Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court

Manila

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 94457. June 10, 1992.]

VICTORIA LEGARDA, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS, NEW CATHAY
HOUSE, INC. and REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 94,
Respondents.

Singson, Valdez & Associates for Petitioner.

Ceferino Padua Law Office for private respondent Cabrera.

E.A. Barangan & Associates Law Offices for Nancy Saw Cheung.


SYLLABUS


1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; MOTION FOR EXTENSION;
GRANTING AND DENIAL THEREOF; SUBJECT TO THE SOUND DISCRETION
OF THE COURT; CASE AT BAR. The Court, in its resolution of March 9, 1992,
granted said motion for extension with warning that no further extension will be
given. Atty. Coronel received a copy of said resolution on March 27, 1992 but it
appears that on March 24, 1992, a day after the expiration of the 30-day extended
period prayed for in his first motion for extension, he had mailed another urgent
motion for a second extension of thirty (30) days within which to submit his
explanation on the ground that since March 2, 1992, he had been "treated and
confined at the St. Lukes Hospital." Attached to the motion is a medical certificate
stating that Atty. Coronel had "ischemic cardiomyopathy, diabetes mellitus,
congestive heart failure class IV and brain infraction, thrombotic." While off-hand,
the reasons cited in the second motion for reconsideration seem to warrant
another extension, the fact that it was filed one day late, coupled with the
circumstances of this case do not call for a reconsideration of the resolution of
March 9, 1992. Hence, the second motions for extension of time will always be
granted by the Court. The granting or denial of motions for extension of time is
addressed to the sound discretion of the Court with a view to attaining substantial
justice.

2. LEGAL ETHICS; LAWYERS; EXPECTED TO RECOGNIZE THE AUTHORITY
OF THE COURT AND OBEY ITS LAWFUL PROCESSES; EFFECT OF FAILURE
TO DO SO. It should be emphasized that the show-cause resolution was
addressed to Atty. Coronel not in his capacity as a lawyer of a litigant in this Court.
It was addressed to him in his personal capacity as a lawyer subject to the
disciplinary powers of this Court. That he failed to immediately heed the directive
of the decision of March 18, 1991 to show cause, notwithstanding the grant of a
30-day extension for him to do so, reflects an unbecoming disrespect. As a lawyer,
Atty. Coronel is expected to recognize the authority of this Court and obey its
lawful processes and orders. Hence, the Court considers his failure to show
cause, notwithstanding reasonable notice therefor, as a waiver of his rights to be
heard and to due process, thereby warranting an ex parte determination of the
matter for which he had been required to explain.

3. ID.; ID.; DUTY TO SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND
DILIGENCE; NON-OBSERVANCE THEREOF CONSTITUTES GROSS
NEGLIGENCE HENCE LIABLE. The facts of the case clearly show that Atty.
Coronel violated Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
mandates that "a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence." He
failed to observe particularly Rule 18.03 of the same Code which requires that "a
lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable." Indeed, petitioner could not have
gone through the travials attending the disposition of the case against her not to
mention the devastating consequence on her property rights had Dean Coronel
exercised even the ordinary diligence of a member of the Bar. By negligence to file
the answer to the complaint against petitioner, he set off the events which resulted
in the deprivation of petitioners rights over her house and lot. In this regard, worth
quoting is the observation of Justice Emilio A. Gancayco in his ponencia of March
18, 1991: "Petitioners counsel is a well-known practicing lawyer and dean of a law
school. It is to be expected that he would extend the highest quality of service as a
lawyer to the petitioner. Unfortunately, counsel appears to have abandoned the
cause of petitioner. After agreeing to defend the petitioner in the civil case failed
against her by the private respondent, said counsel did nothing more than enter
his appearance and seek for an extension of time to file the answer. Nevertheless,
he failed to file the answer. Hence, petitioner was declared in default on the motion
of private respondents counsel. . . ."


