Chapter: 3

3.1 Decision making process in Irans nuclear program:

The Iranian leadership is acutely aware of its strategic disadvantage of its potential
enemies like US, Israel, Iraq, Turkey and Saudi Arabia. This sense of strategic dependency was
intensified by the conclusions that the Iranian defense establishment portrayed from the war with
Iraq. The only weapon that could conceivable deter the US from a military operation against Iran
would be nuclear.
While Iran officially denies having any form of WMD capabilities or programs, this is
presented as aware of Irans national right to such weapons for the sake of regional confidence
building and stability. Iran has signed the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) from 1997,
which allows for relatively intrusive inspection. Upon signing, Iran owned up to a chemical
weapons program that was developed towards the end of the Iraq-Iran war, and later dismantled
it. It claims that it has no further R&D in this field.
1
The importance that Iran accords to
international legitimacy, however, created limitations that require it to remain within the treaty's
bounds.
Iranian defense doctrinaires rarely comment on the place of nuclear weapons in their
countrys strategic outlook. A significant departure from this custom was remarks by former
Minister of Defense, Ali Shamkhani, which can be interpreted as legitimization for acquisition of
a military nuclear capability. Such a capability, according to Shamkhani would be the natural
reaction of the Islamic Republic of Iran to attaining its national and regional security. Iran in

1
Geoffrey Kemp, Irans Nuclear Options, Geoffrey Kemp, et al, Irans Nuclear Weapons Options,
Issues and Analysis, the Nixon Center, January 2001, pp. 117.
essence ignores parts of its security concern for the sake of broader security goals for all
countries despite the fact that threats to the national security of the Islamic Republic all point to a
security disparity. This inequity, according to Shamkhani is characterized in the list of Irans
potential nuclear threats: Israel, India and Pakistan, Russia, NATO and the US naval fleets
deployed in the region that are carrying atomic weapons.2
Iran has close ties with North Korea and there is much evidence that it has been learning
lessons from the Korean. Iran is attempting to gain security guarantees and international support
for the civil nuclear program in return for apparently freezing an illegal military program, while
delaying on demands for a rollback of the military program. The logic behind this goal would
seem to be to maintain international legitimacy as a signatory to the NPT. Same time Iran is
blackmailing the Western countries with the threat of withdrawal from the NPT and renewal of
the enrichment to military levels.3
3.2 Paradigms of Nuclear Posturing:
There is no evidence to the effect that Iran has already preserved its future nuclear
doctrine. There are however four basic Patterns of nuclear importance, which Iran may learn
from and implement individually or uninterruptedly:
3.2.1 Premature Posturing:
This model fits Irans present stage of nuclear development and would be similar to the
Iraqi model before the first Gulf War. Iran may attempt to create the impression that it already

2
Jam-e Jam, 3, 638 & 639, 2002, http://www.netiran.com.
3
Ted Galen Carpenter, North Korea and Iran: the case for formal relations,
http://www.cato.org/publications/northkorea-iran-case-formal-relations.
has a military nuclear capability, even when some of these capabilities are not working yet. As
the conflict with the West intensifies, it seems that Iran is moving towards such a pattern.
3.2.2 Nuclear Ambiguity:
Similar to the model which is attributed to Israel, South Africa and Pakistan in the 1980s.
This pattern would be the ideal one for the point of view of traditional Iranian international
relations and the ideological opposition among the clergy to nuclear weapons. It would allow for
a level of deterrence and regional status based on the perception of Irans nuclear power, without
having to sacrifice international legitimacy. The present stage of hostility between Iran and the
international community makes such a model difficult to implement.
3.2.3 Early Posturing:
Similar to Indias explosion in 1974 of a nuclear device even before it had real delivery
capabilities. This model seems to be more and more related. Patriotic thoughts and
Ahmadinejads tendency towards challenging the international community may push Iran
towards exposing its nuclear capabilities. From the domestic point of view, it would be virtually
impossible for the improver camp to oppose such a step and the tension with the West that such a
step would probably generate would play into the hands of the regime in its struggle against the
reformists.
3.2.4 Maintaining ambiguity:
Maintaining uncertainties pending a credible nuclear strike capability with a reliable
delivery system this would be similar to the Pakistani model. Under the present circumstances,
it would seem that Iran would find it difficult to bid its time until it achieves a credible nuclear
weapon.
3.3 Arguments against the Regimes Nuclear Policy:
The nuclear policy of Iran is among the densest facets of Iranian strategic thinking. Yet,
the debate over achievement of nuclear weapons has sometimes slipped into the public realm.
Evidence of discussion within the regime regarding the pros and cons and the consequences of
going nuclear. The discussion broke out from behind the scenes again in the wake of the
Pakistani nuclear test in 1998 which encouraged the pro-nuclear lobby to speak out, and in
response to the IAEA demand that Iran sign and ratify the additional protocol to the safeguards
agreement (93+2) and later Irans open conflict with the IAEA. The arguments against the
regimes nuclear policy include.
1. Charges by reformists that the regime has without any cause exposed Iran to international
pressure and damaged its international legitimacy. Reformist politicians who criticized the
regime for having reached the point where Iran was put under pressure were again attacked by
the conservatives for abusing their right of speech, since the issue should be decided by the
Supreme National Security Council alone.4

