|
|

 
|| 

|
 !"#$%
|
- The respondent National Labor Union, Inc. prayed for the vacation of the judgment
rendered by the majority of this Court and the remanding of the case to the
Court of Industrial Relations for a new trial. The union avers that: Teodoro's
claim that there was shortage of leather soles in ANG TIBAY making it necessary for
him to temporarily lay off the members of the union is entirely false and
unsupported by the records of the Bureau of Customs and the Books of Accounts
of native dealers in leather; that the National Worker's Brotherhood of ANG TIBAY is
a company or employer union dominated by Teodoro, the existence and functions of
which are illegal; that the employer Toribio Teodoro was guilty of unfair labor
practice for discriminating against the National Labor Union, Inc., and unjustly
favoring the National Workers' Brotherhood; that important documents attached are
inaccessible to the respondents.


WON the union was denied procedural due process by the CIR
&  '
The CIR, a special court created under CA 103, is more an administrative than a part
of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not intended to be a mere
receptive organ of the Government. Unlike a court of justice which is essentially
passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases that are
presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of the CIR is more active,
affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasi - judicial functions in
the determination of disputes between employers and employees but its
functions in the determination of disputes between employers and employees
but its functions are far more comprehensive and expensive. It has jurisdiction
over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any
question, matter controversy or dispute arising between, and/or affecting employers
and employees or laborers, and regulate the relations between them. It may appeal
to voluntary arbitration in the settlement of industrial disputes; may employ mediation
or conciliation for that purpose, or recur to the more effective system of
official investigation and compulsory arbitration in order to determine specific
controversies between labor and capital industry and in agriculture. There is in
reality here a mingling of executive and judicial functions, which is a departure from
the rigid doctrine of the separation of governmental powers.
The CIR is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and the Act
requires it to "act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case,
without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any
technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal
evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and
equitable." It shall not be restricted to the specific relief claimed or demands made
by the parties to the industrial or agricultural dispute, but may include in the award,
order or decision any matter or determination which may be deemed necessary or
expedient for the purpose of settling the dispute or of preventing further industrial or
agricultural disputes. And in the light of this legislative policy, appeals to this Court
have been especially regulated by the rules recently promulgated by the rules

recently promulgated by this Court to carry into the effect the avowed legislative
purpose.
The fact, however, that the CIR may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain
procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in justifiable cases before it,
entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due
process in trials and investigations of an administrative character. There are
primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character:
(1) V
   

    
   


    
 

   
 



 




  


 



   

 The liberty and property of the citizen shall be
protected by the rudimentary requirements of fair play.
(2) 


 



 








 
  


  
    


  











(3)  
 
   



 
  
 
 
  


   
 



  
 
 


 

 
 
  
    
 
 







 This principle emanates from the
more fundamental is contrary to the vesting of unlimited power anywhere. Law is
both a grant and a limitation upon power.
(4)    

 
 



  
   
  



  



 It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind accept as
adequate to support a conclusion. Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not
constitute substantial evidence.
(5) V
 
  
 


  



 



 



  
 

 

  
 

  
   
  





  Only by confining the administrative tribunal to the evidence

disclosed to the parties, can the latter be protected in their right to know and meet
the case against them. It should not, however, detract from their duty actively to
see that the law is enforced, and for that purpose, to use the authorized legal
methods of securing evidence and informing itself of facts material and relevant to
the controversy. Boards of inquiry may be appointed for the purpose of investigating
and determining the facts in any given case, but their report and decision are only
advisory. (6) ()(*+,-./,"+*("0,+1+()+,(,(2)
).3).)+ 1(),.+() (* + 2 ). *1+, (* + 1()+(," ). )(+
,03 113+ +2, (* ,(.)+))/+.1,()'
(7) ,(.")1()+(,4,+(),").+,.1,()),1
0))+++3+,+(+
3(1.)/1)5)(2+(, ,,,)(." ).+,(),*(
+  .1,()  )..'  The performance of this duty is inseparable from the
authority conferred upon it.
- In the right of the foregoing fundamental principles, except as to the alleged
agreement between the Ang Tibay and the National Worker's Brotherhood, the
record is barren and does not satisfy the thirst for a factual basis upon which
to predicate, in a national way, a conclusion of law.
- This result, however, does not now preclude the concession of a new trial prayed
for the by respondent National Labor Union, Inc. The interest of justice would be
better served if the movant is given opportunity to present at the hearing the
documents referred to in his motion and such other evidence as may be
relevant to the main issue involved. The legislation which created the CIR is new.
The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to

the parties adversely affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial is
grant ed, and the entire record of the case shall be remanded to the CIR.


6 |7|76 8,1()1(9
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|

Special civil action of certiorari
|
- Leonides C. BASCONCILLO, filed a complaint with the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA) Workers Assistance and Adjudication Office
for illegal dismissal against Vinta Maritime Co., Inc. and Elkano Ship Management,
Inc.
- The employers alleged that he was dismissed for his gross negligence and
incompetent performance as chief engineer of the o
 They claim that he
was /) * 2))/ ). )(/ (33(+)+ +( <3) , ,., not to
mention all the chances given to him to improve his substandard work
performance before he was dismissed.
- The employee denied the allegations against him; contrary to his employers claim,
he was actually surprised when he was told of his dismissal. This occurred after he
had a verbal altercation with a British national, regarding the lack of discipline of the
Filipino crew under the engineers supervision.
( )4 ( ),+/+()"
(2" /.)/ , ,33(,. )1(03+)1 ( )//)1 2, 
1().1+.; neither was private respondent furnished with a notice or memorandum
regarding the cause of his dismissal.
- POEA considered the case submitted for resolution 
  
  
 
  
     
   | |.0),++(
|11(,( .++ 3+,3().)+2,/.,0,,..
- On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the POEA.

=
1. WON trial is indispensable in administrative proceedings
2. WON the employee was illegally dismissed
&
1. NO

 Although bound by law and practice to observe due process, administrative
agencies exercising quasi-judicial powers are nonetheless free from the rigidity of
certain procedural requirements.

 >.)0/+,
- In labor cases, this Court has consistently held that due process does not
necessarily mean or require a hearing, but simply an opportunity or a right to be
heard. The requirements of due process are deemed to have been satisfied when
parties are given the opportunity to submit position papers. The holding of an
adversarial trial is discretionary on the labor arbiter and the parties cannot demand it
as a matter of right.

- These rules     

 



. Proceedings before a POEA hearing officer are non-litigious, although
they are still subject to the requirements of due process.


 Petitioners were given their chance to be heard. Their answer, position
paper and supporting documents had become parts of the records and were
considered by the POEA and by the NLRC.
2. YES

 Where there is no showing of a clear, valid, and legal cause for the
termination of employment, the law considers the matter a case of illegal
dismissal. Verily, the burden is on the employer to prove that the termination was
for a valid or authorized cause.
- Due process, the second element for a valid dismissal, requires NOTICE and
HEARING. The employer must furnish the worker with two written notices before
termination can be legally effected: (1) notice which apprises the employee of the
particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought and (2) subsequent
notice which informs the employee of the employers decision to dismiss him.
Petition is u
o

u.

 |  
 6'|8| ?|@|7@|77|
|

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|

Petition for review
|
-Private respondent Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine is a citizen of India and
holder of a Philippine visitors visa. she enrolled in the doctoral program in
Anthropology of the University of the Philippines College of Social Sciences and
Philosophy (CSSP) in Diliman, Quezon City.
-After completing the units of course work required in her doctoral program, private
respondent went on a two-year leave of absence to work as Tamil Programme
Producer of the Vatican Radio in the Vatican and as General Office Assistant at
the International Right to Life Federation in Rome. She returned to the
Philippines to work on her dissertation entitled, "Tamil Influences in Malaysia,
Indonesia and the Philippines."
-Dr. Realidad S. Rolda, chairperson of the U.P. Department of Anthropology,
wrote a letter to Dr. Maria Serena Diokno, CSSP Associate Dean and Graduate
Program Director, certifying that private respondent had finished her dissertation
and was ready for her oral defense. She was allowed to give an oral defense.
-After going over private respondents dissertation, Dr. Medina informed CSSP
Dean Consuelo Joaquin-Paz that
there was a portion in private respondents dissertation that was lifted, without
proper acknowledgment, from Balfours Cyclopaedia of India and Eastern and
Southern Asia (1967) and from John Edyes article entitled "Description of the
Various Classes of Vessels Constructed and Employed by the Natives of the
Coasts of Coromandel, Malabar, and the Island of Ceylon for their Coasting

