ANG YU ASUNCION v CA

FACTS:
The Unijeng spouses owned certain residential and commercial spaces leased by Ang Yu.
They offered to sell the said units to Ang Yu on several occasions and for P6M. Ang Yu
made a counter offer for P5M. The Unijeng spouses asked Ang Yu to specify his terms in
writing but the latter failed to do so. They failed to arrive at any definite agreement. When
Ang Yu discovered that the spouses were planning to sell the property to others, he sued
them for specific performance. While the case was pending, the spouses sold the units to
Buen Realty for P15M.
ISSUE: W/N there was a perfected contract of sale between Unijeng and Ang Yu
HELD: NO. There was no perfected contract of sale yet since there was yet any meeting of
the minds. Thus, there is no ground for specific performance. During the negotiation stage,
any party may withdraw the offer madeespecially if it was not supported by any
consideration. An Option Contract of a Right of First Refusal is separate and distinct from
the actual contract of salewhich is the basis for specific performance. The remedy
available to Any Yu, in case the withdrawal was made capriciously and arbitrarily, would be
to sue on the basis of abuse of right. In case there was an option contract, timely
acceptance would create an obligation to sell on the part of the vendor; but no such
circumstance attends in this case.
VILLONCO v BORMAHECO
FACTS:
Cervantes and his wife owned 3 parcels of land along Buendia where he buildings of
Bormaheco Inc were situated. Beside their property were lots owned by Villonco Realty.
Cervantes entered into several negotiations with Villonco for sale of the Buendia property.
Cervantes made a written offer of P400/sqm with a downpayment of P100,000 to serve as
earnest money. The offer also made the consummation of the sale dependent upon the
acquisition by Bormaheco of a Sta. Ana property. Villonco made a counter-offer stating that
the earnest money was to earn 10% interest p.a. The check was enclosed with the reply
letter. Cervantes accepted and cashed the check. The Sta. Ana Property was awarded to
Bormaheco; the transfer was also duly approved. However, Cervantes sent the check back
to Villonco with the interest thereonstating that he was no longer interested in selling the
property. He also claims that no contract was perfected; Villonco sues for specific
performance.
ISSUE: W/N there was a perfected contract of sale
Held:
Yes. YES. There was a perfected contract of sale. The alleged changes made in the counter-
offer are immaterial and are mere clarifications. The changes of the words Sta. Ana
property to another property as well as the insertion of the number 12 in the date and
the words per annum in the interest are trivial. There is incompatibility in the offer and
the counter offer Cervantes assented to the interest and he, in fact, paid the same. Also,
earnest money constitutes prood of the perfection of the contract of sale and forms part of
the consideration. The condition regarding the acquisition of the Sta. Ana property was
likewise fulfilled; there is thus no ground for the refusal of Cervantes to consummate the
sale.
DAILON v CA
FACTS:
Sabesaje sues to recover ownership of a parcel of land based on a private document of
absolute sale executed by Dailon. Dailon denies the fact of the sale alleging that the same
being embodied in a private instrument, the same cannot convey title under Art. 1358 of
the Civil Code which requires that contracts which have for their object the creation,
transmission, modification, or extinction of real rights over immovable property must
appear in a public instrument.
ISSUE: W/N there was a valid/perfected contract of sale
HELD: YES. The necessity of a public instrument is only for conveniencenot for validity and
enforceability. Such is not a requirement for the validity of a contract of sale, which is
perfected by mere consent. Dailon should thus be compelled to execute the corresponding
deed of conveyance in a public instrument in favor of Sabesaje. If the sale is made through a
public instrument, it amounts to constructive delivery.




YUVIENGCO v DACUYCUY
FACTS:
Yuvienco entered into a contract with Yao King Ong and the other occupants, wherein the
former will sell to the latter the Sotto property in Tacloban City for P6.5M provided that the
latter made known their decision to buy it or not later than July 31, 1978. When Yuvienco's
representative went to Cebu with a prepared and duly signed contract for the purpose of
perfecting ANTONIO | HIPOLITO | IMPERIAL | ZARAGOSA 16and consummating the
transaction, Yao King Ong and other occupants found variance between the terms of
payment stipulated in the document and what they had in mind. Thus, it was returned
unsigned. Thus, the action for specific performance.