R E S O L U T I O N


PER CURIAM:


Petitioner Victoria Legarda was the defendant in a complaint for specific
performance with damages filed by private respondent New Cathay House, Inc.
before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The complaint was aimed at
compelling Victoria Legarda to sign a lease contract involving her house and lot at
123 West Avenue, Quezon City which New Cathay House, Inc. intended to use in
operating a restaurant. 1

As prayed for in the complaint, the lower court issued a temporary restraining
order enjoining Victoria Legarda and her agents from stopping the renovation of
the property which was being done by New Cathay House, Inc. After hearing, the
lower court issued a writ of preliminary injunction.

Thereafter, Antonio P. Coronel of the Coronel Law Office at 146 Katipunan Road,
White Plains, Quezon City, entered his appearance as counsel for Victoria
Legarda. He also filed an urgent motion for an extension of ten (10) days from
February 6, 1985 within which to file an answer to the complaint. The motion was
granted by the court which gave Victoria Legarda until February 20, 1985 to
answer the complaint.

However, Victoria Legarda failed to file her answer within the extended period
granted by the court. Hence, upon motion of New Cathay House, Inc., she was
declared in default, thereby paving the way for the presentation of evidence ex
parte.

On March 25, 1985, the lower court rendered a decision by default. It ordered
Victoria Legarda to execute and sign the lease contract and to pay the following:
(a) exemplary damages of P100,000.00, (b) actual and compensatory damages in
the total amount of P278,764.37, and (c) attorneys fees of P10,000.00.

Atty. Coronel received a copy of the lower courts decision on April 9, 1985 but he
did not interpose an appeal therefrom within the reglementary period.
Consequently, the decision became final and, upon motion of New Cathay House,
Inc., the lower court issued a writ of execution. In compliance with the writ, on
June 27, 1985, the sheriff levied upon, and sold at public auction, the property
subject of the litigation to New Cathay House, Inc., the highest bidder. The
sheriffs certificate of sale was registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City.

The one-year redemption period having expired on July 8, 1986, the sheriff issued
a final deed of sale which, on July 11, 1986, was duly registered with the Office of
the Register of Deeds. On November 6, 1986, Victoria Legarda, represented by
her attorney-in-fact Ligaya C. Gomez, filed in the Court of Appeals a petition of
annulment of the judgment against her in Civil Case No. Q-43811. She alleged
therein that the decision was obtained through fraud and that it is not supported by
the allegations in the pleadings nor by the evidence submitted.

Forthwith, the Court of Appeals issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the
respondents from dispossessing petitioner of the premises in question. Private
respondent New Cathay House, Inc. then filed its consolidated comment on the
petition with a motion for the lifting of the temporary restraining order. Victoria
Legarda, through Atty. Coronel, filed a reply to the consolidated comment. The
petition was thereafter orally argued. Required by the Court of Appeals to manifest
if the parties desired to file their respective memoranda, Dean Coronel informed
the appellate court that he was adopting Victoria Legardas reply to the
consolidated comment as her memorandum.