Navigation" in the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland Journal.
-Nonetheless, private respondent was allowed to defend her dissertation. Four (4) out
of the five (5) panelists gave private respondent a passing mark for her oral defense
by affixing their signatures on the approval form.
-The CSSP College Faculty Assembly approved private respondents graduation
pending submission of final copies
of her dissertation.
-The University Council met to approve the list of candidates for graduation for the
second semester of school year
1992-1993. The list, which was endorsed to the Board of Regents for final approval,
included private respondents
name.
-Dean Paz sent a letter to Dr. Milagros Ibe, Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs,
requesting the exclusion of private respondents name from the list of candidates
for graduation, pending clarification of the problems regarding her dissertation.
-Dean Pazs letter did not reach the Board of Regents on time, because the
next day, the Board approved the
University Councils recommendation for the graduation of qualified students,
including private respondent. Two days later, private respondent graduated with the
degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Anthropology.
-Dr. Medina formally charged private respondent with plagiarism and recommended
that the doctorate granted to her be withdrawn.
-Dean Paz formed an ad hoc committee to investigate the plagiarism charge against
private respondent. Meanwhile, she recommended to U.P. Diliman Chancellor, Dr.
Emerlinda Roman, that the Ph.D. degree conferred on private respondent be
withdrawn.
-In a letter Dean Paz informed private respondent of the charges against her.
-The CSSP College Assembly unanimously approved the recommendation to
withdraw private
respondents doctorate degree and forwarded its
recommendation to the University Council. The University Council, in turn,
approved and endorsed the same recommendation to the Board of Regents on
August 16, 1993.
-Meanwhile, in a letter, U.P. Diliman Chancellor Emerlinda Roman summoned private
respondent to a meeting on the
same day and asked her to submit her written explanation to the charges against her.
-During the meeting, Chancellor Roman informed private respondent of the charges
and provided her a copy of the findings of the investigating committee. Private
respondent, on the other hand, submitted her written explanation in a letter.
-Another meeting was held between Chancellor Roman and private respondent to
discuss her answer to the charges. | +. 0+)/ 2, ,1.. + 3+
,3().)+ .. )(+ ++). +" /)/ ++ + (. (* /)+,..
.1..1,*(,1(.*.'
-BOR withdrew degree
-TC dismissed petition for mandamus filed by Arokiaswamy. CA reversed
ordering BOR to restore her doctoral degree.


WON Arokiaswamy was denied due process
&  '


    In this case, the trial court dismissed private respondents petition
precisely on grounds of academic

freedom but the Court of Appeals reversed holding that private respondent was
denied due process. It said:
It is worthy to note that during the proceedings taken by the College Assembly
culminating in its recommendation to
the University Council for the withdrawal of petitioners Ph.D. degree, petitioner was
not given the chance to be heard until after the withdrawal of the degree was
consummated. Petitioners subsequent letters to the U.P. President proved
unavailing.

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1+,D
- GLORIOUS was found guilty of dollar-salting and misdeclaration of importations
by the GTEB and, as a result of which, the export quotas allocated to it were
cancelled. Soon after the rendition of the GTEB decision, GLORIOUS filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court, contending that its right to due
process of law was violated, and that the GTEB decision was not supported by
substantial evidence.
- Giving credence to the allegations of respondent GLORIOUS, the Court issued
a resolution ordering GTEB to conduct further proceedings in the administrative
case against respondent GLORIOUS.
- However, GLORIOUS filed a manifestation of its intention to withdraw the petition
which the Court granted
- GLORIOUS filed another motion to dismiss with prejudice, which was duly noted by
the Court in a resolution.
- More than 2 years later, GLORIOUS filed with the GTEB a petition for the
restitution of its export quota allocation and requested for a reconsideration of the
GTEB decision dated April 27, 1984.
- GLORIOUS again alleged that the charges against it were not supported by
evidence.
- Moreover, it alleged that the GTEB decision canceling its export quotas was
rendered as a result of duress, threats, intimidation and undue influence exercised
by former Minister Roberto V. Ongpin in order to transfer GLORIOUS' export
quotas to "Marcos crony-owned" corporations De Soleil Apparel Manufacturing
Corporation [DSA] and AIFC.
- GLORIOUS further alleged that it was coerced by Mr. Roberto Ongpin to withdraw
its petition and to enter into joint
venture agreements paving the way for the creation of DSA and petitioner AIFC
which were allowed to service
GLORIOUS' export quotas and to use its plant facilities, machineries and equipment.
- GTEB denied the petition of GLORIOUS. An appeal was then taken to the Office of
the President.
- At this point, AIFC sought to intervene in the proceedings and filed its opposition
to GLORIOUS' appeal claiming that the GTEB decision has long become final, and

that a favorable action on the appeal would result in the forfeiture of the export
quotas which were legally allocated to it.
- The Office of the President ruled in favor of GLORIOUS, finding the proceedings
before the GTEB in 1984 irregular, and remanded the case to GTEB for further
proceedings.
- The MR of AIFC was subsequently denied.
,,,:
1. WON the OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION and
2. WON the final judgment constitutes res judicata on the ground that the final
judgment in was a judgment on the merits.
&.D
#' 'In finding that GTEB proceedings were irregular, the OP didnt commit GAD
as GTEB indeed violated the right to due process of Glorious. GTEB failed to
disclose evidence used by it in rendering the resolution against Glorious Sun. The
decision penned by Deputy Executive Secretary Magdangal B. Elma and the
resolution penned by Acting Deputy Executive Secretary Mariano Sarmiento II are
not tainted in the slightest by any grave abuse of discretion. They outline in
detail why the private respondent was denied due process when its export quotas
were cancelled by GTEB The findings are supported by the records.
| D.)1()1(.0,+*.,1(,.+(+3+,'
' ' - The dismissal of the first petition was clearly based on a technical matter
rather than on the merits of the petition. Hence, the dismissal of the petition
with the factual issues hanging in mid-air cannot, under the circumstances,
constitute res judicata.
,())/:
- For a judgment to be a bar to a subsequent case, the following requisites must
concur:
. . . (1) it must be a final judgment; (2) the court which resolved it had jurisdiction
over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it must be a judgment on the merits;
and (4) there must be identity between the two cases, as to the parties, subject
matter and cause of action.
- The well-entrenched principle is that "a judgment on the merits is one rendered
after a determination of which party is right, as distinguished from a judgment
rendered upon preliminary or final or merely technical point." (Deang v. IAC).
- The protestation of Glorious Sun of non-disclosure of evidence had been effectively
remedied by the subsequent accommodation by the GTEB of its request for copies of
the relevant documents.
- The petitioner claims that the subsequent disclosure of the documents by GTEB to
Glorious Sun in 1987 cured the defect of non-disclosure of evidence in 1984
under the constitutional provision of due process enunciated in the landmark case
of Ang Tibay v. CIR and other subsequent cases.
- The documents used by the GTEB in its 1984 decision and referred to in the 1987
decision as being "intact" relates to what the GTEB labeled as Documents used by
GTEB and "Additional Documents" which, as earlier discussed, were either not
disclosed to Appellant for being privileged or unmarked as exhibits or not presented
in evidence.
- At any rate, the conclusions of GTEB as to the excessiveness of Appellant's import
prices drew a controverting statement from its own Raw Materials Importation
Regulation Division,

- Findings of administrative agencies are accorded respect and finality, and generally
should not be disturbed by the courts. This general rule, however, is not without
exceptions.
- As recently reiterated, it is jurisprudentially settled that absent a clear,
manifest and grave abuse of discretion amount to want of jurisdiction, the findings
of the administrative agency on matters falling within its competence will not be
disturbed by the courts.
- Specifically with respect to factual findings, they are accorded respect, if not
finality, because of the special
knowledge and expertise gained by these tribunals from handling the specific matters
falling under their jurisdiction.
- Such factual findings may be disregarded only if they "are not supported by
evidence; where the findings are initiated by fraud, imposition or collussion; where
the procedures which lead to the factual findings are irregular; when palpable errors
are committed; or when grave abuse of discretion arbitrarines or capriciousness is
manifest." (Mapa v. Arroyo, 175 SCRA 76 [1989])
- In the case at bar, the petitioner was never given the chance to present its side
before its export quota allocations were revoked and its officers suspended. While
it is true that such allocations as alleged by the Board are mere privileges which
it can revoke and cancel as it may deem fit, these privileges have been accorded to
petitioner for so long that they have become impressed with property rights especially
since not only do these privileges determine the continued existence of the petitioner
with assets of over P80,000,000.00 but also the livelihood of some 700 workers who
are employed by the petitioner and their families .
-Finally, American Inter-Fashion is hardly the proper party to question the
Malacaang decision. It was incorporated after the incidents in this case
happened. It was created obviously to be the recipient of export quotas arbitrarily
removed from the rightful owner. It was sequestered precisely because of the
allegation that it is a crony corporation which profited from an act of injustice inflicted
on another private corporation.


: MFR is GRANTED. The instant petition is DISMISSED. The
question decision and resolution of the
Office of the President are hereby AFFIRMED.





| -concurring:
I concur in the result reached by the Court, that is, that petitioner American Interfashion Corporation has failed to show any grave abuse of discretion or act without
or in excess of jurisdiction on the part of the public respondent Office of the
President in rendering its decision in OP Case No. 3781 dated 7 September 1989.

|  6'7 |
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|

Petition for review of decision of CA
|
- Sec Pefianco of DECS seeks to nullify CA decision.

- Ex-Sec Gloria filed complaint against Moral, Chief Librarian of National Library for
dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service. The complaint charged respondent Moral with the pilferage of some
historical documents.
- DoJ Special Prosecutor represented Sec Gloria in the administrative case. Moral
was represented by her private counsel. Sec Gloria issued resolution finding Moral
guilty. She was ordered dismissed.
- Moral did not appeal but filed a Petition for Production of DECS Investigation
Committee Report. Her petition was twice denied.
- Moral instituted an action for

 and injunction before regular courts
against Sec Gloria praying that she be
furnished a copy of the DECS Investigation Committee Report and that the
DECS Secretary be enjoined from enforcing the order of dismissal until she
received a copy of the said report.
- Secretary Gloria moved to dismiss the

 case principally for lack of
cause of action, but the trial court
denied his motion. Thus, he elevated the case to the Court of Appeals on  
CA sustained TC.
- Sec Gloria filed instant petition. Sec Gloria was replaced by Sec Pefianco.


