JosephreyBelciaLumabas

ARTICLE XI SECTION 1: PUBLIC OFFICE

ESTRELLA V. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. 125160, JUNE 20, 2000

FACTS:
Petitioner was appointed as municipal cashier in the Office of thee Municipal
treasurer with a bond issued by the Commission on Audit Regional Office XII, he was
audited of his cash and accounts for the period from March 18-24, 1986 only. For reasons
unknown, the cash and account of the petitioner were not audited for the period of his
appointment up to march 17. During audit examination petitioner submitted his daily
collections and was supposed to turn over the collections to the municipal treasurer but
failed to do so due to the absence of the treasurer. As recourse, petitioner should have
deposited his collection with the depository bank but he neglected to do so. Petitioner
made a cash advance, all in all petitioner received 249, 829.25 pesos. Petitioner was able to
liquidate the amount of 29, 083. 57pesos only and admitted the accuracy of this amounts.
State auditor serves a letter of demand, demanding the immediate production of the
missing fund and a written explanation. Petitioner was charged with malversation of public
funds in the information filed with the sandiganbayan.

ISSUE:
Whether the sandiganbayan in finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of malversation.

HELD:
Petitioner failed to produce the missing amount and neither was he able to explain
his failure to produce that amount. Nothing in the record supports his allegation that the
audit team had committed an error in the report of cash examination.
Art. 217 of the Revised penal code holds liable for malversation a public officer who
shall appropriate public funds or property for which he is accountable, or shall take or
misappropriate or shall consent, or through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any
other person to take such public funds or property. Furthermore, the failure of a public to
have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon
demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such
missing funds or property to personal uses.













JosephreyBelciaLumabas

ARTICLE XI SECTION 4: SANDIGANBAYAN
NUEZ V. SANDIGANBAYAN 111 SCRA 433 (1982)

FACTS:
Nuez assails the validity of the PD 1486 creating the Sandiganbayan as amended by PD
1606. He was accused before the Sandiganbayan of estafa through falsification of public
and commercial documents committed in connivance with his other co-accused, all public
officials, in several cases. It is the claim of Nuez that PD1486, as amended, is violative of
the due process, equal protection, and ex post facto clauses of the Constitution. He claims
that the Sandiganbayan proceedings violates Nuezs right to equal protection, because
appeal as a matter of right became minimized into a mere matter of discretion; appeal
likewise was shrunk and limited only to questions of law, excluding a review of the facts
and trial evidence; and there is only one chance to appeal conviction, by certiorari to the SC,
instead of the traditional two chances; while all other estafa indictees are entitled to appeal
as a matter of right covering both law and facts and to two appellate courts, i.e., first to the
CA and thereafter to the SC.

ISSUE:
Whether the creation of Sandiganbayan violates equal protection insofar as appeals
would be concerned.

HELD:
The SC ruled against Nuez. The 1973 Constitution had provided for the creation of a
special court that shall have original jurisdiction over cases involving public officials
charged with graft and corruption. The constitution specifically makes mention of the
creation of a special court, the Sandiganbayan, precisely in response to a problem, the
urgency of which cannot be denied, namely, dishonesty in the public service. It follows that
those who may thereafter be tried by such court ought to have been aware as far back as
January 17, 1973, when the present Constitution came into force, that a different procedure
for the accused therein, whether a private citizen as petitioner is or a public official, is not
necessarily offensive to the equal protection clause of the Constitution.















JosephreyBelciaLumabas

ARTICLE XI SECTION 13: POWERS; FUNCTIONS; DUTIES
OMB V. MASING, 542 SCRA 245 (2007)

FACTS:
Respondents Florita A. Masing, former Principal of the Davao City Integrated Special
School, and JocelynA. Tayactac, an office clerk in the same school, were administratively
charged before the Office of the Ombudsman for allegedly collecting unauthorized fees,
failing to remit authorized fees, and to account for public funds. Respondents filed a motion
to dismiss on the ground that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over them. Respondents
alleged that the DECS has jurisdiction over them which shall exercise the same through a
committee to be constituted under Section 9 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4670, otherwise
known as the The Magna Carta for Public School Teachers.

The motion was denied. Ombudsman rendered a joint decision finding respondents
Masing and Tayactac guilty. Masing was dismissed from service while Tayactac was
suspended for 6 months. On appeal, CA reversed. Meanwhile, Masing faced yet
another administrative case before the Ombudsman for charges of oppression, serious
misconduct, discourtesy in the conduct of official duties, and physical or mental incapacity
or disability due to immoral or vicious habits. Ombudsman found Masing guilty as charged
and ordered her suspension for six (6) months without pay. On appeal, CA also reversed.

Ombudsman, which was not impleaded as respondent in the cases, filed an Omnibus
Motion to Intervene and for Reconsideration. CA denied the on the grounds that (1)
intervention is not proper because it is sought by the quasi-judicial body whose judgment
is on appeal, and (2) intervention, even if permissible, is belated under Section 2, Rule 19 of
the Rules of Court. Hence, appeal before SC. The 2 cases were consolidated.

