CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEW

CASE DIGESTS

EMMANUEL T. PONTEJOS
vs

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN Promulgated:
and RESTITUTO AQUINO,
Respondents. February 22, 2006



The Facts

Sometime in 1998, Restituto P. Aquino filed an Affidavit/Complaint before the Ombudsman
against Emmanuel T. Pontejos (arbiter), Wilfredo I. Imperial (regional director)
and Carmencita R. Atos (legal staff), all of them officials of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board (HLURB), and Roderick Ngo, a private individual.
[6]

Aquino accused Pontejos and Atos of conspiring to exact money in exchange for a favorable
decision of a case against Roderick Ngo then pending in the HLURB. He further averred
that Pontejos acted as his counsel during the time when the latter was the hearing officer of the
case.
[7]
Moreover, Atos allegedly received P10,000 in check, which was part of the consideration for
a favorable decision. Imperial was implicated as an alleged accomplice.
[8]


The respondents filed separate Counter-Affidavits to refute the charges.
[10]
They claimed that
the meetings mentioned by Aquino did not take place. Neither did they receive any money from
him.
[11]


Imperial denied all links to the extortion allegedly perpetrated by Pontejos and Atos. Moreover, he
could not have shared with the alleged pay-off money given in January 1998, because he decided
the case as far back as September 1997.
[14]


Atos justified receipt of the P10,000 from Aquino, claiming that it was payment for hams and
cold cuts ordered in December 1996 and January 1997 by Ruth Adel, one of the affiants.
[15]
In
support of this defense, she submitted Joint-Affidavits of her officemates and neighbors confirming
her business activities.
[16]


Subsequently, Atos issued two Affidavits where she retracted her original
defense.
[17]
She encashed the check allegedly to accommodate Pontejos, who was her boss. She
also recounted attending at least four meetings with Pontejos, Aquino and Adel during
which Pontejos offered legal services to Aquino and discussed Aquinos pending cases.
[18]




Ruling of the Overall Deputy Ombudsman


The Overall Deputy Ombudsman found probable cause against Pontejos for the crimes of
estafa, direct bribery and illegal practice of profession in violation of RA 6713.

There was estafa because Pontejos allegedly made false pretenses to Aquino in order to
receive P25,000.
[19]
He supposedly assured the cancellation ofHammercons license to sell and
registration certificate, notwithstanding the contrary decision issued by Imperial.
[20]


Pontejos was guilty of direct bribery for demanding and receiving P100,000 from Aquino in
exchange for a favorable decision.
[21]
Further, Pontejos should be charged with unauthorized
practice of law for providing legal services to Aquino and receiving litigation expenses.
[22]
He
purportedly prepared the pleadings thatAquino submitted; these pleadings where confirmed by the
NBI to have been authored by him.
[23]


The Overall Deputy Ombudsman ruled that Atos should be extended immunity from criminal
prosecution and discharged as state witness.
[24]
According to him,Atos was merely a subordinate
who could have acted only upon the prodding of Pontejos. Also, her testimony was necessary to
build a case against Pontejos.
[25]


The criminal cases for estafa and direct bribery against Pontejos were filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
[28]
On May 13, 1999, Pontejos filed a Motion for
Reinvestigation
[29]
to be conducted by the City Prosecutor without remanding the case to the
Ombudsman. The prosecution had no objection. Thus, hearing of the case was held in abeyance
pending the outcome of the reinvestigation.
[30]


Assistant City Prosecutor Ma. Teresa E. De Guzman conducted the reinvestigation and
thereafter recommended to amend the Information for estafa to includeAtos as co-
accused. According to her, the power to grant immunity pertains solely to the courts, not to the
prosecution which can only recommend.
[31]
The Overall Deputy Ombudsman disapproved De
Guzmans report in the May 21, 2002 Review and Recomm endation The March 14, 2003 Order
denied reconsideration. Thereafter, Pontejos filed this Petition.
[32]


The Issue


Whether or not the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of or excess of jurisdiction when it granted an immunity to Ms. Atos to
become a state witness on almost the same date the Affidavit was executed and
submitted;


HELD:

NO. The decision on whether to prosecute and whom to indict is executive in character. It is
the prosecution that could essentially determine the strength of pursuing a case against an
accused. The prosecutorial powers include the discretion of granting immunity to an accused in
exchange for testimony against another. It is constitutionally permissible for Congress to vest the
prosecutor with the power to determine who can qualify as a witness and be granted immunity from
prosecution. In relation to this, the Court has previously upheld the discretion of the Department of
Justice (DOJ), Commission on Elections (Comelec), and the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) to grant immunity from prosecution on the basis of the respective laws that
vested them with such power.

The OMB was also vested with the power to grant immunity from prosecution, thus:

Sec. 17. Under such terms and conditions as it may determine, taking into
account the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court, the Ombudsman may grant
immunity from criminal prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose
possession and production of documents or other evidence may be necessary to
determine the truth in any hearing, inquiry or proceeding being conducted by the
Ombudsman or under its authority, in the performance or in the furtherance of its
constitutional functions and statutory objectives.




























BANDA v. ERMITA
G.R. No. 166620 April 20, 2010

Delegated Legislative Power; The issuance of Executive Order No. 378 by President Arroyo is an
exercise of a delegated legislative power granted by the Section 31, Chapter 10, Title III, Book III of
the Administrative Code of 1987.The issuance of Executive Order No. 378 by President Arroyo is
an exercise of a delegated legislative power granted by the aforementioned Section 31, Chapter 10,
Title III, Book III of the Administrative Code of 1987, which provides for the continuing authority of
the President to reorganize the Office of the President, in order to achieve simplicity, economy and
efficiency. This is a matter already well-entrenched in jurisprudence. The reorganization of such an
office through executive or administrative order is also recognized in the Administrative Code of
1987.

The delegated legislative power to reorganize pertains only to the Office of the President and the
departments, offices and agencies of the executive branch and does not include the Judiciary, the
Legislature or the constitutionally-created or mandated bodies.To be very clear, this delegated
legislative power to reorganize pertains only to the Office of the President and the departments,
offices and agencies of the executive branch and does not include the Judiciary, the Legislature or
the constitutionally-created or mandated bodies. Moreover, it must be stressed that the exercise by
the President of the power to reorganize the executive department must be in accordance with the
Constitution, relevant laws and prevailing jurisprudence. x x x Stated alternatively, the presidential
power to reorganize agencies and offices in the executive branch of government is subject to the
condition that such reorganization is carried out in good faith.

If the reorganization is done in good faith, the abolition of positions, which results in loss of security
of tenure of affected government employees, would be valid.If the reorganization is done in good
faith, the abolition of positions, which results in loss of security of tenure of affected government
employees, would be valid. In Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora, 360 SCRA 718 (2001), we even
observed that there was no such thing as an absolute right to hold office. Except those who hold
constitutional offices, which provide for special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can
be said to have any vested right to an office or salary.


FACTS:
President GMA issued Executive Order No. 378 on 2004 amending Section 6 of Executive Order No.
285by, inter alia, removing the exclusive jurisdiction of the NPO (National Printing
Office) over the printing services requirements of government agencies and instrumentalities.
Pursuant to Executive Order No. 378, government agencies and instrumentalities are allowed to
source their printing services from the private sector through competitive bidding,
subject to the condition that the services offered by the private supplier be of superior
quality and lower in cost compared to what was of f ered by t he NPO. Execut i ve
Order No. 378 al so l i mi t ed NPO s appropri at i on i n t he General Appropriations Act
to its income. Perceiving Executive Order No. 378 as a threat to their security of tenure
as employees of the NPO, petitioners now challenge its constitutionality, contending
that: (1) it is beyond the executive powers of President Arroyo to amend or repeal Executive
Order No. 285 issued by former President Aquino when the latter still exercised legislative
powers; and (2) Executive Order No. 378 violates petitioners security of tenure, because
it paves the way for the gradual abolition of the NPO.

ISSUE:
Whether EO 378 is constitutional.


HELD:
YES
. It is a well-settled principle in jurisprudence that the President has the power to
reorganize the offices and agencies in the executive department in line with the Presidents
constitutionally granted power of control over executive offices and by virtue of previous delegation
of the legislative power to reorganize executive offices under existing statutes. Executive Order
No. 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987 gives the President continuing authority to
reorganize and redefine the functions of the Office of the President. Section 31, Chapter 10, Title III,
Book III of the said Code, is explicit: The President
, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and
efficiency, shall have continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the
Office of the President
.It is undisputed that the NPO, as an agency that is part of the Office of the Press Secretary (which
in various times has been an agency directly attached to the Office of the Press Secretary or as an
agency under the Philippine Information Agency), is part of the Office of the President. To be very
clear, this delegated legislative power to reorganize pertains only to the Office of the President and
the departments, offices and agencies of the executive branch and does not include the Judiciary,
the Legislature or the constitutionally-created or mandated bodies. Moreover, it must be
stressed that the exercise by the President of the power to reorganize the executive department
must be in accordance with the Constitution, relevant laws and prevailing jurisprudence.

J. Carpio:
RA 9184 mandates the conduct of competitive bidding in all the procurement activities
of the government including the acquisition of items, supplies, materials, and general support
services x x x which may be needed in the transaction of the public businesses or in the pursuit of
any government x x x activity save for limited transactions. By opening governments procurement
of standard and accountable forms to competitive bidding (except for documents crucial to the
conduct of clean elections which has to be printed solely by government), EO 378 merely
implements RA 9184s principle of promoting competitiveness by extending equal opportunity to
enable private contracting parties who are eligible and qualified to participate in public bidding.


REVIEW CENTER ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Petitioner,
vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARYEDUARDO ERMITA and COMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION
represented by its Chairman ROMULO L. NERI,
Respondents.

Facts:
- There was a report that handwritten copies of two sets of 2006 Nursing Board examination were
circulated during the examination period among examinees reviewing at the R.A. Gapuz Review
Center and Inress Review Center. The examinees were provided with a list of 500 questions and
answers in two of the examinations five subjects, particularly Tests III (Psychiatric Nursing) and V
(Medical-Surgical Nursing). The PRC later admitted the leakage and traced it to two Board of
Nursing members. Exam results came out but Court of Appeals restrained the PRC from proceeding
with the oath-taking of the successful examinees.-

President GMA ordered for a re-examination and issued EO 566
which authorized the CHED to supervise the establishment and operation of all review centers and
similar entities in the Philippines. CHED Chairman Puno approved CHED Memorandum Order No.
49 series of 2006 (Implementing Rules and Regulations).- Review Center Association of the
Philippines (petitioner), an organization of independent review centers, asked the CHED to "amend,
if not withdraw" the IRR arguing, among other things, that giving permits to operate a review center
to Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) or consortia of HEIs and professional organizations will
effectively abolish independent review centers. CHED Chairman Puno however believed that
suspending the implementation of the IRR would be inconsistent with the mandate of EO 566.- A
dialogue between the petitioner and CHED took place.
Revised IRR was approved
. Petitioner filed before the CHED a Petition to Clarify/Amend RIRR praying to exclude independent
review center from the coverage of the CHED; to clarify the meaning of the requirement for existing
review centers to tie-up with HEIs; to revise the rules to make it conform with RA 7722 limiting the
CHEDs coverage to public and private institutions of higher.- In 2007, then CHED Chairman
Neri responded to the petitioner that: to exclude the operation of independent review
centers from the coverage of CHED would clearly contradict the intention of the said Executive
Order No.566; As to the request to clarify what is meant by tie-up/be integrated with an
HEI, tie-up/be integrated simply means, to be in partner with an HEI.-
Petitioner filed a petition for Prohibition and Mandamus before this Court praying for the
annulment of
theRIRR, the declaration of EO 566 as inval id and unconstitutional exercise of l
egislative power
, and t hepr ohi bi t i on agai ns t CHED f r om i mpl ement i ng t he RI RR.

Issues:

Whether EO 566 is an unconstitutional exercise by the Executive of legislative power as it
expands the CHEDs jurisdiction.

Held: Yes. Executive Order No. 566, which grants the CHED the power to regulate review center, is
unconstitutional as it expands Republic Act No. 7722,. The CHEDs coverage under RA 7722 is
limited to public and private institutions of higher education and degree-granting programs in all
public and private post-secondary educational institutions. EO 566 directed the CHED to
formulate a framework for the regulation of review centers and similar entities. A review center is
not an institution of higher learning as contemplated by RA 7722. It does not offer a degree-
granting program that would put it under the jurisdiction of the CHED.


G.R. No. 192935 December 7, 2010
LOUIS BAROK C. BIRAOGO
vs.
THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010
FACTS:
Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC) dated July
30, 2010.
PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary task to
investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees,
their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous administration, and to submit
its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. PTC has all the
powers of an investigative body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate,
resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes between contending parties. All it can do is gather,
collect and assess evidence of graft and corruption and make recommendations. It may have
subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt, much less order their arrest.
Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to
warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law.
Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing its
functions. They argued that:
(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the Congress to create a
public office and appropriate funds for its operation.
(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot
legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize the
Office of the President to achieve economy, simplicity and efficiency does not include the power to
create an entirely new public office which was hitherto inexistent like the Truth Commission.
(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and statutes when it vested the Truth
Commission with quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if not superseding, those of the Office of the
Ombudsman created under the 1987 Constitution and the DOJ created under the Administrative
Code of 1987.
(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for investigation and
prosecution officials and personnel of the previous administration as if corruption is their peculiar
species even as it excludes those of the other administrations, past and present, who may be
indictable.
ISSUE: WON E O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the powers of
Congress to create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and commissions;
HELD: No. The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed.
The powers of the President are not limited to those specific powers under the Constitution. One of
the recognized powers of the President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is
the power to create ad hoc committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and
determine if laws have been faithfully executed. The purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies
to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to know so that he can be
properly advised and guided in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and
enforcement of the laws of the land.
There is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate funds.
There is no need to specify the amount to be earmarked for the operation of the commission
because, whatever funds the Congress has provided for the Office of the President will be the very
source of the funds for the commission. The amount that would be allocated to the PTC shall be
subject to existing auditing rules and regulations so there is no impropriety in the funding. PTC will
not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective powers. If at all, the investigative
function of the commission will complement those of the two offices. The function of determining
probable cause for the filing of the appropriate complaints before the courts remains to be with the
DOJ and the Ombudsman.




DENNIS A. B. FUNA,
Petitioner,

v.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA, Office of the
President, SEC.LEANDRO R. MENDOZA, in his official
capacity as Secretary of the Department of Transportation
and Communications, USEC. MARIA ELENA H. BAUTISTA, in
her official capacities as Undersecretary of the Department
of Transportation and Communications and as Officer-in-
Charge of the Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA),
Respondents.
Promulgated:

February 11, 2010

FACTS: On October 4, 2006, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed respondent Maria Elena
H. Bautista (Bautista) as Undersecretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications
(DOTC).
On September 1, 2008, following the resignation of then MARINA Administrator Vicente T.
Suazo, Jr., Bautista was designated as Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Office of the Administrator,
MARINA, in concurrent capacity as DOTC Undersecretary.
On October 21, 2008, Dennis A. B. Funa in his capacity as taxpayer, concerned citizen and lawyer,
filed the instant petition challenging the constitutionality of Bautistas appointment/designation,
which is proscribed by the prohibition on the President, Vice-President, the Members of the
Cabinet, and their deputies and assistants to hold any other office or employment.
On January 5, 2009, during the pendency of this petition, Bautista was appointed
Administrator of the MARINA and she assumed her duties and responsibilities as such on
February 2, 2009.
Petitioner argues that Bautistas concurrent positions as DOTC Undersecretary and MARINA OIC is
in violation of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution .
On the other hand, the respondents argue that the requisites of a judicial inquiry are not present in
this case. In fact, there no longer exists an actual controversy that needs to be resolved in view of
the appointment of respondent Bautista as MARINA Administrator effective February 2, 2009 and
the relinquishment of her post as DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport, which rendered the
present petition moot and academic. Petitioners prayer for a temporary restraining order or writ of
preliminary injunction is likewise moot and academic since, with this supervening event, there is
nothing left to enjoin.

ISSUE: Whether or not the designation of respondent Bautista as OIC of MARINA, concurrent with
the position of DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport to which she had been appointed,
violated the constitutional proscription against dual or multiple offices for Cabinet Members and
their deputies and assistants.

HELD: Petitioner having alleged a grave violation of the constitutional prohibition against Members
of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants holding two (2) or more positions in government, the
fact that he filed this suit as a concerned citizen sufficiently confers him with standing to sue for
redress of such illegal act by public officials.
A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of
supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. Generally,
courts decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on ground of mootness. But even in cases
where supervening events had made the cases moot, this Court did not hesitate to resolve the legal
or constitutional issues raised to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, bar, and
public. In the present case, the mootness of the petition does not bar its resolution.
Resolution of the present controversy hinges on the correct application of Section 13, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants
shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or
employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice
any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with,
or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.
The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the President
shall not, during his tenure, be appointed as Members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the
Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or
offices, including government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.
On the other hand, Section 7, paragraph (2), Article IX-B reads:
Sec. 7. x x x
Unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall
hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries.
Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or
employment in the government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary
functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only
when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7, Article IX-B is
meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all elective and appointive public officials
and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to
the President, the Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants.
Since the evident purpose of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is to impose a stricter prohibition
on the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants with
respect to holding multiple offices or employment in the government during their tenure, the
exception to this prohibition must be read with equal severity. On its face, the language of Section
13, Article VII is prohibitory so that it must be understood as intended to be a positive and
unequivocal negation of the privilege of holding multiple government offices or employment. Verily,
wherever the language used in the constitution is prohibitory, it is to be understood as intended to
be a positive and unequivocal negation. Respondent Bautista being then the appointed
Undersecretary of DOTC, she was thus covered by the stricter prohibition under Section 13, Article
VII and consequently she cannot invoke the exception provided in Section 7, paragraph 2, Article
IX-B where holding another office is allowed by law or the primary functions of the position. Neither
was she designated OIC of MARINA in an ex-officio capacity, which is the exception recognized in
Civil Liberties Union.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The designation of respondent Ma. Elena H. Bautista as
Officer-in-Charge, Office of the Administrator, Maritime Industry Authority, in a concurrent
capacity with her position as DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport, is hereby declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being violative of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution and
therefore, NULL and VOID.










Enrique U. Betoy v. The Board of Directors, National Power Corporation, GR 15655657, 04
December 2011 (reiterate CLU)
FACTS: On June 8, 2001, the EPIRA was enacted by Congress with the goal of restructuring the
electric power industry and privatization of the assets of the National Power Corporation (NPC).
Pursuant to Section 48 3 of the EPIRA, a new National Power Board of Directors (NPB) was created.
On February 27, 2002, pursuant to Section 77 4 of the EPIRA, the Secretary of the Department of
Energy promulgated the IRR.
On the other hand, Section 63 of the EPIRA provides for separation benefits to officials and
employees who would be affected by the restructuring of the electric power industry and the
privatization of the assets of the NPC, to wit: cIaCTS
Section 63. Separation Benefits of Officials and Employees of Affected Agencies.
National Government employees displaced or separated from the service as a
result of the restructuring of the electricity industry and privatization of NPC
assets pursuant to this Act, shall be entitled to either a separation pay and
other benefits in accordance with existing laws, rules or regulations or be
entitled to avail of the privileges provided under a separation plan which shall
be one and one-half month salary for every year of service in the
government: Provided, however, That those who avail of such privileges shall start
their government service anew if absorbed by any government-owned successor
company. In no case shall there be any diminution of benefits under the separation
plan until the full implementation of the restructuring and privatization.
Displaced or separated personnel as a result of the privatization, if qualified, shall be
given preference in the hiring of the manpower requirements of the privatized
companies. . . . 5
Rule 33 6 of the IRR provided for the coverage and the guidelines for the separation benefits to be
given to the employees affected.
On November 18, 2002, pursuant to Section 63 of the EPIRA and Rule 33 of the IRR, the NPB
passed NPB Resolution No. 2002-124 7 which, among others, resolved that all NPC personnel shall
be legally terminated on January 31, 2003 and shall be entitled to separation benefits. On the same
day, the NPB passed NPB Resolution No. 2002-125 8 which created a transition team to manage
and implement the separation program.
As a result of the foregoing NPB Resolutions, petitioner Enrique U. Betoy, together with thousands
of his co-employees from the NPC were terminated.
Hence, herein petition for certiorari with petitioner praying for the grant of the following reliefs from
this Court, to wit:
1. Declaring National Power Board Resolution Nos. 2002-124 and 2002-125 and its
Annex "B" Null and Void, the fact [that] it was done with extraordinary haste and in
secrecy without the able participation of the Napocor Employees Consolidated Union
(NECU) to represent all career civil service employees on issues affecting their rights
to due process, equity, security of tenure, social benefits accrued to them, and as
well as the disclosure of public transaction provisions of the 1987 Constitution
because during its proceeding the National Power Board had acted with grave abuse
of discretion and disregarding constitutional and statutory injunctions on removal of
public servants and non-diminution of social benefits accrued to separated
employees, thus, amounting to excess of jurisdiction; IHCDAS
2. Striking down Section 11, Section 48 and Section 52 of RA 9136 (EPIRA) for being
violative of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution and, therefore,
unconstitutional;
3. Striking Section 34 of RA 9136 (EPIRA) for being exorbitant display of State Power
and was not premised on the welfare of the FILIPINO PEOPLE or principle of salus
populi est suprema lex;
4. Striking down Section 38 for RA 9136 (EPIRA) for being a prelude to Charter
Change without a valid referendum for ratification of the entire voter citizens of the
Philippine Republic;
5. Striking down all other provisions of RA 9136 (EPIRA) found repugnant to the
1987 Constitution;
6. Striking down all provisions of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of
the EPIRA found repugnant to the 1987 Constitution;
7. Striking down Section 63 of RA 9136 (EPIRA) for classifying such provisions in the
same vein with Proclamation No. 50 used against MWSS employees and its failure to
classify which condition comes first whether the restructuring effecting total
reorganization of the electric power industry making NPC financially viable or the
privatization of NPC assets where manpower reduction or sweeping/lay-off or
termination of career civil service employees follows the disposal of NPC assets. This
is a clear case of violation of the EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE, therefore,
unconstitutional;

8. Striking down Rule 33 of the Implementing Rules [and] Regulations (IRR) for
disregarding the constitutional and statutory injunction on arbitrary removal of
career civil service employees; and
9. For such other reliefs deemed equitable with justice and fairness to more than
EIGHT THOUSAND (8,000) EMPLOYEES of the National Power Corporation (NPC)
whose fate lies in the sound disposition of the Honorable Supreme Court.

ISSUE: WON Section 11, Section 48 and Section 52 of RA 9136 (EPIRA) violates
Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution and, therefore, unconstitutional;
HELD: In Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, this Court explained that the prohibition
contained in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution does not apply to posts occupied by the
Executive officials specified therein without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as
provided by law and as required by the primary function of said official's office, to wit:
The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under Section
13, Article VII of the Constitution must not, however, be construed as applying to
posts occupied by the Executive officials specified therein without additional
compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the
primary functions of said officials' office. The reason is that these posts do not
comprise "any other office" within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition
but are properly an imposition of additional duties and functions on said officials. To
characterize these posts otherwise would lead to absurd consequences, among which
are: The President of the Philippines cannot chair the National Security Council
reorganized under Executive Order No. 115 (December 24, 1986). Neither can the
Vice-President, the Executive Secretary, and the Secretaries of National Defense,
Justice, Labor and Employment and Local Government sit in this Council, which
would then have no reason to exist for lack of a chairperson and members. The
respective undersecretaries and assistant secretaries, would also be prohibited.
The designation of the members of the Cabinet to form the NPB does not violate the prohibition
contained in our Constitution as the privatization and restructuring of the electric power industry
involves the close coordination and policy determination of various government agencies. Section 2
of the EPIRA clearly shows that the policy toward privatization would involve financial, budgetary
and environmental concerns as well as coordination with local government units.
In Civil Liberties, this Court explained that mandating additional duties and functions to Cabinet
members which are not inconsistent with those already prescribed by their offices or appointments
by virtue of their special knowledge, expertise and skill in their respective executive offices, is a
practice long-recognized in many jurisdictions. It is a practice justified by the demands of efficiency,
policy direction, continuity and coordination among the different offices in the Executive Branch in
the discharge of its multifarious tasks of executing and implementing laws affecting national
interest and general welfare and delivering basic services to the people.
The production and supply of energy is undoubtedly one of national interest and is a basic
commodity expected by the people. This Court, therefore, finds the designation of the respective
members of the Cabinet, as ex-officio members of the NPB, valid. Considering that the concerned
Cabinet secretaries were merely imposed additional duties and their posts in the NPB do not
constitute "any other office" within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition. The
delegation of the said official to the respective Board of Directors were designation by Congress of
additional functions and duties to the officials concerned, i.e., they were designated as members of
the Board of Directors. Designation connotes an imposition of additional duties, usually by law,
upon a person already in the public service by virtue of an earlier appointment. Designation does
not entail payment of additional benefits or grant upon the person so designated the right to claim
the salary attached to the position. Without an appointment, a designation does not entitle the
officer to receive the salary of the position. The legal basis of an employee's right to claim the salary
attached thereto is a duly issued and approved appointment to the position, and not a mere
designation.
Hence, Congress specifically intended that the position of member of the Board of NPB shall be ex-
officio or automatically attached to the respective offices of the members composing the board. It is
clear from the wordings of the law that it was the intention of Congress that the subject posts will
be adjunct to the respective offices of the official designated to such posts.





Atty. Elias Omar Sana v. Career Executive Service Board, GR 192296, 15 November 2011
FACTS: On 28 May 2010, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (President Arroyo) issued EO 883
granting the rank of CESO III or higher to officers and employees occupying legal positions in the
government executive service who have obtained graduate degrees in law and successfully passed
the bar examinations (Section 1). EO 883 invoked the granting of CESO rank to government
personnel who successfully complete certain graduate programs, such as Masters in Public Safety
Administration (MPSA) and Masters in National Security Administration (MNSA) as basis for the
granting of CESO rank to government lawyers in the executive service.
4

On 2 June 2010, the CESB issued Resolution No. 870 finding no legal impediment for the President
to vest CESO rank to executive officials during the periods covered by the constitutional ban on
midnight appointment and statutory ban on pre-election appointment
The CESB subsequently endorsed to President Arroyo its recommendation to vest CESO rank to 13
officials from various departments and agencies, including three members of the CESB who signed
CESB Resolution No. 870 On 10 June 2010, President Arroyo appointed the 13 officials to varying
CESO ranks.
On 30 July 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III (President Aquino) issued EO 3 expressly revoking
EO 883 (Section 1) and [a]ll x x x administrative orders, proclamations, rules and regulations that
conflict with EO 3 (Section 2). As basis for the repeal, the fifth Whereas clause of EO 3 provides
that EO 883 encroaches upon the power of the CESB to promulgate rules, standards and
procedures on the selection, classification, compensation and career development of members of the
Career Executive service x x x vested by law with the [CESB]
On 4 August 2010, petitioner Atty. Elias Omar A. Sana (petitioner) filed the present petition,
contending that EO 883 and the subsequent appointment of the 13 executive officials to CESO rank
are void for violating the constitutional ban on midnight appointment under Section 15, Article VII
of the Constitution. Petitioner theorizes that appointments to positions and ranks in the CES are
executive in nature and, if made within the period provided under Section 15, Article VII, fall
under its prohibition. Petitioner submits that CESB Resolution No. 870 circumvents Section 15,
Article VII by distinguishing the terms appoint and appointment. He contends that CESB
Resolution No. 870 cannot give new meaning to presidential issuances, laws, and the Constitution.
ISSUE: WON EO 883 is unconstitutional for being violative of Section 15, Article VII of the
Constitution.
HELD:
The petition seeks a review of the constitutionality of EO 883 and CESB Resolution No. 870 for
being repugnant to Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution. At the time this petition was filed,
however, President Aquino had already issued EO 3 revoking EO 883 expressly (under Section 1)
and CESB Resolution No. 870 impliedly (under Section 2). EO 883 and CESB Resolution No. 870
having ceased to have any force and effect, the Court finds no reason to reach the merits of the
petition and pass upon these issuances validity. To do so would transgress the requirement of case
and controversy as precondition for the Courts exercise of judicial review.
The question whether an appointment to a CESO rank of an executive official amounts to an
appointment for purposes of the constitutional ban on midnight appointment, while potentially
recurring, holds no certainty of evading judicial review as the question can be decided even beyond
the appointments-ban period under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution.
Indeed, petitioner does not allege to have suffered any violation of a right vested in him under EO
883. He was not among the 13 officials granted CESO ranking by President Arroyo. The CESB itself
stated that no conferment of CESO rank was ever made by President [Arroyo] in relation to EO
883. Hence, for the Court to nevertheless reach the merits of this petition and determine the
constitutionality of EO 883 and CESB Resolution No. 870 despite their unquestioned repeal and the
absence of any resulting prejudice to petitioners rights is to depart from its constitutional role of
settling actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable.

