1. WON the order of the TC is proper
2. WON Moral is entitled to a copy of the Report
&
1. NO.
- Section 3, Rule 16, of the
       mandatorily requires
that the resolution on a motion to
dismiss should clearly and distinctly state the reasons therefor.
- The challenged Order of the trial court dated 23 April 1997 falls short of the
requirements prescribed in Rule 16. The
Order merely discussed the general concept of

 and the trial courts
jurisdiction over the rulings and
actions of administrative agencies without stating the basis why petitioners motion to
dismiss was being denied.
- Judges should take pains in crafting their orders, stating therein clearly and
comprehensively the reasons for their issuance, which are necessary for the full
understanding of the action taken. Where the court itself has not st ated any basis for
its order, to be very strict in requiring a prior motion for reconsideration before
resort to higher courts on may be had, would be to expect too much. Since
the judge himself was not precise and specific in his order, a certain degree of
liberality in exacting from petitioner strict compliance with the rules was justified.
2. NO.
- o
 is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a
ministerial duty, this being its main
objective. It does not lie to require anyone to fulfill a discretionary duty. It is
essential to the issuance of a writ of

that petitioner should have a clear
legal right to the thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of the
respondent to perform the act required.
- In her petition for

, respondent miserably failed to demonstrate that
she has a clear legal right to the
u
  

 and that it is the ministerial duty of petitioner

DECS Secretary to furnish her with a copy thereof.

- Primarily, respondent did not appeal to the Civil Service Commission the DECS
resolution dismissing her from the
service. By her failure to do so, nothing prevented the DECS resolution from
becoming final.
- Moreover, there is no law or rule which imposes a legal duty on petitioner to
furnish respondent with a copy of the investigation report. On the contrary, it was
held in !  u  that a respondent in an administrative case is not entitled to
be informed of the findings and recommendations of any investigating committee
created to inquire into
charges filed against him. He is entitled only to the administrative decision based
on substantial evidence made of record, and a reasonable opportunity to meet
the charges and the evidence presented against her during the hearings of the
investigation committee. Respondent no doubt had been accorded these rights.
- More importantly, the DECS resolution is complete in itself for purposes of appeal to
the Civil Service Commission, that is, it contains sufficient findings of fact and
conclusion of law upon which respondents removal from office was grounded.
DPetition is granted.

|  6'7 |
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|

Petition for review of decision of CA
|
- Sec Pefianco of DECS seeks to nullify CA decision.
- Ex-Sec Gloria filed complaint against Moral, Chief Librarian of National Library for
dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service. The complaint charged respondent Moral with the pilferage of some
historical documents.
- DoJ Special Prosecutor represented Sec Gloria in the administrative case. Moral
was represented by her private counsel. Sec Gloria issued resolution finding Moral
guilty. She was ordered dismissed.
- Moral did not appeal but filed a Petition for Production of DECS Investigation
Committee Report. Her petition was twice denied.
- Moral instituted an action for

 and injunction before regular courts
against Sec Gloria praying that she be
furnished a copy of the DECS Investigation Committee Report and that the
DECS Secretary be enjoined from enforcing the order of dismissal until she
received a copy of the said report.
- Secretary Gloria moved to dismiss the

 case principally for lack of
cause of action, but the trial court
denied his motion. Thus, he elevated the case to the Court of Appeals on  
CA sustained TC.
- Sec Gloria filed instant petition. Sec Gloria was replaced by Sec Pefianco.


1. WON the order of the TC is proper

2. WON Moral is entitled to a copy of the Report

&
1. NO.
- Section 3, Rule 16, of the
       mandatorily requires
that the resolution on a motion to
dismiss should clearly and distinctly state the reasons therefor.
- The challenged Order of the trial court dated 23 April 1997 falls short of the
requirements prescribed in Rule 16. The
Order merely discussed the general concept of

 and the trial courts
jurisdiction over the rulings and
actions of administrative agencies without stating the basis why petitioners motion to
dismiss was being denied.
- Judges should take pains in crafting their orders, stating therein clearly and
comprehensively the reasons for their issuance, which are necessary for the full
understanding of the action taken. Where the court itself has not st ated any basis for
its order, to be very strict in requiring a prior motion for reconsideration before
resort to higher courts on may be had, would be to expect too much. Since
the judge himself was not precise and specific in his order, a certain degree of
liberality in exacting from petitioner strict compliance with the rules was justified.
2. NO.
- o
 is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a
ministerial duty, this being its main
objective. It does not lie to require anyone to fulfill a discretionary duty. It is
essential to the issuance of a writ of

that petitioner should have a clear
legal right to the thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of the
respondent to perform the act required.
- In her petition for

, respondent miserably failed to demonstrate that
she has a clear legal right to the
u
  

 and that it is the ministerial duty of petitioner

DECS Secretary to furnish her with a copy thereof.
- Primarily, respondent did not appeal to the Civil Service Commission the DECS
resolution dismissing her from the
service. By her failure to do so, nothing prevented the DECS resolution from
becoming final.
- Moreover, there is no law or rule which imposes a legal duty on petitioner to
furnish respondent with a copy of the investigation report. On the contrary, it was
held in !  u  that a respondent in an administrative case is not entitled to
be informed of the findings and recommendations of any investigating committee
created to inquire into charges filed against him. He is entitled only to the
administrative decision based on substantial evidence made of record, and a
reasonable opportunity to meet the charges and the evidence presented
against her during the hearings of the investigation committee. Respondent no
doubt had been accorded these rights.
- More importantly, the DECS resolution is complete in itself for purposes of appeal to
the Civil Service Commission, that is, it contains sufficient findings of fact and
conclusion of law upon which respondents removal from office was grounded.
Petition is granted.
As the foregoing narration of facts in this case shows, however, various committees
had been formed to investigate the charge that private respondent had committed
plagiarism and, in all the investigations held, she was heard in her defense. Indeed,

if any criticism may be made of the university proceedings before private

respondent was finally stripped of her degree, it is that there were too many
committee and individual investigations conducted, although all resulted in a finding
that private respondent committed dishonesty in submitting her doctoral dissertation
on the basis of which she was conferred the Ph.D. degree.
Indeed, in administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the
opportunity to explain ones side of a
controversy or a chance to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained
of. A party who has availed of the opportunity to present his position cannot tenably
claim to have been denied due process.
In this case, private respondent was informed in writing of the charges against her
and afforded opportunities to refute them. She was asked to submit her written
explanation, which she forwarded. Private respondent then met with the U.P.
chancellor and the members of the Zafaralla committee to discuss her case. In
addition, she sent several letters to the U.P. authorities explaining her position.
It is not tenable for private respondent to argue that she was entitled to have
an audience before the Board of Regents. Due process in an administrative
context does not require trial-type proceedings similar to those in the courts of
justice. It is noteworthy that the U.P. Rules do not require the attendance of
persons whose cases are included as items on the agenda of the Board of Regents.
,3(,+()Petition for mandamus DISMISSED
| &|

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| | 6 7  '6  
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|

Special civil action of certiorari with preliminary injunction
|
- The Collector of Customs sent a notice to C. F. Sharp & Company informing
it that a vessel it operates was apprehended and found to have committed a
violation of the customs laws and regulations and that it carried an unmanifested
cargo consisting of one RCA Victor TV set 21" in violation of Section 2521 of the
Tariff and Customs Code.
- C. F. Sharp & Company, not being the agent or operator of the vessel, referred the
notice to A. V. Rocha, the agent and operator thereof, who answered the notice
stating, among other things, that the television set referred to therein was not a
cargo of the vessel and, therefore, was not required by law to be manifested. Rocha
stated further: "If this explanation is not sufficient, we request that this case be set
for investigation and hearing in order to enable the vessel to be informed of the
evidence against it to sustain the charge and to present evidence in its defense."
- The Collector of Customs replied to Rocha stating that the television set in
question was a cargo on board the vessel and that he does not find his
explanation satisfactorily enough to exempt the vessel from liability for violating
Section 2521 of the Tariff and Customs Code. In said letter, the collector imposed a
fine of P5,000.00 on the vessel and ordered payment thereof within 48 hours with a
threat that he will deny clearance to said vessel and will issue a warrant of seizure
and detention against it if the fine is not paid.
- Petitioner filed a special civil action of certiorari with preliminary injunction before
the Court of First Instance, which

was granted. Respondent interposed present appeal.



