The Royal African Society

Djibouti: France's Strategic Toehold in Africa

Author(s): Thomas A. Marks
Source: African Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 290 (Jan., 1974), pp. 95-104
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of The Royal African Society
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DJIBOUTI:
FRANCE'S STRATEGIC TOEHOLD IN
AFRICA
by
THOMAS
A. MARKS
United States
Army,
Hawaii
WITH THE fourth
major
outbreak of war in the Middle East
having
once
again
rivetted
great power
attention to this vital corner of the
globe,
a
seemingly
unobtrusive
piece
of barren
territory lying
between
Ethiopia
and the Somali
Republic
has
suddenly gained
in
political
and
strategic importance.
The
French
Territory
of the Afars and the
Issas,
a
sparsely-inhabited
land of
searing
heat and
mutually
hostile tribal
factions, commonly
referred to
by
the name of
its
capital
and
only major city, Djibouti,
has
long
been looked
upon by
western
observers as
nothing
more than a sentimental remnant of France's
once-sprawling
African colonial
empire.
The French themselves have seemed
hard-put
to
justify
their continued
presence
in what was until 1967 known as French Somali-
land; yet by
an historical accident
they may
well find themselves the
possessors
of an area
having
a
great
deal more
strategic importance
than has been hitherto
appreciated.
Djibouti's
value stems from its
significant
location at the Indian Ocean
entrance to the Red
Sea,
a
position
from which a naval
power
of
consequence
could exert
powerful
influence over the oil tanker trade
plying
the waters of the
Indian
Ocean,
and could also stand
ready
to make its
presence
felt in the
pursuance
of
political goals.
The
Territory already possesses
a modern
port
in
Djibouti,
which also serves as a base for an air
transport
network between
Europe,
East
Africa,
the Near
East,
and India.' For a number of
years
this
position
has been used
by
the French to link their
upper
African
sphere
of
influence with that which
they
maintain in southern
African,
and until
recently
in the
Malagasy Republic, formerly Madagascar.
This
strategic
network has
been little understood or
appreciated by
Western
military observers,
who tend to
view the African continent as a
hodgepodge
of
newly emergent
states known
primarily
for their
poverty,
unstable
rulers,
and domestic
political squabbles.
French
defence policy
in
Africa
and the Middle East
To understand the French
position
and hence the role
Djibouti
has come to
play
in
it,
it is
necessary
to examine
briefly
French
strategy
in Africa. 'France's
defence
policy
in the
independence
era of Africa has been based on two needs:
This article was
completed
after the outbreak of the October Arab-Israeli
war,
but before
the full
implications
of the Arab decision to use oil as a
major military
and
diplomatic
weapon
became
apparent.
Thomas A. Marks is a Second Lieutenant
(Infantry)
in the
United States
Army,
at
present
stationed in Hawaii. He is the author of a number of
articles on
military
and
strategic
issues. In this article the French
spelling
of
Djibouti
has been retained.
95
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96 AFRICAN AFFAIRS
to maintain its own
strategic position
in Africa "without an
overly conspicuous
deployment
of forces in Africa
itself;" and,
as an extension of
this,
to reserve
the
right
of intervention "on behalf of" African states and
regimes.'
This
strategy
was
developed following
an
analysis
of the
military
and
political collapse
of France in 1940. It was reasoned that a
large proportion
of French
fighting
power
could have been withdrawn intact to North Africa and from there
gathered
the
necessary strength
to launch a counterattack
against Germany. According
to the writer
quoted
above,
in consideration of this
argument
France's
post-war
defences were
organized
on a 'Euro-African
basis',
thus
allowing
France to
present
itself as a
major military power.2
When
independence
was
granted
to France's African colonies
by
President
de Gaulle in
1960,
national armies were created and armed
directly by
France,
thus
being
committed to that
country
for
supplies
and
training.
