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Digest by: Alexis Bea

Civil Liberties Union v Executive Secretary


FACTS:

In July 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 284 which
allowed members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold
other government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions subject to
limitations set therein. The Civil Liberties Union (CLU) assailed this EO averring that
such law is unconstitutional. The constitutionality of EO 284 is being challenged by CLU
on the principal submission that it adds exceptions to Sec 13, Article 7 of the
Constitution which provides:
Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and
their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure.
They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other
profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any
contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the
Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of
their office.

CLU avers that by virtue of the phrase unless otherwise provided in this Constitution,
the only exceptions against holding any other office or employment in Government are
those provided in the Constitution, namely: (i) The Vice-President may be appointed as a
Member of the Cabinet under Sec 3, par. (2), Article 7; and (ii) the Secretary of Justice is
an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec 8 (1), Article 8.


ISSUE:

Whether or not EO 284 is constitutional.
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HELD:

No, it is unconstitutional. It is clear that the 1987 Constitution seeks to prohibit the
President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants from
holding during their tenure multiple offices or employment in the government, except in
those cases specified in the Constitution itself and as above clarified with respect to
posts held without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law
and as required by the primary functions of their office, the citation of Cabinet members
(then called Ministers) as examples during the debate and deliberation on the general
rule laid down for all appointive officials should be considered as mere personal opinions
which cannot override the constitutions manifest intent and the peoples understanding
thereof.
In the light of the construction given to Sec 13, Art 7 in relation to Sec 7, par. (2), Art IX-
B of the 1987 Constitution, EO 284 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting
the number of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries
may hold in addition to their primary position to not more than 2 positions in the
government and government corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple
offices or employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Sec 13, Art 7 of
the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the
1987 Constitution itself.



Ulpiano Sarmiento III v Salvador Mison


FACTS:

This is the 1st major case under the 1987 Constitution. In 1987, Salvador Mison was
appointed as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs by then president Corazon
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Aquino. Ulpiano Sarmiento III and Juanito Arcilla, being members of the bar, taxpayers,
and professors of constitutional law questioned the appointment of Mison because it
appears that Misons appointment was not submitted to the Commission on
Appointments (COA) for approval. Sarmiento insists that uner the new Constitution,
heads of bureaus require the confirmation of the COA.
Meanwhile, Sarmiento also sought to enjoin Guillermo Carague, the then Secretary of
the Department of Budget, from disbursing the salary payments of Mison due to the
unconstitutionality of Misons appointment.


ISSUE:

Whether or not the appointment of heads of bureaus needed confirmation by the
Commission on Appointment.


HELD:

No. In the 1987 Constitution, the framers removed heads of bureaus as one of those
officers needing confirmation by the Commission on Appointment. Under the 1987
Constitution, there are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint.

These four (4) groups are:
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other
officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution;

Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law;

Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;

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Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the
President alone.

The first group above are the only public officers appointed by the president which
require confirmation by the COA. The second, third, and fourth group do not require
confirmation by the COA. The position of Mison as the head of the Bureau of Customs
does not belong to the first group hence he does not need to be confirmed by the COA.

Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs. Zamora, G.R. No. 141284
Petition: special civil action for certiorari and prohibition
Petitioner: Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Respondent: Hon. Ronaldo B. Zamora, Gen. Panfilo M. Lacson, Gen. Edgar B. Aglipay, and Gen.
Angelo Reyes
Ponente: Kapunan, J.
Date: 15 August 2000
Facts:
In view of the alarming increase in violent crimes in Metro Manila, like
robberies, kidnappings and carnappings, the President, in a verbal directive,
ordered the PNP and the Marines to conduct joint visibility patrols for the purpose
of crime prevention and suppression.
In compliance with the presidential mandate, the PNP Chief, through Police Chief
Superintendent Edgar B. Aglipay, formulated Letter of Instruction 02/2000[1] (the
LOI) which detailed the manner by which the joint visibility patrols, called Task
Force Tulungan, would be conducted. Task Force Tulungan was placed under
the leadership of the Police Chief of Metro Manila.
In a Memorandum issued on January 24, 2000, President Ejercito Estrada
invoked his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Section 18, Article VII of the
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Constitution, directing the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with
each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the
PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence.
On 17 January 2000, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (the IBP) filed the
instant petition to annul LOI 02/2000 and to declare the deployment of the
Philippine Marines, null and void and unconstitutional. The petitioner alleged that:
1. The deployment of Phil. Marines violates the constitution since:
o there is no emergency situation which will justify such deployment. Hence,
it is a derogation of Art 16 Sec. 5(4)
o deployment constitutes an insidious incursion by the military in a civilian
function of government (law enforcement) in derogation of article xvi,
section 5 (4), of the Constitution
o deployment creates a dangerous tendency to rely on the military to
perform the civilian functions of the government.
2. In militarizing law enforcement in metro manila, the administration is
unwittingly making the military more powerful than what it should really be
under the constitution
Solicitor General asserted that :
1. IBP has no legal standing
2. Question of deployment of the is a political question
3. Organization and conduct of police visibility patrols does not violate the
civilian supremacy clause in the Constitution
Issues:
1. Whether the IBP has locus standi to raise the issues in the petition.
2. Whether the Presidents factual determination of the necessity of calling the
armed forces is subject to judicial review.
3. Whether President committed grave abuse of discretion in calling out the Marines
4. Whether the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols
violates the Sec. 3 Art. 2 of the Constitution on civilian supremacy over the
military and the civilian character of the PNP.

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Ruling:
1. No, the petitioner failed to sufficiently complied with the requisites of standing in
the case.
2. Yes, it is justiciable.
3. No, President did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction nor did he commit a violation of the civilian supremacy
clause of the Constitution.
4. No, the deployment of the Marines does not violate the civilian supremacy clause
nor does it infringe the civilian character of the police force.
Ratio:
1. The petitioner failed to sufficiently complied with the requisites of standing in the case.
The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing
more is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case. This is too general an
interest which is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry.
Furthermore, the petition was signed by the National President of IBP without the
formal board resolution, therefore it should be taken as his interest alone.
Assuming he was duly authorized, the petitioner wasnt able to show any specific
injury which it suffered or will suffer due to the governmental act.
*However, the Court has discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the
requirement of legal standing when paramount interest is involved. When the issues raised
are of paramount importance to the public, the Court may brush aside technicalities of
procedure.
2. It is justiciable. When the grant of power is qualified, conditional or subject to limitations,
the issue of whether the prescribed qualifications or conditions have been met of the
limitations respected, is justiciable.
3.

The President did not commit grave abuse of discretion in calling out the Marines. There is
a clear textual commitment under the Constitution to bestow on the President full
discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to determine the necessity for the
exercise of such power. Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution. The President may call
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the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion whenever
it becomes necessary.
4. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy
clause. Local police forces are in charge of visibility patrols, and the Marines render nothing
more than assistance required in conducting the patrols.

Separate opinion: Puno
Went over numerous cases to prove that In sum, this Court brushed aside the
political question doctrine and assumed jurisdiction whenever it found
constitutionally-imposed limits on the exercise of powers conferred upon the
Legislature.
On the issue of the exercise by the President of his powers as Commander-in-
Chief vis-a-vis the political question doctrine: the function of the Court is not to
supplant but merely to check the Executive; to ascertain whether the President
has gone beyond the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to exercise the
power vested in him or to determine the wisdom of his act. Judicial inquiry is
confined to the question of whether the President did not act arbitrarily. Using this
yardstick, the Court found that the President did not.
On the issue WON the actions of the President to call out the armed forces be
revoked: Absence of provision to grant Court the power to review the exercise of
calling out the armed forces by the President does not render this Court
incapable to pass upon the validity of the exercise.