WON the requirements of administrative due process have already been complied
with
&
NO
- Rocha was not given an opportunity to prove that the television set complained of
is not a cargo that needs to be
manifested as required by Section 2521 of the Tariff and Customs Code.
Under said section, in order that an imported article or merchandise may be
considered a cargo that should be manifested it is first necessary that it be so
established for the reason that there are other effects that a vessel may carry
that are excluded from the requirement of the law, among which are the personal
effects of the members of the crew. The fact that the set in question was claimed
by the customs authorities not to be within the exception does not automatically
make the vessel liable. It is still necessary that the vessel, its owner or operator, be
given a chance to show otherwise. This is precisely what petitioner Rocha has
requested in his letter. Not only was he denied this chance, but respondent
collector immediately imposed upon the vessel the huge fine of P5,000.00. This is a
denial of the elementary rule of due process.
- True it is that the proceedings before the Collector of Customs insofar as the
determination of any act or irregularity that may involve a violation of any customs
law or regulation is concerned, or of any act arising under the Tariff and
Customs Code, are not judicial in character, but merely administrative, where the
rules of procedure are generally disregarded, but even in the administrative
proceedings due process should be observed because that is a right enshrined
in our Constitution. The right to due process is not merely statutory. It is a
constitutional right. That this principle applies with equal force to administrative
proceedings was well elaborated upon by this Court in the Ang Tibay case.
The decision appealed from is affirmed.

6 |
'' ('#%:


71 #" %%%
|

Special civil action for certiorari
|
- Petitioners were among the employees of the Provincial Engineering Office who
were dismissed by Gov. Paredes, allegedly to scale down operations.
- Petitioners filed a petition for reinstatement to the Merit Systems Protection
Board (MSPB). MSPB found that the reduction in work force was not done in
accordance with civil service rules and
regulations, and ordering the
reinstatement of petitioners. It held that while reduction in force due to lack of funds
is a valid ground for termination,
employees to be terminated must be determined after being found to be the
least qualified (in terms of relative

fitness, efficiency and length of service)

- MSPB later issued an order directing the Provincial Government of Agusan
del Sur pay petitioners their back salaries and other money benefits.
- At first, the Governor did not want to comply with said orders. The matter was
brought up to the CSC, wherein
indirect contempt proceedings were held. This prompted the Governor to
finally comply with the order of reinstatement. The provincial treasurer also
partially released some of the backwages.
- But the problems did not stop there. Later, the Provincial Administrator, for and in
behalf of Governor Plaza, wrote a letter to respondent Commission on Audit. It
claims that COA is the proper authority to determine disbursement as regards the
backwages. In its decision, COA ruled that the payment of backwages has become
the personal liability of former Governor Paredes, it appearing that the illegal
dismissal was done in bad faith.
- Pursuant to the ruling of COA, the provincial treasurer stopped the payment of
backwages.

=
1. WON the COA, in the exercise of its power to audit, can disallow the payment of
back wages of illegally dismissed employees by the Provincial Government of
Agusan del Sur which has been decreed pursuant to a final decision of the Civil
Service Commission
&
1. NO.



- First, COA based its ruling on the MSRB decision. A careful perusal of said
Decision will disclose that the MSPB never made a categorical finding of fact that
former Governor Paredes acted in bad faith and hence, is personally liable for the
payment of petitioners' back wages. Indeed, the MSPB even found that there was
lack of funds which would have justified the reduction in the workforce were it not for
the procedural infirmities in its implementation
- m
     " Second, the fundamental requirements
of procedural due process were
violated in proceedings before the COA. In the case at bar, former Governor Paredes
was never made a party to nor served a notice of the proceedings before the COA.
While administrative agencies exercising quasi-judicial powers are not hide bound
by technical procedures, nonetheless, they are not free to disregard the basic
demands of due process. Notice to enable the other party to be heard and to
present evidence is not a mere technicality or a trivial matter in any administrative
proceedings but an indispensable ingredient of due process. It would be unfair for
COA to hold former Governor Paredes personally liable for the claims of petitioners
amounting to millions of pesos without giving him an opportunity to be heard and
present evidence in his defense. Our rulings holding that public officials are
personally liable for damages arising from illegal acts done in bad faith are premised
on said officials having been sued both in their official and personal capacities
- Third, the MSRB decision became final and executory. Final judgments may no
longer be reviewed or in any way modified directly or indirectly by a higher court,
not even by the Supreme Court, much less by any other official, branch or
department of Government
Decision of COA set aside

?

| 
'' ('>$%
| |"';) "#!
|

Petition for a writ of 
|
- Dr. Antonio Nubla, father of Alicia Nubla, a minor of 16 years, filed a verified
complaint against Emilio Suntay in the Office of the City Attorney of Quezon City,
as follows: The accused took Alicia Nubla from St. Paul's Colleges in Quezon
City with lewd design and took her to somewhere near the U.P. compound in
Diliman, Quezon City and was then able to have carnal knowledge of her. Alicia
Nubla is a minor of 16 years.
- Petitioner applied for and was granted a passport by the DFA. Petitioner left the
Philippines for San Francisco where he is at present enrolled in school. The offended
girl subscribed and swore to a complaint charging the petitioner with seduction which
was filed in the CFI of Quezon City after preliminary investigation had been
conducted. The private prosecutor filed a motion praying the Court to issue an
order "directing such government agencies as may be concerned, particularly the
NBI and the DFA, for the purpose of having the accused brought back to the
Philippines so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law." The Court granted
the motion.
- Respondent Secretary cabled the Ambassador to the United States instructing him
to order the Consul General in San Francisco to cancel the passport issued to the
petitioner and to compel him to return to the Philippines to answer the criminal
charges against him. The Embassy was likewise directed to make
representation with the State Department that Emilio Suntay's presence outside the
Philippines is considered detrimental to the best interest of this Government, that his
passport has been withdrawn, and that he is not considered under the
protection of the Philippines while abroad. However, this order was not
implemented or carried out in view of the commencement of this proceedings in
order that the issues raised may be judicially resolved. Counsel for the petitioner
wrote to the respondent Secretary requesting that the action taken by him be
reconsidered, and filed in the criminal case a motion praying that the respondent
Court reconsider its order. The respondent Secretary denied counsel's request and
the Court denied the motion for reconsideration.
- Petitioner contends that as the order of the respondent Court may be carried out
only "through the cancellation of his passport," the said order is illegal because "while
a Court may review the action of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs in cancelling a
passport and grant relief when the Secretary's discretion is abused, the court
cannot, in the first instance, take the discretionary power away from the Secretary
and itself order a passport to be cancelled."
- Petitioner further contends that while the Secretary for Foreign Affairs has
discretion in the cancellation of
passports, "such discretion cannot be exercised until after hearing," because the right
to travel or stay abroad is a personal liberty within the meaning and protection of the
Constitution and hence he cannot be deprived of such liberty without due process of
law.



1. WON the order of the respondent Court is beyond or in excess of its jurisdiction
2. WON petitioner is entitled to hearing before his passport can be cancelled
&
1. NO

When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary

writs, processes and other means
necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or officer; and if the
procedure to be followed in t he exercise of such jurisdiction is not specifically pointed
out by these rules, any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted
which appears most conformable to the spirit of said rules. (Section 6, Rule 124.)
Moreover, the respondent Court did not specify what step the respondent Secretary
must take to compel the petitioner to return to the Philippines to answer the criminal
charge preferred against him. In issuing the order in question, the respondent
Secretary was convinced that a miscarriage of justice would result by his inaction
and as he issued it in the exercise of his sound discretion, he cannot be enjoined
from carrying it out.
2. NO

 Hearing would have been proper and necessary if the reason for the
withdrawal or cancellation of the passport were not clear but doubtful. But where the
holder of a passport is facing a criminal a charge in our courts and left the country to
evade criminal prosecution, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in the exercise of his
discretion to revoke a passport already issued, cannot be held to have acted
whimsically or capriciously in withdrawing and cancelling such passport. Due process
does not necessarily mean or require a hearing.
Petition is denied

& 6
||

:| $$
7#"#
|

Appeal from an order of CFI.
|
- American citizen George de Bisschop (petitioner-appellee) was allowed to stay in
the Philippines for 3 years as a prearranged employee of the Bissmag Production,
Inc., of which he is president and general manager.
- He applied for extension of stay with the Bureau of Immigration. This was
denied when Immigration Officer
Benjamin de Mesa discovered that Bissmag Inc. was a gambling front, and that de
Bisschop is suspect of evading payment of his income tax. In a letter dated
September 5, 1959, the Board of Commissioners advised him to depart within 5
days. De Bisschop requested for a copy of the decision, but the legal officer of
Bureau of Immigration replied that no formal decision, order or resolution is
promulgated by the Board for reasons of practicability and expediency.
- To forestall his arrest and the filing of the corresponding deportation
proceedings, de Bisschop filed the present case.



1.

WON Commissioners of immigration are required by law to conduct formal

hearings on all applications for extension of stay of aliens;
2.
WON Commissioners are enjoined to promulgate written decisions.
&
1.
NO

 Extension of stay of aliens is purely discretionary on the part of

immigration authority. Administration of immigration laws is the primary and
exclusive responsibility of the Executive branch of the government.