A
system
of
defence
co-operation
was
developed through
the use of defence
agreements
signed
with eleven African nations. These
agreements generally
stated that the
African nation had to
provide
for its own internal and external
security,
but that
France could be called
upon
to intervene in extreme circumstances. For its
part
France would use intervention
only
in
special
circumstances and reserved
to itself the
right
to decide if it would accede to the
request
for aid. Several
states, among
them
Chad,
where the French
recently
concluded a successful
intervention on behalf of President
Frangois Tombalbaye's government,
had
included in their
treaty
a clause
relating
to the conduct of
stability operations
(au
maintien de
l'ordre)
which allowed for the intervention of French
troops
at
the African
government's request
for
specified
durations of
time.3
To fulfil its
agreements
France maintained the 11th Division of six airborne
infantry
battalions and two combined
support
battalions in southwest
France,
together
with the 9th Marine
Brigade
of three
amphibious
battalions stationed
in
Brittany. (Troupes
de Marine are a
part
of the
army, supplying troops
for
intervention,
overseas
service,
and
advisory duty.) Additionally,
a
permanent
intervention force is
deployed
at Fort
Lamy, Chad, consisting
in 1972-73 of a
battalion task force of 500 men.4 Between 1960 and 1963 French forces inter-
vened twelve times at the
request
of
legitimate
African
governments;5
and it
was the intervention force at Fort
Lamy, together
with a
company
of reinforce-
ments from
France,
which first aided the Chadians in the
suppression
of the
revolt
by
Moslim tribesmen from the Sahara
against
the
black, Christian/
animist
government.6
1. T. N.
Dupuy,
The Almanac
of
World
Military
Power
(Dunn Loring, Virginia, 1970),
p.
199.
2. Ruth
First,
Power in
Africa (Baltimore, Maryland, 1971), p.
422.
3. Thomas A.
Marks,
'Chad: The
Mysterious War', Infantry,
63
(May-June 1973),
pp.
28-31.
4. Interview with Lt.-Col.
Jean Salvan,
French Liaison Officer to the US
Army Infantry
School,
Fort
Benning, Georgia,
on 7 December 1972.
5.
First,
Power in
Africa, pp.
423-24.
6.
Philippe Jaubert,
'Intervention
Franqaise
au
Tchad',
Terre-Air-Mer
(January 1970),
pp.
21-6.
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DJIBOUTI:
STRATEGIC FRENCH TOEHOLD 97
Cementing
the defence
alignment
outlined above was the fact that the economic
development
and even the
government budgets
of the 15 former African
colonies were underwritten
by
the
French,
thus
tying
a vast area of West Africa
integrally
to the
metropole. Along
the Red
Sea/Indian
Ocean coast was
Djibouti
and in the Indian Ocean the French forces stationed in
Malagasy.
To
complete
the chain France
very quietly
became South Africa's
leading
arms
supplier,
a
major trading partner,
and an instrumental factor in
moving
the
white-ruled nation towards arms
production self-sufficiency.7
Thus France
developed
a web of influence
extending
down the entire west coast of Africa and
linked to the Indian Ocean
by
the
outposts just mentioned,
as well as
by
several
small
archipelagoes
near
Malagasy.
Until
recently
the French seemed to have established a secure
position,
and
the role
played by Djibouti
remained
peripheral.
The first cracks in the
system
came in
early
1973 when
Libya's
leader Colonel
Qaddafi persuaded
the
govern-
ments of
Niger, Mali,
and Chad to break
diplomatic
relations with Israel in
return for
promises
of economic
aid,
little of which
eventually
materialized.8
The
significance
of this
development
was the illumination of the ease with which
the
loyalties
of the
desperately poor
nations France was
relying upon
as
part
of
its own national defence
system
could be
bought.
The
price
in
Niger's
case
was a mere
$35
million in loans and
$7-5
million in
grants,
while Chad
gave
in
to a
promise
of
$93
million in aid and an end to the
open support
of
Libya
for
the Moslim
guerrillas
still active
against
the Chadian
government.9
The middle of 1973 saw still further moves detrimental to French interests.
With
Europe obtaining
60
per
cent or more of its oil from the Middle
East,
it
had been vital that some Western
European power
maintain a
protective presence
in the area
following
the British withdrawal from east of the Suez Canal.
Djibouti
formed one end of a
protective
arc which the French had been able
to establish
by
defence
agreements
with
Malagasy, coupled
with their
military
presence
on the Comoro Islands and Reunion. The main route taken
by
oil
supertankers making
the
trip
between the Middle East and
Europe
was
through
the Indian Ocean and the
Mozambique
Channel
separating Malagasy
from
Africa;10
hence the French
appeared
to be in an excellent
position
to
safeguard
their own interests in
particular,
and those of Western
Europe
in
general.