G.R. No. 175787. February 4, 2009.*
PHILLIPS SEAFOOD (PHILIPPINES) CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. THE BOARD OF
INVESTMENTS, respondent.
Administrative Law; Remedial Law; Appeals; The right to appeal is not a constitutional, natural or
inherent rightit is a statutory privilege and of statutory origin and therefore, available only if
granted or provided by statute.The right to appeal is not a constitutional, natural or inherent
rightit is a statutory privilege and of statutory origin and, therefore, available only if granted or
provided by statute. It may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by, and in accordance with,
the provisions of the law. Thus, in determining the appellate procedure governing administrative
agencies exercising quasi-judicial or regulatory functions such as respondent BOI, a perusal of the
legislative enactments creating them is imperative.
Same; Same; Same; Executive Order No. 226 apparently allows two avenues of appeal from an
action or decision of the Board of Investments (BOI), depending on the nature of the controversy.
E.O. No. 226 apparently allows two avenues of appeal from an action or decision of the BOI,
depending on the nature of the controversy. One mode is to elevate an appeal to the Office of the
President when the action or decision pertains to either of these two instances: first, in the
decisions of the BOI over controversies concerning the implementation of the relevant provisions of
E.O No. 226 that may arise between registered enterprises or investors and government agencies
under Article 7; and second, in an action of the BOI over applications for registration under the
investment priorities plan under Article 36. Another mode of review is to elevate the matter directly
to judicial tribunals. For instance, under Article 50, E.O. No. 226, a party adversely affected by the
issuance of a license to do business in favor of an alien or a foreign firm may file with the proper
Regional Trial Court an action to cancel said license. Then, there is Article 82, E.O. No. 226, which,
in its broad phraseology, authorizes the direct appeal to the Supreme Court from any order or
decision of respondent BOI involving the provisions of E.O. No. 226.
Same; Same; Same; Section 1 of Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure expressly includes
respondent Board of Investments (BOI) as one of the quasi-judicial agencies whose judgments or
final orders are appealable to the Court of Appeals via a verified petition for review.In relation to
Article 82, E.O. No. 226, Section 1 of Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure expressly
includes respondent BOI as one of the quasi-judicial agencies whose judgments or final orders are
appealable to the Court of Appeals via a verified petition for review. Appeals from judgments and
final orders of quasi-judicial agencies are now required to be brought to the Court of Appeals on a
verified petition for review, under the requirements and conditions in Rule 43 which was precisely
formulated and adopted to provide for a uniform rule of appellate procedure for quasi-judicial
agencies.
Same; Same; Same; Petitioner cannot invoke Article 36 of Executive Order No. 226 to justify its
appeal to the Office of the President.Petitioner cannot invoke Article 36 of E.O. No. 226 to justify
its appeal to the Office of the President. Article 36, along with Article 7, which allows recourse to the
Office of the President, applies to specific instances, namely, controversies between a registered
enterprise and a government agency and decisions concerning the registration of an enterprise,
respectively. Expresio unius est exclusio alterius. This enumeration is exclusive so that other
controversies outside of its purview, including petitioners entitlement to an ITH, can invoke only
the appellate judicial relief provided under Article 82. In the instant case, the denial of petitioners
application for an ITH is not within the cases where the law expressly provides for appellate
recourse to the Office of the President. That being the case, petitioner should have elevated its
appeal to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43.
Same; Same; Same; A decision or order issued by a department or agency need not be appealed to
the Office of the President when there is a special law that provides for a different mode of appeal.
Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 18 expressly recognizes an exception to the remedy of appeal to the
Office of the President from the decisions of executive departments and agencies. Under Section 1
thereof, a decision or order issued by a department or agency need not be appealed to the Office of
the President when there is a special law that provides for a different mode of appeal. In the instant
case, the enabling law of respondent BOI, E.O. No. 226, explicitly allows for immediate judicial relief
from the decision of respondent BOI involving petitioners application for an ITH. E.O. No. 226 is a
law of special nature and should prevail over A.O. No. 18.






















G.R. No. 165276. November 25, 2009.*
JUDGE ADORACION G. ANGELES, petitioner, vs. HON. MANUEL B. GAITE, Acting Deputy
Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs; HON. WALDO Q. FLORES, Senior Deputy Executive
Secretary, Office of the President; Former DOJ SECRETARY HERNANDO B. PEREZ (now
substituted by the Incumbent DOJ Secretary RAUL GONZALES); Former PROV. PROS.
AMANDO C. VICENTE (now substituted by the Incumbent PROV. PROS. ALFREDO L.
GERONIMO); PROS. BENJAMIN R. CARAIG, Malolos, Bulacan; and MICHAEL T. VISTAN,
respondents.
Petitioner [Judge Adoracion G. Angeles] was the foster mother of her fourteen (14) year-old
grandniece Maria Mercedes Vistan who, in April 1990 was entrusted to the care of the former by the
girls grandmother and petitioners sister Leonila Angeles Vda. de Vistan when the child was
orphaned at the tender age of four.
Petitioner provided the child with love and care, catered to her needs, sent her to a good school and
attended to her general well-being for nine (9) memorable and happy years. The child also
reciprocated the affections of her foster mother and wrote the latter letters.
Petitioners love for the child extended to her siblings, particularly her half-brother respondent
Michael Vistan, a former drug-addict, and the latters family who were regular beneficiaries of the
undersigneds generosity. Michael would frequently run to the undersigned for his variety of needs
ranging from day to day subsistence to the medical and hospital expenses of his children.
In the evening of 11 April 1999, Michael Vistan had a falling out with petitioner for his failure to do
a very important errand for which he was severely reprimanded over the phone. He was told that
from then on, no assistance of any kind would be extended to him and that he was no longer
welcome at petitioners residence.
Feeling thwarted, he, in conspiracy with his co-horts (sic), retaliated on 12 April 1999 by inducing
his half-sister, Maria Mercedes, to leave petitioners custody. Michael used to have free access to the
undersigneds house and he took the girl away while petitioner was at her office.
In the evening of that day, 12 April 1999, petitioner, accompanied by her friend Ines Francisco,
sought Michael Vistan in his residence in Sta. Cruz, Guiguinto, Bulacan to confront him about the
whereabouts of his half-sister. He disclosed that he brought the girl to the residence of her maternal
relatives in Sta. Monica, Hagonoy, Bulacan. Petitioner then reported the matter and requested for
the assistance of the 303rd Criminal Investigation and Detective Group Field Office in Malolos,
Bulacan to locate the girl. Consequently, PO3 Paquito M. Guillermo and Ruben Fred Ramirez
accompanied petitioner and her friend to Hagonoy, Bulacan where they coordinated with police
officers from the said place. The group failed to find the girl. Instead, they were given the run-
around as the spouses Ruben and Lourdes Tolentino and spouses Gabriel and Olympia Nazareno
misled them with the false information that Maria Mercedes was already brought by their brother
Carmelito Guevarra and the latters wife Camilia to Casiguran, Quezon Province.
On 13 April 1999, petitioner filed a complaint for Kidnapping under Article 271 of the Revised Penal
Code (Inducing a Minor to Abandon His Home) against Michael Vistan, the Tolentino spouses, the
Nazareno spouses and Guevarra spouses, all maternal relatives of Maria Mercedes Vistan.

Warrants of arrest were subsequently issued against them and to evade the long arm of the law,
Michael Vistan went into hiding. He dragged along with him his half-sister Maria Mercedes.
From 12 April 1999 to 16 April 1999, Michael Vistan, with his little sister in tow, shuttled back and
forth from Guiguinto to Hagonoy, Bulacan as well as in Manila and Quezon City, living the life of a
fugitive from justice. He eventually brought the girl to ABS-CBN in Quezon City where he made her
recite a concocted tale of child abuse against herein petitioner hoping that this would compel the
latter to withdraw the kidnapping charge which she earlier filed.
In the early morning of 16 April 1999, Michael Vistan brought Maria Mercedes to the DSWD after
he felt himself cornered by the police dragnet laid for him.
Prompted by his overwhelming desire to retaliate against petitioner and get himself off the hook
from the kidnapping charge, Michael Vistan had deliberately, maliciously, selfishly and insensitively
caused undue physical, emotional and psychological sufferings to Maria Mercedes Vistan, all of
which were greatly prejudicial to her well-being and development.
Thus, on 1 December 1999, petitioner filed a complaint against Michael Vistan before the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor in Malolos, Bulacan for five counts of Violation of Section 10 (a), Article VI
of RA 7610, otherwise known as the Child Abuse Act, and for four counts of Violation of Sec. 1 (e) of
PD 1829. She likewise filed a complaint for Libel against Maria Cristina Vistan, aunt of Michael and
Maria Mercedes.
In a Resolution dated March 3, 2000, Investigating Prosecutor Benjamin R. Caraig recommended
upheld (sic) the charge of Violation of RA 7160 but recommended that only one Information be filed
against Michael Vistan. The charge of Violation of PD 1829 was dismissed. Nonetheless, the
Resolution to uphold the petitioners complaint against Maria Cristina Vistan must (sic) remained.
However, Provincial Prosecutor Amando C. Vicente denied the recommendation of the Investigating
Prosecutor that Michael Vistan be indicted for Violation RA 7610. He also approved the
recommendation for the dismissal of the charge for Violation of PD 1829.
On 14 April 2000, petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration. This was denied in a
Resolution dated 28 April 2000.
Petitioner then filed a Petition for Review before the Department of Justice on 18 May 2000. She
also filed a Supplement thereto on 19 May 2000.
In a Resolution dated 5 April 2001, Undersecretary Manuel A.J. Teehankee, acting for the Secretary
of Justice, denied the petition for review. The undersigneds Motion for Reconsideration filed on 25
April 2001 was likewise denied by then DOJ Secretary Hernando B. Perez in a Resolution dated 15
October 2001.
On 26 November 2001, the undersigned filed a Petition for Review before the Office of President. The
petition was dismissed and the motion for reconsideration was denied before said forum anchored
on Memorandum Circular No. 58 which bars an appeal or a petition for review of
decisions/orders/reso-lutions of the Secretary of Justice except those involving offenses punishable
by reclusion perpetua or death.

On March 18, 2003, petitioner filed a petition for review5 before the CA assailing the Order of the
Office of President. Petitioner argued that the Office of the President erred in not addressing the
merits of her petition by relying on Memorandum Circular No. 58, series of 1993. Petitioner assailed
the constitutionality of the memorandum circular, specifically arguing that Memorandum Circular
No. 58 is an invalid regulation because it diminishes the power of control of the President and
bestows upon the Secretary of Justice, a subordinate officer, almost unfettered power.6 Moreover,
petitioner contended that the Department of Justice (DOJ) erred in dismissing the complaint
against respondent Michael Vistan for violations of Presidential Decree No. 1829 (PD No. 1829) and
for violation of Republic Act No. 7610 (RA No. 7610).
On February 13, 2004, the CA rendered a Decision, dismissing the petition.
The CA affirmed the position of the Solicitor General (OSG) to apply the doctrine of qualified political
agency.
ISSUES:
1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE RELIANCE OF THE
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT IN THE PROVISIONS OF MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR NO. 58.
2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE DISMISSAL BY THE DOJ
SECRETARY OF THE COMPLAINT OF VIOLATION OF SECTION 1(E). P.D. 1829 (OBSTRUCTION OF
JUSTICE) AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENT MICHAEL VISTAN.
3. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE DISMISSAL OF THE
COMPLAINT OF VIOLATION OF R.A. 7610 (CHILD ABUSE) AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENT
MICHAEL VISTAN.
RULING:
Petitioners arguments have no leg to stand on. They are mere suppositions without any basis in
law. Petitioner argues in the main that Memorandum Circular No. 58 is an invalid regulation,
because it diminishes the power of control of the President and bestows upon the Secretary of
Justice, a subordinate officer, almost unfettered power. This argument is absurd. The Presidents
act of delegating authority to the Secretary of Justice by virtue of said Memorandum Circular is well
within the purview of the doctrine of qualified political agency, long been established in our
jurisdiction.
Under this doctrine, which primarily recognizes the establishment of a single executive, all
executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department; the heads of
the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive; and, except in
cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the
exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and
administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive
departments, and the acts of the secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in
the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive,
presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. The CA cannot be deemed to have committed any
error in upholding the Office of the Presidents reliance on the Memorandum Circular as it merely
interpreted and applied the law as it should be.
Nonetheless, the power of the President to delegate is not without limits. No less than the
Constitution provides for restrictions. These restrictions hold true to this day as they remain
embodied in our fundamental law. There are certain presidential powers which arise out of
exceptional circumstances, and if exercised, would involve the suspension of fundamental
freedoms, or at least call for the supersedence of executive prerogatives over those exercised by co-
equal branches of government. The declaration of martial law, the suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus, and the exercise of the pardoning power, notwithstanding the judicial determination of guilt
of the accused, all fall within this special class that demands the exclusive exercise by the President
of the constitutionally vested power. The list is by no means exclusive, but there must be a showing
that the executive power in question is of similar gravitas and exceptional import.























G.R. No. 177131. June 7, 2011.*
BOY SCOUTS OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent.

FACTS:
This case arose when the COA issued Resolution No. 99-0115 on August 19, 1999 (the COA
Resolution), with the subject Defining the Commissions policy with respect to the audit of the Boy
Scouts of the Philippines. In its whereas clauses, the COA Resolution stated that the BSP was
created as a public corporation under Commonwealth Act No. 111, as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 460 and Republic Act No. 7278; that in Boy Scouts of the Philippines v. National Labor
Relations Commission,6 the Supreme Court ruled that the BSP, as constituted under its charter,
was a government-controlled corporation within the meaning of Article IX(B)(2)(1) of the
Constitution; and that the BSP is appropriately regarded as a government instrumentality under
the 1987 Administrative Code. The COA Resolution also cited its constitutional mandate under
Section 2(1), Article IX (D).
ISSUE: WON COA has jurisdiction over the BSP.
RULING:
YES. After looking at the legislative history of its amended charter and carefully studying the
applicable laws and the arguments of both parties, we find that the BSP is a public corporation and
its funds are subject to the COAs audit jurisdiction.
Evidently, the BSP, which was created by a special law to serve a public purpose in pursuit of a
constitutional mandate, comes within the class of public corporations defined by paragraph 2,
Article 44 of the Civil Code and governed by the law which creates it, pursuant to Article 45 of the
same Code.
The BSP is a public corporation or a government agency or instrumentality with juridical
personality, which does not fall within the constitutional prohibition in Article XII, Section 16,
notwith-standing the amendments to its charter. Not all corporations, which are not government
owned or controlled, are ipso facto to be considered private corporations as there exists another
distinct class of corporations or chartered institutions which are otherwise known as public
corporations. These corporations are treated by law as agencies or instrumentalities of the
government which are not subject to the tests of ownership or control and economic viability but to
different criteria relating to their public purposes/interests or constitutional policies and objectives
and their administrative relationship to the government or any of its Departments or Offices.






G.R. No. 190259. June 7, 2011.*
DATU ZALDY UY AMPATUAN, ANSARUDDIN ADIONG, REGIE SAHALI-GENERALE, petitioners,
vs. HON. RONALDO PUNO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Interior and
Local Government and alter-ego of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, and anyone acting in
his stead and on behalf of the President of the Philippines, ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES (AFP), or any of their units operating in the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao (ARMM), and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, or any of their units operating in
ARMM, respondents.


FACTS:
On November 24, 2009, the day after the gruesome massacre of 57 men and women, including
some news reporters, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation 1946,1 placing
the Provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato under a state of
emergency. She directed the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National
Police (PNP) to undertake such measures as may be allowed by the Constitution and by law to
prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence in the named places.
Three days later or on November 27, President Arroyo also issued Administrative Order 273 (AO
273)2 transferring supervision of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) from the
Office of the President to the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG). But, due to
issues raised over the terminology used in AO 273, the President issued Administrative Order 273-A
(AO 273-A) amending the former, by delegating instead of transferring supervision of the ARMM
to the DILG.
Claiming that the Presidents issuances encroached on the ARMMs autonomy, petitioners Datu
Zaldy Uy Ampatuan, Ansaruddin Adiong, and Regie Sahali-Generale, all ARMM officials, filed this
petition for prohibition under Rule 65. They alleged that the proclamation and the orders
empowered the DILG Secretary to take over ARMMs operations and seize the regional governments
powers, in violation of the principle of local autonomy under Republic Act 9054 (also known as the
Expanded ARMM Act) and the Constitution. The President gave the DILG Secretary the power to
exercise, not merely administrative supervision, but control over the ARMM since the latter could
suspend ARMM officials and replace them.
Petitioner ARMM officials claimed that the President had no factual basis for declaring a state of
emergency, especially in the Province of Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato, where no critical
violent incidents occurred. The deployment of troops and the taking over of the ARMM constitutes
an invalid exercise of the Presidents emergency powers.6 Petitioners asked that Proclamation 1946
as well as AOs 273 and 273-A be declared unconstitutional and that respondents DILG Secretary,
the AFP, and the PNP be enjoined from implementing them.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Proclamation 1946 and AOs 273 and 273-A violate the principle of local
autonomy under Section 16, Article X of the Constitution, and Section 1, Article V of the Expanded
ARMM Organic Act; = NO

2. Whether or not President Arroyo invalidly exercised emergency powers when she called out the
AFP and the PNP to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence in Maguindanao, Sultan
Kudarat, and Cotabato City; = NO
RULING:
The DILG Secretary did not take over control of the powers of the ARMM. After law enforcement
agents took respondent Governor of ARMM into custody for alleged complicity in the Maguindanao
massacre, the ARMM Vice-Governor, petitioner Ansaruddin Adiong, assumed the vacated post on
December 10, 2009 pursuant to the rule on succession found in Article VII, Section 12, of RA 9054.
In turn, Acting Governor Adiong named the then Speaker of the ARMM Regional Assembly,
petitioner Sahali-Generale, Acting ARMM Vice-Governor. In short, the DILG Secretary did not take
over the administration or operations of the ARMM.
The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of emergency in the three places
mentioned. And she did not act pursuant to any law enacted by Congress that authorized her to
exercise extraordinary powers. The calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence in such places is a power that the Constitution directly vests in the President. She did not
need a congressional authority to exercise the same.
While it is true that the Court may inquire into the factual bases for the Presidents exercise of the
above power, it would generally defer to her judgment on the matter. As the Court acknowledged in
Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Hon. Zamora, 338 SCRA 81 (2000), it is clearly to the President
that the Constitution entrusts the determination of the need for calling out the armed forces to
prevent and suppress lawless violence. Unless it is shown that such determination was attended by
grave abuse of discretion, the Court will accord respect to the Presidents judgment.













G.R. No. 190293. March 20, 2012.*
PHILIP SIGFRID A. FORTUN and ALBERT LEE G. ANGELES, petitioners, vs. GLORIA
MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, as Commander-in-Chief and President of the Republic of the
Philippines, EDUARDO ERMITA, Executive Secretary, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES
(AFP), or any of their units, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE (PNP), or any of their units, JOHN
DOES and JANE DOES acting under their direction and control, respondents.
FACTS:
On November 23, 2009 heavily armed men, believed led by the ruling Ampatuan family, gunned
down and buried under shoveled dirt 57 innocent civilians on a highway in Maguindanao. In
response to this carnage, on November 24 President Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation 1946,
declaring a state of emergency in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City to prevent and
suppress similar lawless violence in Central Mindanao.
Believing that she needed greater authority to put order in Maguindanao and secure it from large
groups of persons that have taken up arms against the constituted authorities in the province, on
December 4, 2009 President Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation 1959 declaring martial law
and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in that province except for identified areas
of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front.
Two days later or on December 6, 2009 President Arroyo submitted her report to Congress in
accordance with Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which required her, within 48
hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, to submit to that body a report in person or in writing of her action.
In her report, President Arroyo said that she acted based on her finding that lawless men have
taken up arms in Maguindanao and risen against the government. The President described the
scope of the uprising, the nature, quantity, and quality of the rebels weaponry, the movement of
their heavily armed units in strategic positions, the closure of the Maguindanao Provincial Capitol,
Ampatuan Municipal Hall, Datu Unsay Municipal Hall, and 14 other municipal halls, and the use of
armored vehicles, tanks, and patrol cars with unauthorized PNP/Police markings.
On December 9, 2009 Congress, in joint session, convened pursuant to Section 18, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution to review the validity of the Presidents action. But, two days later or on
December 12 before Congress could act, the President issued Presidential Proclamation 1963, lifting
martial law and restoring the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao.
Petitioners Philip Sigfrid A. Fortun and the other petitioners in G.R. 190293, 190294,
190301,190302, 190307, 190356, and 190380 brought the present actions to challenge the
constitutionality of President Arroyos Proclamation 1959 affecting Maguindanao. But, given the
prompt lifting of that proclamation before Congress could review it and before any serious question
affecting the rights and liberties of Maguindanaos inhabitants could arise, the Court deems any
review of its constitutionality the equivalent of beating a dead horse.
ISSUE:
WON THE presidential proclamation of martial law and suspension of the privilege of habeas corpus
in 2009 in a province in Mindanao which were withdrawn after just eight days ARE
CONSTITUTIONAL?
RULING:
The pertinent provisions of Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution state: Sec. 18. The
President shall be the CommanderinChief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it
becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for
a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the
Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within fortyeight hours from the proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a
report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a
majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or
suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the
President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a
period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety
requires it. The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twentyfour hours following such
proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without any need of a call. x x x x
Although the above vests in the President the power to proclaim martial law or suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, he shares such power with the Congress. Thus: 1. The
Presidents proclamation or suspension is temporary, good for only 60 days; 2. He must, within 48
hours of the proclamation or suspension, report his action in person or in writing to Congress; 3.
Both houses of Congress, if not in session must jointly convene within 24 hours of the proclamation
or suspension for the purpose of reviewing its validity; and 4. The Congress, voting jointly, may
revoke or affirm the Presidents proclamation or suspension, allow their limited effectivity to lapse,
or extend the same if Congress deems warranted. It is evident that under the 1987 Constitution the
President and the Congress act in tandem in exercising the power to proclaim martial law or
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. They exercise the power, not only sequentially,
but in a sense jointly since, after the President has initiated the proclamation or the suspension,
only the Congress can maintain the same based on its own evaluation of the situation on the
ground, a power that the President does not have.











Re: Letter of the UP Law Faculty entitled Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the Faculty of
the University of the Philippines College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and
Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court., En Banc, A.M. No. 10-10-4- SC, Oct. 19, 2010, the
Supreme Court ordered the following UP Diliman law professors, i.e., Attys. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen,
Froilan M. Bacungan, Pacifico A. Agabin, Merlin M. Magallona, Salvador T. Carlota, Carmelo V.
Sison, Patricia R.P. Salvador Daway, Dante B. Gatmaytan, Theodore O. Te, Florin T. Hilbay, Jay L.
Batongbacal, Evelyn (Leo) D. Battad, Gwen G. De Vera, Solomon F. Lumba, Rommel J. Casis, Jose
Gerardo A. Alampay, Miguel R. Armovit, Arthur P. Autea, Rosa Maria J. Bautista, Mark R. Bocobo,
Dan P. Calica, Tristan A. Catindig, Sandra Marie O. Coronel, Rosario O. Gallo, Concepcion L.
Jardeleza, Antonio G.M. La Via, Carina C. Laforteza, Jose C. Laureta, Owen J. Lynch, Rodolfo Noel
S. Quimbo, Antonio M. Santos, Gmeleen Faye B. Tomboc, Nicholas Felix L. Ty, Evalyn G. Ursua,
Raul V. Vasquez, Susan D. Villanueva, and Dina D. Lucenario, to SHOW CAUSE why they should
not be disciplined as members of the Bar for violation of Canons 10, 11, and 13 and Rules 1.02 and
11.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Further, the Court directed "UP Diliman Law Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen ...to SHOW CAUSE,
within ten (10) days from receipt of this Resolution, why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with
for violation of Canon 10, Rules 10.01, 10.02 and 10.03 for submitting, through his letter dated
August 10, 2010, during the pendency of G.R. No. 162230, Vinuya v. Executive Secretary and of the
investigation before the Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards, for the consideration of the
Court En Banc, a dummy which is not a true and faithful reproduction of the purported statement,
entitled Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College
of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court.















PICHAY V.OFFICE OF THE
DEPUTY
EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY
(2012)

FACTS
On November 15, 2010, President Benigno Simeon Aquino III issued Executive Order No. 13 (E.O. 13), abolishing
the PAGC and transferring its functions to the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal
Affairs(ODESLA), more particularly to its newly-established Investigative and Adjudicatory Division
(IAD).On April 6, 2011, respondent Finance Secretary Cesar V. Purisima filed before the IAD-
ODESLA a complaint-affidavit for grave misconduct against petitioner Prospero A. Pichay, Jr.,
Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), as well as the
incumbent members of the LWUA Board of Trustees, namely, Renato Velasco, Susana Dumlao Vargas,
Bonifacio Mario M. Pena, Sr. and Daniel Landingin, which arose from the purchase by the LWUA of
Four Hundred Forty-Five Thousand Three Hundred Seventy Seven (445,377) shares of stock
of Express Savings Bank, Inc. On April 14, 2011, petitioner received an Order3 signed by Executive
Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr. requiring him and his co-respondents tosubmit their respective written
explanations under oath. In compliance therewith, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam
manifesting that a case involving the same transaction and charge of grave misconduct entitled,
"Rustico B. Tutol, et al. v. Prospero Pichay, et al.", and docketed as OMB-C-A-10-0426-I, is already
pending before the Office of the Ombudsman.

ISSUE

Whether E.O. 13 is unconstitutional for abrogating unto an administrative office a quasi-judicial function through
and E.O. and not through legislative enactment by Congress.

HELD
NO.The President has Continuing Authority to Reorganize the Executive Department under E.O. 292. In the case
of Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v.Zamora the Court affirmed that the President's authority to carry out a
reorganization in any branch or agency of the executive department is an express grant by the legislature by virtue
of Section 31, Book III, E.O. 292(the Administrative Code of 1987), "the President, subject to the policy of
the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have the continuing authority
to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President."The law grants the President this
power in recognition of the recurring need of every President to reorganize his office "to achieve
simplicity, economy and efficiency." The Office of the President is the nerve center of the Executive
Branch. To remain effective and efficient, the Office of the President must be capable of being
shaped and reshaped by the President in the manner he deems fit to carry out his directives and policies.
After all, the Office of the President is the command post of the President. (Emphasis supplied)Clearly, the
abolition of the PAGC and the transfer of its functions to a division specially created within the ODESLA is
properly within the prerogative of the President under his continuing "delegated legislative authority to
reorganize" his own office pursuant to E.O. 292.The President's power to reorganize the Office of the
President under Section31 (2) and (3) of EO 292 should be distinguished from his power to reorganize the
Office of the President Proper. Under Section 31 (1) of EO292, the President can reorganize the
Office of the President Proper by abolishing, consolidating or merging units, or by transferring functions from
one unit to another. In contrast, under Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292, the President's power to reorganize
offices outside the Office of the President Proper but still within the Office of the President is limited
to merely transferring functions or agencies from theOffice of the President to Departments or
agencies, and vice versa. The distinction between the allowable organizational actions under
Section31(1) on the one hand and Section 31 (2) and (3) on the other is crucial not only as it affects
employees' tenurial security but also insofar as it touches upon the validity of the reorganization,
that is, whether the executive actions undertaken fall within the limitations prescribed under E.O. 292. When
the PAGC was created under E.O. 12, it was composed of a Chairman and two(2) Commissioners who held the
ranks of Presidential Assistant II and I,respectively,9 and was placed directly "under the Office of the
President."



G.R. No. 169042. October 5, 2011.*
ERDITO QUARTO, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN SIMEON MARCELO, CHIEF
SPECIAL PROSECUTOR DENNIS VILLA IGNACIO, LUISITO M. TABLAN, RAUL B. BORILLO, and
LUIS A. GAYYA, respondents.


ISSUE:
Petitioner seeks to nullify the immunity granted to the respondents, and to compel the Ombudsman
to include them as accused in the informations for estafa through falsification of public documents
and for violation of Section 3(e), Republic Act (RA) No. 3019.
RULING:
The power to grant immunity from prosecution is essentially a legislative prerogative. The exclusive
power of Congress to define crimes and their nature and to provide for their punishment
concomitantly carries the power to immunize certain persons from prosecution to facilitate the
attainment of state interests, among them, the solution and prosecution of crimes with high
political, social and economic impact.
While the legislature is the source of the power to grant immunity, the authority to implement is
lodged elsewhere. The authority to choose the individual to whom immunity would be granted is a
constituent part of the process and is essentially an executive function.
An immunity statute does not, and cannot, rule out a review by this Court of the Ombudsmans
exercise of discretion. Like all other officials under our constitutional scheme of government, all
their acts must adhere to the Constitution.








G.R. No. 145184 March 14, 2008
PRESIDENTIAL AD HOC FACT-FINDING COMMITTEE ON BEHEST LOANS, represented by
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT through ATTY. ORLANDO L.
SALVADOR, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in his capacity as OMBUDSMAN; DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES' MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS AND OFFICERS AT THE TIME -
RAFAEL SISON, JOSEPH TENGCO, ALICE REYES, VICENTE PATERNO, JOSEPH EDRALIN,
ROBERTO ONGPIN, VERDEN DANGILAN, RODOLFO MANALO; BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND
OFFICERS INTEGRATED CIRCUITS PHILIPPINES, INC. QUERUBE MAKALINTAL,
*
AMBROSIO
MAKALINTAL, VICENTE JAYME, ANTONIO SANTIAGO, EDGAR QUINTO, HORACIO
MAKALINTAL, ALFREDO DE LOS ANGELES, JOSE REY D. RUEDA, RAMONCITO MODESTO,
GERARDO LIMJUCO, Respondents.

