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Lee Hong Kok v.

David, 48 SCRA 372



Main point: A grant by the government through the appropriate public officials exercising the competence duly
vested in them by law is not to be set at naught on the premise, unexpressed but implied, that land not otherwise
passing into private ownership may not be disposed of by the state. Such an assumption is at war with settled
principles of constitutional law.

Ruling: Only the government, represented by the Director of Lands or the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, can bring an action to cancel a void certificate of title issued pursuant to a void patent. The fact that the
grant was made by the government is undisputed. Whether the grant was in conformity with the law or not is a
question which the government may raise, but until it is raised by the government and set aside, the defendant
cannot question it.
Carino v. Insurer Government, 41 PHIL 935
Main Point: There is an existence of native title to land, or ownership of land by Filipinos by virtue of possession
under a claim of ownership since time immemorial and independent of any grant from the Spanish Crown, as an
exception to the theory of jura regalia.
Ruling: The government is still the absolute owner of the land (regalian doctrine). Further, Mateos possession
of the land has not been of such a character as to require the presumption of a grant. No one has lived upon it
for many years. It was never used for anything but pasturage of animals, except insignificant portions thereof,
and since the insurrection against Spain it has apparently not been used by the petitioner for any
purpose.while the state has always recognized the right of the occupant to a deed if he proves a possession for a
sufficient length of time, yet it has always insisted that he must make that proof before the proper administrative
officers, and obtain from them his deed, and until he did the state remained the absolute owner.
Laurel v. Garcia, 187 SCRA 797 (1990)
Case main point: Executive Order No. 296, though its title declares an authority to sell, does not have a provision
in this text expressly authorizing the sale of the four properties procured from Japan for the government sector. It
merely intends to make the properties available to foreigners and not to Filipinos alone in case of a sale, lease or
other disposition.
Ruling: yes. Under Philippine law, there can be no doubt that it is of public dominion unless it is convincingly
shown that the property has become patrimonial. As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the
commerce of man. It cannot be alienated.
Almeda v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 85322, April 30, 1991
Case Main Point: The thirty year period only begins to toll only from the time the land is converted into alienable
public land.
The right to appeal is a statutory right and one who seeks to avail of it must strictly comply with the statutes or
rules as they are considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays and for an orderly discharge of
judicial business.
Ruling: No. The court of appeals correctly ruled that the private respondents had not qualified for a grant under
section 48(b) of the public land act because their possession of the land while it was still inalienable forest
land, or before it was declared alienable and disposable land of the public domain on january 13, 1968, could
not ripen into private ownership, and should be excluded from the computation of the 30-year open and
continuous possession in concept of owner required under section 48(b) of com. Act 141.



