Abandoning the Middle: The Bush Tax Cuts and the Limits of Democratic Control

Author(s): Jacob S. Hacker and Paul Pierson

Source: Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Mar., 2005), pp. 33-53
Published by: American Political Science Association
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Articles
Abandoning
th e Middle:
T h e B u sh T ax C u ts and th e
L im its of Dem ocratic C ontrol
Jacob S. Hacker and Pau l Pierson
T h e 2001 and2003 tax cu ts
represent
dram atic
legislative breakth rou gh s.
T aken
togeth er, th ey
h ave
f u ndam entally resh aped
th e
nation's f iscal
landscape.
Inview of th e volu m inou s and
largely sangu ine
literatu re onAm ericandem ocratic
responsiveness,
one
m igh t
assu m e th at th is
policy
tu rnarou ndwas
broadly
consistent with voters'
priorities.
Inth is article, we sh ow th at-in contradic-
tiontoth is
prevailing
view, as well as th e claim s of
L arry
B artels inth is issu e-th e su bstance of th e tax cu ts was inf act
sh arply
at odds
with
pu blic pref erences.
T ax
policy
was
pu lledradically
of f
center,
we
argu e, by
th e intersectionof twof orces:
(1)
th e
increasing
incentives
of political
elites tocater toth eir
partisan
and
ideological
"base"; and
(2)
th e
increasingcapacity
of
politicians
wh oabandon
th e m iddle to
escape political
retribu tion. In
accou nting
f or th ese
centrif u gal
f orces, we stress, as oth ers
h ave,
increasingpartisansh ip
and
polarization,
as well as th e
growingsoph istication
of
political m essage-control.
Yet we also
em ph asize
a
pivotal
f actor th at is too
of tenoverlooked: th e deliberate
craf ting
of
policy
todistort
pu blic perceptions,
set th e f u tu re
political agenda,
andm inim ize th e
likelih oodof voter backlash .
B y sh owing
h ow
politicians
can
engineer policy
sh if ts th at are at odds with
m ajority pu blic pref erences,
we
h ope
to
provoke
abroader discu ssionof voters'
capacity
to
protect
th eir interests inAm erica's
representative dem ocracy.
O n
Ju ne 7, 2001, President
George
W. B u sh
signed
into law th e Econom ic Growth andT ax Relief
ReconciliationAct of 2001. T h e
largest
tax cu t in
twodecades (andth e second
largest
in
post-Vietnam
h is-
tory),
th e bill
im m ediately
cu t f ederal
receipts by
h alf a
Jacob
S. Hacker is Peter Strau ss
Fam ily
Assistant
Prof essor of
PoliticalScience at Yale
University
Qacob.
h acker@yale.
edu )
andau th or
of
T h e DividedWelf are State: T h e B attle over
Pu blic andPrivate Social B enef its inth e UnitedStates
andT h e RoadtoNowh ere: T h e Genesis of President C lin-
ton's Planf or Health
Secu rity.
Pau l Piersonis
Prof essor of
Political Science at th e
University of C alif ornia, B erkeley
(pierson@berkeley.
edu ),
wh ere h e h olds th e Avice Saint
C h air inPu blic
Policy.
He is th e au th or
of
Politics inT im e:
History,
Institu tions andSocial
Analysis
and
Dism antling
th e Welf are State?
Reagan,
T h atch er, andth e Politics
of Retrench m ent. T h e au th ors are
gratef u lf or
th e com m ents
andsu ggestions of Akh ilAm ar,
Daniel
C arpenter,
Peter
Hall,
Mich aelHeany,Jennif erHoch sch ild, Rich ardKogan,
T h eodore
Marm or, Andrew
Martin,
DavidMayh ew,
Nolan
McC arty,
B ru ce Nesm ith , Peter
Orszag,
EricSch ickler,
T h edaSkocpol,
Rich ard
Vallely,
Robert van
Hou weling, Joseph
Wh ite, and
th ree
anonym ou s
reviewers, as well
asparticipants
ina
worksh op
at Harvard
University sponsoredby
th e Ru ssell
Sage
Fou ndation. Rach el
Goodm an, Pearline
Kyi, Joanne
L im ,
andAlan
Sch oenf eldprovided
able research assistance. A
pre-
viou s version
of th ispaper waspresented
at th e 2003 annu al
m eetingof
th e Am ericanPolitical Science Association.
percent
of Gross Dom estic Produ ct
(GDP).
With in
weeks,
all
tax paying
h ou seh olds
beganreceiving
rebate ch ecks of
u p
to$600. B u t th e
legislation's
m ajor
provisions
were not
sch edu ledto take ef f ect f or
years,
as th e law
ph ased
in
redu ctions inincom e tax rates and
gradu ally
elim inated
th e estate tax . Initial estim ates
placed
th e
ten-year
cost as
h igh
as
$2.1 trillion-a
f igu re
th at was soontobe cast in
stark relief
by
th e
sh arp
reversal of f ederal f inances f rom
record
su rplu ses
to
m ou nting
def icits.1
Equ ally striking,
h owever,
was th e bill's distribu tion: 36
percent
of th e cu ts
accru edto th e rich est 1
percent
of Am ericans-a sh are
alm ost identical toth at received
by
th e bottom 80
percent.2
As both a
political victory
anda
policy
sh if t,
th e bill
was adram atic
breakth rou gh .
It was
not, h owever,
aniso-
lated
accom plish m ent.
Ineach of th e nex t th ree
years,
President B u sh and
congressional Repu blicans
su ccess-
f u lly pu sh ed
f or additional cu ts-f irst f or bu sinesses in
2002,
th enf or individu als in
2003,
andth en
again
f or
individu als in2004. T h e
biggest
of th ese
post-2001
bills,
th e tax revisionof
2003,
was th e m ost notable of th e
th ree.
Rou gh ly
as tiltedtowardth e af f lu ent as th e 2001
bill,
its
potential price tag
ex ceeded$1 trillionover ten
years, according
tosom e estim ates-at atim e wh enbu d-
get projections
sh oweda
m ou nting
def icit.3 All
told,
if th e
2001-2003 tax cu ts are ex tendedas advocates
desire,
th ey
will cost m ore th an$4 trillion
th rou gh
2013. Inth at
year,
th e revenu e loss will ex ceed2
percent
of GDP.4 T o
pu t
th is
staggeringf igu re
in
perspective,
th e
long-term
cost of f ix -
ing
th e sh ortf all inSocial
Secu rity-of ten
describedas
catastroph ically large-is
u nder 0.75
percent
of GDP.5
March 2005
1
Vol. 3/No. 1 33
Articles
I Abandoning
th e Middle
T h e tax -cu t
legislation
of ..-^.
2001
is,
in
sh ort,
a rem ark- _
||
able and
ongoingstory.
It is
I
!B
also
pu zzling.
Most Am eri-
cans received
ex trem ely
m od-
est direct benef its f rom th e
: j
i
bill. Even
taking
intoaccou nt
:
^
th e well-knownskew in
par-
ticipation
towardth e
af f lu ent,
th e
average
voter didnot
reap
su bstantial rewards. At th e
sam e
tim e,
th e
h u ge aggre-
gate
cost of th e cu t m eant an
inevitable
clam pdown
on
pri-
orities th at m ost voters said
th ey su pported,
su ch as Medi-
care,
Social
Secu rity,
edu ca-
tion,
and redu ction of th e
national debt. C redible esti-
m ates indicate
th at,
once th e
long-term f inancing
cost of
th e tax cu ts is taken into
accou nt,
"th e bottom f ou r-
f if th s of h ou seh olds ... lose
m ore th an
th ey gain
f rom th e
HH
tax cu ts."6 Ina
representative
dem ocracy
th at ensh rines th e
principle
of one
person,
one
vote,
wh at
ex plains
th e
pas-
sage
of a
h igh ly
salient
policy
th at
prom ises very
m odest
benef its and
very large long-
term risks toth e
average
voter?
Pu t m ore
blu ntly: Wh y,
wh en
so
m any
receivedso
little,
and
som u ch th at citizens valu ed
R
F
was
placed
in
jeopardy,
didth e
B u sh tax cu ts
pass?
T h is
qu estion
ref lects acon-
cernwith wh ich
political
sci-
entists h ave
longgrappled.
Robert Dah l
pu t
it well m ore
th an
f orty years ago:
"Ina
political system
wh ere
nearly every
adu lt
m ay
vote bu t wh ere
knowledge,
wealth ,
social
posi-
tion,
access to
of f icials,
andoth er resou rces are
u nequ ally
distribu ted,
wh o
actu ally governs?"7
T h e 2001 tax cu ts cast
Dah l's
qu estion
in
especially sh arp
relief ,
f or th is was nodead-
of -nigh t legislative
ach ievem ent,
su rreptitiou sly presented
and
covertly
enacted. T h e tax cu ts were th e m ost
prom i-
nent of B u sh 's aim s,
of
virtu ally u nparalleled
su bstantive
im portance,
and
potentially
f ar m ore
transparent
inth eir
f irst-order ef f ects th an
policies u su ally
are. If
any policy epi-
sode sh ou ldillu strate th e reach of
popu lar
control ina
dem ocracy,
th e tax cu ts of 2001 sh ou ld.
Far f rom
representingpopu lar
wish es,
th e
size,
stru c-
tu re,
anddistribu tionof th e tax cu ts
passed
in2001 were
Q)
0o
0
a.
0
1S
I
directly
at odds with
m ajority
views. As th e UnitedStates
f acedanew
centu ry,
f orecasts of
large su rplu ses
raiseda
f u ndam ental
qu estion
of
priorities:
How sh ou ldth ese con-
siderable bu t f inite resou rces be allocated? It is
possible,
at
least in broad
strokes,
to
depict
with som e conf idence
voters'
opinions
onth is issu e. Wh envoters were
prom pted
to
pay
attentiontoth e
tradeof f s,
tax cu ts were
assigned
a
very
low
priority.
Evencitizens wh of avoredtax cu ts of f ered
little
su pport
f or th e m assive scale or skeweddistribu tion
of th e 2001 bill. T h e m ost
striking
ch aracteristic of th e tax
cu ts-th e f eatu re we seek toestablish and
ex plain-is
h ow
f ar a
policy produ cedby
electedof f icials
diverged
f rom
th e
pref erences
of m ost voters.
T h is
divergence
of
policy
and
opinion
is not
m erely
of
su bstantive
im portance.
It alsocarries
im portant m essages
34
Perspectives
onPolitics
f or ou r th eories of Am erican
politics.
For in
ru nning
af ou l
of
pu blic opinion,
th e B u sh tax cu t alsoru ns af ou l of one
of th e m ost
prom inent
andassertive veins of research on
Am erican
politics,
wh ich we du bth e "new
plu ralism ."
T h e new
plu ralism
is a
com plex
webof
intersecting
research
agendas-som e
f ocu sedon
voters,
oth ers on
pu blic opin-
ion,
still oth ers on"m acro"
political processes.
All th ese
strands, h owever,
su pport
th e claim
th at,
at least on
big
issu es,
voters h ave atrem endou s
capacity
to
get
wh at
th ey
want. Voters elect
politicians
wh odo
th ings th ey
like, and
pu nish politicians
wh odo
th ings th ey
donot like. As a
resu lt,
pu blic policies
and
pu blic pref erences
tendtobe
closely aligned
over tim e.8
T h e new
plu ralism 's
claim s are
clear,
logical,
andarrest-
ing. T h ey
alsof ail to
ex plain
th e
h igh -prof ile legislative
break-
th rou gh
of 2001. T h e 2001 tax cu ts didnot
pass
becau se
ordinary
voters wantedth em .
Instead,
we
argu e, th ey passed
becau se of two
f requ ently neglected
bu t central f eatu res of
contem porary
Am erican
politics:
(1)
th e su bstantial incen-
tives f or
politicians
torewardth eir base-th e
partisans,
activ-
ists,
and
m oneyed
interests th at are th eir f irst line of
su pport-and
(2)
th e
capacity
of
political
elites,
incertain
circu m stances,
to
m anipu late
th e
reception
of th eir
propos-
als
th rou gh f ram ing
ef f ects,
agenda
control,
and
policy
design.9
Not
only,
th en,
do
politicians
h ave su bstantial and
growing
incentives to
depart
f rom th e
pref erences
of vot-
ers,
bu t
th ey
alsoh ave
powerf u l
m eans
by
wh ich todoso.
Perh aps
th e m ost
im portant-and
least
appreciated-of
su ch m eans is th e
design
of
policies.
C entral f eatu res of th e
2001 tax -cu t
legislation
cannot be
ex plained
with ou t tak-
ing
intoaccou nt h ow
policy
m akers
h igh ligh ted
som e ben-
ef its and
actions,
wh ile
obscu ring
or
disgu ising
oth ers.
We
beginby laying
ou t th e
key
claim s of th e new
plu -
ralism ,
andth eir
sh ortcom ings.
We th ensu bstantiate ou r
argu m ent
th at th e tax cu ts were at odds with
ordinary
voters'
pref erences.
Nex t,
we
ex plainwh y politicians
h ave
increasedincentives to f ocu s on th eir base.
Finally,
we
ex plore
h ow
proponents
of th e 2001 tax cu t f orestalled
th e activationof
pu blic pref erences
h ostile to th e cu ts.
T h e
strongest
evidence tu rns ou t tobe th e bill itself . C ore
f eatu res of th e
legislation
sh ow th at its
designers
didnot
believe
th ey
were
operating
inth e
political
worldsketch ed
by
th e new
plu ralism .
T h e new
plu ralism
is correct torem indu s th at
average
Am ericans
can,
u nder th e
righ t
conditions,
h ave real inf lu -
ence. It is
wrong
to
f orget ju st
h ow
dem anding
th ose con-
ditions are. In
doing
so,
it risks
painting
a
Panglossian
portrait
of Am erican
politics
basedona
system atic neglect
of
key
dim ensions of
contem porary political
lif e.
Does th e Middle Hold? T h e New
Plu ralism and Its C ritics
Ef f orts toestablish an
em pirical
basis f or citizencontrol of
governm ent
h ave com e f u ll circle over th e
past
h alf cen-
tu ry.1?