Notes:

Requisites of Judicial Review:
(1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case
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(2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question
(3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity
(4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.



Marcelino v Cruz


FACTS:

Bernardino Marcelino was charged for the crime of rape. On August 4, 1975, the
prosecution finished presenting evidence against Marcelino and rested its case. On the
same date, the attorneys of both parties in the criminal case moved for time within which
to submit their respective memoranda. The presiding judge, Fernando Cruz, Jr., gave
them 30 days or until September 4, 1975. Only Marcelino submitted a memoranda.
On November 28, 1975, Judge Cruz filed with the Clerk of Court a copy of his decision,
his decision bears the same date of November 28, 1975. The promulgation of the
decisions was scheduled in January 1976. Marcelino is now contending that the court
can no longer promulgate judgment because by January 1976, the 3-month period (90
day period) within which lower courts must decide on cases had already lapsed, thus,
the lower court lost its jurisdiction over the case.


ISSUE:

Whether or not Judge Cruz had resolved the case within the allotted period.


HELD:

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Digest by: Alexis Bea
Yes. The case is deemed submitted for decision on September 4, 1975 (date of last day
of filing of the memoranda by the respective parties). From that day, the 3-month period
begins to run so Judge Cruz had until December 4, 1975 to rule on the case. Judge Cruz
made a rendition of his decision on November 28, 1975. The date of rendition is the date
of filing of the decision with the clerk of court. Hence, Judge Cruz was able to rule on the
case within the 3-month period because November 28, 1975 was merely the 85th day
from September 4, 1975.
The date of promulgation of a decision, in this case it was set in January 1976, could not
serve as the reckoning date because the same necessarily comes at a later date.
Is the period to decide provided for by the Constitution mandatory?
Section 11 (1), Art 10 of the 1987 Constitution provides that upon the effectivity of this
constitution, the maximum period within which case or matter shall be decided or
resolved from the date of its submission shall be; 18 months for the Supreme Court, 12
months for the inferior courts and 3 months for lower courts. In practice, the Supreme
Court is liberal when it comes to this provision. The provision is mandatory, its merely
directive. Extensions can be granted in meritorious cases. To interpret such provision as
mandatory will only be detrimental to the justice system. Nevertheless, the SC warned
lower court judges to resolve cases within the prescribed period and not take this liberal
construction as an excuse to dispose of cases at later periods.




Co v Electoral Tribunal


FACTS:

On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of Northern Samar
was held. Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the
second legislative district of Northern Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and
Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr. Respondent Ong was proclaimed
the duly elected representative of the second district of Northern Samar.

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The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent alleging that Jose
Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines and not a resident of the second
district of Northern Samar.

The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) declared respondent Ong is a
natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting
purposes.


ISSUES:

1. Whether or not respondent is a natural born Filipino and a resident of Laoang,
Northern Samar.
2. Whether or not the HRET committed grave abuse of authority in the exercise of its
powers.


HELD:

1. The Court affirmed the decision of HRET that respondent is a natural born Filipino and
a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar. The respondent traces his natural born
citizenship through his mother, not through the citizenship of his father. The citizenship
of the father is relevant only to determine whether or not the respondent "chose" to be a
Filipino when he came of age. At that time and up to the present, both mother and father
were Filipinos. Respondent Ong could not have elected any other citizenship unless he
first formally renounced Philippine citizenship in favor of a foreign nationality. Unlike
other persons faced with a problem of election, there was no foreign nationality of his
father which he could possibly have chosen.

2. The Court declared that HRET did not commit any grave abuse of discretion. The
same issue of natural-born citizenship has already been decided by the Constitutional
Convention of 1971 and by the Batasang Pambansa convened by authority of the
Constitution drafted by that Convention. Emil Ong, full blood brother of the respondent,
was declared and accepted as a natural born citizen by both bodies.