Suddenly
this
system
came
tumbling
down.
Riding
a wave of discontent
which
swept throughout Francophone
Africa, triggered by
the
heavy-handed
French
approach
of
dealing
with its former
colonies, Malagasy joined
Mauritania
in
quitting
the franc
zone,
and demanded that the French withdraw from the
bases which
they
had held since the turn of the
century.
At the time the French
had stationed in
Malagasy
the Third
Foreign Legion Regiment (3e
Rdgiment
7. 'Arms: The French
Connection',
Newsweek
(21 May 1973), pp.
45-6.
8.
'Libya:
The Dust
Devil',
Newsweek
(28 May 1973), pp.
10-11.
9. Ibid.
10. C. L.
Sulzberger,
'Oil and the Indian
Ocean',
Honolulu
Star-Bulletin,
11
June
1973,
sec.
1, p.
A-18.
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98 AFRICAN AFFAIRS
Etranger d'Infanterie),
one
paratroop regiment,
an air force
detachment,
and a
naval
contingent manning
the
key
base of
Diego Suarez,
a vital link in the
French Indian Ocean and African defence
system.
In
August
1973 France
began
to close its bases and
pull
out."1
Final
disposition
of the
rejected
forces has not
yet
been decided. Some of
them are to be
redeployed
to the French island of Reunion to the east of
Malagasy,
with additional units
being
sent north to the Comoro
Archipelago.
Yet the facilities of Reunion and the naval base at the Comoro
port
of
Mayotte
cannot be
compared
with the
relinquished
base of
Diego
Suarez.
Moreover,
the Comoro Islands have a restless
independence movement, MOLINACO,
based in
nearby Tanzania,
which cannot
help
but be
encouraged by
the French
setback in
Malagasy."2
Faced with the
continuing requirement
of
safeguarding
its oil
supply,
the
greater part
of which-22 million tons in 1972-comes from
Saudi
Arabia,
and its
strategic interests,
France will have no choice but to
increase its
present
force level in
Djibouti.
It stands as the sole base
capable
of
serving
as a viable alternative to the facilities that have had to be abandoned.
Not
only
France's interests are at
stake, however,
as the Western World now
well knows. A
military presence plays
an
important
role in
any diplomatic
framework,
but
despite
the enormous
significance
of Middle Eastern
oil,
Western
powers
other than France have been slow to establish
any
sort of concrete
presence
in the Indian
Ocean, relying primarily upon
Arab
largess
to secure a
steady
oil
supply.
This situation is
rapidly coming
to a forced end.
Emerging
with burned
fingers
from the French national oil
company's (ERAP) attempts
to
reach favourable oil accords with
Iraq,
the French
government
understands
fully
that a
pro-Arab
orientation is not
proof against
the
capriciousness
of individual
Arab
rulers,13
or
against
their use of oil as a
major weapon
in the Arab-Israeli
conflict.
So, also,
do the Communist
powers. Germany,
it has been
said,
was the first
nation to
comprehend
the value of
political strategy
as an
adjunct
to war and to
recognize
that it was rooted in
geography,14
but since the second world war the
Communists have excelled in the use of
political geography
to further their
aims. After
being
blocked in
any attempt
to
expand by outright
force of
arms,
the Soviet Union was forced to break out of its continental isolation and
compete
for
power
and influence
among
the Third World nations. While
making
numerous tactical
blunders,
the Communist have shown
increasing sophisti-
cation in their
geographical dispositions
so as to maximize
political
and
military
influence.
11. 'Africa:
Unbinding
the
Ties',
Newsweek
(27 August 1973), pp. 36,
40.
12.
Sulzberger,
'Oil and the Indian Ocean'. In
June
1973
agreement
was reached
between France and the Comoro nationalist
parties, including
the Comoro National
Liberation Movement
(MOLINACO),
for the
independence
of the islands in five
years'
time.
13.
James
E.
Akins,
'The Oil Crisis: This Time the Wolf is
Here', Foreign Affairs,
51
(April 1973), p.
486.
14. Derwent
Whittlesey, 'Chapter
16-Haushofer: the
Geopoliticans,'
in Makers
of
Modern
Strategy,
ed. Edward Mead Earle
(New York, 1969), p.
393.