Director of Lands v. Kalahi Investments, Inc, GR No. 48066, January 31, 1989
Case Main point: Mere location does not mean absolute ownership over the affected land or the located claim. It
merely segregates the located land or area from the public domain by barring other would be locators from
locating the same and appropriating for themselves the minerals found therein. To rule otherwisewould imply that
location is all that is needed to acquire and maintain rights over a located mining claim.This, the Court cannot
approve or sanction because it is contrary to the intention of the lawmaker that thelocator should faithfully and
consistently comply with the requirements for annual work and improvements in the located mining claims.
Ruling: No, the court ruled that while it is recognized that the right of a locator of a mining claim is a
property right, it is not absolute. It is merely a possessory right, more so where petitioner's claims are still
unpatented. Mere location does not mean absolute ownership over the affected land or the located claim. It
merely segregates the located land or area from the public domain by barring other would be locators from
locating the same and appropriating for themselves the minerals found therein. To rule otherwise would imply
that location is all that is needed to acquire and maintain rights over a located mining claim. This, we cannot
approve or sanction because it is contrary to the intention of the lawmaker that the locator should faithfully
and consistently comply with the requirements for annual work and improvements in the located mining
claims.
Land Mgt. Bureau v. CA, GR 112567, February 7, 2000
Case Main Point: Basic is the rule that the petitioner in a land registration case must prove the facts and
circumstances evidencing his alleged has been in open, continuous, exclusive, and adverse possession and
occupation of the land sought for registration, for at least thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of the
petition for confirmation of title. General statements, which are mere conclusions of law and not factual proof of
possession are unavailing and cannot suffice.
Republic v. De Guzman, GR 105630, February 23, 2000
Case Main Point: 1. Actual possession of the land by the applicant and making improvements thereto were among
the legal requirements to be complied with by an applicant.
2. The authority of the Director of Lands to investigate conflicts over public lands is derived from Section 91 of the
Public Land Act. In fact, it is not merely his right but his specific duty to conduct investigations of alleged fraud in
securing patents and the corresponding titles thereto. While title issued on the basis of a patent is as indefeasible
as one judicially secured, such indefeasibility is not a bar to an investigation by the Director of Lands as to how
such title had been acquired, if the purpose of such investigation is to determine whether or not fraud had been
committed in securing such title, in order that the appropriate action for reversion may be filed by the Government
Pua v. CA, GR 134992, November 20, 2000
Case Main Point: The acts sought to be punished by the Anti-Dummy Law are allowing the use of the name of a
citizen of the Philippines for the purpose of evading any constitutional or legal provision requiring Philippine
citizenship as a requisite for the exercise or enjoyment of a right, franchise or privilege, and the profiting of any
alien thereby.It punishes the evasion of nationalization laws (by the use of dummies) and prohibits aliens from
intervening in the management, operation, administration or control of any nationalized activity, wholly or
partially but to an extent of not less than sixty percent (60%), whether as an officer, employee or laborer, as well as
imposing criminal sanctions on the president, managers, board members or persons in charge of the violating
entity and causing the latter to forfeit its privileges, rights and franchises
Cruz v. Sec. of DENR, GR 135385, December 6, 2000
Case Main Point: The Rules and Regulations Implementing the IPRA, and Section 57 of the IPRA which he
contends should be interpreted as dealing with the large-scale exploitation of natural resources and should be read
in conjunction with Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. It does not amount to an unlawful deprivation of
the States ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in
violation of the regalian doctrine
Chavez v. PEA, GR 133250, July 9, 2002
Case Main Point: The 1987 Constitution continues the State policy in the 1973 Constitution banning private
corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. Like the 1973 Constitution, the 1987
Constitution allows private corporations to hold alienable lands of the public domain only through lease.
If a negotiation indeed violates the Constitution under Sec 3 Art 12, it is the duty of the Court to enjoin its
implementation, and if already implemented, to annul the effects of such unconstitutional contract.It now becomes
more compelling for the Court to resolve the issue to insure the government itself does not violate a provision of
the Constitution intended to safeguard the national patrimony.Even in cases where supervening events had made
the cases moot, the Court did not hesitate to resolve the legal or constitutional issues raised to formulate
controlling principles to guide the bench, bar, and the public.
Ruling: The bulk of the lands subject of the amended JVA are still submerged lands even to this very day, and
therefore inalienable and outside the commerce of man. Of the 750 hectares subject of the amended JVA, 78% of
the total area is still submerged, permanently under the waters of manila bay. Under the amended JVA, the
pea conveyed to amari the submerged lands even before their actual reclamation, although the
documentation of the deed of transfer and issuance of the certificates of title would be made only after actual
reclamation. To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to pea as private lands
is in violation of sec. 2 article xii of the constitution.
La Bugal-Blaan v. Ramos, GR 127872, Dec. 1, 2004
Case Main Point: All mineral resources are owned by the State. Their exploration, development and utilization
(EDU) must always be subject to the full control and supervision of the State. More specifically, given the
inadequacy of Filipino capital and technology in large-scale EDU activities, the State may secure the help of foreign
companies in all relevant matters -- especially financial and technical assistance -- provided that, at all times, the
State maintains its right of full control. The foreign assistor or contractor assumes all financial, technical and
entrepreneurial risks in the EDU activities; hence, it may be given reasonable management, operational, marketing,
audit and other prerogatives to protect its investments and to enable the business to succeed.
Dipido v. Gozun 485 SCRA 586
Case Main Point: The use of the word involving used in Art 12 Sec 2 implies that these agreements with foreign
corporations are not limited to mere financial or technical assistance. The difference in sense becomes very
apparent when we juxtapose agreements for technical or financial assistance against agreements including
technical or financial assistance.
Chavez v. NHA 530 SCRA 235 [2007]
Case Main Point: To lands reclaimed by PEA or through a contract with a private person or entity, such reclaimed
lands still remain alienable lands of public domain which can be transferred only to Filipino citizens but not to a
private corporation. This is because PEA under PD 1084 and EO 525 is tasked to hold and dispose of alienable
lands of public domain and it is only when it is transferred to Filipino citizens that it becomes patrimonial
property.
The NHA is an end-user agency authorized by law to administer and dispose of reclaimed lands. The moment
titles over reclaimed lands based on the special patents are transferred to the NHA by the Register of Deeds, they
are automatically converted to patrimonial properties of the State which can be sold to Filipino citizens and private
corporations, 60% of which are owned by Filipinos. The reason is obvious: if the reclaimed land is not converted
to patrimonial land once transferred to NHA, then it would be useless to transfer it to the NHA since it cannot
legally transfer or alienate lands of public domain.