ISSUE: W/N the claim for specific performance of Yao King Ong is enforceable under the
Statute of Frauds
HELD:
YES. It is nowhere alleged in the complaint that there is any writing or memorandum, much
less a duly signed agreement to the effect, that the price of P6,500,000 fixed by petitioners
for the real property herein involved was agreed to be paid not in cash but in installments
as alleged by Yao King Ong. The only documented indication of the non-wholly-cash
payment extant in the record is the deeds already signed by Yuvienco and taken to
Tacloban by Atty. Gamboa for the signatures of the respondents. In other words, the 90-day
term for the balance of P4.5 M insisted upon by respondents choices not appear in any
note, writing or memorandum signed by either the petitioners or any of them, not even by
Atty. Gamboa. Hence, looking at the pose of respondents that there was a perfected
agreement of purchase and sale between them and petitioners under which they would pay
in installments of P2 M down and P4.5 M within ninety 90) days afterwards it is evident
that such oral contract involving the "sale of real property" comes squarely under the
Statute of Frauds (Article 1403, No. 2(e), Civil Code.) In any sale of real property on
installments, the Statute of Frauds read together with the perfection requirements of
Article 1475 of the Civil Code must be understood and applied in the sense that the idea of
payment on installments must be in the requisite of a note or memorandum therein
contemplated. While such note or memorandum need not be in one single document or
writing and it can be in just sufficiently implicit tenor, imperatively the separate notes must,
when put together', contain all the requisites of a perfected contract of sale. To put it the
other way, under the Statute of Frauds, the contents of the note or memorandum, whether
in one writing or in separate ones merely indicative for an adequate understanding of all
the essential elements of the entire agreement, may be said to be the contract itself, except
as to the form.
DANGUILAN v IAC
FACTS:
Domingo owned 2 lots, which he donated through a private instrument to Danguilan for the
consideration that the latter must take care of him for the remainder of his life and manage
his burial. Domingos daughter, Apolonia, laid claim to the land, presenting a public
document allegedly executed in her favor, the purchase price being paid for by her mother.
She however failed to take possession of the said property after the execution of the deed.
In fact, she moved out of the farm when Danguilan started to cultivate the same for as long
as she was given a share from the harvests. She decided to file a case only after the
deliveries of farm produce have ceased.
ISSUE: Who has a better title over the land, Danguilan or Apolonia?
HELD:
DANGUILAN. At the onset, the donation in favor of Danguilan was valid even though
embodied in a private instrument, because it was an onerous donation. The deed of sale
presented by Apolonia was also suspicious. It was only 3 years old and the consideration
was paid for by her mother. Assuming that it was valid, still the presumptive delivery is
overcome by the fact that she failed to take possession of the property. Ownership, after
all, is not transferred by mere stipulation butby actual and adverse possession. She even
transferred the same to Danguilan possession of the same. She cannot have a better right in
this case than Danguilan.
PASAGUI v VILLABLANCA
FACTS:
Pasagui purchased a parcel of land form the Bocar Spouses for P2,800, which was
embodied in a public instrument. They failed to take possession of the property because
the Villablancas illegally took possession of the property and harvested the coconuts
therein. Thus, Pasagui filed a case for ejectment before the CFI. The Bocar spouses were
likewise impleaded. The latter contested that the case should be dismissed because the CFI
did not have jurisdiction over forcible entry cases.
ISSUE: W/N this is a case of forcible entry
HELD:
NO. The case was not for forcible entry because there was no allegation that Pasagui was in
prior physical possession of the land and that the Villablancas, through force, stealth, or
threat, deprived them thereof. While the sale was made through a public document is
equivalent to delivery, this presumption only holds true if there is no impediment to the
possession of the purchaser. Such is not the case here. Since Pasagui had not yet acquired
physical possession of the land, the case was not one for forcible entry and the CFI (not
municipal courts) has jurisdiction.