At th e endof WorldWar II, voters were of ten
viewedas th e f ou ndationof dem ocratic
practices. Du ring
th e 1950s and
1960s, h owever,
political
scientists
largely
abandonedth is ideainth e f ace of new research th at
su g-
gested
voters were inattentive to
politics,
knew little abou t
pu blic
af f airs,
andh adill-f orm edandof ten
contradictory
belief s.11
T h ese dism al
f indings
abou t voters createdah ole inth e
case f or
responsive
dem ocratic
governance.
Robert Dah l's
f am ou s solu tion-wh at we term th e "old
plu ralism "-
f ocu sedoninterest
grou ps.12
Power was
widely dispersed
inAm erican
politics
not becau se of th e activities of iso-
lated
voters,
bu t becau se th e institu tions of Madisonian
dem ocracy
enabledanenorm ou s nu m ber of
grou ps
to
organize
and
f igh t
f or th eir interests. For two
decades,
th e
old
plu ralism
was th e
leadinginterpretive
f ram e f or u nder-
standing
Am erican
politics.
Yet it toolost
credibility
in
th e wake of ef f ective
critiqu es
of core
plu ralist
claim s abou t
th e
relatively egalitarian
natu re of
grou p organization
in
Am erican
society.13
Evenas th e old
plu ralism
was u nder
attack, h owever,
assertions abou t th e
possibilities
f or citizencontrol were
being
reorientedandrevitalized.14 T h is m ore recent
body
of
work,
wh ich we call th e new
plu ralism ,
em braces th e
sam e conclu sionreach ed
by
th e
original plu ralists:
a
rou gh
versionof citizencontrol
ex ists,
even
th ou gh
resou rces,
inclu dingknowledge,
are distribu ted
u nequ ally.
Yet th e
ex traordinary
f eatu re of th e new
plu ralism
is th at it reverses
th e m oves m ade
by
th e old. T h e old
plu ralists
lost conf i-
dence invoters and
pu t
th eir f aith ininterest
grou ps.
New
plu ralists
h ave lost conf idence ininterest
grou ps
and
pu t
th eir f aith back inth e
average
voter.
Rath er th anex alt th e attentionor
knowledge
of
average
citizens, h owever,
new
plu ralists
h ave instead
pu rsu ed
two
com plem entary
lines of
argu m ent,
both of wh ich take
citizens' lim its as
given.
T h e f irst is th at voters m ake su r-
prisingly
ef f icient u se of th e lim itedinf orm ation
th ey
h ave.
Ef f ectively m anaging
inf orm ationand
em ployingcogni-
tive cu es and
sh ortcu ts,
voters can
produ ce
ou tcom es not
sodif f erent f rom th ose of
f u lly
inf orm edindividu als.15 As
Sh anto
Iyengar pu ts
it, "[T ]
h e
average
citizenis f ar f rom
overwh elm ed
by
th e
issu es, events,
and
personae
th at enter
andleave th e
political stage. B y resorting
tovariou s sim -
plif yingstrategies, people
wrestle th e
'bloom ing, bu zzing
conf u sion' of
politics
into
m eaningf u l
inf orm ation, and,
inso
doing, provide
th em selves with th e
'intelligence'
to
f orm u late th eir
political pref erences
anddecisions."
16
T h e second
prom inent
line of
argu m ent developedby
th e new
plu ralism
m oves f rom th e
capacities
of individu al
voters toth e collective electorate.
According
toth is vein
of
research ,
processes
of social
aggregation
h ave
strong
rationalizingqu alities
th at enh ance th e electorate's
power.
Mu ch as th e stock m arket
m ay
be anaccu rate store of
widely dispersed
inf orm ationabou t th e
econom y, aggre-
gation
of
pu blic
views-in
opinionsu rveys
and
voting
March 2005
|
Vol. 3/No. 1 35
Articles
|
Abandoning
th e Middle
ou tcom es-serves tof ilter ou t elem ents of
cognitive
weak-
ness wh ile
m agnif ying
areas of
strength .
At th e m acro
level,
idiosyncratic
or
f au lty
elem ents of individu al views
tendtocancel
ou t,
allowing
th e
endu ring,
reasoned,
and
inf orm edelem ents of
pu blic
attitu des to
em erge.
T h e new
plu ralism 's argu m ents
abou t th e
capacities
of
voters are
powerf u l,
creative, andof ten
convincing.
Yet
th ey
donot
by
th em selves su f f ice to
generate
conf idence
abou t dem ocratic control. Wh at alsoneeds tobe sh ownis
th at th ese
capacities im pel
electedof f icials to
produ ce
responsive policies.
Here,
th e new
plu ralism
is bolstered
by
several lines of research and
th eorizing
th at
tru m pet
th e
political
inf lu ence of th e m edianvoter.17 Ina
plu rality
electoral
system requ iring
th e
su pport
of
swing
voters,
th e
individu al andcollective attribu tes of voters described
by
th e new
plu ralism
sh ou ld
generate
intense
pressu re
on
electedof f icials to
adopt policies
th at are
responsive
to
m iddle-of -th e-road
voters,
at least on
h igh ly
salient issu es.
Sim ilarly,
recent stu dies of
C ongress
stress h ow th e stru c-
tu re of decisionru les
places power f irm ly
inth e h ands of
"pivotal" legislators
with
pref erences
at or near th e m iddle
of th eir ch am ber.18
T h ou gh u su ally
silent onth e sou rces
of
legislators' pref erences,
th ese m odels canbe com bined
with m edian-voter m odels to
su ggest h igh
levels of elec-
toral
responsiveness.
At a
m inim u m ,
th ey su ggest
th at th e
statu s
qu o
bias of
legislative voting
ru les sh ou ldm ake it
dif f icu lt tointrodu ce
m ajor
initiatives th at
depart
dram at-
ically
f rom voters' wish es.
T h is broad
perspective
h as
recently
receivedits m ost
encom passing
andinf lu ential treatm ent inth e
im pressive
work of Robert
Erikson,
Mich ael
MacKu en,
and
Jam es
Stim son.19
Em ph asizing
th e
rationalizing
ef f ects of
aggre-
gationth ey
stress th e
"ex traordinary soph istication
of th e
collective electorate."20
T h ey
link th e collective electorate
to
policy m aking, su ggesting
th at
politicians
h ave over-
wh elm ing
incentives to
obey pu blic opinion.
B asedon
ex tensive
analyses
of both th e evolu tionof
pu blic
"m ood"
and
pu blic policy, th ey
conclu de th at "th ere ex ists abou t a
one-to-one translationof
pref erences
into
policy."21
And
th ey ex plicitly
endorse th e
optim istic ju dgm ent
of th e old
plu ralism :
"T h e
pu blic opinion-policy linkage
serves to
keep
th e
political system along
th e cou rse set
by pu blic
pref erences,
m u ch as anearlier
generationof 'system
th eo-
rists'
postu lated."22
T h is new
portrait
of a
collectively
inf orm edelectorate
h arnessing
th e
power
of th e vote to
keep
electedof f icials
inline h as
m ajor im plications.
It
su ggests
th at
popu lar
control rem ains viable even in a
h u ge-and h u gely
com plex -polity.
Andit of f ers
strong
reasons f or th ink-
ing
th at wh at
governm ent
does is
generally
close towh at
voters want it do.
And
yet,
th e new
plu ralism ,
like th e
old,
rests onsom e
sh aky
f ou ndations. Voters of tenlack
im portant
resou rces
neededtoex ercise ef f ective control over
policy. Perh aps
th e m ost cru cial resou rce is
knowledge-knowledge
of
wh at
politicians
do,
andof wh at th eir actions m eanf or
citizens. As R.
Dou glas
Arnoldh as
argu ed,
electoral retri-
bu tion
against
incu m bents f or th eir
policy
ch oices
requ ires
at least th ree conditions:
(1)
ef f ects m u st be discernible
by
voters, (2)
ef f ects m u st be traceable to
policies,
and
(3)
th ere m u st be
accou ntability-voters
m u st be able todeter-
m ine wh osh ou ldbe h eld
responsible.23
T h ese conditions
are not
easily
f illed, andin
m any
cases, one or m ore of
Arnold's th ree
stages presents
voters with f orm idable
cog-
nitive h u rdles.24
As nu m erou s sch olars h ave
pointed
ou t,
elites
possess
th e m eans tom ake th eir actions m ore or less
prom inent
with
regard
toeach of Arnold's th ree conditions
requ ired
f or electoral control.25
Discernibility, traceability,
and
accou ntability
can
vary independently
of a
policy's
actu al
im pact-in ways
th at
politicians
h ave
m ajor
incentives to
m anipu late.
For
ex am ple, policy
m akers canaf f ect th e
traceability
of
policies by varying
wh at Arnoldcalls th e
"length
of th e cau sal ch ain."26 T h e
greater
th e u ncer-
tainty, length ,
and
com plex ity
of th e cau sal
processes
th at
lie betweena
policy
enactm ent and
perceived
ou tcom es,
th e less
likely
it is th at th ose af f ectedwill
respondpoliti-
cally. Ideally,
th eref ore,
politicians h ope
to
design
initia-
tives f or wh ich th e benef its involve sh ort cau sal ch ains and
th e costs involve
long
ones. T im e
lags,
f or
instance,
ex tend
th e
length
and
com plex ity
of cau sal
ch ains,
so
policy
m ak-
ers of tenf ront-loadbenef its andback-loadcosts. With
su ch
m anipu lations, th ey
cantailor th e
presentation
and
design
of even
relatively straigh tf orward
initiatives tom ake
it
very
dif f icu lt to
recognize aggregate
or
long-term
ef f ects.
Indeed,
each
cognitive step
th at voters needtoex ercise
control-discernibility, traceability,
and
accou ntability-is
su bject
to
potential m anipu lationth rou gh
th e
design
of
policies.
It is
perh aps
noaccident th at stu dents of
opinion
and
voting
are
generally optim istic
abou t th e
prospects
f or
citizen
control,
wh ile sch olars of
policy
are of ten
skepti-
cal. T h e worldof
policy m aking
is a
com plex
environ-
m ent,
inwh ich control of inf orm ationf lows is cru cial.
Onissu es of
great signif icance
to
average
Am ericans, th e
presentation
and
design
of
policies
conf er
signif icant
resou rces onth ose m ost
intim ately
involved. Wh eth er or
not citizens are m obilizedandwh om andwh at
options
th ey su pport f requ ently
tu rnon th e m anner inwh ich
elites f ash ionth e
com plex
instru m ents of
governance.
T h ese instru m ents canbe
u sed, m oreover,
not
only
to
ex ploit
lim itations invoter
knowledge,
bu t alsototake
advantage
of
asym m etries
of
knowledge.
Indeed,
th is
pos-
sibility
strikes at af u ndam ental weakness of
optim istic
claim s abou t
opinion
leaders and
aggregation-nam ely,
th e
assu m ption
th at
"good"
inf orm ationwill be
relatively
equ ally
distribu ted
am ong
voters with
dif f eringpref er-
ences
(even
if
particu lar
individu als are
likely
tobe
igno-
rant).
Ina
sense, th en,
th e new
plu ralism
h as backeditself
intoth e
qu andary
th at
plagu ed
th e old
plu ralism :
Is knowl-
edge widely
dif f u sedanddistribu ted
dif f erently
f rom issu e
36
Perspectives
onPolitics
toissu e,
or do
knowledge
im balances tendtoaccu m u late
and
consistently h eigh ten
th e inf lu ence of certain
seg-
m ents of th e electorate?
T h eory
andevidence
point
towardth e second
possibil-
ity.
B asedonh is
reading
of th e literatu re on
cognition,
C onverse
persu asively argu es
th at
knowledge inequ alities
are cu m u lative: "With inf orm ationas with
wealth , 'th em
th at h as
gets,'
andth ere is no
com f ortingsystem
of
pro-
gressive
tax ationoninf orm ationto
h elp
redress th e drif t
toward
glaringinequ alities."27 Stu dy
af ter
stu dy
f inds th at
th e
politically
active are f ar f rom identical inth eir
pref er-
ences or ch aracteristics toth e
politically
inactive. As Steven
Rosenstone and
Joh n
Mark Hansensu m
u p
th e evidence
onU.S.
political participation,
"T h e ... decline of citizen
involvem ent inelections and... in
governm ent
h as
yielded
a
politically engaged
class th at is not
only growing
sm aller
andsm aller bu t alsoless andless
representative
of th e
Am erican
polity."28
T h e tax cu ts of 2001
strongly
vindicate th ese concerns.
Su rveys
ontax issu es reveal th at
E
Scott
Fitzgerald
was
righ t:
th e
very
rich are dif f erent-not
ju st
inth eir
pref er-
ences
regarding
tax
policy
bu t,
cru cially,
inth eir level of
knowledge
with
respect
tovariou s dim ensions of th is com -
plex
issu e.
Knowledge
of th e tax code is
sh arply
skewed
by
incom e. Ina2003
poll,
f or
ex am ple,
a
m ajority
of th e
rich est 5
percent
of Am ericans answeredth e
knowledge
qu estions correctly. Only
af if th of oth er Am ericans
did,
with
knowledge
lowest
am ong
th e
poor. Only
h alf of th e
respondents
evenknew th ere h adbeenatax cu t in2001.
Far f ewer u nderstoodor
su pported
acu t inth e dividend
tax or th e ideaof
speedingu p
and
m akingperm anent
th e
2001 tax cu ts-two issu es
prom inent
wh enth e
poll
was
condu cted.
C onsistently,
h owever,
people
onth e
top
5
per-
cent of th e incom e ladder not
only su pported
th ese and
oth er
specif ic
cu ts bu t knew m u ch m ore abou t th em .29
In
su m , voters h ave
m any ways
to
com pensate
f or th eir
perceptu al
andinf orm ational
lim itations,
bu t elites h ave
at least as
m any strategies
to
prey
onth ose lim itations.
T h ese
strategies,
we
contend,
h ad
prof ou nd
ef f ects
du ring
th e debate over tax cu ts.