Republic v. Enciso, GR No. 160145, November 11, 2005
Case Main Point: Applicants for registration of title must therefore prove the following: (a) that the land forms
part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; and (b) that they have been in open, continuous,
exclusive,and notorious possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership either since
time immemorial, or since June 12, 1945.
Philippine Geothermal v. Napocor, GR No. 144302, May 27, 2004
Case Main Point: Contracts should be congruent with the constitution, especially on the role of the State in
exploration of natural resources. Terms and agreements shall also be harmonious with the law.
JG Summit v. CA, GR No. 124293, January 31, 2005
Case Main Point: The prohibition of aliens in owning a property in the country applies only to ownership of land.
It does not extend to all immovable or real property as defined under Art 45 of the Civil Code, that is, those which
are considered immovable for being attached to land, including buildings and constructing of all kind attached to
the soil.
ALIENATION
Sta. Rosa Mining v. Liedo 156 SCRA 1 [1987] (mining claims)
Case Main Point: It is a valid exercise of the sovereign power of the State, as owner, over lands of the public
domain, of which filing a mining lease application within one (1) year from the approval of the Decree, and over the
patrimony of the nation, of which mineral deposits are a valuable asset. It may be underscored, in this connection,
that the Decree does not cover all mining claims located under the Phil. Bill of 1902, but only those claims over
which their locators had failed to obtain a patent. And even then, such locators may still avail of the renewable
twenty-five year (25) lease prescribed by Pres. Decree No. 463, the Mineral Development Resources Decree of
1974.
San Miguel Corporation v. CA 185 SCRA 722 [1990] (possession in the concept of an owner)
Case Main Point:The Regalian doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State. The
applicant for land registration has the burden of overcoming the presumption of State ownership by establishing
through incontrovertible evidence that the land sought to be registered is alienable or disposable based on a
positive act of the government.
Republic v. Bantigue Point development Corporation, GR 162322, 14 March 2012
Case Main Point: The Regalian doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State. The
applicant for land registration has the burden of overcoming the presumption of State ownership by establishing
through incontrovertible evidence that the land sought to be registered is alienable or disposable based on a
positive act of the government.
(burden on applicant to prove land sought to be registered is alienable or disposable on a positive act the
government)
Utilization
Miners v. Factoran 240 SCRA 100[1995] (jura regalia)
Case Main Point:The adoption of the concept of jura regalia that all natural resources are owned by the State, as
well as the recognition of the importance of the country's natural resources, not only for national economic
development, but also for its security and national defense, ushered in the adoption of the constitutional policy of
"full control and supervision by the State" in the exploration, development and utilization of the country's natural
resources. The options open to the State are through direct undertaking or by entering into co-production, joint
venture; or production-sharing agreements, or by entering into agreement with foreign-owned corporations for
large-scale exploration, development and utilization.
Tano v. Socrates 278 SCRA 154 [1997] (Subsistence fisherman)
Case Main Point: Section 2 of Article XII aims primarily not to bestow any right to subsistence fishermen, but to
lay stress on the duty of the State to protect the nations marine wealth. What the provision merely recognizes is
that the State may allow, by law, cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fishworkers
in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons.Moreover, their mandated protection, development, and conservation as
necessarily recognized by the framers of the Constitution, imply certain restrictions on whatever right of
enjoyment there may be in favor of anyone.
Villaflor v. CA - 280 SCRA 297 [1997] (private ownership)
Case Main Point: It is well-settled that no public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant,
express or implied from the government. It is indispensable then that there be showing of title from the state or
any other mode of acquisition recognized by law.
It is well-settled that all lands remain part of the public domain unless severed therefrom by state grant or unless
alienated in accordance with law. The deeds of sale do not constitute clear and convincing evidence to establish
that the contested area is of private ownership. Hence, the property must be held to be public domain.
REPUBLIC V. CA AND PREC GR 103882, [NOVEMBER 25, 1998] 299 SCRA 199
The duty of the court is to interpret the enabling Act, RA 1899. In so doing, we cannot broaden its meaning;
much less widen the coverage thereof. If the intention of Congress were to include submerged areas, it should
have provided expressly. That Congress did not so provide could only signify the exclusion of submerged areas
from the term foreshore lands.
It bears stressing that the subject matter of Pasay City Ordinance No. 121, as amended by Ordinance No. 158, and
the Agreement under attack, have been found to be outside the intendment and scope of RA 1899, and
therefore ultra vires and null and void.
REPUBLIC V. ROSEMOOR MINING AND DEVT CORP. , GR 149927, MAR 30, 2004
The license was not valid. When such was issued, the governing law was pd463. While the subsequently
enacted ra7942 or Philippine mining act of 1995 repealed prior mining laws, it nonetheless respects previously
issued licenses. Also, sec. 2 of article xii of the 1987 constitution does not apply retroactively to a license,
concession or lease granted by the government before the effectivity of the 1987 constitution. Thus, pd463 is still
controlling in the case.
ALVAREZ V. PICOP 606 SCRA 444 [2009]
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads: "SEC. 10. No law
impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed." cannot be invoked.
Doctrine: A timber license is not a contract within the purview of the non-impairment clause.
IID V. PSALM 682 SCRA 602 [2012]
The court reiterated that the constitutional right to information includes official information on on-
goingnegotiations before a final contract. The information, however, must constitute definite propositions by the
government and should not cover recognized exceptions like privileged information, military and diplomatic
secrets and similar matters affecting national security and public order.




