning with the Family Code, we have to consider our Constitution and its rm
guarantees of due process and equal protection of
law.
30
It can hardly be doubted that the common law imposition on a married woman of her dead
husband's domicile even beyond his grave is patently discriminatory to women. It is a gender-
based discrimination and is not rationally related to the objective of promoting family solidarity. It
cannot survive a constitutional challenge. Indeed, compared with our previous fundamental laws,
the 1987 Constitution is more concerned with equality between sexes as it explicitly commands that
the State ". . . shall ensure fundamental equality before the law of women and men." To be exact,
section 14, Article II provides: "The State recognizes the role of women in nation building, and shall
ensure fundamental equality before the law of women and men. We shall be transgressing the
sense and essence of this constitutional mandate if we insist on giving our women the caveman's
treatment.
Prescinding from these premises, I respectfully submit that the better stance is to rule that
petitioner reacquired her Tacloban domicile upon the death of her husband in 1989. This is the
necessary consequence of the view that petitioner's Batac dictated domicile did not continue after
her husband's death; otherwise, she would have no domicile and that will violate the universal rule
that no person can be without a domicile at any point of time. This stance also restores the right of
petitioner to choose her domicile before it was taken away by Article 110 of the Civil Code, a right
now recognized by the Family Code and protected by the Constitution. Likewise, I cannot see the
fairness of the common law requiring petitioner to choose again her Tacloban domicile before she
could be released from her Batac domicile. She lost her Tacloban domicile not through her act but
through the act of her deceased husband when he xed their domicile in Batac. Her husband is
dead and he cannot rule her beyond the grave. The law disabling her to choose her own domicile
has been repealed. Considering all these, common law should not put the burden on petitioner to
prove she has abandoned her dead husband's domicile. There is neither rhyme nor reason for this
gender-based burden.
But even assuming arguendo that there is need for convincing proof that petitioner chose to
reacquire her Tacloban domicile, still, the records reveal ample evidence to this effect. In her
afdavit submitted to the respondent COMELEC, petitioner averred:
xxx xxx xxx
36. In November, 1991, I came home to our beloved country, after several requests for my return
were denied by President Corazon C. Aquino, and after I led suits for our Government to issue me
my passport.
37. But I came home without the mortal remains of my beloved husband, President Ferdinand E.
Marcos, which the Government considered a threat to the national security and welfare.
38. Upon my return to the country, I wanted to immediately live and reside in Tacloban City or in
Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, even if my residences there were not livable as they had been destroyed and
cannibalized. The PCGG, however, did not permit and allow me.
39. As a consequence, I had to live at various times in the Westin Philippine Plaza in Pasay City, a
friend's apartment on Ayala Avenue, a house in South Forbes Park which my daughter rented, and
Pacic Plaza, all in Makati.
40. After the 1992 Presidential Elections, I lived and resided in the residence of my brother in San
Jose, Tacloban City, and pursued my negotiations with PCGG to recover my sequestered
residences in Tacloban City and Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte.
40.1 In preparation for my observance of All Saints' Day and All Souls' Day that year, I renovated
my parents' burial grounds and entombed their bones which had been excalvated, unearthed and
scattered.
41. On November 29, 1993, I formally wrote PCGG Chairman Magtanggol Gunigundo for
permissions to
. . . rehabilitate . . . (o)ur ancestral house in Tacloban and farmhouse in Olot, Leyte . . . to make them
livable for us the Marcos family to have a home in our own motherland.
xxx xxx xxx
42. It was only on 06 June 1994, however, when PCGG Chairman Gunigundo, in his letter to Col.
Simeon Kempis, Jr., PCGG Region 8 Representative, allowed me to repair and renovate my Leyte
residences. I quote part of his letter:
Dear Col. Kempis,
Upon representation by Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos to this Commission, that she intends to visit our
sequestered properties in Leyte, please allow her access thereto. She may also cause repairs and
renovation of the sequestered properties, in which event, it shall be understood that her
undertaking said repairs is not authorization for her to take over said properties, and that all
expenses shall be for her account and not reimbursable. Please extend the necessary courtesy to
her.
xxx xxx xxx
43. I was not permitted, however, to live and stay in the Sto. Nio Shrine residence in Tacloban City
where I wanted to stay and reside, after repairs and renovations were completed. In August 1994, I
transferred from San Jose, Tacloban City, to my residence in Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, when
PCGG permitted me to stay and live there.
It is then clear that in 1992 petitioner reestablished her domicile in the First District of Leyte. It is not
disputed that in 1992, she rst lived at the house of her brother in San Jose, Tacloban City and
later, in August 1994, she transferred her residence in Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. Both Tacloban
City and the municipality of Olot are within the First District of Leyte. Since petitioner reestablished
her old domicile in 1992 in the First District of Leyte, she more than complied with the
constitutional requirement of residence
". . . for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election," i.e., the
May 8, 1995 elections.
The evidence presented by the private respondent to negate the Tacloban domicile of petitioner is
nil. He presented petitioner's Voter's Registration Record led with the Board of Election
Inspectors of Precinct 10-A of Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte wherein she stated that her period of
residence in said barangay was six (6) months as of the date of her ling of said Voter's
Registration Record on January 28, 1995.
31
This statement in petitioner's Voter's Registration
Record is a non-prejudicial admission. The Constitution requires at least one (1) year residence in
the district in which the candidate shall be elected. In the case at bench, the reference is the First
District of Leyte. Petitioner's statement proved that she resided in Olot six (6) months before
January 28, 1995 but did not disprove that she has also resided in Tacloban City starting 1992. As
aforestated, Olot and Tacloban City are both within the First District of Leyte, hence, her six (6)
months residence in Olot should be counted not against, but in her favor. Private respondent also
presented petitioner's Certicate of Candidacy led on March 8, 1995
32
where she placed seven
(7) months after Item No. 8 which called for information regarding "residence in the constituency
where I seek to be elected immediately preceding the election." Again, this original certicate of
candidacy has no evidentiary value because an March 1, 1995 it was corrected by petitioner. In her
Amended/Corrected Certicate of Candidacy,
33
petitioner wrote "since childhood" after Item No.
8. The amendment of a certicate of candidacy to correct a bona de mistake has been allowed by
this Court as a matter of course and as a matter of right. As we held in Alialy v. COMELEC,
34
viz.:
xxx xxx xxx
The absence of the signature of the Secretary of the local chapter N.P in the original certicate of
candidacy presented before the deadline September 11, 1959, did not render the certicate
invalid. The amendment of the certicate, although at a date after the deadline, but before the
election, was substantial compliance with the law, and the defect was cured.
It goes without saying that petitioner's erroneous Certicate of Candidacy led on March 8, 1995
cannot be used as evidence against her. Private respondent's petition for the disqualication of
petitioner rested alone on these two (2) brittle pieces of documentary evidence petitioner's
Voter's Registration Record and her original Certicate of Candidacy. Ranged against the evidence
of the petitioner showing her ceaseless contacts with Tacloban, private respondent's two (2) pieces
of evidence are too insufcient to disqualify petitioner, more so, to deny her the right to represent
the people of the First District of Leyte who have overwhelmingly voted for her.
Fifth. Section 10, Article IX-C of the Constitution mandates that "bona de candidates for any
public ofce shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination."
35
A detached reading
of the records of the case at bench will show that all forms of legal and extra-legal obstacles have
been thrown against petitioner to prevent her from running as the people's representative in the
First District of Leyte. In petitioner's Answer to the petition to disqualify her, she averred:
36

xxx xxx xxx
10. Petitioner's (herein private respondent Montejo) motive in ling the instant petition is devious.
Tacloban City and run for Congress in the First District of Leyte, petitioner (Montejo) immediately
opposed her intended registration by writing a letter stating that "she is not a resident of said city
but of Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte." (Annex "2" of respondent's afdavit, Annex "2"). After
respondent (petitioner herein) had registered as a voter in Tolosa following completion of her six-
month actual residence therein, petitioner (Montejo) led a petition with the COMELEC to transfer
the town of Tolosa from the First District to the Second District and pursued such move up to the
Supreme Court in G.R. No. 118702, his purpose being to remove respondent (petitioner herein) as
petitioner's (Montejo's) opponent in the congressional election in the First District. He also led a
bill, along with other Leyte Congressmen, seeking to create another legislative district, to remove
the town of Tolosa out of the First District and to make it a part of the new district, to achieve his
purpose. However, such bill did not pass the Senate. Having, failed on such moves, petitioner now
led the instant petition, for the same objective, as it is obvious that he is afraid to submit himself
along with respondent (petitioner herein) for the judgment and verdict of the electorate of the First
District of Leyte in an honest, orderly, peaceful, free and clean elections on May 8, 1995.
These allegations which private respondent did not challenge were not lost
to the perceptive eye of Commissioner Maambong who in his Dissenting Opinion,
37
held:
xxx xxx xxx
Prior to the registration date January 28, 1995 the petitioner (herein private respondent Montejo)
wrote the Election Ofcer of Tacloban City not to allow respondent (petitioner herein) to register
thereat since she is a resident of Tolosa and not Tacloban City. The purpose of this move of the
petitioner (Montejo) is not lost to (sic) the Commission. In UND No. 95-001 (In the matter of the
Legislative Districts of the Provinces of Leyte, Iloilo, and South Cotabato, Out of Which the New
Provinces of Biliran, Guimaras and Saranggani Were Respectively Created), . . . Hon. Cirilo Roy G.
Montejo, Representative, First District of Leyte, wanted the Municipality of Tolosa, in the First
District of Leyte, transferred to the Second District of Leyte. The Hon. Sergio A.F. Apostol,
Representative of the Second District of Leyte, opposed the move of the petitioner (Montejo).
Under Comelec Resolution No. 2736 (December 29, 1994), the Commission on Elections refused
to make the proposed transfer. Petitioner (Montejo) led "Motion for Reconsideration of Resolution
No. 2736" which the Commission denied in a Resolution promulgated on February 1, 1995.
Petitioner (Montejo) led a petition for certiorari before the Honorable Supreme Court (Cirilo Roy
G. Montejo vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 118702) questioning the resolution of the
Commission. Believing that he could get a favorable ruling from the Supreme Court, petitioner
(Montejo) tried to make sure that the respondent (petitioner herein) will register as a voter in
Tolosa so that she will be forced to run as Representative not in the First but in the Second District.
It did not happen. On March 16, 1995, the Honorable Supreme Court unanimously promulgated a
"Decision," penned by Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno, the dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, Section 1 of Resolution No. 2736 insofar as it transferred the municipality of
Capoocan of the Second District and the municipality of Palompon of the Fourth District to the
Third District of the province of Leyte, is annulled and set aside. We also deny the Petition praying
for the transfer of the municipality of Tolosa from the First District to the Second District of the
province of Leyte. No costs.
Petitioner's (Montejo's) plan did not work. But the respondent (petitioner herein) was constrained
to register in the Municipality of Tolosa where her house is instead of Tacloban City, her domicile.
In any case, both Tacloban City and Tolosa are in the First Legislative District.
All these attempts to misuse our laws and legal processes are forms of rank harassments and
invidious discriminations against petitioner to deny her equal access to a public ofce. We cannot
commit any hermeneutic violence to the Constitution by torturing the meaning of equality, the end
result of which will allow the harassment and discrimination of petitioner who has lived a
controversial life, a past of alternating light and shadow. There is but one Constitution for all
Filipinos. Petitioner cannot be adjudged by a "different" Constitution, and the worst way to
interpret the Constitution is to inject in its interpretation, bile and bitterness.
Sixth. In Gallego v. Vera,
38
we explained that the reason for this residence requirement is "to
exclude a stranger or newcomer, unacquainted, with the conditions and needs of a community
and not identied with the latter, from an elective ofce to serve that community . . . ." Petitioner's
lifetime contacts with the First District of Leyte cannot be contested. Nobody can claim that she is
not acquainted with its problems because she is a stranger to the place. None can argue she
cannot satisfy the intent of the Constitution.
Seventh. In resolving election cases, a dominant consideration is the need to effectuate the will of
the electorate. The election results show that petitioner received Seventy Thousand Four Hundred
Seventy-one (70,471) votes, while private respondent got only Thirty-Six Thousand Eight Hundred
Thirty-Three (36,833) votes. Petitioner is clearly the overwhelming choice of the electorate of the
First District of Leyte and this is not a sleight of statistics. We cannot frustrate this sovereign will on
highly arguable technical considerations. In case of doubt, we should lean towards a rule that will
give life to the people's political judgment.
A nal point. The case at bench provides the Court with the rare opportunity to rectify the
inequality of status between women and men by rejecting the iniquitous common law precedents
on the domicile of married women and by redening domicile in accord with our own culture, law,
and Constitution. To rule that a married woman is eternally tethered to the domicile dictated by her
dead husband is to preserve the anachronistic and anomalous balance of advantage of a husband
over his wife. We should not allow the dead to govern the living even if the glories of yesteryears
seduce us to shout long live the dead! The Family Code buried this gender-based discrimination
against married women and we should not excavate what has been entombed. More importantly,
the Constitution forbids it.
Bellosillo and Melo, JJ., concur.
I concur with Mr. Justice Kapunan's ponencia nding petitioner qualied for the position of
Representative of the First Congressional District of Leyte. I wish, however, to express a few
comments on the issue of petitioner's domicile.
Domicile has been dened as that place in which a person's habitation is xed, without any
present intention of removing therefrom, and that place is properly the domicile of a person in
which he has voluntarily xed his abode, or habitation, not for a mere special or temporary
purpose, but with a present intention of making it his permanent home (28 C.J.S. 1). It denotes a
xed permanent residence to which when absent for business, or pleasure, or for like reasons one
intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances, in the sense that they disclose intent.
(Ong Huan Tin v. Republic, 19 SCRA 966, 969)
Domicile is classied into domicile of origin and domicile of choice. The law attributes to every
individual a domicile of origin, which is the domicile of his parents, or of the head of his family, or
of the person on whom he is legally dependent at the time of his birth. While the domicile of origin
is generally the place where one is born or reared, it maybe elsewhere (28 C.J.S. 5). Domicile of
choice, on the other hand, is the place which the person has elected and chosen for himself to
displace his previous domicile; it has for its true basis or foundation the intention of the person (28
C.J.S. 6). In order to hold that a person has abandoned his domicile and acquired a new one
called domicile of choice, the following requisites must concur, namely, (a) residence or bodily
presence in the new locality, (b) intention to remain there or animus manendi, and (c) an intention
to abandon the old domicile or animus non revertendi (Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, 226
SCRA 408, 415). A third classication is domicile by operation of law which attributes to a person a
domicile independent of his own intention or actual residence, ordinarily resulting from legal
domestic relations, as that of the wife arising from marriage, or the relation of a parent and a child
(28 C.J.S. 7).
In election law, when our Constitution speaks of residence for election purposes it means domicile
(Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 199 SCRA 692, 713; Nuval v. Guray, 52
Phil. 645, 651). To my mind, public respondent Commission on Elections misapplied this concept,
of domicile which led to petitioner's disqualication by ruling that petitioner failed to comply with
the constitutionally mandated one-year residence requirement. Apparently, public respondent
Commission deemed as conclusive petitioner's stay and registration as voter in many places as
conduct disclosing her intent to abandon her established domicile of origin in Tacloban, Leyte. In
several decisions, though, the Court has laid down the rule that registration of a voter in a place
other than his place of origin is not sufcient to constitute abandonment or loss of such residence
(Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294, 300). Respondent Commission offered no cogent reason to depart
from this rule except to surmise petitioner's intent of abandoning her domicile of origin.
It has been suggested that petitioner's domicile of origin was supplanted by a new domicile due
to her marriage, a domicile by operation of law. The proposition is that upon the death of her
husband in 1989 she retains her husband's domicile, i.e., Batac, Ilocos Norte, until she makes an
actual change thereof. I nd this proposition quite untenable.
Tacloban, Leyte, is petitioner's domicile of origin which was involuntarily supplanted with another,
i.e., Batac, Ilocos Norte, upon her marriage in 1954 with then Congressman Marcos. By legal ction
she followed the domicile of her husband. In my view, the reason for the law is for the spouses to
fully and effectively perform their marital duties and obligations to one another.
1
The question of
domicile, however, is not affected by the fact that it was the legal or moral duty of the individual to
reside in a given place (28 C.J.S. 11). Thus, while the wife retains her marital domicile so long as
the marriage subsists, she automatically loses it upon the latter's termination, for the reason behind
the law then ceases. Otherwise, petitioner, after her marriage was ended by the death of her
husband, would be placed in a quite absurd and unfair situation of having been freed from all
wifely obligations yet made to hold on to one which no longer serves any meaningful purpose.
It is my view therefore that petitioner reverted to her original domicile of Tacloban, Leyte upon her
husband's death without even signifying her intention to that effect. It is for the private respondent
to prove, not for petitioner to disprove, that petitioner has effectively abandoned Tacloban, Leyte
for Batac, Ilocos Norte or for some other place/s. The clear rule is that it is the party (herein private
respondent) claiming that a person has abandoned or lost his residence of origin who must show
and prove preponderantly such abandonment or loss (Faypon v. Quirino, supra at 298; 28 C.J.S.
16), because the presumption is strongly in favor of an original or former domicile, as against an
acquired one (28 C.J.S. 16). Private respondent unfortunately failed to discharge this burden as
the record is devoid of convincing proof that petitioner has acquired whether voluntarily or
involuntarily, a new domicile to replace her domicile of origin.
The records, on the contrary, clearly show that petitioner has complied with the constitutional one-
year residence requirement. After her exile abroad, she returned to the Philippines in 1991 to
reside in Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, but the Presidential Commission on Good Government which
sequestered her residential house and other properties forbade her necessitating her transient
stay in various places in Manila (Afdavit p.6, attached as Annex I of the Petition). In 1992, she ran
for the position of president writing in her certicate of candidacy her residence as San Juan,
Metro Manila. After her loss therein, she went back to Tacloban City, acquired her residence
certicate
2
and resided with her brother in San Jose. She resided in San Jose, Tacloban City until
August of 1994 when she was allowed by the PCGG to move and reside in her sequestered
residential house in Olot, Tolosa, Leyte (Annex I, p. 6).
3
It was in the same month of August when
she applied for the cancellation of her previous registration in San Juan, Metro Manila in order to
register anew as voter of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, which she did on January 28, 1995. From this
sequence of events, I nd it quite improper to use as the reckoning period of the one-year
residence requirement the date when she applied for the cancellation of her previous registration
in San Juan, Metro Manila. The fact which private respondent never bothered to disprove is that
petitioner transferred her residence after the 1992 presidential election from San Juan, Metro
Manila to San Jose, Tacloban City, and resided therein until August of 1994. She later transferred to
Olot, Tolosa, Leyte (Annex I, p. 7). It appearing that both Tacloban City and Tolosa, Leyte are within
the First Congressional District of Leyte, it indubitably stands that she had more than a year of
residence in the constituency she sought to be elected. Petitioner, therefore, has satisfactorily
complied with the one-year qualication required by the 1987 Constitution.
Petitioner has appealed to this Court for relief after the COMELEC ruled that she was disqualied
from running for Representative of her District and that, in the event that she should, nevertheless,
muster a majority vote, her proclamation should be suspended. Not by a straightforward ruling did
the COMELEC pronounce its decision as has been its unvarying practice in the past, but by a
startling succession of "reverse somersaults." Indicative of its shifting stance vis-a-vis petitioner's
certicate of candidacy were rst, the action of its Second Division disqualifying her and canceling
her original Certicate of Candidacy by a vote of 2-1 on April 24, 1995; then the denial by the
COMELEC en banc of her Motion for Reconsideration on May 7, 1995, a day before the election;
then because she persisted in running, its decision on
May 11, 1995 or three days after the election, allowing her proclamation in the event that the
results of the canvass should show that she obtained the highest number of votes (obviously
noting that petitioner had won overwhelmingly over her opponent), but almost simultaneously
reversing itself by directing that even if she wins, her proclamation should nonetheless be
suspended.
Crucial to the resolution of the disqualication issue presented by the case at bench is the
interpretation to be given to the one-year residency requirement imposed by the Constitution on
aspirants for a Congressional seat.
1