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DJIBOUTI:
STRATEGIC FRENCH TOEHOLD 99
After
failing
to obtain
through
its
relationship
with
Egypt any
concessions
which would
significantly
enhance its
staying
and
striking power
in the
area,
Russia moved elsewhere. A new Soviet base is under construction at Um
Qasr,
on the Persian Gulf in
Iraq,
while the
strategic
location of
Djibouti
has been
appreciated
and a
nearby
Soviet base built at Berbera in the Somali
Republic.15
Other countries have
joined
the scramble for influence in the
region.
Cuba has
more than 100 advisers
training pilots
in South Yemen to
fly
the advanced
MIG-21
jet fighter;'6
a number of North Korean
pilots
have flown in combat
for the
Egyptian
Air Force
against
the
Israelis," following
the
precedent
set in
1971
by
the direct
participation
of about 100 Soviet advisers in the effort of the
Sudanese Moslim
majority
to crush the revolt of the black
southerners;18
and
in
April
1973 India
began
to
supply military
advisers to
Iraq
under a secret
agreement designed primarily
to counter the
growing strength
of
Iran.19
Such
developments, coupled
with the Soviet naval
build-up
in the Indian
Ocean,20
have
inevitably brought
about much discussion in the Western World
concerning
the
proper response. Japan,
which receives 90
per
cent of its oil
from the Persian Gulf
area,
has been
urged
to take a more active role in the
region.21
The United
States,
which has but a
seaplane
tender and two old
destroyers
based at Bahrain Island in the Persian
Gulf,
is
preparing
to set
up
an
outpost
on the British island of
Diego
Garcia in the Indian Ocean.22
In
addition America has been the
major supplier
in Iran's
$3
billion 1973
purchase
of
military hardware,
with more than
1,200
advisers in the
country.23
Djibouti
and its
neighbours
Having
now examined French
strategy
in relation to
Africa,
the
process
which has thrust
Djibouti
into a sudden
position
of increased
prominence,
and
the involvement of other
powers
which forces a Western
response,
it is
proper
to examine in more detail
Djibouti
itself and the characteristics which will
aid or hinder French endeavours to use it as the
linchpin
for the
security
oftheir
African and Middle Eastern
positions.
The French
presence
in the
Territory
15.
Joseph Alsop,
'Soviet Naval Power Increase Threatens Persian Gulf
Route',
The
Oregonian. Clipping,
no data available.
16. 'Cuba
Training
MIG Pilots in S.
Yemen',
The Honolulu
Advertiser,
25
June 1973,
sec.
1, p.
A-2.
17. 'North Koreans
Flying
for
Egypt',
Honolulu
Star-Bulletin,
15
August 1973,
sec.
1,
p. A-7; 'Israelis,
N. Koreans
Fight
in
Egypt Skies',
Honolulu
Star-Bulletin,
18 October
1973,
sec.
1, p.
1.
18.
'Africa-Rumblings
on a Fault
Line/Sudan:
The Soviet Viet
Nam',
Time
(1
March
1971), p.
34-5.
19. 'India
Helping Iraq's Military
With
Advisers',
The Honolulu
Advertiser,
22
June
1973,
sec.
1, p.
A-10.
20. Richard T.
Ackley,
'The Soviet
Navy's
Role in
Foreign Policy',
Naval War
College
Review,
XXIV
(May 1972), pp.
48-65.
21. Crocker
Snow, Jr., 'Japan's
Sea
Power',
The Honolulu
Advertiser,
6 October
1973,
sec.
1, p.
A-16.
22. Dara Adams
Schmidt, 'Isolating
the
Military',
The Honolulu
Advertiser,
18
July
1973,
sec.
1, p.
A-16.
23.
Georgie
Anne
Geyer, 'Iran,
an
Emerging Power',
Honolulu
Star-Bulletin,
23
July
1973,
sec.
1, p.
A-20.
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100 AFRICAN AFFAIRS
dates from a
treaty
made in 1862 with local
chiefs,
which set the
stage
for
gradual
expansion, by treaty,
in
1884, 1885,
and 1896.
Djibouti
became the
capital
town in
1892,
and the official name of the
possession
French Somaliland in 1896.
Two treaties
signed
in 1897 with Menelik II of
Ethiopia
finalized the
Territory's
borders and
provided
for the construction of a
railway
between the
Ethiopian
capital
of Addis Ababa and
Djibouti.