2. The political-strategic arguments against such a policy state that having nuclear weapons
would lead the Persian Gulf states to strengthen their ties with the United States and even
provide the pretext for further projection of US power in the region, and see a net loss for Iran in
choosing the nuclear option.5

4
Time to attack Iran/foreign affairs. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136917/time-to-attack-iran.
5
ibid
3. Arguments raised by the scientific community, pointing to the cost effectiveness of a
military nuclear program and Irans technological deficiencies, which make an attempt to
achieve a nuclear balance with Israel prohibitive.
The strategic argument taking place in the public domain in favor of nuclear weapons is
basically one of deterrence. Iran lives in a dangerous neighborhood and is surrounded by nuclear
or potentially nuclear neighbors. Another argument justifies acquisition of nuclear weapons on
the basis of national honor and achieving the means to impose Irans world view on the region.
According to this viewpoint, Iran should formally withdraw from the NPT in light of the IAEA
decision to report it to the Security Council. Such a step would be compatible with the guidelines
of the Supreme Leader for the states principles: expediency, honor and wisdom.6
3.4 Sanctions on Iran and its Effects:
Iranian leaders appear to believe that possible actions that the West may take could
include a gamut of economic, political and diplomatic sanctions, ranging from relatively
harmless protests of disapproval such as: cutting off of sport and educational relations; restricting
the movement of Iranian diplomats abroad; limiting interaction with Iranian banks and even
embargoes on Iranian oil and shipment of refined oil products to Iran. The primary sanctions that
would affect the regime would include:
3.4.1 Economic Sanctions:
To date, the conventional wisdom in Tehran has been that Europe (and China) needs Iran
more than Iran needs them. The identity of the parties to political sanctions is therefore crucial.

6
The United States and The Iranian Nuclear Program: Policy option. http://www.choices.edu/resources/choices-
twtn-iran-options.
Sanctions which would include Russia, Germany, the UK and China would have a demoralizing
effect within the regime, whether or not the entire EU was committed to the sanctions.7 In the
short term, economic sanctions would reduce the regimes income and its ability to fund strategic
programs. Obviously, this effect would be contingent on the scope of the sanctions and the
countries party to them, on the one hand, and the regimes priorities for allocating what is left of
its finances, on the other hand. If the regime's top priority is to fund strategic programs and the
military, it will face discontent and possible unrest among the populace further down the road.
Four major areas of economic sanctions relevant to Iran are:
Oil sanctions: Oil sanctions are significant in two areas: an embargo on Iranian exports and an
embargo on imports of refined oil to Iran. Both sanctions would have short and long term effects
on the Iranian economy. Sanctions on Iranian export of oil would severely hinder the regimes
ability to continue its nuclear program. In the short term oil export sanctions would probably
result in short term massive unemployment in the sensitive oil regions, since Iran lacks the
storage facilities to store large amounts of crude oil that it cannot export.
General trade sanctions: An embargo on trade with Iran along the lines of the sanctions against
Iraq would have a more severe effect. Without the cooperation of Arab and Central Asian
countries, though and strict adherence to the embargo, the effect will take even longer than the
Iraqi case.
c) Freezing of assets: An effective freezing of Iranian international assets would probably be one
of the most crippling sanctions. It would severely damage the ability of the regime to use those
assets for acquisition of essential material for the nuclear program.