Bearing in mind that the term "resident" has been held to be synonymous with "domicile" for
election purposes, it is important to determine whether petitioner's domicile was in the First
District of Leyte and if so, whether she had resided there for at least a period of one year.
Undisputed is her domicile of origin, Tacloban, where her parents lived at the time of her birth.
Depending on what theory one adopts, the same may have been changed when she married
Ferdinand E. Marcos, then domiciled in Batac, by operation of law. Assuming it did, his death
certainly released her from the obligation to live with him at the residence xed by him during his
lifetime. What may confuse the layman at this point is the fact that the term "domicile" may refer to
"domicile of origin," "domicile of choice," or "domicile by operation of law," which subject we shall
not belabor since it has been amply discussed by the ponente and in the other separate opinions.
In any case, what assumes relevance is the divergence of legal opinion as to the effect of the
husband's death on the domicile of the widow. Some scholars opine that the widow's domicile
remains unchanged; that the deceased husband's wishes perforce still bind the wife he has left
behind. Given this interpretation, the widow cannot possibly go far enough to sever the
domiciliary tie imposed by her husband.
It is bad enough to interpret the law as empowering the husband unilaterally to x the residence or
domicile of the family, as laid down in the Civil Code,
2
but to continue giving obeisance to his
wishes even after the rationale underlying the mutual duty of the spouses to live together has
ceased, is to close one's eyes to the stark realities of the present.
At the other extreme is the position that the widow automatically reverts to her domicile of origin
upon the demise of her husband. Does the law so abhor a vacuum that the widow has to be
endowed somehow with a domicile? To answer this question which is far from rhetorical, one will
have to keep in mind the basic principles of domicile. Everyone must have a domicile. Then one
must have only a single domicile for the same purpose at any given time. Once established, a
domicile remains until a new one is acquired, for no person lives who has no domicile, as dened
by the law be is subject to.
At this juncture, we are confronted with an unexplored legal terrain in this jurisdiction, rendered
more murky by the conicting opinions of foreign legal authorities. This being the state of things, it
is imperative as it is opportune to illumine the darkness with the beacon light of truth, as dictated
by experience and the necessity of according petitioner her right to choose her domicile in
keeping with the enlightened global trend to recognize and protect the human rights of women,
no less than men.
Admittedly, the notion of placing women at par with men, insofar as civil, political and social rights
are concerned, is a relatively recent phenomenon that took seed only in the middle of this century.
It is a historical fact that for over three centuries, the Philippines had been colonized by Spain, a
conservative, Catholic country which transplanted to our shores the Old World cultures, mores and
attitudes and values. Through the imposition on our government of the Spanish Civil Code in
1889, the people, both men and women, had no choice but to accept such concepts as the
husband's being the head of the family and the wife's subordination to his authority. In such role,
his was the right to make vital decisions for the family. Many instances come to mind, foremost
being what is related to the issue before us, namely, that "the husband shall x the residence of the
family."
3
Because he is made responsible for the support of the wife and the rest of the family,
4
he
is also empowered to be the administrator of the conjugal property, with a few exceptions
5
and
may, therefore, dispose of the conjugal partnership property for the purposes specied under the
law;
6
whereas, as a general rule, the wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the
husband's consent.
7
As regards the property pertaining to the children under parental authority,
the father is the legal administrator and only in his absence may the mother assume his powers.
8

Demeaning to the wife's dignity are certain strictures on her personal freedoms, practically
relegating her to the position of minors and disabled persons. To illustrate a few: The wife cannot,
without the husband's consent, acquire any gratuitous title, except from her ascendants,
descendants, parents-in-law, and collateral relatives within the fourth degree.
9
With respect to her
employment, the husband wields a veto power in the case the wife exercises her profession or
occupation or engages in business, provided his income is sufcient for the family, according to its
social standing and his opposition is founded on serious and valid grounds.
10
Most offensive, if
not repulsive, to the liberal-minded is the effective prohibition upon a widow to get married till
after three hundred days following the death of her husband, unless in the meantime, she has
given birth to a child.
11
The mother who contracts a subsequent marriage loses the parental
authority over her children, unless the deceased husband, father of the latter, has expressly
provided in his will that his widow might marry again, and has ordered that in such case she should
keep and exercise parental authority over their children.
12
Again, an instance of a husband's
overarching inuence from beyond the grave.
All these indignities and disabilities suffered by Filipino wives for hundreds of years evoked no
protest from them until the concept of human rights and equality between and among nations and
individuals found hospitable lodgment in the United Nations Charter of which the Philippines was
one of the original signatories. By then, the Spanish "conquistadores" had been overthrown by the
American forces at the turn of the century. The bedrock of the U.N. Charter was rmly anchored on
this credo: "to reafrm faith in the fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the
human person, in the equal rights of men and women." (Emphasis supplied)
It took over thirty years before these egalitarian doctrines bore fruit, owing largely to the
burgeoning of the feminist movement. What may be regarded as the international bill of rights for
women was implanted in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women (CEDAW) adopted by the U.N. General Assembly which entered into force as an
international treaty on September 3, 1981. In ratifying the instrument, the Philippines bound itself
to implement its liberating spirit and letter, for its Constitution, no less, declared that "The
Philippines. . . adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of
the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with
all nations."
13
One such principle embodied in the CEDAW is granting to men and women "the
same rights with regard to the law relating to the movement of persons and the freedom to choose
their residence and domicile."
14
(Emphasis supplied).
CEDAW's pro-women orientation which was not lost on Filipino women was reected in the 1987
Constitution of the Philippines and later, in the Family Code,
15
both of which were speedily
approved by the rst lady President of the country, Corazon C. Aquino. Notable for its emphasis on
the human rights of all individuals and its bias for equality between the sexes are the following
provisions: "The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for
human rights"
16
and "The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure
the fundamental equality before the law of women and men."
17

A major accomplishment of women in their quest for equality with men and the elimination of
discriminatory provisions of law was the deletion in the Family Code of almost all of the
unreasonable strictures on wives and the grant to them of personal rights equal to that of their
husbands. Specically, the husband and wife are now given the right jointly to x the family
domicile;
18
concomitant to the spouses' being jointly responsible for the support of the family is
the right and duty of both spouses to manage the household;
19
the administration and the
enjoyment of the community property shall belong to both spouses jointly;
20
the father and
mother shall now jointly exercise legal guardianship over the property of their unemancipated
common child
21
and several others.
Aware of the hiatus and continuing gaps in the law, insofar as women's rights are concerned,
Congress passed a law popularly known as "Women in Development and Nation Building Act"
22

