METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY et.al. vs.

CONCERNED RESIDENTS OF MANILA BAY

G.R. Nos. 171947-48
December 18, 2008

FACTS:
The government agencies namely, MWSS, LWUA, DENR, PPA, MMDA, DA, DBM, DPWH, DOH,
DECS, and PNP did not take notice of the present danger to public health and the depletion and
contamination of the marine life of Manila Bay. According to the Concerned Citizens of Manila
Bay, the condition of Manila Bay did not matched to the intended SB level standard of water
quality in such a way that swimming, ski diving and etc. are unallowable. Thus, the RTC ordered
the government agencies to participate in cleaning the Bay. Authorities from DENR and MWSS
testified in favor of the petitioners that the bay is in safe-level bathing and that they are doing
their function in reducing water pollution. However the RTC decided in favor of the
respondents and ordered the government agencies in violation of PD 1152 or the Philippine
Environment Code to rehabilitate the bay. The petitioners argued to the CA that PD 1152s
provisions only pertain to the cleaning of specific pollution incidents and do not cover cleaning
in general. However, CA affirmed the RTCs decision.

SB level standard of water quality:
The trial of the case started off with a hearing at the Manila Yacht Club followed by an ocular
inspection of the Manila Bay. Renato T. Cruz, the Chief of the Water Quality Management
Section, Environmental Management Bureau, Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), testifying for petitioners, stated that water samples collected from different
beaches around the Manila Bay showed that the amount of fecal coliform content ranged from
50,000 to 80,000 most probable number (MPN)/ml when what DENR Administrative Order No.
34-90 prescribed as a safe level for bathing and other forms of contact recreational activities, or
the SB level, is one not exceeding 200 MPN/100 ml.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not cleaning Manila Bay is the ministerial act of the petitioners that can be
induced by mandamus.
(2) Whether or not Section 17 and 20 of Presidential Decree 1152only pertain to the specific
cleaning of pollution (and not general cleaning).




RATIO DECIDENDI:
(1) The cleaning and rehabilitation of Manila Bay can be compelled by Mandamus. Petitioners
claimed that it is not their ministerial duty to clean up the bay because for them it is a
discretionary duty which cannot be compelled by mandamus. According to theSupreme Court,
the obligations to perform the duties (as defined by law) of the petitioners and on how they
carry out such duties are two distinct concepts. The former pertains to the discretionary duties
of the petitioners while the latter is their ministerial duty. As for this case, it is the discretion of
the petitioners to choose not to perform or to perform their duties as defined by law. And
when they have chosen to perform their duties, the way they carry out those duties are called
ministerial acts. It is very clear in their charters that aside from performing their main function
as an agency, they are also mandated to perform certain functions relating directly or indirectly
to the cleanup, rehabilitation, protection, and preservation of the Manila Bay.

(2) In the second issue, the Supreme Court held that Sections 17 and 20 of P.D. 1152 include
cleaning in general. Section 17 provides that in case the water quality has deteriorated, the
government agencies concerned shall act on it to bring back the standard quality of water. On
theother hand, Section 20 also mandates the government agencies concerned to take action in
cleaning-up in case the polluters failed to do their part. In the succeeding section 62(g) and (h)
of the same Code, provide that oil spilling is the cause of pollution that should be done in clean-
up operations. This provision actually, expanded the coverage of Sec. 20 because it included oil-
spilling as one of the causes of pollutions that need to be cleaned-up by the government
agencies concerned. Moreover, Sec. 17 emphasizes that government agencies should clean
that water for the sake of meeting and maintaining the right quality standard. This presupposes
that the government agencies concerned have the duties of cleaning the water not only in
times when the water is polluted. Moreover, even without such provisions, it is the inescapable
duty of everyone to protect the water and prevent pollution, because of the tenable need of
present and future generations as provided in Art. 2 Sec. 16 of the 1987 Constitution, that the
State shall protect and advance the right to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with
the rhythm and harmony of nature.