SECTION 3. LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN
DIRECTOR OF LANDS V. AQUINO, 192 SCRA 296 (1990)
The classification of the land as forest land is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to
be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Moreover, only a positive act by the chief executive is needed to
change such. Thus, in the case at bar, the respondent corporation has to prove that the lands it claims for
registration are alienable or disposable lands, which it failed to so.
REPUBLIC V. CA, 160 SCRA 228 (1988)
The regalian doctrine applies. Thus, once minerals are discovered in the land, whatever the use to which it
is being devoted at the time, such use may be discontinued by the state to enable it to extract the minerals therein
in the exercise of its sovereign prerogative. The land is thus converted to mineral land and may not be used by any
private party, including the registered owner thereof, for any other purpose that will impede the mining operations
to be undertaken therein.
APEX MINING V. SOUTHEAST MINDANAO GOLD, INC, GR NO. 152613, JUNE 23, 2006
Upon the effectivity of the 1987 constitution, the state assumed a more dynamic role in the exploration,
development and utilization of the natural resources of the country. With this policy, the state may pursue full
control and supervision of the exploration, development and utilization of the countrys natural mineral resources.
The options open to the state are through direct undertaking or by entering into co-production, joint venture, or
production-sharing agreements, or by entering into agreement with foreign-owned corporations for large-scale
exploration, development and utilization. recognizing the importance of the countrys natural resources, not only
for national economic development, but also for its security and national defense, section 5 of republic act no. 7942
empowers the president, when the national interest so requires, to establish mineral reservations where mining
operations shall be undertaken directly by the state or through a contractor
DIR. OF LANDS V. IAC, 146 SCRA 509 (1986)
The amendment of the application from the name of Pacific Farms Inc. To the name of J. Antonio Araneta
inc. was a mere attempt to evade disqualification. Our constitution prohibits private corporations or associations
from holding alienable lands of the public domain except by lease. The court ruled to release the subject property
from the unclassified category, which is beyond their competence and jurisdiction. They reiterate that the
classification of public lands is an exclusive prerogative of the executive department of the government and not of
the courts. In the absence of such classification, the land remains unclassified until released and rendered open to
disposition.
TEN FORTY REALTY V. LORENZANA, GR NO. 151212, SEPT. 10, 2003
On the question of ownership for the purpose of compensating for the latters failure to counter such held.
The rtc had held that, as a corporation, petitioner had no right to acquire the property which was alienable public
land.
CHAVEZ V. PEA, GR NO. 133250, JULY 9, 2002
The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of manila bay remain inalienable natural resources of the public
domain. Since the amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares of
the freedom islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to section 3, article xii of the 1987 constitution which
prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.






REPUBLIC V. SOUTHSIDE, 502 SCRA 587

As regards the issue of inalienability, the Court upheld the contention of the Republic that the JUSMAG area
is inalienable, the same having not effectively been separated from the military reservation and declared as
alienable and disposable. Until a given parcel of land is released from its classification as part of the military
reservation zone and reclassified by law or by presidential proclamation as disposable and alienable, its status as
part of a military reservation remains, even if incidentally it is devoted for a purpose other than as a military camp
or for defence.
The Constitution also forbids private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable public land except
through lease for a limited period. The whole conveyance process was also suspicious since the whole process was
accomplished only in one day.

REPUBLIC V. T.A.N., 555 SCRA 477

It is the burden of the applicant to prove that the land subject to registration is alienable and disposable
and for such the applicant must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released
the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable. In the present case, T.A.N. Properties did not provide the
needed proof. For the documents provided by the company, the Court cited DENR Administrative Order No.
20(DAO No. 20) and DAO No. 38; DAO No. 20 proves that FMS-DENR has no authority to issue certificates,
classifying lands to be alienable and disposable; and DAO No. 38 provides that CENRO can issue certificates of land
classification for lands having a maximum area of 50hectares. The land applied for in the case has an area of
56.4007 hectares, thus CENRO has no jurisdiction over it.
SECTION 4. SPECIFIC LIMITS OF FOREST LANDS AND NATIONAL PARKS
LA BUGAL-BLAAN TRIBAL ASSN. V. DENR, GR127872, JAN 27, 2004,MR GR 127882, DEC. 1, 2004
The court finds assailed provisions of R.A. No. 7942 to be violative of section 2, article XII of the
constitution and hereby declares unconstitutional and void as said act authorizes service contracts. Although the
statute employs the phrase financial and technical agreements in accordance with the 1987 constitution, it actually
treats these agreements as service contracts that grant beneficial ownership to foreign contractors contrary to the
fundamental law. The framers of this constitution expressly omitted the phrase service contracts that was
provided for in the1973 constitution which allowed foreign companies to manage and operate mining activities
and replaced it with technical or financial assistance only.
SECTION 5. ANCESTRAL LANDS AND DOMAIN
CRUZ V. SEC. OF DENR, 347 SCRA 128 (2000)
FACTS: Cruz, a noted constitutionalist, assailed the validity of the RA 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act on
the ground that the law amount to an unlawful deprivation of the States ownership over lands of the public
domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in
Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution. The IPRA law basically enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples
over ancestral domains which may include natural resources. Cruz et al contend that, by providing for an all-
encompassing definition of ancestral domains and ancestral lands which might even include private lands
found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) of said law violate the rights of private landowners.
ISSUE: Whether or not the IPRA law is unconstitutional.
HELD: The SC deliberated upon the matter. After deliberation they voted and reached a 7-7 vote. They deliberated
again and the same result transpired. Since there was no majority vote, Cruzs petition was dismissed and the IPRA
law was sustained. Hence, ancestral domains may include public domain somehow against the regalian doctrine.