Regarding
a
prom inent piece
of
legislation
wh ose distribu tional ef f ects
were,
in
principle,
qu ite
knowable,
politicians repeatedly
ch ose
provisions
th at
sh oweredth e bu lk of th eir
largesse
onth e attentive and
well of f . Rath er th an
respond
to
pu blic
sentim ents,
th ey
craf tedth eir
appeals
and
policies
to
ex ploit knowledge
asym m etries
andcreate
political pressu res
inf avor of th e
ends
th ey su pported-ends
th at abandonedth e m iddle
andracedtoth e base.
Abandoning
th e Middle
Perh aps
we are too
qu ick
tosee abandonm ent of th e m id-
dle.
Perh aps
m ost of th e
pu blic tru ly
wantedth e tax cu ts
th at
passed.
T h is,
af ter
all,
is th e m ost obviou s
argu m ent
f or
wh y
th e tax cu ts
passed-and alsoth e one m ost con-
T able 1
Su rf ace
su pport
f or th e B u sh tax
cu t,
Janu ary-May
2001
Don't
Su pport Oppose
know
Average
sh are 56% 33% 11%
of
respondents
Sou rces: T h e Harris Poll; C NN/USA
T oday/Gallu p Poll; C B S
News; FOX
News/OpinionDynam ics Poll; C NN/T im e Poll;
L os
Angeles T im es; Reu ters/Zogby;
Pew Research C enter
f or th e
People
andth e Press; all available at National Jou ral's
Poll T rack
(h ttp://nationaljou rnal.com ).
Note: T h ere are
twenty-one
occu rrences of th e
qu estiontype:
"Do
you
f avor or
oppose George
W. B u sh 's tax cu t
plan?"
T h ere are f ou r occu rrences of th e
qu estiontype:
"Do
you
approve
or
disapprove
of
George
W. B u sh 's tax cu t
proposal?"
sistent with th e new
plu ralism .
B artels
pu ts
th e
point
strongly
and
clearly:
"Wh at is m ost rem arkable is th at th is
m assive
u pward
transf er of wealth was
broadly su pported
by ordinary
Am ericans. ...
[T ]
o th e ex tent th at
["pu blic
opinion"
abou t tax
policy]
ex ists at all, it seem s to be
h igh ly su pportive
of tax cu ts
along
th e lines
pu rsu edby
President B u sh ."30 Oth ers h ave
sim ilarly
f ram edth eir
inqu iries
arou ndth e
pu zzle
of
wh y
voters wou ld
su pport
policies seem ingly
soinconf lict with th eir interests.31
T h e m ainevidence inf avor of th is contentioncom es
f rom
polls
th at askedvoters wh eth er
th ey
f avored"B u sh 's
tax -cu t
proposal."
T able 1
presents
th e
average
resu lts of
th e 25
su rveys
th at we cou ldf ind
asking
th is
qu estion
in
early
2001. As th e table
sh ows,
on
average,
between50
and60
percent
of
respondents
said
yes, lending
su rf ace
plau sibility
toth e
pu blic-su pported-it position.
Yet,
f or
determ ining
voter
pref erences,
th ese resu lts are
close to
m eaningless.
L et u s
pu t
aside th e
point
of th e
last sectionandassu m e f or th e m om ent th at th ese
ex pres-
sions of
opinion
didnot ref lect elite
m anipu lation.
It is
still th e case th at th ese
polls say
alm ost
noth ing
abou t
wh at kindof tax cu ts th e
pu blic
wantedandh ow m u ch
priority th ey gave
th em . In
f act,
by isolating
th e issu e of
tax cu ts f rom
any
discu ssionof alternatives or
tradeof f s,
th e
polls
f ail
com pletely
to
captu re pu blic opinion
abou t
policy priorities.
Stu dents of
pu blic opinion
h ave
long
knownth at if
respondents
are
asked, "Wou ld
you
like to
spend
m ore, less,
or th e sam e on
X?,"
m any spending
program s
will
generate ex trem ely h igh
levels of
su pport,
u su ally
m u ch
h igh er
th anth ose
program s
wou ld
garner
if th eir
f inancing
or
com petingspendingpriorities
were
discu ssed. For th is
reason, as
Joh n
Mark Hansenh as
argu ed, pu blic
views cannot be u nderstoodwith ou t
qu es-
tions th at
tap
intoth e "th e essential
aspect
of th e
pu blic
bu dgetingproblem :
th e tradeof f s inh erent in
establish ing
pu blic priorities."32
March 2005
1
Vol. 3/No. 1 37
Articles
I
Abandoning
th e Middle
Wh enwe
dig
alittle
deeper,
it becom es clear th at
su p-
port
f or th e tax cu t's actu al
provisions
was narrow. T osee
th is
requ ires ex am iningpolls
th at
captu re
th e twodistin-
gu ish ing
f eatu res of th e 2001 tax cu ts: th eir size andth eir
distribu tion.33 T h e rem ainder of th is section
presents
th is
evidence insom e detail-not tobelabor aconclu sionth at
m ost,
we th ink,
will f ind
inescapable,
bu t rath er to
m ap
ou t inclear term s th e contou rs of
pu blic opinionregard-
ing
tax cu ts th at
sh aped
th e
strategies
of President B u sh
andh is allies in2001.
T o
begin
with ,
tax es were not a
bu rning
concernf or
m ost Am ericans. B ef ore 2001
virtu ally
never didm ore
th anatenth of
respondents say
th at tax es were th e nation's
"m ost
im portant problem ."
Wh en B u sh enteredof f ice,
th e
f igu re
was
ju st
5
percent.34
More f u ndam ental is th e f act th at
large m ajorities
of
Am ericans
ex pressed
clear
h ostility
to th e tax cu t's size.
T h e cru cial issu e in
gau gingpu blic pref erences
is not h ow
respondents
answeredisolated
qu estions
abou t
su pport
f or tax
cu ts,
bu t h ow voters
weigh ed
th e tradeof f between
tax cu ts andoth er
governingpriorities. Alth ou gh
th e f ed-
eral
governm ent
was
ru nningsu rplu ses
in2000 and2001,
th e
loom ing
retirem ent of th e
baby
boom
generation
th reat-
enedf u tu re f inancial dif f icu lties.
Equ ally im portant,
tax
cu ts were
only
one
possible
cu rrent u se of f ederal f u nds.
Edu cation, Medicare,
Social
Secu rity,
environm ental
protection-all
f eatu red
prom inently
inth e 2000 race.
Wh enaskedabou t th ese
com peting
u ses,
voters consis-
tently
saw tax cu ts as alower
priority
th an
plau sible
alter-
native u ses of th e f orecasted
su rplu ses.
T able 2 su m m arizes
th e
su rveys
th at askedabou t
possible
alternatives. Versu s
Social
Secu rity,
tax cu ts lost
by
a74 to21
percent m argin.
Versu s Medicare,
th e
m argin
is 65 to25
percent.
Even
wh enSocial
Secu rity
is takenou t of consideration, 69
percent
of
respondents pref erredu sing
ex tram onies on
"edu cation,
th e environm ent,
h ealth
care,
crim e-f igh ting,
and
m ilitary
def ense,"
rath er th anatax cu t,
wh ich
gar-
nered
ju st
22
percent su pport.
T h ese sentim ents didnot
disappear
wh enth e tax cu ts
passed;
evenaf ter benef its
began
tof low tovoters,
large m ajorities
said
th ey
wou ld
be
willing
to
f orgo
th eir continu ationinf avor of alterna-
tive u ses of th e f u nds.
Im m ediately
af ter th e 2004 elec-
tion,
f or
ex am ple,
a New York T im es
poll
f ou nd th at
redu cing
th e def icit
tru m ped
tax cu ts as a
pu blic priority
by
m ore th anatwo-to-one
m argin.35
B artels
dispu tes
ou r u se of th is
su rvey
evidence,
argu ing
th at Am ericans'
yes-or-no
views ontax cu ts,
not th eir
pu b-
lic f inance
priorities,
are wh at
really
m atters.36 We sh ou ld
em ph asize
th at B artels's rich and
revealinganalysis
of su r-
vey
datadoes not contradict ou r m ost f u ndam ental
point:
th at
pu blic opinion
ontax cu ts was
deliberately sh apedby
political
actors
f ram ingpolicy design
toconf u se voters,
elevate su rf ace
su pport
f or tax cu ts,
and
betray clearly
ex pressedpu blic priorities.
Indeed,
B artels's
analysis, by
takingpu blic opinion
as th e sole f ocu s of
analysis, pro-
vides a
revealing
indicationof h ow little attentionm ost
stu dies of th e
opinion-policy linkage give
toth e role of
elite
m anipu lation.
B u t evenwith
regard
to th e
su rvey
data,
B artels is too
qu ick
todism iss ou r resu lts. T h e debate
in
2000, af ter all,
was abou t
allocating
f inite resou rces
am ongcom petingpriorities,
andonth is
issu e,
Am ericans
were
consistently
biased
against
tax cu ts.
Figu re
2 leaves
little room f or
am bigu ity:
wh atever th e
lineu p
of
options,
tax cu ts end
u p
at or near th e bottom of th e list. We
certainly
wou ldnot
deny
th at th ere are elem ents of Am er-
ican
opinion
th at
su pport
tax cu ts. Wh at we do
deny
is
th at it m akes sense to
say
Am ericans "wanted" th e 2001
tax cu ts wh enth ere is
am ple
evidence not
only
th at
th ey
wou ldh ave
pref erred
oth er
policy priorities
andoth er sorts
of tax
cu ts,
bu t alsoth at
political
elites
deliberately
set th e
agenda
and
designedkey policy
f eatu res to
prevent
voters
f rom
f u lly perceivingaspects
of th e tax cu ts th at
th ey
opposed.
Wh at abou t th e seconddim ensionof
policy ch ange-
distribu tion? Pu blic
opinion
was
clearly
and
consistently
h ostile toth e
top-h eavy
skew of th e B u sh tax cu t. Indeed,
voters'
leading
concernabou t tax es inth e
years
bef ore th e
tax cu ts
passed
was neith er th e tax code's
staggering
com -
plex ity
nor th e bu rdens
th ey
th em selves f aced. Rath er,
th e
top worry
of Am ericans was th at "th e rich
pay
toolittle in
tax es"-h ardly
th e sentim ent ref lectedinth e 2001 cu ts.
Not
su rprisingly given
th is concern,
large m ajorities
of
respondents consistently
saidth at
th ey
wantedth e
legis-
lationto distribu te m ore of its benef its to m iddle- and
lower-incom e Am ericans andless toth e well of f . Evenina
poll
condu ctedbetweenHou se andSenate
passage
of th e
bill,
th e
m ajority
of
respondents
saidth at th e tax cu t sh ou ld
be eith er
rejected
(17
percent)
or
only passed
with
m ajor
ch anges
(35
percent).
And
by
a
53-point m arginth ey
wantedth e
planadju sted
som ore of th e tax cu ts went to
lower-incom e
tax payers.37
C itizens also
rejected
th e B u sh adm inistration's asser-
tionth at th e benef its of tax cu ts sh ou ldbe distribu tedin
rou gh
accordance with cu rrent incom e-tax liabilities,
with
h igh -incom e
voters
receiving
th e
largest
sh are of benef its.
A
su rvey
of March 2001,
f or
ex am ple,
asked
respondents
to
com pare
two
generic plans-th e
f irst of wh ich "wou ld
redu ce f ederal incom e tax es across th e board" and
give
"th e
largest
sh are of th is tax cu t ... towealth ier Am eri-
cans,
wh o
cu rrently pay
th e m ost in
tax es";
th e secondof
wh ich wou ld "take f u ll ef f ect th is
year,
andwou ldbe
aim edm ore at m iddle incom e Am ericans ...
[and]
involve
eith er credits or redu ctions inth e
payroll
tax es th at are
dedu ctedf rom
people's paych ecks." Respondents pre-
f erredth e second
plan
toth e f irst
by
73 to20
percent.
Sim ilarly,
wh en askedwh eth er th e "rich sh ou ld
get
a
bigger
tax cu t becau se
th ey pay
m ore intax es" or wh eth er
"everyone
sh ou ld
get
th e sam e level of tax cu t," 70
per-
cent of voters ch ose th e latter
option
and
ju st
24
percent
th e f orm er.38
38
Perspectives
onPolitics
T able 2
Pref erred u ses of th e
bu dget su rplu s
NB C News/ AB C News/ Pew Pew
Wall Street
Wash ington
Research Research
B loom berg
News C B S News Hart-T eeter Jou rnal Post C enter Newsweek L A T im es C NN/T im e C enter Fox News
Social
Secu rity
Social Edu cation/ Social Social Social
Edu cation,
Medicare
(32%) Secu rity/
Health care
Secu rity/ Secu rity/ Secu rity
th e
(65%)
Medicare
(36%)
Medicare Medicare
(74%) environm ent,
(48%) (41%) (77%)
etc.
(69%)
Def ense,
Social Dom estic
dom estic
Secu rity program s
program s (25%) (24%)
(32%)
Debt Redu ction Debt Debt Debt Debt
(18%)
Redu ction Redu ction Redu ction Redu ction,
(37%) (37%) (18%)
etc.
(65%)
T ax cu t T ax cu t T ax cu t T ax cu t T ax cu t T ax cu t T ax cu t T ax cu t T ax cu t T ax cu t T ax cu t
(14%) (17%) (36%) (36%) (21%) (16%) (28%) (19%) (21%) (22%) (25%)
Debt
Fu nding
f or
Fu nding
f or Debt
Redu ction govern- govern- redu ction
(16%)
m ental m ental
(18%)
program s program s
(20%) (20%)
Sou rce: C B S
News;
AB C
NewslWash ington
Post; Pew Research C enter f or th e
People
andth e
Press; Newsweek; NB C News/Wall Street Jou rnal;
B loom berg
News
Poll;
L A T im es;
Hart-T eeter;
Fox
News; C NN/T im e. All
su rvey
resu lts are f rom 2000 or
early
2001,
ex cept
f or th e
righ tm ost th ree,
wh ich are f rom 1999.
a)-
N)
(Z)
C :)
cC )
0
z
0 W
(D
Articles
I Abandoning
th e Middle
Not
su rprisingly,
Am ericans donot th ink th at th e econ-
om y
or th eir own
pocketbooks
h ave benef itedm u ch f rom
recent tax cu ts. In
Au gu st
2004,
f or
instance, 63
percent
of
poll respondents
believedth at th e tax cu ts of 2001
and2003 h adeith er h u rt th e
econom y
or not m ade
m u ch dif f erence.