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Perfecto v Meer


FACTS:

In April, 1947 the Collector of Internal Revenue required Mr. Justice Gregorio Perfecto to
pay income tax upon his salary as member of this Court during the year 1946. After
paying the amount (P802), he instituted this action in the Manila Court of First Instance
contending that the assessment was illegal, his salary not being taxable for the reason
that imposition of taxes thereon would reduce it in violation of the Constitution.


ISSUE:

Does the imposition of an income tax upon this salary amount to a diminution thereof?


HELD:

Yes. As in the United States during the second period, we must hold that salaries of
judges are not included in the word "income" taxed by the Income Tax Law. Two
paramount circumstances may additionally be indicated, to wit: First, when the Income
Tax Law was first applied to the Philippines 1913, taxable "income" did not include
salaries of judicial officers when these are protected from diminution. That was the
prevailing official belief in the United States, which must be deemed to have been
transplanted here ; and second, when the Philippine Constitutional Convention approved
(in 1935) the prohibition against diminution of the judges' compensation, the Federal
principle was known that income tax on judicial salaries really impairs them.

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This is not proclaiming a general tax immunity for men on the bench. These pay taxes.
Upon buying gasoline, or cars or other commodities, they pay the corresponding duties.
Owning real property, they pay taxes thereon. And on incomes other than their judicial
salary, assessments are levied. It is only when the tax is charged directly on their salary
and the effect of the tax is to diminish their official stipend that the taxation must be
resisted as an infringement of the fundamental charter.

Judges would indeed be hapless guardians of the Constitution if they did not perceive
and block encroachments upon their prerogatives in whatever form. The undiminishable
character of judicial salaries is not a mere privilege of judges personal and therefore
waivable but a basic limitation upon legislative or executive action imposed in the
public interest (Evans vs. Gore).

Endencia and Jugo v David, etc.

Doctrine: A law that violates a constitutional provision shall be declared invalid and
unconstitutional even if the legislature validated it through declaring that the said law shall
be construed as not to violate the constitutional inhibition.
Petition: Appeal from a judgment of lower court
Plaintiff & Appellees: Pastor M. Endencia & Fernando Jugo
Defendant & Appellant: Sturnino David (Collector of BIR)
Pontente: Justice Montemayor

Short version:
Taxes were collected from the petitioners who are both members of the judiciary by the
BIR. They are asking the appellant for a refund of the taxes collected arguing that sec.13 of
R.A. 590, which states that no salary received by any public officer shall be exempted from
the income tax, is unconstitutional as Sec 9, Art VIII of the constitution states that
compensation of members of the SC and all judges shall not be diminished during their
continuance in office. The SC affirmed the decision appealed from, stating that should there
be a conflict between a legislature and the constitution, the law will have to give way and
has to be declared invalid and unconstitutional.

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Facts:
1. Sec. 13 of R.A. 590 states that no salary received by any public officer shall be exempted
from the income tax, payment of which was declared not to be a diminution of his
compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law. Tax was hence collected by the BIR
from Justice Pastor Endencia and Justice Fernando Jugo as follows:

J.
Endencia
Associate
Justice; Court
of Appeals
1951 PHP 1,744.45
J. Jugo Associate
Justice; Court
of Appeals
January
1950
October
1950
PHP 2,345.46
Associate
Justice;
Supreme
Court
October
December
1950

2. A joint appeal to the Court of First Instance of Manila declared Sec 13 of R.A. 590
unconstitutional as it violates Sec 9, Art VII of the constitution which explicitly states
that [members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts] shall receive
such compensation as may be fixed by law, which shall not be diminished during their
continuance in office.
3. The SC ordered the defendant to refund the income tax collected. The defendants
appealed from the decision of the lower court.

Issue:
1. Is Sec 13 of R.A. 590 unconstitutional?

Held:
1. Yes. Sec. 13 of R.A. 590 is unconstitutional
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Ratio:
Contention Supreme Court
The law declared that tax payment is not to
be a diminution of the compensation fixed
by the constitution.
First, it is not within the sphere of the
legislature to interpret or ascertain the
meaning of the phrase which shall not be
diminished during their continuance in
office (Sec 9, Art VII of the constitution).
This act of the legislature invades the
fundamental principles of separation of
powers.