Since 1946
Djibouti
has been
represented
in the French Parliament as an Overseas
Territory,
a status it chose to continue
in a
popular
referendum conducted in 1967. A
High
Commissioner is
appointed
by Paris,
but his
powers
are
theoretically
limited to certain areas such as defence
and
foreign
affairs. The
Territory
is
financially
autonomous.
The
economy
itself is based
upon
the
port
of
Djibouti's shipping
and the
traffic of the
Franco-Ethiopian railway.
It costs France
$60
million a
year
to
administer the
Territory
and subsidize its
economy.
While the
Territory's
location
gives
it its
strategic importance,
it is also in one of the world's most
barren, resource-lacking
areas. Its
8,800
square miles,
roughly
the size of New
Hampshire,
burn under
temperatures
which
average
920 from
May
to
October,
and are covered with
sand, thorny
scrub
bush,
and rock hills. Rivers are
generally dry,
and
permanent
lakes such as Lake Assal and Lake Abbe have
too
high
a salt concentration to be of
any
use. Some livestock is raised in the
coastal
region
and on the
high plateaus
of the Gouda and Mabla mountain
ranges,
but at
present
there are
only 10,500
head of cattle and
80,000
sheep,
as
against 600,000 goats. Agricultural development
is limited
mainly
to the
outskirts of the
larger
towns and at some oases
plots, industry being
based
entirely upon
the
port
activities at
Djibouti.24
In 1967
exports
were a mere
$2-8 million, principally
hides and
salt,
all but
$400,000
of this trade
going
to France.
Imports
were
$26.9
million, again
primarily
from France. Tourism has been
increasing
in recent
years
to the
pleasant holiday
resort area
along
the
Bay
of
Tadjoura,
but can do little to offset
the tremendous imbalance of trade. The situation has been exacerbated
by
the
closing
of the Suez Canal in
1967; shipping passing through Djibouti
has
declined 80
per
cent,
thus
causing
massive
unemployment.
The
city
itself
already
contains two-thirds of the
Territory's population,
and in 1967 barbed
wire fences studded with watchtowers and flare mines were erected in an
attempt
to control the constant influx of rural
peoples
drawn
by
the salaries which are
still twice those of
neighbouring
countries.25
The
problem
of continual
population
flow into
Djibouti
is
intimately
con-
nected with the most
pressing
and
potentially explosive aspect
of the
Territory's
internal and external relations-the
nearly
even ethnic division of the
125,000
24. Ambassade de France Service de Presse et
d'Information,
The French
Territory of
the
Afars
and the Issas
(no publication data), pp. 4-5,
7-16. See also 'Africa:
Dropping
in on
Djibouti',
Time
(29 January 1973), p. 28,
and
generally, Virginia Thompson
and
Richard
Adloff, Djibouti
and the Horn
of Africa (Stanford, 1968).
25.
John Hatch, Africa Today-And
Tomorrow
(New York, 1965), p. 351;
P.
J.
M.
McEwan, ed., Twentieth-Century Africa (London, 1968), p.
197. See also
'Dropping
in
on
Djibouti'.
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DJIBOUTI:
STRATEGIC FRENCH TOEHOLD 101
population
into two
mutually antagonistic
tribal
groups,
the
Afar,
or
Danakil,
nomads who have ties with
Ethiopia,
and the Issa tribesmen who have ties with
Somalia. Both
Ethiopia
and Somalia stand
ready
to assert their claims to the
Territory
in the event of a French
departure. Ethiopia
bases its claims
upon
an
historical
presence
in the area and the nineteenth
century
treaties it made
ceding
land to France. Until the
grafting
of Eritrea onto
Ethiopia
in 1952 under
United Nations'
direction, Djibouti
served as
Ethiopia's only
outlet to the sea.
Although
now
possessing
the Eritrean
ports
of Massawa and
Assab, Ethiopia
still sends over half of its
foreign
trade
through Djibouti
via the Franco-
Ethiopian railway.
The
presence
of a
simmering
revolt in Eritrea led
by
the
Liberation Front of Eritrea
(ELF)26
has served to further increase the vital
nature of the
railway
in which
Ethiopia acquired
a financial interest as a result of
a 12 November 1959
treaty
with
France.27
Emperor
Hailie Selassie stated in
September
1966 that when France left the
Territory,
which he claimed had
once been
part
of
Ethiopia,
it would return to its
'rightful
owners'. Somalia
said it would
oppose any
such
move.28
For its
part
Somalia sees the
acquisition
of
Djibouti
as a
necessity
in its
quest
to unite the Somali
peoples
of Africa.