Meanwh ile,
only
ath irdsaid
th ey
h ad
personally
benef itedf rom th e tax cu ts.39 Wh enaskedin
March 2004 wh eth er th e "tax cu ts
[of
th e f irst B u sh
term ]
were too
large"
andneededto be scaledback to
pay
f or social
program s
or "th e
righ t
size" andneededto
be m ade
perm anent
to
h elp
th e
econom y,
55
percent
ch ose th e f irst
option,
39
percent
th e second.40
It is
im portant
to
em ph asize,
m oreover,
th at th e two
dim ensions of size anddistribu tionof th e tax cu ts are
distinct,
so
lookingseparately
at each
probably
overstates
su pport
f or th e cu ts. T h at
is,
of th e 20-30
percent
of
respondents
wh osaidth at tax cu ts were a
h igh er priority
th anoth er
potential
u ses of th e
su rplu s, m any probably
didnot f avor th e
top-h eavy
distribu tionof th e B u sh
pro-
posal.
T h e 20-30
percent range
sh ou ldth eref ore be viewed
as th e
u pper
bou ndof
su pport.
A f inal
piece
of evidence
regardingpu blic pref erences
com es f rom an
u nex pected
sou rce: th e adm inistration
itself . Form er
T reasu ry Secretary
Pau l O'Neill h as released
aninternal m em o
dating
f rom th e
u nveiling
of th e B u sh
adm inistration's f irst rou ndof tax cu ts in 2001.41 Its
au th or was Mich ele
Davis,
a
top T reasu ry
of f icial and
participant
in
daily m eetings
onth e adm inistration's com -
m u nications
strategy.
Her
m em o,
generated
f or a
h igh -
prof ile pu blic appearance
of th e adm inistration's
top
econom ic
spokesm an, u ndou btedly
ref lects
strategies
developed
at th e
h igh est
level. It
begins by asking
O'Neill to
plu g
tax cu ts at a
press
event
u nveiling
th e
president's bu dget.
T h en, h owever,
Davis warns: "T h e
pu blic pref ers spending
on
th ings
like h ealth care and
edu cationover
cu tting
tax es."42 Inth e
pictu re
of
politics
sketch ed
by
th e new
plu ralism ,
th is wou ld
prom pt
atten-
tive of f ice h olders toscale back th eir am bitions. B u t to
Davis,
it is insteadareasontoavoid
talking
abou t
any
tradeof f s tax cu ts
m igh t
entail. "It's cru cial th at
you
m ake
clear th at th ere are notrade-of f s h ere,"
sh e writes. "Roll-
ou t events like th is are th e clearest
ex am ples
of wh en
staying
on
m essage
is
absolu tely
cru cial.
Any
deviation
... will
ch ange
th e
way coverage plays
ou t f rom tom or-
row f orward."
T h is internal m em o,
along
with th e
poll
resu lts
ju st
reviewed,
m akes clear th at th e
B u sh -su pportedplan
divergedsh arply
f rom
popu lar
views abou t scale and
distribu tionof
any
tax cu ts.
Wh y,
th en,
didadvocates of
th e tax cu ts believe
th ey
cou ldenact th em ? T h e answer
h inges
ontwosets of
ch anges
inth e Am erican
political
u niverse: th ose th at h ave increasedth e benef its to
politi-
cians of
departing
f rom voters'
pref erences
andth ose th at
h ave decreasedth e costs of su ch
departu res
f or
politi-
cians' f ates.
T h e Race f or th e B ase
In
early
2003, Maine voters were
ex posed
toT V ads th at
com pared
th eir senior
senator,
Olym pia
Snowe,
toFrench
President
Jacqu es
C h irac. T h e ads annou ncedth at wh en
"President B u sh
cou rageou sly
ledth e f orces of f reedom "
against Iraq,
"som e so-calledallies like France stoodinth e
way."
Now th at th e
president sou gh t
"bold
job-creating
tax
cu ts,"
th e ads
continu ed,
"som e so-called
Repu blicans
like
Olym pia
Snowe standinth e
way."
Sim ilar ads were
ru n
against
Oh ioSenator
George
Voinovich ,
a
longtim e
Repu blican
stalwart wh oalso
su ggested
th at th e new rou nd
of tax cu ts in2003 was too
ex pensive.
T h ese ads were ru n
by
a once-obscu re conservative
grou p,
th e C lu bf or Growth .
B y
th e standards of m ass-
m em bersh ip organizations,
th e C lu bis
sm all,
boasting
arou nd
10,000
m em bers in2003. Yet
du ring
th e 2002
m idterm
elections,
th e
organization's
$10 m illionincon-
tribu tions m ade it th e
leading
sou rce of
cam paign
f u nds
f or
Repu blicans
ou tside of th e GOP itself .
Focu sing
on
prim aries
and
open-seat
contests,
th e C lu bbu ndles dona-
tions f rom its
wealth y
m em bers tof u ndconservative anti-
tax candidates.
Perh aps
th e m ost distinctive f eatu re of th e
C lu bis th at it som etim es
targets
f or def eat not Dem o-
crats,
bu t incu m bent
Repu blicans ju dgedinsu f f iciently
f ierce inth eir
tax -cu tting
com m itm ent. C lu bPresident Ste-
ph en
Moore
jokes
th at wh enh e th reatens a
prim ary
ch al-
lenge against waywardRepu blicans (dism issively
term ed
RINOs,
or
Repu blicans
InNam e
Only), "th ey
start wet-
ting
th eir
pants."43 C lu b-su pported
Hou se
Repu blican
Jef f
Flake is
equ ally
blu nt: "Wh en
you
h ave 100
percent
of
Repu blicans voting
f or th e B u sh tax
cu t,
you
know th at
th ey
are
looking
over th eir sh ou lder andnot
wanting
to
h ave Steve Moore
recru iting
candidates inth eir district."44
T h e
strategy
of th e C lu bf or Growth h as dovetailed
with th e activities of anoth er
relatively
recent antitax
grou p:
Grover
Norqu ist's
Am ericans f or T ax Ref orm
(AT R).
L ike
Moore,
Norqu ist
is anantitax cru sader: h e describes h is
goal
as a50
percent
redu ctionin
spending
andtax es as a
sh are of GDP
("down
toth e size wh ere
you
cou lddrown
[governm ent]
in th e
bath tu b").
Andlike th e C lu bf or
Growth ,
AT R h as f ocu sedits
energies
on
Repu blican
m em -
bers of
C ongress.
Its central
strategy
h as beentodem and
awrittenantitax
pledge-cu rrently signedby
216
repre-
sentatives,
42
senators,
andPresident B u sh -to
"oppose
any
andall ef f orts to increase th e
m arginal
incom e tax
rates f or individu als and/or bu sinesses."45 Som e
Repu bli-
cans,
m ostly
m oderate incu m bents,
resistedth e AT R
pledge
f or atim e. B u t th e
logic
of
contem porary Repu blicanpri-
m aries is clear. For
non-incu m bents,
agreem ent
toth ese
pledges
h as becom e a
necessary com ponent
of
any
ru nf or
C ongress.
Inth eir com m itm ents and
aim s,
th e C lu bf or Growth
andAT R
sym bolize
th e
tax -cu tting
f ervor of a
m ajor
activ-
ist
wing
of th e GOP. Andinth eir
operation
andinf lu -
ence, th e C lu bandAT R are
representative
of
m any key
40
Perspectives
onPolitics
trends inAm erican
politics today,
f rom
increasingparti-
san
polarization
to
growing
econom ic
inequ ality
to th e
increasingly prom inent
role of
ideological
and
partisan
f orces in
determ ining politicians' agendas
andf ates.
T ogeth er,
th ese trends h ave
encou raged
conservative
pol-
iticians to abandonth e m iddle oncru cial
policy
issu es,
racing
to th e base
representedby
th eir m ost vocal and
partisansu pporters.
Political observers h ave
longrecognized
th e electoral
tensionbetween
party
activists andm iddle-of -th e-roadvot-
ers. Rich ardFenno's classic 1970s
stu dy
of m em bers of
C ongress
notes,
f or
ex am ple,
th at
politicians
care
dispro-
portionately
abou t th eir
"prim ary constitu ency,"
wh ose
"loyalty
and
intensity
of com m itm ent" m ake th em at once
invalu able and
potentially dangerou s.46
Yet
com pared
with
th e candidates Fenno
observed,
today's politicians
h ave
enh ancedincentives tocater toth eir base. Inth e
Hou se,
risingideological u nity
of districts and
increasingly soph is-
ticated
gerrym andering
h ave raisedth e relative
im por-
tance of
prim aries. C am paignm oney
m atters m ore th an
it once
did,
and
m oney
f lows
disproportionately
f rom th e
af f lu ent and
ideologically
ex trem e. Andinth e Hou se in
particu lar, parties
in
governm ent
h ave becom e m ore
pow-
erf u l as
agenda-setters, disciplinarians,
andf inancers. T h e
resu lt is not
ju st increasingpartisanpolarization,
bu t also
an
increasing
needanddesire to
respond
toth e base.
Partisan
polarization
h as increased
dram atically
since
th e 1970s.
According
toall available
m easu res,
th e
parties
h ave m oved
sh arply away
f rom each oth er andnow dis-
agree
f ar m ore
consistently
and
deeply
th anbef ore. Wh at
is less of tennotedis th at th is
divergence
is not
sym m etri-
cal:
Repu blicans
h ave
grownsu bstantially
m ore conserva-
tive,
wh ile Dem ocrats h ave becom e
only m odestly
m ore
liberal. SeanT h eriau lt h as stu diedth e transf orm ationof
th e
pref erences
of
Repu blican
andDem ocratic m em bers
of
C ongress
over th e
past
th ree decades
u sing
th e
ideolog-
ical
position
m easu res
com pu tedby
Keith Poole and
HowardRosenth al.47 He f inds th at over th e 1970-2002
period,
th e
Repu blicanParty
h as becom e twice as con-
servative,
wh ile th e Dem ocratic
Party
h as becom e abou t
h alf
again
m ore liberal.
Moreover,
th e
increasing
liberal-
ism of th e Dem ocratic
Party
is accou ntedf or alm ost
entirely
by
th e
replacem ent
of m oderate Dem ocrats inth e Sou th
by
conservative
Repu blicans.
Ou tside th e
Sou th ,
th e
m edianDem ocrat is
scarcely
m ore liberal th anh e or
sh e was
th irty years ago.
T h e sam e is not tru e of th e
Repu b-
lican
Party:
evenou tside th e
Sou th ,
Repu blicanlegisla-
tors are
m arkedly
m ore conservative
today
th anin
prior
decades. T h is is
particu larly
tru e of th e
Repu blican
con-
gressional leadersh ip,
wh ich h as beenalm ost
ex clu sively
drawnf rom th e GOP's conservative sou th ern
wing
since
th e m id-1990s.
Partisan
polarization
h as
progressed
h andinh andwith
growing
econom ic
inequ ality.48
T h e
parties
are m ore
divided
along
econom ic lines
today
th an
th ey
h ave been
f or
decades,
and
partisan
conf lict h as
increasingly
f ocu sed
onzero-su m distribu tional issu es,
particu larly
intax
pol-
icy
debates.49 Onth ese
issu es,
th e resou rces
brou gh t
to
bear
by u pper-incom e
Am ericans h ave
ex panded
dram at-
ically,
wh ile th ose
brou gh t
tobear
by
m iddle- andlower-
incom e Am ericans h ave
atroph ied.
Over th e
past qu arter
centu ry,
less af f lu ent voters h ave su f f erednot
only
f rom
nearly stagnant earnings,
bu t alsof rom broaddeclines in
locally
rooted
organizations,
like
u nions,
th at
h istorically
played
acru cial role in
representing
th eir interests.50
Risingpartisanpolarization
h as h adtwocru cial ef f ects.
First,
it h as elevated
(at
th e sam e tim e th at it h as
ref lected)
th e relevance of th e base inelectoral contests.
Second,
it
h as increasedth e incentives and
capacities
of
party
leaders
in
governm ent
tostru ctu re th e
agenda
andu se
procedu ral
strong-arm
tactics. T h ese two f orces-one
m ostly
elec-
toral,
th e oth er
m ostly
internal to
C ongress-converged
inth e
early
2000s to
produ ce
of f -center
policies.
Inth e electoral realm ,
th e
m ajor developm ent
is th e
growing
relative
im portance
of
processes
th at
precede
th e
general
election-th e initial
vetting
of candidates
by party
leaders andallied
grou ps,
andth e
prim ary stage,
inwh ich
party ch am pions
are selected. T h anks to
geograph ic polar-
izationand
gerrym andering
(inth e
Hou se),
th e over-
wh elm ingm ajority
of
congressional
districts are saf e f or
one
party
or th e oth er. T h is
m eans,
in
tu rn,
th at th e
greatest
electoral risk f aced
by m any
cu rrent or
aspiring
of f iceh olders is
likely
tocom e in
prim aries.
Andinth ese
races,
m arked
by
lim itedand
partisan
tu rnou t,
respon-
siveness toone's base becom es of
param ou nt im portance.
B arry
B u rdenestim ates th at acredible
prim ary ch allenge
pu lls
a
typical congressional
candidate arem arkable 10
points
towardth e
ideological poles
onascale of zeroto
100.51 Yet
ju st
th e
prospect
of a
prim ary ch allenge-
especially
if u nm atch ed
by com parable
concernabou t
assau lts f rom th e oth er side of th e
aisle-m ay
be su f f icient
to
pu sh politicians
closer toth e
party
line.
Wh eth er or not
prim aries
are th e
cu lprit,
th ere is
strong
evidence th at candidates'
positions
h ave becom e m ore con-
gru ent
with th eir
party's
national doctrine th anwith
m edian-voter sentim ents inth eir districts. T h is h as been
especially
tru e of
Repu blicans.52
In
f act,
in
ideological
term s,
th ere are now wh at Steven
Ansolabeh ere,
Jam es
Snyder,
andC h arles Stewart describe as two
"pools"
of
candidates-"one Dem ocratic andone
Repu blican,
and
little
overlap
betweenth e two."53
Standardelectoral th eories
su ggest
th at as candidates
m ove towardth eir
base,
th ey
sh ou ldbe
increasingly
vu l-
nerable to
general
election
ch allenges.
