As a response to the behavioural theories of industrial decision-making which st

ress the
geography of enterprise, structuralist or radical theories have more recently em
erged
which stress that the enterprises are part of the wider structure of society in
which the
interplay of capital and labour is based upon power coalitions whose interests a
re usually
in conflict. Much of industrial geography is concerned with production in the ca
pitalist
mode in which capital and labour combine to generate wages for labour and profit
for
capital, but a growth in one is likely, ceteris paribus, to be achieved at the e
xpense of the
other. The major elements in the structuralist approach have been the role of ve
ry large
enterprises in using their economic and political power to achieve authority ove
r their
workforces, the role of organised labour in responding to this control, and the
overall
patterns of change in the world economy. Massey (1979) argued that an alternativ
e,
radical approach to neoclassical industrial location theory was required. What w
as
distinctive about this approach, she argued, was firstly that it applied no abst
ract model of
the firm or enterprise. The form of abstraction used was that of isolating the d
etermining
structure of the actual situation under study. Only within the context of a seve
re national
economic crisis, and its implications for the production process and consequentl
y for
locational requirements, could the spatial behaviour of the individual firms be
understood. Secondly, the spatial dimension was introduced only as a last step i
n the
causal sequence: spatial change is viewed only as an effect of the response to n
on-spatial
changes in the macro-economy. Thirdly, by dealing with particular product market
s the
macro-economic effects are held constant, thus permitting an analysis of differe
nt
responses by different types of company.
Massey and Meegan (1982) point out that employment change is the net result of t
wo
factors, output and productivity per capita. They identify on this basis three t
ypes of
production reorganisation. First, there is intensification, which is defined as
changes
designed to increase labour productivity without major new investment or changes
in
production technology. Secondly, there is investment and technical change, where
jobloss occurs in the context of substantial investment often related to change
s in production
technology. Lastly there is rationalisation which is defined as a simple reducti
on in total
capacity. Table 1.4 lists 31 industrial sectors by the type of reorganisation wh
ich they
were undergoing in the period of the late 1960s and early 1970s. Massey and Meeg
an
then go on to examine the spatial implications of the three types of reorganisat
ion.
Intensification reduces the level of labour employed in plants but does not invo
lve plant
closure. It does not have major spatial effects as there are no job transfers be
tween
regions and no new job creations at new locations. Rationalisation is different.
It involves
no new locations, and changes of productive capacity take place within the stock
of
existing locations. However, job mobility may occur as production is rationalise
d
between sites. The reorganisation of the electrical engineering industry provide
s good
examples of both inter- and intraregional shifts. However, the overall pattern w
as for
recipient areas to gain fewer jobs than those lost in the donor areas, thus crea
ting the
TABEL
concept of the transfer loss of jobs. Technical change, however, does create mobil
e
employment.
In using examples of industries undergoing specific forms of restructuring, Mass
ey
and Meegan are able to demonstrate the locational consequences of the three type
s of
change. In the case of rationalisation, the iron-castings industry lost 16,000 j
obs between
1968 and 1973. Output grew significantly in regions such as Wales and the West
Midlands where the buoyant markets for automobile castings and ingot moulds expa
nded,
whereas output in the Northern region was stagnant as sales were dependent upon
the
declining sectors such as steel manufacture, heavy engineering and shipbuilding.
However, changes in output did not correlate with changes in employment, as
productivity per worker showed significant differences. Thus in Wales, a 50 per
cent rise
in output was accompanied by a 35 per cent decline in employment, as continuous
casting, mass production methods were introduced, radically improving output per
worker. In the North, however, the pattern was different with job loss attributa
ble to
complete plant closures (especially amongst smaller plants) rather than to chang
es in
markets and production techniques. Massey and Meegan stressed that in the Northe
rn
region the preponderance of small, jobbing foundries made it difficult to increa
se
productivity in the way that the Welsh foundries had, thereby rendering them mor
e
vulnerable to closure. As an example of intensification, the tailored outerwear
industry is
cited. In this sector the range of employment rate changes at the regional level
is much
narrower than in iron castings. Three regions show small net gains over the stud
y period
196873 (Scotland, West Midlands and East Anglia). In this sector some expansion d
id
occur with new branch plants being opened by the medium-sized or larger enterpri
ses.