Among the rights given to married women evidencing their capacity to act in contracts equal to
that of men are:
(1) Women shall have the capacity to borrow and obtain loans and execute security and credit
arrangements under the same conditions as men;
(2) Women shall have equal access to all government and private sector programs granting
agricultural credit, loans and non material resources and shall enjoy equal treatment in agrarian
reform and land resettlement programs;
(3) Women shall have equal rights to act as incorporators and enter into insurance contracts; and
(4) Married women shall have rights equal to those of married men in applying for passports,
secure visas and other travel documents, without need to secure the consent of their spouses.
As the world draws the curtain on the Fourth World Conference of Women in Beijing, let this Court
now be the rst to respond to its clarion call that "Women's Rights are Human Rights" and that "All
obstacles to women's full participation in decision-making at all levels, including the family" should
be removed. Having been herself a Member of the Philippine Delegation to the International
Women's Year Conference in Mexico in 1975, this writer is only too keenly aware of the unremitting
struggle being waged by women the world over, Filipino women not excluded, to be accepted as
equals of men and to tear down the walls of discrimination that hold them back from their proper
places under the sun.
In light of the inexorable sweep of events, local and global, legislative, executive and judicial,
according more rights to women hitherto denied them and eliminating whatever pockets of
discrimination still exist in their civil, political and social life, can it still be insisted that widows are
not at liberty to choose their domicile upon the death of their husbands but must retain the same,
regardless?
I submit that a widow, like the petitioner and others similarly situated, can no longer be bound by
the domicile of the departed husband, if at all she was before. Neither does she automatically
revert to her domicile of origin, but exercising free will, she may opt to reestablish her domicile of
origin. In returning to Tacloban and subsequently, to Barangay Olot, Tolosa, both of which are
located in the First District of Leyte, petitioner amply demonstrated by overt acts, her election of a
domicile of choice, in this case, a reversion to her domicile of origin. Added together, the time
when she set up her domicile in the two places sufced to meet the one-year requirement to run
as Representative of the First District of Leyte.
In view of the foregoing expatiation, I vote to GRANT the petition.
VITUG, J., separate opinion:
The case at bench deals with explicit Constitutional mandates.
The Constitution is not a pliable instrument. It is a bedrock in our legal system that sets up ideals
and directions and render steady our strides hence. It only looks back so as to ensure that mistakes
in the past are not repeated. A compliant transience of a constitution belittles its basic function and
weakens its goals. A constitution may well become outdated by the realities of time. When it does,
it must be changed but while it remains, we owe it respect and allegiance. Anarchy, open or subtle,
has never been, nor must it ever be, the answer to perceived transitory needs, let alone societal
attitudes, or the Constitution might lose its very essence.
Constitutional provisions must be taken to be mandatory in character unless, either by express
statement or by necessary implication, a different intention is manifest (see Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121
SCRA 51).
The two provisions initially brought to focus are Section 6 and Section 17 of Article VI of the
fundamental law. These provisions read:
Sec. 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born
The Commission on Election (the "COMELEC") is constitutionally bound to enforce and administer
"all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of election . . ." (Art. IX, C, Sec. 2, Constitution) that,
there being nothing said to the contrary, should include its authority to pass upon the qualication
and disqualication prescribed by law of candidates to an elective ofce. Indeed, pre-proclamation
controversies are expressly placed under the COMELEC's jurisdiction to hear and resolve (Art. IX,
C, Sec. 3, Constitution).
The matter before us specically calls for the observance of the constitutional one-year residency
requirement. The issue (whether or not there is here such compliance), to my mind, is basically a
question of fact or at least inextricably linked to such determination. The ndings and judgment of
the COMELEC, in accordance with the long established rule and subject only to a number of
exceptions under the basic heading of "grave abuse of discretion," are not reviewable by this
Court.
I do not nd much need to do a complex exercise on what seems to me to be a plain matter.
Generally, the term "residence" has a broader connotation that may mean permanent (domicile),
ofcial (place where one's ofcial duties may require him to stay) or temporary (the place where he
sojourns during a considerable length of time). For civil law purposes, i.e., as regards the exercise
of civil rights and the fulllment of civil obligations, the domicile of a natural person is the place of
his habitual residence (see Article 50, Civil Code). In election cases, the controlling rule is that
heretofore announced by this Court in Romualdez vs. Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Tacloban City
(226 SCRA 408, 409); thus:
In election cases, the Court treats domicile and residence as synonymous terms, thus: "(t)he term
"residence" as used in the election law is synonymous with "domicile," which imports not only an
intention to reside in a xed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct
indicative of such intention." "Domicile" denotes a xed permanent residence to which when
absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. . . . . Residence thus
acquired, however, may be lost by adopting another choice of domicile. In order, in turn, to
acquire a new domicile by choice, there must concur (1) residence or bodily presence in the new
locality, (2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile. In other
words, there must basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose
to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indenite period of time; the change of
residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be
actual.
Using the above tests, I am not convinced that we can charge the COMELEC with having
committed grave abuse of discretion in its assailed resolution.
The COMELEC's jurisdiction, in the case of congressional elections, ends when the jurisdiction of
the Electoral Tribunal concerned begins. It signies that the protestee must have theretofore been
duly proclaimed and has since become a "member" of the Senate or the House of
Representatives. The question can be asked on whether or not the proclamation of a candidate is
just a ministerial function of the Commission on Elections dictated solely on the number of votes
cast in an election exercise. I believe, it is not. A ministerial duty is an obligation the performance of
which, being adequately dened, does not allow the use of further judgment or discretion. The
COMELEC, in its particular case, is tasked with the full responsibility of ascertaining all the facts and
conditions such as may be required by law before a proclamation is properly done.
The Court, on its part, should, in my view at least, refrain from any undue encroachment on the
ultimate exercise of authority by the Electoral Tribunals on matters which, by no less than a
constitutional at, are explicitly within their exclusive domain. The nagging question, if it were
otherwise, would be the effect of the Court's peremptory pronouncement on the ability of the
Electoral Tribunal to later come up with its own judgment in a contest "relating to the election,
returns and qualication" of its members.
Prescinding from all the foregoing, I should like to next touch base on the applicability to this case
of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, in relation to Section 72 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, each
providing thusly:
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6646
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualication Case. Any candidate who has been declared by nal judgment to
reason a candidate is not declared by nal judgment before an election to be disqualied and he
is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission
shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 881
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 72. Effects of disqualication cases and priority. The Commission and the courts shall give
priority to cases of disqualication by reason of violation of this Act to the end that a nal decision
shall be rendered not later than seven days before the election in which the disqualication is
sought.
Any candidate who has been declared by nal judgment to be disqualied shall not be voted for,
and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. Nevertheless, if for any reason, a candidate is not
declared by nal, judgment before an election to be disqualied, and he is voted for and receives
the winning number of votes in such election, his violation of the provisions of the preceding
sections shall not prevent his proclamation and assumption to ofce.
I realize that in considering the signicance of the law, it may be preferable to look for not so much
the specic instances they ostensibly would cover as the principle they clearly convey. Thus, I will
not scoff at the argument that it should be sound to say that votes cast in favor of the disqualied
candidate, whenever ultimately declared as such, should not be counted in his or her favor and
must accordingly be considered to be stray votes. The argument, nevertheless, is far outweighed
by the rationale of the now prevailing doctrine rst enunciated in the case of Topacio vs. Paredes
(23 Phil. 238 [1912]) which, although later abandoned in Ticzon vs. Comelec (103 SCRA 687
[1981]), and Santos vs. COMELEC (137 SCRA 740 [1985]), was restored, along with the interim case
of Geronimo vs. Ramos (136 SCRA 435 [1985]), by the Labo (176 SCRA 1 (1989]), Abella (201 SCRA
253 [1991]), Labo (211 SCRA 297 [1992]) and, most recently, Benito (235 SCRA 436 [1994]) rulings.
Benito vs. Comelec was a unanimous decision penned by Justice Kapunan and concurred in by
Chief Justice Narvasa, Justices Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Romero, Melo, Quiason,
Puno, Vitug and Mendoza (Justices Cruz and Bellosillo were on ofcial leave). For easy reference,
let me quote from the rst Labo decision:
Finally, there is the question of whether or not the private respondent, who led the quo warranto
petition, can replace the petitioner as mayor. He cannot. The simple reason is that as he obtained
only the second highest number of votes in the election, he was obviously not the choice of the
people of Baguio City.
The latest ruling of the Court on this issue is Santos v. Commission on Elections, (137 SCRA 740)
decided in 1985. In that case, the candidate who placed second was proclaimed elected after the
votes for his winning rival, who was disqualied as a turncoat and considered a non-candidate,
were all disregard as stray. In effect, the second placer won by default. That decision was
supported by eight members of the Court then, (Cuevas, J., ponente, with Makasiar, Concepcion,
Jr., Escolin, Relova, De la Fuente, Alampay and Aquino, JJ., concurring.) with three dissenting
(Teehankee, Acting C.J., Abad Santos and Melencio-Herrera, JJ.) and another two reserving their
vote. (Plana and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ.) One was on ofcial leave. (Fernando, C.J.)
Re-examining that decision, the Court nds, and so holds, that it should be reversed in favor of the
earlier case of Geronimo v. Ramos, (136 SCRA 435) which represents the more logical and
democratic rule. That case, which reiterated the doctrine rst announced in 1912 in Topacio v.
Paredes, (23 Phil. 238) was supported by ten members of the Court, (Gutierrez, Jr., ponente, with
Teehankee, Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Relova, De la Fuente, Cuevas and
Alampay, JJ., concurring) without any dissent, although one reserved his vote, (Makasiar, J.)
another took no part, (Aquino, J.) and two others were on leave. (Fernando, C.J. and Concepcion,
Jr., J.) There the Court held:
. . . it would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right
to suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a
winner and imposed as the representative of a constituency, the majority of which have positively
declared through their ballots that they do not choose him.
Sound policy dictates that public elective ofces are lled by those who have received the highest
number of votes cast in the election for that ofce, and it is a fundamental idea in all republican
forms of government that no one can be declared elected and no measure can be declared
carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the election. (20
Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676.)
meaningless. (at pp. 20-21)
Considering all the foregoing, I am constrained to vote for the dismissal of the petition.
In my view the issue in this case is whether the Commission on Elections has the power to
disqualify candidates on the ground that they lack eligibility for the ofce to which they seek to be
elected. I think that it has none and that the qualications of candidates may be questioned only in
the event they are elected, by ling a petition for quo warranto or an election protest in the
appropriate forum, not necessarily in the COMELEC but, as in this case, in the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal. That the parties in this case took part in the proceedings in the
COMELEC is of no moment. Such proceedings were unauthorized and were not rendered valid by
their agreement to submit their dispute to that body.
The various election laws will be searched in vain for authorized proceedings for determining a
candidate's qualications for an ofce before his election. There are none in the Omnibus Election
Code (B.P. Blg. 881), in the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 (R.A. No. 6646), or in the law providing
for synchronized elections (R.A. No. 7166). There are, in other words, no provisions for pre-
proclamation contests but only election protests or quo warranto proceedings against winning
candidates.
To be sure, there are provisions denominated for "disqualication," but they are not concerned
with a declaration of the ineligibility of a candidate. These provisions are concerned with the
incapacity (due to insanity, incompetence or conviction of an offense) of a person either to be a
candidate or to continue as a candidate for public ofce. There is also a provision for the denial or
cancellation of certicates of candidacy, but it applies only to cases involving false representations
as to certain matters required by law to be stated in the certicates.
These provisions are found in the following parts of the Omnibus Election Code:
12. Disqualications. Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or
incompetent, or has been sentenced by nal judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for
any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a
crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualied to be a candidate and to hold any ofce,
unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.
The disqualications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon the
declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been removed or after
the expiration of a period of ve years from his service of sentence, unless within the same period
he again becomes disqualied. (Emphasis added)
68. Disqualications. Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is
declared by nal decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a)
given money or other material consideration to inuence, induce or corrupt the voters or public
ofcials performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy;
(c) spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited,
received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e)
violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6, shall
be disqualied from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the ofce.
Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be
qualied to run for any elective ofce under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as
permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence
requirement provided for in the election laws. (Emphasis added)
78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certicate of
candidacy. A veried petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certicate of candidacy
may be led by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained
therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be led at any time not later
than twenty-ve days from the time of the ling of the certicate of candidacy and shall be
decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fteen days before the election. (Emphasis
added)
the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 (R.A. No. 6646):
6. Effect of Disqualication Case. Any candidate who has been declared by nal judgment to
reason a candidate is not declared by nal judgment before an election to be disqualied and he is
voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall
continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and; upon motion for the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. (Emphasis added).
7. Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel a Certicate of Candidacy. The procedure
hereinabove provided shall apply to petitions to deny due course to or cancel a certicate of
candidacy as provided in Section 78 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.
and the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160):
40. Disqualications. The following persons are disqualied from running for any elective local
position:
(a) Those sentenced by nal judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense
punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;
(b) Those removed from ofce as a result of on administrative case;
(c) Those convicted by nal judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic;
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
(e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here or abroad;
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside abroad
and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code; and
(g) The insane or feeble-minded.
The petition led by private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo in the COMELEC, while entitled "For
Cancellation and Disqualication," contained no allegation that private respondent Imelda
Romualdez-Marcos made material representations in her certicate of candidacy which were false,
it sought her disqualication on the ground that "on the basis of her Voter Registration Record and
Certicate of Candidacy, [she] is disqualied from running for the position of Representative,
considering that on election day, May 8, 1995, [she] would have resided less than ten (10) months
in the district where she is seeking to be elected." For its part, the COMELEC's Second Division, in
its resolution of April 24, 1995, cancelled her certicate of candidacy and corrected certicate of
candidacy on the basis of its nding that petitioner is "not qualied to run for the position of
Member of the House of Representatives for the First Legislative District of Leyte" and not because
of any nding that she had made false representations as to material matters in her certicate of
candidacy.
Montejo's petition before the COMELEC was therefore not a petition for cancellation of certicate
of candidacy under 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, but essentially a petition to declare
private respondent ineligible. It is important to note this, because, as will presently be explained,
proceedings under 78 have for their purpose to disqualify a person from being a candidate,
whereas quo warranto proceedings have for their purpose to disqualify a person from holding
public ofce. Jurisdiction over quo warranto proceedings involving members of the House of
Representatives is vested in the Electoral Tribunal of that body.
Indeed, in the only cases in which this Court dealt with petitions for the cancellation of certicates
of candidacy, the allegations were that the respondent candidates had made false representations
in their certicates of candidacy with regard to their citizenship,
1
age,
2
or residence.
3
But in the
generality of cases in which this Court passed upon the qualications of respondents for ofce, this
Court did so in the context of election protests
4
or quo warranto proceedings
5
led after the
proclamation of the respondents or protestees as winners.
Three reasons may be cited to explain the absence of an authorized proceeding for determining
before election the qualications of a candidate.
First is the fact that unless a candidate wins and is proclaimed elected, there is no necessity for
determining his eligibility for the ofce. In contrast, whether an individual should be disqualied as
a candidate for acts constituting election offenses (e.g., vote buying, over spending, commission of
prohibited acts) is a prejudicial question which should be determined lest he wins because of the
very acts for which his disqualication is being sought. That is why it is provided that if the grounds
for disqualication are established, a candidate will not be voted for; if he has been voted for, the
votes in his favor will not be counted; and if for some reason he has been voted for and he has
won, either he will not be proclaimed or his proclamation will be set aside.
6