FACTS:
The Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, (the Committee), representing
the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), through Atty. Orlando L. Salvador (Atty.
Salvador) filed this Petition for Certiorari seeking to nullify the September 3, 1999 Resolution
1
of the
Office of the Ombudsman in OMB-0-95-0443, dismissing the criminal complaint filed against
private respondents, and the June 6, 2000 Order
2
denying its reconsideration.
On October 8, 1992, President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 13 creating the
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans (Committee).
The Committee is hereby empowered to call upon any department, bureau, office, agency,
instrumentality or corporation of the government, or any officer or employee thereof, for such
assistance as it may need in the discharge of its function.
By Memorandum Order No. 61 dated November 9, 1992, the functions of the Committee were
subsequently expanded by including in its investigation, inventory and study all non-performing
loans, whether behest or non-behest.
After examining and studying the loan transactions, the Committee determined that they bore the
characteristics of a behest loan as defined under Memorandum Order No. 61. Consequently, Atty.
Orlando L. Salvador, Consultant of the Committee, and representing the PCGG, filed with the Office
of the Ombudsman a sworn complaint
3
for violation of Section 3(e)(g) of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, against the Concerned Members of the DBP
Board of Governors, and Concerned Directors and Officers of ICPI, namely, Querube Makalintal,
Ambrosio C. Makalintal, Vicente R. Jayme, Antonio A. Santiago, Edgar L. Quinto, Horacio G.
Makalintal, Alfredo F. delos Angeles, Josery D. Ruede, Manuel Tupaz, Alberto T. Perez and Gerardo
A. Limjuco (private respondents).
Atty. Salvador alleged that ICPI applied for an industrial loan (foreign currency loan) of
US$1,352,400.00, or P10,143,000.00, from DBP. The loan application was approved on August 6,
1980 under DBP Board Resolution No. 2924. Atty. Salvador claimed that there was undue haste in
the approval of the loan. He also alleged that prior to its approval, ICPI was granted an interim loan
of P1,786,000.00 to cover the projects initial financing requirement. He added that the ICPIs
industrial loan was under-collateralized and ICPI was undercapitalized at the time the loan was
granted. ICPIs paid up capital by then was only P3,000,000.00, while the appraised value of the
machinery and equipment offered as collaterals was only P5,943,610.00. Atty. Salvador concluded
that ICPI was undeserving of the concession given to it, and the approval of the loan constitutes a
violation of Section 3(e)(g) of R.A. No. 3019.
ISSUE:
Petitioner alleges that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in ruling that (i) the offenses subject of its criminal complaint had prescribed;
(ii) Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61 are ex post facto laws; and (iii)
there is no probable cause to indict private respondents for violation under Section 3(e)(g) of R.A.
No. 3019.
RULING:
In Estarija v. Ranada, 492 SCRA 652 (2006), in which petitioner raised the issue of constitutionality
of R.A. No. 6770 in his motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsmans decision, we had occasion to
state that the Ombudsman had no jurisdiction to entertain questions on the constitutionality of a
law. The Ombudsman, therefore, acted in excess of its jurisdiction in delving into the
constitutionality of the subject administrative and memorandum orders.
Case law has it that the determination of probable cause against those in public office during a
preliminary investigation is a function that belongs to the Office of the Ombudsman. The
Ombudsman is empowered to determine, in the exercise of his discretion, whether probable cause
exists, and to charge the person believed to have committed the crime as defined by law. As a rule,
courts should not interfere with the Ombudsmans investigatory power, exercised through the
Ombudsman Prosecutors, and the authority to determine the presence or absence of probable
cause, except when the finding is tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction.
For one to have violated Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, the following elements must be established:
1) the accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions; 2)
he must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence; and 3) he
must have caused undue injury to any party, including the government, or given any private party
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference, in the discharge of his functions. Evidently, mere
bad faith or partiality and negligence per se are not enough for one to be held liable under the law.
It is required that the act constitutive of bad faith or partiality must, in the first place, be evident or
manifest, while the negligent deed should be both gross and inexcusable. Further, it is necessary to
show that any or all of these modalities resulted in undue injury to a specified party. On the other
hand, to be liable under Section 3(g), there must be a showing that private respondents entered into
a grossly disadvantageous contract on behalf of the government.
The Chapter on Human Relations of the Civil Code directs every person, inter alia, to observe good
faith, which springs from the fountain of good conscience. Well-settled is the rule that good faith is
presumed. Specifically, a public officer is presumed to have acted in good faith in the performance
of his duties. Mistakes committed by a public officer are not actionable, absent a clear showing that
he was motivated by malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith. Bad faith does not simply
connote bad moral judgment or negligence. There must be some dishonest purpose or some moral
obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of a sworn duty through some motive or intent,
or ill will. It partakes of the nature of fraud. It contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating
with furtive design or some motive of self-interest or ill will for ulterior purposes. Petitioners utterly
failed to show that private respondents actions fit such description.



G.R. No. 154652. August 14, 2009.*
PRUDENCIO M. REYES, JR., petitioner, vs. SIMPLICIO C. BELISARIO and EMMANUEL S.
MALICDEM, respondents.

FACTS:
On March 3, 2000, respondents Deputy Administrators Simplicio Belisario, Jr. and Emmanuel B.
Malicdem6(respondents), along with Daniel Landingin and Rodolfo S. De Jesus, all officers of the
Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), filed before the Office of the Ombudsman a criminal
complaint against LWUA Administrator Prudencio M. Reyes, Jr. (petitioner) for violation of Section
3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
On March 16, 2000, or only 13 days after the filing of the graft charge, the petitioner issued Office
Order No. 69 reassigning respondents together with De Jesus from the offices they then held to the
Office of the Administrator. Supposedly, the reassigned officers were to act as a core group of a
LWUA Task Force and their specific assignments were to be given by petitioner; Officers-in-Charge
(OICs) were designated for the offices they vacated.
The following day, March 17, 2000a Friday, the OIC for Administration issued a directive to the
Magilas Security Agency to bar the respondents from using the rooms and facilities they occupied
prior to their reassignments.
On Monday, March 20, 2000, the petitioner, through Office Order No. 82, further directed the
respondents to vacate [their] offices and remove [their] personal belongings and transfer the same
to the former PROFUND Office which has been designated as the Office of the Special Task Force.
On March 24, 2000, Atty. Arnaldo M. Espinas, LWUA corporate legal counsel, sought the opinion of
the Civil Service Commission (CSC) regarding the regularity of the reassignments of respondents
and of De Jesus.
On March 30, 2000, the petitioner, via Office Order No. 99, directed the respondents to desist in
performing and exercising the functions and activities pertaining to [their] previous positions and
relieved them of their designations or assignments as 6th Member and interim Directors of the
Water Districts under their responsibility. To implement this latest Office Order, and in the
respondents absence, entry was effected into their respective rooms with the help of police officers;
their room locks were replaced with new ones; and their cabinet drawers were sealed with tapes.7
The CSC responded on April 3, 2000 through a legal opinion (CSC legal opinion) issued by Assistant
Commissioner Adelina B. Sarmiento. It categorically ruled that the reassignments were not in order,
tainted with bad faith, and constituted constructive dismissal.
ISSUE:
WON OMBS.HAS POWER OVER THE CASE. = NO


RULING:
By statute and regulation, a decision of the Ombudsman absolving the respondent of the
administrative charge is final and unappealable. Section 7, Rule III of the Ombudsman Rules
provides: SECTION 7. Finality of decision.Where the respondent is absolved of the charge, and in
case of conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not
more than one month, or a fine equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall be final and
unappealable. In all other cases, the decision shall become final after the expiration of ten (10) days
from receipt thereof by the respondent, unless a motion for reconsideration or petition for certiorari
shall have been filed by him (referring to the respondent) as prescribed in Section 27 of RA 6770.
This rule is based on Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (RA No. 6770) or the Ombudsman Act,
that in turn states: SECTION 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions.(1) All provisionary orders of
the Office of the Ombudsman are immediately effective and executory. x x x Findings of fact by the
Office of the Ombudsman when supported by substantial evidence are conclusive. Any order,
directive or decision imposing the penalty of public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more
than one months salary shall be final and unappealable. (emphasis supplied). Notably, exoneration
is not mentioned in Section 27 as final and unappealable. However, its inclusion is implicit for, as
we held in Barata v. Abalos (358 SCRA 575 [2001]), if a sentence of censure, reprimand and a one-
month suspension is considered final and unappealable, so should exoneration.

















G.R. No. 153809 July 27, 2011
ELOISA L. TOLENTINO, Petitioner,
vs.
ATTY. ROY M. LOYOLA, Municipal Mayor, DOMINGO C. FLORES, Municipal Budget Officer,
ALICIA L. OLIMPO, Municipal Treasurer, ANNALIZA L. BARABAT, Municipal Accountant,
AMADOR B. ALUNIA, Municipal Administrator, NENITA L. ERNACIO, Municipal Agriculturist,
AMELIA C. SAMSON, Human Resource Officer IV, EDWIN E. TOLENTINO, Community Affairs
Officer IV, DOMINGO R. TENEDERO and ROEL Z. MANARIN, Sangguniang Bayan (SB)
Members, All from Carmona, Cavite, Respondents.
FACTS:
On November 9, 1999, the petitioner filed a Complaint-Affidavit charging respondents with Violation
of Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019 otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, for
Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of Public Documents and, administratively, for
Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty, Gross Neglect of Duty, and Falsification of Official Documents.
The complaint averred that in a letter dated October 6, 1998, respondent Municipal Mayor Roy M.
Loyola requested the Sangguniang Bayan of Carmona, Cavite for the creation of twenty-four (24)
unappropriated positions for the inclusion in the 1998 Plantilla,
On November 23, 1998, the Sangguniang Bayan of Carmona, Cavite passed Municipal Resolution
No. 061-98 approving the creation of only 19 out of the 24 requested positions, under the different
offices of the Municipality of Carmona for inclusion in the 1998 Plantilla of Personnel.
The appointment papers of the aforesaid personnel were subsequently approved by the Civil Service
Commission.
Thereafter, respondents Budget Officer Domingo C. Flores, Municipal Treasurer Alicia L. Olimpo,
Municipal Accountant Annaliza L. Barabat, Municipal Agriculturist Nenita L. Ernacio and Municipal
Administrator Amador B. Alumia, allowed and caused the payment of salaries of the aforesaid
employees.
The petitioner further alleged that by the respondents concerted efforts to make it appear that the
inexistent positions were created, causing the unlawful payment of salaries to illegally appointed
employees, the respondents are liable for malversation of public funds thru falsification of public
documents. Likewise, the respondents are allegedly liable administratively for gross neglect of duty,
grave misconduct, dishonesty and falsification of official documents.
ISSUE:
WON OMBS.committed grave abuse of discretion or any reversible error in issuing its assailed
administrative decision, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, which would compel this Court to
overturn it. = NO.
RULING:
Elementary is the rule that the findings of fact of the Office of the Ombudsman are conclusive when
supported by substantial evidence and are accorded due respect and weight, especially when they
are affirmed by the Court of Appeals. It is only when there is grave abuse of discretion by the
Ombudsman that a review of factual findings may aptly be made. In reviewing administrative
decisions, it is beyond the province of this Court to weigh the conflicting evidence, determine the
credibility of witnesses, or otherwise substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency
with respect to the sufficiency of evidence. It is not the function of this Court to analyze and weigh
the parties evidence all over again except when there is serious ground to believe that a possible
miscarriage of justice would thereby result.
In sum, respondents could not be held administratively liable since their official actions starting
from the creation of positions to selection of personnel, appointment, and ultimately payment of
salaries were all in accordance with the law.
























G.R. No. 157584. April 2, 2009.*
CONGRESSMAN ENRIQUE T. GARCIA of the 2nd District of Bataan, petitioner, vs. THE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, CALTEX
PHILIPPINES, INC., PETRON CORPORATION, and PILIPINAS SHELL CORPORATION, respondents. [
FACTS:
After years of imposing significant controls over the downstream oil industry in the Philippines, the
government decided in March 1996 to pursue a policy of deregulation by enacting Republic Act No.
8180 (R.A. No. 8180) or the Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Act of 1996.
R.A. No. 8180, however, met strong opposition, and rightly so, as this Court concluded in its
November 5, 1997 decision in Tatad v. Secretary of Department of Energy.2 We struck down the law
as invalid because the three key provisions intended to promote free competition were shown to
achieve the opposite result; contrary to its intent, R.A. No. 8180s provisions on tariff differential,
inventory requirements, and predatory pricing inhibited fair competition, encouraged monopolistic
power, and interfered with the free interaction of market forces.
Notwithstanding the existence of a separability clause among its provisions, we struck down R.A.
No. 8180 in its entirety because its offensive provisions permeated the whole law and were the
principal tools to carry deregulation into effect.
Congress responded to our Decision in Tatad by enacting on February 10, 1998 a new oil
deregulation law, R.A. No. 8479. This time, Congress excluded the offensive provisions found in the
invalidated law. Nonetheless, petitioner Garcia again sought to declare the new oil deregulation law
unconstitutional on the ground that it violated Article XII, Section 19 of the Constitution.4 He
specifically objected to Section 19 of R.A. No. 8479 which, in essence, prescribed the period for
removal of price control on gasoline and other finished petroleum products and set the time for the
full deregulation of the local downstream oil industry.
ISSUE:
WON Section 19 of R.A. No. 8479 IS unconstitutional for contravening Section 19, Article XII of the
Constitution. = NO
RULING:
In asking the Court to declare Section 19 of R.A. No. 8479 as unconstitutional for contravening
Section 19, Article XII of the Constitution, petitioner Garcia invokes the exercise by this Court of its
power of judicial review, which power is expressly recognized under Section 4(2), Article VIII of the
Constitution. The power of judicial review is the power of the courts to test the validity of executive
and legislative acts for their conformity with the Constitution. Through such power, the judiciary
enforces and upholds the supremacy of the Constitution. For a court to exercise this power, certain
requirements must first be met, namely: (1) an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of
judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have standing to challenge; he must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct
injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the
earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the
case.
The petition fails to satisfy the very first of these requirementsthe existence of an actual case or
controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power. An actual case or controversy is one that
involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial
resolution; the case must not be moot or academic or based on extra-legal or other similar
considerations not cognizable by a court of justice. Stated otherwise, it is not the mere existence of
a conflict or controversy that will authorize the exercise by the courts of its power of review; more
importantly, the issue involved must be susceptible of judicial determination. Excluded from these
are questions of policy or wisdom, otherwise referred to as political questions: As Taada v. Cuenco,
103 Phil. 1051 (1958) puts it, political questions refer to those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of government.
Thus, if an issue is clearly identified by the text of the Constitution as matters for discretionary
action by a particular branch of government or to the people themselves then it is held to be a
political question. In the classic formulation of Justice Brennan in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,
[p]rominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack
of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding
without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the
impossibility of a courts undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect
due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a
political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious
pronouncements by various departments on the one question.

To summarize, we declare that the issues petitioner Garcia presented to this Court are non-
justiciable matters that preclude the Court from exercising its power of judicial review. The
immediate implementation of full deregulation of the local downstream oil industry is a policy
determination by Congress which this Court cannot overturn without offending the Constitution
and the principle of separation of powers. That the law failed in its objectives because its adoption
spawned the evils petitioner Garcia alludes to does not warrant its nullification. In the words of Mr.
Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing in the 1999 Garcia case, [a] calculus of fear and pessimism xxx
does not justify the remedy petitioner seeks: that we overturn a law enacted by Congress and
approved by the Chief Executive.
WHEREFORE, we hereby DISMISS the petition.








A.M. No. 10-1-13-SC. March 2, 2010.*
RE: SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM DATED JANUARY 11, 2010 OF ACTING DIRECTOR ALEU A.
AMANTE, PIAB-C, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN

Before us for consideration are the interrelated matters listed below.
a. The subpoena duces tecum (dated January 11, 2010 and received by this Court on January 18,
2010), issued by the Office of the Ombudsman on the Chief, Office of the Administrative Services or
AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE, Supreme Court, Manila, for the submission to the Office of the
Ombudsman of the latest Personal Data Sheets and last known forwarding address of former Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. and former Associate Justice Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez. The
subpoena duces tecum was issued in relation with criminal complaint under (b) below, pursuant to
Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution and Section 15 of Republic Act No. 6770. The Office of the
Administrative Services (OAS) referred the matter to us on January 21, 2010 with a request for
clearance to release the specified documents and information.
b. Copy of the criminal complaint entitled Oliver O. Lozano and Evangeline Lozano-Endriano v.
Hilario G. Davide, Jr., et al., OMB-C-C-09-0527-J, cited by the Ombudsman as basis for the the
subpoena duces tecum it issued. We secured a copy of this criminal complaint from the
Ombudsman to determine the legality and propriety of the subpoena duces tecum sought.
c. Order dated February 4, 2010 (which the Court received on February 9, 2010), signed by Acting
Director Maribeth Taytaon-Padios of the Office of the Ombudsman (with the approval of
Ombudsman Ma. Merceditas Navarro-Gutierrez), dismissing the Lozano complaint and referring it
to the Supreme Court for appropriate action. The order was premised on the Memorandum issued
on July 31, 2003 by Ombudsman Simeon Marcelo who directed that all complaints against judges
and other members of the Judiciary be immediately dismissed and referred to the Supreme Court
for appropriate action.
RULING:
In the appropriate case, the Office of the Ombudsman has full authority to issue subpoenas,
including subpoena duces tecum, for compulsory attendance of witnesses and the production of
documents and information relating to matters under its investigation. The grant of this authority,
however, is not unlimited, as the Ombudsman must necessarily observe and abide by the terms of
the Constitution and our laws, the Rules of Court and the applicable jurisprudence on the
issuance, service, validity and efficacy of subpoenas. Under the Rules of Court, the issuance of
subpoenas, including a subpoena duces tecum, operates under the requirements of reasonableness
and relevance. For the production of documents to be reasonable and for the documents themselves
to be relevant, the matter under inquiry should, in the first place, be one that the Ombudsman can
legitimately entertain, investigate and rule upon.
A first step in considering whether a criminal complaint (and its attendant compulsory processes) is
within the authority of the Ombudsman to entertain (and to issue), is to consider the nature of the
powers of the Supreme Court. This Court, by constitutional design, is supreme in its task of
adjudication; judicial power is vested solely in the Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may
be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts, not only to settle actual
controversies, but to determine whether grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction has been committed in any branch or instrumentality of government. As a rule, all
decisions and determinations in the exercise of judicial power ultimately go to and stop at the
Supreme Court whose judgment is final. This constitutional scheme cannot be thwarted or
subverted through a criminal complaint that, under the guise of imputing a misdeed to the Court
and its Members, seeks to revive and re-litigate matters that have long been laid to rest by the
Court. Effectively, such criminal complaint is a collateral attack on a judgment of this Court that,
by constitutional mandate, is final and already beyond question.
Consistent with the nature of the power of this Court under our constitutional scheme, only this
Courtnot the Ombudsmancan declare a Supreme Court judgment to be unjust.





RE: PETITION FOR A.M. No. 08-2-01-0
RECOGNITION OF THE
EXEMPTION OF THE Present:
GOVERNMENT SERVICE
INSURANCE SYSTEM FROM PUNO, C.J.,
PAYMENT OF LEGAL FEES. CARPIO,
CORONA,
GOVERNMENT SERVICE CARPIO MORALES,
INSURANCE SYSTEM, VELASCO, JR.,
Petitioner. NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ and
MENDOZA, JJ.

Promulgated:

February 11, 2010

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x


R E S O L U T I O N
CORONA, J.:

May the legislature exempt the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) from legal fees
imposed by the Court on government-owned and controlled corporations and local government
units? This is the central issue in this administrative matter.
The GSIS seeks exemption from the payment of legal fees imposed on government-owned or
controlled corporations under Section 22,[1] Rule 141 (Legal Fees) of the Rules of Court. The said
provision states:

SEC. 22. Government exempt. The Republic of the Philippines, its agencies
and instrumentalities are exempt from paying the legal fees provided in this Rule.
Local government corporations and government-owned or controlled corporations
with or without independent charter are not exempt from paying such fees.

However, all court actions, criminal or civil, instituted at the instance of the
provincial, city or municipal treasurer or assessor under Sec. 280 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 shall be exempt from the payment of court and sheriffs
fees. (emphasis supplied)


The GSIS anchors its petition on Section 39 of its charter, RA[2] 8291 (The GSIS Act of 1997):

SEC. 39. Exemption from Tax, Legal Process and Lien. It is hereby declared to
be the policy of the State that the actuarial solvency of the funds of the GSIS shall be
preserved and maintained at all times and that contribution rates necessary to sustain
the benefits under this Act shall be kept as low as possible in order not to burden the
members of the GSIS and their employers. Taxes imposed on the GSIS tend to
impair the actuarial solvency of its funds and increase the contribution rate
necessary to sustain the benefits of this Act. Accordingly, notwithstanding any
laws to the contrary, the GSIS, its assets, revenues including accruals thereto, and
benefits paid, shall be exempt from all taxes, assessments, fees, charges or
duties of all kinds. These exemptions shall continue unless expressly and specifically
revoked and any assessment against the GSIS as of the approval of this Act are
hereby considered paid.Consequently, all laws, ordinances, regulations, issuances,
opinions or jurisprudence contrary to or in derogation of this provision are
hereby deemed repealed, superseded and rendered ineffective and without legal
force and effect.

Moreover, these exemptions shall not be affected by subsequent laws to the
contrary unless this section is expressly, specifically and categorically revoked or
repealed by law and a provision is enacted to substitute or replace the exemption
referred to herein as an essential factor to maintain and protect the solvency of the
fund, notwithstanding and independently of the guaranty of the national government
to secure such solvency or liability.

The funds and/or the properties referred to herein as well as the benefits, sums
or monies corresponding to the benefits under this Act shall be exempt from
attachment, garnishment, execution, levy or other processes issued by the courts,
quasi-judicial agencies or administrative bodies including Commission on Audit (COA)
disallowances and from all financial obligations of the members, including his
pecuniary accountability arising from or caused or occasioned by his exercise or
performance of his official functions or duties, or incurred relative to or in connection
with his position or work except when his monetary liability, contractual or otherwise,
is in favour of the GSIS. (emphasis supplied)


The GSIS then avers that courts still assess and collect legal fees in actions and proceedings
instituted by the GSIS notwithstanding its exemption from taxes, assessments, fees, charges, or
duties of all kinds under Section 39. For this reason, the GSIS urges this Court to recognize its
exemption from payment of legal fees.

According to the GSIS, the purpose of its exemption is to preserve and maintain the actuarial
solvency of its funds and to keep the contribution rates necessary to sustain the benefits provided
by RA 8291 as low as possible. Like the terms taxes, assessments, charges, and duties, the
term fees is used in the law in its generic and ordinary sense as any form of government
imposition. The word fees, defined as charge[s] fixed by law for services of public officers or for
the use of a privilege under control of government, is qualified by the phrase of all kinds.[3]
Hence, it includes the legal fees prescribed by this Court under Rule 141. Moreover, no distinction
should be made based on the kind of fees imposed on the GSIS or the GSIS ability to pay because
the law itself does not distinguish based on those matters.

The GSIS argues that its exemption from the payment of legal fees would not mean that RA
8291 is superior to the Rules of Court. It would merely show deference by the Court to the
legislature as a co-equal branch.[4] This deference will recognize the compelling and overriding
State interest in the preservation of the actuarial solvency of the GSIS for the benefit of its
members.[5]

The GSIS further contends that the right of government workers to social security is an
aspect of social justice. The right to social security is also guaranteed under Article 22 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 9 of the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights. The Court has the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection
and enforcement of constitutional rights, including the right to social security, but the GSIS is not
compelling the Court to promulgate such rules. The GSIS is merely asking the Court to recognize
and allow the exercise of the right of the GSIS to seek relief from the courts of justice sans payment
of legal fees.[6]

Required to comment on the GSIS petition,[7] the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
maintains that the petition should be denied.[8] According to the OSG, the issue of the GSIS
exemption from legal fees has been resolved by the issuance by then Court Administrator Presbitero
J. Velasco, Jr.[9] of OCA[10] Circular No. 93-2004:

TO : ALL JUDGES, CLERKS OF COURT AND COURT PERSONNEL OF
THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL
COURTS IN CITIES, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL
CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS, SHARIA CIRCUIT COURTS

SUBJECT : REMINDER ON THE STRICT OBSERVANCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE
CIRCULAR NO. 3-98 (Re: Payment of Docket and Filing Fees in
Extra-Judicial Foreclosure); SECTION 21, RULE 141 OF THE
RULES OF COURT; SECTION 3 OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO.
385; and ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 07-99 (Re: Exercise of
Utmost Caution, Prudence, and Judiciousness in Issuance of
Temporary Restraining Orders and Writs of Preliminary Injunctions)

Pursuant to the Resolution of the Third Division of the Supreme Court dated
05 April 2004 and to give notice to the concern raised by the [GSIS] to expedite
extrajudicial foreclosure cases filed in court, we wish to remind all concerned [of] the
pertinent provisions of Administrative Circular No. 3-98, to wit:

2. No written request/petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgages,
real or chattel, shall be acted upon by the Clerk of Court, as Ex-Officio
Sheriff, without the corresponding filing fee having been paid and the
receipt thereof attached to the request/petition as provided for in Sec.
7(c), of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court.

3. No certificate of sale shall be issued in favor of the highest bidder until
all fees provided for in the aforementioned sections and paragraph 3 of
Section 9 (I) of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court shall have been paid.The
sheriff shall attach to the records of the case a certified copy of the
Official Receipt [O.R.] of the payment of the fees and shall note the O.R.
number in the duplicate of the Certificate of Sale attached to the records
of the case.

Moreover, to settle any queries as to the status of exemption from payment of
docket and legal fees of government entities, Section 21, Rule 141 of the Rules of
Court explicitly provides:

SEC. 21. Government exempt. The Republic of the Philippines,
its agencies and instrumentalities are exempt from paying the legal fees
provided in this Rule. Local governments and government-owned or
controlled corporations with or without independent charters are
not exempt from paying such fees.[11]
x x x x x x x x x


The OSG contends that there is nothing in Section 39 of RA 8291 that exempts the GSIS
from fees imposed by the Court in connection with judicial proceedings. The exemption of the GSIS
from taxes, assessments, fees, charges or duties of all kinds is necessarily confined to those that
do not involve pleading, practice and procedure. Rule 141 has been promulgated by the Court
pursuant to its exclusive rule-making power under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution.
Thus, it may not be amended or repealed by Congress.

On this Courts order,[12] the Office of the Chief Attorney (OCAT) submitted a report and
recommendation[13] on the petition of the GSIS and the comment of the OSG thereon. According to
the OCAT, the claim of the GSIS for exemption from the payment of legal fees has no legal basis.
Read in its proper and full context, Section 39 intends to preserve the actuarial solvency of GSIS
funds by exempting the GSIS from government impositions through taxes. Legal fees imposed under
Rule 141 are not taxes.

The OCAT further posits that the GSIS could not have been exempted by Congress from the
payment of legal fees. Otherwise, Congress would have encroached on the rule-making power of this
Court.

According to the OCAT, this is the second time that the GSIS is seeking exemption from
paying legal fees.[14] The OCAT also points out that there are other government-owned or controlled
corporations and local government units which asked for exemption from paying legal fees citing
provisions in their respective charters that are similar to Section 39 of RA 8291.[15] Thus, the
OCAT recommends that the petition of GSIS be denied and the issue be settled once and for all for
the guidance of the concerned parties.
Faced with the differing opinions of the GSIS, the OSG and the OCAT, we now proceed to
probe into the heart of this matter: may Congress exempt the GSIS from the payment of legal fees?
No.

The GSIS urges the Court to show deference to Congress by recognizing the exemption of the
GSIS under Section 39 of RA 8291 from legal fees imposed under Rule 141. Effectively, the GSIS
wants this Court to recognize a power of Congress to repeal, amend or modify a rule of procedure
promulgated by the Court. However, the Constitution and jurisprudence do not sanction such view.

Rule 141 (on Legal Fees) of the Rules of Court was promulgated by this Court in the exercise
of its rule-making powers under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution:

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
x x x x x x x x x
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts,
the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal
assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified
and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish,
increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special
courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless
disapproved by the Supreme Court.
x x x x x x x x x (emphasis supplied)
The power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts is a
traditional power of this Court.[16] It necessarily includes the power to address all questions arising
from or connected to the implementation of the said rules.

The Rules of Court was promulgated in the exercise of the Courts rule-making power. It is
essentially procedural in nature as it does not create, diminish, increase or modify substantive
rights. Corollarily, Rule 141 is basically procedural. It does not create or take away a right but
simply operates as a means to implement an existing right. In particular, it functions to regulate the
procedure of exercising a right of action and enforcing a cause of action.[17] In particular, it
pertains to the procedural requirement of paying the prescribed legal fees in the filing of a pleading
or any application that initiates an action or proceeding.[18]

Clearly, therefore, the payment of legal fees under Rule 141 of the Rules of Court is an
integral part of the rules promulgated by this Court pursuant to its rule-making power under
Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution. In particular, it is part of the rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedure in courts. Indeed, payment of legal (or docket) fees is a jurisdictional
requirement.[19] It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading but the
payment of the prescribed docket fee that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject-
matter or nature of the action.[20] Appellate docket and other lawful fees are required to be paid
within the same period for taking an appeal.[21] Payment of docket fees in full within the prescribed
period is mandatory for the perfection of an appeal.[22] Without such payment, the appellate court
does not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action and the decision sought to be
appealed from becomes final and executory.[23]

An interesting aspect of legal fees is that which relates to indigent or pauper litigants. In
proper cases, courts may waive the collection of legal fees. This, the Court has allowed in Section
21, Rule 3 and Section 19, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court in recognition of the right of access to
justice by the poor under Section 11, Article III of the Constitution.[24] Mindful that the rule with
respect to indigent litigants should not be ironclad as it touches on the right of access to justice by
the poor,[25] the Court acknowledged the exemption from legal fees of indigent clients of the Public
Attorneys Office under Section 16-D of the Administrative Code of 1987, as amended by RA
9406.[26] This was not an abdication by the Court of its rule-making power but simply a
recognition of the limits of that power. In particular, it reflected a keen awareness that, in the
exercise of its rule-making power, the Court may not dilute or defeat the right of access to justice of
indigent litigants.

The GSIS cannot successfully invoke the right to social security of government employees in
support of its petition. It is a corporate entity whose personality is separate and distinct from that of
its individual members. The rights of its members are not its rights; its rights, powers and functions
pertain to it solely and are not shared by its members. Its capacity to sue and bring actions under
Section 41(g) of RA 8291, the specific power which involves the exemption that it claims in this
case, pertains to it and not to its members. Indeed, even the GSIS acknowledges that, in claiming
exemption from the payment of legal fees, it is not asking that rules be made to enforce the right to
social security of its members but that the Court recognize the alleged right of the GSIS to seek
relief from the courts of justice sans payment of legal fees.[27]

However, the alleged right of the GSIS does not exist. The payment of legal fees does not take
away the capacity of the GSIS to sue. It simply operates as a means by which that capacity may be
implemented.