ISSUE:
Whether Ombudsman may directly discipline public school teachers and
employees?

HELD:
YES. The authority of the Ombudsman to act on complaints filed against public
officers and employees is explicit in Article XI, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution. Article
XI, Section 13 of the same Constitution delineates the powers, functions and duties of the
Ombudsman. The enumeration of these powers is non-exclusive.









JosephreyBelciaLumabas

ARTICLE XI SECTION 13: POWERS; FUNCTIONS; DUTIES
LASTIMOSA V. VASQUEZ, 243 SCRA 497(1995)

FACTS:
Jessica Villacarlos Dayon, public health nurse, filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman a criminal complaint for frustrated rape and an administrative complaint for
immoral acts, abuse of authority and grave misconduct against the Municipal Mayor of
Santa Fe, Rogelio Ilustrisimo. The graft investigation officer assigned to the case found,
after investigation, no prima facie evidence and accordingly recommended for the
dismissal of the case. However, upon review of the matter, Ombudsman, Hon. Conrado
Vasquez, disapproved the recommendation and instead directed that Mayor Illustrisimo be
charged with attempted rape in the Regional Trial Court. The case was then referred by the
Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas, Arturo Mojica, to the Cebu Provincial Kintanar for the
filing of appropriate information with the RTC of Danao City. The same was eventually
assigned to herein petition, First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Lastimosa. On preliminary
investigation, petitioner found that only acts of lasciviousness had been committed. With
the approval of the Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar, an information for act of lasciviousness
against Mayor Ilustrisimo with the MTC of Santa Fe. Deputy Ombudsman Mojica wrote two
letters to the Provincial Prosecutor inquiring on any action taken on the referred case. And
since no case for attempted rape had been filed, Deputy Ombudsman Mojica ordered the
Provincial Prosecutor and petitioner Lastimosa to show cause why they should not be
punished for contempt for refusing and failing to obey the lawful directives of the Office
of the Ombudsman. For this purpose, hearings were duly conducted. As a result, Provincial
Prosecutor Kintanar and petitioner Gloria Lastimosa were placed under preventive
suspension for a period of six (6) months.
ISSUE:
Whether the Office of the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the case against the mayor
because the crime was not committed in relation to a public office and whether it has
authority to place petitioner and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar under preventive
suspension.
HELD: The court ruled that the Office of the Ombudsman has the power to investigate and
prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public
officer or employee, office or agency, when such act of omission appears to be illegal,
unjust, improper or inefficient. This power has been held to include the investigation and
prosecution of any crime committed by a public official regardless of whether the acts or
omissions complained of are related to, or connected with, or arise from the performance
of his official duty. It is enough that the act or omission was committed by a public official.
Hence, the crime of rape, when committed by a public official like a municipal mayor, is
within the power of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute





JosephreyBelciaLumabas



ARTICLE XII SECTION 2: REGALIAN DOCTRINE
STA. ROSA MINING V. LEIDO, 156 SCRA 1 (1987)

FACTS:
PD No. 1214 was issued requiring holders of subsisting and valid patentable mining
under Philippine bill of 1902 to file a mining lease of application within one year from the
approval of the decree. The sta. Rosa mining company assailed the constitutionality of PD
1214 claiming that it amounts to deprivation of property without due process of law.

ISSUE:
Whether the PD 1214 is unconstitutional.

HELD:
NO. The constitutional mandate of PD 1214 is found in sec. 2, Art.XII of the 1987
constitution. It is a valid exercise of the sovereign power of the state, as owner over lands of
the public domain of which petitioner's mining claims still form a part.




























JosephreyBelciaLumabas



ARTICLE XII SECTION 3: LANDS OF PUBLIC DOMAIN
DIR. OF LANDS V. IAC, 146 SCRA 509 (1986)

FACTS:
The tambac island in Lingayen Gulf is situated in the municipality of bani,
pangasinan, which consists of more or less 187,288 square meters. The initial application
for registration was filed for pacific farms, Inc. Under the provisions of the land registration
act (496). The director of lands opposed the application alleging that the pacific farms, Inc.
Does not possess a fee simple title to the land nor did its predecessors possess the land for
at 30 years immediately after filing the application. In an amended application, pacific
farms, inc. filed a manifestation-motion to change the applicant from pacific farms, Inc. To j.
Antonio Araneta. Despite the supposed amendment, there was no republication. So, the
director of lands alleged that the land is within the unclassified public land and inalienable.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the land known as "Tambac Island" can be subject to registration.

HELD:
The amendment of the application from the name of pacific farms Inc. To the name
of j. Antonio Araneta inc. was a mere attempt to evade disqualification. Our constitution
prohibits private corporations or associations from holding alienable lands of the public
domain except by lease. The court ruled to release the subject property from the
unclassified category, which is beyond their competence and jurisdiction. They reiterate
that the classification of public lands is an exclusive prerogative of the executive
department of the government and not of the courts. In the absence of such classification,
the land remains unclassified until released and rendered open to disposition.


