SECTION 6. COMMON GOOD
TELECOM V. COMELEC, 289 SCRA 337 (1998)
The court held that a franchise is a mere privilege which may be reasonably burdened with some form of
public service. Thus what better measure can be conceived for the common good than one for free air time for the
benefit not only of candidates but even more of the public, particularly the voters, so that they will be fully
informed of the issues in an election. it is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters,
which is paramount.
SECTION 7. PRIVATE LANDS
REPUBLIC V. CA, 235 SCRA 567
A foreign national may apply for registration of title over a parcel of land which he acquired by purchase
while still a citizen of the philippines, from a vendor who has complied with the requirements for registration
under the public land act (ca 141).
The time to determine whether the person acquiring land is qualified is the time the right to own land is
acquired and not the time to register ownership.

ZARAGOSA V. CA, GR NO. 106401, SEPTEMBER 29, 2000
It is basic in the law of succession that a partition inter vivos may be done for as long as legitimes are not
prejudiced. However, to properly determine the legitimes collation must be done (art.1061). , unfortunately, for
this case where the original petition for delivery of inheritance share only impleaded one of the other compulsory
heirs. The petition must therefore be dismissed without prejudice to the institution of a new proceeding where all
the indispensable parties are present for the rightful determination of their respective legitime and if the legitimes
were prejudiced by the partitioning inter vivos.
RAMIREZ V. VDA. DE RAMIREZ, 111 SCRA 704 (1982)
The court a quo upheld the validity of the usufruct given to wanda on the ground that the constitution
covers not only succession by operation of law but also testamentary succession. We are of the opinion that the
constitutional provision which enables aliens to acquire private lands does not extend to testamentary succession
for otherwise the prohibition will be for naught and meaningless. Any alien would be able to circumvent the
prohibition by paying money to a Philippine landowner in exchange for a devise of a piece of land.
This opinion notwithstanding, we uphold the usufruct in favor Of wanda because a usufruct, albeit a real
right, does not vest Title to the land in the usufructuary and it is the vesting of Title to land in favor of aliens which
is proscribed by the Constitution.
(usufructuary rights to an alien yes. But the entire title of the land no.)

HALILI V. CA, 287 SCRA 465 (1998)
The deed of quitclaim is invalid because it violated section 7, article xii of the constitution which limits the
transfer or conveyance of private lands to those who are qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. As
to the effect of the subsequent sale of david to cataniag, jurisprudence is consistent that if land is invalidly
transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original
transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid.
LEE V. REPUBLIC, 366 SCRA (2001)
The sale of the land in question was consummated sometime in march 1936, during the effectivity of the
1935 constitution. Under the 1935 constitution, aliens could not acquire private agricultural lands, save in cases of
hereditary succession. Thus, lee liong, a chinese citizen, was disqualified to acquire the land in question.the
constitutional proscription on alien ownership of lands of the public or private domain was intended to protect
lands from falling in the hands of non-filipinos. In this case, however, there would be no more public policy violated
since the land is in the hands of filipinos qualified to acquire and own such land. If land is invalidly transferred to
an alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is
considered.
FRENZEL V. CATITO, GR NO. 143958, JULY 11, 2003
A contract that violates the constitution and the law, is null and void and vests no rights and creates no
obligations. It produces no legal effect at all. Alfred, being a party to an illegal contract, cannot come into a court of
law and ask to have his illegal objective carried out. One who loses his money or property by knowingly engaging
in a contract or transaction which involves his own moral turpitude may not maintain an action for his losses. To
him who moves in deliberation and premeditation, the law is unyielding. The law will not aid either party to an
illegal contract or agreement; it leaves the parties where it finds them.
LENTFER V. WOLFF 441 SCRA 584 [2004]
Lentfer's claim of either cash or property donation rings hollow. A donation is a simple act of liberality
where a person gives freely of a thing or right in favor of another, who accepts it. But when a large amount of
money is involved, equivalent to P3,297,800, based on the exchange rate in the year 1992, we are constrained to
take the petitioners' claim of liberality of the donor with more than a grain of salt.

Petitioners could not brush aside the fact that a donation must comply with the mandatory formal requirements
set forth by law for its validity. Since the subject of donation is the purchase money, Art. 748 of the New Civil Code
is applicable. Accordingly, the donation of money equivalent to P3,297,800 as well as its acceptance should have
been in writing. It was not. Hence, the donation is invalid for non-compliance with the formal requisites prescribed
by law.

