HON. HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ v. PICOP RESOURCES, INC.
G.R. No. 162243, December 3, 2009
Chico-Nazario, J.:

Doctrine:
A timber license is not a contract within the purview of the non-impairment clause.

Facts:
PICOP filed with the DENR an application to have its Timber License Agreement (TLA) No. 43
converted into an IFMA. PICOP filed before the (RTC) City a Petition for Mandamus against then
DENR Sec Alvarez for unlawfully refusing and/or neglecting to sign and execute the IFMA
contract of PICOP even as the latter has complied with all the legal requirements for the
automatic conversion of TLA No. 43, as amended, into an IFMA. The cause of action of PICOP
Resources, Inc. (PICOP) in its Petition for Mandamus with the trial court is clear: the
government is bound by contract, a 1969 Document signed by then President Ferdinand
Marcos, to enter into an Integrated Forest Management Agreement (IFMA) with PICOP.

Issue:
Whether the 1969 Document is a contract recognized under the non-impairment clause by
which the government may be bound (for the issuance of the IFMA)

Held:
NO. Our definitive ruling in Oposa v. Factoran that a timber license is not a contract within the
purview of the non-impairment clause is edifying.

We declared:

Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a
contract, property or a property right protected by the due process clause of the Constitution.

Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads: "SEC. 10. No
law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed." cannot be invoked. The Presidential
Warranty cannot, in any manner, be construed as a contractual undertaking assuring PICOP of
exclusive possession and enjoyment of its concession areas. Such an interpretation would result
in the complete abdication by the State in favor of PICOP of the sovereign power to control and
supervise the exploration, development and utilization of the natural resources in the area.


HON. HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ v. PICOP RESOURCES, INC.
November 29, 2006

DOCTRINE:
Timber licenses concerning the harvesting of timber in the countrys forests cannot be
considered contracts that would bind the Government regardless of changes in policy and the
demands of public interest and welfare.

FACTS:
PICOPs predecessor, Bislig Bay Lumber Co., Inc. (BBLCI) was granted Timber License
Agreement (TLA) No. 43.TLA No. 43, as amended, expired on 26 April 1977. It was renewed on
7 October 1977 for another 25 years to "terminate on April 25,2002. On 25 November 2002,
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 297, "EXCLUDING A CERTAIN AREA
FROM THE OPERATION OF PROCLAMATION NO. 369 DATED FEBRUARY 27, 1931, AND
DECLARING THE SAME AS MINERAL RESERVATION AND AS ENVIRONMENTALLY CRITICAL AREA.
"The excluded area consists of 8,100 hectares, more or less, which formed part of PICOPs
expired TLA No. 43, subject of its applicationfor IFMA conversion. On 21 January 2003, PICOP
filed a Petition for the Declaration of Nullity of the aforesaid presidential proclamation as well
as its implementing DENR Administrative Order. In said NULLITY CASE, the RTC issued a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining respondents therein from implementing the
questioned issuances. The DENR Secretary and her co-respondents in said case filed on 6
February 2003 an Omnibus Motion (1) ToDissolve the Temporary Restraining Order dated 3
February 2003; and (2) To Dismiss

ISSUE:
Whether or not the presidential warranty was a contract

HELD:
NO, PICOPs ground for the issuance of a writ of mandamus is the supposed contract entered
into by the government in the form of a Presidential Warranty, dated 29 July 1969 issued by
then President Ferdinand E. Marcos to PICOP. The DENR Secretary refutes this claim, and
alleges that the RTC and the Court of Appeals erred in declaring the Presidential Warranty a
valid and subsisting contract under the Constitutions Non-Impairment Clause. The SC
disagrees. Such licenses concerning the harvesting of timber in the countrys forests cannot be
considered contracts that would bind the Government regardless of changes in policy and the
demands of public interest and welfare.