7
Yitzhak Gal and Yair Minzili, The Economic Important of International sanctions on Iran feb 9, 201.
http//www.herzliyaconfrence.org/YitzhakgGalYairMinzili.
Banking sanctions: Secondary sanctions on banking institutions that cooperate with the Iranian
banking system would virtually isolate the Iranian financial system. Such sanctions would
severely hamper Iranian acquisition abroad and raise its prices.
3.4.2 Political sanctions:
Iran attaches great significance on its international legitimacy. Political sanctions could
include barring Iranians from travel, barring Iranian diplomats from movement, barring Iran
from participation in cultural and sporting events, etc.
3.4.3 Individual targeted sanctions:
The option to impose targeted sanctions on the regime without harming the population
at large is limited. The main figures in the regime are deeply entrenched in the economy and any
action against their own economic interests would have wide repercussions for the entire
economy. A case in point is the economic infrastructure IRGC which represents today more than
30 percent of the business sector. The Iranian system of allocation of economic interests to
family members leaves few if any areas of economic activity which are not part of the
portfolios of the regime leaders or their immediate families. Although such sanctions would
indirectly affect the population at large, because of the wide involvement of top officials in the
economy, they are likely to feel threatened and at least consider a course of action more
favorable to their own private interests.
3.4.4 Targeted Sanctions:
Economic and political sanctions would no doubt hurt the Iranian economic elite, to
which the heads of the regime belong, mainly through the damage they would cause to the
Iranian economy and incremental after-shocks of civil unrest and popular discontent. It is
difficult to assess how long it would take for economic pressure to unleash wide enough civil
unrest as to actually threaten the regime. In any case, the present government enjoys a higher
deterrent image in the eyes of the populace than its predecessor; its special relations with the
IRGC, its revolutionary passion and its apocalyptic worldview strengthen its image of
willingness to go to great lengths to maintain power. Economic sanctions would affect central
pillars of the regime, which have built their power bases through economic interests which
extend to assets outside of Iran and are dependent on Iran's access to international financial
markets. The main official institutions in this category are the bonyads (foundations) with assets
of over $20 billion and which control an estimated 20-30 percent of the Iranian economy. As
economic entities which are dependent on international trade and the ability to bring in foreign
capital, real economic sanctions would undermine their power base. The bonyads, which are
officially "charities", also serve as conduits for transfer of bribes from foreign companies to
senior officials for facilitating the affairs of those companies in Iran.8
3.5 U.S and Iran: Nuclear policy or Talks:
Although the U.S.-Iranian relationship today is fraught with tension, for many years the
two countries were close allies. In fact, it was with U.S. support that the Iranian government
began its nuclear program in the 1960s to produce nuclear fuel. In 1968 Iran signed the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the international treaty that regulates international nuclear
activities and aims to prevent the proliferation, or spread, of nuclear weapons. U.S.-Iranian
relations quickly deteriorated after Iranians took American diplomats hostage at the end of 1979.