Since the payment of legal fees is a vital component of the rules promulgated by this Court
concerning pleading, practice and procedure, it cannot be validly annulled, changed or modified by
Congress. As one of the safeguards of this Courts institutional independence, the power to
promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now the Courts exclusive domain. That
power is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, much less with the Executive.[28]

Speaking for the Court, then Associate Justice (now Chief Justice) Reynato S. Puno traced
the history of the rule-making power of this Court and highlighted its evolution and development in
Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice:[29]


Under the 1935 Constitution, the power of this Court to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure was granted but it appeared to be co-
existent with legislative power for it was subject to the power of Congress to repeal,
alter or supplement. Thus, its Section 13, Article VIII provides:

Sec. 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate
rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the
admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all
courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice and
procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of
Court, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify
the same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter or
supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and
the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.

The said power of Congress, however, is not as absolute as it may appear on
its surface. In In re Cunanan, Congress in the exercise of its power to amend rules of
the Supreme Court regarding admission to the practice of law, enacted the Bar
Flunkers Act of 1953 which considered as a passing grade, the average of 70% in the
bar examinations after July 4, 1946 up to August 1951 and 71% in the 1952 bar
examinations. This Court struck down the law as unconstitutional. In his
ponencia, Mr. Justice Diokno held that "x x x the disputed law is not a legislation; it
is a judgment - a judgment promulgated by this Court during the aforecited years
affecting the bar candidates concerned; and although this Court certainly can revoke
these judgments even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no less certain that only this
Court, and not the legislative nor executive department, that may do so. Any attempt
on the part of these departments would be a clear usurpation of its function, as is the
case with the law in question." The venerable jurist further ruled: "It is obvious,
therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs
exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of
permissive character, or as other authorities say, merely to fix the minimum
conditions for the license." By its ruling, this Court qualified the absolutist tone of
the power of Congress to "repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.

The ruling of this Court in In re Cunanan was not changed by the 1973
Constitution. For the 1973 Constitution reiterated the power of this Court "to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, x x x
which, however, may be repealed, altered or supplemented by the Batasang
Pambansa x x x." More completely, Section 5(2)5 of its Article X provided:

x x x x x x x x x



Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers.
x x x x x x x x x
(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, and
the integration of the Bar, which, however, may be repealed,
altered, or supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa. Such
rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for
the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of
the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights.

Well worth noting is that the 1973 Constitution further strengthened the
independence of the judiciary by giving to it the additional power to promulgate
rules governing the integration of the Bar.

The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more independent
judiciary. Among others, it enhanced the rule making power of this Court. Its
Section 5(5), Article VIII provides:
x x x x x x x x x
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
x x x x x x x x x
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such
rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for
the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of
the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and
quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless
disapproved by the Supreme Court.

The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first
time was given the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was also granted for the first time
the power to disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial
bodies. But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power of
Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure
is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so with the Executive.


The separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of our government has erected
an impregnable wall that keeps the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure
within the sole province of this Court. The other branches trespass upon this prerogative if they
enact laws or issue orders that effectively repeal, alter or modify any of the procedural rules
promulgated by this Court. Viewed from this perspective, the claim of a legislative grant of
exemption from the payment of legal fees under Section 39 of RA 8291 necessarily fails.

Congress could not have carved out an exemption for the GSIS from the payment of legal fees
without transgressing another equally important institutional safeguard of the Courts
independence fiscal autonomy.[30] Fiscal autonomy recognizes the power and authority of the
Court to levy, assess and collect fees,[31] including legal fees. Moreover, legal fees under Rule 141
have two basic components, the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) and the Special Allowance for
the Judiciary Fund (SAJF).[32] The laws which established the JDF and the SAJF[33] expressly
declare the identical purpose of these funds to guarantee the independence of the Judiciary as
mandated by the Constitution and public policy.[34] Legal fees therefore do not only constitute a
vital source of the Courts financial resources but also comprise an essential element of the Courts
fiscal independence. Any exemption from the payment of legal fees granted by Congress to
government-owned or controlled corporations and local government units will necessarily reduce
the JDF and the SAJF. Undoubtedly, such situation is constitutionally infirm for it impairs the
Courts guaranteed fiscal autonomy and erodes its independence.

WHEREFORE, the petition of the Government Service Insurance System for recognition of its
exemption from the payment of legal fees imposed under Section 22 of Rule 141 of the Rules of
Court on government-owned or controlled corporations and local government units is hereby
DENIED.

The Office of the Court Administrator is hereby directed to promptly issue a circular to
inform all courts in the Philippines of the import of this resolution.





Case Digest: ROLEX SUPLICO, Petitioner, vs NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY, represented by NEDA SECRETARY ROMULO L. NERI, and the NEDA-INV
Case Digest:
On April 18, 2008, the OSG filed respondents reply, reiterating their position that for a court to
exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual case or controversy one which
involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims
susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or
academic or based on extra-legal or other similar considerations
not cognizable by a court of justice.

Contrary to petitioners contentions that these declarations made
by officials belonging to the executive branch on the Philippine
Governments decision not to continue with the ZTE-NBN Project
are self-serving, hence, inadmissible, the Court has no alternative
but to take judicial notice of this official act of the President
of the Philippines.

Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 1. Judicial Notice, when mandatory. A court shall take
judicial notice, without introduction of evidence, of the existence
and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms
of government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations,
the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals,
the political constitution and history of the Philippines,
the official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial
departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measureof time, and the geographical
divisions.


It is further provided in the above-quoted rule that the court shall take judicial notice of the
foregoing facts without introduction of evidence. Since we consider the act of cancellation by
President Macapagal-Arroyo of the proposed ZTE-NBN Project during the meeting of October 2,
2007 with the Chinese President in China as an official act of the executive department, the Court
must take judicial notice of such official act without need of evidence.


Judicial power presupposes actual controversies, the very antithesis of mootness. In the
absence of actualjusticiable controversies or disputes, the Court generally Bopts to refrain
from deciding moot issues. Where there is no more live subject of controversy, the Court
ceases to have a reason to render any ruling or make any pronouncement.

The rule is well-settled that for a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be
an actual case or controversy one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of
opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or
academic or based on extra-legal or other similar Nconsiderations not cognizable by a court
of justice. Where the issue has become moot and academic, there is no justiciable
controversy, and an adjudication thereon would be of no practical use or value as
courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest,
however intellectually challenging.

Let it be clarified that the Senate investigation in aid of legislation cannot be the basis of Our
decision which requires a judicial finding of facts.
Randolf David et al vs Gloria Arroyo
Proclamation 1017 Take Care Clause Take Over Power Calling Out Power
&
Niez Cacho-Olivares vs Exec Sec Ermita
-Freedom of Speech Overbreadth
In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members and the discovery of a plan (Oplan
Hackle I) to assassinate GMA she declared PP 1017 and is to be implemented by GO 5. The said law
was aimed to suppress lawlessness and the connivance of extremists to bring down the government.
Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled all plans to celebrate EDSA I and at the same time revoked all
permits issued for rallies and other public organization/meeting. Notwithstanding the cancellation
of their rally permit, KMU head Randolf David proceeded to rally which led to his arrest. Later that
day, the Daily Tribune, which Cacho-Olivares is the editor, was raided by the CIDG and they seized
and confiscated anti-GMA articles and write ups. Later still, another known anti-GMA news agency
(Malaya) was raided and seized. On the same day, Beltran of Anakpawis, was also arrested. His
arrest was however grounded on a warrant of arrest issued way back in 1985 for his actions against
Marcos. His supporters cannot visit him in jail because of the current imposition of PP 1017 and
GO 5. In March, GMA issued PP 1021 w/c declared that the state of national emergency ceased to
exist. David and some opposition Congressmen averred that PP1017 is unconstitutional for it has
no factual basis and it cannot be validly declared by the president for such power is reposed in
Congress. Also such declaration is actually a declaration of martial law. Olivares-Cacho also
averred that the emergency contemplated in the Constitution are those of natural calamities and
that such is an overbreadth. Petitioners claim that PP 1017 is an overbreadth because it encroaches
upon protected and unprotected rights. The Sol-Gen argued that the issue has become moot and
academic by reason of the lifting of PP 1017 by virtue of the declaration of PP 1021. The Sol-Gen
averred that PP 1017 is within the presidents calling out power, take care power and take over
power.
ISSUE: Whether or not PP 1017 and GO 5 is constitutional.
HELD: The issue cannot be considered as moot and academic by reason of the lifting of the
questioned PP. It is still in fact operative because there are parties still affected due to the alleged
violation of the said PP. Hence, the SC can take cognition of the case at bar. The SC ruled that PP
1017 is constitutional in part and at the same time some provisions of which are unconstitutional.
The SC ruled in the following way;
Resolution by the SC on the Factual Basis of its declaration
The petitioners were not able to prove that GMA has factual basis in issuing PP 1017 and GO 5. A
reading of the Solicitor Generals Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows a detailed
narration of the events leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with supporting reports forming part of
the records. Mentioned are the escape of the Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of the Magdalo
D-Day, the defections in the military, particularly in the Philippine Marines, and the reproving
statements from the communist leaders. There was also the Minutes of the Intelligence Report and
Security Group of the Philippine Army showing the growing alliance between the NPA and the
military. Petitioners presented nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent any contrary
allegations, the Court is convinced that the President was justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for
military aid. Indeed, judging the seriousness of the incidents, GMA was not expected to simply fold
her arms and do nothing to prevent or suppress what she believed was lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. However, the exercise of such power or duty must not stifle liberty.
Resolution by the SC on the Overbreadth Theory
First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing on their
faces statutes in free speech cases. The 7 consolidated cases at bar are not primarily freedom of
speech cases. Also, a plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily directed to speech or
even speech-related conduct. It is actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of
lawless violence. Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a law
that reflects legitimate state interest in maintaining comprehensive control over harmful,
constitutionally unprotected conduct. Undoubtedly, lawless violence, insurrection and rebellion are
considered harmful and constitutionally unprotected conduct. Thus, claims of facial overbreadth
are entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken
words and again, that overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked
against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct. Here, the
incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free speech,
which is manifestly subject to state regulation.
Resolution by the SC on the Calling Out Power Doctrine
On the basis of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution, GMA declared PP 1017. The SC considered the
Presidents calling-out power as a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom, it stressed that
this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible
constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion.
The SC ruled that GMA has validly declared PP 1017 for the Constitution grants the President, as
Commander-in-Chief, a sequence of graduated powers. From the most to the least benign, these
are: the calling-out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the
power to declare Martial Law. The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that
whenever it becomes necessary, the President may call the armed forces to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. And such criterion has been met.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Care Doctrine
Pursuant to the 2
nd
sentence of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution (He shall ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed.) the president declared PP 1017. David et al averred that PP 1017 however
violated Sec 1, Art 6 of the Constitution for it arrogated legislative power to the President. Such
power is vested in Congress. They assail the clause to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all
decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction. The SC noted
that such provision is similar to the power that granted former President Marcos legislative powers
(as provided in PP 1081). The SC ruled that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it
grants GMA the authority to promulgate decrees. Legislative power is peculiarly within the
province of the Legislature. Sec 1, Article 6 categorically states that [t]he legislative power shall be
vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives. To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency
can justify GMA[s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees. The president can only take
care of the carrying out of laws but cannot create or enact laws.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Over Power Doctrine
The president cannot validly order the taking over of private corporations or institutions such as the
Daily Tribune without any authority from Congress. On the other hand, the word emergency
contemplated in the constitution is not limited to natural calamities but rather it also includes
rebellion. The SC made a distinction; the president can declare the state of national emergency but
her exercise of emergency powers does not come automatically after it for such exercise needs
authority from Congress. The authority from Congress must be based on the following:
1 There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress.
Resolution by the SC on the Issue that PP 1017 is a Martial Law Declaration
The SC ruled that PP 1017 is not a Martial Law declaration and is not tantamount to it. It is a valid
exercise of the calling out power of the president by the president.























[G.R No. 164987: April 24, 2012]
LAWYERS AGAINST MONOPOLY AND POVERTY (LAMP), REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRMAN AND
COUNSEL, CEFERINO PADUA, MEMBERS, ALBERTO ABELADA, JR. ELEAZAR ANGELES,
GREGELY FULTON ACOSTA, VICTOR AVECILLA, GALILEO BRION, ANATALIA BUENAVENTURA,
EFREN CARAG, PEDRO CASTILLO, NAPOLEON CORONADO, ROMEO ECHAUZ, ALFREDO DE
GUZMAN, ROGELIO KARAGDAG, JR. MARIA LUZ ARZAGA-MENDOZA, LEO LUIS MENDOZA,
ANTONIO P. PAREDES, AQUILINO PIMENTEL III, MARIO REYES, EMMANUEL SANTOS, TERESITA
SANTOS, RUDEGELIO TACORDA, SECRETARY GEN. ROLANDO ARZAGA, BORAD OF
CONSULTANTS, JUSTICE ABRAHAM SARMIENTO, SEN. AQUILINO PIMENTEL, JR., AND
BARTOLOME FERNANDEZ, JR., PETITIONERS, VS. THE SECRETARY OF THE COMMISSION ON
AUDIT, AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE AND THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES IN REPRESENTATION OF THE MEMBERS OF THE CONGRESS,
RESPONDENTS.

Petitioners assail the constitutionality and legality of the implementation of the PDAF as provided in
GAA of 2004 RA 9206 for violating the known principle of separation of powers among the branches
of the government by contending as follows:
1.the law is silent as to the allocation of lump sum to individual members of the congress and
therefor, the void of constitutional powers to allocate among themselves to propose, select and,
identify programs and projects to be funded out of PDAF.
2. the authority to propose and select projects does not pertain to legislation.
In preliminary, the Supreme Court touches on the requisites for judicial settlement of issue as
follow:
1. Actual case or controversy - involves uncertain contingent future events that may occur as
anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all. Another concern is the evaluation of the twofold aspect
of ripeness.
2.Locus standi - that the person who impugns the validity of a statue must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustained, direct injury as a
result of its enforcement.
3. the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity.
4. the issue of constitutionality must be very lis mota of the case.
Court Ruling
1. there exist an actual case or controversy on the case at bar, undeniably, as taxpayers, LAMP
would somehow be adversely affected by misapplication of public funds.
2. Locus Standi - As taxpayers.
3. the court dismissed the petition for failure on the part of the petitioner to substantiate their
allegation. the court rely on the principle that laws are presumed constitutional unless otherwise
declared "to doubt is to sustained".







G.R. No. 178624. June 30, 2009.*
JOSE CONCEPCION, JR., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

The petition cites and quotes the assailed rulings, then recites that on January 5, 2007, the
National Citizens Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL) filed a Petition for Accreditation to
Conduct the Operation Quick Count with the COMELEC, docketed as SSP No. 07-001.3 The
present petitionerthen the incumbent Punong Barangay of Barangay Forbes Park, Makati City
was one of the signatories of the NAMFREL petition in his capacity as the National Chairman of
NAMFREL.
On the same date, COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 77984 (Resolution 7798) that reads in
full
WHEREAS, Section 3 of Executive Order [EO] No. 94 dated March 2, 1987, provides as follows:
Sec. 3. Prohibition on barangay officials.No barangay official shall be appointed as member of
the Board of Election Inspectors or as official watcher of each duly registered major political party or
any socio-civic, religious, professional or any similar organization of which they may be members.
WHEREAS, the barangay is the smallest political unit of government and it is a widely accepted fact
that barangay officials wield tremendous influence on their constituents or the residents in the
barangay;
WHEREAS, the Boards of Election Inspectors [BEIs] are charged with the duty of maintaining the
regularity and orderliness of the election proceedings in each precinct to the end that elections will
be honest, orderly, peaceful and credible:
WHEREAS, records of past political exercises show that on election day, the Commission on
Elections usually receive numerous complaints against barangay officials entering polling places
and interfering in proceedings of the BEIs thereby causing not only delay in the proceedings, but
also political tension among the BEIs, the voters and the watchers in the polling place;
NOW THEREFORE, to insure that elections are peaceful, orderly, regular and credible, the
Commission on Elections, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution, the Omnibus
Election Code [OEC], EO No. 94, and other election laws RESOLVED to prohibit, as it hereby
RESOLVES to prohibit:
1. The appointment of barangay officials which includes the Punong Barangay, Barangay
Kagawad, Barangay Secretary, Barangay Treasurer, and Barangay Tanod, as Chairman/person
and/or Member of the BEIs or as official watcher of any candidate, duly registered major political
party, or any similar organization, or any socio-civic, religious, professional [sic], in the May 14,
2007 National and Local Elections. The prohibition extends to barangay officials, employees and
tanods, who are members of accredited citizens arms.
2. The barangay officials, employees and tanods from staying inside any polling place, except to
cast their vote. Accordingly, they should leave the polling place immediately after casting their vote.

This Resolution shall take effect on the seventh day after the publication in two (2) newspapers of
general circulation in the Philippines.
The Education and Information Department shall cause the publication of this Resolution in two (2)
daily newspapers of general circulation and shall furnish copies thereof to all field officers of the
Commission and the Department of Interior and Local Government, other deputies and heads of
accredited political parties.
SO ORDERED. [Emphasis supplied.]

The COMELEC ruled on NAMFRELs petition for accreditation on April 2, 2007 in the assailed
Resolution (April 2, 2007 Resolution), conditionally granting NAMFRELs petition in the following
tenor:
Having already discussed above the reasons, both factual and legal, for the dismissal of the
Verified Opposition, we find the instant petition for accreditation as the citizens arm of the
petitioner NAMFREL meritorious. Pursuant to Section 2(5), Article IX (C) of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution and Section 52(k) of the Omnibus Election Code, as amended, this Commission en
banc hereby resolves to accredit petitioner NAMFREL as its citizens arm in the 14 May 2007
national and local elections, subject to its direct and immediate control and supervision.
There is, however, one important condition that must be fulfilled by the petitioner before its
accreditation as citizens arm could legally take effect. Accordingly, Mr. Jose S. Concepcion, Jr., the
National Chairman of NAMFREL, must first be removed both as a member and overall Chairman of
said organization. As correctly pointed out by the oppositor, Mr. Concepcion, being the Barangay
Chairman of Barangay Forbes Park, Makati City, cannot be a member much more the overall
chairman of the citizens arm such as NAMFREL. This is explicitly provided for in COMELEC
Resolution No. 7798 promulgated on 5 January 2007, pertinent of which we quote:
WHEREAS, Section 3 of Executive Order No. 94 dated March 2, 1987 provides as follows:
Sec. 3. Prohibition on Barangay officials.No barangay official shall be appointed as member of
the Board of Election Inspectors or as watcher of each duly registered major political party or any
socio-civic, religious, professional or any similar organization of which they may be members.
xxx xxx xxx
NOW THEREFORE, to insure that the elections are peaceful, orderly, regular and credible, the
Commission on Elections, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution, the OEC, EO No.
94, and other election laws, RESOLVED to prohibit, as it is hereby RESOLVES to prohibit:
1. The appointment of barangay officials which include the Punong Barangay, Kagawad, Barangay
Secretary, Barangay Treasurer, and Barangay Tanod, as Chairman / person and/or Members of the
BEIs or as official watcher of any candidate, duly registered major political party, or any similar
organization, or any socio-civic, religious, professional, in the May 14, 2007 National and Local
Elections. The prohibition extends to the barangay officials, employees and tanods, who are
members of the accredited citizens arms.
x x x x

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Commission en banc RESOLVED as it hereby RESOLVES,
to grant the instant petition for accreditation finding it imbued with merit.
x x x x
The ACCREDITATION herein GRANTED is further SUBJECT TO THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS:
1. The petitioner is hereby enjoined and encouraged by the Commission to re-organize in
accordance with its own internal rules and procedures as an independent organization, and to
submit before election day a list of its responsible officers and members, deleting therefrom the
names of any previous officer or member similarly situated with Mr. Jose S. Concepcion, Jr. who
are disqualified to be part of the citizens arm in view of the passage of COMELEC Resolution No.
7798 on 5 January 2007;
x x x x
9. This accreditation shall be deemed automatically revoked in case petitioner violates any of the
provisions and conditions set forth herein. [Italics supplied.]
Soon thereafter, NAMFREL filed a Manifestation and Request for Re-Examination that: (1)
contains information regarding NAMFRELs reorganization and its new set of officers showing that
the petitioner had stepped down as National Chair and had been replaced by a new Chair; (2)
manifests NAMFRELs acceptance of the conditional grant of its petition for accreditation; and (3)
includes NAMFRELs request for a re-examination without further arguments of the April 2, 2007
Resolution as it specifically affected the petitioners membership with NAMFREL. In this
Manifestation and Request for Re-examination, NAMFREL outlined its various objections and
concerns on the legality or validity of Resolution 7798.
The COMELEC, in its Order of May 8, 2007, noted the information relating to NAMFRELs current
officers, and denied the request to examine its (COMELECs) interpretation of the April 2, 2007
Resolution prohibiting petitioners direct participation as member and National Chairman of
NAMFREL. The COMELEC reasoned out that the April 2, 2007 Resolution is clear, and NAMFREL
had not presented any convincing argument to warrant the requested examination.
NAMFREL did not question the COMELECs ruling.

RULING:
The above features of the petition render it fatally defective. The first defect lies in the petitioners
personality to file a petition for certiorari to address an adjudicatory resolution of the COMELEC in
which he was not a party to, and where the direct party, NAMFREL, does not even question the
assailed resolution. It would have been another matter if NAMFREL had filed the present petition
with the petitioner as intervenor because of his personal interest in the COMELEC ruling. He could
have intervened, too, before the COMELEC as an affected party in NAMFRELs Manifestation and
Request for Examination. As a last recourse, the petitioner could have expressly stated before this
Court the procedural problems he faced and asked that we suspend the rules based on the unusual
circumstances he could have pointed out. None of these actions, however, took place. Instead, the
petitioner simply questioned the COMELECs April 2, 2007 Resolution without explaining to this
Court his reason for using Rule 65 as his medium, and from there, proceeded to attack the validity
of COMELEC Resolution 7798. Under these questionable circumstances, we cannot now recognize
the petitioner as a party-in-interest who can directly assail the COMELECs April 2, 2007
Resolution in an original Rule 65 petition before this Court.
The requirement of personality or interest is sanctioned no less by Section 7, Article IX of the
Constitution which provides that a decision, order, or ruling of a constitutional commission may be
brought to this Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy
thereof. This requirement is repeated in Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which applies to
petitions for certiorari under Rule 64 of decisions, orders or rulings of the constitutional
commissions pursuant to Section 2, Rule 64. Section 1, Rule 65 essentially provides that a person
aggrieved by any act of a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions
rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction may file a petition for certiorari.




















JELBERT B. GALICTO vs H.E. PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III
G.R. No. 193978
February 28, 2012

FACTS:
On September 8, 2010, issued EO 7 which provided for the guiding principles and framework
to establish a fixed compensation and position classification system for GOCCs and GFIs. EO 7
ordered (1) a moratorium on the increases in the salaries and other forms of compensation, except
salary adjustments under EO 8011 and EO 900, of all GOCC and GFI employees for an indefinite
period to be set by the President, and (2) a suspension of all allowances, bonuses and incentives of
members of the Board of Directors/Trustees until December 31, 2010. Jelbert Galicto claims that
as a PhilHealth employee, he is affected by the implementation of EO 7, which was issued with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, as it is null and void for lack
of legal basis. He asserts that EO7 is unconstitutional for having been issued beyond the powers of
the President. It is contended, however, that the President exercises control over the governing
boards of the GOCCs and GFIs; thus, he can fix their compensation packages in order to control the
grant of excessive salaries, allowances, incentives, etc. Hence, he filed this Petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition with Application for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining
Order, seeking to nullify and enjoin the implementation of EO7.

ISSUE: Was certiorari a proper remedy?

HELD:
No. Under the Rules of Court, petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition are availed of to
question judicial, quasi-judicial and mandatory acts. Since the issuance of an EO is not judicial,
quasi-judicial or a mandatory act, a petition for certiorari and prohibition is an incorrect remedy;
instead a petition for declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, filed with the RTC, is
the proper recourse to assail the validity of EO 7: Section 1.Who may file petition. Any person
interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, whose rights are affected by
a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation may,
before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to
determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or
duties, thereunder.






















RAYOS vs.THE CITY OF MANILA


FACTS:

A petition for review on certiorari and declaratory reliefassails the Order of 6 January2011 of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 49, denying reconsideration of the trial courts Order of
11 March 2010 which denied the motion to dismiss filed by petitioners Orlando A. Rayos, Fe A.
Rayos Dela Paz, and Engr. Manuel A. Rayos.

The present case originated from a complaint for eminent domain filed by respondent City
of Manila against Remedios V. De Caronongan,et. Al. the City of Manila alleged that it passed
Ordinance No. 7949 authorizing the City Mayor to acquire "by expropriation, negotiation or by any
other legal means" the parcel of land co-owned by defendants, which is covered by TCT No. 227512
and with an area of 1,182.20 square meters. The City of Manila offered to purchase the property at
P1,000.00 per square meter.

In their Answer, defendants conveyed their willingness to sell the property to the City
of Manila, but at the price of P50,000.00 per square meter which they claimed was the fair market
value of the land at the time.

On 7 December 2009, petitioners Orlando A. Rayos, Fe A. Rayos Dela Paz, and Engr. Manuel
A. Rayos filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that (1) Ordinance No. 7949 is unconstitutional
and (2) the cases of Lagcao v. Labr and Jesus Is Lord Christian School Foundation, Inc. v.
Municipality (now City) of Pasig, Metro Manila apply squarely to the present case.

On 11 March 2010, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss. The trial court ruled that
the motion to dismiss did not show any compelling reason to convince the court that the doctrine
of stare decisis applies. Petitioners failed to demonstrate how or why the facts in this case are
similar with the cited cases in order that the issue in this case be resolved in the same manner.

On 6 January 2011, the trial court denied the motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE:Is the petition for review on certiorari and declaratory relief be admitted to the Supreme
Court?

RULING:
An order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory and not appealable. An order denying a
motion to dismiss does not finally dispose of the case, and in effect, allows the case to proceed until
the final adjudication thereof by the court. In all the above instances where the judgment or final
order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule
65. Clearly, no appeal, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, may be taken from an interlocutory
order.
The Courts original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari is not exclusive. It is shared by
this Court with RTC and with the CA. This concurrence of jurisdiction is not however, to be taken
as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the
court to which application therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That
hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and also serves as a general determinant of the
appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial
hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first
level (inferior) courts should be filed with the RTC, and those against the latter, with the Court of
Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction to issue these writs should
be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set
out in the petition.

LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY NATIONAL v.
THE CITY MAYOR OF MANILA
G.R. No. 154599 January 21, 2004

FACTS:
Liga ng mga Barangay National (Liga for brevity) is the national organization of all the
barangays in the Philippines. By virtue of the provision in the Local Government Code of 1991, the
Liga adopted and ratified its own Election Code.

Section 1.2, Article I of the Liga Election Code states: Liga president duly assisted by the
government officer aforementioned, shall notify, in writing, all the above concerned at least fifteen
(15) days before the scheduled election meeting on the exact date, time, place and requirements of
the said meeting. Respondent City Council of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8039, for the election
of representatives of the District Chapters in the City Chapter of Manila and setting the elections for
both chapters thirty days after the barangay elections. Liga sent respondent Mayor of Manila a
letter requesting him that said ordinance be vetoed considering that it encroached upon, or even
assumed, the functions of the Liga through legislation, a function which was clearly beyond the
ambit of the powers of the City Council.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner observes the hierarchy of courts rule? Whether or not it
is correct to assail the petition of the writ of certiorari?

HELD:
Technical rules of procedure should be relaxed in the instant petition. Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, as amended, grants original jurisdiction over cases of this nature to the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), the exigency of the present petition, however, calls for the relaxation of this rule. Section 496
(should be Section 491) of the Local Government Code of 1991 primarily intended that the Liga ng
mga Barangay determine the representation of the Liga in the Sanggunians for the immediate
ventilation, articulation, and crystallization of issues affecting barangay government administration.
We have held that this Courts original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari (as well as of
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is not exclusive, but is
concurrent with the Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals in certain cases. As aptly stated
in People v. Cuaresma: This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to
parties seeking any of the writs anabsolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which
application therefore will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is
determinative of the venue of appeals, and also serves as a general determinant of the appropriate
forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard of that judicial hierarchy most
certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior")
courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of
Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction to issue these writs should
be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set
out in the petition. This is [an] established policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent inordinate
demands upon the Courts time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within
its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Courts docket. Respondents
do not fall within the ambit of tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions. The enactment by the City Council of Manila of the assailed ordinance and the issuance
by respondent Mayor of the questioned executive order were done in the exercise of legislative and
executive functions, respectively, and not of judicial or quasi-judicial functions. On this score alone,
certiorari will not lie.
Writ of certiorari to issue, the following requisites must concur:
(1) it must be directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions;
(2) the tribunal, board, or officer must have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting lack or excess of jurisdiction; and
(3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.





SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE ENGAGEMENT NETWORK, INC. V. ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL
632 SCRA 146
October 5, 2010

This is a consolidation of 6 petitions, thus:
GR No. 178552Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. NGOcertiorari and
prohibitionAtty. Soliman Santos, Jr.Concerned citizen,taxpayer, andlawyer
GR No. 178554 KMU, NAFLU-KMU, CTUHR citizens
GR No. 178581 BAYAN, GABRIELA, KMP, MCCCL, COURAGE, KADAMAY, SCW,LFS,
PAMALAKAYA, ACT, HEAD, Guingona, Jr., Lumbera,Constantino, Jr., Sr. Manansan, OSB, Dean
Paz, Atty. Lichauco, Ret.Col. Cunanan, Siguion-Reyna, Dr. Pagaduan-Araullo, Reyes, Ramos,De
Jesus, Baua, Casambre
GR No. 178890 SELDA, EMJP, PCPR
GR No. 179157 IBP, CODAL, Senator Madrigal, Osmena III, and Taada
GR. No. 179461 BAYAN- ST, other regl chapters and orgs mostly based in Southern Tagalog

Respondents: Anti-Terrorism Council, composed of: Chairperson Eduardo Ermita, Vice-Chair Raul
Gonzales, Acting Defense Secretary Alberto Romulo, National Security Adviser Norberto Gonzales,
DILG Secretary Ronaldo Puno, Finance Secretary Margarito Teves, AFP Chief of Staff General
Hermogenes Esperon, PNP Chief General Oscar Calderon, PGMA, Support agencies of the Anti-
Terrorism Council, namely: National Intelligence Coordinating Agency, NBI, Bureau of Immigration,
Office of Civil Defense, Intelligence Service of the AFP, Anti-Money Laundering Center, Philippine
Center on Transnational Crime, PNP intelligence and investigative elements

FACTS:
This case consists of 6 petitions challenging the constitutionality of RA 9372, An Act to
Secure the State and Protect our People from Terrorism, aka Human Security Act of 2007.
Petitioner-organizations assert locus standi on the basis of being suspected communist
fronts by the government, whereas individual petitioners invoke the transcendental importance
doctrine and their status as citizens and taxpayers KARAPATAN, Hustisya, Desaparecidos, SELDA,
EMJP, and PCR allege they have been subjected to close security surveillance by state security
forces, their members followed by suspicious persons and vehicles with dark windshields, and
their offices monitored by men with military build. They likewise claim they have been branded
as enemies of the State.

BAYAN, GABRIELA, KMP, MCCCL, COURAGE, KADAMAY, SCW, LFS, Anakbayan,
PAMALAKAYA, ACT, Migrante, HEAD, and Agham would like the Court to take judicial notice of
respondents alleged action of tagging them as militant organizations fronting for the CPP and
NPA. They claim such taggingis tantamount to the effects of proscription without following the
procedure under the law.

Meanwhile, IBP and CODAL base their claim of locus standi on their sworn duty to uphold
the Constitution.

Petitioners claim that RA 9372 is vague and broad, in that terms like widespread
and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace and coerce the government to give in to an
unlawful demand are nebulous, leaving law enforcement agencies with no standard to measure
the prohibited acts.

ISSUES:
1.WON petitioners resort to certiorari is proper. NO.
2.WON petitioners have locus standi. NO.
3.WON the Court can take judicial notice of the alleged tagging. NO.
4.WON petitioners can invoke the transcendental importance doctrine. NO.
5.WON petitioners can be conferred locus standi as they are taxpayers and citizens. NO.
6.WON petitioners were able to present an actual case or controversy. NO.


RULING:

1. Preliminarily, certiorari does not lie against respondents who do not exercise judicial or
quasi-judicial functions. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is clear:

Section 1. Petition for certiorari.When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified
petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such
incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.


Parenthetically, petitioners do not even allege with any modicum of particularity how respondents
acted without or in excess of their respective jurisdictions, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

2.Locus standi or legal standing requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court
so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.

Locus standi or legal standing has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in a
case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental
act that is being challenged. The gist of the question on standing is whether a party alleges such
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions.

A party who assails the constitutionality of a statute must have a direct and personal interest. It
must show not only that the law or any governmental act is invalid, but also that it sustained or is
in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely
that it suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must show that it has been or is about to be denied
some right or privilege to which it is lawfully entitled or that it is about to be subjected to some
burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of.

3. Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter
must be one of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and
not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the
court. The principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that
of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records
and facts of general notoriety. Moreover, a judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to a
reasonable dispute in that it is either:
(1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court; or (2) capable of
accurate and ready determination by resorting to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably
be questionable.

4. To invoke the transcendental doctrine, the following are the determinants:

a. The character of the funds or the other assets involved in the case;
b. The presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the
public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government;
c. The lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest in the questions being
raised. In the case at bar, there are other parties not before the Court with direct and specific
interests in the questions being raised.

5. Petitioners cannot be conferred upon them as taxpayers and citizens.

a. A taxpayer suit is proper only when there is an exercise of the spending or taxing power of
Congress, whereas citizen standing must rest on direct and personal interest in the proceeding.
b. RA 9372 is a penal statute and does not even provide for any appropriation from Congress
for its implementation, while none of the individual petitioner-citizens has alleged any direct and
personal interest in the implementation of the law.
c. Generalized interest, albeit accompanied by the assertion of a public right, do not establish
locus standi. Evidence of a direct of personal interest is key.

6. In constitutional litigations, the power of judicial review is limited by four exacting requisites,
viz:
(a) there must be an actual case or controversy;
(b) petitioners must possess locus standi;
(c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and
(d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.[10]


























BAYAN MUNA vs. ALBERTO ROMULO
G.R. No. 159618 February 1, 2011

FACTS:
Petitioner Bayan Muna is a duly registered party-list group established to represent the
marginalized sectors of society. Respondent Blas F. Ople, now deceased, was the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs during the period material to this case. Respondent Alberto Romulo was impleaded
in his capacity as then Executive Secretary. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.
Having a key determinative bearing on this case is the Rome Statute establishing the International
Criminal Court (ICC) with the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious
crimes of international concern and shall be complementary to the national criminal jurisdictions.
The serious crimes adverted to cover those considered grave under international law, such as
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crimes of aggression. On December 28, 2000,
the RP, through Charge d Affaires Enrique A. Manalo, signed the Rome Statute which, by its terms,
is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by the signatory states. As of the filing of the
instant petition, only 92 out of the 139 signatory countries appear to have completed the
ratification, approval and concurrence process. The Philippines is not among the 92.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RP-US Non Surrender Agreement is void ab initio for contracting
obligations that are either immoral or otherwise at variance with universally recognized principles of
international law.

HELD: No.
Petitioner urges that the Agreement be struck down as void ab initio for imposing immoral
obligations and/or being at variance with allegedly universally recognized principles of international
law. The immoral aspect proceeds from the fact that the Agreement, as petitioner would put it,
leaves criminals immune from responsibility for unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the
conscience of humanity; it precludes our country from delivering an American criminal to the ICC.
The above argument is a kind of recycling of petitioners earlier position, which, as already
discussed, contends that the RP, by entering into the Agreement, virtually abdicated its sovereignty
and in the process undermined its treaty obligations under the Rome Statute, contrary to
international law principles. The Court is not persuaded. Suffice it to state in this regard that the
non-surrender agreement, as aptly described by the Solicitor General, is an assertion by the
Philippines of its desire to try and punish crimes under its national law. The agreement is a
recognition of the primacy and competence of the countrys judiciary to try offenses under its
national criminal laws and dispense justice fairly and judiciously. Petitioner, labors under the
erroneous impression that the Agreement would allow Filipinos and Americans committing high
crimes of international concern to escape criminal trial and punishment. This is manifestly
incorrect. Persons who may have committed acts penalized under the Rome Statute can be
prosecuted and punished in the Philippines or in the US; or with the consent of the RP or the US,
before the ICC, assuming that all the formalities necessary to bind both countries to the Rome
Statute have been met. Perspective wise, what the Agreement contextually prohibits is
the surrender by either party of individuals to international tribunals, like the ICC, without the
consent of the other party, which may desire to prosecute the crime under its existing laws.











MAGALLONA vs ERMITA
55 SCRA 476 (2011)

FACTS:
In March 2009, Republic Act 9522, an act defining the archipelagic baselines of the
Philippines was enacted the law is also known as the Baselines Law. This law was meant to
comply with the terms of the third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III),
ratified by the Philippines in February 1984.
Professor Merlin Magallona et al questioned the validity of RA 9522 as they contend, among
others, that the law decreased the national territory of the Philippines hence the law is
unconstitutional. Some of their particular arguments are as follows:
a. the law abandoned the demarcation set by the Treaty of Paris and other ancillary treaties
this also resulted to the exclusion of our claim over Sabah;
b. the law, as well as UNCLOS itself, terms the Philippine waters a archipelagic waters
which, in international law, opens our waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all
vessels (innocent passage) and aircrafts (overflight), undermining Philippine sovereignty and
national security, contravening the countrys nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine resources,
in violation of relevant constitutional provisions;
c. the classification of the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG), as well as the Scarborough Shoal
(bajo de masinloc), as a regime of islands pursuant to UNCLOS results in the loss of a large
maritime area but also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen.

ISSUE: Whether or not the contentions of Magallona et al are tenable.

HELD: No.
The Supreme Court emphasized that RA 9522, or UNCLOS, itself is not a means to acquire,
or lose, territory. The treaty and the baseline law has nothing to do with the acquisition,
enlargement, or diminution of the Philippine territory. What controls when it comes to acquisition
or loss of territory is the international law principle on occupation, accretion, cession and
prescription and NOT the execution of multilateral treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or
enacting statutes to comply with the treatys terms to delimit maritime zones and continental
shelves.
The law did not decrease the demarcation of our territory. In fact it increased it. Under the
old law amended by RA 9522 (RA 3046), we adhered with the rectangular lines enclosing the
Philippines. The area that it covered was 440,994 square nautical miles (sq. na. mi.). But under
9522, and with the inclusion of the exclusive economic zone, the extent of our maritime are
increased to 586,210 sq. na. mi. (See image below for comparison)
If any, the baselines law is a notice to the international community of the scope of the
maritime space and submarine areas within which States parties exercise treaty-based rights.







Enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedures in all courts
53. Baguio Market Vendors v. Hon. Cortes, GR 165922, February 26, 2010

FACTS:

Petitioner is a credit cooperative organized under Republic Act No. 6938 (RA 6938), or the
Cooperative Code of the Philippines, Article 62(6) of RA 6938 exempts cooperatives:

from the payment of all court and sheriff's fees payable to the Philippine Government for
and in connection with all actions brought under this Code, or where such action is
brought by the Cooperative Development Authority before the court, to enforce the
payment of obligations contracted in favor of the cooperative.

In 2004, petitioner, as mortgagee, filed with the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio
City a petition to extrajudicially foreclose a mortgage under Act 3135, as amended. Under Section
7(c) of Rule 141, as amended, petitions for extrajudicial foreclosure are subject to legal fees based
on the value of the mortgagees claim. Invoking Article 62 (6) of RA 6938, petitioner sought
exemption from payment of the fees.

In order, respondent court, denied the request for exemption, citing Section 22 of Rule 141 of the
Rules of Court, as amended, exempting from the Rules coverage only the Republic of the
Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and certain suits of local government units. Motion
for reconsideration but was denied. This time, respondent reasoned that petitioners reliance on
Article 62(6) of RA 6938 is misplaced because the fees collected under Rule 141 are not fees
payable to the Philippine Government as they do not accrue to the National Treasury but to a
special fund under the Courts control.

ISSUES:
Whether or not may the Congress validly annul, change or modify, the rule on the payment of legal
fees promulgated by the Court?

HELD:
The Supreme court held that the 1987 Constitution textually altered the power-sharing
scheme under the previous charters by deleting in Section 5(5) of Article VIII Congress subsidiary
and corrective power. This glaring and fundamental omission led the Court to observe in Echegaray
v. Secretary of Justic
]
that this Courts power to promulgate judicial rules is no longer shared by
this Court with Congress:Since the payment of legal fees is a vital component of the rules
promulgated by this Court concerning pleading, practice and procedure, it cannot be validly
annulled, changed or modified by Congress. As one of the safeguards of this Courts institutional
independence, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now the Courts
exclusive domain. That power is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, much less with the
Executive

The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more independent
judiciary. Among others, it enhanced the rule making power of this Court. Its
Section 5(5), Article VIII provides:
x x x x x x x x x
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
x x x x x x x x x
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such
rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for
the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of
the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and
quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless
disapproved by the Supreme Court.

The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first
time was given the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was also granted for the first
time the power to disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial
bodies. But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power of
Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure
is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so with the Executive.


















54. In re Petition for Recognition 612 SCRA 193 [2010]

FACTS:
The GSIS seeks exemption from the payment of legal fees imposed on government-owned or
controlled corporations under Section 22,
[1]
Rule 141 (Legal Fees) of the Rules of Court. The GSIS
anchors its petition on Section 39 of its charter, RA
[2]
8291 (The GSIS Act of 1997) The GSIS then
avers that courts still assess and collect legal fees in actions and proceedings instituted by the GSIS
notwithstanding its exemption from taxes, assessments, fees, charges, or duties of all kinds under
Section 39. For this reason, the GSIS urges this Court to recognize its exemption from payment of
legal fees.

ISSUES:
May the legislature exempt the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) from legal fees
imposed by the Court on government-owned and controlled corporations and local government
units?

HELD:
The Supreme Court held in negative. The power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice
and procedure in all courts is a traditional power of this Court
]
It necessarily includes the power to
address all questions arising from or connected to the implementation of the said rules.

The Rules of Court was promulgated in the exercise of the Courts rule-making power. It is
essentially procedural in nature as it does not create, diminish, increase or modify substantive
rights. Corollarily, Rule 141 is basically procedural. It does not create or take away a right but
simply operates as a means to implement an existing right. In particular, it functions to regulate the
procedure of exercising a right of action and enforcing a cause of action.
[17]
In particular, it pertains
to the procedural requirement of paying the prescribed legal fees in the filing of a pleading or any
application that initiates an action or proceeding.
[18]


Clearly, therefore, the payment of legal fees under Rule 141 of the Rules of Court is an integral part
of the rules promulgated by this Court pursuant to its rule-making power under Section 5(5),
Article VIII of the Constitution. In particular, it is part of the rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure in courts. Indeed, payment of legal (or docket) fees is a jurisdictional requirement.
[19]
It is
not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading but the payment of the
prescribed docket fee that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature of
the action.
[20]
Appellate docket and other lawful fees are required to be paid within the same period
for taking an appeal.
[21]
Payment of docket fees in full within the prescribed period is mandatory for
the perfection of an appeal.
[22]
Without such payment, the appellate court does not acquire
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action and the decision sought to be appealed from
becomes final and executory.
[23]


An interesting aspect of legal fees is that which relates to indigent or pauper litigants. In proper
cases, courts may waive the collection of legal fees. This, the Court has allowed in Section 21, Rule
3 and Section 19, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court in recognition of the right of access to justice by
the poor under Section 11, Article III of the Constitution.
[24]
Mindful that the rule with respect to
indigent litigants should not be ironclad as it touches on the right of access to justice by the
poor,
[25]
the Court acknowledged the exemption from legal fees of indigent clients of the Public
Attorneys Office under Section 16-D of the Administrative Code of 1987, as amended by RA
9406.
[26]
This was not an abdication by the Court of its rule-making power but simply a recognition
of the limits of that power. In particular, it reflected a keen awareness that, in the exercise of its
rule-making power, the Court may not dilute or defeat the right of access to justice of indigent
litigants.

Since the payment of legal fees is a vital component of the rules promulgated by this Court
concerning pleading, practice and procedure, it cannot be validly annulled, changed or modified by
Congress. As one of the safeguards of this Courts institutional independence, the power to
promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now the Courts exclusive domain. That
power is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, much less with the Executive.
[28]



The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more independent
judiciary. Among others, it enhanced the rule making power of this Court. Its
Section 5(5), Article VIII provides:
x x x x x x x x x
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
x x x x x x x x x
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such
rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for
the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of
the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and
quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless
disapproved by the Supreme Court.

The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first
time was given the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was also granted for the first
time the power to disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial
bodies. But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power of
Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure
is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so with the Executive.



55. In re Exemption of NPC 615 SCRA [2010]

FACTS:
The National Power Corporation (NPC) seeks clarification from the Court on whether or not it is
exempt from the payment of filing fees, appeal bonds and supersedeas bonds. On December 6,
2005, the Court issued A.M. No. 05-10-20-SC, In re: Exemption of the National Power Corporation
from the Payment of Filing/Docket Fees, on the basis of Section 13, Republic Act No. 6395 (An Act
Revising the Charter of the National Power Corporation). It reads:

The Court Resolved, upon the recommendation of the Office of the Court
Administrator, to DECLARE that the National Power Corporation (NPC) is still exempt
from the payment of filing fees, appeals bond, and supersedeas bonds.

On October 27, 2009, however, the Court issued A.M. No. 05-10-20-SC stating that:

The Court Resolved, upon recommendation of the Committee on the Revision of
the Rules of Court, to DENY the request of the National Power Corporation (NPC) for
exemption from the payment of filing fees pursuant to Section 10 of Republic Act No.
6395, as amended by Section 13 of Presidential Decree No. 938. The request appears to
run counter to Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution, in the rule-making power of
the Supreme Court over the rules on pleading, practice and procedure in all courts,
which includes the sole power to fix the filing fees of cases in courts.

Hence, the subject letter of NPC for clarification as to its exemption from the payment of filing fees
and court fees.

ISSUES:
Whether or not National Power Corporation (NPC) is exempt from the payment of filing fees, appeal
bonds and supersede as bonds.?

HELD:
The Supreme Court held that Section 22 of Rule 141 provides xxx Local government units and
government-owned or controlled corporations with or without independent charters are not exempt
from paying such fees.xx. Further, Section 70 of Republic Act No. 9136 (Electric Power Industry
Reform Act of 2001), on privatization of NPC assets, expressly states that the NPC shall remain as
a national government-owned and controlled corporation.Thus, NPC is not exempt from payment of
filing fees.

The non-exemption of NPC is further fortified by the promulgation on February 11, 2010 of
A.M. No. 08-2-01-0, In re: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS) from Payment of Legal Fees. In said case, the Court, citing Echegaray v.
Secretary of Justice,
[1]
stressed that the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to
repeal, alter or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure; and that the power
to promulgate these rules is no longer shared by the Court with Congress and the Executive, thus:

Since the payment of legal fees is a vital component of the rules promulgated
by this Court concerning pleading, practice and procedure, it cannot be validly
annulled, changed or modified by Congress. As one of the safeguards of this Courts
institutional independence, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and
procedure is now the Courts exclusive domain. That power is no longer shared by
this Court with Congress, much less the Executive.

The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more independent
judiciary. Among others, it enhanced the rule making power of this Court. Its
Section 5(5), Article VIII provides:

x x x x x x x x x

Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers.

x x x x x x x x x

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement
of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the
underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for
the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and
shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of
special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved
by the Supreme Court.

The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first time was given the
power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. The
Court was also granted for the first time the power to disapprove rules of procedure of special
courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the
power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no longer
shared by this Court with Congress, more so with the Executive.

The separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of our government has erected an
impregnable wall that keeps the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure
within the sole province of this Court. The other branches trespass upon this prerogative if they
enact laws or issue orders that effectively repeal, alter or modify any of the procedural rules
promulgated by this Court. Viewed from this perspective, the claim of a legislative grant of
exemption from the payment of legal fees under Section 39 of RA 8291 necessarily fails.





56.Sto. Tomas v. Paneda 685 SCRA 245 [2012]

FACTS:
On June 7, 1995 Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) 8042 or the Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipinos Act of 1995 that, for among other purposes, sets the Governments policies on overseas
employment and establishes a higher standard of protection and promotion of the welfare of
migrant workers, their families, and overseas Filipinos in distress.

On August 21, 1995 respondent Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI) filed a
petition for declaratory relief and prohibition with prayer for issuance of TRO and writ of
preliminary injunction before the RTC of Manila, seeking to annul among others Section 9 of R.A.
8042 for being unconstitutional. Section 9 of R.A. 8042 allowed the filing of criminal actions arising
from illegal recruitment before the RTC of the province or city where the offense was committed or
where the offended party actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the fixing by the Congress, of an alternative venue for violation of Sec 6, RA 8042
that differs from the venue established by the rules of criminal procedure unconstitutional?

HELD:
The Supreme Court held that the fixing by the Congress, of an alternative venue for violation of Sec
6, RA 8042 that differs from the venue established by the rules of criminal procedure constitutional.

The Manila RTC also invalidated Section 9 of R.A. 8042 on the ground that allowing the offended
parties to file the criminal case in their place of residence would negate the general rule on venue of
criminal cases which is the place where the crime or any of its essential elements were committed.
Venue, said the RTC, is jurisdictional in penal laws and, allowing the filing of criminal actions at the
place of residence of the offended parties violates their right to due process. Section 9 provides:
SEC. 9. Venue. A criminal action arising from illegal recruitment as defined herein shall be filed
with the Regional Trial Court of the province or city where the offense was committed or where the
offended party actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense: Provided, That the
court where the criminal action is first filed shall acquire jurisdiction to the exclusion of other
courts: Provided, however, That the aforestated provisions shall also apply to those criminal actions
that have already been filed in court at the time of the effectivity of this Act.

But there is nothing arbitrary or unconstitutional in Congress fixing an alternative venue for
violations of Section 6 of R.A. 8042 that differs from the venue established by the Rules on Criminal
Procedure. Indeed, Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the latter Rules allows exceptions provided by laws.
Thus: SEC. 15. Place where action is to be instituted. (a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal
action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory where the offense
was committed or where any of its essential ingredients occurred. (Emphasis supplied)

Section 9 of R.A. 8042, as an exception to the rule on venue of criminal actions is, consistent with
that laws declared policy
15
of providing a criminal justice system that protects and serves the best
interests of the victims of illegal recruitment.



Admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, disciplinary powers, and legal assistance
to the under privileged
57.Velez v. De Vera- A.C no.6697, July 25,2006

FACTS:
ISSUES:
HELD:
58. *In re letter of UP Law Faculty
644 SCRA 543 [2011]

FACTS:
ISSUES:
HELD:
Supervision over the Judiciary
59. *Ampong v. CSC-563 SCRA 293 [2008

FACTS:
Petitioner Sarah P. Ampong and Evelyn Junio-Decir were public school teachers under the
supervision of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS). Later, on August 3, 1993,
Ampong transferred to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Alabel, Sarangani Province, where she was
appointed as Court Interpreter III.

On July 5, 1994, a woman representing herself as Evelyn Decir went to the Civil Service Regional
Office (CSRO) No. XI, Davao City, to claim a copy of her PBET Certificate of Eligibility. During the
course of the transaction, the CSRO personnel noticed that the woman did not resemble the picture
of the examinee in the Picture Seat Plan (PSP). Upon further probing, it was confirmed that the
person claiming the eligibility was different from the one who took the examinations. It was
petitioner Ampong who took and passed the examinations under the name Evelyn Decir.

The CSRO conducted a preliminary investigation and determined the existence of a prima facie case
against Decir and Ampong for Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best
Interest of the Service. On August 23, 1994, they were formally charged and required to file
answers under oath. Even before filing an Answer, petitioner Ampong voluntarily appeared at the
CSRO on February 2, 1995 and admitted to the wrongdoing. When reminded that she may avail
herself of the services of counsel, petitioner voluntarily waived said right.

On March 21, 1996, the CSC found petitioner Ampong and Decir guilty of dishonesty, dismissing
them from the service. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, raising for the first time the issue of
jurisdiction. She argued that the exclusive authority to discipline employees of the judiciary lies
with the Supreme Court; that the CSC acted with abuse of discretion when it continued to exercise
jurisdiction despite her assumption of duty as a judicial employee. She contended that at the time
the case was instituted on August 23, 1994, the CSC already lost jurisdiction over her. She was
appointed as Interpreter III of the RTC, Branch 38, Alabel, Sarangani Province on August 3, 1993.

ISSUE:
Whether or not may the CSC properly assume jurisdiction over the administrative proceedings
against a judicial employee involving acts of dishonesty as a teacher, committed prior to her
appointment to the judiciary?

Whether the CSC has administrative jurisdiction over an employee of the Judiciary for acts
committed while said employee was still with the Executive or Education Department?


HELD:
The Supreme Court held that it is true that the CSC has administrative jurisdiction over the civil
service. As defined under the Constitution and the Administrative Code, the civil service
embraces every branch, agency, subdivision, and instrumentality of the government, and
government-owned or controlled corporations. Pursuant to its administrative authority, the CSC is
granted the power to control, supervise, and coordinate the Civil Service examinations. This
authority grants to the CSC the right to take cognizance of any irregularity or anomaly connected
with the examinations.

However, the Constitution provides that the Supreme Court is given exclusive administrative
supervision over all courts and judicial personnel. By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme
Court that can oversee the judges and court personnels compliance with all laws, rules and
regulations. It may take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any
violation. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the
doctrine of separation of powers.
[19]
Thus, this Court ruled that the Ombudsman cannot justify its
investigation of a judge on the powers granted to it by the Constitution. It violates the specific
mandate of the Constitution granting to the Supreme Court supervisory powers over all courts and
their personnel; it undermines the independence of the judiciary.

Petitioner committed the offense before her appointment to the judicial branch. At the time of
commission, petitioner was a public school teacher under the administrative supervision of the
DECS and, in taking the civil service examinations, under the CSC. Petitioner surreptitiously took
the CSC-supervised PBET exam in place of another person. When she did that, she became a party
to cheating or dishonesty in a civil service-supervised examination. That she committed the
dishonest act before she joined the RTC does not take her case out of the administrative reach of
the Supreme Court.

The bottom line is administrative jurisdiction over a court employee belongs to the Supreme
Court, regardless of whether the offense was committed before or after employment in the
judiciary. Indeed, the standard procedure is for the CSC to bring its complaint against a judicial
employee before the OCA. Records show that the CSC did not adhere to this procedure in the
present case.

However, We are constrained to uphold the ruling of the CSC based on the principle
of estoppel. The previous actions of petitioner have estopped her from attacking the jurisdiction of
the CSC.





















Sec. 6.Administrative supervision of inferior courts
60. MAYOR ALVIN GARCIA VS. HON. PRIMO. MIRA, ET AL.
G.R. No. 148944. February 5, 2003
Facts:
City Mayor Garcia was charged by Ombudsman Special Prosecution Officer Jesus Rodrigo
Tagaan for violation of the Anti-Graft Law as a result of his having entered into a contract with F.E.
Zuellig for the supply of asphalt batching plant for three years. The joint affidavits of State Auditors
Cabreros and Quejada alleged that petitioner entered into the contract without available funds
appropriated to cover the expenditure in violation of Sections 85 and 86 of P.D. 1445 or the State
Audit Code of the Phil.; that petitioner exceeded the authority granted him by the Sangguniang
Panlungsod; and that the contract is manifestly disadvantageous to the City. Note however that
thereafter, Special Prosecution Officer Tagaan resigned from his office and his name was withdrawn
as complainant in the case. Instead of filing a counter-affidavit, Garcia filed with the Supreme Court
a petition to prohibit the Ombudsman from conducting the preliminary investigation on the ground
that there is no sufficient complaint.

Issue: Whether or not the complaint/affidavits filed against Garcia is sufficient in form or manner.

Ruling:
Yes, the complaints/affidavits were sufficient in form. For purposes of initiating a preliminary
investigation before the Office of the Ombudsman, a complaint in any form or manner is sufficient.
The Constitution states that the Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall
act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of the
government. In Almonte vs. Vasquez, 244 SCRA 286, we held that even unverified and anonymous
letters may suffice to start an investigation. The Office of the Ombudsman is different from the
other investigatory and prosecutory agencies of the government because those subject to its
jurisdiction are public officials who, through official pressure and influence, can quash, delay, or
dismiss investigations against them. The joint affidavits of State Auditors Cabreros and Quejada
contain allegations specific enough for petitioner to prepare his evidence and counter-arguments.

The fact that Special Prosecution Officer Tagaan already resigned from his office and that his
name was withdrawn as complainant in the case is of no consequence. First, Tagaans report and
affidavit still form part of the records of the case. He can still be called by subpoena, if necessary.
Second, Tagaan was only a nominal party whose duty as special prosecutor was to investigate the
commission of crimes and file the corresponding complaint whenever warranted. Since the illegal
acts committed are public offenses, the real complainant is the State, which is represented by the
remaining complainants.


Sec. 11.Security of tenure
61.Lumpas v. Tamin, AM no. RTJ-99-1519
A certain Guillermo Lumapas died single and intestate on April 8, 1965. He left a parcel of
land covered by OCT No. P-157 registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga del
Sur on April 21, 1953. The complainant [Gregorio Limpot Lumapas], claiming to be the only son
and heir of the deceased Guillermo Lumapas, succeeded in obtaining OCT No. 06-151 over the
same parcel of land on August 20, 1985 by virtue of Cadastral Decree No. 190636, Cad. Case No. N-
3, Cad. Record No. N-10 dated October 31, 1984 by substituting his name in the stead of Guillermo
Lumapas in the cadastral proceedings.
Complainant filed a complaint for Recovery of Possession/Ownership over the said parcel of
land against Alan U. Lumapas, et al., nephews and nieces of the deceased Guillermo, in RTC,
Branch 25, Molave, Zamboanga del Sur presided over by the respondent . On the other hand, Alan
Lumapas and his co-defendants also filed a complaint for Recovery of the same parcel of land
against Gregorio Limpot Lumapas, et al., in the same court, docketed as Civil Case No. 90-
20,025(2993). These two (2) cases were consolidated, the respondent rendered a judgment declaring
that the complainant is the son of the deceased Guillermo Lumapas and his sole heir, and ordered
the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga del Sur to cancel OCT-RP-157 in the name of Guillermo
Lumapas and deal with said land as registered only under OCT-0-6-151 in the name of Gregorio
Limpot Lumapas.
Alan Lumapas and his co-heirs appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals. the CA
promulgated a judgment declaring that Gregorio Lumapas has not sufficiently proved that he is the
son of Gregorio Lumapas but he has the right of possession over lot 4329.
The decision of the Court of Appeals became final and executory. Consequently, complainant
filed a motion for execution but respondent judge denied the motion in an order dated December 6,
1995 stating that a Gregorio Limpot has no legal right to use the surname "Lumapas" without the
consent of the putative father. "Gregorio Limpot-Lumapas" is therefore, a non-entity in so far as the
law is concerned for there is in fact no such person existing.
Because of respondent judges denial to issue a writ of execution on a final and executory
judgment, complainant filed a Petition for Mandamus. The Respondent judge, instead of obeying or
implementing the writ, filed a motion for reconsideration before the Court of Appeals. The motion
was denied.
A complaint was then filed against the judge before the Office of the Court Administrator
against the judge.
The OCA found the respondentsrefusal to issue said writ is without sufficient justification
and found that the judge even had the teme he writ of mandamus issued by the CA. For this, the
OCA recommended that respondent judge be fined
Issue :
Whether or not the respondent judge erred in refusing to issue a writ of execution and
disobeying the writ of Mandamus.
Ruling
Yes, the Court agreed with the OCA that it was error for respondent to refuse to issue the
writ of execution of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. His refusal to issue said
writ is without sufficient justification. The issuance of a writ of execution is a ministerial duty on
the part of the court, after a judgment becomes final and executory, and leaves no room for the
exercise of discretion.
A writ of mandamus lies to compel the issuance of a writ of execution. The writ
of mandamus is one commanding a tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person that or who
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting
from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a
right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Mandamus literally means "we command." Again, respondent had no option but to obey the
writ. Refusal to obey it is clearly a violation of the order of, and a manifest disrespect towards, a
court of superior jurisdiction.