Second is the fact that the determination of a candidate's eligibility, e.g., his citizenship or, as in this
case, his domicile, may take a long time to make, extending beyond the beginning of the term of
the ofce. This is amply demonstrated in the companion case (G.R. No. 120265, Agapito A. Aquino
v. COMELEC) where the determination of Aquino's residence was still pending in the COMELEC
even after the elections of May 8, 1995. This is contrary to the summary character of proceedings
relating to certicates of candidacy. That is why the law makes the receipt of certicates of
candidacy a ministerial duty of the COMELEC and its ofcers.
7
The law is satised if candidates
state in their certicates of candidacy that they are eligible for the position which they seek to ll,
leaving the determination of their qualications to be made after the election and only in the event
they are elected. Only in cases involving charges of false representations made in certicates of
candidacy is the COMELEC given jurisdiction.
Third is the policy underlying the prohibition against pre-proclamation cases in elections for
President, Vice President, Senators and members of the House of Representatives. (R.A. No. 7166,
15) The purpose is to preserve the prerogatives of the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal and the other Tribunals as "sole judges" under the Constitution of the election, returns
and qualications of members of Congress or of the President and Vice President, as the case may
be.
By providing in 253 for the remedy of quo warranto for determining an elected ofcial's
qualications after the results of elections are proclaimed, while being conspicuously silent about a
pre-proclamation remedy based on the same ground, the Omnibus Election Code, or OEC, by its
silence underscores the policy of not authorizing any inquiry into the qualications of candidates
unless they have been elected.
Apparently realizing the lack of an authorized proceeding for declaring the ineligibility of
candidates, the COMELEC amended its rules on February 15, 1993 so as to provide in Rule 25, 1
the following:
Grounds for disqualication. Any candidate who does not possess all the qualications of a
candidate as provided for by the Constitution or by existing law or who commits any act declared
by law to be grounds for disqualication may be disqualied from continuing as a candidate.
The lack of provision for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, however, cannot be supplied by a
mere rule. Such an act is equivalent to the creation of a cause of action which is a substantive
matter which the COMELEC, in the exercise of its rulemaking power under Art. IX, A, 6 of the
Constitution, cannot do. It is noteworthy that the Constitution withholds from the COMELEC even
the power to decide cases involving the right to vote, which essentially involves an inquiry into
qualications based on age, residence and citizenship of voters. (Art. IX, C, 2(3))
The assimilation in Rule 25 of the COMELEC rules of grounds for ineligibility into grounds for
disqualication is contrary to the evident intention of the law. For not only in their grounds but also
in their consequences are proceedings for "disqualication" different from those for a declaration
of "ineligibility." "Disqualication" proceedings, as already stated, are based on grounds specied
in 12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code and in 40 of the Local Government Code and are
for the purpose of barring an individual from becoming a candidate or from continuing as a
candidate for public ofce. In a word, their purpose is to eliminate a candidate from the race either
from the start or during its progress. "Ineligibility," on the other hand, refers to the lack of the
qualications prescribed in the Constitution or the statutes for holding public ofce and the
purpose of the proceedings for declaration of ineligibility is to remove the incumbent from ofce.
Consequently, that an individual possesses the qualications for a public ofce does not imply that
he is not disqualied from becoming a candidate or continuing as a candidate for a public ofce
and vice versa. We have this sort of dichotomy in our Naturalization Law. (C.A. No. 473) That an
alien has the qualications prescribed in 2 of the law does not imply that he does not suffer from
any of disqualications provided in 4.
Indeed, provisions for disqualications on the ground that the candidate is guilty of prohibited
election practices or offenses, like other pre-proclamation remedies, are aimed at the detestable
practice of "grabbing the proclamation and prolonging the election protest,"
8
through the use of
"manufactured" election returns or resort to other trickery for the purpose of altering the results of
the election. This rationale does not apply to cases for determining a candidate's qualications for
ofce before the election. To the contrary, it is the candidate against whom a proceeding for
disqualication is brought who could be prejudiced because he could be prevented from
assuming ofce even though in end he prevails.
To summarize, the declaration of ineligibility of a candidate may only be sought in an election
protest or action for quo warranto led pursuant to 253 of the Omnibus Election Code within 10
days after his proclamation. With respect to elective local ofcials (e.g., Governor, Vice Governor,
members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, etc.) such petition must be led either with the
COMELEC, the Regional Trial Courts, or Municipal Trial Courts, as provided in Art. IX, C, 2(2) of
the Constitution. In the case of the President and Vice President, the petition must be led with the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal (Art. VII, 4, last paragraph), and in the case of the Senators, with the
Senate Electoral Tribunal, and in the case of Congressmen, with the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal. (Art. VI, 17) There is greater reason for not allowing before the election the
ling of disqualication proceedings based on alleged ineligibility in the case of candidates for
President, Vice President, Senators and members of the House of Representatives, because of the
same policy prohibiting the ling of pre-proclamation cases against such candidates.
For these reasons, I am of the opinion that the COMELEC had no jurisdiction over SPA No. 95-009;
that its proceedings in that case, including its questioned orders, are void; and that the eligibility of
petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos for the ofce of Representative of the First District of Leyte
may only be inquired into by the HRET.
Accordingly, I vote to grant the petition and to annul the proceedings of the Commission on
Elections in SPA No. 95-009, including its questioned orders doted April 24, 1995, May 7, 1995,
May 11, 1995 and May 25, 1995, declaring petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos ineligible and
ordering her proclamation as Representative of the First District of Leyte suspended. To the extent
that Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure authorizes proceedings for the disqualication of
candidates on the ground of ineligibility for the ofce, it should considered void.
The provincial board of canvassers should now proceed with the proclamation of petitioner.
Narvasa, C.J., concurs.
I regret that I cannot join the majority opinion as expressed in the well-written ponencia of Mr.
Justice Kapunan.
As in any controversy arising out of a Constitutional provision, the inquiry must begin and end with
the provision itself. The controversy should not be blurred by what, to me, are academic
disquisitions. In this particular controversy, the Constitutional provision on point states that "no
person shall be a member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, and on the day of the election, is at least twenty-ve (25) years of age, able to read and
write, and except the party list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be
elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the
day of the election." (Article VI, section 6)
It has been argued that for purposes of our election laws, the term residence has been understood
as synonymous with domicile. This argument has been validated by no less than the Court in
numerous cases
1
where signicantly the factual circumstances clearly and convincingly proved
that a person does not effectively lose his domicile of origin if the intention to reside therein is
manifest with his personal presence in the place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
With this basic thesis in mind, it would not be difcult to conceive of different modalities within
which the phrase "a resident thereof (meaning, the legislative district) for a period of not less than
one year" would t.
The rst instance is where a person's residence and domicile coincide in which case a person only
has to prove that he has been domiciled in a permanent location for not less than a year before the
election.
A second situation is where a person maintains a residence apart from his domicile in which case
he would have the luxury of district shopping, provided of course, he satises the one-year
residence period in the district as the minimum period for eligibility to the position of
congressional representative for the district.
In either case, one would not be constitutionally disqualied for abandoning his residence in order
to return to his domicile of origin, or better still, domicile of choice; neither would one be
disqualied for abandoning altogether his domicile in favor of his residence in the district where
he desires to be a candidate.
The most extreme circumstance would be a situation wherein a person maintains several
residences in different districts. Since his domicile of origin continues as an option as long as there
is no effective abandonment (animus non revertendi), he can practically choose the district most
advantageous for him.
All these theoretical scenarios, however, are tempered by the unambiguous limitation that "for a
period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election", he must be a
resident in the district where he desires to be elected.
To my mind, the one year residence period is crucial regardless of whether or not the term
"residence" is to be synonymous with "domicile." In other words, the candidate's intent and actual
presence in one district must in all situations satisfy the length of time prescribed by the
fundamental law. And this, because of a denite Constitutional purpose. He must be familiar with
the environment and problems of a district he intends to represent in Congress and the one-year
residence in said district would be the minimum period to acquire such familiarity, if not versatility.
In the case of petitioner Imelda R. Marcos, the operative facts are distinctly set out in the now
assailed decision of the Comelec 2nd Division dated 24 April 1995 (as afrmed by the Comelec en
banc)
now Divine Word University of Tacloban, where she earned her degree in Education. Thereafter,
she taught in the Leyte Chinese High School, still in Tacloban City. In 1952 she went to Manila to
work with her cousin, the late Speaker Daniel Z. Romualdez in his ofce in the House of
Representatives. In 1954, she married ex-president Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a
congressman of Ilocos Norte. She lived with him in Batac, Ilocos Norte and registered there as a
voter. When her husband was elected Senator of the Republic in 1959, she and her husband lived
together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965 when her husband was elected
President of the Republic of the Philippines, she lived with him in Malacanang Palace and
registered as a voter in San Miguel, Manila.
During the Marcos presidency, respondent served as a Member of the Batasang Pambansa,
Minister of Human Settlements and Governor of Metro Manila. She claimed that in February 1986,
she and her family were abducted and kidnapped to Honolulu, Hawaii. In November 1991, she
came home to Manila. In 1992 respondent ran for election as President of the Philippines and led
her Certicate of Candidacy wherein she indicated that she is a resident and registered voter of
San Juan, Metro Manila. On August 24, 1994, respondent led a letter with the election ofcer of
San Juan, Metro Manila, requesting for cancellation of her registration in the Permanent List of
Voters in Precinct No. 157 of San Juan, Metro Manila, in order that she may be re-registered or
transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. (Annex 2-B, Answer). On August 31, 1994, respondent led
her Sworn Application for Cancellation of Voter's Previous Registration (Annex 2-C, Answer) stating
that she is a duly registered voter in 157-A, Brgy. Maytunas, San Juan, Metro that she intends to
register at Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte.
On January 28, 1995 respondent registered as a voter at Precinct No. 18-A of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte.
She led with the Board of Election Inspectors CE Form No. 1, Voter Registration Record No.
94-3349772, wherein she alleged that she has resided in the municipality of Tolosa for a period of
6 months (Annex A, Petition).
On March 8, 1995, respondent led with the Ofce of the Provincial Election Supervisor, Leyte, a
Certicate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte wherein she
also alleged that she has been a resident in the constituency where she seeks to be elected for a
period of 7 months. The pertinent entries therein are as follows:
7. PROFESSION OR OCCUPATION: House-wife/ Teacher/ Social Worker
8. RESIDENCE (complete address): Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
Post Ofce Address for election purposes: Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
9. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHEREIN I SEEK TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY
PRECEDING ELECTION: ________ Years Seven Months
10. I AM NOT A PERMANENT RESIDENT OF, OR IMMIGRANT TO, A FOREIGN COUNTRY.
THAT I AM ELIGIBLE for said ofce; That I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic
of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; That I will obey the laws, legal
orders and decrees promulgated by the duly-constituted authorities; That the obligation imposed
by my oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and That the
facts stated herein are true to the best of my knowledge.
(Sgd.) Imelda Romualdez-Marcos
(Signature of Candidate)
2

Petitioner's aforestated certicate of candidacy led on 8 March 1995 contains the decisive
component or seed of her disqualication. It is contained in her answer under oath of "seven
months" to the query of "residence in the constituency wherein I seek to be elected immediately
preceding the election."
It follows from all the above that the Comelec committed no grave abuse of discretion in holding
that petitioner is disqualied from the position of representative for the 1st congressional district
of Leyte in the elections of 8 May 1995, for failure to meet the "not less than one-year residence in
the constituency (1st district, Leyte) immediately preceding the day of election (8 May 1995)."
Having arrived at petitioner's disqualication to be a representative of the rst district of Leyte, the
next important issue to resolve is whether or not the Comelec can order the Board of Canvassers
to determine and proclaim the winner out of the remaining qualied candidates for representative
in said district.
I am not unaware of the pronouncement made by this Court in the case of Labo vs. Comelec, G.R.
86564, August 1, 1989, 176 SCRA 1 which gave the rationale as laid down in the early 1912 case of
Topacio vs. Paredes, 23 Phil. 238 that:
. . . . Sound policy dictates that public elective ofces are lled by those who have received the
highest number of votes cast in the election for that ofce, and it is a fundamental idea in all
republican forms of government that no one can be declared elected and no measure can be
declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the
election. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676)
meaningless.
Under Sec. 6 RA 6646, (An Act Introducing Additional Reforms in the Electoral System and for
other purposes) (84 O.G. 905, 22 February 1988) it is provided that:
. . . Any candidate who has been declared by nal judgment to be disqualied shall not be voted
for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by
nal judgment before an election to be disqualied and he is voted for and receives the winning
number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing
of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may,
during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate
whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
There is no need to indulge in legal hermeneutics to sense the plain and unambiguous meaning of
the provision quoted above. As the law now stands, the legislative policy does not limit its concern
with the effect of a nal judgement of disqualication only before the election, but even during or
after the election. The law is clear that in all situations, the votes cast for a disqualied candidate
SHALL NOT BE COUNTED. The law has also validated the jurisdiction of the Court or Commission
on Election to continue hearing the petition for disqualication in case a candidate is voted for and
receives the highest number of votes, if for any reason, he is not declared by nal judgment before
an election to be disqualied.
Since the present case is an after election scenario, the power to suspend proclamation (when
evidence of his guilt is strong) is also explicit under the law. What happens then when after the
elections are over, one is declared disqualied? Then, votes cast for him "shall not be counted"
and in legal contemplation, he no longer received the highest number of votes.
It stands to reason that Section 6 of RA 6646 does not make the second placer the winner simply
because a "winning candidate is disqualied," but that the law considers him as the candidate who
had obtained the highest number of votes as a result of the votes cast for the disqualied
candidate not being counted or considered.
As this law clearly reects the legislative policy on the matter, then there is no reason why this
Court should not re-examine and consequently abandon the doctrine in the Jun Labo case. It has
been stated that "the qualications prescribed for elective ofce cannot be erased by the
electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of
ineligibility" most especially when it is mandated by no less than the Constitution.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition and to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers of
Leyte to proclaim the candidate receiving the highest number of votes, from among the qualied
candidates, as the duly elected representative of the 1st district of Leyte.
Hermosisima, Jr. J., dissent.
While I agree with same of the factual bases of the majority opinion, I cannot arrive conjointly at
the same conclusion drawn therefrom Hence, this dissent which assuredly is not formulated "on
the basis of the personality of a petitioner in a case."
I go along with the majority in their narration of antecedent facts, insofar as the same are pertinent
to this case, and which I have simplied as follows:
1. Petitioner, although born in Manila, resided during her childhood in the present Tacloban City,
she being a legitimate daughter of parents who appear to have taken up permanent residence
therein. She also went to school there and, for a time, taught in one of the schools in that city.
2. When she married then Rep. Ferdinand E. Marcos who was then domiciled in Batac, Ilocos
Norte, by operation of law she acquired a new domicile in that place in 1954.
3. In the successive years and during the events that happened thereafter, her husband having
been elected as a Senator and then as President, she lived with him and their family in San Juan,
Rizal and then in Malacanang Palace in San Miguel, Manila.
4. Over those years, she registered as a voter and actually voted in Batac, Ilocos Norte, then in San
Juan, Rizal, and also in San Miguel, Manila, all these merely in the exercise of the right of suffrage.
5. It does not appear that her husband, even after he had assumed those lofty positions
successively, ever abandoned his domicile of origin in Batac, Ilocos Norte where he maintained his
residence and invariably voted in all elections.
6. After the ouster of her husband from the presidency in 1986 and the sojourn of the Marcos
family in Honolulu, Hawaii, U.S.A., she eventually returned to the Philippines in 1991 and resided in
different places which she claimed to have been merely temporary residences.
7. In 1992, petitioner ran for election as President of the Philippines and in her certicate of
candidacy she indicated that she was then a registered voter and resident of San Juan, Metro
Manila.
8. On August 24, 1994, she led a letter for the cancellation of her registration in the Permanent
List of Voters in Precinct No. 157 of San Juan, Metro Manila in order that she may "be re-registered
or transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte." On August 31, 1994, she followed this up with her
Sworn Application for Cancellation of Voter's Previous Registration wherein she stated that she was
a registered voter in Precinct No. 157-A, Brgy. Maytunas, San Juan, Metro Manila and that she
intended to register in Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte.
9. On January 28, 1995, petitioner registered as a voter at Precinct No. 18-A of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte,
for which purpose she led with the therein Board of Election Inspectors a voter's registration
record form alleging that she had resided in that municipality for six months.
10. On March 8, 1995, petitioner led her certicate of candidacy for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte wherein she alleged that she had been a resident for
"Seven Months" of the constituency where she sought to be elected.
11. On March 29, 1995, she led an "Amended/Corrected Certicate of Candidacy" wherein her
answer in the original certicate of candidacy to item "8. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY
WHERE I SEEK, TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION:" was changed or
replaced with a new entry reading "SINCE CHILDHOOD."
The sole issue for resolution is whether, for purposes of her candidacy, petitioner had complied
with the residency requirement of one year as mandated by no less than Section 6, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution.
I do not intend to impose upon the time of my colleagues with a dissertation on the difference
between residence and domicile. We have had enough of that and I understand that for purposes
of political law and, for that matter of international law, residence is understood to be synonymous
with domicile. That is so understood in our jurisprudence and in American Law, in contradistinction
to the concept of residence for purposes of civil, commercial and procedural laws whenever an
issue thereon is relevant or controlling.
Consequently, since in the present case the question of petitioner's residence is integrated in and
inseparable from her domicile, I am addressing the issue from the standpoint of the concept of the
latter term, specically its permutations into the domicile of origin, domicile of choice and domicile
by operation of law, as understood in American law from which for this case we have taken our
jurisprudential bearings.
My readings inform me that the domicile of the parents at the time of birth, or what is termed the
"domicile of origin," constitutes the domicile of an infant until abandoned, or until the acquisition
of a new domicile in a different place.
1
In the instant case, we may grant that petitioner's domicile
of origin,
2
at least as of 1938, was what is now Tacloban City.
Now, as I have observed earlier, domicile is said to be of three kinds, that is, domicile by birth,
domicile by choice, and domicile by operation of law. The rst is the common case of the place of
birth or domicilium originis, the second is that which is voluntarily acquired by a party or
domicilium propio motu; the last which is consequential, as that of a wife arising from marriage,
3
is
sometimes called domicilium necesarium. There is no debate that the domicile of origin can be
lost or replaced by a domicile of choice or a domicile by operation of law subsequently acquired
by the party.
When petitioner contracted marriage in 1954 with then Rep. Marcos, by operation of law, not only
international or American but of our own enactment,
4
she acquired her husband's domicile of
origin in Batac, Ilocos Norte and correspondingly lost her own domicile of origin in Tacloban City.
Her subsequent changes of residence to San Juan, Rizal, then to San Miguel, Manila, thereafter to
Honolulu, Hawaii, and back to now San Juan, Metro Manila do not appear to have resulted in her
thereby acquiring new domiciles of choice. In fact, it appears that her having resided in those
places was by reason of the fortunes or misfortunes of her husband and his peregrinations in the
assumption of new ofcial positions or the loss of them. Her residence in Honolulu and, of course,
those after her return to the Philippines were, as she claimed, against her will or only for transient
purposes which could not have invested them with the status of domiciles of choice.
5