8
Ben Schreiner, Destabilizing Iran as a Nation State: Targated Sanctions as an Alternative to war? January 8
2013.
The relationship has never recovered. To this day, Iran and the United States do not have formal
diplomatic relations.
In 1979, a popular revolution overthrew Irans U.S.-backed government and established
an Islamic Republic. Under this political system, Iranians elect their president and legislators, but
Islamic clerics have final say over all government decisions. U.S.-Iranian relations quickly
deteriorated after Iranians took American diplomats hostage at the end of 1979. The relationship
has never recovered. To this day, Iran and the United States do not have formal diplomatic
relations. For many years after the Revolution, Iran continued to allow regular inspections of its
nuclear program by monitors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Then, in
2003, Iran admitted it had been secretly enriching uraniuma process that is necessary to create
both nuclear power and nuclear weapons. In the face of international condemnation, Iran
voluntarily suspended its enrichment program.
Although the IAEA has expressed concerns about Irans nuclear program, it has stated
that there is no definitive proof that Iran is developing nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, the United
States and other governments around the world worry that Iran intends to build nuclear weapons.
Irans President Ahmadinejad has staunchly defended Irans right to a nuclear program on the
basis that it is only developing nuclear materials for peaceful purposes, a right protected under
the NPT. The dilemma for the international community is that it is difficult to distinguish
between good atoms for peaceful purposes like nuclear power and bad atoms for military
purposes. As a result, many foreign leaders have pressed Iran to obtain nuclear fuel from other
countries rather than produce the fuel itself.
The U.S. response to Irans nuclear program is tied to a number of important issues. The
United States has labeled the Iranian government a state sponsor of terrorism for its support of
radical Islamic groups like Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in the Palestinian Territories. In
addition, the United States accuses the Iranian government of human rights abuses against the
Iranian people. During a contested presidential election in 2009, hundreds of thousands of
Iranians took to the streets to protest the government.9

The 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq was justified by claims that Iraq had developed weapons
of mass destruction (WMD). Those claims were later proved false. The U.S. government has
accused Iran of supporting this insurgency. U.S. troops withdrew from Iraq in December 2011
after nearly eight years of occupation.
3.5.1 Iran and IAEA:
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), located in Vienna, Austria, has
responsibility for tracking day-to-day developments in the Iranian nuclear sector and providing
quarterly reports on its findings. The IAEA had released in mid-November 2007 a report
concerning the degree of cooperation by Iran in responding to concerns about the true nature of
its nuclear program. In sum, the report noted the IAEA had not been satisfied although a number
of questions were answered, with Iran probably hoping to circumvent the imposition of any more
sanctions. That hope will not be answered, for the report stated that the agencys knowledge

9
The United States and the Iranian Nuclear program. http//www.CHOICES.EDU.Watson Institute for
International Studies.
about Irans current nuclear program is diminishing because of limited access to Iranian
sites.10
A CSIS report noted that the evidence presented by the IAEA provided strong indications
that Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapons program. This report shows that the IAEA has traced a
pattern of Iranian efforts that fit a coherent and consistent nuclear weapons program and is
difficult to explain in any other way, yet no certainties are involved.11
The U.S. government response to the IAEA report was immediate: the Iranian failure to
respond was grounds for the United Nations to proceed on a long-delayed resolution imposing
new sanctions on the Islamic republic. However, the support of China and Russia is needed at the
UN, and both countries have been reluctant to impose any new sanctions on Iran. In the interim
U.S. nuclear officials calculated that, based on information contained in the IAEA report, Iran
could reach its nuclear goal in a year, the key being whether all 3,000 referenced centrifuges
were working properly.12
On November 19, 2008, the director general of the IAEA reported to the Board of
Governors that no progress had been made in securing a verifiable agreement by Iran to suspend
its uranium enrichment program.13 Indeed, a senior UN official underscored the disappointment,

10
Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council
Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Vienna; international Atomic Energy agency. November 15, 2007.
11
Anthony H. Cordesman, Iran as a Nuclear Weapons Power (Washington, D.C.: CSIS, December
17, 2009).
12
Robin Wright, U.S. to Seek New Sanctions against Iran, Washington Post, November 16, 2007.
13
Glen R. Simpson and Jay Solomon, Fresh Clues of Iranian Nuclear Intrigue, Wall Street Journal,
January 16, 2009.
noting that we seem to be at a dead end. Further UN sanctions evidently were out, given the
unwillingness of Russia to support the United States on this issue.14
Mohamed ElBaradei, having led the IAEA for 12 years, stepped down at the end of
November 2009. In a presentation before the Council on Foreign Relations in early November he
voiced the opinion that there is no indication and no concrete proof that Iran has an active
nuclear weapons program.15
3.5.2: The Geneva Negotiations, Iran and P5+1:
The October 1, 2009 Geneva meeting between Iran and 5+1 was indeed a significant
development. This meeting was preceded with the publicity surrounding the news of the
discovery of a secret nuclear facility in Fordo, which is located near the city of Qom. President
Obama, accompanied by the French President Nicolas Sarkozy and the British Prime Minister
Gordon Brown, announced that the Iranian nuclear program represents a direct challenge to the
basic foundation of the nonproliferation regime and warned Iran to adhere to its obligations
under the UN Security Council and the IAEA.16
On September 21, 2009, Iran notified the IAEA that it was constructing a new pilot
enrichment plant in Fordo. Under the terms of Irans safeguard agreement with the IAEA, Iran is
required to notify the IAEA of the existence of a nuclear facility 180 days before it introduces
nuclear material to that facility. Therefore, Iran viewed the Wests outrage at the public