62.Cefirina Lopez Tan v. Spouses Antazo, GR 187208,23 February 2011
In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner
Ceferina Lopez Tan seeks to nullify the Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
105514 which dismissed her petition for certiorari for being the wrong mode of appeal.

In abovementioned petition for review, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 68, Binangonan,
Rizal, rendered judgment favoring respondents, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:

A. That the defendant encroached on the property of the plaintiffs by 114
square meters.
B. The defendant is hereby ordered to vacate the 114 square meters of the
plaintiffs property illegally occupied by the defendant and to turn over its full
possession and ownership in favor of the plaintiffs. To remove the fence
constructed on the encroached area.
C. The plaintiffs are awarded attorneys fees in the amount of 50,000 pesos
]


Issue:
Whether or not the honorable judge/trial court committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction and/or without jurisdiction in rendering a judgment which does
not contain factual and legal bases
Ruling:
The Judge/ Trial Court did not commit a grave abuse of discretion in this case.

The Supreme Court ruled that the assigned error argues that the trial courts judgment is
void for lack of factual and legal bases. This allegation is worthy only if it is read to mean that the
questioned judgment did not state the facts and the law on which it is based, i.e., that it violates
Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution which provides that no decision shall be rendered by any
court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.

The Court found that the assailed decision substantially complied with the constitutional
mandate. While the decision is admittedly brief, it however contains all factual bases to support its
conclusion. The first two (2) paragraphs of the decision established the ownership of respondents
through certificates of title. The fact of encroachment was proven by the relocation survey
conducted by the geodetic engineer, which the trial court found to be credible. The trial court held
that these evidence are more than sufficient to prove two mattersownership by respondents and
encroachment by petitioner.



63. Donnina C. Halley v. Printwell,Inc. GR 157549,30 May 2011
Facts:

Printwell engaged in commercial and industrial printing.BMPI commissioned Printwell for
the printing of the magazine Philippines, Inc. (together with wrappers and subscription cards) that
BMPI published and sold. For that purpose, Printwell extended 30-day credit accommodations to
BMPI.

BMPI failed to pay its obligation and Printwell sued to recover for the collection
of the unpaid balance amounting to P291,342.76 in the RTC.

Printwell amended the complaint in order to implead as defendants all the original
stockholders and incorporators to recover on their unpaid subscriptions.

The RTC rendered a decision in favor of Printwell with all the defendants, except BMPI,
appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the same.



Issue:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming in toto the decision that did not
state the facts and the law upon which the judgment was based but merely copied the contents of
respondents memorandum adopting the same as the reason for the decision


Ruling:
The CA did not err in affirming in toto the decision of lower court.

It is noted that the petition for review merely generally alleges that starting from its page 5,
the decision of the RTC copied verbatim the allegations of herein Respondents in its Memorandum
before the said court, as if the Memorandum was the draft of the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig,but fails to specify either the portions allegedly lifted verbatim from the
memorandum, or why she regards the decision as copied. The omission renders the petition for
review insufficient to support her contention, considering that the mere similarity in language or
thought between Printwells memorandum and the trial courts decision did not necessarily justify
the conclusion that the RTC simply lifted verbatim or copied from the memorandum.

It is to be observed in this connection that a trial or appellate judge may occasionally view a
partys memorandum or brief as worthy of due consideration either entirely or partly. When he does
so, the judgemay adopt and incorporate in his adjudication the memorandum or the parts of it he
deems suitable,and yet not be guilty of the accusation of lifting or copying from the
memorandum.This is because of the avowed objective of the memorandum to contribute in the
proper illumination and correct determination of the controversy. Nor is there anything untoward in
the congruence of ideas and views about the legal issues between himself and the party drafting the
memorandum. The frequency of similarities in argumentation, phraseology, expression, and citation
of authorities between the decisions of the courts and the memoranda of the parties, which may be
great or small, can be fairly attributable to the adherence by our courts of law and the legal
profession to widely known or universally accepted precedents set in earlier judicial actions with
identical factual milieus or posing related judicial dilemmas.

We also do not agree with the petitioner that the RTCs manner of writing the decision
deprived her of the opportunity to analyze its decision as to be able to assign errors on appeal. The
contrary appears, considering that she was able to impute and assign errors to the RTC that she
extensively discussed in her appeal in the CA, indicating her thorough analysis of the decision of
the RTC.

Our own reading of the trial courts decision persuasively shows that the RTC did comply
with the requirements regarding the content and the manner of writing a decision prescribed in the
Constitution and the Rules of Court. The decision of the RTC contained clear and distinct findings of
facts, and stated the applicable law and jurisprudence, fully explaining why the defendants were
being held liable to the plaintiff. In short, the reader was at once informed of the factual and legal
reasons for the ultimate result.


64. Hon. Waldo Q. Flores v. Atty. Antonio F. Montemayor, GR 170146

Facts This case is about the resolution of the Court concerning the motion for
reconsideration of a Decision dated August 25, 2010 setting aside the October 19, 2005 Decision of
the Court of Appeals and reinstating the Decision dated March 23, 2004 of the Office of the
President in O.P. Case No. 03-1-581, which found the respondent administratively liable for failure
to declare in his 2001 and 2002 Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities (SSAL) two expensive
cars registered in his name, in violation of Section 7, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 in relation to
Section 8 (A) of R.A. No. 6713. The OP adopted the findings and recommendations of the
Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC), including the imposition of the penalty of dismissal
from service on respondent, with all accessory penalties.

The OP decision, after quoting verbatim the findings and recommendation of the PAGC,
adopted the same with a brief statement preceding the dispositive portion:

After a circumspect study of the case, this Office fully agrees with the
recommendation of PAGC and the legal premises as well as the factual findings that
hold it together. Respondent failed to disclose in his 2001 and 2002 SSAL high-priced
vehicles in breach of the prescription of the relevant provisions of RA No. 3019 in
relation to RA No. 6713. He was, to be sure, afforded ample opportunity to explain his
failure, but he opted to let the opportunity pass by.

In the dissenting opinion of Justice Bersamin (Decision dated August 25, 2010 ) he
assails the OPs complete reliance on the PAGCs findings and recommendation which
constituted a gross violation of administrative due process as set forth in Ang Tibay v. Court
of Industrial Relations
[17]
. Among others, it is required that [T]he tribunal or any of its
judges must act on its or his own independent consideration of the facts and the law of the
controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a
decision. Justice Bersamin thus concludes that the OP should have itself reviewed and
appreciated the evidence presented and independently considered the facts and the law of the
controversy.

Issue:
Whether or not the above quoted decision violated the right of the Respondent to
administrative due process.

Ruling:

The SC ruled that it is not the brevity of the above disquisition adopting fully the
findings and recommendation of the PAGC as the investigating authority. It is rather the fact
that the OP is not a court but an administrative body determining the liability of respondent
who was administratively charged, in the exercise of its disciplinary authority over
presidential appointees.

In Solid Homes, Inc. v. Laserna, the Court ruled that the rights of parties in an
administrative proceedings are not violated by the brevity of the decision rendered by the OP
incorporating the findings and conclusions of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB), for as long as the constitutional requirement of due process has been satisfied.
Thus:

It must be stated that Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution need not
apply to decisions rendered in administrative proceedings, as in the case a[t] bar.
Said section applies only to decisions rendered in judicial proceedings. In fact, Article
VIII is titled Judiciary, and all of its provisions have particular concern only with
respect to the judicial branch of government. Certainly, it would be error to hold or
even imply that decisions of executive departments or administrative agencies are
oblige[d] to meet the requirements under Section 14, Article VIII.


65. Report on the judicial Audit (MTC of Tambulig) Report on the judicial Audit (MTC of
Tambulig)-472 SCRA 419 [2005]

This administrative case is an offshoot of the judicial audit conducted in March 2004 in the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Tambulig and the 11
th
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of
Mahayag-Dumingag-Josefina, both in Zamboanga del Sur, in anticipation of the compulsory
retirement of the Acting Presiding Judge thereof, herein respondent Judge Ricardo L. Salvanera.
The respondent was the Presiding Judge of the 6
th
MCTC of Bonifacio-Don Mariano Marcos,
Misamis Occidental, who compulsorily retired on 3 April 2004.

Among the findings of the Audit Tean was the docket pertaining to Civil Case No. 183-M
where Judge Salvanera rendered a one-page decision dated 25 March 2004 without stating the
facts and the law on which it was in violation of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution, which
provides: No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing clearly and distinctly the
facts and the law on which it is based. Section 1, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court also requires that a
judgment or final order determining the merits of the case shall be in writing personally and
directly prepared by the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is
based, signed by him, and filed with the clerk of court. This requirement is an assurance to the
parties that, in reaching judgment, the judge did so through the processes of legal reasoning. A
decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based leaves
the parties in the dark as to how it was reached. It is precisely prejudicial to the losing party, who
is unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal.


The respondent died during the pendency of this case and in view of thereof, in line with
precedents, the Court found it inappropriate to impose a sanction upon him and must forthwith
dismiss this case. Consequently, there being no more impediment for the release of the entire
compulsory retirement benefits of the respondent, the amount of P50,000 which was withheld
pursuant to the Courts Resolution of 31 January 2005 in A.M. No. 11775-Ret. must be released to
the respondents rightful heirs.











66. Lacurom v. Tienzo-535 SCRA 252 [2007]

The respondent Judge issued the herein quoted decision, to wit:
D E C I S I O N
After a cursory study of this appealed case of Unlawful Detainer, this Court
finds that the procedural due process [has] been complied with under the Summary
Procedure. The Decision of the Lower Court cannot be disturbed by this Court.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the said Lower Court, MTCC, Branch
III, Cabanatuan City, is hereby AFFIRMED en toto.

SO ORDERED.

Cabanatuan City, July 21, 2005.
Issue:
Whether or not the above decision is a valid memorandum decision.

Ruling:

No the assailed memorandum decision is not valid. The Supreme Court ruled that a
memorandum decision, to be valid, cannot incorporate the findings of fact and the conclusions of
law of the lower court only by remote reference or that the challenged decision is not easily and
immediately available to the person reading the memorandum decision. For the incorporation by
reference to be allowed, it must provide for direct access to the facts and the law being adopted,
which must be contained in a statement attached to the said decision. In other words, the
memorandum decision authorized under Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129 should actually embody the
findings of fact and conclusions of law of the lower court in an annex attached to and made an
indispensable part of the decision.

It is expected that this requirement will allay suspicion that no study was made of the
decision of the lower court and that its decision was merely affirmed without a proper examination
of the facts and law on which it is based. The proximity at least of the annexed statement should
suggest that such an examination has been undertaken. It is, of course, also understood that the
decision being adopted should, to begin with, comply with Article VIII, Section 14 as no amount of
incorporation or adoption will rectify its violation.

The Court finds it necessary to emphasize that the memorandum decision should be
sparingly used lest it become an addictive excuse for judicial sloth. It is an additional condition for
its validity that this kind of decision may be resorted only in cases where the facts are in the main
accepted by both parties or easily determinable by the judge and there are no doctrinal
complications involved that will require an extended discussion of the laws involved. The
memorandum decision may be employed in simple litigations only, such as ordinary collection
cases, where the appeal is obviously groundless and deserves no more than the time needed to
dismiss it.

It is obvious that the decision rendered by respondent judge failed to conform to this
requirement. The cryptic decision simply referenced the appealed decision of the MTCC and
forthwith found the same as compliant with procedural due process under the Rules of Summary
Procedure. Nowhere in the decision does respondent judge make a statement of the facts which led
to the filing of the appeal. More importantly, the decision does not contain respondent judges
factual findings, albeit affirming those of the MTCC, from which she based her conclusions of law.
Ineluctably, respondent judge transgressed the constitutional directive.

Although not every judicial error signifies ignorance of the law which warrants administrative
sanction, this holds true only in instances of tolerable misjudgment. Where, however, an elementary
constitutional mandate is violated, the blunder constitutes ignorance of the law.


67. Salazar v. Marigomen-537 SCRA 25 [2007]

Facts:
This is an electoral protest case in May 2001mayoralty race between Zenaida F. Salazar, wife
of complainant and the proclaimed winner Lety
[2]
Mancio (Mancio) in the Municipality of Madridejos,
Cebu before the Regional Trial Court, Bogo, Cebu where it was docketed as Election SPC Case No.
BOGO-00789.
The election case was first heard by then Acting Presiding Judge Jesus S. dela Pea who,
on April 1, 2002, issued an order directing the revision of the contested ballots in the premises of
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) where the ballot boxes were being kept.
Respondent took over and started presiding over the election case on June 3, 2002

Respondent dismissed the election protest and declared Mancio as the duly elected
municipal mayor of Madridejos,Cebu with total votes of 5,214

On appeal, the COMELEC First Division, by Resolution
[5]
of March 25, 2004, reversed and set
aside the August 8, 2003 Decision of respondent and declared complainants wife Zenaida Salazar
as the duly elected mayor
Thus, spawned the filing of the complaint at bar. Among the issues raised was complainant
claims that respondent violated the COMELEC Rules of Procedure as well as the Constitution for
not clearly and distinctly stating the facts and the law on which his decision was based.

The questioned decision dismissing for lack of merit the election protest filed by Salazar against
Mancio The final tabulation of votes came about after the respondent judge declared on the
penultimate page of the 22-page decision, thus:

After reviewing or re-appreciating the ballots of the contested
precincts, the Court invalidated ninety (90) votes of the protestant and
has not validated stray votes in her favor as she has not formally offered
the claimed stray votes or ballots. The court shall only consider ballots
which are presented and formally offered.

Issue: Whether or not the decision of the Respondent Judge did not state the facts and
law on which it is based.

Ruling:
Yes, the decision of the Respondent did not state the facts and law on which it
is based.
The Court ruled that After a thorough examination of the questioned decision, it
became obvious that the invalidation of the 90 votes against Salazar was made without
indicating in the decision the factual and legal bases therefor. Expectedly, the COMELEC
First Division, in its Resolution promulgated on March 25, 2004, reversed and set aside the
August 8, 2003 Decision of respondent judge, and declared Salazar as the duly elected mayor
of Madridejos, Cebu.
Time and again, the Court had instructed judges to exert effort to ensure the
decisions would present a comprehensive analysis or account of the factual and legal
findings that would substantially address the issues raised by the parties. Respondent failed
in this respect.

68.De la Pena v. CA -579 369


This petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioners Annabelle dela Pea and Adrian
Villareal (petitioners) seeks to nullify and set aside the October 31, 2006 Decision
[1]
and May 8,
2007 Resolution
[2]
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 91338.

The Resolution of the Court of Appeal affirmed the decision of the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) of Bolinao, Pangasinan on the collection suit filed by the Rural Bank of Bolinao against
herein petitioner for collection of money, is as follows:

The instant case is an off-shoot of the appealed decision of this court to the
Regional Trial Court, Alaminos, Pangasinan, which remanded back in its order dated
August 29, 1996 x x

Proceedings were held whereby [respondent] moved with leave of court to
amend paragraph 2 of the complaint to conform to evidence.

Accordingly, the amended complaint was granted by the court during the
hearing on September 18, 2000. With the admission of the amended complaint of the
respondent, the case was set for hearing with due notices to [petitioners] and counsel
for further reception of evidence the [respondent] may desire to adduce. On the said
scheduled date of hearing, the [petitioners] and counsel did not show up in
court. [Respondent], thru counsel, re-introduced in toto the documentary evidences
which they have previously presented which they then re-offered in evidence and
prayed for their re-admission and thereafter rested their case. There being no more
supervening facts or new documentary evidences introduced by the plaintiff in the
instant case, the court deemed no necessity in having a different decision from the
appealed decision of this court, except, of course maybe its change of date, so it was
already wise and unmistakable to just re-write and adapt the decision of this Court
dated November 2, 1995 by the then Honorable Antonio V. Tiong, Municipal Trial
Judge.

From the evidence adduced by the [respondent], it has clearly been established
that the [petitioners] obtained a loan from [respondent] Rural Bank of Bolinao, Inc.,
with office address at Poblacion, Bolinao, Pangasinan, in the sum of EIGHTY-ONE
THOUSAND PESOS (P81,000.00), on October 20, 1983, as evidenced by a promissory
note duly signed and executed by the herein [petitioners] spouses Annabelle dela Pea
and Adrian Villareal at the place of business of the [respondent] as a banking
institution in the presence of the witnesses of the [respondent], namely Cederico C.
Catabay and Maximo Tiangsing who are both employees of the [respondent], that the
[petitioners] have paid a part of the principal loan with a remaining outstanding
balance of P77,772.67, but has from then defaulted in the last payment of the loan
which has and have matured on October 14, 1984 (Exh. A). Accordingly, letters of
demand by Mateo G. Caasi, then General Manager of the respondent Rural Bank of
Bolinao, Inc., were sent by registered mail to [petitioners] at their given address but
turned deaf eared (Exh. C & D); that, as a result of the utter disregard and failures
of the [petitioners] in payment of their long overdue loan, the [respondent] was
constrained to engage the legal services of a lawyer in the filing of the instant case for
collection and has incurred litigation expenses and attorneys fees; that, together with
collection fees which [respondent] is legally entitled to and the remaining unpaid
balance up to the present; that the grand total amount of money the [petitioners] are
obliged to pay [respondent] as of October 17, 1995, as reflected in the Statement of
Account prepared and submitted by Lito C. Altezo, Bookkeeper of the [respondent]
Rural Bank is Two Hundred Twenty-One Thousand Six Hundred and Sixty-Seven
Pesos and Six Centavos (P221,667.06)- Exh. B

WHEREFORE, clearly viewed in the light of all the foregoing considerations, the court
hereby renders judgment in favor of the [respondent] and against the petitioners, to wit:

1. Ordering the [petitioners] to pay jointly and severally the [respondent] the remaining
principal (obligation) loan in the sum of P77.722.67 outstanding as of October 17, 1995, plus
interest of 3% per annum, until full payment of the principal loan is made thereof;

2. Ordering [petitioners] to pay jointly and severally the [respondent] the interest due as
of October 17, 1995, in the sum of P105, 951.91;

3. Ordering the [petitioners] to pay jointly and severally the [respondent] the penalty due
as of October 17, 1995, in the sum of P25,670.21;

4. Ordering the [petitioners] to pay jointly and severally the [respondent] the litigation
expenses in the sum of P4,500.00

5. Ordering the [petitioners] to pay jointly and severally attorneys fees in the sum
of P7,722.27;

6. Ordering the [petitioners] to pay jointly and severally the [respondent] the collection
fees in the sum of P50.00; and

7. To pay the cost of the suit;

SO ORDERED

Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals affirmation of the decision of the Municipal Trial Court
of Bolinao amounts to denial of the petitioners constitutional right to due process of law on mere
technicality

Ruling:
Yes.The Supreme Court agreed with the petitioners that the above decision did not conform
to the requirements of the Constitution and of the Rules of Court. The decision contained no
reference to any legal basis in reaching its conclusions. It did not cite any legal authority or
principle to support its conclusion that petitioners are liable to pay respondent the amount claimed
including interests, penalties, attorneys fees and the costs of suit.
In Yao v. Court of Appeals,
[36]
the SC held that:
Faithful adherence to the requirements of Section 14, Article VIII of the
Constitution is indisputably a paramount component of due process and fair play. It is
likewise demanded by the due process clause of the Constitution. The parties to a
litigation should be informed of how it was decided, with an explanation of the factual
and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court. The court cannot simply say
that judgment is rendered in favor of X and against Y and just leave it at that without
any justification whatsoever for its action. The losing party is entitled to know why he
lost, so he may appeal to the higher court, if permitted, should he believe that the
decision should be reversed. A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the
facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was
reached and is precisely prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the
possible errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal. More than that, the
requirement is an assurance to the parties that, in reaching judgment, the judge did
so through the processes of legal reasoning. It is, thus, a safeguard against the
impetuosity of the judge, preventing him from deciding ipse dixit. Vouchsafed neither
the sword nor the purse by the Constitution but nonetheless vested with the sovereign
prerogative of passing judgment on the life, liberty or property of his fellowmen, the
judge must ultimately depend on the power of reason for sustained public confidence
in the justness of his decision.

Thus, the Court has struck down as void, decisions of lower courts and even of
the Court of Appeals whose careless disregard of the constitutional behest exposed
their sometimes cavalier attitude not only to their magisterial responsibilities but
likewise to their avowed fealty to the Constitution.

Thus, we nullified or deemed to have failed to comply with Section 14, Article VIII of
the Constitution, a decision, resolution or order which: contained no analysis of the evidence
of the parties nor reference to any legal basis in reaching its conclusions; contained nothing
more than a summary of the testimonies of the witnesses of both parties; convicted the
accused of libel but failed to cite any legal authority or principle to support conclusions that
the letter in question was libelous; consisted merely of one (1) paragraph with mostly
sweeping generalizations and failed to support its conclusion of parricide; consisted of five (5)
pages, three (3) pages of which were quotations from the labor arbiters decision including
the dispositive portion and barely a page (two [2] short paragraphs of two [2] sentences each)
of its own discussion or reasonings; was merely based on the findings of another
court sans transcript of stenographic notes; or failed to explain the factual and legal bases
for the award of moral damages.































69.Office of the President and Presidential Anti-Graft Commission v. Calixto R. Cataquiz, GR
183445, 14 September 2011 70
Facts:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the January 31, 2008 Decision
[1]
and the June 23, 2008 Resolution
[2]
of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 88736 entitled Calixto R. Cataquiz v. Office of the President and
Concerned Employees of the LLDA (CELLDA), which reversed and set aside the Amended
Resolution
[3]
dated February 10, 2005 of the Office of the President (OP).
The CA reversed and set aside the Amended Resolution of the OP. In so resolving, the CA in
a one paragraph pronouncement ruled that reasoned Cataquiz under R.A. No. 4850 constituted
acts that were within his authority as general manager of the LLDA to perform
Issue :
Whether or not the finding of fact of by the Court of Appeals can be reviewed by the Supreme Court.
Ruling:
Yes, as a general rule, only questions of law can be raised in a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Since the Court is not a trier of facts, findings of fact of the
appellate court are binding and conclusive upon this Court. There are, however, several recognized
exceptions to this rule among them that are applicable to this case are as follows, to wit:
(7) When the findings are contrary to those of the trial court;

(8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based;

It should be emphasized that findings of fact of administrative agencies will not be interfered
with and shall be considered binding and conclusive upon this Court provided that there is
substantial evidence to support such findings. Substantial evidence has been defined as that
amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion or evidence commonly accepted by reasonably prudent men in the conduct of their
affairs.
In this case, the findings of the CA are contrary to those of PAGC which recommended
Cataquiz dismissal for violating Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, in relation to Section 46(b)(27),
Chapter 6, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of E.O. 292. Likewise, the Investigating Team of the DENR
also agreed that there exists evidence that could sustain a finding of respondents violation of
several laws and regulations.
The result of PAGCs investigation, however, was simply brushed aside by the CA, without
citing any evidence on which its findings were based, ignoring the meticulous discussion of PAGCs
conclusions and in absolving Cataquiz from any wrongdoing.
As plain as that, without any analysis of the evidence on record or a comprehensive
discussion on how the decision was arrived at, the CA absolved Cataquiz of the acts he was accused
of committing during his service as General Manager of the LLDA.
Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution mandates that decisions must clearly and
distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based. Decisions of courts must be able to
address the issues raised by the parties through the presentation of a comprehensive analysis or
account of factual and legal findings of the court. It is evident that the CA failed to comply with
these requirements.

70.Republic of the Philippines (University of the Philippines) v. Legaspi, GR 177611
A Deed of Definite Sale was then executed whereby Rosalina, with the conformity of her then
tenant, Vicente Libo-on, sold the subject parcel in favor of UPV for the stated consideration
of P56,479.50. As a consequence, UPV immediately took possession of the property and, in line
with its educational development plan, started building thereon road networks, infrastructure and
school facilities.
However, Rosalina informed UPV that she was rescinding the sale of the subject parcel on
the ground that she was no longer the owner of the property as it was conveyed by way of barter or
exchange in favor of respondents Rodolfo Legaspi, Sr., Querobin Legaspi. It was also learned that
the said lot one was then divided into 10 lots
Petitioner, thru UPV, filed against respondents the complaint for eminent domain docketed
before the RTC.
Finding no opposition to petitioners motion for a declaration on its right to expropriate the
same, the RTC issued an order of condemnation upholding UPVs right to expropriate said three
parcels which had been denominated as Lot Nos. 21609-B, 21609-C and 21609-E
Considering that the foregoing condemnation order covered only three (3) of the ten (10) lots
comprising the subject property, petitioner moved for the continuation of the condemnation
proceedings insofar as the remaining seven lots were concerned.
the RTC further issued the herein assailed condemnation order of the same date, upholding
petitioners authority to expropriate the remaining seven lots comprising the property, namely, Lot
Nos. 21609-A, 21609-D, 21609-F, 21609-G, 21609-H, 21609-I and 21609-J. Excluding therefrom
the area occupied by the Villa Marina Beach Resort which respondent Rodolfo Legaspi, Sr. operated
in the premises
Aggrieved, petitioner filed on 16 August 2004 the Rule 65 petition
for certiorari and mandamus assailing the RTCs order dated 31 May 2004.

On 26 April 2007, the CA denied the petition on the ground that, under Rule 67 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, the proper remedy from said assailed orders was an ordinary appeal which,
once lost, cannot be substituted by a Rule 65 petition for certiorari and mandamus

Issue: Whether or not the Court of appeals erred on a question of law in denying the petition
for certiorari and affirming the order dated May 31, 2004 of branch 38 of
the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City which did not state the facts and the law on which it is
based.
Held :
Yes, the Court erred in denying and affirming the order dated May 31,2004 of the RTC.
The Supreme Court ruled that although certiorari cannot be generally used as a substitute
for a lapsed appeal, the CA lost sight of the fact, however, that the rule had been relaxed on a
number of occasions, where its rigid application will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of
justice.
The grave abuse of discretion imputable against the RTC was manifest as early in the
assailed 17 November 2003 order where, without giving any rationale therefor, and while it upheld
petitioners right of expropriation over Lot Nos. 21609-A, 21609-D, 21609-F, 21609-G, 21609-H,
21609-I and 21609-J, it excluded the area occupied by the Villa Marina Beach Resort owned and
operated by respondent Rodolfo Legaspi, Sr. No less than the Constitution mandates that "(n)o
decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts
and the law on which it is based."
Since it is a requirement of due process that the parties to a litigation be informed of how it
was decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the
court, the rule is settled that a decision that does not conform to the form and substance required
by the Constitution and the law is void and deemed legally inexistent. In Yao v. Court of
Appeals, this Court ruled as follows
Faithful adherence to the requirements of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution is
indisputably a paramount component of due process and fair play. It is likewise demanded by the
due process clause of the Constitution. The parties to a litigation should be informed of how it was
decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the
court. The court cannot simply say that judgment is rendered in favor of X and against Y and just
leave it at that without any justification whatsoever for its action. The losing party is entitled to
know why he lost, so he may appeal to the higher court, if permitted, should he believe that the
decision should be reversed. A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the
law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was reached and is precisely
prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review
by a higher tribunal. More than that, the requirement is an assurance to the parties that, in
reaching judgment, the judge did so through the processes of legal reasoning. It is, thus, a
safeguard against the impetuosity of the judge, preventing him from deciding ipse dixit. Vouchsafed
neither the sword nor the purse by the Constitution but nonetheless vested with the sovereign
prerogative of passing judgment on the life, liberty or property of his fellowmen, the judge must
ultimately depend on the power of reason for sustained public confidence in the justness of his
decision.
Thus the Court has struck down as void, decisions of lower courts and even of the Court of Appeals
whose careless disregard of the constitutional behest exposed their sometimes cavalier attitude not
only to their magisterial responsibilities but likewise to their avowed fealty to the Constitution.


G.R. No. 168654 March 25, 2009
ZAYBER JOHN B. PROTACIO, Petitioner,
vs.
LAYA MANANGHAYA & CO. and/or MARIO T. MANANGHAYA, Respondents.