During
the nineteenth
century
Somalia
was divided
among
the
British, French,
and Italians. In 1960 the British zone
joined
the Italian
area,
then under United Nations'
trusteeship,
to form the
Republic
of Somalia. French Somaliland had been
granted
internal
autonomy
in
1956,
but
by
a 75
per
cent
majority
voted in 1958 to retain its territorial
status.29
Somalia is committed
by
its constitution to seek the
peaceful
and
legal
reunification of all the Somali
peoples.
Most of those who live outside the
borders of Somalia are nomads who
constantly squabble among themselves,
and who
accept
neither
government
rule nor national boundaries. There
is,
however,
a
strong underlying unity
when the
fighting
is turned
against outsiders,
and
many
of the Somalis look to the
Republic
of Somalia for
support
in their
more serious battles.30 The Somali
flag
has a
five-pointed
white star on an
azure
background,
two
points symbolizing
the former British and Italian
colonies,
one the French
territory,
one the Northern Province of
Kenya,
and
the other the
Haud-Ogaden region
of
Ethiopia.
The Somali claims in
pursuance
of their
goal
of
unity
have led to strained relations with the states involved.
France has
strongly opposed
the
pan-Somali movement,31
and the
presence
of Somalia-based
political parties
in
Djibouti
has led to violence in recent
years.
When President de Gaulle visited the
Territory
in
1966,
the nationalist Issa
26.
Mary Hanson,
'Eritrea: The Hidden War in East
Africa', Pacific
Research & World
Empire Telegram, I (10 September 1969), pp.
1-6.
27. The French
Territory of
the
Afars
and the
Issas, p.
9.
28. 'Somalia
Moving
to Ease Tension Over
Neighbour',
The New York
Times,
8 March
1967,
sec.
1, p.
18.
29. Thomas Patrick
Melady,
Faces
of Africa (New York, 1964), p.
240.
30. 'Somalia
Moving
to Ease Tension Over
Neighbour.'
On Somalia
generally,
see
I. M.
Lewis,
The Modern
History of
Somaliland
(London, 1965), J. Drysdale,
The Somali
Dispute (London, 1964),
and S.
Touval,
Somali Nationalism
(London, 1969).
31. Helen
Kitchen, ed.,
A Handbook
of African Affairs (New York, 1964), p.
136.
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102 AFRICAN AFFAIRS
Parti Mouvement
Populaire,
which drew most of its
strength
from the 66
per
cent of
Djibouti city's population
which was of Somali
extraction,
launched a
series of violent riots
demanding
immediate
independence. Highly embarassed,
de Gaulle ordered an immediate referendum to determine the future status of
the
Territory.
Due to the continual influx of non-citizens across the
Territory's
borders,
stiff
voting regulations
were
put
into effect under which
only
French
citizens over 21
years
whose
papers
were in order were alllowed to vote. There
were
39,024 eligible
voters out of
125,050 inhabitants, 22,004
Afar and
14,689
Somalis of the Issa and
Isaq
subgroups.32
Thousands who lacked valid
residence
papers
were
expelled.
In the actual
balloting
held on 19 March
1967,
nearly
60
per
cent of the voters
opted
for continuance of the French mandate. As was to be
expected,
the
opposition
claimed that the
balloting
had been
rigged,
and Somalia stated its
refusal to
accept
the results. Demonstrations
erupted, leading
to
rioting
in
which at least 17 civilians were
killed.33
With
Ethiopian
and Somali
troops
poised
on the
Territory's borders,
the French were
caught
in a situation where
they
were forced to localize the bloodshed
by calling
in
troops
and
police
to
forcibly quell
the
disorders.34
Given the fact that a French
departure
would
have led to an
Ethiopian-Somali war,
which would
hardly
have been
expected
to
stay
localized for
long,
the French chose to take what came and continue their
'mission'
in
Djibouti.