The Court of Appeals promulgated its decision on November 29, 1989. On the
issue of fraud, for which Victoria Legarda claimed that Robert V. Cabrera Jr., who
represented New Cathay House, Inc., made her believe through false pretenses
that he was agreeable to the conditions of the lease she had imposed on the
lessee and that the latter would withdraw the complaint against her, thereby
prompting her to advise her lawyer not to file an answer to the complaint anymore,
the Court of Appeals 2 said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"On the other hand, petitioners above allegation of fraud supposedly practiced
upon her by Roberto V. Cabrera, Jr. is so improbable as to inspire belief. For the
Coronel Law Office had already entered its appearance as petitioners counsel by
then, so that if it were true that Cabrera had already agreed to the conditions
imposed by petitioner, said law office would have asked plaintiff to file the proper
motion to dismiss or withdraw complaint with the Court, and if plaintiff had refused
to do so, it would have filed defendants answer anyway so that she would not be
declared in default. Or said law office would have prepared a compromise
agreement embodying the conditions imposed by their client in the lease contract
in question which plaintiffs had allegedly already accepted, so that the same could
have been submitted to the Court and judgment on a compromise could be
entered. All these, any conscientious lawyer of lesser stature than the Coronel
Law Office, headed by no less than a member of the bar, would normally have
done under the circumstances to protect the interests of their client, instead of
leaving it to the initiative of plaintiff to withdraw its complaint against defendant, as
it had allegedly promised the latter. Thus, it is our belief that this case is one of
pure and simple negligence on the part of the defendants counsel, who simply
failed to file the answer in behalf of defendant. But counsels negligence does not
stop here. For after it had been furnished with copy of the decision by default
against defendant, it should then have appealed therefrom or file (sic) a petition for
relief from the order declaring their client in default or from the judgment by
default. Hence, defendant is bound by the acts of her counsel in this case and
cannot be heard to complain that the result might have been different if it had
proceeded differently (Pulido v. C.A., 122 SCRA 63; Ayllon v. Sevilla, 156 SCRA
257, among other cases). And the rationale of this rule is obvious and clear. For if
such grounds were to be admitted as reasons for opening cases, there would
never be an end to a suit so long as new counsel could be employed who could
allege and show that the prior counsel had not been sufficiently diligent, or
experienced, or learned (Fernandez v. Tan Tiong Tick, 1 SCRA 1138)."
(Emphasis supplied.)

Finding the second ground for the petition to be likewise unmeritorious, the Court
of Appeals dismissed the petition. Surprisingly, however, inspite of the Court of
Appeals tirade on his professional competence, Atty. Coronel did not lift a finger
to file a motion for reconsideration. Neither did he initiate moves towards an
appeal to this Court of the decision which was adverse and prejudicial to his
client.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

Thus, the Court of Appeals decision became final. On December 8, 1989, counsel
for New Cathay House, Inc. sent petitioner through the Coronel Law Office, a letter
demanding that she vacate the property within three days from receipt thereof.
Atty. Coronel did not inform petitioner of this development until sometime in March,
1990. Due to petitioners persistent telephone calls, Atty. Coronels secretary
informed her of the fact that New Cathay House, Inc. had demanded her eviction
from the property. Consequently, petitioner had no recourse but to oblige and
vacate the property. 3

On August 7, 1990, Victoria Legarda, represented by a new counsel, 4 filed before
this Court a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 contending that the decisions of
the courts below "are null and void as petitioner was deprived of her day in court
and divested of her property without due process of law through the gross,
pervasive and malicious negligence of previous counsel, Atty. Antonio Coronel." 5

In its decision of March 18, 1991, this Court declared as null and void the
decisions of March 25, 1985 and November 29, 1989 of the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City and the Court of Appeals, respectively, as well as the sheriffs
certificate of sale dated June 27, 1985 of the property involved and the
subsequent final deed of sale covering the same. The court further directed private
respondent New Cathay House, Inc. to reconvey the property to the petitioner and
the Register of Deeds to cancel the registration of said property in the name of
said private respondent and to issue a new one in the name of the
petitioner.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

The same decision required the former counsel of petitioner, Atty. Antonio
Coronel, to show cause within ten (10) days from notice why he should not be held
administratively liable for his acts and omissions which resulted in grave injustice
to the petitioner. Said counsel having been inadvertently omitted in the service of
copies of said decision, 6 on February 11, 1992, the Clerk of Court of this Division
to which this case was transferred, sent Atty. Coronel a copy thereof which he
received on February 12, 1992. 7

On the tenth day from his receipt of said copy, Atty. Coronel filed an urgent ex-
parte motion for an extension of thirty (30) days from February 22, 1992 within
which to file his explanation. He alleged as reason for the motion pressure of work
"consisting of daily hearings in several forums and preparations of pleadings in
equally urgent cases, such as the more than 80 civil and criminal cases against
the Marcoses." 8