FACTS:
Respondent KPMG Laya Mananghaya & Co. (respondent firm) is a general professional partnership
duly organized under the laws of the Philippines. Respondent firm hired petitioner Zayber John B.
Protacio as Tax Manager on 01 April 1996. He was subsequently promoted to the position of Senior
Tax Manager. On 01 October 1997, petitioner was again promoted to the position of Tax Principal.
However, on 30 August 1999, petitioner tendered his resignation effective 30 September 1999.
Then, on 01 December 1999, petitioner sent a letter to respondent firm demanding the immediate
payment of his 13th month pay, the cash commutation of his leave credits and the issuance of his
1999 Certificate of Income Tax Withheld on Compensation. Petitioner sent to respondent firm two
more demand letters for the payment of his reimbursement claims under pain of the legal action.
Respondent firm failed to act upon the demand letters. Thus, on 15 December 1999, petitioner filed
before the NLRC a complaint for the non-issuance of petitioners W-2 tax form for 1999 and the
non-payment of the following benefits: (1) cash equivalent of petitioners leave credits in the amount
of P55,467.60; (2) proportionate 13th month pay for the year 1999; (3) reimbursement claims in the
amount of P19,012.00; and (4) lump sum pay for the fiscal year 1999 in the amount of
P674,756.70. Petitioner also sought moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees. Respondent
Mario T. Manang-haya was also impleaded in his official capacity as respondent firms managing
partner.
During the pendency of the case before the Labor Arbiter, respondent firm on three occasions sent
check payments to petitioner in the following amounts: (1) P71,250.00, representing petitioners
13th month pay; (2) P54,824.18, as payments for the cash equivalent of petitioners leave credits
and reimbursement claims; and (3) P10,762.57, for the refund of petitioners taxes withheld on his
vacation leave credits. Petitioners copies of his withholding tax certificates were sent to him along
with the check payments. Petitioner acknowledged the receipt of the 13th month pay but disputed
the computation of the cash value of his vacation leave credits and reimbursement claims.
The Labor Arbiter awarded petitioners reimbursement claims on the ground that respondent firms
refusal to grant the same was not so much because the claim was baseless but because petitioner
had failed to file the requisite reimbursement forms. He held that the formal defect was cured when
petitioner filed several demand letters as well as the case before him.
Aggrieved, respondent firm appealed to the NLRC. On 21 August 2003, the NLRC rendered a
modified judgment.
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration but the NLRC denied the motion for lack of merit.
Hence, respondents elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari.
In the assailed Decision dated 19 April 2005, the Court of Appeals further reduced the total money
award to petitioner.
ISSUE:
WON Court of Appeals resolution which denied his motion for reconsideration violated Article VIII,
Section 14 of the Constitution.
HELD:
Courts; Judgments; The mandate of Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution requiring that no
decision shall be rendered without expressing clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which
it is based is applicable only in cases submitted for decision, i.e., given due course and after filing
of briefs or memoranda and/or other pleadings, as the case may bethe requirement is not
applicable to a resolution denying a motion for reconsideration of the decision.Before delving into
the merits of the petition, the issues raised by petitioner adverting to the Constitution must be
addressed. Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals resolution which denied his motion for
reconsideration violated Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution, which states: Section 14. No
decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts
and the law on which it is based. No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of
the court shall be refused due course or denied without stating the legal basis therefor. Obviously,
the assailed resolution is not a decision within the meaning of the Constitutional requirement.
This mandate is applicable only in cases submitted for decision, i.e., given due course and after
filing of briefs or memoranda and/or other pleadings, as the case may be. The requirement is not
applicable to a resolution denying a motion for reconsideration of the decision. What is applicable is
the second paragraph of the above-quoted Constitutional provision referring to motion for
reconsideration of a decision of the court. The assailed resolution complied with the requirement
therein that a resolution denying a motion for reconsideration should state the legal basis of the
denial. It sufficiently explained that after reading the pleadings filed by the parties, the appellate
court did not find any cogent reason to reverse itself.













G.R. No. 186614. February 23, 2011.*
NATIONWIDE SECURITY AND ALLIED SERVICES, INC., petitioner, vs. RONALD P.
VALDERAMA, respondent.
Respondent Ronald Valderama (Valderama) was hired by petitioner as security guard on April 18,
2002. He was assigned at the Philippine Heart Center (PHC), Quezon City, until his relief on
January 30, 2006. Valderama was not given any assignment thereafter. Thus, on August 2, 2006,
he filed a complaint for constructive dismissal and nonpayment of 13th month pay, with prayer for
damages against petitioner and Romeo Nolasco.
Petitioner presented a different version. It alleged that respondent was not constructively or illegally
dismissed, but had voluntarily resigned.
On appeal, the NLRC modified the LA decision. It declared that respondent was neither
constructively terminated nor did he voluntarily resign. As such, respondent remained an employee
of petitioner. The NLRC thus ordered respondent to immediately report to petitioner and assume his
duty. It also deleted the award of backwages and the order of reinstatement by the LA for lack of
basis.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, but the NLRC denied it on June 11, 2008.
Respondent went to the CA via certiorari. On December 9, 2008, the CA rendered a Decision8
setting aside the resolutions of the NLRC and reinstating that of the LA. In gist, the CA sustained
respondents claim of constructive dismissal. It pointed out that respondent remained on floating
status for more than six (6) months, and petitioner offered no credible explanation why it failed to
provide a new assignment to respondent after he was relieved from PHC. It likewise rejected
petitioners claim that respondent voluntarily resigned, holding that no convincing evidence was
offered to prove it. The CA found it odd that respondent attended the re-training course conducted
by petitioner from February 20, 2006 to March 1, 2006, if respondent indeed resigned on February
10, 2006. The CA, therefore, ruled against the legality of respondents dismissal and sustained the
LAs award of back wages and order of reinstatement in favor of respondent.
ISSUE:
WON CA acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction for
sustaining respondents claim of constructive dismissal.
RULING:
The constitutional requirement under the first paragraph of Section 14, Article VIII of the
Constitution that the facts and the law on which the judgment is based must be expressed clearly
and distinctly applies only to decisions, not to minute resolutions. A minute resolution is signed
only by the clerk of court by authority of the justices, unlike a decision. It does not require the
certification of the Chief Justice. Moreover, unlike decisions, minute resolutions are not published
in the Philippine Reports. Finally, the proviso of Section 4(3) of Article VIII speaks of a decision.
Indeed, as a rule, this Court lays down doctrines or principles of law which constitute binding
precedent in a decision duly signed by the members of the Court and certified by the Chief Justice.
Accordingly, since petitioner was not a party in G.R. No. 148680 and since petitioner's liability for
DST on its health care agreement was not the subject matter of G.R. No. 148680, petitioner cannot
successfully invoke the minute resolution in that case (which is not even binding precedent) in its
favor.
Furthermore, the filing of the complaint belies petitioners claim that respondent voluntarily
resigned. As held by this Court in Valdez v. NLRC:
It would have been illogical for herein petitioner to resign and then file a complaint for illegal
dismissal. Resignation is inconsistent with the filing of the said complaint.
Indubitably, respondent remained on floating status for more than six months. He was relieved
on January 30, 2006, and was not given a new assignment at the time he filed the complaint on
August 2, 2006. Jurisprudence is trite with pronouncements that the temporary inactivity or
floating status of security guards should continue only for six months. Otherwise, the security
agency concerned could be liable for constructive dismissal. The failure of petitioner to give
respondent a work assignment beyond the reasonable six-month period makes it liable for
constructive dismissal. The CA was correct in sustaining respondents claim.



















Philippine Health Care v CIR G.R. No. 167330 September 18, 2009
J. Corona

Facts:
Philippine Health Cares objectives were:
"[t]o establish, maintain, conduct and operate a prepaid group practice health care delivery system
or a health maintenance organization to take care of the sick and disabled persons enrolled in the
health care plan and to provide for the administrative, legal, and financial responsibilities of the
organization.
It lost the case in 2004 when it was made to pay over 100 million in VAT deficiencies. At the time
the MFR was filed, it was able to avail of tax amnesty under RA 9840 by paying 5 percent of the tax
or 5 million pesos.
Petitioner passed an MFR but the CA denied. Hence, this case.

Issue:
Was petitioner, as an HMO, engaged in the business of insurance during the pertinent taxable
years, and was thus liable for DST?

Held: No. Mfr granted. CIR must desist from collecting tax.

Ratio:
Section 185 of the NIRC . Stamp tax on fidelity bonds and other insurance policies. On all policies
of insurance or bonds or obligations of the nature of indemnity for loss, damage, or liability made or
renewed by any person, association or company or corporation transacting the business of accident,
fidelity, employers liability, plate, glass, steam boiler, burglar, elevator, automatic sprinkler, or
other branch of insurance (except life, marine, inland, and fire insurance).
Two requisites must concur before the DST can apply, namely: (1) the document must be a policy of
insurance or an obligation in the nature of indemnity and (2) the maker should be transacting the
business of accident, fidelity, employers liability, plate, glass, steam boiler, burglar, elevator,
automatic sprinkler, or other branch of insurance (except life, marine, inland, and fire insurance).
Under RA 7875, an HMO is "an entity that provides, offers or arranges for coverage of designated
health services needed by plan members for a fixed prepaid premium."
Various courts in the United States have determined that HMOs are not in the insurance business.
One test that they have applied is whether the assumption of risk and indemnification of loss are
the principal object and purpose of the organization or whether they are merely incidental to its
business. If these are the principal objectives, the business is that of insurance. But if such is
incidental and service is the principal purpose, then the business is not insurance.
Applying the "principal object and purpose test," there is significant American case law supporting
the argument that a corporation, whose main object is to provide the members of a group with
health services, is not engaged in the insurance business.
For the purpose of determining what "doing an insurance business" means, we have to scrutinize
the operations of the business as a whole. This is of course only prudent and appropriate, taking
into account laws applicable to those in the insurance business.
Petitioner, as an HMO, is not part of the insurance industry. This is evident from the fact that it is
not supervised by the Insurance Commission but by the Department of Health. In fact, in a letter
dated September 3, 2000, the Insurance Commissioner confirmed that petitioner is not engaged in
the insurance business.
As to whether the business is covered by the DST, we can see that while the contract did contains
all the elements of an insurance contract, as stated in Sec 2., Par 1 of the Insurance Code, the
primary purpose of the company is to render service. The primary purpose of the parties in making
the contract may negate the existence of an insurance contract.
Also, there is no loss, damage or liability on the part of the member that should be indemnified by
petitioner as an HMO. Under the agreement, the member pays petitioner a predetermined
consideration in exchange for the hospital, medical and professional services rendered by the
petitioners physician or affiliated physician to him.
In other words, there is nothing in petitioner's agreements that gives rise to a monetary liability on
the part of the member to any third party-provider of medical services which might in turn
necessitate indemnification from petitioner. The terms "indemnify" or "indemnity" presume that a
liability or claim has already been incurred. There is no indemnity precisely because the member
merely avails of medical services to be paid or already paid in advance at a pre-agreed price under
the agreements.
Also, a member can take advantage of the bulk of the benefits anytime, e.g. laboratory services, x-
ray, routine annual physical examination and consultations, vaccine administration as well as
family planning counseling, even in the absence of any peril, loss or damage on his or her part.
Petitioner is obliged to reimburse the member who receives care from a non-participating physician
or hospital. However, this is only a very minor part of the list of services available. The assumption
of the expense by petitioner is not confined to the happening of a contingency but includes
incidents even in the absence of illness or injury.
Consequently, there is a need to distinguish prepaid service contracts (like those of petitioner) from
the usual insurance contracts.
However, assuming that petitioners commitment to provide medical services to its members can be
construed as an acceptance of the risk that it will shell out more than the prepaid fees, it still will
not qualify as an insurance contract because petitioners objective is to provide medical services at
reduced cost, not to distribute risk like an insurer.
If it had been the intent of the legislature to impose DST on health care agreements, it could have
done so in clear and categorical terms. It had many opportunities to do so. But it did not. The fact
that the NIRC contained no specific provision on the DST liability of health care agreements of
HMOs at a time they were already known as such, belies any legislative intent to impose it on them.
As a matter of fact, petitioner was assessed its DST liability only on January 27, 2000, after more
than a decade in the business as an HMO.
In view of petitioners availment of the benefits of [RA 9840], and without conceding the merits of
this case as discussed above, respondent concedes that such tax amnesty extinguishes the tax
liabilities of petitioner.
21 Our Insurance Code was based on California and New York laws. When a statute has been
adopted from some other state or country and said statute has previously been construed by the
courts of such state or country, the statute is deemed to have been adopted with the construction
given.











A.M. OCA IPI No. 11-184-CA-J January 31, 2012
RE: VERIFIED COMPLAINT OF ENGR. OSCAR L. ONGJOCO, CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD/CEO
OF FH-GYMN MULTI-PURPOSE AND TRANSPORT SERVICE COOPERATIVE, AGAINST HON.
JUAN Q. ENRIQUEZ, JR., HON. RAMON M. BATO, JR. AND HON. FLORITO S. MACALINO,
ASSOCIATE JUSTICES, COURT OF APPEALS
On June 7, 2011, the Court received a letter from Engr. Oscar L. Ongjoco, claiming himself to be
the Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the FH-GYMN Multi-Purpose and
Transport Service Cooperative (FH-GYMN).
1
The letter included a complaint-affidavit,
2
whereby
Ongjoco charged the CAs Sixth Division composed of Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. (as
Chairman), Associate Justice Ramon M. Bato, Jr., and Associate Justice Florito S. Macalino as
Members for rendering an arbitrary and baseless decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 102289 entitled FH-
GYMN Multi-Purpose and Transport Service Cooperative v. Allan Ray A. Baluyut, et al.
3

The genesis of CA-G.R. SP No. 102289 started on July 26, 2004 when FH-GYMN requested the
amendment of Kautusang Bayan Blg. 37-02-97 of the City of San Jose del Monte, Bulacan through
the Committee on Transportation and Communications (Committee) of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod (Sanggunian) in order to include the authorization of FH-GYMNs Chairman to issue
motorized tricycle operators permit (MTOP) to its members.
4
During the ensuing scheduled public
hearings, City Councilors Allan Ray A. Baluyut and Nolly Concepcion, together with ABC President
Bartolome B. Aguirre and one Noel Mendoza (an employee of the Sanggunian), were alleged to have
uttered statements exhibiting their bias against FH-GYMN, giving FH-GYMN reason to believe that
the Committee members were favoring the existing franchisees Francisco Homes Tricycle
Operators and Drivers Association (FRAHTODA) and Barangay Mulawin Tricycle Operators and
Drivers Association (BMTODA).
5
Indeed, later on, the Sanggunian, acting upon the recommendation
of the Committee, denied the request of FH-GYMN.
6

On July 15, 2005, FH-GYMN brought a complaint in the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
Luzon charging Baluyut, Concepcion, Aguirre, Mendoza with violations of Article 124(2)(d) of the
Cooperative Code, Section 3(e) and (f) of the Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act), and Section 5(a) of Republic Act No. 6713 (Code of Conduct for Public Officials and
Employees). The complaint also charged Eduardo de Guzman (FRAHTODA President) and Wilson de
Guzman (BMTODA President). Eventually, the complaint of FH-GYMN was dismissed for
insufficiency of evidence as to the public officials, and for lack of merit and lack of jurisdiction as to
the private respondents. FH-GYMN sought reconsideration, but its motion to that effect was
denied.
7

FH-GYMN timely filed a petition for review in the CA.
In the meanwhile, FH-GYMN filed in the Office of the President a complaint accusing Overall Deputy
Ombudsman Orlando C. Casimiro, Deputy Ombudsman Emilio A. Gonzales III, and Graft
Investigator and Prosecution Officer Robert C. Renido with a violation of Section 3(i) of Republic Act
No. 3019 arising from the dismissal of its complaint.
8

On January 31, 2011, the CAs Sixth Division denied the petition for review.
9

FH-GYMN, through Ongjoco, moved for the reconsideration of the denial of the petition for review,
with prayer for inhibition,
10
but the CAs Sixth Division denied the motion.
Thereafter, Ongjoco initiated this administrative case against the aforenamed member of the CAs
Sixth Division.
In the complaint, Ongjoco maintained that respondent members of the CAs Sixth Division violated
Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution by not specifically stating the facts and the law on
which the denial of the petition for review was based; that they summarily denied the petition for
review without setting forth the basis for denying the five issues FH-GYMNs petition for review
raised; that the denial was "unjust, unfair and partial," and heavily favored the other party; that the
denial of the petition warranted the presumption of "directly or indirectly becoming interested for
personal gain" under Section 3(i) of Republic Act No. 3019; and that the Ombudsman officials who
were probably respondent Justices schoolmates or associates persuaded, induced or influenced
said Justices to dismiss the petition for review and to manipulate the delivery of the copy of the
decision to FH-GYMN to prevent it from timely filing a motion for reconsideration.
11

RULING:
We find the administrative complaint against respondent Justices of the Court of Appeals baseless
and utterly devoid of legal and factual merit, and outrightly dismiss it.
Firstly, Ongjoco insists that the decision promulgated on January 31, 2011 by the CAs Sixth
Division had no legal foundation and did not even address the five issues presented in the petition
for review; and that the respondents as members of the CAs Sixth Division thereby violated Section
14, Article VIII of the Constitution, which provides as follows:
Section 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.
No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due
course or denied without starting the legal basis therefor.
The insistence of Ongjoco is unfounded. The essential purpose of the constitutional provision is to
require that a judicial decision be clear on why a party has prevailed under the law as applied to the
facts as proved; the provision nowhere demands that a point-by-point consideration and resolution
of the issues raised by the parties are necessary.
12
Cogently, the Court has said in Tichangco v.
Enriquez,
13
to wit:
This constitutional provision deals with the disposition of petitions for review and of motions for
reconsideration. In appellate courts, the rule does not require any comprehensive statement of facts
or mention of the applicable law, but merely a statement of the "legal basis" for denying due course.
Thus, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement when a collegiate appellate
court, after deliberation, decides to deny a motion; states that the questions raised are factual or
have already been passed upon; or cites some other legal basis. There is no need to explain fully the
courts denial, since the facts and the law have already been laid out in the assailed Decision.
(Emphasis supplied)
Its decision shows that the CAs Sixth Division complied with the requirements of the constitutional
provision,
14
viz:
The petition is without merit.
Petitioner alleged that the Ombudsman erred in not finding respondents liable for violation of the
Cooperative Code of the Philippines considering that their actuations constituted acts of direct or
indirect interference or intervention with the internal affairs of FH-GYMN and that recommendation
to deny FH-GYMNs application was tantamount to "any other act inimical or adverse to its
autonomy and independence."
We disagree.
It is well settled that in administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving, by
substantial evidence, the allegations in his complaint. Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act is
unequivocal. Findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman, when supported by substantial
evidence, are conclusive. Conversely, when the findings of fact by the Ombudsman are not
adequately supported by substantial evidence, they shall not be binding upon the courts (Marcelo
vs. Bungubung, 552 SCRA 589).
In the present case, the Deputy Ombudsman found no substantial evidence to prove that there was
interference in the internal affairs of FH-GYMN nor was there a violation of the law by the
respondents. As aptly ruled by the Ombudsman:
"While the utterances made by respondents Baluyot, Aguirre and Mendoza in the course of public
hearings earlier mentioned indeed demonstrate exaltation of FRAHTODA and BMTODA, to the
apparent disadvantage of FH-GYMN, the same does not imply or suggest interference in the internal
affairs of the latter considering that said remarks or comments were made precisely in the lawful
exercise of the mandate of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the locality concerned through the
Committee on Transporation and Communication. It is worthy to emphasize that were it not for the
complainants letter-request dated July 23, 2004, the committee concerned would not have
conducted the aforementioned public hearings, thus, there would have been no occasion for the
subject unfavorable remarks to unleash. Thus, it would be irrational to conclude that simply
because the questioned utterances were unfavorable to FH-GYMN, the same constitutes
interference or intervention in the internal affairs of the said cooperative.
In the same vein, while respondents Baluyot, Concepcion and Aguirre rendered an adverse
recommendation as against complaints letter-request earlier mentioned, the same does not signify
giving of undue favors to FRAHTODA or BMTODA, or causing of undue injury to FH-GYMN,
inasmuch as said recommendation or decision, as the records vividly show, was arrived at by the
said respondents in honest exercise of their sound judgment based on their interpretation of the
applicable ordinance governing the operation of tricycles within their area of jurisdiction. Evidence
on record no doubt failed to sufficiently establish that, in so making the questioned
recommendation, respondents Baluyot, Concepcion and Aguirre acted with manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. It is likewise worthy to note that, contrary to
complainants insinuation, the letter-request adverted to was acted upon by respondents Baluyot,
Concepcion and Aguirre within a reasonable time and, as a matter of fact, complainant had been
notified of the action taken by the former relative to his letter-request or proposals.
Time and again, it has been held, no less than by the Supreme Court, that mere suspicions and
speculations can never be the basis of conviction in a criminal case. Guided by the same doctrinal
rule, this Office is not duty-bound to proceed with the indictment of the public respondents as
charged. Indeed well entrenched is the rule that "(t)he purpose of a preliminary investigation is to
secure the innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution and to protect him from
an open and public accusation of crime, from the trouble, expense and anxiety of a public trial, and
also to protect the state from useless and expensive trials (Joint Resolution, October 17, 2005, Rollo
pp. 142-143).
Moreover, petitioners failed to rebut the presumption of regularity in the performance of the official
duties of respondents by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. The
presumption prevails and becomes conclusive until it is overcome by no less than clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary. Every reasonable intendment will be made in support of the
presumption and in case of doubt as to an officers act being lawful or unlawful, construction
should be in favor of its lawfulness (Bustillo vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 160718, May 12,
2010).
There being no substantial evidence to reverse the findings of the Ombudsman, the instant petition
is denied.
WHEREFORE, premises considered the Petition for Review is DENIED for lack of merit. The Joint
Resolution dated October 17, 2005 and Joint Order dated April 25, 2006 of the Deputy
Ombudsman of Luzon are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Indeed, the definitive pronouncement of the CAs Sixth Division that "the Deputy Ombudsman
found no substantial evidence to prove that there was interference in the internal affairs of FH-
GYMN nor was there a violation of the law by the respondents"
15
met the constitutional demand for
a clear and distinct statement of the facts and the law on which the decision was based. The CAs
Sixth Division did not have to point out and discuss the flaws of FH-GYMNs petition considering
that the decision of the Deputy Ombudsman sufficiently detailed the factual and legal bases for the
denial of the petition.
Moreover, the CAs Sixth Division expressly found that FH-GYMN had not discharged its burden as
the petitioner of proving its allegations with substantial evidence.
16
In administrative cases involving
judicial officers, the complainants always carried on their shoulders the burden of proof to
substantiate their allegations through substantial evidence. That standard of substantial evidence
is satisfied only when there is reasonable ground to believe that the respondent is responsible for
the misconduct complained of although such evidence may not be overwhelming or even
preponderant.
17

Secondly, Ongjoco ought to know, if he genuinely wanted the Court to sustain his allegations of
misconduct against respondent Justices, that his administrative complaint must rest on the quality
of the evidence; and that his basing his plain accusations on hunches and speculations would not
suffice to hold them administratively liable for rendering the adverse decision. Nonetheless, he
exhibited disrespect for respondent Justices judicial office by still filing this administrative
complaint against them despite conceding in the administrative complaint itself his having no proof
of his charges, viz:
21. The petition to review in determining probable cause in a preliminary investigation had reached
this far and may reach the Supreme Court due to corrupt practices and culpable violation of the
1987 Constitution committed by Ombudsman officials and the herein respondents of the Court of
Appeals. A Motion for Reconsideration was submitted with prayer for the respondents to inhibit
themselves to act on it. Otherwise, it will add to congest the court docket which this Honorable
Court should intercede to look deeper into this matter by exercising its disciplinary functions over
herein respondents.1wphi1 The arbitrary denial of the Petition for Review rendered by the herein
respondents is meant that there is no sufficient ground out of the five (5) issues raised to engender
a well-founded belief that no single offense has been committed.
18

xxx
24. Though there was no clear evidence to link Ombudsman officials, they may have persuaded,
induced or influenced the herein respondents, who are either their schoolmates or associates, to
deny the Petition for Review in their bid to establish innocence on the related offense charged
against them on 18 August 2010 before the Office of the President docketed as OP-DC Case No. 11-
C-006. Likewise, they may have manipulated the delivery of a copy of Decision intended for the
petitioner in order for the latter to fail in submitting a motion for reconsideration purposely to make
the Decision final and executory by which the said Ombudsman officials could use such Decision to
attain impunity on complaint against them filed with the Office of the President.
19
(emphasis
supplied)
It is evident to us that Ongjocos objective in filing the administrative complaint was to take
respondent Justices to task for the regular performance of their sworn duty of upholding the rule of
law. He would thereby lay the groundwork for getting back at them for not favoring his unworthy
cause. Such actuations cannot be tolerated at all, for even a mere threat of administrative
investigation and prosecution made against a judge to influence or intimidate him in his regular
performance of the judicial office always subverts and undermines the independence of the
Judiciary.
20

We seize this occasion, therefore, to stress once again that disciplinary proceedings and criminal
actions brought against any judge in relation to the performance of his official functions are neither
complementary to nor suppletory of appropriate judicial remedies, nor a substitute for such
remedies.
21
Any party who may feel aggrieved should resort to these remedies, and exhaust them,
instead of resorting to disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions. We explained why in In Re:
Joaquin T. Borromeo:
22

Given the nature of the judicial function, the power vested by the Constitution in the Supreme
Court and the lower courts established by law, the question submits to only one answer: the
administrative or criminal remedies are neither alternative or cumulative to judicial review where
such review is available, and must wait on the result thereof.
Simple reflection will make this proposition amply clear, and demonstrate that any contrary
postulation can have only intolerable legal implications. Allowing a party who feels aggrieved by a
judicial order or decision not yet final and executory to mount an administrative, civil or criminal
prosecution for unjust judgment against the issuing judge would, at a minimum and as an
indispensable first step, confer the prosecutor (Ombudsman) with an incongruous function
pertaining, not to him, but to the courts: the determination of whether the questioned disposition is
erroneous in its findings of fact or conclusions of law, or both. If he does proceed despite that
impediment, whatever determination he makes could well set off a proliferation of administrative or
criminal litigation, a possibility hereafter more fully explored.
Such actions are impermissible and cannot prosper. It is not, as already pointed out, within the
power of public prosecutors, or the Ombudsman or his Deputies, directly or vicariously, to review
judgments or final orders or resolutions of the Courts of the land. The power of reviewby appeal or
special civil actionis not only lodged exclusively in the Courts themselves but must be exercised in
accordance with a well-defined and long established hierarchy, and long standing processes and
procedures. No other review is allowed; otherwise litigation would be interminable, and vexatiously
repetitive.
In this regard, we reiterate that a judges failure to correctly interpret the law or to properly
appreciate the evidence presented does not necessarily incur administrative liability,
23
for to hold
him administratively accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision he renders, assuming he
has erred, will be nothing short of harassment and will make his position doubly unbearable. His
judicial office will then be rendered untenable, because no one called upon to try the facts or to
interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment.
24

Administrative sanction and criminal liability should be visited on him only when the error is so
gross, deliberate and malicious, or is committed with evident bad faith,
25
or only in clear cases of
violations by him of the standards and norms of propriety and good behavior prescribed by law and
the rules of procedure, or fixed and defined by pertinent jurisprudence.
26

What the Court sees herein is Ongjocos proclivity to indiscriminately file complaints. His proclivity
reminds us now of Joaquin T. Borromeo whom this Court pronounced guilty of indirect contempt of
court he "repeatedly committed over time, despite warnings and instructions given to him."
27
The
Court imposed the penalty for contempt of court "to the end that he may ponder his serious errors
and grave misconduct and learn due respect for the Courts and their authority."
28

Having determined that the administrative charge against respondent Justices had no factual and
legal bases, we cannot hesitate to shield them by immediately rejecting the charge. We do so
because unfounded administrative charges do not contribute anything worthwhile to the orderly
administration of justice; instead, they retard it.
Nor should we just let such rejected charge pass and go unchallenged. We recognize that
unfounded administrative charges against judges really degrade the judicial office, and interfere
with the due performance of their work for the Judiciary. Hence, we deem to be warranted to now
direct Ongjoco to fully explain his act of filing an utterly baseless charge against respondent
Justices.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court: (a) DISMISSES the administrative complaint against Associate Justice
Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., Associate Justice Ramon M. Bato, Jr., and Associate Justice Florito S.
Macalino for its utter lack of merit; and (b) ORDERS Engr. Oscar L. Ongjoco to show cause in
writing within ten (10) days from notice why he should not be punished for indirect contempt of
court for degrading the judicial office of respondent Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals, and
for interfering with the due performance of their work for the Judiciary.
SO ORDERED.

















G.R. No. 196358 March 21, 2012
JANDY J. AGOY, Petitioner,
vs.
ARANETA CENTER, INC., Respondents.