- Courts have no jurisdiction to review the purely administrative practice of
immigration authorities of not granting formal hearings in certain cases as the
circumstances may warrant, for reasons of practicability and expediency.
- This is not a violation of the due process clause; the letter advising Bisschop
to depart in 5 days was a mere
formality, and far from final, because the requirement to leave before the start of the
deportation proceedings is only an advice to party unless he departs voluntarily, the
State will be compelled to take steps for his expulsion.
- It is a settled rule that a day in court is not a matter of right in administrative
proceedings. As per ;./((D
F. 3(1,, (* 2 , )(+  )1,,  -.1 3(1,, 01 (* +
3(1,,  0),(*21 +

()0)+ , 1. ()" ). + (. (* ,(1+ 0)+)." , 3
<1+(.0),++"21,,01.3(1,,(*2",,-.1
3(1,,' C<< ) 1+) 3(1.)/, (* .0),++ 11+" + 0 
,++. 2+(+* (* 1()+.1+()" ++ + /+ +( )(+1 ). )/ 
)(+ ,,)+ +( .3(1,,(*2'G
2.
NO

Decision as employed in the law refers to the number of

votes necessary to
constitute the decision of the said
Board.


  There is nothing in immigration law which provides that the Board
of Commissioners must render decisions on petitioners for extension of stay.
+
Prohibition is not favored by the Courts. It will issue only if there is no other plain,
speedy , and adequate remedy. The use of habeas corpus to test the legality of
aliens confinement and proposed expulsion from the Philippines is now a settled
practice. Habeas corpus affords prompt relief from unlawful imprisonment of any
kind, and under all circumstances. The existence of habeas corpus will bar the
issuance of a writ of prohibition.
    The order appealed from is reversed. The petition for prohibition is
dismissed.


 
 | ;
|  | 6|8(<+),)/(39
#|##
| 71##"##
|

Petition to review

|
-22 Sept 1988: the Board issued an ex parte Order, signed by Board Chairman
Fulgencio Factoran, Jr., directing Solar immediately to cease and desist from
utilizing its wastewater pollution source installations which were discharging
untreated wastewater directly into a canal leading to the adjacent Tullahan-Tinejeros
River.
-Said order, issued pursuant to Sec7 of P.D. 984 and Sec38 of its IRR, was based on
findings of several inspections
of Solar's plant:
a. inspections conducted on 5 November 1986 and 12 November 1986 by the
National Pollution Control Commission
("NPCC"), the predecessor of the Board; and
b. the inspection conducted on 6 September 1988 by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources
("DENR").
-A copy of the above Order was received by Solar on 26 Sept 1988. A Writ of
Execution issued by the Board was received by Solar on 31 March 1989. Meantime,
Solar filed MFR appeal with prayer for stay of execution of the Order dated 22 Sept
1988.
-Acting on this motion, the Board issued an Order dated 24 April 1989 allowing Solar
to operate temporarily, to enable the Board to conduct another inspection and
evaluation of Solar's wastewater treatment facilities. In the same Order, the Board
directed the Regional Executive Director of the DENR NCR to conduct the
inspection and evaluation within thirty (30) days.
-21 April 1989: Solar went to RTC QC on petition for certiorari with preliminary
injunction against the Board. RTC dismissed Solar's petition upon two (2) grounds:
that appeal and not certiorari from the questioned Order of the Board as well as the
Writ of Execution was the proper remedy, and that the Board's subsequent Order
allowing Solar to operate temporarily had rendered Solar's petition moot and
academic.
-Solar went on appeal to the CA. CA reversed the Order of dismissal of TC and
remanded the case to that court for further proceedings. CA also declared the Writ
of Execution null and void. At the same time, the CA said that the decision was
without prejudice to whatever action the Board may take relative to the
projected 'inspection and evaluation' of Solar's water treatment facilities.
-CA, in so ruling, held that certiorari was a proper remedy since the Orders of
the Board may result in great and irreparable injury to Solar; and that while the
case might be moot and academic, "larger issues" demanded that the question of
due process be settled. The Boards MFR was dismissed. Hence, this petition for
certiorari.
(.H,/,D
-that its ex parte Order dated 22 Sept 1988 and the Writ of Execution were issued
in accordance with law (PD984, Sec7(a)) and were not violative of due process; and
-that the ex parte Order and the Writ of Execution are not the proper subjects of a
petition for certiorari.
( contends that under the Board's own rules and regulations, an ex parte
order may issue only if the effluents
discharged pose an "immediate threat to life, public health; safety or welfare, or to
animal and plant life." In the instant case, according to Solar, the inspection reports
before the Board made no finding that Solar's wastewater discharged posed such a
threat.



WON the CA erred in reversing the RTC on the ground that Solar had been denied
due process by the Board.
&
NO.
1
-Section 7(a) of P.D. No. 984 authorized the Board to issue ex parte cease and
desist orders (a) whenever the wastes discharged by an establishment pose an
"immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal
or plant life," or (b) whenever such discharges or wastes exceed "the allowable
standards set by the [NPCC]."
-It is not essential that the Board prove that an "immediate threat to life, public
health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life" exists before an ex parte cease
and desist order may be issued. It is enough if the Board finds that the wastes
discharged do exceed "the allowable standards set by the [NPCC]."
-Sec5 of the Effluent Regulations of 1982 sets out the max permissible levels of
physical and chemical substances which effluents from domestic wastewater
treatment plants and industrial plants must not exceed when discharged into
bodies of water classified as Class A, B, C, D, SB and SC in accordance with
the 1978 NPCC Rules and Regulations. Tullahan-Tinejeros River is classified as
inland waters Class D (for agriculture, irrigation, live stock watering, industrial
cooling and processing)
-Note: the plant under its previous owner, Fine Touch Finishing Corporation, was
issued a Notice of Violation on 20 Dec 1985 directing same to cease and desist
from conducting dyeing operation until such time the waste treatment plant is
already completed and operational. The new owner Solar Textile Corporation, after
informing the Commission of the plant acquisition, was summoned to a hearing held
on 13 October 1986 based on the adverse findings during the inspection/water
sampling test conducted on 08 August 1986.
-The inspection reports of November 1986 and September 1988 make clear that
there was at least prima facie evidence before the Board that the effluents
emanating from Solar's plant exceeded the max allowable levels of physical and
chemical substances set by the NPCC and that accordingly there was adequate
basis supporting the ex parte cease and desist order issued by the Board.
-The Board refrained from issuing an ex parte cease and desist order until after the
November 1986 and September
1988 re-inspections were conducted and the violation of applicable standards was
confirmed. The Board appears to
have been remarkably forbearing in its efforts to enforce the applicable standards

?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?"P.D. 984, Section 7, paragraph (a), provides:
(a) Public Hearing . . . Provided, That whenever the Commission finds prima facie evidence
that the discharged sewage or wastes are of immediate threat to life, public health, safety or
welfare, or to animal or plant life, or exceeds the allowable standards set by the Commission,
the Commissioner may issue an ex-parte order directing the discontinuance of the same
or the temporary suspension or cessation of operation of the establishment or person
generating such sewage or wa stes without the necessity of a prior public hearing. The said
ex-parte order shall be immediately executory and shall remain in force until said
establishment or person prevents or abates the said pollution within the allowable standards or
modified or nullified by a competent court.".

vis-a-vis Solar. Solar, on the other hand, seemed very casual about its continued
discharge of untreated, pollutive effluents into the Tullahan-Tinejeros River,
presumably loath to spend the money necessary to put its Wastewater
Treatment Plant ("WTP") in an operating condition.
-In V  u #     , the SC upheld the summary closure
ordered by the Acting Mayor of Sta.
Maria, Bulacan, of a pollution-causing establishment. In the instant case, the ex parte
cease and desist Order was issued not by a local government official but by the
Pollution Adjudication Board, the very agency of the Government charged with the
task of determining whether the effluents of a particular industrial establishment
comply with or violate applicable anti-pollution statutory and regulatory provisions.
-Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and regulations in situations
like that here presented precisely because stopping the continuous discharge of
pollutive and untreated effluents into the rivers and other inland waters of the
Philippines cannot be made to wait until protracted litigation over the ultimate
correctness or propriety of such orders has run its full course, including multiple and
sequential appeals such as those which Solar has taken, which of course may take
several years. It is a constitutional common place that the ordinary requirements of
procedural due process yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests
like those here involved, through the exercise of police power.
 |&  7 " '
#%!& !
|
||
 |3 "#!
|

Petition for review of a decision of the Court of Industrial Relations
|
- A complaint was filed by petitioner alleging that respondent has engaged in unfair
labor practice
- Hearings were conducted by the hearing examiner, Atty. Emiliano Tabigne, at
which both parties, represented by counsel, appeared.
- After the presentation of the evidence, the hearing examiner rendered his report
stating that the charge of unfair labor practice has not been substantiated by the
evidence and recommending its dismissal. He also found that the dismissal of
petitioner was for sufficient cause.
- The court approved the hearing examiner's recommendation and rendered the
following order:
Hearing Examiner Mr. Tabigne recommends the dismissal of this case on the
ground that the evidence by the complainant did not support the charges of unfair
labor practice. The facts are stated in the Hearing Examiner's dated May 16, 1955.
After a perusal of the record of the case, the Court finds no sufficient
justification for modifying said recommendation, findings and conclusions, and
consequently, this case is hereby dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
- Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the court en banc.
- Hence this petition for review.
- It is contended that the aforequoted order runs counter to the Constitution which
provides that "No decision shall be rendered by any court of record without
expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based"
(Article VIII, section 12); and to Rule 35, Section 1, of the Rules of Court, which

provides that a court decision shall state "clearly and distinctly the facts and the law
on which it is based." And the claim is made in view of the fact that the order does
not contain either a discussion of the evidence or any finding of fact based on
said evidence, which counsel claims does not meet the requirements of the law and
the Constitution.