They seem selectively to have picked regions where there was little history of t
he
industry (avoiding the East Midlands and the South East) and where wages were lo
w for
garment workers.
In seeking a sector which exhibits the characteristics of investment and technic
al
change, Massey and Meegan selected the fletton brick industry. Whilst some expan
sion
into low wage areas might have been expected when de-skilling took place as a
consequence of increased technology, the locational constraints of access to raw
material
and the patterns of land ownership by the market leading company forced expansio
ns to
occur in the same locations as earlier developments.
Using examples of sectors undergoing different types of restructuring, Massey an
d
Meegan introduce a number of factors which contribute to an explanation of regio
nal
shifts in employment: these include labour costs, access to local markets, corpo
rate form
and size of enterprise, and capital vintage. In an earlier study showing how ind
ustrial
restructuring had operated to the disadvantage of the inner areas of the largest
cities,
Massey and Meegan (1978) suggested that capital vintage played an important role
. As
companies sought to reduce capacity or to improve productivity by technologicall
y
upgrading production, it was the oldest plant which was removed and this typical
ly was
to be found in the inner areas of the largest cities. Where new plant was instal
led it was
not likely to be installed in the largest cities but at new locations either on
the urban
periphery or, more probably, in small to medium-sized urban centres. The reasons
for this
choice lie largely in the different natures of the two types of labour market.
The ability of an employer to control the operation of the local labour market t
hrough
recruitment, lay-offs and wages, is a function of the relative size of the emplo
yer and thelabour market. No employer in large cities is likely to be large enou
gh, in relative terms,
to be able to influence the performance of the overall local labour market. A si
ngle large
plant, however, can influence, and in extreme cases control, the local labour fo
rce in
smaller urban centres. Such control can minimise the risks of high rates of wage
inflation,
industrial disruption and problems of high labour turn-over rates. Lever (1978,
1981) has
identified those British local labour markets which could be considered to be do
minated
by a single non-tertiary employer. He hypothesises that this degree of control i
s likely to
be reflected in lower wages, lower turnover rates and better industrial relation
s than those
experienced by plants of a similar size in similar sectors in larger cities wher
e it would
not be possible for a single employer to dominate or control the work-force. It
can be
argued that where a single employer employs all the labour in a local labour mar
ket he
can depress wages to a point where labour will be prepared to migrate to another
town,
incurring considerable costs in so doing. In reality such extreme cases are rare
and are
absent in a closely knit urban structure such as that of Britain. A comparison b
y McPhail
(1982), however, does show (Table 1.5) that hourly wage rates paid by large plan
ts in
small towns were lower than those paid by similar plants in non-dominated labour
markets. For three different types of labour, skilled male manual, other male ma
nual and
female manual, hourly wage rates were 4 per cent to 12 per cent lower in the for
mer type
of location. Weekly wages (including overtime, bonuses, etc.) confirmed the exis
tence of
these differentials, as Table 1.6 shows. The differential in both cases is great
est for
female workers, reflecting the fact that they are less mobile and therefore more
likely to
be controlled by a major employer in a small labour market.
If wages are lower in these small towns, then it might be expected that despite
controlling the local labour market, firms might find difficulty in recruiting som
e forms
of labour. The McPhail study, however, demonstrated that, for all three types of
labour
covered by the survey, large plants in small labour markets were less likely to
experience
labour shortages than comparable plants in larger towns (Table 1.7). When querie
d on the
reason for this, the former pointed to links with local colleges and schools, th
e
effectiveness of word of mouth recruitment methods and the firms generally high
visibility within the town. Large plants in large towns did not have such a clos
e
relationship with the local pool of available labour and claimed to suffer from
labour
poaching.