Section 7: Private Lands
Muller vs. Muller
Case Main Point: Violation of Article 12 Section 7: Save for the exception provided in cases of hereditary
succession, respondents disqualification from owning lands in the Philippines is absolute. Not even an
ownership in trust is allowed. Besides, where the purchase is made in violation of an existing statute and
in evasion of its express provision, no trust can result in favor of the party who is guilty of the fraud.
Matthews vs. Taylor Spouses
Case Main Point: Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, have been disqualified from acquiring
lands of the public domain. Hence, by virtue of the aforecited constitutional provision, they are also
disqualified from acquiring private lands. The primary purpose of this constitutional provision is the
conservation of the national patrimony. Our fundamental law cannot be any clearer. The right to acquire
lands of the public domain is reserved only to Filipino citizens or corporations at least sixty percent of the
capital of which is owned by Filipinos.
Hulst vs. PR Builders
Case Main Point: No condominium unit therein shall be conveyed or transferred to persons other than Filipino
citizens or corporations at least 60% of the capital stock of which belong to Filipino citizens, except in cases of
hereditary succession. Where the common areas in a condominium project are held by a corporation, no
transfer or conveyance of a unit shall be valid if the concomitant transfer of the appurtenant membership
or stockholding in the corporation will cause the alien interest in such corporation to exceed the limits
imposed by existing laws.
Ting Ho vs. Teng
Case Main Point: The Court of Appeals erred in holding that an implied trust was created and resulted
by operation of law in view of petitioner's marriage to respondent. Save for the exception provided in
cases of hereditary succession, respondent's disqualification from owning lands in the Philippines is
absolute. Not even an ownership in trust is allowed. Besides, where the purchase is made in violation of
an existing statute and in evasion of its express provision, no trust can result in favor of the party who is
guilty of the fraud. To hold otherwise would allow circumvention of the constitutional prohibition.
Osmena vs. Osmena
If the properties of Chiong Tan Sy and that the same were only put in the name of
respondents father because he was the only Filipino citizen in the family at the time the
properties were purchased, this Court will not consent to any violation of the
constitutional prohibition on foreign ownership of land.
Beurmer vs Amores
It is the Constitution itself which demarcates the rights of citizens and non-citizens in owning
Philippine land. To be sure, the constitutional ban against foreigners applies only to ownership of
Philippine land and not to the improvements built thereon.
Section 8: Exception for Former Filipino Citizens
Republic vs. CA

Section 10: Filipinization
Manila Prince Hotel vs GSIS
Case Main Point: Filipino First Policy: In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in
a public bidding concerning the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy
and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino will have to
be allowed to match the bid of the foreign entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the
award should go to the Filipino. It must be so if we are to give life and meaning to the Filipino First Policy
provision of the 1987 Constitution. For, while this may neither be expressly stated nor contemplated in
the bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is omnipresent to be simply disregarded. To ignore it would be
to sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law.
Army and Navy Club vs. CA
Case Main Point: Nowhere in the law does it state that such recognition grants possessory rights over
the property to the petitioner. Nor is the National Historical Commission given the authority to vest such
right of ownership or possession of a private property to the petitioner. The law merely states that it
shall be the policy of state to preserve and protect the important cultural properties and National
Cultural Treasures of the nation and to safeguard their intrinsic value. In line with this, any restoration,
reconstruction or preservation of historical buildings shall only be made under the supervision of the
Director of the National Museum.[11] The authority of the National Historical Commission is limited only
to the supervision of any reconstruction, restoration or preservation of the architectural design of the
identified historical building and nothing more.
Tanada vs. Angara
Case Main Point: While the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services,
labor and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the
world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against
foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair.[32] In other words, the Constitution did not
intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not shut out foreign investments, goods and services in the
development of the Philippine economy. While the Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry
of foreign goods, services and investments into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it
allows an exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is
unfair.
Republic vs. CA
The State has to protect its interests and can not be bound by, or estopped from, the mistakes or
negligent acts of its officials or agents, much more, non-suited as a result thereof. Clearly, there is a need
to determine once and for all whether the subject land is really foreshore land and/or whether the
respondent has registerable title thereto. The classification of public lands is a function of the executive
branch of government, specifically, the director of lands (now the director of the Land Management
Bureau).





J.G. Summit Holdings vs. CA

It is true that properties of the National Government, as a rule, may be sold only after a public
bidding is held. Public bidding is the accepted method in arriving at a fair and reasonable price and
ensures that overpricing, favoritism and other anomalous practices are eliminated or minimized.[42] But
the requirement for public bidding does not negate the exercise of the right of first refusal. In fact, public
bidding is an essential first step in the exercise of the right of first refusal because it is only after the
public bidding that the terms upon which the Government may be said to be willing to sell its shares to
third parties may be known. It is only after the public bidding that the Government will have a basis with
which to offer KAWASAKI the option to buy or forego the shares.
Section 11: Public Utilities
Bagatsing vs Committee
A "public utility" under the Constitution and the Public Service Law is one organized "for hire or
compensation" to serve the public, which is given the right to demand its service. PETRON is not engaged
in oil refining for hire and compensation to process the oil of other parties.
Likewise, the activities considered as "public utility" under Section 7 of R.A. No. 387 refer only to
petroleum which is indigenous to the Philippines. Hence, the refining of petroleum products sourced
from abroad as is done by Petron, is not within the contemplation of the law.
Albano vs. Reyes
Tatad vs. Garcia
Case Main Point: The Constitution, in no uncertain terms, requires a franchise for the operation of a
public utility. However, it does not require a franchise before one can own the facilities needed to operate
a public utility so long as it does not operate them to serve the public.
The right to operate a public utility may exist independently and separately from the ownership of the
facilities thereof. One can own said facilities without operating them as a public utility, or conversely, one
may operate a public utility without owning the facilities used to serve the public. The devotion of
property to serve the public may be done by the owner or by the person in control thereof who may not
necessarily be the owner thereof.
Telecom vs. COMELEC
Case Main Point: For while broadcast media are not mere common carriers but entities with free speech
rights, they are also public trustees charged with the duty of ensuring that the people have access to the
diversity of views on political issues. This right of the people is paramount to the autonomy of broadcast
media. To affirm the validity of 92, therefore, is likewise to uphold the peoples right to information on
matters of public concern. The use of property bears a social function and is subject to the states duty to
intervene for the common good. Broadcast media can find their just and highest reward in the fact that
whatever altruistic service they may render in connection with the holding of elections is for that
common good.