WON the Court of Industrial Relations can issue an order dismissing a case
without stating the facts and the law support thereof.
&
YES
- The order, it is true, does not make its own discussion of the evidence or its own
findings of fact, but such is not necessary if the court is satisfied with the report of
its examiner or referee which already contains a full discussion of the evidence and
the findings of fact based thereon. The situation differs if the court disagrees with
the report in which case it should state the reasons for its disagreement. If it is in
full accord with the report, it is purposeless to repeat what the referee or examiner
has already found in it.
- Such is the present situation. The court approved the report of the hearing examiner
"after a perusal of the record of
the case." This presupposes that it has examined the evidence and found no
justification for modifying his findings and conclusions. This is a substantial
compliance with the law.
- When the Court of Industrial Relations refers a case to a commissioner
for investigation, report, and recommendation, and at such investigation the
parties were duly represented by counsel, heard or at least given an opportunity to
be heard, the requirement of due process has been satisfied, even if the court
failed to set the report for hearing, and a decision on the basis of such report, with
the other evidence of the case, is a decision which meets the requirement of a fair
and open hearing.
 ,3(,+()The order appealed from was affirmed.
| 
$|:!
 | |/%"#:
|

Petition for review of a decision of the Public Service Commission.
|
- Serrano filed an application with the Public Service Commission requesting
authority to operate a taxicab automobile service within the City of Manila and
from said city to any place in Luzon open to motor vehicle traffic and vice versa.
Fifty units of taxicabs were to be used.
- Serrano was a public service bus operator in the City of Manila and was the holder
of several certificates of public convenience.
- His application was heard by Associate Commissioner Panganiban. Serrano
completed the presentation of his evidence, but the oppositors and no evidence
was presented to rebut his claims as to his qualification and financial capacity.
The Public Service Commission denied application
- A motion for reconsideration was filed and denied by the PSC.

- Serrano alleged that the Public Service Commission erred in failing to make a
statement of facts as to each case regarding the qualification and financial ability
of the applicant and the other factors constituting the criterion used as basis in
granting the application, in whole or in part, on the one hand, and dismissing or
denying the application on the other. He relies on the constitutional provision that no
decision shall be rendered by any court of record without expressing clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.


WON the denial of the PSC of Serranos petition was correct
&
NO

Quasi-judicial tribunals, including the Public Service Commission, should, in all

controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to
the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the
decisions rendered.



- The obligation to state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which the
decision is based is incumbent on a court of record. The Public Service Commission
is not a court of record within the meaning of the above constitutional provision.
- The PSC is not a judicial tribunal and its functions are limited and administrative in
nature. The PSC is not a court
(u 
$     ).
- It does not mean, however, that the non-inclusion of the administrative
tribunal within the scope of the above constitutional provision justifies the
summary disposition of petitioner's application in the manner followed by
respondent Public Service Commission.
- In  V   , speaking of the Court of Industrial Relations, which is
likewise an administrative tribunal
possessed of quasi-judicial powers like the PSC, the Court made clear that while it
(the CIR) is "free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements," it does not
mean "that it can, in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard
the fundamental and essential requirement of due process.
- The failure to respect such cardinal primary right of petitioner to have his application
decided in such a manner as to inform him not only of the issues involved but the
reasons for the decision, which necessarily would likewise require a finding of facts,
cannot receive judicial approval.
- The denial of Serranos petition was plain and palpable error. There is a need
then to remand the matter to the Public Service Commission so that it could
consider the evidence and discharge the function committed to it by law. Only after it
has rendered its decision setting forth the facts on which it is based does the power
of review on the part of this Court come into play.
Decision set aside, case remanded to PSC.


|7|  |  &   | 
!| :!
|    1+'#$"#!

|D
- petitioners are challenging the validity of Rule 168 of the "Revised Rules of
Practice before the Philippine Patent Office in Trademark Cases" as amended,
authorizing the Director of Patents to designate any ranking official of said office to
hear  % proceedings. Said Rule likewise provides that "all judgments
determining the merits of the case shall be personally and directly prepared by the
Director and signed by him." These proceedings refer to the hearing of opposition
to the registration of a mark or trade name, interference proceeding instituted for the
purpose of
determining the question of priority of adoption and use of a trade-mark,
trade name or service-mark, and cancellation of registration of a trade-mark or
trade name pending at the Patent Office.
- Under the Trade-mark Law (Republic Act No. 166 ), the Director of Patents
is vested with jurisdiction over
opposition, interference and cancellation cases filed by petitioners. Likewise, the
Rules of Practice in Trade-mark
Cases contains a similar provision, thus:
168.  . - The Director of Patents shall
have original jurisdiction over   proceedings. In the event that the
Patent Office should be provided with an Examiner of
Interferences, this Examiner shall have the original jurisdiction over these cases,
instead of the Director. In the case that the Examiner of Interferences takes over the
original jurisdiction over proceedings, his final decision subject to appeal
to the Director of Patents within three months of the receipt of notice of decisions.
Such appeals shall be governed by sections 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15
and 22 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court insofar as said sections are applicable and
appropriate, and the appeal fee shall be P25.00.
- The Rules of Practice in Trade-mark Cases were drafted and promulgated by the
Director of Patents and approved by the then Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce.
- Subsequently, the Director of Patents, with the approval of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce, amended
the afore-quoted Rule 168 to read as follows:
168.   &    . - The Director of Patents
shall have original jurisdiction
over proceedings, [In the event that the Patent Office is provided with an
Examiner of Interferences, this Examiner shall then have the original jurisdiction
over these cases, instead of the Director. In the case that the Examiner of
Interferences takes over the original jurisdiction over   proceedings, his
final decisions shall be subject to appeal to the Director of Patents within three
months of the receipt of notice decision. Such appeals shall be governed by
Sections 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8,10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 22 of Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court insofar as said sections are applicable and appropriate, and the appeal fee
shall be [P25.00.] Such   proceedings in the Philippine Patent Office
under this Title shall be heard before the Director of Patents, any hearing officer, 
 '      u#    
 
 

               u 

. (Emphasis supplied.)
- In accordance with the amended Rule, the Director of Patents delegated the
hearing of petitioners' cases to hearing officers, specifically, Attys. Amando
Marquez, Teofilo Velasco, Rustico Casia and Hector Buenaluz, the other
respondents herein.

- Petitioners filed their objections to the authority of the hearing officers to

hear their cases, alleging that the amendment of the Rule is illegal and void
because under the law the Director must personally hear and decide  
. Said objections were overruled by the Director of Patents, hence, the present
petition for

, to compel The Director of Patents to personally hear the
cases of petitioners, in lieu of the hearing officers.

D
WON the amendment of the rule is illegal and void as it should be the Director who
must personally hear and decide
cases.
& D
NO.
- The power conferred upon an administrative agency to which the administration
of a statute is entrusted to issue such regulations and orders as may be deemed
necessary or proper in order to carry out its purposes and provisions may be an
adequate source of authority to delegate a particular function, unless by express
provisions of the Act or by implication it has been withheld.
- The nature of the power and authority entrusted to The Director of Patents
suggests that the aforecited laws (Republic Act No. 166, in relation to Republic Act
No. 165) should be construed so as to give the aforesaid official the administrative
flexibility necessary for the prompt and expeditious discharge of his duties in the
administration of said laws. As such officer, he is required, among others, to
determine the question of priority in patent interference proceedings, decide
applications for reinstatement of a lapsed patent, cancellations of patents under
Republic Act No. 165,   proceedings such as oppositions, claims of
interference, cancellation cases under the Trade- mark Law and other matters in
connection with the enforcement of the aforesaid laws. It could hardly be expected,
in view of the magnitude of his responsibility, to require him to hear personally
each and every case pending in his Office. This would leave him little time to
attend to his other duties. The remedy is a far wider range of delegations to
subordinate officers.
- Thus, while the power to decide resides solely in the administrative agency vested
by law, this does not preclude a
delegation of the power to hold a hearing on the basis of which the decision of
the administrative agency will be made.
- The rule that requires an administrative officer to exercise his own judgment and
discretion does not preclude him
from utilizing, as a matter of practical administrative procedure, the aid of
subordinates to investigate and report to him the facts, on the basis of which the
officer makes his decisions. It is sufficient that the judgment and discretion finally
exercised are those of the officer authorized by law. Neither does due process of
law nor the requirements of fair hearing require that the actual taking of testimony
be before the same officer who will make the decision in the
case. As long as a party is not deprived of his right to present his own case and
submit evidence in support thereof, and the decision is supported by the evidence in
the record, there is no question that the requirements of due process
#
and fair trial are fully met.
In short, there is no abnegation of responsibility on the
part of the officer concerned as
#
the actual decision remains with and is made by said officer.
It is, however,
required that to "give the substance of a hearing, which is for the purpose of

making determinations upon evidence the officer who makes the

determinations must consider and appraise the evidence which justifies them."
- In the case at bar, while the hearing officer may make preliminary rulings on the
myriad of questions raised at the
hearings of these cases, the ultimate decision on the merits of all the issues and
questions involved is left to the Director of Patents. Apart from the circumstance that
the point involved is procedural and not jurisdictional, petitioners have not shown in
what manner they have been prejudiced by the proceedings.
 ,3(,+()Petition is dismissed