TABEL
Proneness to industrial stoppages is a third area in which dominant plants may b
e able to
exert some control over the labour force. Massey and Meegan (1982) suggest that
one
reason why, when multi-plant companies reduce capacity by plant closures, they d
o so by
shutting inner city plants, is that levels of unionisation are known to be highe
r in large
cities. Thus by increasingly concentrating production in smaller urban centres,
companies
are able to reduce levels of union penetration. Fothergill, Kitson and Monk (198
2) further
emphasise this point by saying that higher levels of union militancy in large ci
ties lower
company profitability there. A study comparing firms in Glasgow with a similar g
roup in
the smaller manufacturing towns of Lanarkshire (Lever, Danson and Malcolm, 1981)
cited industrial relations as a problem in about one-fifth of the plants surveye
d, and as a
greater problem in the inner city than in the small towns. The same study also f
ound that
high rates of labour turnover were a greater problem to inner-city firms than to
those in
the smaller towns where the range of alternative employment was restricted.
The second area of risk-minimisation is in the field of unfortunate effects of loc
al
authority policy. Where a small town is dependent upon a large plant or upon a s
mall
number of medium-sized plants, the local authority is likely both to take care t
hat policies
such as urban renewal do not adventitiously harm the employers, and to ensure th
at local
authority services can be directed positively to benefit the employers. Large lo
cal
authorities, however, have such complicated urban strategies that not all the un
fortunate
effects of some policies can be anticipated. No one employer is likely to be so
relatively
large as to warrant special treatment by the local authority. Evidence to suppor
t this
hypothesis, although piecemeal and at times anecdotal, does exist.
The most obvious area of urban policy which may have a prejudicial effect on loc
al
industryurban renewalis often associated with urban road construction. In theconte
xt of Glasgow, early urban renewal was largely restricted to residential areas;
the
effect on local industry was indirect through dislocation of the local labour ma
rket,
especially for female workers. As renewal was expanded through the 1960s, more
industrial premises were affected, although at first acceptable alternative prem
ises were
often not too far away. With the further renewal programmes, however, the stock
of old,
cheap inner-city premises for industry was significantly eroded and firms displa
ced later
were either forced toward peripheral locations with considerable disruption, acc
epted
new inner-city premises at greatly increased rents, or, increasingly, went out o
f business
(Bull, 1981). The impact of urban renewal on inner-city business, however, great
ly
exceeds the effect on those firms whose premises lie on the route of new urban r
oads or
are scheduled for treatment within comprehensive development areas. The uncertai
nty
which attaches to the lengthy process of designation, public participation, and
consultation before actual implementation, may make it extremely difficult to ma
ke
rational decisions on such matters as capital investment. A number of firms leav
ing the
eastern part of Glasgows inner city in favour of locations in New Towns made thei
r
choice in the knowledge that the new premises, usually on industrial estates, ar
e unlikely
to be affected by uncertainties in the foreseeable future, and that the local la
bour supply is
virtually guaranteed through housing-allocation policies of local authorities. I
n contrast,
inner-city labour markets are often disrupted by urban renewal.
The relationship between the local authority and its large employers, in the cas
e of
relatively small towns, may be even closer when employees became elected to the
town
council. Phelan and Pozen (1973) in a study of the influence of the du Pont comp
any on
Wilmington, Delaware, state that the company has the right to nominate members t
o the
State legislature, presumably to safe-guard the companys interests. The political
power
of large employers in small towns in Britain does not extend as far as that into
the
democratic process, but Lane and Roberts (1971, pp. 301) in a study of the influe
nce of
Pilkingtons the glass manufacturing company, at that time employing 32 per cent o
f the
work-force of St. Helens, suggested that:
No doubt, Pilkingtons have given the council the odd nudge from time to
time but generally speaking the councillors and aldermen will not have
needed reminding that anything affecting their (Pilkingtons) interests
required the most sympathetic and careful consideration. We would be
very surprised if any of Pilkingtons planning proposals had been rejected.