The Court, in its resolution of March 9, 1992 granted said motion for extension
with warning that no further extension will be given. Atty. Coronel received a copy
of said resolution on March 27, 1992 but it appears that on March 24, 1992, 9 a
day after the expiration of the 30-day extended period prayed for in his first motion
for extension, he had mailed another urgent motion for a second extension of thirty
(30) days within which to submit his explanation on the ground that since March 2,
1992, he had been "treated and confined at the St. Lukes Hospital." Attached to
the motion is a medical certificate stating that Atty. Coronel had "ischemic
cardiomyopathy, diabetes mellitus, congestive heart failure class IV and brain
infraction, thrombotic." 10

While off-hand, the reasons cited in the second motion for reconsideration seem to
warrant another extension, the fact that it was filed one day late, coupled with the
circumstances of this case do not call for a reconsideration of the resolution of
March 9, 1992. Hence, the second motion for extension must be denied. Lawyers
should not presume that their motions for extension of time will always be granted
by the Court. The granting or denial of motions for extension of time is addressed
to the sound discretion of the Court with a view to attaining substantial justice. 11

It should be emphasized that the show-cause resolution was addressed to Atty.
Coronel not in his capacity as a lawyer of a litigant in this Court. It was addressed
to him in his personal capacity as a lawyer subject to the disciplinary powers of
this court. That he failed to immediately heed the directive of the decision of March
18, 1991 to show cause, notwithstanding the grant of a 30-day extension for him
to do so, reflects an unbecoming disrespect towards this Courts orders. We
cannot countenance such disrespect. As a lawyer, Atty. Coronel is expected to
recognize the authority of this Court and obey its lawful processes and orders. 12

Hence, the Court considers his failure to show cause, notwithstanding reasonable
notice therefor, as a waiver of his rights to be heard and to due process, thereby
warranting an ex parte determination of the matter for which he had been required
to explain. 13

The facts of the case clearly show that Atty. Coronel violated Canon 18 of the
Code of the Professional Responsibility which mandates that "a lawyer shall serve
his client with competence and diligence." He failed to observe particularly Rule
18.03 of the same Code which requires that "a lawyer shall not neglect a legal
matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render
him liable."cralaw virtua1aw library

Indeed, petitioner could not have gone through the travails attending the
disposition of the case against her not to mention the devastating consequence on
her property rights had Dean Coronel exercised even the ordinary diligence of a
member of the Bar. By neglecting to file the answer to the complaint against
petitioner, he set off the events which resulted in the deprivation of petitioners
rights over her house and lot. In this regard, worth quoting is the observation of
Justice Emilio A. Gancayco in his ponencia of March 18, 1991:chanrobles.com :
virtual law library

"Petitioners counsel is a well-known practicing lawyer and dean of a law school. It
is to be expected that he would extend the highest quality of service as a lawyer to
the petitioner. Unfortunately, counsel appears to have abandoned the cause of
petitioner. After agreeing to defend the petitioner in the civil case filed against her
by private respondent, said counsel did nothing more than enter his appearance
and seek for an extension of time to file the answer. Nevertheless, he failed to file
the answer. Hence, petitioner was declared in default on the motion of private
respondents counsel. . ."cralaw virtua1aw library

This is not the only case wherein, in dealing with this Courts orders, Atty. Coronel
appears to exhibit a pattern of negligence, inattention to his obligations as
counsel, sloppiness and superciliousness. In G.R. No. 97418, "Imelda R. Marcos,
Et. Al. v. PCGG, Et Al.," the Court en bank, in its Resolution of May 28, 1992,
imposed upon Atty. Coronel a fine of Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00) after he was
found guilty of inexcusable negligence in his failure to comply with this Courts
resolutions. The Court said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"We find the explanation for his failure to comply with the Resolutions of 4 June
1991 and 27 August 1991 unsatisfactory. Atty. Coronel had obviously taken this
Court for granted. Although he received a copy of the 4 June 1991 Resolution on 4
July 1991, he nonchalantly let the 10-day period pass and even deliberately chose
to remain silent about it even after he received a copy of the Resolution of 27
August 1991. It was only on the last day of the period granted to him under said
Resolution that he showed initial efforts to comply with the Resolution by filing a
motion for a 20-day extension from 30 September 1991 to file the Reply. This was
a a self-imposed period and, therefore, he was expected to faithfully comply with it
not only because of the respect due this Court, but also because he had put his
honor and virtues of candor and good faith on the line. For reasons only known to
him, he did not. Worse, despite his receipt on 27 November 1991 of the
Resolution of 5 November 1991 which granted his 30 September 1991 motion,
Atty. Coronel did not even move for a new period within which to comply with the
Resolutions of 4 June 1991 and 27 August 1991. This Court had to issue the
Resolution of 30 January 1992 to compel compliance. When he finally did, he
committed, allegedly through inadvertence, the blunder of placing his Reply under
a wrong caption.