JosephreyBelciaLumabas



ARTICLE XII SECTION 7: PRIVATE LANDS
FRENZEL V. CATITO, GR NO. 143958, JULY 11, 2003

FACTS:
Alfred fritz frenzel, an Australian citizen of German descent, was married to Teresita
Santos; while Ederlina Catito, a Filipina, was married to Klaus Muller. Alfred and Ederlina
met and later cohabited in a common-law relationship, during which Alfred acquired real
properties; and since he was disqualified from owning lands in the Philippines, Ederlinas
name appeared as the vendee in the deeds of sale. When their relationship turned sour,
Alfred filed an action for the recovery of the real properties registered in the name of
Ederlina, claiming that he was the real owner.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Alfred is entitled to compensation for the properties?

HELD:
No. The court refused to declare Alfred as the owner mainly because of the
constitutional prohibition. The court added that being a party to an illegal contract, he
could not come to court and ask to have his illegal objective carried out. Even if, as claimed
by Alfred, the sales in question were entered into by him as the real vendee, the said
transactions are in violation of the constitution; hence, are null and void ab initio. A
contract that violates the constitution and the law, is null and void and vests no rights and
creates no obligations. It produces no legal effect at all. Alfred, being a party to an illegal
contract, cannot come into a court of law and ask to have his illegal objective carried out.
One who loses his money or property by knowingly engaging in a contract or transaction
which involves his own moral turpitude may not maintain an action for his losses. To him
who moves in deliberation and premeditation, the law is unyielding. The law will not aid
either party to an illegal contract or agreement; it leaves the parties where it finds them.
















JosephreyBelciaLumabas



ARTICLE XII SECTION 10: FILIPINIZATION
TANADA V. ANGARA, 272 SCRA 18 (1997)

FACTS:
Petitioners senator Tanada et. Al. Questioned the constitutionality of the
concurrence by the Philippine senate of the presidents ratification of the international
agreement establishing the world trade organization. They argued that the WTO agreement
violates the mandate of the 1987 constitution to develop a self-reliant and independent
national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos by giving preference to qualified
Filipinos and to promote preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally
produced goods. Further, they contended that the national treatment and parity provisions
of the WTO agreement places nationals and products of member countries on the same
footing as Filipinos and local products in contravention the Filipino first policy of our
constitution and render meaningless the phrase effectively controlled by Filipinos.

ISSUE:
Whether the 1987 constitution prohibit our country from participating in
worldwide trade liberalization and economic globalization and from integrating into a
global economy that is liberalized, deregulated and privatized.

HELD:
The court dismissed the petition. The 1987 constitution does not prohibit our
country from participating in worldwide trade agreements. While indeed the constitution
mandates a bias in favors of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprise, at the same time,
it recognized the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of
equality and reciprocity. The constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It
did not shut out foreign investments, goods and service in the development of the
Philippine economy. While the constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of
foreign goods, services and investments into the country, it does not prohibit them either.
In fact, it allows an exchange of good, services and products but frowns only on foreign
competition that is unfair and unjust.













JosephreyBelciaLumabas



ARTICLE XII SECTION 11: PUBLIC UTILITIES
ROYAL CARGO CORP. V. CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD (CAB) 421 SCRA 21

FACTS:
Royal Cargo Corporation is a stock corporation with a 70% owned by Filipino
citizens and 30% owned by foreigners. The president is a foreigner married to a Filipina,
while The Chairman of the board, Executive Vice-president and all the Vice-presidents are
all Filipinos. CAB initially granted petitioner an indefinite authority to engage in
international air freight forwarding. Petitioner filed a petition, requesting for fix duration of
its authority. Permit was extended for a period of five years. Petitioner applied for a
renewal, was granted provided that that the position of the president be transferred to a
Filipino citizen within thirty days from notice thereof, otherwise the permit would be
cancelled.
A petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the decision
resolution of CA was filed. the appellate court affirmed the resolution of the Civil
Aeronautics Board directing the petitioner to transfer the top position of its corporation to
a Filipino national.

ISSUE:
Whether the resolution of CAB directing the petitioner to transfer the top position of
its corporation to a Filipino national is valid?

HELD:
YES. Under Section 11 last sentence state: The participation of foreign investors in
the governing body of any public utility enterprise shall be limited to their corporate share
in its capital, and all the executive and managing officers of such corporation or association
must be citizens if the Philippines.

















JosephreyBelciaLumabas



ARTICLE XII SECTION 18: NATIONALIZATION
REPUBLIC V. PLDT, 26 SCRA 620 (1968)

FACTS:
Public petitioner commenced a suit against private respondent praying for the right
of the bureau of telecommunications to demand interconnection between the government
telephone system and that of PLDT, so that the government telephone system could make
use of the lines and facilities of the PLDT. Private respondent contends that it cannot be
compelled to enter into a contract where no agreement is had between them.

ISSUE:
Whether or not interconnection between PLDT and the government telephone
system can be a valid object for expropriation.

HELD:
Yes, in the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain, the republic may
require the telephone company to permit interconnection as the needs of the government
service may require, subject to the payment of just compensation. The use of lines and
services to allow inter-service connection between the both telephone systems, through
expropriation can be a subject to an easement of right of way.