J.G. Summit Holdings vs. CA
No person or corporation can be compelled to remain or to continue the partnership. Of course,
this presupposes that there are no other restrictions in the maximum allowable share that the non-selling
partner may acquire such as the constitutional restriction on foreign ownership in public utility. The
theory that KAWASAKI can acquire, as a maximum, only 40% of PHILSECOs shares is correct only if a
shipyard is a public utility. In such instance, the non-selling partner who is an alien can acquire only a
maximum of 40% of the total capitalization of a public utility despite the grant of first refusal. The
partners cannot, by mere agreement, avoid the constitutional proscription. But as afore-discussed,
PHILSECO is not a public utility and no other restriction is present that would limit the right of
KAWASAKI to purchase the Governments share to 40% of Philsecos total capitalization.
Republic vs. Express Telecom
Case Main Point: Furthermore, Extelcom does not enjoy the grant of any vested interest on the right to
render a public service. The Constitution is quite emphatic that the operation of a public utility shall not
be exclusive. Thus:
No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be
granted to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations organized under the laws of the Philippines at
least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens, nor shall such franchise, certificate or
authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years. Neither shall any such
franchise or right be granted except under the condition that it shall be subject to amendment, alteraion,
or repeal by the Congress when the common good so requires.
Del Mar vs. Pagcor
PAGCOR) has a valid franchise to, but only by itself (i.e., not in association with any other person or entity),
operate, maintain and/or manage the game of jai-alai, and (b) to DENY the motions insofar as respondents would
also seek a reconsideration of the Courts decision of 29 November 2000 that has, since then, (i) enjoined the
continued operation, maintenance, and/or management of jai-alai games by PAGCOR in association with its co-
respondents Belle Jai-Alai Corporation and/or Filipinas Gaming Entertainment Totalizator Corporation and (ii)
held to be without force and effect the agreement of 17 June 1999 among said respondents.
PTC vs. NTC
Thus, a franchisee of a public utility cannot complain of seizure or taking of property because of
the issuance of another franchise to a competitor. Every franchise, certificate or authority to operate a
public utility is, by constitutional mandate, non-exclusive. PILTEL cannot complain of a taking of an
exclusive right that it does not own and which no franchisee can ever own.
Section 11.

ASSOCIATED COMMUNICATIONS v. NTC

The power to issue franchises for radio and television system is legislative in nature but is
delegable. EO 546 authorizes NTC to issue authorizations for the operation of radio and television broadcasting
systems without need of a prior franchise issued by Congress.

EASTERN TELECOM v. TELECOM TECHNOLOGIES

Neither Congress nor NTC can grant an exclusive franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization
to operate a public utility. The operation of the public utility shall not be exclusive.


ROYAL CARGO CORPORATION v. CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD

Royal Cargo Corporation is a stock corporation, seventy percent (70%) of which is owned by Filipino
citizens and thirty percent (30%) by foreigners. The President of the petitioner company is a foreigner who is
married to a Filipina. The participation of foreign investors in the governing body of any public utility enterprise
shall be limited to their proportionate share in its capital, and all the executive and managing officers of such
corporation or association must be citizens of the Philippines. The CA, thus, held that the respondent Board
did not err in ordering the petitioner to transfer its top position to a Filipino national.

METROPOLITAN CEBU WATER DISTRICT v. ADALA

The term franchise broadly so as to include, not only authorizations issuing directly from Congress in the
form of statute, but also those granted by administrative agencies to which the power to grant franchises has been
delegated by Congress.

PAGCOR v. BIR

PAGCOR was granted a franchise to operate and maintain gambling casinos, clubs and other
recreation or amusement places, sports, gaming pools, within the territorial jurisdiction of the Republic of
the Philippines. PAGCORs franchise is subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by Congress. Hence, the
provision in Section 1 of R.A. No. 9337 withdrawing the exemption of PAGCOR from corporate income tax, which
may affect any benefits to PAGCORs transactions with private parties, is not violative of the non-impairment clause
of the Constitution.

FRANCISCO v. TRB

The limiting thrust of the foregoing constitutional provision on the grant of franchise or other forms of
authorization to operate public utilities may, in context, be stated as follows: (a) the grant shall be made only in
favor of qualified Filipino citizens or corporations; (b) Congress can impair the obligation of franchises, as
contracts; and (c) no such authorization shall be exclusive or exceed fifty years.