"For deliberately failing, if not stubbornly refusing, to comply with the Resolutions
of 4 June 1991 and 27 August 1991 and meet his self-imposed deadline, Atty.
Coronel was both unfair and disrespectful to this Court. Furthermore, he has
unduly delayed the disposition of the pending incidents in this case." (Emphasis
supplied).

Undoubtedly, in the case at hand, Atty. Coronels failure to exercise due diligence
in protecting and attending to the interest of his client caused the latter material
prejudice. 14 It should be remembered that the moment a lawyer takes a clients
cause, he covenants that he will exert all effort for its prosecution until its final
conclusion. A lawyer who fails to exercise due diligence or abandons his clients
cause makes him unworthy of the trust reposed on him by the latter. 15 Moreover,
a lawyer owes fealty, not only to his client, but also to the Court of which he is an
officer. Atty. Coronel failed to obey this Courts order even on a matter that
personally affects him, such that one cannot avoid the conclusion that he must be
bent on professional self-destruction. Be that as it may, Atty. Coronel cannot
escape this Courts disciplinary action for gross negligence which resulted in
depriving petitioner or her property rights, for, as this Court enunciated in the
aforecited Cantiller v. Potenciano case:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Lawyers are indispensable part of the whole system of administering justice in
this jurisdiction. At a time when strong and disturbing criticisms are being hurled at
the legal profession, strict compliance with ones oath of office and the canons of
professional ethics is an imperative.

"Lawyers should be fair, honest, respectable, above suspicion and beyond
reproach in dealing with their clients. The profession is not synonymous with an
ordinary business proposition. It is a matter of public interest."cralaw virtua1aw
library

WHEREFORE, the second motion for an extension of time to file explanation is
hereby DENIED. Atty. Antonio P. Coronel is hereby found GUILTY of gross
negligence in the defense of petitioner Victoria Legarda in Civil Case No. Q-43811
and accordingly SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6)
months effective from the date of his receipt of this resolution. A repetition of the
acts constituting gross negligence shall be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this resolution be attached to his personal record, another copy be
furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and copies thereof be circulated in
all the courts.

SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Bidin, Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:


1. Civil Case No. Q-43811.

2. Justice Alicia V. Sempio Diy, ponente, Justices Nathanael P. de Pano, Jr. and
Celso L. Magsino, concurring.

3. Petition, pp. 14-15; Rollo, pp. 15-16.

4. Singson Valdez and Associates.

5. Petition, p. 16; Rollo, p. 17.

6. The instant petition having been filed by another counsel and not by Dean
Coronel, he was not been served any court processes prior to the promulgation of
the decision of March 18, 1991. Since the dispositive portion of said decision does
not mention specifically the name of Dean Coronel, inadvertently, no copy thereof
was served on him.

7. Rollo, p. 364.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid, pp. 381 & 386.

10. Ibid, p. 385.

11. Roxas v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 76549, December 10, 1987, 156 SCRA
252.

12. Santos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 92862, July 4, 1991, 198 SCRA 806.

13. Santos v. CFI of Cebu, Branch VI, G.R. No. 58532, May 18, 1990, 185 SCRA
472, 486-487.

14. See: Gutierrez v. Zulueta, Adm. Case No. 2200, July 19, 1990, 187 SCRA
607.

15. Cantiller v. Potenciano, Adm. Case No. 3195, December 18, 1989, 180 SCRA
246.