T h is does not seem
toh ave
h appened. Alth ou gh incu m bency advantage m ay
h ave erodedinth e
1990s,
any
deterioration
appears
to
be m odest.
Despite
th e
very
close overall
partisan
bal-
ance and candidates'
apparent
m ovem ent
away
f rom
m edianvoters inth eir
districts,
arecord99
percent
of
incu m bents were reelectedto th e Hou se in2002. Few
March 2005
1
Vol. 3/No. 1 41
Articles
I
Abandoning
th e Middle
races are
contested,
andevencontestedraces are
typically
noncom petitive,
with
only
15 races in2002 decided
by
f ou r
points
or less.
T h e race to th e base h as been
propelledby
electoral
f orces. Yet it
appears
toh ave
gone
evenf u rth er th anth ese
trends wou ld
predict, especially
onth e
Repu blican
side.
Adding
to th e
pu zzle,
it seem s sof ar toh ave
generated
little backlash . T ou nderstand
wh y,
it is
necessary
totu rn
f rom th e electoral realm toth e
ch angingstrategies
of
par-
ties in
governm ent
th at h ave intensif iedth e
growingpu ll
of th e base.
T h e
increasingprom inence
and
aggressiveness
of
party
leaders in
C ongress
over th e
past
f ew decades is u ndeni-
able. As
Joh n
Aldrich andDavidRoh de h ave
argu ed,
h eigh tenedpartisanpolarization-both risingh om ogene-
ity
with in
parties
andth e
growingideological
distance
betweenth em -increases rank-and-f ile
legislators'
incen-
tives to
ex pand
th e
au th ority
of
party
leaders. Su ch leaders
are,
of
cou rse,
perf ectly positioned
to
deploy procedu ral,
rh etorical,
and
agenda-settingstrategies
toredu ce th e
pros-
pect
of m edian-voter backlash .
Wh ile f ew
congressional
observers
dispu te
th e
growing
prom inence
and
capacity
of
party
leaders,
qu estions
lin-
ger.
Are
party
leaders
sim ply
"enablers" wh oallow m em -
bers toenact th eir own
pref erences ex peditiou sly,
or are
th ey
"enf orcers" wh ocan
ef f ectively em ploy
carrots and
sticks to
pressu re
backbench ers todowh at leaders want?
T h e tworoles are dif f icu lt to
disentangle,
andelem ents of
both are
u ndou btedly
at
work-especially
wh enone rec-
ognizes th at parties sh ape wh ogets electedas well as h ow
legislators
vote once inof f ice.54 T h e cru cial
point
is th at
party
leaders,
wh eth er enf orcers or
enablers,
can
play
a
key
role in
h elpingpoliticians respond
todem ands f rom
th e base with ou t
alienating
voters inth e m iddle.
T h e essential lever f or
pacif ying
th e m iddle is
agenda
control-th e
f ram ing
of issu es,
determ inationof th e
pol-
icy agenda,
and
sh aping
of
specif ic proposals (inclu ding
cru cial details of
policy design)
onwh ich electedof f icials
get
th e
opportu nity
tovote. E. E. Sch attsch neider once
saidth at th e "def initionof th e alternatives is th e
su prem e
instru m ent of
power," eloqu ently ex pressing
a
proposi-
tionth at social ch oice
th eory
h as since
ex tensively
con-
f irm ed. 55 B ecau se
agenda
setters h ave som u ch inf lu ence,
th e
leadersh ip
statu s th at
Repu blicans enjoyed
in both
h ou ses of
C ongress
in
early
2001 was worth m u ch m ore
th anth e h andf u l of ex traseats th at h ad
produ ced
it. Wh en
it com es toth e
political agenda, m ajority
control is af orce
m u ltiplier.
A
great
deal of
contem porary political
science-
especially spatial
m odels of
lawm aking
th at view
politi-
cians as
h aving
f ix edideal
points-m isses
th is
sim ple
insigh t
becau se it f ails toconsider h ow issu es andalter-
natives reach th e
agenda
inth e f irst
place.56
Yet wh eth er
anissu e
gets
to th e
agenda
andh ow it
presents
itself
f or avote
m ay
leadth e sam e set of decisionm akers to
endorse
strikingly
dif f erent
policies.
In
m any
collective
ch oice
situ ations,
as R. Kent Weaver
argu es, politicians'
ex act
pref erences
are less critical th anth eir "zones of
acceptable
ou tcom es"-"th ose ou tcom es th at
th ey
will
accept
inach oice betweenth e def au lt
position
andth at
alternative,"
wh ich of teninclu de ou tcom es
th ey
consider
distinctly
second-best. Su ch zones of
acceptance
are
u su ally
m u ch m ore
f lu id,
am orph ou s,
and
perm issive
th an
politicians'
ideal
points, ref lecting
not
ju st personal
pref erences
bu t also
sh if ting
electoral and coalitional
considerations th at som etim es
requ ire
dif f icu lt tradeof f s.
Political leaders th u s
try
tom ove ontoth e
agendaaccept-
able anddesirable
options
andto
keep
of f less desirable
options
th at
th ey
wou ldneverth eless f eel
pressu re
to
accept.
T h ey
alsou se
policy f ram ing
and
design
to
ex pand
oth er
politicians'
zones of
acceptance. B y placing
alternatives
with ina
larger
f ram e th at m akes it dif f icu lt f or f ence-
sitters to
adopt
astance of
pu blic opposition("protect
andsecu re
Medicare,"
"welf are
dependency
vs.
personal
responsibility,"
"tax cu ts:
yes
or
no?"),
agenda
setters can
of tencreate a
signif icant
am ou nt of
ru nning
room with in
wh ich to craf t
policy details-especially
wh en
th ey
are
able tolessenth e
visibility
or
im m ediacy
of th e th orniest
tradeof f s.
Over th e
past
two
decades,
party
leaders h ave increased
th eir control of th e
legislative agenda. T h ey
now ex ert
trem endou s inf lu ence over th e issu es th at receive
legisla-
tive considerationandth e
specif ic proposals
th at com e to
avote.
T h ey largely
control th e of tenrestrictive ru les
gov-
erning
debate,
wh ich lim it or
proh ibit
considerationof
alternatives. And
th ey
dictate th e
participants
inconf er-
ence com m ittees,
wh ich intu rncontrol th e
proposals
th at
will be
brou gh t
toth e f loors of th e Hou se andSenate f or
af inal
u p
or downvote. Robert Van
Hou weling
(wh o
sees
party
leaders as enablers rath er th an
enf orcers)
h as
argu ed
th at interventions of th is kindh ave
increasingly
h ada
specif ic pu rpose:
to enable
legislators
to enact ex trem e
policies
with ou t
cou rting
electoral backlash .57
Strategies
of th is sort are
by
nom eans lim itedtorh e-
torical
f ram ing
and
procedu ral legerdem ain.
Evenm ore
im portant
is
policy design-a su bject
th at th e new
plu ral-
ism h as
neglected.58 B y designingpolicies
soth at ex trem e
ends are visible to
partisans
andbenef iciaries bu t not to
voters,
party
leaders addto th e incentives of th e
party
rank-and-f ile toendorse of f -center
policies.
Ou r
em ph asis
onth e role of
policy design
sets ou r work
apart
not
only
f rom th e new
plu ralism ,
bu t alsof rom th e
im portant ch allenges
toit th at h ave
already
beenlau nch ed.
L awrence
Jacobs
andRobert
Sh apiro,
f or
instance,
argu e
th at
contem porary politicians
h ave th e incentives andth e
m eans to
depart
f rom wh at m iddle-of -th e-roadvoters
desire.59 Yet f or all th e
insigh ts th ey
of f er, Jacobs
andSh a-
piro
draw too
sh arp
aline between
policy design
andth e
selling
of
policies. T h ey argu e
th at
politicians
ch oose
pol-
icies f or th eir ownreasons,
th enu se wh at
th ey
call "craf ted
42
Perspectives
onPolitics
talk" to
m anipu late pu blic opinion
andenact th em . T h is
neglects
th e ex tent towh ich th e
design
of
policies
is itself
acru cial m eans of
m anipu lation-one
th at was
probably
evenm ore
im portant
th an"craf tedtalk" in
ex plaining
th e
tax -cu t
breakth rou gh
of 2001.
T h at
breakth rou gh represented
th e cu lm ination of
decades-long
trends inAm erican
politics
th at h ave increased
th e incentives f or
politicians
to
appeal
toth e
ideological
ex trem e,
particu larly
wh enth e h olders of th ese views are
inf orm ed, af f lu ent,
and
politically
active. T h e tax cu ts were
at odds with voters'
pref erences. T h ey
were consistent with
th e views of th e sm all
m inority
of Am ericans th at m ake
u p
acru cial
com ponent
of th e
Repu blicans' f u ndraising
andelectoral base. Advocates of tax cu ts were
cognizant
of
th is
prof ou ndpref erence divergence
andth e electoral risks
it
posed.
T h eir
reaction, h owever,
was not to m oderate
th eir
policy
am bitions,
bu t todoctor th e
plan's m arketing
and
design
in an
attem pt
to
sidestep
andsh ort-circu it
pu blic
views.
Selling
th e T ax C u ts
Politicians twist f acts.
Still,
inth e
ru n-u p
toth e 2001 tax
cu ts,
m any analysts ex pressedsu rprise
at th e sh eer volu m e
of
m isleading
and,
at
tim es,
dish onest inf orm ationreleased
by
th e Wh ite Hou se and
congressional Repu blicans.
T h e
biggest splash
was m ade
by
th e
May
21 cover of th e lef t-
leaning
New
Repu blic,
wh ich f eatu reda
pictu re
of B u sh
alongside
th e h eadline "He's
L ying."
L ess
colorf u l,
bu t
m ore
powerf u l,
was a
nonpartisan
indictm ent written
by
veterantax
analyst
MartinSu llivaninth e
jou rnal
T ax Notes.
Observing
th at
C ongress
andth e
T reasu ry Departm ent
h adceasedto
produ ce analyses
of th e distribu tional ef f ects
of tax
cu ts,
Su llivan
com plained
th at
T reasu ry's analysis
h ad
by early
2001 becom e "so
em barrassingly poor
andso
biased,
we
th ou gh t
we h adseenth e last of its kind." "If
th is continu es," Su llivan
wryly com plained,
"th e
T reasu ry's
Of f ice of T ax
Policy (OT P) m ay
h ave to
ch ange
its nam e
toth e Of f ice of T ax
Propaganda."60
T h e
widespreadcom plaints
of th is ch aracter bear
em ph a-
sis not som u ch becau se of th e ex act u ntru th s th at
th ey
u nearth ,
bu t becau se of th e consistent natu re of th e
m anip-
u lations. For wh at
su pporters
of th e tax cu ts said-and
didnot
say-displayed
anacu te
u nderstanding
of th e
key
vu lnerabilities of th e
legislation
inth e
pu blic
m ind.
T h rou gh ou t
th e
debate,
th e Wh ite Hou se andits allies
presented
th e tax cu t in
ways designed
tof orestall activa-
tion of h ostile
pu blic opinion.
T h ree
strategies
were
central-each attu nedtoth e tax cu t's
principal
liabilities.
First, u nrealistic
projections
of f ederal
su rplu ses
andof th e
costs of th e tax
ch anges
were u sedto
ju stif y
th e tax cu ts
andobscu re th eir ef f ects on
com petingpriorities.
Second,
Repu blican
leaders
m anaged
th e
legislative agenda
to
pre-
vent considerationof th e tax cu ts'
specif ic
ef f ects onval-
u ed
program s. T h ird, tax cu t advocates u sed
m isleading
or f alse
langu age
and
im agery
to describe th e distribu -
tional ef f ects of th e cu ts, wh ile
cu rtailingindependent
and
potentially com petinganalyses.
Insh ort,
presentation
of
th e tax cu ts was
precisely
calibratedto
navigate
th e h ostile
u ndercu rrents of
pu blic opinion.
T h e adm inistrationandits allies cam e intoof f ice deter-
m inedtooverstate th e
su rplu s
andu nderstate th e size of
th e tax cu ts:
h iding
th e tru e
bu dgetary
ef f ects of th e tax
cu ts wou ldm inim ize th e
danger
of th e f iscal tradeof f s
becom ing
salient.
B u dget
estim ates of th e
C ongressional
B u dget
Of f ice
(C B O)
th at overstatedth e
su rplu s
u nder
any plau sible
scenariowere a
great h elp.
T h e C B O was
requ iredby
law toassu m e th at
C ongress
wou ldabide
by
all th e dictates of
previou s
tax and
spendinglegislation,
evendictates th at h adbeen
h abitu ally
overriddenor h ad
noch ance of
being
observedinth e f u tu re.
Moreover, esti-
m ates of th e available
su rplu s
inclu dedf u nds inth e Medi-
care Part A tru st
f u nd, wh ich , like th e Social
Secu rity
tru st
f u nd,
representatives
of both
parties
h advowednot to
tou ch . And
by overstating
th e am ou nt of th e
su rplu s,
C B O
estim ates alsou nderstatedth e cost of debt service.61
Yet,
wh ile th ese
sh ortcom ings
in
bu dgetary accou nting
were f or th e m ost
part already
establish ed,
th e arch itects
of th e tax cu t
designed
th e
proposal
to
ex ploit
th em
f u lly.
T h ey
th enaddedinnu m erou s u nrealistic
assu m ptions
of
th eir own. Most
notably, su pporters
of th e tax cu t ref rained
f rom
discou nting
revenu es th at were alm ost certainto
dissipate.
T h e
key ex am ple
is th e Alternative Minim u m
T ax
(AMT ),
af eatu re of th e tax code
originally
inserted
in 1969 (and
su bstantially
revisedin
1986)
to ensu re
th at
h igh er-incom e tax payers
did not u se
dedu ctions,
ex em ptions,
andcredits to avoid
paying
incom e tax es
entirely.