After petitioner's return to the Philippines in 1991 and up to the present imbroglio over her
requisite residency in Tacloban City or Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, there is no showing that she ever
attempted to acquire any other domicile of choice which could have resulted in the abandonment
of her legal domicile in Batac, Ilocos Norte. On that score, we note the majority's own submission
6

that, to successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate (a) an actual removal or an
actual change of domicile, (b) a bona de intention of abandoning the former place of residence
and establishing a new one, and (c) acts which correspond with the purpose.
We consequently have to also note that these requirements for the acquisition of a domicile of
choice apply whether what is sought to be changed or substituted is a domicile of origin
(domicilium originis) or a domicile by operation of law (domicilium necesarium). Since petitioner
had lost her domicilium originis which had been replaced by her domicilium necesarium, it is
therefore her continuing domicile in Batac, Ilocos Norte which, if at all, can be the object of legal
change under the contingencies of the case at bar.
To get out of this quandary, the majority decision echoes the dissenting opinion of Commissioner
Regalado E. Maambong in SPA 95-009 of the Commission on Elections,
7
and advances this novel
proposition.
It may be said that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her
marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952 (sic, 1954). By operation of law
(domicilium necesarium), her legal domicile at the time of her marriage became Batac, Ilocos
Norte although there were no indications of an intention on her part to abandon her domicile of
origin. Because of her husband's subsequent death and through the operation of the provisions of
the New Family Code already in force at the time, however, her legal domicile automatically
reverted to her domicile of origin. . . . (Emphasis supplied).
Firstly, I am puzzled why although it is conceded that petitioner had acquired a domicilium
necesarium in Batac, Ilocos Norte, the majority insists on making a qualication that she did not
intend to abandon her domicile of origin. I nd this bewildering since, in this situation, it is the law
that declares where petitioner's domicile is at any given time, and not her self-serving or putative
intent to hold on to her former domicile. Otherwise, contrary to their own admission that one
cannot have more than one domicile at a time,
8
the majority would be suggesting that petitioner
retained Tacloban City as (for lack of a term in law since it does not exist therein) the equivalent of
what is fancied as a reserved, dormant, potential, or residual domicile.
Secondly, domicile once lost in accordance with law can only be recovered likewise in accordance
with law. However, we are here being titillated with the possibility of an automatic reversion to or
reacquisition of a domicile of origin after the termination of the cause for its loss by operation of
law. The majority agrees that since petitioner lost her domicile of origin by her marriage, the
termination of the marriage also terminates that effect thereof. I am impressed by the
ingeniousness of this theory which proves that, indeed, necessity is the mother of inventions.
Regretfully, I nd some difculty in accepting either the logic or the validity of this argument.
If a party loses his domicile of origin by obtaining a new domicile of choice, he thereby voluntarily
abandons the former in favor of the latter. If, thereafter, he abandons that chosen domicile, he does
not per se recover his original domicile unless, by subsequent acts legally indicative thereof, he
evinces his intent and desire to establish the same as his new domicile, which is precisely what
petitioner belatedly and, evidently just for purposes of her candidacy, unsuccessfully tried to do.
One's subsequent abandonment of his domicile of choice cannot automatically restore his
domicile of origin, not only because there is no legal authority therefor but because it would be
absurd Pursued to its logical consequence, that theory of ipso jure reversion would rule out the
fact that said party could already very well have obtained another domicile, either of choice or by
operation of law, other than his domicile of origin. Signicantly and obviously for this reason, the
Family Code, which the majority inexplicably invokes, advisedly does not regulate this contingency
since it would impinge on one's freedom of choice.
Now, in the instant case, petitioner not only voluntarily abandoned her domicile of choice (unless
we assume that she entered into the marital state against her will) but, on top of that, such
abandonment was further afrmed through her acquisition of a new domicile by operation of law.
In fact, this is even a case of both voluntary and legal abandonment of a domicile of origin. With
much more reason, therefore, should we reject the proposition that with the termination of her
marriage in 1989, petitioner had supposedly per se and ipso facto reacquired her domicile of
origin which she lost in 1954. Otherwise, this would be tantamount to saying that during the
period of marital coverture, she was simultaneously in possession and enjoyment of a domicile of
origin which was only in a state of suspended animation.
Thus, the American rule is likewise to the effect that while after the husband's death the wife has
the right to elect her own domicile,
9
she nevertheless retains the last domicile of her deceased
husband until she makes an actual change.
10
In the absence of afrmative evidence, to the
contrary, the presumption is that a wife's domicile or legal residence follows that of her husband
and will continue after his death.
11