The reaction of most African
governments
was
favourable.35
Acting swiftly,
French
troops
held or
deported
thousands of Somalis who
held no valid
papers
and were
suspected
of
being agitators.36
Somalia refused
to let the
deported
tribesmen into her
territory,
and
feelings
became
very
bitter,
particularly
in
light
of evidence that massive Somali financial aid had
played
a
part
in the
post-election demonstrations.37
Acrimonious verbal
volleys passed
between Afar and Issa
leaders,
with Ali
Aref,
leader of the
strong
Afar Democratic
Party, declaring
'The Afar hate the
Somalis,
to
say things
as
they
are.
They
have
always
been our
enemies.'38
Somali leaders said
they
would no
longer
take
part
in
any
internal
government,39
but later
relented,
while the French launched
an intensive
programme
to raise the economic level of the nomadic Afar to that
of the more urban Issa. In a final move the name of French
Somaliland,
32. Eric
Pace,
'French Said to Plan Fast Exit if
Displeased by
Somali
Election',
The
New York
Times,
17 March
1967,
sec.
1, p. 16;
Eric
Pace,
'Somaliland Voters Back Con-
tinuation of Rule
by France',
The New York
Times,
20 March
1967,
sec.
1, p.
1.
33. 'French Somaliland:
Victory
for
Trouble', Time,
89
(31
March
1967), p.
30.
34. Eric
Pace,
'
11
Somalis Killed
by
French
Troops
in
Djibouti Riots',
The New York
Times,
21 March
1967,
sec.
1, p.
1.
35.
Henry Tanner,
'France to Retain Somaliland
Rule',
The New York
Times,
23 March
1967,
sec.
1, p.
1.
36. Eric
Pace,
'Somalia Bars
Somalis',
The New York
Times,
23 March
1967,
sec.
1,
p.
10.
37. Eric
Pace,
'Desert Torture is Laid to
French',
The New York
Times,
24 March
1967,
sec.
1, p.
10.
38. Eric
Pace,
'France Will
Help
Somaliland
Tribe',
The New York
Times,
25 March
1967,
sec.
1, p.
5.
39. 'Somaliland: Votes and
Riots',
The New York
Times,
26 March
1967,
sec.
4, p.
2.
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DJIBOUTI:
STRATEGIC FRENCH TOEHOLD 103
which in French is 'the French Coast of the
Somalis',
was
changed
to the
French
Territory
of the Afars and the
Issas.40
Tensions
gradually
subsided, although
Somalia continued to
covertly support
resistance
parties
and a small-scale
guerrilla
movement. On the
night
of
24
January
1970 a
grenade
thrown into a restaurant
injured
16
Europeans,
while
a number of leaflets
calling
for violence were scattered in the African
quarter
of
Djibouti.
These were
signed by
the Somali Coast Liberation Front.41
Today
both the Somalis and
Ethiopians provide refuge
for
groups seeking
the
independence
of the
Territory,
so as to be in a
position
to
capitalize upon
a French withdrawal. The
Ethiopian counterpart
to the
Hargeisa-based
Somali
Coast Liberation Front is the Movement for the Liberation of French
Somaliland,
led
by
an Afar tribesmen. To avoid a
confrontation,
the Somali have asked
that when and if the French
withdraw,
the United Nations assume a
temporary
administration over the
territory
for a
period
of two
years.
This would allow
both time for the Somalis to cultivate
support
before the self-determination
referendum and for some
arrangement
to be reached that
might satisfy
both
Somalia and
Ethiopia.42
In
January
1973 President
Pompidou
visited the
Territory.
Amidst massive
security precautions
and
reports
that both the Somalis and
Ethiopians planned
to foment
trouble,
the visit went off
peacefully.43
There are
reports
of a
gradual
shift in the French attitude towards the
continuing costly presence
in
Djibouti,
with
many wondering why
France bothers to
stay
at
all.44
Such doubt is
understandable, given
the traditional French
governmental
reluctance to
publically
explain
the
strategic thinking
behind its
military
decisions. More
fundamentally,
however,
it is obvious that while
Djibouti
has
always
had intrinsic
positional
value,
the French continued to
hang
onto it in the
past
as the lesser of two evils.
A withdrawal would
precipitate
both an internal conflict between the Afar and
Issa and also a sure war between
Ethiopia
and Somalia. Such a conflict would
involve
others,
for the United States and Israel back
Ethiopia's claims,
while
Russia and China
support
Somalia.45
France,
it would
appear,
had little
option
but to remain.