B ecau se th e AMT is not index edf or
inf lation,
th e sh are of Am ericans wh om u st
pay
it is
anticipated
to
rise f rom less th an2
percent
in2002 to
rou gh ly
one-
th irdin2010. Noone in2001 believedth is wou ldcom e
to
pass-certainly
not
key
m em bers of th e adm inistra-
tion,
wh o
began
tom u se abou t th e needf or
cu tting
th e
AMT downtosize bef ore th e ink h addriedonth e 2001
tax
legislation.
Yet f or th e
pu rposes
of
m aking
estim ates,
th e adm inistrationassu m edth at all revenu es
projected
f rom a
rapidly ex panding
AMT wou ldf low into
govern-
m ent cof f ers.
Moreover,
as will alsobe discu ssedinm ore
depth
inth e
nex t
section,
th e 2001
legislation
inclu dedtwokinds of
provisions
th at servedtou nderstate its tru e costs:
"ph ase-
ins,"
or
delays
inth e
im plem entation
of
legislated
tax cu ts
u ntil later
years;
and
"su nsets,"
or tax
provisions
th at
ex pire
ona
given
date. Most tax cu ts f or
h igh er-incom e
earners,
f or
ex am ple,
were
ph ased
in
slowly, m u sh room ingonly
in
th e later
years.
More
notable,
th e entire
package
was slated
to
ex pire
at th e endof
2010,
with all tax es af f ected
by
th e
cu t
reverting
to th eir
pre-2001
levels. T h ese
provisions
h ave
im portant im plications
f or ou r
u nderstanding
of th e
political strategy
of tax -cu t advocates. For now, we
m erely
March 2005
1
Vol. 3/No. 1 43
Articles
I Abandoning
th e Middle
note th at
th ey
servedtoredu ce th e of f icial estim atedcost
of th e tax cu t.
T h e Wh ite Hou se also
ex ploited
oth er baseline
assu m p-
tions abou t tax es and
spending.
For
ex am ple,
wh ere th e
C B O was
legally com pelled
toassu m e th at
popu lar
cred-
its and
spending
initiatives,
su ch as th e investm ent tax
credit or f arm
su bsidies,
were slatedto
ex pire,
th e adm in-
istrationref rainedf rom
stating
th at it wou ldtake
contrary
action,
reaping
th ose
(h igh ly u nlikely) savings.
T h e con-
gressional bu dget
resolu tionalsof ailedtoinclu de f u nds
f or initiatives th e
president
declaredh e wou ld
su pport,
su ch as abroadMedicare
prescriptiondru g
benef it and
additional def ense
spending.
Andall th ese
h igh er
costs
carriedwith th em additional debt-service
paym ents.
All
told,
th ese distortions redu cedth e
apparent
cost of th e tax
cu t
by
am inim u m of 40
percent.62
T ax -cu t advocates f ou ndit
relatively easy
to
ex ploit
bu dgetary procedu res.
T h e sam e
m igh t
not h ave been
ex pected
with
regard
todistribu tional
analyses
of th e bill.
Af ter
all,
th e
Joint
C om m ittee onT ax ationandth e T rea-
su ry Departm ent's
Of f ice of T ax
Analysis
h ad
rou tinely
produ ced
ex cellent distribu tional
analyses
inth e
past.63
Moreover,
voters sh ou ldbe
qu ite
sensitive toinf orm ation
abou t th e distribu tional ef f ects of tax cu ts-th eir m ost
im m ediate and
tangible consequ ence,
andth e one m ost
obviou sly
relevant toth e
qu estion
of wh owins andwh o
loses.
Yet,
rem arkably, proponents
of th e tax cu t were
largely
able tocontrol th e
agenda
ondistribu tional issu es
as well.
As Su llivan
reports,
th e f ew distribu tional
analyses pro-
du ced
by C ongress
andth e
T reasu ry Departm ent
were
designed
toobscu re andm islead. T h e
Joint
T ax C om m it-
tee's estim ates of th e distribu tional
im pact
of th e 2001 tax
cu t,
f or
ex am ple,
went
only th rou gh
2006,
th u s
leaving
ou t m ost of th e
ph ased-in
benef its f or
h igh -incom e
tax -
payers.
It ex clu ded
ch anges
inth e estate tax
altogeth er.64
T h e
T reasu ry Departm ent departed
f rom
past procedu re
toex clu de
payroll
tax es f rom its estim ates of redu ctions in
tax liabilities at dif f erent incom e
levels,
th u s
overstating
th e
percentage
redu ctionin tax es received
by
lower-
incom e
tax payers,
f or wh om
payroll
tax es f or Social Secu -
rity
andMedicare are th e
largest
f ederal tax es
paid.
T aken
togeth er,
th ese
ch anges su ggested,
as Su llivanconclu ded,
th at "conservatives inth e ex ecu tive and
legislative
branch es
h ave been
qu ietly snu f f ing
th e lif e ou t of
analysis
th at
ex am ines tax bills' of th e
poor
relative toth e rich ."65
T ax cu tters alsoworkedh ardtocreate th e
im pression
th at th e tax cu t wou ldsh ower
h u ge
benef its onm edian-
incom e,
andevenlower-incom e,
tax payers.
Few of th e
ef f orts were as
transparently
f alse as B u sh 's statem ent du r-
ing
th e 2000
cam paign(repeatedagain,
in
sligh tly
altered
f orm ,
du ring
th e f inal
presidential
debate of th e 2004
race)
th at
"by
f ar th e vast
m ajority
of
m y
tax cu ts
go
to
th e bottom endof th e
spectru m ."66
Instead,
advocates
craf tedth eir
appeals
to
im ply-with ou t
ever
qu ite saying
ou trigh t-th at
th e tax cu ts wou ld lavish rewards on
m iddle-incom e Am ericans.
T h ey
insisted,
f or
ex am ple,
th at th e cu ts wou ld
h elp
"all
tax payers"-ignoring
th e
one-th irdor soof f am ilies th at
pay only payroll
tax es.
T h ey
also
consistently
conf latedth e
average
tax cu t with
th e
averagef am ilys
tax
cu t,
obscu ring
th e f act th at m iddle-
incom e f am ilies wou ld
get
m u ch less th anth e m ath em at-
ical
average,
becau se of th e
legislation's
tilt towardth e
wealth y. T h ey argu ed
th at
elim inating
th e $20
incom e-
tax bu rdenof a
f am ily
of f ou r
m aking
$26,000
was a
"100
percent
cu t in
tax es,"
even
th ou gh
th at $20
repre-
sentedless th an1
percent
of th e
f am ily's
overall tax bu r-
den. B u sh
repeatedly
citedth e
ex am ple
of awaitress with
twokids
earning
$22,000
a
year,
wh ose f ederal incom e
tax wou ldbe elim inated-a waitress wh o
likely
h adno
incom e tax
liability
in
any
case. T h is
langu age
was backed
u p by
a
range
of colorf u l m ediaevents at
wh ich ,
f or
ex am ple,
bu siness
lobbyists
donnedh ardh ats-to
appear
as wh at one leaked
congressional leadersh ip
m em ocalled
"real worker
types."67
At one
event,
a
reporter, im pressed
by
th e
large
nu m ber of
"average
f am ilies" th e Wh ite Hou se
h ad
presented,
askedwh o was th ere to
represent
th e
wealth y.
President B u sh assu redth e
reporter
th at h e
was.68
For all th e tax cu tters' creative ef f orts,
m ost voters cor-
rectly
believedth at th e
biggest benef iciary
of th e tax cu ts
wou ldbe th e rich .69 B u t th e
su ppression
of accu rate
gov-
ernm ent
analyses
andth e
relentlessly m isleadingpresen-
tation
probably
didlessenth e
im m ediacy
of voters' concern
abou t th e tax cu t's distribu tional ef f ects. Sotoo,
of
cou rse,
didth e invocationof th e
su rplu s
to
su ggest
th at
h u ge,
top-h eavy
tax cu ts were
sim ply
arebate f or an
"overch arge."
T h ou gh
we
disagree
with B artels's conclu sionth at th e 2001
tax cu t
enjoyed
broad
pu blic su pport,
we
agree
with h im
th at Am ericans
"largely
f ailedtoconnect
inequ ality
and
pu blic policy."70
B arrels, h owever,
appears
to sees th is
m ostly
as a
problem
of
cognitive
f ailu re. We believe th at it
ref lects
equ ally,
if not m ore so,
m anipu lation
of
pu blic
opinion.
B artels h as little to
say
abou t th e
political
con-
tex t of voters'
th inking.
Yet toth e ex tent th at th ere was a
disconnect inth e
pu blic
m ind,
it was one th at was
actively
nu rtu red
by political
elites. Indeed,
th e
system atic
cu lti-
vationof th is disconnect is evenm ore evident inth e sec-
ond
key
dim ensionof
m anipu lation:
th e
design
of th e
policy
itself .
Designing
th e T ax C u ts
For an
inqu isitive
tax
analyst dropped
toEarth f rom Mars
in
early
2001,
m any
f eatu res of th at
year's
tax
legislation
wou ldh ave been
pu zzling.
C onsider th e
f ollowing
th u m b-
nail sketch of th e tax treatm ent of estates. T h e 2001
leg-
islationdictatedincrem ental redu ctions inth e estate tax
between2002 and2009,
cu lm inating
intotal
repeal
in
2010. In2011, h owever, th e entire tax sch edu le th at was
44
Perspectives
onPolitics
inf orce bef ore B u sh cam e to
Figu re
1
of f ice is set to be restoredas Sh are of B u sh tax cu ts
th e law "su nsets." Pau l
Kru g-
2001-10
m an h as du bbed th is th e
70.0%
"th row m om m af rom th e train"
design:
If m om dies onDecem -
ber
30,
2010 h er h eirs will
pay
60.0%
noth ing.
If sh e dies two
days
later, th ey
will
pay
50 percent.71
T h at
politicians m anipu late
500%
toach ieve th eir ends is well rec-
ognized.
B u t
m anipu lationgoes
400%
well
beyond
"craf ted
talk";
it X
alsoinclu des th e
design
of
pol-
icies th em selves.72
Policy
y
30.0%
m anipu lation
h as twodistinct
pu rposes:
todistort initial
per-
ceptions
of
policies
inorder to 20.0%
-
increase th eir
appeal,
andto /
sh ape
th e f u tu re
political
land-
10.0%
/
scape
in
ways
th at f avor
policy
d
designers' long-term
interests.
Of
cou rse,
th e
long-term
0.0%
ef f ects of th e 2001 tax cu t are 2001 2002
u nknown. B u t even
now,
two
conclu sions are clear: central Sou rce: C itizens f or T ax Ju
f eatu res of th e
legislation
will
h ave a
great
and
lastingim pact
onth e contou rs of tax
politics,
andth eir inclu sioninth e
legislation
indicates th at
Repu blicans
believedth ere was a
good
ch ance th at th ese
provisions
wou ldm ove
policy
closer
toth eir ends. We consider th ree
m ajor ex am ples
of
policy
m anipu lation-ph ase-ins,
su nsets,
and"tim e bom bs." Each
distortedelem ents of th e tax -cu t debate in2001 and
pre-
conf igu red
th e
agenda
f or f u tu re debates in
ways h igh ly
f avorable to
Repu blicans'
aim s.
Ph ase-ins
T h e
ph ase-in
f eatu res of th e 2001 tax
cu t,
wh ich
delay
im plem entation
of
m any
of th e cu ts f or alm ost a
decade,
are notable in
part
becau se
th ey
reverse th e norm al
ex pec-
tationth at
politicians
f rontloadbenef its. T otake th e m ost
prom inent ex am ples,
th e
top
f ou r incom e tax rates will
be
gradu ally
redu ced,
with th e
largest
cu ts
com ing
af ter
2004. T h e contribu tionlim its f or IRAs will be increased
f rom
$2,000 to
$5,000,
againm ostly
af ter
2004,
and
index edtoinf lationin2008. T h e estate tax will be redu ced
by
a
percentage point
a
year starting
in
2003,
with all
bu t th e
biggest
estates
ex em pted
in
2009,
andth enelim -
inated
entirely
in2010-bu t
only
f or a
year,
if th e su nsets
rem ainin ef f ect. T h is u nu su al
pattern
canin
part
be
u nderstoodas a
way
of
redu cing
th e total cost of th e
tax cu t. Yet it alsoh as th e
im portant political
ef f ect of
creatingex pectations am ong(m ostly af f lu ent) constitu -
received
by top
1
percent
andbottom 80
percent,
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Year
istice 2002.
ents th at
th ey
wou ldreceive ever
greater
tax cu ts inth e
f u tu re.73
Indeed,
perh aps
th e m ost
striking
f eatu re of th e
ph ase-
ins is h ow
th ey
af f ect th e distribu tionof benef its across
incom e classes over tim e. Alm ost with ou t
ex ception,
th e
ph ased-in
tax cu ts are
designed
to benef it th e rich est
Am ericans. As a
resu lt,
th e
com paratively
evendistribu -
tionof tax breaks inth eir f irst f ew
years
belies th e skew
towardth e rich th at ch aracterizes th e
legislation
as awh ole.
T h is canbe seenin
f igu re
1,
wh ich sh ows th at th e sh are
of th e tax cu ts received
by
th e
top
1
percent
of Am eri-
cans balloons between2001 and
2010,
wh ile th e sh are
received
by
th e bottom 80
percent plu m m ets. Equ ally
revealing
is th e
proportion
of th e
projectedten-year
cost
of th e tax cu ts received
by
dif f erent incom e
grou ps
inth e
legislation's
f irst
year.
T h e lowest f if th of
Am ericans,
f or
ex am ple,
received85
percent
of th eir total
ten-year
tax
savings im m ediately,
wh ile th e secondf if th received72
percent
of th eir total
savings
andth e m iddle
f if th ,
68
percent. B y
contrast, abou t twoth irds of th e
ten-year
tax
cu ts f or th e
top
f if th were set to be distribu ted
af ter
2001,
a
f igu re
th at rises to 95
percent
f or th e rich est 1
percent
of Am ericans.74
T h e cartoonth at leads
L arry
B artels's article h u m or-
ou sly
m akes th e sam e
point.
Hom er
Sim pson
is anarch e-
typal
m iddle-class
Am erican, wh o does not
recognize
th at h e is
being
robbed.