In upholding Perfecto v Meer, the SC
reiterated that taxing the salary of a judicial
officer in the Philippines is a diminution of
such salary as his salary is actually
decreased every year.
Hence Sec 13 of RA 590 is not
unconstitutional
The Legislature may not legally provide in a
law that it be interpreted in such a way that
it may not violate a constitutional provision.

Since Sec 13 of RA 590 violates the
constitution, it is held invalid and
unconstitutional.

Opinions:

Justice Bautista Angela (concurring)
- The provision that that taxing of the salary of a judicial officer shall be considered
not to be a diminution of his compensation fixed by the constitution or by law is an
invasion of the province and jurisdiction of the judiciary.

Chief Justice Paras (concurring and dissenting):
- Referred to dissent of Justice Ozaeta in Perfecto v Meer where the intent of the
drafters of the constitution was considered saying, when the framers of the
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Constitution fixed those salaries, they must have taken into consideration that the
recipients were paying income tax thereon. There was no necessity to provide
expressly that said salaries shall be subject to income tax because they knew that
already so provided. On the other hand, if exemption from any tax on said salaries
had been intended, it would have been specifically [provided],
- Disagrees that no legislation may provide that it be held valid although against a
provision of the constitution.








Magtoto vs. Manguera


FACTS:

No preliminary facts are available in the body of the case. Judge Miguel M. Manguera of
the Court of First Instance (Branch II) of Occidental Mindoro (in GR L-37201-02) and
Judge Judge Onoftre A. Villaluz of the Criminal Circuit Court of Pasig, Rizal (in GR L-
37424) declarede admissible the confessions of the accused in said cases (Clemente
Magtoto in GR L-37201-02; and Maximo Simeon, Louis Mednatt, Inocentes De Luna,
Ruben Miranda, Alfonso Ballesteros, Rudolfo Suarez, Manuel Manalo, Alberto Gabion,
and Rafael Brill in GR L-37424). District Judge Asaali S. Isnani of Court of First Instance
(Branch II) of Zamboanga de Sur (in GR L-38928), on the other hand, declared
inadmissible the confessions of the accused in said case (Vicente Longakit and Jaime
Dalion), although they have not been informed of their right to remain silent and to
counsel before they gave the confessions, because they were given before the effectivity
of the 1973 Constitution. Petitions for certiorari were filed with the Supreme Court.


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ISSUE:

Whether the right to counsel and to be informed in such right, incorporated in Section 20,
Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, applies prospectively or retroactively.


HELD:

Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution granted, for the first time, to a person
under
investigation for the commission of an offense, the right to counsel and to be informed of
such right. And the last sentence thereof which, in effect, means that any confession
obtained in violation of this right shall be inadmissible in evidence, can and should be
given effect only when the right already existed and had been violated. Consequently,
because the confessions of the accused in GRs L-37201-02, 37424 and 38929 were
taken before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution in accordance with the rules then in
force, no right had been violated as to render them inadmissible in evidence although
they were not informed of "their right to remain silent and to counsel," "and to be
informed of such right," because, no such right existed at the time. The argument that
the second paragraph of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, which was added by
Republic Act 1083 enacted in 1954, which reads that "In every case, the person
detained shall be informed of the cause of his detention and shall be allowed, upon his
request, to communicate and confer at anytime with his attorney or counsel," impliedly
granted to a detained person the right to counsel and to be informed of such right, is
untenable. The only right granted by said paragraph to a detained person was to be
informed of
the cause of his detention. But he must make a request for him to be able to claim the
right to communicate and confer with counsel at any time. The historical background of
Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution shows that the new right granted therein
to a detained person to counsel and to be informed of such right under pain of his
confession being declared inadmissible in evidence, has and should be given a
prospective and not a retroactive effect. Furthermore, to give a retroactive effect to this
constitutional guarantee to counsel would have a great unsettling effect on the
administration of justice in this country. It may lead to the acquittal of guilty individuals
and thus cause injustice to the People and the offended parties in many criminal cases
where confessions were obtained before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and in
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accordance with the rules then in force although without assistance of counsel. The
Constitutional Convention could not have intended such a disastrous consequence in
the administration of justice. For if the cause of justice suffers when an innocent person
is convicted, it equally suffers when a guilty one is acquitted.