I cannot appreciate the premises advanced in support of the majority's theory based on Articles 68
and 69 of the Family Code. All that is of any relevance therein is that under this new code, the right
and power to x the family domicile is now shared by the spouses. I cannot perceive how that joint
right, which in the rst place was never exercised by the spouses, could affect the domicile xed by
the law for petitioner in 1954 and, for her husband, long prior thereto. It is true that a wife now has
the coordinate power to determine the conjugal or family domicile, but that has no bearing on this
case. With the death of her husband, and each of her children having gotten married and
established their own respective domiciles, the exercise of that joint power was and is no longer
called for or material in the present factual setting of this controversy. Instead, what is of concern in
petitioner's case was the matter of her having acquired or not her own domicile of choice.
I agree with the majority's discourse on the virtues of the growing and expanded participation of
women in the affairs of the nation, with equal rights and recognition by Constitution and statutory
conferment. However, I have searched in vain for a specic law or judicial pronouncement which
either expressly or by necessary implication supports the majority's desired theory of automatic
reacquisition of or reversion to the domicilium originis of petitioner. Denitely, as between the
settled and desirable legal norms that should govern this issue, there is a world of difference; and,
unquestionably, this should be resolved by legislative articulation but not by the eloquence of the
well-turned phrase.
In sum, petitioner having lost Tacloban City as her domicile of origin since 1954 and not having
automatically reacquired any domicile therein, she cannot legally claim that her residency in the
political constituency of which it is a part continued since her birth up to the present. Respondent
commission was, therefore, correct in rejecting her pretension to that effect in her amended/
corrected certicate of candidacy, and in holding her to her admission in the original certicate
that she had actually resided in that constituency for only seven months prior to the election. These
considerations render it unnecessary to further pass upon the procedural issues raised by
petitioner.
ON THE FOREGOING PREMISES, I vote to DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.
DAVIDE, JR., J., dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the opinion of the majority written by Mr. Justice Santiago M. Kapunan,
more particularly on the issue of the petitioner's qualication.
Under Section 7, Subdivision A, Article IX of the Constitution, decisions, orders, or rulings of the
COMELEC may be brought to this Court only by the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court (Aratuc vs. COMELEC, 88 SCRA 251 [1979]; Dario vs. Mison, 176 SCRA 84
[1989]).
Accordingly, a writ of certiorari may be granted only if the COMELEC has acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion (Section 1, Rule 65, Rules of Court). Since
the COMELEC has, undoubtedly, jurisdiction over the private respondent's petition, the only issue
left is whether it acted with grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying the petitioner.
My careful and meticulous perusal of the challenged resolution of 24 April 1995 of the COMELEC
Second Division and the En Banc resolution of 7 May 1995 discloses total absence of abuse of
discretion, much less grave abuse thereof. The resolution of the Second Division dispassionately
and objectively discussed in minute details the facts which established beyond cavil that herein
petitioner was disqualied as a candidate on the ground of lack of residence in the First
Congressional District of Leyte. It has not misapplied, miscomprehended, or misunderstood facts
or circumstances of substance pertinent to the issue of her residence.
The majority opinion, however, overturned the COMELEC's ndings of fact for lack of proof that
the petitioner has abandoned Tolosa as her domicile of origin, which is allegedly within the First
Congressional District of Leyte.
I respectfully submit that the petitioner herself has provided the COMELEC, either by admission or
by documentary evidence, overwhelming proof of the loss or abandonment of her domicile of
origin, which is Tacloban City and not Tolosa, Leyte. Assuming that she decided to live again in her
domicile of origin, that became her second domicile of choice, where her stay, unfortunately, was
for only seven months before the day of the election. She was then disqualied to be a candidate
for the position of Representative of the First Congressional District of Leyte. A holding to the
contrary would be arbitrary.
It may indeed be conceded that the petitioner's domicile of choice was either Tacloban City or
Tolosa, Leyte. Nevertheless, she lost it by operation of law sometime in May 1954 upon her
marriage to the then Congressman (later, President) Ferdinand E. Marcos. A domicile by operation
of law is that domicile which the law attributes to a person, independently of his own intention or
actual residence, as results from legal domestic relations as that of the wife arising from marriage
(28 C.J.S. Domicile 7, 11). Under the governing law then, Article 110 of the Civil Code, her new
domicile or her domicile of choice was the domicile of her husband, which was Batac, Ilocos Norte.
Said Article reads as follows:
Commenting thereon, civilist Arturo M. Tolentino states:
Although the duty of the spouses to live together is mutual, the husband has a predominant right
because he is empowered by law to x the family residence. This right even predominates over
some rights recognized by law in the wife. For instance, under article 117 the wife may engage in
business or practice a profession or occupation. But because of the power of the husband to x
the family domicile he may x it at such a place as would make it impossible for the wife to
continue in business or in her profession. For justiable reasons, however, the wife may be
exempted from living in the residence chosen by the husband. The husband cannot validly allege
desertion by the wife who refuses to follow him to a new place of residence, when it appears that
they have lived for years in a suitable home belonging to the wife, and that his choice of a different
home is not made in good faith. (Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the
Philippines, vol. 1, 1985 ed., 339).
Under common law, a woman upon her marriage loses her own domicile and, by operation of law,
acquires that of her husband, no matter where the wife actually lives or what she believes or
intends. Her domicile is xed in the sense that it is declared to be the same as his, and subject to
certain limitations, he can change her domicile by changing his own (25 Am Jur 2d Domicile 48,
37).
It must, however, be pointed out that under Article 69 of the Family Code, the xing of the family
domicile is no longer the sole prerogative of the husband, but is now a joint decision of the
spouses, and in case of disagreement the court shall decide. The said article uses the term "family
domicile," and not family residence, as "the spouses may have multiple residences, and the wife
may elect to remain in one of such residences, which may destroy the duty of the spouses to live
together and its corresponding benets" (ALICIA V. SEMPIO-DIY, Handbook on the Family Code of
the Philippines, [1988], 102).
The theory of automatic restoration of a woman's domicile of origin upon the death of her
husband, which the majority opinion adopts to overcome the legal effect of the petitioner's
marriage on her domicile, is unsupported by law and by jurisprudence. The settled doctrine is that
after the husband's death the wife has a right to elect her own domicile, but she retains the last
domicile of her husband until she makes an actual change (28 C.J.S. Domicile 12, 27). Or, on the
death of the husband, the power of the wife to acquire her own domicile is revived, but until she
exercises the power her domicile remains that of the husband at the time of his death (25 Am Jur
2d Domicile 62, 45). Note that what is revived is not her domicile of origin but her power to
acquire her own domicile.
Clearly, even after the death of her husband, the petitioner's domicile was that of her husband at
the time of his death which was Batac, Ilocos Norte, since their residences in San Juan, Metro
Manila, and San Miguel, Manila, were their residences for convenience to enable her husband to
effectively perform his ofcial duties. Their residence in San Juan was a conjugal home, and it was
there to which she returned in 1991 when she was already a widow. In her sworn certicate of
candidacy for the Ofce of the President in the synchronized elections of May 1992, she indicated
therein that she was a resident of San Juan, Metro Manila. She also voted in the said elections in
that place.
On the basis of her evidence, it was only on 24 August 1994 when she exercised her right as a
widow to acquire her own domicile in Tolosa, Leyte, through her sworn statement requesting the
Election Ofcer of San Juan, Metro Manila, to cancel her registration in the permanent list of voters
in Precinct 157 thereat and praying that she be "re-registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa,
Leyte, the place of [her] birth and permanent residence" (photocopy of Exhibit "B," attached as
Annex "2" of private respondent Montejo's Comment). Notably, she contradicted this sworn
statement regarding her place of birth when, in her Voter's Afdavit sworn to on 15 March 1992
(photocopy of Exhibit "C," attached as Annex "3," Id.), her Voter Registration Record sworn to on
28 January 1995 (photocopy of Exhibit "E," attached as Annex "5," Id.), and her Certicate of
Candidacy sworn to on 8 March 1995 (photocopy of Exhibit "A," attached as Annex "1," Id.), she
solemnly declared that she was born in Manila.
The petitioner is even uncertain as to her domicile of origin. Is it Tacloban City or Tolosa, Leyte? In
the afdavit attached to her Answer to the petition for disqualication (Annex "I" of Petition), she
declared under oath that her "domicile or residence is Tacloban City." If she did intend to return to
such domicile or residence of origin why did she inform the Election Ofcer of San Juan that she
would transfer to Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, and indicate in her Voter's Registration Record and in her
certicate of candidacy that her residence is Olot, Tolosa, Leyte? While this uncertainty is not
important insofar as residence in the congressional district is concerned, it nevertheless proves
that forty-one years had already lapsed since she had lost or abandoned her domicile of origin by
virtue of marriage and that such length of time diminished her power of recollection or blurred her
memory.
I nd to be misplaced the reliance by the majority opinion on Faypon vs. Quirino (96 Phil. 294
[1954]), and the subsequent cases which established the principle that absence from original
residence or domicile of origin to pursue studies, practice one's profession, or engage in business
in other states does not constitute loss of such residence or domicile. So is the reliance on Section
117 of the Omnibus Election Code which provides that transfer of residence to any other place by
reason of one's "occupation; profession; employment in private and public service; educational
activities; work in military or naval reservations; service in the army, navy or air force, the
constabulary or national police force; or connement or detention in government institutions in
accordance with law" is not deemed as loss of original residence. Those cases and legal provision
do not include marriage of a woman. The reason for the exclusion is, of course, Article 110 of the
Civil Code. If it were the intention of this Court or of the legislature to consider the marriage of a
woman as a circumstance which would not operate as an abandonment of domicile (of origin or of
choice), then such cases and legal provision should have expressly mentioned the same.
This Court should not accept as gospel truth the self-serving claim of the petitioner in her afdavit
(Annex "A" of her Answer in COMELEC SPA No. 95-009; Annex "I" of Petition) that her "domicile or
residence of origin is Tacloban City," and that she "never intended to abandon this domicile or
residence of origin to which [she] always intended to return whenever absent." Such a claim of
intention cannot prevail over the effect of Article 110 of the Civil Code. Besides, the facts and
circumstances or the vicissitudes of the petitioner's life after her marriage in 1954 conclusively
establish that she had indeed abandoned her domicile of origin and had acquired a new one
animo et facto (KOSSUTH KENT KENNAN, A Treatise on Residence and Domicile, [1934], 214, 326).
Neither should this Court place complete trust on the petitioner's claim that she "merely
committed an honest mistake" in writing down the word "seven" in the space provided for the
residency qualication requirement in the certicate of candidacy. Such a claim is self-serving and,
in the light of the foregoing disquisitions, would be all sound and fury signifying nothing. To me,
she did not commit any mistake, honest or otherwise; what she stated was the truth.
The majority opinion also disregards a basic rule in evidence that he who asserts a fact or the
afrmative of an issue has the burden of proving it (Imperial Victory Shipping Agency vs. NLRC,
200 SCRA 178 [1991]; P.T. Cerna Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 221 SCRA 19 [1993]). Having admitted
marriage to the then Congressman Marcos, the petitioner could not deny the legal consequence
thereof on the change of her domicile to that of her husband. The majority opinion rules or at least
concludes that "[b]y operation of law (domicilium necesarium), her legal domicile at the time of her
marriage automatically became Batac, Ilocos Norte." That conclusion is consistent with Article 110
of the Civil Code. Since she is presumed to retain her deceased husband's domicile until she
exercises her revived power to acquire her own domicile, the burden is upon her to prove that she
has exercised her right to acquire her own domicile. She miserably failed to discharge that burden.
I vote to deny the petition.
Footnotes
1 Jarrolt v. Mabberly, 103 U.S. 580 (1881).
2 CONST, art. VI, states:
Sec. 6. No person shall be a member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines
and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-ve years of age, able to read and write, and except the party-list
representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not
less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election.
See, Jarrolt v. Mabberly, supra, note 1.
3 Gallego vs. Vera, 73 Phil. 453 (1941).
4 Rollo, p. 114, Annex "D".
5 Rollo, p. 110, Annex "D".
6 Rollo, p. 113.
7 Rollo, p. 111.
8 Rollo, p. 115, Annex "E".
9 Signed by Virgilo S. Oledan, Provincial Election Supervisor IV, Leyte; Rollo,
p. 116, Annex "F".
10 Rollo, p. 117, Annex "G". Petitioner explained the circumstances surrounding the lling up of the original certicate
thus:
1. On March 8, 1995, I led my certicate of candidacy for Member of the House of Representatives (Congresswoman) of
the First Legislative District of the province of Leyte, which was drafted by Mr. Filomeno A. Zeta.
2. I learned lately that Congressman Cirilo Montejo wants to disqualify me as I allegedly lack residence in the constituency
because of the entry of the word "SEVEN" in Item No. 8 of my certicate of candidacy.
3. I read my certicate of candidacy before signing it and thought of the word "RESIDENCE" to mean actual or physical
residence, and the word "SEVEN" merely reected my actual and physical residence in Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte.
3.1. The word "SEVEN" was placed on my certicate of candidacy to indicate that at lease one (1) month had passed from
my registration as voter of Tolosa, Leyte, on January 28, 1995, when I wrote "06" months under "PERIOD OF RESIDENCE"
as my actual or physical residence in the town.
4. I thought then that the sense in Item No. 10 of my certicate of candidacy stating "THAT I AM eligible for said Ofce"
was sufcient to afrm that I possess all the qualications, including my residence, for Member of the House of
Representatives for which I am aspiring in the May 8, 1995 elections.
5. The fact, however, is that my domicile or residence of origin is Tacloban City, a component city of the First Legislative
District of Leyte I never intended to abandon this domicile or residence of origin to which I always intended to return
whenever absent; indeed in 1992, I returned to Tacloban City to live and stay there. On November 5, 1992; I bought my
Residence Certicate No. 15226186L there, which is made an integral part hereof as Annex "I" (Annex "2" hereof).
11 Id., at p. 120. See also, Rollo, p. 130-133, Annex "I", petitioner's Afdavit explaining her residence:
13. I established my domicile, however in Tacloban, Leyte (Tacloban City in 1938, when was little over eight (8) years old.
Shortly after my mother died on April 7, 1938, my widowed father, Vicente Orestes Romualdez, brought me and my
brothers. . .and my sisters to Tacloban, Leyte (now Tacloban City) his hometown.
xxx xxx xxx
18. I have always considered Tacloban City as my permanent residence or residence of origin have not abandoned and
have never intended to abandon my permanent residence or residence of origin there. To it I always intend to return
whenever absent.
19. In 1952, I went to Manila to work with my cousin, the late speaker
Daniel Z. Romualdez in his ofce in the House of Representatives.
20. In May, 1954, I married President Ferdinand E. Marcos when he was still the congressman of Ilocos, Norte.
21. As a dutiful wife who loved him deeply, I lived with him in Batac, Ilocos Norte and registered as a voter there.
22. In 1965, my husband was elected President of the Republic of the Philippines. Together, we lived in Malacaang
Palace and I registered as a voter in San Miguel, Manila.
23. My registration as voter in Batac, Ilocos Norte; San Juan, Rizal (now San Juan, Metro Manila); and San Miguel, Manila,
was for convenience because I had to live with my husband to serve him when he was congressman, Senator and
President of the Republic of the Philippines. During those years however, I never intended nor desired to abandon my
domicile or residence of origin in Tacloban City, which I established since I was a child.
xxx xxx xxx
33. Throughout the Marcos Presidency, I spent most of my birthday anniversaries and attended the Sto. Nini Fiesta in
Tacloban City. I regularly visited my domicile or residence of origin in Leyte and even held important functions and
entertained guests and foreign dignitaries there.
34. After President Ferdinand E. Marcos and I, together with our children and innocent grandchildren were abducted and
kidnapped to Honolulu, Hawaii, in February, 1986, my Leyte properties were sequestered by the PCGG, and were
destroyed and cannibalized.
xxx xxx xxx
38. Upon my return to the country, I wanted to immediately live and reside in Tacloban City or in Olot, Tolosa, Leyte even
if my residences there were not livable as they had been destroyed and cannibalized. The PCGG, however, did not permit
and allow me.
xxx xxx xxx
40. After the 1992 Presidential Elections, I lived and resided in the residence of my brother in San Jose, Tacloban City, and
pursued my negotiations with PCGG to recover my sequestered residences in Tacloban City and Barangay Olot, Tolosa,
Leyte.
12 Rollo, p. 122.
13 Commissioners Manolo B. Gorospe and Teresita Dy-Liaco Flores formed the majority opinion. Commissioner
Remedies A. Salazar-Fernando dissented.
14 Rollo, p. 64.
15 Rollo, p. 57-64.
16 Petitioner led a "Motion to Recall Resolution Promulgated on April 24, 1995 and to Dismiss the Petition Because of
Lapse of Jurisdiction; Alternatively, Motion for Reconsideration." The Commission's May 7, 1995 Resolution treated the
same simply as a Motion for Reconsideration.
17 Commissioners Regalado E. Maambong, Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando and Julio F. Desamito dissented. All led
separate dissenting opinions. In disqualifying petitioner, the majority held:
As it stands now, only the Certicate of Candidacy respondent led on March 8, 1995, stands, and on the basis of the
entries therein, she is disqualied to run for failure to meet the constitutional requirement of one (1) year of residence in
the place where she wanted to be elected.
18 Rollo, p. 78, Annex "B".
19 Rollo, Annex "D".
20 19 SCRA 966 (1967). See also, Corre v. Corre, 100 Phil. 221 (1956).
21 Id. at 969.
22 Uytengsu v. Republic, 95 Phil. 890 (1954).
23 Id.
24 52 Phil. 645 (1928).
25 Citing People v. Bender 144 N.Y.S., 145.
26 61 Phil. 36 (1934).
27 96 Phil. 294 (1954).
28 Id, see also Ujano v. Republic, 17 SCRA 147 (1966); Nuval v. Guray, supra
note 22.
29 II RECORD OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, 110 (July 22, 1986).
30 Id.
31 199 SCRA 692 (1991).
32 Id, at 714.
33 61 Phil. 36 (1934).
34 96 Phil. 294, 299-300 (1954).
35 B.P. 881, sec. 117 states:
xxx xxx xxx
Any person who transfers residence to another city, municipality or country solely by reason of his occupation; profession;
employment in private or public service; educational activities; work in military or naval reservations; service in the army,
navy or air force; the constabulary or national police force; or connement or detention in government institutions in
accordance with law shall not be deemed to have lost his original residence.
36 Rollo, p. 38.
37 18 Am Jur 219-220.
38 20 Am Jur 71.
39 TOLENTINO 1 COMMENTARIES & JURISPRUDENCE ON THE CIVIL CODE, 220 (1987).
40 Id.
41 TOLENTINO, 1 COMMENTARIES AND JURISPRUDENCE ON CIVIL CODE, 220 (1987).
42 Under modern laws, it is clear that many exceptions to the rule that the domicile of the wife is determined by that of
her husband must obtain. Accordingly, the wife may acquire another and separate domicile from that of her husband
where the theoretical unity of the husband and wife is dissolved, as it is by the institution of divorce proceedings; or
where the husband has given cause for divorce; or where there is a separation of the parties by agreement, or a
permanent separation due to desertion of the wife by the husband or attributable to cruel treatment on the part of the
husband; or where there has been a forfeiture by the wife of the benet of the husband's domicile. 9 R.C.L., 545, cited in
De La Vina, supra. If the law allows the wife to automatically revert to her original domicile or acquire a new domicile under
these situations, all the more should it sanction a reversion or the acquisition of a new domicile by the wife upon the
death of her husband.
43 41 Phi. 13 (1920).
44 The rule that the wife automatically acquires or follows her husband's domicile is not an absolute one. A specic
situation recognized in Spanish jurisprudence involves the one in which husband acquiesces (1 Manresa 223) or gives his
tacit consent (Scaevola, Civil Code; 354.)
45 42 Phil. 54 (1921).
46 Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy recognizes the same Civil Code distinction. However, taking another approach, she writes:
(6) The above Article (Article 69, FC) uses the term "family domicile" instead of family residence because the spouses may
have multiple residences, and the wife may elect to remain in one of such residences, which may destroy the duty of the
spouses to live together and its corresponding benets. SEMPIO-DIY, HANDBOOK ON THE FAMILY CODE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, 102 (1988).
47 Rollo, pp. 132-133.
48 The provision reads: Section 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certicate of candidacy. A veried petition
seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certicate of candidacy may be led by any person exclusively on the ground
that any material representation contained therein as required under
Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be led at any time not later than twenty-ve days from the time of ling of the
certicate of candidacy and shall be decided after due notice and hearing, not later than fteen days before the election.
49 Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51 (1983).
50 American Tupe Founders Co. v. Justice's Court, 133 Cal. 819, 65 Pac. 742; Heillen v. Phillipps, 88 Cal. 557, 26 Pac. 366;
Drake v. Bagley, 69 Mo. App. 39; State v. Davis, 194 Mo. 585.
51 Supra, note 39, citing Hufnes v. Gold 154 Tenn. 583, 588; 288 S.W. 353, 354.
52 Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualication Case. Any candidate who has been declared by nal judgment to be disqualied
shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by
nal judgment before an election to be disqualied and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such
election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon
motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such
candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
Sec. 7 Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel a Certicate Candidacy.
The procedure hereinabove provided shall apply to petitions to deny due course to or cancel a certicate of candidacy as
provided in Section 78 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.
53 CONST., art. VI, sec. 11 states:
The Senate and the House of Representatives shall have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all
questions relating to the election, returns, and qualications of their respective Members. . . .
1 Aristotle, Ethica Nichomachea, bk., v. 3, 1131 (a) (W. Ross translation, 1925 ed).
2 It provides: "No person shall be a member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural born citizen of the
Philippines and on the day of the election, is at least twenty-ve years of age, able to read and write, and except the party
list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not
less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election." (Emphasis supplied)
3 There are two (2) other instances when a married woman may have a domicile different from the husband: (1) if they are
legally separated pursuant to par. 1, Art. 106 of the Civil Code, and (2) if the husband forcibly ejects the wife from the
conjugal home to have illicit relations with another. (De la Via v. Villareal and Geopano, 41 Phil. 13 [1920]).
4 Op cit.
5 Id., at pp. 16-17.
6 Id., at p. 20, citing 1 Manresa 223.
7 25 AM JUR 2nd S. 48, p. 37.
8 28 CJS on Domicile, S. 12, 27; 25 AM JUR 2nd on Domicile S. 62, 46.
9 28 CJS, S. 12, p. 24.
10 Restatement of the Law, 2d, Conict of Laws 2d., S. 21, p. 84.
11 Ibid.
12 83 U.S. 442; 21 Law Ed. 442; S.C. 16 Wall 130.
13 Supra.
14 Supra.
15 In re Green's Estate, 191 N.Y.S. 757, 117 Misc. 800, 165 N.Y.S. 1063, 99 Misc. 582.
16 Clark et al. v. Baker et al., 196 SE 750, 186 Ga 65.
17 Lefcourt, Women and The Law, 1990 ed.
18 404 US 71.
19 28 CJS S. 12, p. 25 citing Shute v. Sargent, 36 A 282, 67 N.H. 305.
20 Op cit., p. 84.
21 Women's Status in Philippine Society, UP Law Center, 1979, pp. 4-6.
22 In submitting the draft of the Family Code to President Corazon Aquino, the Civil Code Revision Committee stated:
Close to forty years of experience under the Civil Code adopted in 1949 and changes and developments in all aspects of
Filipino Life since then have revealed the unsuitability of certain provisions of that Code, implanted from foreign sources,
to Philippine culture; the unfairness, unjustness, and gaps or inadequacies of others; and the need to attune them to
contemporary developments and trends.
In particular to cite only a few instances (1) the property regime of conjugal partnership of gains is not in accord with
Filipino custom, especially in the rural areas, which is more congenial to absolute community of property; (2) there have
considerably been more grounds for annulment of marriage by the Church than those provided by the Code, thus giving
rise to the absurd situation of several marriages already annulled under Canon Law but still considered subsisting under
the Civil Law and making it necessary to make the grounds for annulment under both laws to coincide; (3) unequal
treatment of husband and wife as to rights and responsibilities, which necessitates a response to the long-standing clamor
for equality between men and women now mandated as a policy to be implemented under the New Constitution; (4) the
inadequacy of the safeguards for strengthening marriage and the family as basic social institutions recognized as such by
the New Constitution; (5) recent developments have shown the absurdity of limiting the grounds for legal separation to
the antiquated two grounds provided under the Civil Code; (6) the need for additional safeguards to protect our children
in the matter of adoption by foreigners; and (7) to bring our law on paternity and liation in step with or abreast of the
latest scientic discoveries." (Emphasis supplied)
23 Article 96, Family Code.
28 Op cit., Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines, pp. 98-99.
29 As cited in Diy, Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines, pp. 184-185.
30 Section 1, Article III of the Constitution provides: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws."
31 Exhibit "E"; see also Exhibit "B" in SPA No. 95-001.
32 Exhibit "A" in SPA No. 95-009.
33 Exhibit "2" in SPA No. 95-009.
34 2 SCRA 957, 960 (1961); See Canceran v. COMELEC, 107 Phil. 607 (1960); Gabaldon v. COMELEC, 99 Phil. 898 (1956).
35 Section 26, Article II of the Constitution also provides: "The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for
public service . . . ."
36 Annex "G," Petition.
37 Petition, Annex "B-1" pp. 6-7.
38 73 Phil. 453, 459 (1951).
1 See Articles 68-73 of E.O. 209, as amended, otherwise known as The Family Code of the Philippines.
2 Residence Certicate No. 15226186L, dated Nov. 5, 1992.
3 PCGG Chairman Gunigundo's letter addressed to Col. Kempis.
1 Art. VI, Sec. 6, Const.: "No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen
of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-ve years of age, able to read and write, and, except
the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a
period not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election."
2 Art. 110: "The husband shall x the residence of the family. But the court may exempt the wife from living with the
husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of the Republic.
3 Art. 110, Civil Code.
13 Art. II, Sec. 2, Const.
14 Part IV, Art. 15, Paragraph 4, CEDAW.
15 Executive Order No. 209, July 6, 1987, as amended by Executive Order No. 227, July 17,1987, which took effect on
August 3, 1988.
16 Art. II Sec. 11, Const.
17 Art. II, Sec. 14, Const.
18 Art. 69, Family Code.
22 Republic Act No. 7192 approved February 12, 1992.
23 Ibid., Sec. 5.
1 Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC, 211 SCRA 297 (1992) (for mayor).
2 Loong v. COMELEC, 216 SCRA 760 (1992) (for regional vice governor).
3 Abella v. Larrazabal, 180 SCRA 509 (1989); Abella v. COMELEC, 201 SCRA 253 (1991) (for provincial governor).
4 Co. v. HRET, 199 SCRA 692 (1991) (election protest against a Congressman).
5 Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294 (1954) (quo warranto against a governor); Gallego v. Verra, 73 Phil. 453 (1941) (quo
warranto against a mayor); Larena v. Teves, 61 Phil. 36 (1934) (quo warranto against a provincial board member); Tanseco
v. Arteche, 57 Phil. 227 (1932) (quo warranto against a governor): Yra v. Abao, 52 Phil. 380 (1928) (quo warranto against a
municipal president); Vivero v. Murillo, 52 Phil. 694 (1929) (quo warranto against a municipal president). Cf. Aznar v.
COMELEC, 185 SCRA 703 (1990) (quo warranto although prematurely led, against a governor-elect).
6 R.A. No. 6646, 6; Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC, supra note 1.
7 OEC, 76.
8 Lagumbay v. COMELEC, 16 SCRA 175 (1966).
1 Nuval vs. Guray, G.R. No. 30241, December 29, 1928; Larena vs. Teves, G.R.
No. 42439, December 10, 1934; Gallego vs. Verra, G.R. No. 48641, November 24, 1941; De los Reyes vs. Solidum, G.R.
No. 42798. August 31, 1935; but see Romualdez vs. RTC, Br. 7 Tacloban City, where a sudden departure from the country
was not deemed "voluntary" so as to constitute abandonment of domicile both in fact and in law.
2 Annex "A" Petition, pp. 2-4.
1 Struble vs. Struble, Tex. Civ. App., 177 S.W. 2d, 279, 283.
2 This is also referred to as natural domicile or domicile by birth (Johnson vs. Twenty-One Bales, 13 Fed. Cas. 863).
3 Story, Conict of Laws, Sec. 46; Railroad Co. vs. Kimbrough, 115 Ky 512, 74 S.W. 229; and Johnson vs. Harvey, 261 Ky.
522, 88 S.W. 2d 42, 46, 47, as cited in Black's Law Dictionary, 4th ed.
4 Article 110, Civil Code.
5 Towson vs. Towson, 126 Va. 640, 102 S.E. 48, 52; Fisher vs. Jordan, C.C.A. Tex., 116 F. 2d. 183, 186; Minick vs. Minick,
111 Fla. 469, 149 So. 483, 488; Hartzler vs. Radeka, 265 Mich. 451, 251 N.W. 554.
6 Citing 18 Am. Jur. 219-220.
7 Montejo vs. Marcos, En Banc, May 10, 1995.
8 Citing 20 Am. Jur. 71.
9 Cheely vs. Clayton, D.C., 110 U.S. 701, L. Ed. 298.
10 In re Gates' Estate, 191 N.Y.S. 757, 117 Misc. 800 In re Green's Estate, 164 N.Y.S. 1063, 99 Misc. 582, afrmed 165
N.Y.S. 1088, 179 App. Div. 890, as reported in 28 C.J.S. 27.
11 Clark vs. Baker, 196 S.E. 750, 186 Ga. 65, op. cit. 37.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-18684 September 14, 1961
LAMBERTO MACIAS, LORENZO TEVES, FAUSTO DUGENIO, ROGACIANO MERCADO and
MARIANO PERDICES, petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and VICENTE GELLA in his Capacity as National Treasurer,
respondents.
Crispin D. Baizas for petitioners.
Barrios, Garcia and Apostol for respondent Commission on Elections.
Ofce of the Solicitor General for respondent Vicente Gella.