Happily celebrating
h is
visible,
March 2005
i
Vol. 3/No. 1 45
Articles
I Abandoning
th e Middle
im m ediate,
bu t
relatively
m odest
benef its,
h e f ails to
see th e m u ch less
visible,
m u ch less
im m ediate,
bu t
m u ch m ore
generou s
rewards
reapedby
Mr. B u rns. T h e
very pecu liar
over-tim e f ea-
tu res of th e
legislation's design
m ake sense
only
if we take
seriou sly
dif f erences in
per-
ception
and
power-and pol-
iticians'
attem pts
to
ex ploit
th em .
Figu re
2
Nu m ber of AMT
tax payers,
2001-12
45
40
35
30
c 25
?
20
15
nl
Su nsets
Writing
in T ax
Notes,
two
B rookings
econom ists re-
cently
docu m entedth at th e
"2001 tax cu t
represented
a
dram atic
departu re"
f rom
past
tax -code
ch anges-one
th at h as
f u ndam entally
ch anged
th e
landscape
of f ed-
eral tax
policy.75
Until
2001,
m inor f eatu re of th e tax
code, a
ex tension
posed
a
qu ite
m inc
ch anged.
If ,
f or
ex am ple,
2002
ex tending
all th e
ex piringprov
by
th e 2001 tax bill
th rou gh
th e
wou ldcost
nearly
2
percent
of
cu t is takeninto
accou nt,
th e
percent
of GDP.
As
already
noted,
th is
polic)
m atedcost of th e tax cu ts.
Eqi
it m eans th at f u tu re
politicians
w
th ey
allow
already
enacted
pro'
ex pire, ex plicitly taking
f rom
(f i
tax payers
benef its th at
th ey
alre
ex tendth ese
provisions,
incu rri
revenu e andadditional debt si
provisions
of th e
2001, 2002,
sent? T h e scale of th e su nset
prc
edentednew set of f iscal
policy
L ike th e
ph ase-ins,
th e su ns?
th at arch itects of th e tax cu t were
term
political
ef f ects of th eir
F
reasonably predict
th at th e
press
will be
intense,
not least becau s
th e
big
tax
provisions
th at take ef
kick inwill be
u nu su ally
well
pc
h eard.76
T h ey
also
ex pect,
no
protect
th ese
provisions
will
pr
tion f or th e
wealth y
to bankrc
ef f orts inth e f u tu re. As T odL in(
Wash ington
T im es,
"T h e lesson
5
0
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Year
Sou rce:
B u rm an, Gale,
and
Roh aly 2003,
h ttp://www.tax policycenter.org/T ax Facts/
T FDB /T FT em plate.cf m ?Docid=
187.
su nsets were a
relatively
recordis th at wh at m atters is stru ctu ral
ch ange
and
polit-
ndth eir
(u su ally
rou tine)
ical
leverage
downth e line."77
)r cost. Af ter 2001 th at
! is u sedas th e base
year,
'isions
placed
inth e code T im e bom bs
e
ten-year bu dget
window Anoth er
design
f eatu re alsoreveals th e
signif icant capacity
GDP. Once th e 2003 tax of
caref u lly
craf ted
legislation
toset th e
political agenda
in
f igu re
rises to
nearly
2.5 years ah ead: tim e bom bs
prim ed
todetonate ina
politically
f avorable
way.
T h e
key ex am ple
of th is is th e law's
disposi-
y
design
redu ces th e esti- tionof th e Alternative Minim u m T ax . We h ave
already
noted
u ally im portant,
h owever,
h ow th e adm inistration's
projections
of th e f u tu re
su rplu s
rill
f ace a
qu andary:
sh ou ld f ailedtoinclu de th e
large
cost of
f ix ing
th e AMT . Yet
policy
visions of th e tax code to
designers
didnot
sim ply ignore
th e AMT in
2001;
as
f igu re
or th e m ost
part, wealth y)
2
sh ows,
th ey
m ade th e
problem
worse.
B y slash ing
th e
:ady enjoy,
or sh ou ld
th ey
incom e tax bu rdenof
h igh er-incom e
Am ericans,
th e 2001
ing
th e $4 trillioninlost tax cu t will cau se th e sh are of
tax payers f acing
th e AMT
ervice th at all th e su nset af ter 2004 to
ex plode.
Since
policy
m akers cou ldh ave f ix ed
and2003 tax cu ts
repre-
th e AMT
problem
in2001
(at
th e cost of oth er tax
cu ts),
)visions creates an
u nprec-
th is was a
policy
ch oice,
presu m ably
basedonth e reason-
ch allenges.
able
assu m ption
th at th is
policy
stru ctu re wou ld
com pel
:t
provisions
sh ow
clearly
f u tu re
politicians
toact as tax -cu t advocates wantedth em
e
th inking
abou t th e
long-
to.
Responding
toth is tim e
bom b,
as th e adm inistration
)olicy design.
T ax cu tters now
says
it
plans
to
do,
will
requ ire
anoth er
big
rou ndof
su re toex tendth e tax cu ts tax cu ts: th e cost of
ex tending
th e 2004 AMT
provisions
se well-of f benef iciaries of ju st
th rou gh
2013, f or
ex am ple,
is alm ost $800 billion.78
f f ect
ju st
bef ore th e su nsets T h e basic
story
is stark. On an
u nprecedented
scale,
oisedtom ake th eir voices
ph ase-ins, su nsets, andtim e-bom bs were u sedto
give
th e
dou bt,
th at th e needto 2001 tax cu ts th e m ost attractive
pu blic
f ace
possible
in
ovide a
powerf u l
m otiva- th e sh ort
ru n, wh ile
stru ctu ringpolitical agendas
f or th e
oll
Repu blican
reelection f u tu re. T h e
legislation
was loadedwith f eatu res th at m ake
dbergpu t
th e
point
inth e little sense as tax or econom ic
policy,
bu t trem endou s sense
of th e B u sh
tax -cu tting
f or
pu rposes
of
political m anipu lation.
46
Perspectives
onPolitics
Mainstream
sch olarsh ip
onAm erican
politics
h as little
to
say
abou t th ese
aspects
of
pu blic policy. Policy
is
u su ally
treatedas aresu lt of
pu blic pref erences,
m ediated
by
elec-
toral and
governing
institu tions. Politicians
responding
to
pu blic
sentim ent act and
perh aps
overreach . T h enth e
pu blic
reacts,
pu sh ing
th em back toward
equ ilibriu m .
In
th is
vision,
policy
is
plastic, resh aped
as th e tastes and
dem ands of th e m edianvoter evolve. Political
representa-
tion
operates
ina
self -correctingloop,
with th e
pref er-
ences of th e m edianvoter
serving
as th e central m otor.
T h e
designers
of th e 2001 tax cu t
clearly
didnot believe
th ey
livedinsu ch aworld.
Rou nding Up
th e Vote
For all th e
advantages Repu blicans enjoyed
in
2001,
inclu d-
ing
th eir control of th e Wh ite
Hou se,
th e
Senate,
andth e
Hou se,
th e
passage
of th e tax cu t in2001 was not assu red.
B u sh 's
standing
in
early
2001 was
h ardly
secu re,
nor h ad
th e 2000 electiondeliveredaclear verdict. Inth e
Senate,
Repu blicans em ergedh olding
th e slim m est of
m argins-
only
Vice-President
C h eney's
role as tie-breaker delivered
Repu blicans
control of th e 50-50 ch am ber. Onits
f ace,
th is was not an
au spiciou s
m om ent f or a
policy
adventu re
as
large
andcontroversial as B u sh 's tax -cu t
plan.
How, th en,
were
Repu blicans
able towinth eir
prize,
especially given
th e
pu blic's u nderlying
concerns? We h ave
already
reviewedth e m ainou tlines of ou r
argu m ent.
In
th is
section, h owever,
we consider th e basic
qu estions
of
h ow, andf rom
wh ere,
B u sh
got
th e votes to
pass
h is
plan
ina
closely
divided
C ongress.
B asedon th e
pivotal politics
f ram ework introdu ced
earlier,
th e
sim ple
answer to
wh y
th e tax cu t
passed
is
th at th e Wh ite Hou se
ch anged
h ands,
elim inating
th e
vetoth reat th at h adbeenex ercised
repeatedly du ring
th e
C linton
presidency.
Inth is
view,
a
congressional m ajority
in f avor of tax cu ts ex isted
prior
to
2001,
andB u sh 's
im pact
was f elt
solely
inth e rem oval of th e last obstacle
toth eir ach ievem ent.
T h ere is anelem ent of tru th toth is view. B u sh 's elec-
tionwas indeeda
prerequ isite
f or th e tax cu t's
passage.
B u t th at is not
m erely
becau se h is electionsh if tedth e
"pivot." T h e 2001
legislationrequ ires ex planationpre-
cisely
becau se it
represented
aradical
departu re
f rom th e
f iscal andtax
policies
establish edandm aintainedf or two
decades
prior
toits
passage,
as well as aclear contradiction
of basic
pu blic
sentim ents. As we h ave
sh own,
m ore was
neededto
engineer
su ch anof f -center reversal th ana
pres-
ident
u nwilling
towieldh is veto
pen.
One
th ing
th at was not
needed, h owever,
was 60 votes
in th e Senate-th e th ree-f if th s th resh oldth at m u st be
crossedtoovercom e af ilibu ster. Unlike m ost
m ajor policy
ref orm s,
tax cu ts cou ldbe
pu rsu edth rou gh
th e
bu dget
reconciliation
process,
wh ich is not
su bject
tof ilibu ster.
T h ere
was, h owever, acatch . T ou se th e reconciliation
process,
th e tax cu t was lim itedtoth e am ou nt
Repu bli-
cans were
willing
tof inance with inth eir
ten-year bu dget
resolu tion
ou tliningspending
andrevenu e
ch anges-an
am ou nt set at $1.38 trillionover ten
years.79 Essentially,
th en,
th e cost of
lowering
th e
necessary
Senate
m arginby
tenvotes was atax cu t sm all
enou gh
toensu re th e f iscal
integrity
of th e
agreed-u ponten-year bu dget-or
th e sem -
blance of it. B u t th e
price
was
paid,
andth e closeness of
m any
of th e
key
Senate votes in2001 sh ows th at th e tax
cu t wou ldnot h ave been
passed
oth erwise.
T h rou gh ou t
th e
legislative process,
th e
congressional
leadersh ip
u sedits considerable resou rces andskills tom ain-
taincontrol of th e
agenda
andf ram e th e issu e as one of
su pport
f or, or
opposition
to, tax cu ts, wh ile
diverting
attentionf rom th e tax cu t's enorm ou s costs. Inth e Hou se,
wh ere th e
m ajority party
wields m u ch
greater power
th an
inth e
Senate,
Repu blicans played
th eir
advantages
toth e
h ilt,
sending
individu al tax cu ts toth e f loor with ou t
pu b-
lic
testim ony,
with ou t
h avingyet passed
a
bu dget
resolu -
tion, andat tim es with ou t even
specif ying
th e details of
cu ts-all of wh ich m ade it
ex trem ely
dif f icu lt f or
oppo-
nents tof ocu s attentiononth e tax cu t's total costs.
Still, th e size of th e tax cu t cou ldnot be avoidedcom -
pletely
ina
string
of sh owdownvotes inth e Hou se and
Senate-over th e
bu dget
resolu tionth at
specif ied(very
rou gh ly)
h ow th e tax cu t wou ldbe
f inanced,
over each
body's
versionof th e tax
bill, and,
f inally,
over th e
legisla-
tionth at
u ltim ately em erged
f rom th e Hou se-Senate con-
f erence com m ittee. As th e m ainactors all
u nderstood, th e
cru cial vote was onth e
bu dget
resolu tion
itself , becau se it
opened
th e door toth e
f ilibu ster-proof
reconciliation
pro-
cess. Inth e Hou se,
passage
was assu red
by
th e
Repu bli-
cans' sm all bu t rock-solid
m ajority.
Inth e
Senate,
th e
balance of
power
was m u ch closer.
Alth ou gh
th e resolu -
tion
eventu ally passed,
it didso
only
af ter th e of f icial cost
of th e tax cu t over ten
years
h adbeenredu ced
by
$300
billionat th e insistence of several centrist Dem ocrats and
Repu blicans.
Giventh e
capacities
f or
designm anipu la-
tionwe h ave
discu ssed,
th is redu ction
proved
toh ave vir-
tu ally
noef f ect onth e overall cost of th e f inal bill. Rath er
th an
redu cing
th e nu m ber or size of individu al
cu ts,
th e
new
target
was m et
by delayingim plem entation
andadd-
ing
su nsets. As a
resu lt,
th e estim atedcost inth e tax cu t's
seconddecade
(th at is,
beyond
th e relevant h orizonof th e
bu dget
resolu tion)
was
u nch anged
f rom th e
original
B u sh
proposals.80
Wh enPresident B u sh
signed
th e tax
cu t,
h e credited
"bipartisanleadersh ip"
andth anked"th e m em bers of C on-
gress
inboth
parties
wh om ade
today possible."81
Yet Dem -
ocrats were alm ost
non-players
inth e
developm ent
of th e
tax cu t.
Having
lost
only
two
Repu blican
votes inth e
Senate,
th e adm inistrationandits allies needed
only
two
Dem ocrats to
su pport
its
proposal.
C onservative Dem o-
crat Zell
Miller,
of
Georgia,
h ad
signaled
h is
strongsu p-
port f or th e initiative f rom th e ou tset. T h e bill's
su pporters
March 2005
1
Vol. 3/No. 1 47
Articles
I Abandoning
th e Middle
th u s h adconsiderable
leverage
in
seeking
to
peel
of f
ju st
one additional vote f rom th e ranks of m oderate Dem ocrats.
In
ach ieving
th is,
Repu blicans
benef itedf rom th e sam e
tech niqu es
th at h ad
qu elledpotential pu blic
discontent.
Agenda
control th at
pu t
th e issu e of tradeof f s
ef f ectively
of f th e
table,
com binedwith
tech niqu es
to lower th e
perceived
size of th e tax cu ts andm ask its distribu tional
ef f ects,
increased
pressu re
onSenate Dem ocrats incon-
servative states to
su pport
th e
proposedlegislation.82
T h e
Dem ocratic
Party, by
contrast,
was
greatly
disadvan-
taged.