WILSON P. GAMBOA v. FINANCE SECRETARY MALGARITO B TEBES

Since PTIC is a stockholder of PLDT, the sale by the Philippine Government of 46.125 percent of PTIC
shares is actually an indirect sale of 12 million shares or about 6.3 percent of the outstanding common shares of
PLDT. With the sale, First Pacifics common shareholdings in PLDT increased from 30.7 percent to 37
percent, thereby increasing the common shareholdings of foreigners in PLDT to about 81.47 percent. This
violates Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which limits foreign ownership of the capital of a
public utility to not more than 40 percent.

EXPRESS INVESTMENT v. BAYANTEL

Definition of capital refers only to share of stock entitled to vote in the election of directors, and thus in the
present case only to common share, and not the total outstanding capital stock comprising.

Section 12. Filipino First Policy

TANADA v. ANGARA

Article XII, Section 12 is not self-executing provisions, the disregard of which can give rise to a cause of
action in the courts. It does not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation.
Section 13. Trade Policy



ESPINA v. ZAMORA

Constitution does not rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods, and services. While it does not
encourage their unlimited entry into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an exchange on
the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair. The key, as in all
economies in the world, is to strike a balance between protecting local businesses and allowing the entry of foreign
investments and services.

Section 16. Corporations

NDC v. PVB

Article XIV, Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution, The Batasang Pambansa shall not, except by general law,
provide for the formation, organization, or regulation of private corporations, unless such corporations are owned
or controlled by the Government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof. --- modified as Article XII, Section
16 of the 1987 Constitution. The new corporation is neither owned nor controlled by the government, thus, it
violates the Constitution.

BOY SCOUTS OF THE PHILIPPINES v. COA,

Section 16, Article XII should not be construed so as to prohibit Congress from creating public
corporation or a corporate agency or instrumentality of the government intended to serve a public interest or
purpose, which should not be measured on the basis of economic viability, but according to the public interest or
purpose it serves. In fact, Congress has enacted numerous laws creating public corporations or government
agencies or instrumentalities vested with corporate powers. Moreover, Section 16, Article XII, which relates to
National Economy and Patrimony, could not have tied the hands of Congress in creating public corporation to serve
any of the constitutional policies or objective.

Section 17. Temporary Take-Over

AGAN v. PIATCO

The nature and extent of the emergency is the measure of the duration of the takeover as well as the terms
thereof. It is the State that prescribes such reasonable terms which will guide the implementation of the temporary
takeover as dictated by the exigencies of the time.

DAVID v. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO

The power to take over the operation of public utilities is activated only if Congress grants emergency
powers under Article VI, Section 23. Section 17 gives the power to the State not to the President.
Section 18. Nationalization

REPUBLIC v. PLDT

The State may compel a public utility to render service in the public interest, provided just compensation is
paid thereafter.

PLDT v. NTC

PLDT cannot attack ETCIs franchise in a petition for certiorari. It cannot be collaterally attacked. It should
be directly attacked through a petition for quo warranto which is the correct procedure. A franchise is a property
right and cannot be revoked or forfeited without due process of law. The transfer of more than 40% of the shares
of stocks is not tantamount to a transfer of franchise. There is a distinction here. There is no need to obtain
authorization of Congress for the mere transfer of shares of stocks. Shareholders can transfer their shares to
anyone. The only limitation is that if the transfer involves more than 40% of the corporations stocks, it should be
approved by the NTC.

PLDT v. EASTERN TELECOM

Eastern was not allowed to interconnect with the PLDT on the ground that they had no franchise.

Section 19. Monopolies and Combinations

ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD v. CA

Only competition which is fair can release the creative forces of the market. The objective of anti-trust law
is to assure a competitive economy based upon the belief that through competition producers will strive
to satisfy consumer wants at the lowest price with the sacrifice of the fewest resources. Competition among
producers allows consumers to bid for goods and services and, thus matches their desires with societys
opportunity costs. Additionally, the market system relies on the consumer to decide what and how much shall be
produced, and on competition, among producers who will manufacture it.

GARCIA v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

RA 8479 was enacted precisely to enhance competition. Towards this end, implementation of oil
deregulation of the industry has been chosen as the tool. Whether or not the choice of deregulation as the
favored tool is wise is not for the Court to decide. On the other hand, petitioner has not shown that deregulation
will result monopoly. Thus, it does not violate Section 19. (note: this refers to the Big Three in Oil Industry)

TATAD v. SECRETARY OF ENERGY

Unlike RA 8479, RA 8180 was struck down as invalid because three key provisions intended to promote
free competition were shown to achieve the opposite result. Specifically, provisions on tariff differential, stocking
of inventories, and predatory pricing inhibit fair competition, encourage monopolistic power, and interfere
with the free interaction of the market forces.

EASTERN ASSURANCE v. LTFRB

The operation of monopolies is not totally banned by the Constitution. However, the State shall
regulate them when public interest so requires. The two consortia of insurance companies that have been
authorized to issue passenger insurance policies are adequately regulated by the LTFRB to protect the riding
public. While individual insurance companies may somehow be adversely affected by this scheme, the paramount
public interest involved must be upheld.

AVON v. LUNA

Contracts requiring exclusivity are not per se void. Each contract must be viewed vis--vis all the
circumstances surrounding such agreement in deciding whether a restrictive practice should be prohibited as
imposing an unreasonable restraint on competition.

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