BENGZON, C.J.:
Statement of the case. Petitioners request that respondent ofcials be prevented from
implementing Republic Act 3040 that apportions representative districts in this country. It is
unconstitutional and void, they allege, because: (a) it was passed by the House of Representatives
without printed nal copies of the bill having been furnished the Members at least three calendar
days prior to its passage; (b) it was approved more than three years after the return of the last
census of our population; and (c) it apportioned districts without regard to the number of
inhabitants of the several provinces.
Admitting some allegations but denying others, the respondents aver they were merely complying
with their duties under the statute, which they presume and allege to be constitutional. The
respondent National Treasurer further avers that petitioners have no personality to bring this
action; that a duly certied copy of the law creates the presumption of its having been passed in
accordance with the requirements of the Constitution (distribution of printed bills included); that
the Director of the Census submitted an ofcial report on the population of the Philippines in
November, 1960, which report became the basis of the bill; and that the Act complies with the
principle of proportional representation prescribed by the Constitution..
After hearing the parties and considering their memoranda, this Court reached the conclusion that
the statute be declared invalid, and, aware of the need of prompt action, issued its brief resolution
of August 23, partly in the following language:
Whereas such Republic Act 3040 clearly violates the said constitutional provision in several ways
namely, (a) it gave Cebu seven members, while Rizal with a bigger number of inhabitants got four
only; (b) it gave Manila four members, while Cotabato with a bigger population got three only; . . .;
Whereas such violation of the Constitutional mandate renders the law void;
Therefore, without prejudice to the writing of a more extended opinion passing additionally on
other issues raised in the case, the Court resolved, without any dissent, forthwith to issue the
injunction prayed for by the petitioners. No bond is needed.
What with the reservation announced in the resolution, and what with the motion for
reconsideration, this is now written fully to explain the premises on which our conclusion rested.
Personality of the petitioners. Petitioners are four members of the House of Representatives from
Negros Oriental, Misamis Oriental, and Bulacan, and the provincial governor of Negros Oriental.
They bring this action in behalf of themselves and of other residents of their provinces. They
allege, and this Court nds, that their provinces had been discriminated against by Republic Act
3040, because they were given less representative districts than the number of their inhabitants
required or justied: Misamis Oriental having 387,839 inhabitants, was given one district only,
whereas Cavite with 379,902 inhabitants, was given two districts; Negros Oriental and Bulacan with
598,783 and 557,691 respectively, were allotted 2 representative districts each, whereas Albay with
515,961 was assigned 3 districts.
The authorities hold that "citizens who are deprived of as full and effective an elective franchise as
they are entitled to under the Constitution by an apportionment act, have a sufcient interest to
proceed in a court to test the statute. (18 Am. Jur. 199.)
Therefore, petitioners as voters and as congressmen and governor of the aggrieved provinces
have personality to sue.
In Stiglitz vs. Schardien (Ky) 40 S.W. (2d) 315, the right of a citizen to question the validity of a
redistricting statute was upheld. The same right was recognized in Jones vs. Freeman (Okla.) 146 P.
(2d) 564, the court saying that each citizen has the right to have the State apportioned in
accordance with the Constitution and to be governed by a Legislative fairly representing the whole
body of electorate and elected as required by the Constitution.
Colegrove vs. Green, 328 .U.S. 549, on which respondents rely, appear to be inconclusive: three
against three. The seventh justice concurred in the result even supposing the contrary was
justiciable."
The printed-form, three-day requirement. The Constitution provides that "no bill shall be passed
by either House unless it shall have been printed and copies thereof in its nal form furnished its
Members at least three calendar days prior to its passage, except when the President shall have
certied to the necessity of its immediate enactment."
Petitioners presented certicates of the Secretary of the House of Representatives to show that no
printed copy had been distributed three days before passage of the bill (on May 10, 1961) and
that no certicate of urgency by the President had been received in the House.
The respondents claim in their defense that a statute may not be nullied upon evidence of failure
to print, because "it is conclusively presumed that the details of legislative procedure leading to
the enrollment that are prescribed by the Constitution have been complied with by the
Legislature." They further claim that the certicates of the Secretary of the House are inadmissible,
in view of the conclusive (enrolled-bill) presumption, which in several instances have been applied
by the courts. In further support of their contention, Sec. 313(2) of Act 190 might be cited.
1

On the other hand, it may be said for the petitioners, that such printed bill requirement had a
fundamental purpose to serve
2
and was inserted in the Constitution not as a mere procedural step;
and that the enrolled-bill theory, if adopted, would preclude the courts from enforcing such
requirement in proper cases.
We do not deem it necessary to make a denite pronouncement on the question, because the
controversy may be decided upon the issue of districts-in-proportion-to-inhabitants.1awphl.nt
Population Census. According to the Constitution, "the Congress shall by law, make an
apportionment (of Members of the House) within three years after the return of every enumeration,
and not otherwise." It is admitted that the bill, which later became Republic Act 3040, was based
upon a report submitted to the President by the Director of the Census on November 23, 1960. It
reads:
I have the honor to submit herewith a preliminary count of the population of the Philippines as a
result of the population enumeration which has just been completed. This is a report on the total
number of inhabitants in this country and does not include the population characteristics. It is the
result of a hand tally and may be subject to revision when all the population schedules shall have
been processed mechanically.
The Census of Population is the rst of a series of four censuses which include housing, agriculture
and economics in addition to population. These four censuses together constitute what is known
as the Census of 1960. Like population, the housing and agricultural censuses are undergoing
processing, while the economic census is now under preparation.
Until the nal report is made, these gures should be considered as ofcial for all purposes.
Petitioners maintain that the apportionment could not legally rest on this report since it is merely
"preliminary" and "may be subject to revision." On the other hand, respondents point out that the
above letter says the report should be considered "ofcial for all purposes." They also point out
that the ascertainment of what constitutes a return of an enumeration is a matter for Congress
action. This issue does not clearly favor petitioners, because there are authorities sustaining the
view that although not nal, and still subject to correction, a census enumeration may be
considered ofcial, in the sense that Governmental action may be based thereon even in matters
of apportionment of legislative districts (Cahill vs. Leopold [Conn.] 108 Atl. 2d 818). (See also Elliott
vs. State, 1 Pac. 2d 370; Ervin vs. State, 44 S.W. 2d 380; Herndon vs. Excise Board, 295 Pac. 223;
Holcomb vs. Spikes, 232 S.W. 891.)
Apportionment of Members. The Constitution directs that the one hundred twenty Members of
the House of Representatives "shall be apportioned among the several provinces as nearly as may
be according to the member of their respective inhabitants." In our resolution on August 23, we
held that this provision was violated by Republic Act 3040 because (a) it gave Cebu seven
members, while Rizal with a bigger number of inhabitants got four only; (b) it gave Manila four
members, while Cotabato with a bigger population got three only; (c) Pangasinan with less
inhabitants than both Manila and Cotabato got more than both, ve members having been
assigned to it; (d) Samar (with 871,857) was allotted four members while Davao with 903,224 got
three only; (e) Bulacan with 557,691 got two only, while Albay with less inhabitants (515,691) got
three, and (f) Misamis Oriental with 387,839 was given one member only, while Cavite with less
inhabitants (379,904) got two. These were not the only instances of unequal apportionment. We
see that Mountain Province has 3 whereas Isabela, Laguna and Cagayan with more inhabitants
have 2 each. And then, Capiz, La Union and Ilocos Norte got 2 each, whereas Sulu that has more
inhabitants got 1 only. And Leyte with 967,323 inhabitants got 4 only, whereas Iloilo with less
inhabitants (966,145) was given 5.
Such disproportion of representation has been held sufcient to avoid apportionment laws
enacted in States having Constitutional provisions similar to ours. For instance, in Massachusetts,
the Constitution required division "into representative district . . . equally, as nearly as may be,
according to the relative number of legal voters in the several districts." The Supreme Judicial
Court of that state found this provision violated by an allotment that gave 3 representatives to
7,946 voters and only 2 representatives to 8,618 voters, and further gave two representatives to
4,854 voters and one representative to 5,598 voters. Justice Rugg said:
It is not an approximation to equality to allot three representatives to 7,946 voters, and only two
representatives to 8,618 voters, and to allot two representatives to 4,854 voters, and one
representative to 5,596 voters. . . .
Whenever this kind of inequality of apportionment has been before the courts, it has been held to
be contrary to the Constitution. It has been said to be "arbitrary and capricious and against the
vital principle of equality." Houghton County v. Blacker, 92 Mich. 638, 647, 653; 16 LRA 432, 52
N.W. 951; Giddings vs. Blacken, 93 Mich. 1, 13, 16 LRA 402, 52 N.W. 944; Barker v. State, 133 Ind.
178, 197, 18 LRA 567, 32 NE 836, 33 NE 119; Denney v. State, 144 Ind. 503, 535, 31 LRA 726, 42 N.
E. 929.
Other cases along the same line upholding the same view are these:
1. Stiglitz v. Schardien, supra, wherein twelve districts entitled to but six were given twelve
representatives, and twelve districts given twelve only were actually entitled to twenty-two.
2. Jones v. Freeman, supra, wherein districts entitled to only 3 senators were given 7, and districts
entitled to 15 were assigned seven only.
It is argued in the motion to reconsider, that since Republic Act 3040 improves existing conditions,
this Court could perhaps, in the exercise of judicial statesmanship, consider the question involved
as purely political and therefore non-justiciable. The overwhelming weight of authority is that
district apportionment laws are subject to review by the courts.
The constitutionality of a legislative apportionment act is a judicial question, and not one which the
court cannot consider on the ground that it is a political question. (Parker v. State ex rel. Powell, 18
L.R.A. 567, 133 Ind. 178, 32 N.E. 836; State ex rel. Morris v. Wrightson, 22 L.R.A. 548, 56 N.J.L. 126,
28 Atl. 56; Harmison v. Ballot Comrs. 42 L.R.A. 591, 45 W. Va. 179, 31 S. E. 394)
It is well settled that the passage of apportionment acts is not so exclusively within the political
power of the legislature as to preclude a court from inquiring into their constitutionality when the
question is properly brought before it. (Indiana-Parker v. Powell (1882) 133 Ind. 178, 18 L.R.A. 567,
32 N. E. 836, 33 N. E. 119; Denney v. State (1896) 144 Ind. 503; 31 L.R.A. 726, 42 N. E. 929; Marion
County v. Jewett (1915) 184 Ind. 63, 110 N. E. 553.) (Kentucky-Ragland v. Anderson (1907) 125 Ky
141, 128 Am. St. Rep. 242, 100 S. W. 865.) (Massachusetts-Atty. Gen. v. Suffolk County
Apportionment Comrs., etc.)
It may be added in this connection, that the mere impact of the suit upon the political situation
does not render it political instead of judicial. (Lamb v. Cunningham, 17 L.R.A. 145, 83 Wis. 90.) .
The alleged circumstance that this statute improves the present set-up constitutes no excuse for
approving a transgression of constitutional limitations, because the end does not justify the means.
Furthermore, there is no reason to doubt that, aware of the existing inequality of representation,
and impelled by its sense of duty, Congress will opportunely approve remedial legislation in
accord with the precepts of the Constitution.
Needless to say, equality of representation
3
in the Legislature being such an essential feature of
republican institutions, and affecting so many lives, the judiciary may not with a clear conscience
stand by to give free hand to the discretion of the political departments of the Government. Cases
are numerous wherein courts intervened upon proof of violation of the constitutional principle of
equality of representation.
An injunction to prevent the secretary of state from issuing notices of election under an
unconstitutional apportionment act gerry-mandering the state is not a usurpation of authority by
the court, on the ground that the question is a political one, but the constitutionality of the act is
purely a judicial question. (State ex rel. Adams County v. Cunningham, 15 L.R.A. 561, 81 Wis. 440,
51 N.W. 724.)
The fact that the action may have a political effect, and in that sense effect a political object, does
not make the questions involved in a suit to declare the unconstitutionality of an apportionment
act political instead of judicial. (State ex rel. Lamb v. Cunningham, 17 L.R.A. 145, 83 Wis. 90, 53
N.W. 48.)
An unconstitutional apportionment law may be declared void by the courts, notwithstanding the
fact that such statute is an exercise of political power. (Denney vs. State ex rel. Basler, 31 L.R.A. 726,
144 Ind. 503, 42 N.E. 929.)
The constitutionality of a statute forming a delegate district or apportioning delegates for the
house of delegates is a judicial question for the courts, although the statute is an exercise of
political power. (Harmison v. Ballot Comrs. 42 L.R.A. 591, 45 W. Va. 179, 31 S. E. 394.) [3 L.R.A.
Digest, p. 2737.)
Conclusion. For all the foregoing, we hereby reiterate our resolution declaring that Republic Act
3040 infringed the provisions of the Constitution and is therefore void.
Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, De Leon and Natividad, JJ.,
concur.
Bautista Angelo, J., is on leave.

Footnotes
1
". . . Provided, That in the case of Acts of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine Legislature
when there is in existence a copy signed by the presiding ofcers and the secretaries of said
bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Act and of the due enactment thereof."
(Emphasis supplied)
2
;To prevent fraud, trickery, deceit and subterfuge in the enactment of bills (59 Corpus Juris 54).
3
"lies at the foundation of representative government" (18 Am. Jur. 192).

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 86344 December 21, 1989
REP. RAUL A. DAZA, petitioner,
vs.
REP. LUIS C. SINGSON and HON. RAOUL V. VICTORINO IN THE LATTER'S CAPACITY AS
SECRETARY OF THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, respondent.