Although
such a decision was
perhaps
the
only
realistic
solution,
the French
public
has
long
since lost its desire to
participate
in these
kinds of colonial ventures.
If,
in the immediate
past,
France has
kept
hold of
Djibouti
for want of
any
better
solution,
it now finds its albatross
sporting plummage
of a different colour.
40. 'French to Alter Name of Somali
Territory',
The New York
Times,
25
April 1967,
sec.
1, p. 46;
'French Somaliland Votes to Alter Territorial
Name',
The New York
Times,
14
May 1967,
sec.
1, p.
17. Elections were
again
held in the
Territory
in November 1973.
The
ruling
Union and
Progress Party,
which favoured the maintenance of French
control,
won all
forty
seats in the
assembly.
The
opposition People's
African
League
declared
that the election had been
rigged.
41. '16 Hurt in
Djibouti
in Terrorist
Attack',
The New York
Times,
26
January 1970,
sec.
1, p.
10.
42.
Irving Kaplan
et
al,
Area Handbook
for
Somalia
(Washington, D.C., 1969), p.
232.
43. 'The Last
Outpost',
Newsweek
(22 January 1973), pp.
39-40.
44. 'Africa:
Dropping
in on
Djibouti'.
45. 'The Last
Outpost'.
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104 AFRICAN AFFAIRS
Developments
in the Indian Ocean
region (which
have been described in the
section
above)
have thrust
upon
the
Territory
a new
importance.
Prior to the
beginning
of the withdrawal from
Malagasy,
French forces in
Djibouti
numbered
between
5,000
and
6,000 men, consisting
of a
Military
Command
group,
the
highly-decorated
Thirteenth
Demibrigade
of the French
Foreign Legion
(13e D.B.L.E.)46
one Marine
infantry battalion,
a Marine
artillery battalion,
one
army
aviation
troop,
two air force
squadrons (one
of A-1E attack aircraft
and one of mixed
transports),
and a naval
contingent manning
two
minesweepers
and some
landing craft.47
Whether these forces will be
augmented
is not
yet
known,
but
appears probable.
For the
Territory
to continue as a viable base will of
necessity depend
to a
large
extent
upon
the
ability
of the French to convince the inhabitants that
association with France is in their best interests.
Development
is a slow task in
a land where there is such a
paucity
of human and natural resources.
Fully
90
per
cent of the
population
is
completely
illiterate. In 1969
only 4,778
students attended the
Territory's
19
public
and seven
private elementary
schools,
and
only
604 students attended the one
public
and two
private secondary
schools.
Increasing
numbers of students are
being
sent to universities in
France, primarily
in the
hope
of
strengthening
cultural
ties,
but
they
are a small
group. Djibouti
itself has but one 600-bed
hospital,
and ten
dispensaries
are
located in the main rural centres. The
transportation
network
(apart
from the
railway)
is
primitive
but
growing.48
Illegal immigration
continues to swell the
population, although
this
problem
has been cut
considerably through
the efforts of the
Foreign Legion,
which
patrols
the desolate 250-mile border. The Afar are
strongly
committed to
French rule as the
only
means to retain their ethnic
independence,
while the
Issa are
just
as committed to
independence
and union with Somalia. Whether
the new focus of attention
upon
the
Territory
will increase tensions cannot be
accurately predicted.
For the moment the French are
firmly
in
possession
of their
strategic
toehold
on the
African
continent. The future of the
Territory
would
appear
to be
as one observer forecast in 1964: 'French Somaliland has chosen what seems the
only way
for a
territory
with a
precarious political
and economic future. It
has voted to remain a French
territory, thereby obtaining
the aid and
guidance
it needs
desperately.
At least for the near
future,
it is
likely
to remain a
necessary
vestige
of colonialism on the continent of
Africa.'49
Of one
thing
there is little
room for doubt-the
heightened importance
of the Red
Sea/Western
Indian
Ocean area in the uncertain
post-October
Arab-Israeli war situation.
46. Martin
Windrow,
French
Foreign Legion (Berkshire, England, 1971), p.
35.
47. Interview with Lt.-Col.
Jean Salvan,
7 December 1972.
48. The French
Territory of
the
Afars
and the
Issas, p.
6.
49.
Melady,
Faces
of Africa, p.
241.
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