Calderon vs. Carale


FACTS:

Sometime in March 1989, RA 6715 (Herrera-Veloso Law), amending the Labor Code
(PD 442) was approved. Section 13 thereof provides that the Chairman, the Division
Presiding Commissioners and other Commissioners of NLRC shall all be appointed by
the President, subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. President
Aquino appointed respondents as the Chairman and Commissioners of the NLRC.

Carale filed a petition for prohibition questioning the constitutionality and legality of
respondents permanent appointments. Calderon insists that the appointments must be
submitted to the CA for confirmation. He also posits that RA 6715 is not an
encroachment on the appointing power of the executive contained in Section 16, Art. VII,
of the Constitution, as Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments of other officers appointed by the President additional to those
mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16 of Article VII of the Constitution.

The Solicitor General, on the other hand, contends that RA 6715 which amended the
Labor Code transgresses Section 16, Article VII by expanding the confirmation powers
of the Commission on Appointments without constitutional basis.


ISSUE:

Whether or not Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments of appointments extended by the President to government officers
additional to those expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the
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Constitution whose appointments require confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments


HELD:

No. In Sarmiento III vs. Mison case, the Court stated that there are four (4) groups of
officers whom the President shall appoint. These four (4) groups, are: First, the heads of
the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of
the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution; Second, all other officers of the
Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law; Third, those
whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and Fourth, officers lower in
rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.

The second sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII refers to all other officers of the government
whose appointment are not otherwise provided for by law and those whom the President
may be authorized by law to appoint.

Indubitably, the NLRC Chairman and Commissioners fall within the second sentence of
Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, more specifically under the "third groups" of
appointees referred to in Mison, i.e. those whom the President may be authorized by law
to appoint. Undeniably, the Chairman and Members of the NLRC are not among the
officers mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII whose appointments
requires confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. To the extent that RA 6715
requires confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of the appointments of
respondents Chairman and Members of the National Labor Relations Commission, it is
unconstitutional because:

1) it amends by legislation, the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution
by adding thereto appointments requiring confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments; and

2) it amends by legislation the second sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the
Constitution, by imposing the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments on
appointments which are otherwise entrusted only with the President.
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It can not be overlooked that Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution was deliberately,
not unconsciously, intended by the framers of the 1987 Constitution to be a departure
from the system embodied in the 1935 Constitution where the Commission on
Appointments exercised the power of confirmation over almost all presidential
appointments, leading to may cases of abuse of such power of confirmation.

Subsection 3, Section 10, Art. VII of the 1935 Constitution provided that the President
shall nominate and with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, shall appoint
the heads of the executive departments and bureau, officers of the Army from the rank
of the colonel, of the Navy and Air Forces from the rank of captain or commander, and
all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not herein otherwise
provided for, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint..

The deliberate limitation on the power of confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments over presidential appointments, embodied in Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987
Constitution, has undoubtedly evoked the displeasure and disapproval of members of
the Congress. The solution to the apparent problem, if indeed a problem, is not judicial
or legislative but constitutional. A future constitutional convention or Congress sitting as
a constituent (constitutional) assembly may then consider either a return to the 1935
Constitutional provisions or the adoption of a hybrid system between the 1935 and 1987
constitutional provisions. Until then, it is the duty of the Court to apply the 1987
Constitution in accordance with what it says and not in accordance with how the
legislature or the executive would want it interpreted.