CRUZ, J.:
After the congressional elections of May 11, 1987, the House of Representatives proportionally
apportioned its twelve seats in the Commission on Appointments among the several political
parties represented in that chamber, including the Lakas ng Bansa, the PDP-Laban, the NP-Unido,
the Liberal Party, and the KBL, in accordance with Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution.
Petitioner Raul A. Daza was among those chosen and was listed as a representative of the Liberal
Party.
1

On September 16, 1988, the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino was reorganized, resulting in a
political realignment in the House of Representatives. Twenty four members of the Liberal Party
formally resigned from that party and joined the LDP, thereby swelling its number to 159 and
correspondingly reducing their former party to only 17 members.
2

On the basis of this development, the House of Representatives revised its representation in the
Commission on Appointments by withdrawing the seat occupied by the petitioner and giving this
to the newly-formed LDP. On December 5, 1988, the chamber elected a new set of representatives
consisting of the original members except the petitioner and including therein respondent Luis C.
Singson as the additional member from the LDP.
3

The petitioner came to this Court on January 13, 1989, to challenge his removal from the
Commission on Appointments and the assumption of his seat by the respondent. Acting initially on
his petition for prohibition and injunction with preliminary injunction, we issued a temporary
restraining order that same day to prevent both the petitioner and the respondent from serving in
the Commission on Appointments.
4

Briey stated, the contention of the petitioner is that he cannot be removed from the Commission
on Appointments because his election thereto is permanent under the doctrine announced in
Cunanan v. Tan.
5
His claim is that the reorganization of the House representation in the said body
is not based on a permanent political realignment because the LDP is not a duly registered
political party and has not yet attained political stability.
For his part, the respondent argues that the question raised by the petitioner is political in nature
and so beyond the jurisdiction of this Court. He also maintains that he has been improperly
impleaded, the real party respondent being the House of Representatives which changed its
representation in the Commission on Appointments and removed the petitioner. Finally, he
stresses that nowhere in the Constitution is it required that the political party be registered to be
entitled to proportional representation in the Commission on Appointments.
In addition to the pleadings led by the parties, a Comment was submitted by the Solicitor
General as amicus curiae in compliance with an order from the Court.
At the core of this controversy is Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution providing as follows:
Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate,
as ex ofcio Chairman, twelve Senators and twelve Members of the House of Representatives,
elected by each House on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and
parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The Chairman
of the Commission shall not vote, except in case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all
appointments submitted to it within thirty session days of the Congress from their submission. The
Commission shall rule by a majority vote of all the Members.
Ruling rst on the jurisdictional issue, we hold that, contrary to the respondent's assertion, the
Court has the competence to act on the matter at bar. Our nding is that what is before us is not a
discretionary act of the House of Representatives that may not be reviewed by us because it is
political in nature. What is involved here is the legality, not the wisdom, of the act of that chamber
in removing the petitioner from the Commission on Appointments. That is not a political question
because, as Chief Justice Concepcion explained in Tanada v. Cuenco.
6

... the term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance,
namely, a question of policy. In other words, ... it refers "to those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the
Government." It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular
measure.
In the aforementioned case, the Court was asked by the petitioners therein to annul the election of
two members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal of that chamber, on the ground that they had not
been validly nominated. The Senate then consisted of 23 members from the Nacionalista Party and
the petitioner as the lone member of the Citizens Party. Senator Lorenzo M. Tanada nominated
only himself as the minority representative in the Tribunal, whereupon the majority elected
Senators Mariano J. Cuenco. and Francisco Delgado, from its own ranks, to complete the nine-man
composition of the Tribunal as provided for in the 1935 Constitution. The petitioner came to this
Court, contending that under Article VI, Section 11, of that Charter, the six legislative members of
the Tribunal were to be chosen by the Senate, "three upon nomination of the party having the
largest number of votes and three of the party having the second largest number of votes therein."
As the majority party in the Senate, the Nacionalista Party could nominate only three members and
could not also ll the other two seats pertaining to the minority.
By way of special and afrmative defenses, the respondents contended inter alia that the subject
of the petition was an internal matter that only the Senate could resolve. The Court rejected this
argument, holding that what was involved was not the wisdom of the Senate in choosing the
respondents but the legality of the choice in light of the requirement of the Constitution. The
petitioners were questioning the manner of lling the Tribunal, not the discretion of the Senate in
doing so. The Court held that this was a justiciable and not a political question, thus:
Such is not the nature of the question for determination in the present case. Here, we are called
upon to decide whether the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado by the Senate, as members
of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, upon nomination by Senator Primicias-member and spokesman of
the party having the largest number of votes in the Senate-behalf of its Committee on Rules,
contravenes the constitutional mandate that said members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal shall be
chosen "upon nomination ... of the party having the second largest number of votes" in the Senate
and hence, is null and void. The Senate is not clothed with "full discretionary authority" in the
choice of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. The exercise of its power thereon is subject to
constitutional limitations which are claimed to be mandatory in nature. It is clearly within the
legitimate province of the judicial department to pass upon the validity of the proceeding in
connection therewith.
... whether an election of public ofcers has been in accordance with law is for the judiciary.
Moreover, where the legislative department has by statute prescribed election procedure in a
given situation, the judiciary may determine whether a particular election has been in conformity
with such statute, and particularly, whether such statute has been applied in a way to deny or
transgress on constitutional or statutory rights ...' (1 6 C.J.S., 439; emphasis supplied)
It is, therefore, our opinion that we have, not only jurisdiction but also the duty, to consider and
determine the principal issue raised by the parties herein."
Although not specically discussed, the same disposition was made in Cunanan v. Tan as it likewise
involved the manner or legality of the organization of the Commission on Appointments, not the
wisdom or discretion of the House in the choice of its representatives.
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive.
The reason is that, even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in
nature, we would still not be precluded from resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction
conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the political question. Article VII, Section
1, of the Constitution clearly provides:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as
may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government.
The respondent's contention that he has been improperly impleaded is even less persuasive.
While he may be technically correct in arguing that it is not he who caused the petitioner's
removal, we feel that this objection is also not an insuperable obstacle to the resolution of this
controversy. We may, for one thing, treat this proceeding as a petition for quo warranto as the
petitioner is actually questioning the respondent's right to sit as a member of the Commission on
Appointments. For another, we have held as early as in the Emergency Powers Cases
7
that where
serious constitutional questions are involved, "the transcendental importance to the public of
these cases demands that they be settled promptly and denitely brushing aside, if we must,
technicalities of procedure." The same policy has since then been consistently followed by the
Court, as in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections,
8
where we held through Chief Justice
Fernando:
In the course of the deliberations, a serious procedural objection was raised by ve members of
the Court. It is their view that respondent Commission on Elections not being sought to be
restrained from performing any specic act, this suit cannot be characterized as other than a mere
request for an advisory opinion. Such a view, from the remedial law standpoint, has much to
recommend it. Nonetheless, a majority would afrm the original stand that under the
circumstances, it could still rightfully be treated as a petition for prohibition.
The language of justice Laurel ts the case: "All await the decision of this Court on the
constitutional question. Considering, therefore, the importance which the instant case has
assumed and to prevent multiplicity of suits, strong reasons of public policy demand that [its]
constitutionality ... be now resolved.' It may likewise be added that the exceptional character of the
situation that confronts us, the paramount public interest, and the undeniable necessity for ruling,
the national elections being barely six months away, reinforce our stand. It would appear
undeniable, therefore, that before us is an appropriate invocation of our jurisdiction to prevent the
enforcement of an alleged unconstitutional statute. We are left with no choice then; we must act on
the matter.
Coming now to the more crucial question, the Court notes that both the petitioner and the
respondent are invoking the case of Cunanan v. Tan to support their respective positions. It is best,
therefore, to make a quick review of that case for a proper disposition of this one.
In the election for the House of Representatives held in 1961, 72 seats were won by the
Nacionalista Party, 29 by the Liberal Party and 1 by an independent. Accordingly, the
representation of the chamber in the Commission on Appointments was apportioned to 8
members from the Nacionalista Party and 4 from the Liberal Party. Subsequently, 25 members of
the Nacionalista Party, professing discontent over the House leadership, made common cause with
the Liberal Party and formed what was called the Allied Majority to install a new Speaker and
reorganize the chamber. Included in this reorganization was the House representation in the
Commission on appointments where three of the Nacionalista congressmen originally chosen
were displaced by three of their party colleagues who had joined the Allied Majority.
Petitioner Carlos Cunanan's ad interim appointment as Deputy Administrator of the Reforestration
Administration was rejected by the Commission on Appointments as thus reorganized and
respondent Jorge Tan, Jr. was thereafter designated in his place. Cunanan then came to this Court,
contending that the rejection of his appointment was null and void because the Commission itself
was invalidly constituted.
The Court agreed. It noted that the Allied Majority was a merely temporary combination as the
Nacionalista defectors had not disafliated from their party and permanently joined the new
political group. Ofcially, they were still members of the Nacionalista Party. The reorganization of
the Commission on Appointments was invalid because it was not based on the proportional
representation of the political parties in the House of Representatives as required by the
Constitution. The Court held:
... In other words, a shifting of votes at a given time, even if du to arrangements of a more or less
temporary nature, like the one that has led to the formation of the so-called "Allied Majority," does
not sufce to authorize a reorganization of the membership of the Commission for said House.
Otherwise the Commission on Appointments may have to be reorganized as often as votes shift
from one side to another in the House. The framers of our Constitution could not have intended to
thus place a constitutional organ, like the Commission on Appointments, at the mercy of each
House of Congress.
The petitioner vigorously argues that the LDP is not the permanent political party contemplated in
the Constitution because it has not been registered in accordance with Article IX-B, Section 2(5), in
relation to the other provisions of the Constitution. He stresses that the so-called party has not yet
achieved stability and suggests it might be no different from several other political groups that
have died "a-bornin'," like the LINA, or have subsequently oundered, like the UNIDO.
The respondent also cites Cunanan but from a different viewpoint. According to him, that case
expressly allows reorganization at any time to reect changes in the political alignments in
Congress, provided only that such changes are permanent. The creation of the LDP constituting
the bulk of the former PDP-Laban and to which no less than 24 Liberal congressmen had
transferred was a permanent change. That change fully justied his designation to the Commission
on Appointments after the reduction of the LP representation therein. Thus, the Court held:
Upon the other hand, the constitutional provision to the effect that "there shall be a Commission
on Appointments consisting of twelve (12) Senators and twelve (12) members of the House of
Representatives elected by each House, respectively, on the basis of proportional
REPRESENTATION OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES THEREIN," necessarily connotes the authority of
each House of Congress to see to it that this requirement is duly complied with. As a consequence,
it may take appropriate measures, not only upon the initial organization of the Commission, but
also, subsequently thereto. If by reason of successful election protests against members of a
House, or of their expulsion from the political party to which they belonged and/or of their
afliation with another political party, the ratio in the representation of the political parties in the
House is materially changed, the House is clothed with authority to declare vacant the necessary
number of seats in the Commission on Appointments held by members of said House belonging
to the political party adversely affected by the change and then ll said vacancies in conformity
with the Constitution.
In the course of the spirited debate on this matter between the petitioner and the respondent
(who was supported by the Solicitor General) an important development has supervened to
considerably simplify the present controversy. The petitioner, to repeat, bases his argument heavily
on the non-registration of the LDP which, he claims has not provided the permanent political
realignment to justify the questioned reorganization. As he insists:
(c) Assuming that the so-called new coalesced majority is actually the LDP itself, then the proposed
reorganization is likewise illegal and ineffectual, because the LDP, not being a duly registered
political party, is not entitled to the "rights and privileges granted by law to political parties' (See.
160, BP No. 881), and therefore cannot legally claim the right to be considered in determining the
required proportional representation of political parties in the House of Representatives.
9

xxx xxx xxx
... the clear constitutional intent behind Section 18, Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution, is to give
the right of representation in the Commission on Appointment only to political parties who are
duly registered with the Comelec.
10

On November 23, 1989, however, that argument boomeranged against the petitioner. On that
date, the Commission on Elections in an en banc resolution afrmed the resolution of its First
Division dated August 28, 1989, granting the petition of the LDP for registration as a political party.
11
This has taken the wind out of the sails of the petitioner, so to speak, and he must now limp to
shore as best he can.
The petitioner's contention that, even if registered, the party must still pass the test of time to
prove its permanence is not acceptable. Under this theory, a registered party obtaining the
majority of the seats in the House of Representatives (or the Senate) would still not be entitled to
representation in the Commission on Appointments as long as it was organized only recently and
has not yet "aged." The Liberal Party itself would fall in such a category. That party was created in
December 1945 by a faction of the Nacionalista Party that seceded therefrom to support Manuel A.
Roxas's bid for the Presidency of the Philippines in the election held on April 23, 1946.
12
The
Liberal Party won. At that time it was only four months old. Yet no question was raised as to its right
to be represented in the Commission on Appointments and in the Electoral Tribunals by virtue of
its status as the majority party in both chambers of the Congress.
The LDP has been in existence for more than one year now. It now has 157 members in the House
of Representatives and 6 members in the Senate. Its titular head is no less than the President of the
Philippines and its President is Senator Neptali A. Gonzales, who took over recently from Speaker
Ramon V. Mitra. It is true that there have been, and there still are, some internal disagreements
among its members, but these are to be expected in any political organization, especially if it is
democratic in structure. In fact even the monolithic Communist Party in a number of socialist states
has undergone similar dissension, and even upheavals. But it surely cannot be considered still
temporary because of such discord.
If the petitioner's argument were to be pursued, the 157 members of the LDP in the House of
Representatives would have to be denied representation in the Commission on Appointments
and, for that matter, also the Electoral Tribunal. By the same token, the KBL, which the petitioner
says is now "history only," should also be written off. The independents also cannot be represented
because they belong to no political party. That would virtually leave the Liberal Party only with all of
its seventeen members to claim all the twelve seats of the House of Representatives in the
Commission on Appointments and the six legislative seats in the House Electoral Tribunal.
It is noteworthy that when with 41 members the Liberal Party was alloted two of the seats in the
Commission on Appointments, it did not express any objection.
13
Inconsistently, the petitioner is
now opposed to the withdrawal from it of one seat although its original number has been cut by
more than half.
As for the other condition suggested by the petitioner, to wit, that the party must survive in a
general congressional election, the LDP has doubtless also passed that test, if only vicariously. It
may even be said that as it now commands the biggest following in the House of Representatives,
the party has not only survived but in fact prevailed. At any rate, that test was never laid down in
Cunanan.
To summarize, then, we hold, in view of the foregoing considerations, that the issue presented to
us is justiciable rather political, involving as it does the legality and not the wisdom of the act
complained of, or the manner of lling the Commission on Appointments as prescribed by the
Constitution. Even if the question were political in nature, it would still come within our powers of
review under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us by Article VIII, Section 1, of the
Constitution, which includes the authority to determine whether grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction has been committed by any branch or instrumentality of
the government. As for the alleged technical aw in the designation of the party respondent,
assuming the existence of such a defect, the same may be brushed aside, conformably to existing
doctrine, so that the important constitutional issue raised may be addressed. Lastly, we resolve that
issue in favor of the authority of the House of Representatives to change its representation in the
Commission on Appointments to reect at any time the changes that may transpire in the political
alignments of its membership. It is understood that such changes must be permanent and do not
include the temporary alliances or factional divisions not involving severance of political loyalties
or formal disafliation and permanent shifts of allegiance from one political party to another.
The Court would have preferred not to intervene in this matter, leaving it to be settled by the
House of Representatives or the Commission on Appointments as the bodies directly involved. But
as our jurisdiction has been invoked and, more importantly, because a constitutional stalemate had
to be resolved, there was no alternative for us except to act, and to act decisively. In doing so, of
course, we are not imposing our will upon the said agencies, or substituting our discretion for
theirs, but merely discharging our sworn responsibility to interpret and apply the Constitution. That
is a duty we do not evade, lest we ourselves betray our oath.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order dated January 13, 1989,
is LIFTED. The Court holds that the respondent has been validly elected as a member of the
Commission on Appointments and is entitled to assume his seat in that body pursuant to Article VI,
Section 18, of the Constitution. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Cows, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Sarmiento, J., took no part.

Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 4 and 23.
2 Ibid, p. 87.
3 Id., pp. 7 and 34, Annex "F" of Petition.
4 Id., 52-53.
5 SCRA 1.
6 103 Phil. 1051.
7 Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368; Rodriguez v. Gella, 92 Phil. 603.
8 21 SCRA 774.
9 Petition, p. 12; Rollo, p. 12.
10 Consolidated Reply, p. 11; Ibid., p. 163.
11 SPP No. 88-001 (SPC No. 88-839).
12 Renato Constantino, The Philippines: The Continuing Past, 1978 edition, pp. 181-187 & 188;
Manuel Buenafe, Wartime Philippines, 1950 edition, p. 284,
13 The other seat was given to Rep. Lorna Verano-Yap, who is now afliated with the Liberal Party.x

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