|& 77  77
| 
'' ' $:%%
| 7 !#:
|
- On July 9, 1961 the petitioner, with three other persons, supposedly his widowed
mother (Dolores Neria) and two younger brothers (Felix and Manuel Neria),
arrived at the Manila International Airport from Hongkong on board a Cathay
Pacific Airways plane. The immigration inspector at the airport, not satisfied
with the petitioner's travel documents and those of his companions upon primary
inspection thereof, referred the matter of their admission to the Board of Special
Inquiry for investigation "to determine filiation and paternity to a Filipino citizen".
Accordingly, the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 conducted a hearing on July 14,
1961, at which time the petitioner offered oral and documentary evidence to support
his claim for admission as a Filipino citizen After the conclusion of the investigation,
the said board on August 2, 1961 deliberated on the case and unanimously voted
for petitioner's admission. The board on the same date rendered its decision,
declaring Dolores Neria a Filipino citizen, and the petitioner a Filipino citizen as he is
an illegitimate son of Dolores, and allowing his admission into the Philippines. This
written decision was subsequently submitted to the members of the Board of
Immigration Commissioners. The Immigration authorities issued Identification
Certificate 16306 to the petitioner, attesting that he "was admitted as a citizen of the
Philippines" per decision of the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 dated August 2, 1961.
- On January 24, 1962, the Secretary of Justice issued Memorandum Order 9 (exh.
7), directing that
[i]t appearing that for the past several years, the Board of Commissioners of
Immigration has not met collectively to discuss and deliberate on the cases coming
before it, it is hereby ordered that all decisions purporting to have been rendered
by the Board of Commissioners on Appeal from, or on review motu proprio of,
decisions of the Board of Special Inquiry are set aside. The Board of
Commissioners is directed to review, in accordance with 1+() ! 89 (*
(00()2+ |1+ (' #, as amended, all decisions of the Board of Special
Inquiry admitting entry of aliens into the country and give preference to all cases
where entry has been permitted on the ground that the entrant is a citizen of the
Philippines, following the principle laid down in 1+()% (* (00()2+ |1+
#" as amended, that 'the burden of proof shall be upon such alien to establish that
he is not subject to exclusion' and the ruling of this Department that "Citizenship is
a status of privilege, power and honor of inestimable value. When doubts exist
concerning a grant of it, they should be resolved in favor of the Government against
the claimant"
- In compliance with the above directive, the Board of Immigration Commissioners,

proceeded to review

the entire proceedings had before the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 relative to the
petitioner's case and that of his supposed relatives. A hearing officer of the Bureau
of Immigration was directed to conduct an investigation of the entire proceedings
of and the evidence presented before the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1. On
the basis of a memorandum of the hearing officer, the new Board of Immigration
Commissioners found that the petitioner had not satisfactorily established his claim
for admission as a Filipino citizen and, consequently, reversed the decision of the
Board of Special Inquiry No. 1, and ordered that the petitioner be excluded from
the Philippines as an alien not properly documented for admission and be returned
to the port from whence he came or to the country of which he is a national. The
petitioner moved for a reconsideration of said decision. This motion was denied by
the new Board.
- The petitioner filed a petition for and prohibition praying the Court of First
Instance of Manila to restrain the
Commissioner of Immigration and the Board of Immigration Commissioners from
arresting and expelling him, and prohibit them from taking any further steps or
actions contrary to the decision rendered by the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1.
This petition was given due course, and a writ of preliminary injunction was issued
as prayed for. But this petition was dismissed.
- On April 30, 1965 the present petition for   was filed, the petitioner
claiming that the respondent's
agents picked him up at Rosario St., Manila, in the evening of the previous April 23
on the supposed claim that he was not properly documented for admission as a
Filipino citizen when he entered the Philippines; and that since then he "has been
unlawfully and illegally confined, restrained and deprived of his liberty in the
Bureau of Immigration Detention Station in the Engineering Island, Manila." On the
same date, the lower court required the respondent to bring the petitioner before
the court on May 3, 1965 at 8:30 O'clock in the morning. The clerk of court
issued the corresponding writ of   directing the respondent to submit
his return. The latter's written return of May 6,
1965 states, among other things, that the petitioner was under lawful custody on a
valid process commanding his exclusion from the Philippines and ordering his return
to the port where he came from or to the country of which he is a national.
- On June 18, 1965 the lower court dismissed the petition stating that the petitioner
is legally detained on a warrant issued by the respondent Commissioner of
Immigration." On July 20, 1965 the lower court set aside its decision of June 17,
1965, and, on the same date, rendered an amended decision completely reversing
its decision of June 17, granted the writ of habeas corpus and ordered the
immediate release of the petitioner. The lower court held that "the decision rendered
by the new Board of Commissioners is null and void for lack of jurisdiction, and no
administrative action being possible because the question involved in this case is
purely a legal question, the doctrine of exhaust ion of administrative remedies has no
application in this case." On July 22 the clerk of court issued the corresponding writ of
habeas corpus.


WON the decision of the new Board of Immigration Commissioner is null and void for
having been rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion, in violation of section 27 (b), Comm. Act 613
& 

|  Comm. Act 613, as amended, provides in part that :

[t]he decision of any
two members of the Board [of Special Inquiry] shall prevail and shall be final
unless reversed on appeal by the Board of Commissioners as hereafter stated,
or, in the absence of an appeal, unless reversed by the Board of Commissioners after
a review by it, motu propio of the entire proceedings within one year from the
promulgation of said decision....
- The resolution of this issue, in turn, depends upon the determination of the date
when the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 was promulgated, August 2,
1961 when it was actually rendered, or September 4, 1961 when the petitioner was
actually notified thereof and a copy received by his counsel. The date of
promulgation is important. It is from that date that the one-year period commenced
within which the Board of Immigration Commissioners could review motu proprio the
entire proceedings of Board of Special Inquiry No. 1.
- According to the Solicitor General, the correct date of promulgation is
September 4, 1961, because under the Immigration Rules and Regulations, the
decision of a Board of Special Inquiry "shall be rendered in writing", 5 and under
section 27 (b), supra, the written decision "shall be promulgated"; that the words
"rendition" (from "rendered")
and "promulgation" (from "promulgated") connote two separate and distinct acts
required to be accomplished by the Board of Special Inquiry, for rendition is the
date when a judge signs his decision and files it with the clerk of court, whereas
promulgation is the date when such decision is published, officially announced, is
made known to the public, or delivered to the clerk of court for filing, coupled with
notice to the parties or to their counsel; and that in this case, rendition was
accomplished on August 2, 1961 when the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 concluded
its hearing on the petitioner's case, deliberated thereon, voted for his admission into
the Philippines and rendered its written decision, and promulgation was
accomplished on September 4, 1961 when the petitioner was actually notified of the
decision, copy of which was received by his counsel.
- No amount of hair-splitting in regard to the words "rendition" and "promulgation"
would convey different meanings. This Court defined promulgation as "the delivery
of the decision to the Clerk of Court for filing and publication". The word
"promulgate" was viewed by the majority in People vs. Dinglasan (77 Phil. 764) as
the entry made by the clerk of a judgment or order in the book of entries of
judgments made by said clerk.
- The petitioner's argument, at all events, is without merit. Section 27 (b), supra,
provides that proceedings of the Board of Special Inquiry its appraisal of a case
on the merits, the result of its deliberation, its decision and notice thereof to an
alien, and the time when an appeal may be brought therefrom
"shall be
conducted under rules of procedure to be prescribed by the Commissioner of
Immigration."
- In this case, August 2, 1961 was the date when the Board of Special Inquiry
No. 1 concluded its hearing of petitioner's case (I.C. 61-2312-C), deliberated on it,
and voted for his admission as a citizen of the Philippines. August
2, 1961 was also the date when the decision in extenso was rendered. That
date and not September 4, 1961, therefore, is the date of promulgation of the
decision of the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1, which decision should "prevail and
shall be final ... unless reversed by the Board of Commissioners after a review by it,
motu proprio of the
10
entire proceedings within one year from the promulgation of said decision."
Computing the one-year period from