14
Thomas Erdbrink, Irans First Nuclear Power Plant Set for Tests before Launch, Washington Post,
February 23, 2009.
15
Nikola Krastev, IAEA Chief: Irans Nuclear Program about Winning Recognition, Prestige, Radio
Free Europe/Radio Liberty, November 5, 2009.
16
For a Transcript of Obamas remark, New York Times, September 26, 2009.
http//www.nytimes.com/2009/world/middleeast/html.
announcement of the Fordo facility as a diversionary negotiating strategy and a cynical attempt
to box-in Tehran at the Geneva talks by exploiting the weakness of the Iranian government.
The Geneva talks, which lasted more than seven hours, included a 45-minute private talk
between Saeed Jalili, Irans chief nuclear negotiator, and William Burns, Under Secretary of
State for Political Affairs, the principal U.S. negotiator at the talks. At the conclusion of the day-
long talks, it was announced that one concrete agreement in principle had been reached: Iran
tentatively agreed to ship the supply of its low enriched uranium from its small research reactor
in Tehran to other countries, most likely Russia and France, to be enriched to a higher grade
uranium 19.5 percent for use in medical and other related fields. This agreement allowed both
sides to claim victory. Mehdi Safari, Irans Deputy Foreign Minister for Europe and a member of
the countrys negotiating team, called the Geneva talks win-win for both sides, while President
Obama assessed the talks as a positive first step while issuing warnings to Iran to follow through
with its promises. As Obama stated: This is a constructive beginning, but hard work lies ahead.
Weve entered a phase of intensive international negotiations. And talk is no substitute for
action. Pledges of Cooperation must be fulfilled our patience is not unlimited.17
In Iran, the supporters and opponents of the Ahmadinejad government offered contrasting
interpretations of the outcome of the Geneva negotiations. The opposition Green Movement
viewed the outcome of the talks as a retreat by the Ahmadinejad government because, contrary to
its previous pronouncements, it agreed in principle to enrichment of Iranian uranium outside the

17
The White House, Remarks by the President on the meeting of P5+1 regarding Iran, October 1 2009.
http//www.nytimes/press- secretory/
country. The Green Movement further argued that the West still remained suspicious of Irans
nuclear intentions and promises.18
The Iranian negotiators will have to eschew sermonizing if they intend to hold
meaningful and potentially fruitful talks with their Western counterparts. Saeed Jalili, Irans
chief negotiator acted professionally in the October 2009 Geneva talks. Although, Jalili may
have a tendency to engage in long monologues, he is a calm person and is not a polarizing figure
(like President Ahmadinejad). However, he may not have the requisite background to lead Iran in
the tough rounds of negotiations. Jalili, who was born in 1965 in Mashad and fought in the Iran-
Iraq War, was appointed to his current position because of his close friendship with
Ahmadinejad. Also, Jalilis worldview may have been shaped by his experience in the Iran-Iraq
War and by injuries he suffered in the War. Moreover, Saeed Jalili views current political
developments exclusively from a Quranic paradigm. His book on foreign policy, titled Foreign
Policy of the Prophet of Islam, and his doctoral dissertation in political science (from Imam
Sadeq University) on Paradigm of Political Thought of Islam in the Holy Quran demonstrate
the ideological impediments that may hinder Jalilis understanding of complex foreign policy
and security issues facing todays Iran. Of course, while he does not have to compromise his
religious beliefs, he must recognize that his counterparts are not looking at the world from his
religious prism.19

18
Jonbesh-e-Rahe Sabz, October 2, 2009. http://www.rahesabz.net/2212.
19
Kayhan, October 6, 2009. http://www.kayhannews.ir/htm.