On June 15, 2011 the Court denied petitioner Jandy J. Agoys petition for review through a minute
resolution that reads:
"G.R. No. 196358 (Jandy J. Agoy vs. Araneta Center, Inc.).- The Court resolves to GRANT
petitioners motion for extension of thirty (30) days from the expiration of the reglementary period
within which to file a petition for review on certiorari.
The court further resolves to DENY the petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision dated
19 October 2010 and Resolution dated 29 March 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA), Manila, in CA-
G.R. SP No. 108234 for failure to show that the CA committed reversible error when it affirmed the
dismissal of petitioner Jandy J. Agoy. Petitioners repeated delays in remitting the excess cash
advances and admission that he spent them for other purposes constitute serious misconduct and
dishonesty which rendered him unworthy of the trust and confidence reposed in him by respondent
Araneta Center, Inc."
Apparently, however, Agoy doubted the authenticity of the copy of the above minute resolution that
he received through counsel since he promptly filed a motion to rescind the same and to have his
case resolved on its merits via a regular resolution or decision signed by the Justices who took part
in the deliberation. In a related development, someone claiming to be Agoys attorney-in-fact
requested an investigation of the issuance of the resolution of June 15, 2011.
On September 21, 2011 the Court denied Agoys motion to rescind the subject minute resolution
and confirmed the authenticity of the copy of the June 15, 2011 resolution. It also treated his
motion to rescind as a motion for reconsideration and denied the same with finality.
Upon receipt of the Courts September 21, 2011 resolution, Agoy filed a motion to rescind the same
or have his case resolved by the Court En Banc pursuant to Section 13 in relation to Sec. 4(3),
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. Agoy reiterated his view that the Court cannot decide his
petition by a minute resolution. He thus prayed that it rescind its June 15 and September 21, 2011
resolutions, determine whether it was proper for the Court to resolve his petition through a minute
resolution, and submit the case to the Court en banc for proper disposition through a signed
resolution or decision.
ISSUE:
Is an adjudication of a case by minute resolution an exercise of judicial discretion and constitutes
sound and valid judicial practice.
RULING:
YES.
One. The notices of the minute resolutions of June 15 and September 21, 2011 sent to Agoy,
bearing the signatures of Assistant Clerk of Court Teresita Aquino Tuazon and Deputy Division
Clerk of Court Wilfredo V. Lapitan, both printed on pink paper and duly received by counsel for
petitioner as evidenced by the registry return cards, are authentic and original copies of the
resolutions. The Court has given Tuazon and Lapitan the authority to inform the parties under their
respective signatures of the Courts actions on the incidents in the cases.
Minute resolutions are issued for the prompt dispatch of the actions of the Court. While they are
the results of the deliberations by the Justices of the Court, they are promulgated by the Clerk of
Court or his assistants whose duty is to inform the parties of the action taken on their cases by
quoting verbatim the resolutions adopted by the Court.
1
Neither the Clerk of Court nor his
assistants take part in the deliberations of the case. They merely transmit the Courts action in the
form prescribed by its Internal Rules:
Sec. 7. Form of notice of a minute resolution.A notice of minute resolution shall be embodied in a
letter of the Clerk of Court or the Division Clerk of Court notifying the parties of the action or
actions taken in their case. In the absence of or whenever so deputized by the Clerk of Court or the
Division Clerk of Court, the Assistant Clerk of Court or Assistant Division Clerk of Court may
likewise sign the letter which shall be in the following form:
(SUPREME COURT Seal)
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC/____ DIVISION
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames:
Please take notice that the Court en banc/___ Division issued a Resolution dated _____, which reads
as follows:
"G.R./UDK/A.M./A.C. No. ____ (TITLE).(QUOTE RESOLUTION)"
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.)
CLERK OF COURT/Division Clerk of Court
As the Court explained in Borromeo v. Court of Appeals,
2
no law or rule requires its members to
sign minute resolutions that deny due course to actions filed before it or the Chief Justice to enter
his certification on the same. The notices quote the Courts actual resolutions denying due course
to the subject actions and these already state the required legal basis for such denial. To require the
Justices to sign all its resolutions respecting its action on new cases would be unreasonable and
unnecessary.
Based on last years figures, the Court docketed a total of 5,864 new cases, judicial and
administrative. The United States Supreme Court probably receives lesser new cases since it does
not have administrative supervision of all courts. Yet, it gives due course to and decides only about
100 cases per year. Agoys demand that this Court give due course to and decide all cases filed with
it on the merits, including his case, is simply unthinkable and shows a lack of discernment of
reality.
Two. While the Constitution requires every court to state in its decision clearly and distinctly the
fact and the law on which it is based, the Constitution requires the court, in denying due course to
a petition for review, merely to state the legal basis for such denial.
Sec. 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly
the facts and the law on which it is based. No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a
decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied without stating the legal basis therefor.
3

(Emphasis supplied)
With the promulgation of its Internal Rules, the Court itself has defined the instances when cases
are to be adjudicated by decision, signed resolution, unsigned resolution or minute resolution.
4

Among those instances when a minute resolution shall issue is when the Court "denies a petition
filed under Rule 45 of the [Rules of Court], citing as legal basis the absence of reversible error
committed in the challenged decision, resolution, or order of the court below."
5
The minute
resolutions in this case complied with this requirement.
The Court has repeatedly said that minute resolutions dismissing the actions filed before it
constitute actual adjudications on the merits.
6
They are the result of thorough deliberation among
the members of the Court.
7
When the Court does not find any reversible error in the decision of the
CA and denies the petition, there is no need for the Court to fully explain its denial, since it already
means that it agrees with and adopts the findings and conclusions of the CA. The decision sought
to be reviewed and set aside is correct.
8
It would be an exercise in redundancy for the Court to
reproduce or restate in the minute resolution denying the petition the conclusions that the CA
reached.1wphi1
Agoy questions the Courts act of treating his motion to rescind as a motion for reconsideration,
arguing that it had no basis for doing so. But the Court was justified in its action since his motion
to rescind asked the Court to review the merits of his case again.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES petitioner Jandy J. Agoys motion to rescind dated December 21,
2011 and the Motion for Clarification and to Resolve Pending Incidents dated January 31, 2012 for
lack of merit.
The Court shall not entertain further pleadings or motions in this case. Let entry of judgment be
issued.
SO ORDERED.









[A.M. No. 01-6-314-RTC. June 19, 2003]
RE: REQUEST OF JUDGE ROBERTO S. JAVELLANA, RTC-BR. 59, SAN CARLOS CITY (NEGROS
OCCIDENTAL) FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO DECIDE CIVIL CASES NOS. X-98 & RTC 363.
FACTS:
On April 25, 2001, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) received a letter1[1] from Judge
Roberto S. Javellana, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of San Carlos City, Negros
Occidental, Branch 59, requesting for an extension of time within which to decide Civil Case No. X-
98 (Teodoro Bintad, et al. v. Celso Ocdinaria, et al.) and Civil Case No. RTC-363 (Ricardo M. Lacson,
et al. v. San Carlos Agro-aqua Corporation, et al.). Judge Javellana explained that he was not able to
render a decision in these cases within the 90-day reglementary period because he presides over
two courts, Branches 57 and 59, and he has to travel to Manila to attend to the administrative case
filed against him.
On May 3, 2001, the OCA required Atty. Titania A. Ledunia, the Clerk of Court of Branch 59, to
explain the circumstances of the aforementioned cases since the reglementary period of ninety (90)
days within which to decide them have already expired.
In her letter2[2] dated May 8, 2001, Atty. Leduna explained that Judge Javellana previously
dismissed Civil Case No. X-98 but on appeal it was remanded to the trial court by the Court of
Appeals. The case was submitted for decision on October 11, 2000. On the other hand, Civil Case
No. RTC-363 was submitted for decision on November 4, 2000. Atty. Leduna further added that the
delay in resolving the above-mentioned cases was due to Judge Javellanas policy of giving priority
to criminal cases.





On August 8, 2001,3[3] the request of Judge Javellana for a 90-day extension within which to
decide the two civil cases was granted. He was directed to submit to the OCA copies of his
decisions in the aforesaid cases within ten (10) days from date of its promulgation. Judge Javellana
was furthermore required to explain, within ten (10) days from notice, why his request for an
extension of time was made after the expiration of the 90-day period to decide the cases.
On October 3, 2001, Judge Javellana rendered a decision4[4] in Civil Case No. RTC-363. However,
it was only on March 20, 20025[5] that he submitted a copy of the said decision to the OCA.
On May 13, 2002, the OCA submitted its Memorandum, stating that Judge Javellana failed to
render a decision in the two civil cases within the 90-day extended period granted by the Court. It
found that while Civil Case No. RTC-363 was submitted for decision on November 4, 2000 and
should have been decided on February 4, 2001, Judge Javellana rendered his decision only on
October 3, 2001. Civil Case No. X-98, on the other hand, was submitted for decision on October
11, 2000 and was due on January 11, 2001, but Judge Javellana has not yet submitted a copy of
his decision to the OCA.
Hence, the OCA recommended that the Court (1) impose on Judge Javellana a fine of Four
Thousand Pesos (P4,000.00) for his failure to decide Civil Cases Nos. RTC-363 and X-98 within the
90-day reglementary period and for his failure to seasonably request for additional time to resolve
them; (2) order respondent judge to submit to this Court, through the OCA, a copy of his decision in
Civil Case No. X-98 immediately after rendition thereof; and (3) to reprimand respondent judge for
his failure to explain why he requested for an extension of time to decide the subject cases only
after the 90-day period within which to decide had already expired.6[6]
RULING:
Decision-making, among others, is the primordial and most important duty of every member of the
bench.7[7] Judges have the sworn duty to administer justice without undue delay, for justice
delayed is justice denied. No less than our Constitution8[8] requires that a trial court judge shall
resolve or decide cases within three (3) months after they have been submitted for decision. In













addition to this Constitutional mandate, the Code of Judicial Conduct9[9] mandates that judges
shall dispose of the courts business promptly and decide cases within the required period. A judge
should not pay mere lip service to the 90-day reglementary period for deciding a case.
Moreover, the Court, in its aim to dispense speedy justice, is not unmindful of circumstances that
justify the delay in the disposition of the cases assigned to judges. It is precisely for this reason why
the Court has been sympathetic to requests for extensions of time within which to decide cases and
resolve matters and incidents related thereto. When a judge sees such circumstances before the
reglementary period ends, all that is needed is to simply ask the Court, with the appropriate
justification, for an extension of time within which to decide the case. Thus, a request for extension
within which to render a decision filed beyond the 90-day reglementary period is obviously a
subterfuge to both the constitutional edict and the Code of Judicial Conduct.
In the case at bar, despite being granted the 90-day extension within which to decide the two civil
cases, Judge Javellana failed to meet the deadline within the extended period. He was able to
decide only Civil Case No. RTC-363 five (5) months after the extended period has expired and he
furnished the OCA a copy of his decision five (5) months after he rendered said decision. Such
delay clearly contravened the directive of this Court in its Resolution dated August 8, 200110[10]
which directed Judge Javellana to provide the OCA a copy of his decision on the case after ten (10)
days from rendition thereof. On the other hand, Judge Javellana has not rendered a decision in
Civil Case No. X-98.
His designation as acting judge in another sala cannot excuse his negligence and gross inefficiency
in failing to decide the two civil cases within the 90-day extended period. As pointed out by the
OCA, the delay of Judge Javellana in resolving the two cases was not caused by heavy caseload in
the two branches that he presides. Moreover, Judge Javellana should have been more circumspect
in monitoring the cases submitted for decision, considering that this is not the first time that he has
been sanctioned by this Court for his failure to decide a case within the reglementary period
prescribed by law. Thus, in Eliezar A. Sibayan-Joaquin v. Judge Roberto S. Javellana,11[11] he was
fined two thousand (P2,000.00) pesos when he failed to decide Criminal Case No. RTC-1150, an
estafa case, within the period prescribed by law.
This Court has ruled in several cases that the designation of a judge to preside over another sala
does not justify delay in deciding a case. This is because he is not precluded from asking for an
extension of the period within which to decide a case if this is necessary.12[12] Judges are called
upon to manage their courts with a view to a prompt and convenient disposition of their
business.13[13] It is therefore incumbent upon Judge Javellana to devise an efficient system in his










courts to obviate any confusion which may adversely affect the flow of cases and their speedy
disposition. Delay results in undermining the people's faith in the judiciary from whom the prompt
hearing of their supplications is anticipated and expected, and reinforces in the mind of litigants
that the wheels of justice grind ever so slowly.14[14]
Respondent judges negligence and gross inefficiency are not the only misdeeds which warrant the
corrective intervention of the Court in this case. We likewise find reason to wield disciplinary
sanction on respondent judges indifference to the directive of this Court. When we issued our
Resolution dated August 8, 2001,15[15] granting the extension of time prayed for by respondent
judge, we further directed him to submit to this Court, through the OCA, a copy of his decisions in
the aforesaid cases within ten (10) days from date of its promulgation and explain, within ten (10)
days from notice of our resolution, why his request for an extension of time was made only after the
90-day period to decide the cases has expired. However, record shows that Civil Case No. RTC-363
was decided on October 3, 2001 but it took respondent judge five (5) months from date of its
promulgation to furnish us a copy of the said decision. He likewise failed to render a decision in
Civil Case No. X-98. Worse, he also failed to submit an explanation why he filed his request for
extension beyond the 90-day reglementary period. The indifference exhibited by respondent judge
constrains us to impose upon him stiffer sanctions than those recommended by the OCA.
In Corazon Guerrero v. Judge Marcial M. Deray,16[16] we held that:
It is hardly necessary to remind respondent that judges should respect the orders and decisions of
higher tribunals, much more the Highest Tribunal of the land from which all other courts should
take their bearings. A resolution of the Supreme Court is not to be construed as a mere request, nor
should it be complied with partially, inadequately or selectively. If at all, this omission not only
betrays a recalcitrant flaw in respondents character; it also underscores his disrespect of the
Courts lawful orders and directives which is only too deserving of reproof.
Thus, in one case, the failure of respondent judge to comply with the show-cause resolutions of the
Court was deemed grave and serious misconduct affecting his fitness and worthiness of the honor
and integrity attached to his office. In Alonto-Frayna v. Astih, we further held:
A judge who deliberately and continuously fails and refuses to comply with the resolution of this
Court is guilty of gross misconductand insubordination. It is gross misconduct and even
outright disrespectfor this Court for respondent to exhibit indifference to the resolutions requiring
him to comment on the accusations contained in the complaint against him.
In other words, indifference or defiance to the Courts orders or resolutions may be punished with
dismissal, suspension or fine as warranted by the circumstances. (Emphasis ours; Citations
omitted)








In sum, Judge Javellana is guilty of gross inefficiency17[17] and negligence for his undue delay in
resolving the two civil cases within the extended 90-day period. He is likewise guilty of gross
misconduct aggravated by his lack of candor and his callous disregard of this Courts previous
sanction and Resolution dated August 8, 2001. Considering the circumstances of this case, we
hold that the penalty of fine in the amount of P20,000.00 is commensurate to respondent Judges
infractions.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Judge Roberto S. Javellana of the Regional Trial Court of
San Carlos City (Negros Occidental), Branch 57 is found GUILTY of gross inefficiency, negligence
and delay in the rendition of judgments and gross misconduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service. Accordingly, he is ordered to pay a FINE in the amount of P20,000.00. He is STERNLY
WARNED that commission of similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

















[A.M. No. RTJ-00-1594. June 20, 2003]



PASTOR SALUD,complainant, vs.JUDGE FLORENTINO M. ALUMBRES, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 255, Las Pias City, respondent.
This is an administrative case filed by Pastor Salud18[1] against the Hon. Florentino M. Alumbres,
then presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Pias City, Metro Manila, Branch 255,
for undue delay in the resolution of Civil Case No. LP-96-300, entitled Sps. Eduardo and Josefina
Laurito v. Sps. Pastor and Marcosa Salud.
As found by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA),19[2] the instant matter originated from the
double sale of a parcel of land. It appears that a certain Ricardo Forneza, Jr., and Cynthia S.
Forneza were the original owners of a house and lot covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
(106597) T-5251-A. In a brief span of four (4) days, the Fornezas managed to sell the same property
twice. The first sale took place on February 8, 1990 to one Ferdinand Jimenez as evidenced by a
Deed of Sale. Then on February 12, 1990, the Fornezas executed in favor of Maria Belen Salud and
Laurina Salud, a Contract to Sell20[3] over the same house and lot.
The first buyer (Jimenez) successfully caused the transfer of the title of the subject property in his
name, as a result of which TCT No. (106597) T-5251-A was cancelled and TCT No. T-14065 issued
in his name. On June 27, 1991, Jimenez sold the property to the spouses Eduardo and Josefina
Laurito. The Laurito spouses then secured a new title, TCT No. T-24778, in their names.21[4]
When the Laurito spouses visited the subject property, they discovered that the spouses Pastor and
Marcosa Salud were occupying the house and lot. Notwithstanding the demand made by the
Lauritos, the Salud couple refused to vacate the property. Hence, the Lauritos filed a suit for
unlawful detainer against them before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Las Pias City.22[5]
Despite the defense of the Salud spouses that they were buyers in good faith, the MeTC rendered a
Decision,23[6] dated December 9, 1996, against them. The MeTC held that the Saluds failed to
present any document to show that they were the owners of the property.













On April 17, 1997, the Salud spouses appealed and filed a memorandum pursuant to Section 7,
Rule 4024[7] of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The case, docketed as Civil Case No. LP-96-
300, was raffled to Branch 255 of the RTC of Las Pias City, presided over by herein respondent.
Notwithstanding the pendency of said appeal, on April 1, 1997,25[8] Judge Alumbres issued an
Alias Writ of Execution, stating that judgment [is] now final and executory. 26[9] Thus, the Salud
spouses filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals on April 23, 1997, with a prayer to
temporarily restrain the RTC from implementing, enforcing or otherwise executing its orders dated
February 17, 1997 and April 1, 1997, or otherwise disturbing the status quo.27[10]
The Laurito spouses then filed with the Court of Appeals a Motion to Declare Temporary Restraining
Order Vacated and for the early resolution of the case. On October 8, 1998, they also filed a Motion
for Issuance of an Alias Writ of Execution Pending Appeal.28[11]
On October 19, 1998,29[12] Pastor Salud filed a Letter Complaint30[13] with the OCA praying that
the respondent judge be found administratively liable for delay in rendering judgment in Civil Case
No. LP-96-300. The Salud spouses claimed that the RTC had the period from May 1997 to August
1997 to decide Civil Case No. LP-96-300, but had not resolved the matter. They likewise pointed to
another case pending before the respondent, where the litigants had been waiting at least six (6)
months for the courts judgment. The complainants herein asked the OCA to look closely at the
docket of respondent judges sala, as they were of the belief that several cases ripe for decision
remained unacted upon.31[14]

















On October 19, 1998, despite Saluds opposition, the respondent judge issued an Alias Writ of
Execution. Salud questioned the issuance of the alias writ on the ground that said order was
contrary to the respondent judges earlier statement that he would not act upon or issue any writ
out of respect for the order of the Court of Appeals to maintain the status quo. The respondent
judge made the statement, according to Salud despite the prayer of the Saluds that a decision be
rendered on their unlawful detainer case.32[15]
On November 20, 1998, or after more than fifteen (15) months from submission, the RTC handed
down its judgment in Civil Case No. LP-96-300. It affirmed in toto the decision of the MeTC, which
found the Saluds have failed to present a better title to the subject property.33[16]
In his Commenton the instant Complaint, respondent judge does not deny that there was a delay in
the rendition of judgment. However, he sought to put the blame for the delay squarely on the
complainant herein. According to respondent, after he decreed the issuance of a Writ of Execution
Pending Appeal, complainant herein filed numerous pleadings not only before the RTC but also with
the Court of Appeals, which sought to thwart the implementation of the writ issued and, obviously,
to harass him. Complainant likewise sought to inhibit him from proceeding with the hearing of
Civil Case No. LP-96-300. Respondent avers that complainant even went to the extent of charging
him with contempt of court before the Court of Appeals. As a result, respondent said his time was
virtually used up by answering baseless and unwarranted pleadings filed by the complainant.34[18]
Respondent points out that despite the pendency of the administrative case against him, he was
nevertheless able to render a decision, albeit delayed by 16 months. He now submits that given this
development, he should be exempted from and relieved of any liability. In addition, Judge Alumbres
submits that more than one (1) year has lapsed since the case was decided and he no longer has
any jurisdiction over Civil Case No. LP-96-300. Hence, he should not be ordered to explain matters
no longer within his jurisdiction and competence.35[19] Lastly, Judge Alumbres attributes the filing
of the administrative case against him to the unfavorable decision he rendered against complainant
in the unlawful detainer case. He cites complainant as a classic example of a disgruntled
litigant.36[20]
On August 29, 2000, the Court Administrator recommended that the respondent judge be
suspended without pay and benefits for a period of two (2) months37[21] for delay in the












disposition of a case.38[22] Said recommendation took into consideration the fact that respondent
had previously been admonished for having decided a case beyond the reglementary period.
It is not disputed that it took respondent judge over 16 months to render his decision in Civil Case
No. LP-96-300 after it was submitted for decision. The Constitution39[23] mandates lower court
judges to decide a case within ninety (90) days from its submission. Likewise, the Code of Judicial
Conduct40[24] mandates judges to administer justice without delay and directs every judge to
dispose of the courts business promptly within the period prescribed by the law and the rules. We
have emphasized strict observance of this duty in order to minimize, if not totally eradicate, the twin
problems of congestion and delay that have long plagued our courts. It is an oft-repeated maxim
that justice delayed is often justice denied. Thus, any delay in the administration of justice, no
matter how brief, may result in depriving the litigant of his right to a speedy disposition of his case.
Delay ultimately affects the image of the judiciary.41[25] Failure to comply with the mandate of the
Constitution and of the Code of Judicial Conduct constitutes serious misconduct, which is detrimental to
the honor and integrity of a judicial office. Inability to decide a case despite the ample time prescribed is
inexcusable, constitutes gross inefficiency,42[26] and warrants administrative sanction of the defaulting
judge.43[27]
Delay in the rendition of judgments diminishes the peoples faith in our judicial system,44[28] and
lowers its standards and brings it into disrepute.45[29] In the event that judges cannot comply with
the deadlines prescribed by law, they should apply for extensions of time to avoid administrative


















sanctions.46[30] The Court allows a certain degree of latitude to judges and grants them reasonable
extensions of time to resolve cases upon proper application by the judges concerned and on
meritorious grounds.47[31] At the very least, respondent judge should have requested for an
extension of time to render judgment once he knew that he could not comply with the prescribed
90-day period to render a judgment. In so doing, he would have been able to apprise litigants as to
the status of the case and the reason for the delay, if any. It would have shown his mindfulness of
the deadlines.
Undue delay in rendering a decision constitutes a less serious charge under Section 4, Rule
14048[32] of the Rules of Court, as amended. If found guilty thereof, the judge shall be suspended
from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) month or more than three (3)
months; or imposed a fine of more than P10,000, but not exceeding P20,000, pursuant to Section
10,49[33] Rule 140.
In this instance, however, we also have to recognize certain contributing factors for the delay.
Among them are the observed tendencies of the litigants to resort to harassment tactics against the
judge, as well as to overburden the court with multiple but unnecessary motions and related
paperwork. These negative tactics are to be deplored. Although they do not excuse undue delay,
they certainly should mitigate the imposable penalty on the erring judge.
Except for the mitigating circumstance, we are in agreement with the OCA recommendations in this
case. The record shows that this is not the first time that respondent has been called to account by
this Court. In 1992, he was fined for gross partiality to a party. In 1996, he was admonished for
delay in the disposition of a case. In 1999, he was reprimanded. Although respondent has retired
on June 3, 2001, the recommendation of the OCA that a fine be imposed on him is still in order.
Worth stressing, even after a judge has retired from the service, he may still be held
administratively accountable for lapses and offenses committed during his incumbency. Although
he may no longer be dismissed or suspended, fines may still be meted out to be deducted from his
retirement benefits.50[34]
ACCORDINGLY, considering all the circumstances in this case, Hon. Florentino M. Alumbres,
former presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court of Las Pias, Branch 255, is FINED FIVE











THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) for undue delay in rendering a decision in Civil Case No. LP-96-
300. Said amount is hereby ORDERED deducted from retirement benefits of respondent.
SO ORDERED.



[A.M. No. RTJ-00-1601. November 13, 2001]
ELIEZER A. SIBAYAN-JOAQUIN, complainant, vs. JUDGE ROBERTO S. JAVELLANA, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 57, San Carlos City, Negros Occidental, respondent.
In a complaint-affidavit, dated 17 September 1999, Eliezer A. Sibayan-Joaquin charged Judge
Roberto S. Javellana, acting presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of San Carlos City,
Branch 57, with grave misconduct in the performance of official duties, graft and gross ignorance of
the law. The complaint was an offshoot of a case for estafa, docketed Criminal Case No. RTC 1150,
entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Romeo Tan y Salazar," filed by Sibayan-Joaquin for and in
behalf of Andersons Group, Inc., against Romeo Tan before the San Carlos City RTC. Complainant
averred that there was an undue delay in the rendition of judgment in the aforenumbered criminal
case, the decision, dated 16 July 1999, that had acquitted the accused Romeo Tan, having been
rendered only on the tenth month after the case was submitted for decision. Complainant further
claimed that neither respondent judge nor his clerk of court was present during the promulgation of
the decision in contravention of Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court. Respondent judge was
also cited for impropriety by complainant because he was often seen with Attorney Vic Agravante,
counsel for the accused, whose vehicle respondent judge would even use at times.
Required to comment on the complaint, respondent judge admitted that the decision in Criminal
Case No. RTC-1150 was rendered beyond the ninety-day reglementary period but attributed the
delay to his voluminous workload. Respondent was handling two salas, his original station, RTC
Branch 59, designated as being a special court for heinous crimes, and RTC Branch 57. He
explained that he was suffering from hypertension which resulted in his frequent requests for leave.
Respondent judge maintained that the decision in Criminal Case No. RTC-1150 was validly
promulgated. He denied any irregularity in the promulgation of the decision which was duly
conducted by Atty. Tarjata Ignalaga, Clerk of Court VI, of the Regional Trial Court of San Carlos
City, Negros Occidental, in the presence of accused Romeo Tan y Salazar and his counsel, Atty.
Agravante, along with Provincial Prosecutor Estefanio Libutna, Jr., and private prosecutor Atty.
Edwin Magrinto. Respondent judge denied any close association with Atty. Agravante.
The matter was referred to the Office of the Court Administrator ("OCA") for evaluation. In its report
of 09 September 2000, the OCA recommended that an investigation be conducted in order to afford
the parties the opportunity to substantiate their respective claims. In its resolution of 23 October
2000, the Court adopted the OCA's recommendation and assigned the case to Associate Justice
Bernardo Abesamis of the Court of Appeals.
In due time, Justice Abesamis submitted his report, dated 25 May 2001, finding respondent judge
to have indeed failed to decide Criminal Case No. RTC-1150 within the ninety-day reglementary
period. The Investigating Justice found no irregularity, however, in the promulgation of the
decision. He also found no gross ignorance of the law on the part of respondent. In order to impose
disciplinary action on judges, Justice Abesamis concluded, it should be shown that the error or
mistake invoked was gross or patent, malicious, deliberate or in bad faith, and that a mere error of
judgment would not be a ground for disciplinary action. Finally, the Investigating Justice held
respondent judge accountable for impropriety for his close association with Atty. Agravante.
The Investigating Justice ended his report to the Court by recommending thusly:
"WHEREFORE, after due investigation, and in consideration of the foregoing discussions, it is most
respectfully recommended to the Honorable Supreme Court that:
"1) The charge of gross ignorance of the law against respondent judge be DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
"2) Respondent judge be held administratively liable for:
"a) failure to render judgment in Criminal Case No. RTC-1150 within the period
prescribed by law (in violation of 15, ARTICLE VIII OF THE PHILIPPINE
CONSTITUTION, CANON 1, RULE 1.02, and CANON 3, RULE 3.05 OF THE Code of
Judicial Conduct); and
"b) engaging in activities having the appearance of impropriety which unduly raise
suspicion and distrust among the people in the administration of justice (in
violation of CANON 2, RULE 2.01 AND RULE 2.03 OF THE CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT);
"3) Respondent JUDGE ROBERTO S. JAVELLANA be ADMONISHED, with a WARNING that a
repetition of similar acts will be dealt with more severely."i[1]
Section 15, Article XVIII, of the Constitution provides that lower courts have three months within
which to decide cases or matters pending before them from the date of submission of such cases or
matters for decision or resolution. Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct holds similarly by
mandating that the disposition of cases must be done promptly and seasonably. Admittedly,
respondent judge has taken ten months to finally decide Criminal Case No. RTC-1150 from its
submission for decision, a period clearly beyond the ninety-day reglementary period. He could have
asked for an extension of time to decide the case and explain why, but he did not. Any undue delay
in the resolution of cases often amounts to a denial of justice and can easily undermine the people's
faith and confidence in the judiciary. Aware of the heavy caseload of judges, the Court has
continued to act with great understanding on requests for extension of time to decide cases.
The Investigating Justice has seen impropriety on the part of respondent judge in his close
association with a counsel for a litigant; thus:
"Giving respondent judge the benefit of the doubt, and presume that his close associations with
lawyers practicing within the territorial jurisdiction of his court are all normal and do not in any
way unduly influence him in the discharge of his sworn duties, the Court cannot just leave
respondent judge's acts and consider them proper.
"It is expressly provided under the CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT that:
"`CANON 2. - A JUDGE SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND THE APPEARANCE OF
IMPROPRIETY IN ALL ACTIVITIES.
`x x x x x x x x x
`Rule 2.01. - A Judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity
and impartiality of the judiciary.
`x x x x x x x x x
`Rule 2.09. - A Judge shall not allow family, social or other relationships to influence judicial
conduct or judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance the private
interests of others to convey the impressions that they are in special position to influence the judge.'
"Hence, a judge's official conduct and his behavior in the performance of judicial duties should be
free from the appearance of impropriety and must be beyond reproach. One who occupies an
exalted position in the administration of justice must pay a high price for the honor bestowed upon
him, for his private as well as his official conduct must at all times be free from the appearance of
impropriety. Because appearance is as important as reality in the performance of judicial
functions, like Caesar's wife, a judge must not only be pure but also beyond suspicion. A judge has
the duty to not only render a just and impartial decision, but also render it in such a manner as to
be free from any suspicion as to its fairness and impartiality, and also as to the judge's integrity.
"It is obvious, therefore, that while judges should possess proficiency in law in order that they can
competently construe and enforce the law, it is more important that they should act and behave in
such a manner that the parties before them should have confidence in their impartiality."ii[2]
The Court shares the view and disquisition of the Honorable Justice. Judges, indeed, should be
extra prudent in associating with litigants and counsel appearing before them so as to avoid even a
mere perception of possible bias or partiality. It is not expected, of course, that judges should live
in retirement or seclusion from any social intercourse. Indeed, it may be desirable, for instance,
that they continue, time and work commitments permitting, to relate to members of the bar in
worthwhile endeavors and in such fields of interest, in general, as are in keeping with the noble
aims and objectives of the legal profession. In pending or prospective litigations before them,
however, judges should be scrupulously careful to avoid anything that may tend to awaken the
suspicion that their personal, social or sundry relations could influence their objectivity, for not
only must judges possess proficiency in law but that also they must act and behave in such manner
that would assure, with great comfort, litigants and their counsel of the judges' competence,
integrity and independence.
WHEREFORE, (a) the complaint against respondent Judge Roberto S. Javellana for ignorance of the
law is DISMISSED for being without basis; (b) said respondent is found administratively liable for
failing to render judgment in Criminal Case No. RTC-1150 within the period prescribed therefor and
is hereby imposed a FINE of TWO THOUSAND PESOS, with warning that a repetition of same or
similar acts will be dealt with more severely than herein imposed; (c) the respondent, finally, is
ADMONISHED to constantly be circumspect in his conduct and dealings with lawyers who have
pending cases before him.
SO ORDERED.