August 2, 1961, the Board of Immigration Commissioners had until August 2,

1962 within which to review the proceedings motu proprio.
- The case of the petitioner was included in the agenda of the Board of Immigration
Commissioners for review motu propio for July 24, 1962. The case was referred to
the Immigration hearing officer, who, on July 30, 1962, submitted
his memorandum to the said board. The case was again included in the agenda of
the said board for August 2, 1962, the date it was considered submitted for
decision. The minutes of the meeting of the Board of Immigration
Commissioners presented by its Secretary Pio Noche and read into the records of
this case, however, reveal that the petitioner's case was actually acted upon and
decided, not on August 2, 1962, as the decision and the warrant of exclusion
would tend to show, but on August 8, 1962
- The minutes of the meeting of the new Board of Commissioners and, the
testimony of its Secretary show that as
late on August 8, 1962, the new Board of Commissioners was, only deliberating on
the case of the petitioner. The admission of the Secretary of the new Board of
Commissioners that the case of the petitioner was not acted upon on August 2,
1962, shows that the alteration of the date of the decision of the new Board of
Commissioners from August
8, 1962 to August 2, 1962 was deliberate. The fact that the case of the petitioner
was submitted to the new Board of
Commissioners for its resolution on August 2, 1962, is no excuse for ante-dating
its decision which was actually rendered after that date. On August 2, 1962, it did
not reverse the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1, because having
actually deliberated on the case of the petitioner on August 8, 1962, it could not
have on August 2 resolved to reverse the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry.
- The alteration of the true date of the decision of the new Board of
Commissioners, made upon instruction of the respondent Commissioner of
Immigration, is revealing: it shows that the respondent Commissioner knew that
the one-year period was to be computed from August 2, 1961; it shows also that he
knew that if the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 had to be reversed,
the new Board of Commissioners had to act not later than August 2,
1962.
As it was on August 8, 1962 when the Board of Immigration Commissioners as a
body deliberated on and voted for the reversal of the decision of the Board of Special
Inquiry No. 1, the review motu proprio was effected 6 days beyond the one-year
period fixed by section 27 (b), supra. The said decision of the Board of Immigration
Commissioners, and the warrant of exclusion issued on the strength of such
decision, are therefore, as correctly found by the lower court, null and void, for
"lack of jurisdiction," since the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 by
that time had already become "final."
- The respondent also contends that the petitioner's petition for habeas corpus was
prematurely filed, because he did
not first appeal the decision of the Board of Immigration Commissioners to the
Secretary of Justice, who, by law, is vested with power of control and supervision
over the said Board. We have already held that the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies is inapplicable "where the question in dispute is purely a
legal one", or where the controverted act is "patently illegal" or was performed
without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction and "nothing of an administrative
nature is to be or can be done" thereon.
  Decision affirmed from affirmed

&|
  |   77  77
| 
'' ('>

$
7|?|| (!"#!
|
- Sy Te, whose name was changed to Benito Sichangco was recognized by the
Bureau of Immigration as a Filipino citizen by birth in an order dated February 19,
1960 .Sychangco is married to Cheng Yok Ha. Three sons were born in China
allegedly out of their marriage, namely, Si Beng, Si Son and Si Luna.
- On August 28, 1961 arrived in the Philippines and sought admission
claiming to be the children of Benito
Sichangco. An investigation was conducted by the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 of
the Bureau of Immigration. After hearing, the said Board rendered a decision on
September 11, 1961 (Exh. C) admitting these minors into the Philippines as
citizens thereof, being the children of the petitioner . said decision was submitted to
the then members of the Board of Commissioners who "noted" the decision on
different dates.
- On January 24, 1962, then Secretary of Justice Jose W. Diokno issued
Memorandum Order No. 9, wherein he found "that for the past several years, the
Board of Commissioners of Immigration has not met collectively to discuss and
deliberate on the cases coming before it," for which reason he set aside "all
decisions purporting to have been rendered by the Board of Commissioners on
appeal from, or on review motu propio of, decisions of the Boards of Special
Inquiry," and directed the Board of Commissioners "to review in accordance
with Section 27(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, all decisions of
the Boards of Special Inquiry admitting entry of aliens into this country and give
preference to all cases where entry has been permitted on the ground that the
entrant is a citizen of the Philippines, following the principle laid down in Section 30
of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, that 'the burden of proof shall be upon
such alien to establish that he is not subject to exclusion ..."
- Pursuant to Memorandum Order No. 9, a committee examined the pretended
right of the said minors as alleged children of petitioner to admission, and
thereafter forwarded its findings to the Commissioner of Immigration
recommending the exclusion of said minors, the revocation of the order
declaring Sy Te or Benito Sichangco a Filipino citizen, and the filing of
deportation proceedings against him.A copy of this decision was received by the
minors on October 26,1962.
- Benito Sichangco, in behalf of the minors Si Beng, Si Son and Si Luna, filed a
petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction on November 20, 1962 before the
Court of First Instance of Manila, to annul the decision of the Board of
Commissioners of Immigration excluding the abovenamed minors from the
Philippines.
- CFI declared that the decision of the Board of Commissioners dated September 4,
1962, reversing the decision of the previous Board of Commissioners dated
September 11, 1961, to have been rendered on October 26, 1962, more than a year
from the first decision, and therefore illegal and null and void, and the injunction
earlier issued was made permanent, with costs against respondent Board.

:
WON the notice of the BOC decision must be received within the 1 year period
&

NO
- The Board of Commissioners rendered on September 4, 1962 its decision
reversing that of the Board of Special
Inquiry No, 1 dated September 11, 1961, well within the one-year period required by
law.
- It is true that the copy of the decision of the Board of Commissioners dated
September 4, 1962 was sent by mail to the petitioner's minor children herein only on
October 26, 1962, and received by the said minors on the same date. This fact,
however, does not work to vitiate said decision. All that the Immigration Law requires
is that the decision of reversal of the Board of Commissioners be promulgated
within one year from the rendition of the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry.
Notice of said decision of reversal may be sent even after the one-year period has
elapsed. In the case of Neria vs. Commissioner of Immigration (L-24800, May 27,
1968, 23 SCRA 807, citing Arocha vs. Vivo, supra), the Supreme Court ruled that
"the operative date of the Commissioners' action is that when the resolution (of
exclusion) was noted and adopted by them as a Board, regardless of the date
when the decision in extenso was prepared, written and signed," and with more
reason, as in this case, regardless of the date when such decision is mailed,
"because the decision in extenso must relate back to the day the resolution to
exclude was actually adopted. Necessarily the extended opinion had to be
posterior to the day when the Commissioners voted and resolved to reverse the
findings of the Board of Special Inquiry. The Secretary's certificate shows that the
Board of Immigration Commissioners acted upon not less than eight Immigration
cases (including that of the Gatchalians) on July 6, 1962; and it was of course
impracticable to prepare and sign fully reasoned decisions in all these cases."

|C&|
6 
  
|
?|
| ";"#$
|D
- Private respondent Lucina C. Sendino entered into a reservation agreement with
Realty Exchange Venture, Inc. (REVI) for a 120-square meter lot in Raymondville
Subdivision in Sucat, Paranaque for P307,800.00 as its purchase price. She paid
P1,000.00 as partial reservation fee on January 15, 1989 and completed payment
of this fee on January 20, 1989 by paying P4,000.00.
- On July 18, 1989, private respondent paid REVI P16,600.00 as full downpayment
on the purchase price. However, she was advised by REVI to change her co-maker,
which she agreed, asking for an extension of one month to do so.
- For alleged non-compliance with the requirement of submission of the appropriate
documents under the terms of the original agreement, REVI, through its VicePresident for Marketing, informed respondent of the cancellation of the contract on
the 31st of July 1989.
- On April 20, 1990, private respondent filed a complaint for Specific Performance
against REVI with the office of Appeals, Adjudication and Legal Affairs (OAALA) of
the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) asking that respondent be
ordered: To comply and continue with the sale of the house and lot, Block 4,
Lot 17 at the Raymondville Subdivision, Sucat Road, Paranaque, Metro Manila;
- This petition was amended on August 17, 1990 by impleading petitioners
Magdiwang Realty Corporation (MRC)
which appeared to be the registered owner of the subject lot as per TCT No. 76023.

- On April 3, 1991 the HLURB, whose authority to hear and decide the
complaint was challenged by REVI in its answer, rendered its judgment in favor of
private respondent and ordered petitioners to continue with the sale of the
house and lot and to pay private respondent P5,000 as moral damages, P5,000 as
exemplary damages and P6,000 as attorney's fees and costs of the suit. An appeal
from this decision was taken to the HLURB OAALA Arbiter, which
affirmed the Board's decision. The decision of the OAALA Arbiter was appealed to
the Office of the President, herein
public respondent.
- On January 7, 1993, the public respondent rendered its decision dismissing
the petitioners' appeal. Motion for reconsideration of the decision was denied by
the public respondent on January 26, 1993. Consequently petitioners come before
this Court, in this petition.


WON the HLURB can act validly as a division composed of only 3 commissioners
&
Yes.
- Under section 5 of E.O. 648 which defines the powers and duties of the
commission, the board is specifically mandated to adopt rules of procedure for the
conduct of its business and to perform such functions necessary for the
accomplishment of its above mentioned functions. Since nothing in the provisions of
either E.O. 90 or E.O. 648 denies or withholds the power or authority to delegate
adjudicatory functions to a division, we cannot see how the Board, for the purpose
of effectively carrying out its administrative responsibilities and quasi-judicial
powers as a regulatory body should be denied the power, as a matter of
practical administrative procedure, to constitute its adjudicatory boards into various
divisions.
- After all, the power conferred upon an administrative agency to issue rules and
regulations necessary to carry out its
functions has been held "to be an adequate source of authority to delegate a
particular function, unless by express provision of the Act or by implication it has
been withheld." The practical necessity of establishing a procedure whereby
cases are decided by three (3) Commissioners furthermore assumes greater
significance when one notes that the HLURB, as constituted, only has four (4) full
time commissioners and five (5) part time commissioners to deal with all the
functions, administrative, adjudicatory, or otherwise, entrusted to it.
- As the Office of the President noted in its February 26, 1993 Resolution
denying petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration, "it is impossible and very
impractical to gather the four (4) full time and five (5) part time
commissioners (together) just to decide a case." Considering that its part time
commissioners act merely in an ()capacity, requiring a majority of the Board
to sit   on each and every case brought before it would result in an
administrative nightmare.