It lackedth e "f irst-m over
advantages"
th at com e
with
congressional agenda
control. It alsolackeda
prom -
inent, well-liked,
andcredible
spokesperson
to cou nter
President B u sh andth e
congressional leadersh ip.
With -
ou t a
f igu re
like President C linton to serve as a f ocal
point-and
aveto
point-Dem ocrats
were f orcedto
try
to
h igh ligh t
th e
com plex
distribu tional andf iscal ef f ects
of th e
legislation
onvoters.
Mu ch ink h as been
spilledtrying
to
f igu re
ou t
wh y
a
h andf u l of Dem ocrats crossed
party
lines to
su pport
th e
tax cu ts in2001. T h e stories are
captivating,
bu t
th ey
m iss th e
bigger qu estion
raised
by
th e
near-u nanim ity
of
Repu blicansu pport
andth e weakness of th e "electoral
connection": How did
Repu blicans
lim it th e
potential
f or def ections
by congressional
m oderates and
m itigate
th e
possibility
of f u tu re electoral risks if Am ericans becam e
f u lly
aware of th e
legislation's
ch aracteristics andef f ects?83
T h is is th e
qu estion
we h ave
sou gh t
toanswer h ere. We
h ave identif iedth e
increasing
incentives f or
politicians
to
appeal
toth eir base,
andth eir
growingcapacity,
onsom e
issu es,
todosoat dim inish edrisk. We h ave sh ownh ow
th e
Repu blicanleadersh ip m anipu lated
th e
f ram ing
and
presentation
of th e tax cu t tof orestall activationof latent
pu blic
sentim ent
against
th e
cu t,
wh ich
m igh t
intu rn
h ave
prom ptedgreater
resistance
am ong
m oderates. And
we h ave dem onstratedth at th e
legislation
was
designed
to m inim ize th e
apparent
size of th e cu t andconf u se
voters abou t its distribu tion.
Once
legislation
becam e inevitable,
andth e f inal vote
was f ram edas "tax cu ts:
yea
or
nay,"
asm all bu t nontrivial
f ractionof Dem ocratic m em bers
(28
of 212 inth e Hou se
and11 of 50 inth e
Senate)
votedinf avor. More
im por-
tant, h owever,
was th e beh avior of
Repu blican
m oderates.
Virtu ally
with ou t
ex ception, th ey provedwilling
toendorse
legislation
th at was
rem arkably
distant f rom th e
policy
pref erences
of m ost voters. As we h ave
argu ed,
th ese
leg-
islators f aced
strong
incentives to
swing
toth e
righ t.
C h al-
lenging
th e
president
ontax cu ts wou ldh ave m eant
risking
th e wrath of th e
leadersh ip
and
key
constitu encies inth e
Repu blican
base. Most
om inou sly,
it raisedth e
specter
of
a
prim ary ch allenge.
B u t,
cru cially,
th ese
legislators
cou ld
only
race towardth eir conservative base if
th ey
believed
th eir
leadersh ip
h ad
m itigated
th e
prospect
th at voters
wou ldsou r onth e tax cu ts. It was su ccess onth is critical
score-th e
ability
of th e
Repu blicanleadersh ip
andB u sh
adm inistrationto
give
th e tax cu t as m oderate af ace as
possible-th at
was at th e h eart of th e tax cu tters'
victory.
L essons L earned? T h e 2003 and
2004 T ax C u ts
One cou ld
object
th at th is is
ju st
one
piece
of
legislation,
albeit an
im portant
one. Politicians
occasionally
overreach
or m ake
errors,
bu t th e reactionof th e
pu blic brings
th em
back inline. Politicians m u st
learn,
painf u lly,
f rom th eir
m istakes,
andth e ironic resu lt of su ch
episodes
of over-
reach is toreinf orce th e
h egem ony
of th e m edianvoter.
T h is is a
plau sible
and
reassu ring
line of
reasoning.
It is
alsom istaken. For wh ile
Repu blicans
didindeedlearn
f rom th e
ex perience
of th e 2001 tax
cu ts,
th e lessons were
not
painf u l
ones. If th e tax cu ts enactedtwo
years
later are
any
indication,
Repu blicans
h adbecom e evenm ore con-
f ident abou t th eir
capacity
tom ake
f orays
f ar af ieldf rom
th e m edianvoter.
All th e
political dynam ics
on
display
in2001 were even
m ore evident in
2003,
an
especially striking
resu lt
given
th e new
backdrop
of
large projectedbu dget
def icits rath er
th an
su rplu ses.
If th ere h adbeenlittle
popu lar
dem and
f or tax redu ctions in
2001,
th ere was evenless in2003. As
in
2001,
th e benef its of th e 2003 tax redu ctions were
skewedtowardth e
wealth y.
Once
again,
benef its f or th ose
with
average
incom es were
f ront-loaded,
wh ile th e m u ch
larger savings
f or th e
wealth y
were back-loaded. Once
again,
m iddle-class Am ericans receivedch ecks with inweeks. T h ere
was one
big
dif f erence: L ess af f lu ent Am ericans received
nonew benef its in2003-th eir ch ecks ref lectedth e accel-
erationof cu ts
already
sch edu ledtotake
place.
T h e new
policies
in2003 were aim edat th e well-to-do.
T h e
strategies
u sedtom ask th e tru e size of th e tax cu t
in2001
reappeared
in2003. As
C ongress
took
u p
th e
president's proposals,
m oderate
Repu blicans
inth e Senate
indicatedth at th eir concernwith f iscal
propriety
wou ld
not allow th em to vote f or th e
president's
$700 billion
proposal. T h ey
com m ittedth em selves to a
"ceiling"
of
$350 billion. T h e
leadersh ip responded
toth is
ch allenge
with a
legislative design
th at
em ployed
su nsets evenm ore
aggressively
th anin2001. T h e resu lt was atax cu t adver-
tisedat $350 billion, bu t wh ich wou ldcost anadditional
$736 billionif its
provisions
were ex tended
th rou gh
2013.
Du ring
th e debate over th e tax
cu t,
Hou se
Majority
L eader
T om
DeL ay
belittledeventh e of f icial estim ates of revenu e
loss: "T h e nu m ber ... is
m eaningless."
Af ter th e 2003
legislationpassed,
Senate
Repu blican
leaders
gath ered
at a
press
conf erence to celebrate
passage
of acu t th at was
f orm ally
f ar sm aller th anth e one
th ey
h ad
originally sou gh t,
bu t
anticipated
tocost f ar m ore. Wh ena
reporter skepti-
cally inqu ired
as towh eth er th e tax cu t
ju st passed
was
"sm oke andm irrors"
designed
to m ake a
large
tax cu t
sm aller,
Senator
George
Allen,
of
Virginia,
said,
"I
h ope
so." All th e senators
lau gh ed.84
48
Perspectives
onPolitics
T h e ef f ectiveness of th is
strategy
is
already
evident. In
2004,
despite
adef icit of alm ost h alf atrillion
dollars,
provisions
of th e 2001 bill sch edu ledto
ex pire
were instead
ex tended,
by
votes of 339-65 inth e Hou se and92-3 in
th e Senate. It is not coincidental th at th e
provisions
of th e
2001 and2003 cu ts least skewedtowardth e rich were set
to
ex pire righ t
bef ore th e
h otly
contestedelection. Nor is
it
su rprising
th at
Repu blicans
still
m anaged
to inclu de
new tax breaks f or
h igh er-incom e grou ps
inth e
legisla-
tion. T h ese
developm ents su ggest
th at
Repu blicans
h ave
u nderm inedth e
previou s
tax
policy equ ilibriu m .
Indeed,
wh enth e 2004
legislation
was u nder
consideration,
th e
tax cu ts of th e f irst B u sh term h ad
h elped
redu ce
personal
and
corporate
incom e tax revenu es toth eir lowest level as
ash are of GDP since
1942,
andtoth eir lowest level as a
sh are of all f ederal tax es since 1941.85
C onclu sion:
Power, Pref erences,
and
Pu blic
Policy
T h e issu es at stake inth e tax -cu t debates of 2001 and
2003 were of th e
h igh est im port,
andwh owonandwh o
lost canbe establish edwith u nu su al
clarity.
For th ese rea-
sons,
th e
politics
of tax cu ts sh ines a
brigh t ligh t
onth e
f u ndam ental
qu estion
of wh o
governs.
For th ose com m ittedtocore
principles
of dem ocratic
governance,
th e
pictu re
th at
em erges
is
u nsettling.
On
th e central
qu estions
of h ow
large
th e tax cu t sh ou ldbe
andh ow its benef its sh ou ldbe
distribu ted,
th e
pref er-
ences of
ordinary
voters
appear
toh ave been
system ati-
cally ignored.
Far f rom
ru ling
th e
polity,
voters
proved
vu lnerable toex tensive
m anipu lation.
Sh eltered
by
th ese
ef f orts,
policy
m akers rewardedasm all
m inority
of
priv-
ileged
citizens.
Ina
powerf u l m etaph or
th at
aptly captu res
th e central
visionof th e new
plu ralism ,
Stim sonandh is
colleagu es
describe th e
contem porary legislators
as "keento
pick u p
th e f aintest
signals
inth eir
political
environm ent. L ike
an
antelope
inan
open
f ield,
th ey
cock th eir ears and
f ocu s th eir f u ll attentionon th e
sligh test sign
of dan-
ger."86
We h ave little
qu arrel
with th is
depiction.
Wh ere
th e new
plu ralism goes wrong
is in
treating
one
particu -
lar
anim al,
th e
ordinary
voter,
as th e m ost f orm idable of
predators. C ontem porary
Am erican
politics su ggests
th at
politicians'
f ears,
and th eir
f avors,
are of ten directed
elsewh ere.
A
wag
once
paraph rased
L incoln
by saying
"You can
f ool som e of th e
people
all of th e
tim e, andall of th e
people
som e of th e tim e-and if
you
th ink abou t
it,
th ose
are
pretty good
odds." T h e new
plu ralism vastly
u nder-
states th e
ch allenges
th at
ordinary
citizens f ace inh arness-
ing governm ent
to th eir own
pu rposes. Agenda-setting
powers
canbe u sedtof ram e discu ssions in
ways
th at
ex ploit
th e bou ndednatu re of h u m an
rationality. Policy designs
canbe u sedto direct distinct
signals
todif f erent
target
popu lations.
V.
O. Key
was
righ t
to
say
th at voters are not
f ools,
bu t incertain
settings,
oncertain
issu es,
m any
of
th em canbe f ooled.
Voters are not
powerless,
bu t th eir
capacity
to m ake
politicians respond
toth eir desires varies
greatly
over tim e
andindif f erent contex ts. T h ere are
f ascinatingqu estions,
wh ich we cannot
ex plore
h ere,
abou t th e
im plications
of
ou r
argu m ent
f or oth er
contem porary
dem ocracies and
oth er
periods
inAm erican
political developm ent.
Ou r
analy-
sis does
point
toanu m ber of recent
ch anges
inth e Am er-
ican
polity
th at h ave u ndercu t
responsiveness.
We h ave
su ggested
th at th e benef its of
appealing
toth e
h igh ly
m obi-
lizedbu t ex trem e elem ents of th e
political spectru m ,
as
well as toth e
well-h eeled,
h ave increased
m arkedly.
We
h ave also
su ggested
anincrease inth e
capacity
of
political
elites tou se
agenda
control,
policy presentation,
and
leg-
islation
design
tom inim ize
pu blic
backlash
against poli-
cies th at cater toth e base.
Yet evenin
today's political system
not all m atters lend
th em selves toth e
dynam ic
we h ave u nearth edinth is case.
Not all issu es m ake voters'
eyes glaze
over inth e
way
th at
details of tax
policy
do. Onm atters su ch as abortionor
th e
environm ent,
ex trem e
policy
initiatives ru n
u p against
opposition
th at is
knowledge-rich ,
well
organized,
and
poised
toreact.
With
respect
toeconom ic andclass
issu es, h owever,
th e
situ ationis dif f erent. As th e
passage
of th e 2001 tax cu t
starkly displays,
it is h ere th at th e
political
resou rces th at
voters needtoensu re
responsiveness
h ave erodedth e m ost.
T h e decline of u nions and
locally
rootedDem ocratic
Party
organizations, cou pled
with
widespread
disillu sionm ent
abou t th e
political process,
h as lef t lower- andm iddle-
incom e citizens
dependent
onth e m ediaandarace-h orse-
obsesseddiscou rse sh ornof m u ch content. It is now
possible
f or
policy
m akers toventu re f ar f rom th e
average
voter on
im portant
m atters. B u t th ere is
noth ing
random abou t
th e kinds of adventu res th at are
possible,
th e
types
of
voters m ost
likely
to
benef it,
or th e citizens m ost
likely
to
pay
th e
price.
Notes
1
Orszag
2001.
2 C itizens f or T ax
Ju stice
2002.
3 Greenstein,
Kogan,
andFriedm an2003.
4 Gale and
Orszag
2003.
5
According
toth e March Social
Secu rity
T ru stees'
Report,
th e Social
Secu rity
sh ortf all
equ als
0.72
per-
cent of GDP over th e nex t 75
years.
Ibid., 1553.
6
Gale,
Orszag,
and
Sh apiro
2004,
2.
7 Dah l
1961,
1.
8 B artels
(2005)
su ggests
th at th e wh ole
em ph asis
on
th e
congru ence
between
pu blic opinion
and
policy
ou t-
pu ts
rests ona"conf u sed"
conception
of dem o-
cratic
th eory.
We are not su re h ow tosqu are th is
March 2005
1
Vol. 3/No. 1 49
Articles
I Abandoning
th e Middle
critiqu e
with h is ownrecent work
(B artels 2002)
on
th e relative
responsiveness
of senators tocitizens
at dif f erent
points
onth e incom e
spectru m ,
wh ich
looks at th e
correspondence
between
pu blic opinion
andsenators' roll-call votes ona
range
of
policy
issu es. B u t evenif B artels's dism issal is
warranted,
th e
standardof
responsiveness
we evalu ate (andf ind
wanting)
rem ains a
m ainstay
of work on
opinion, pu b-
lic
policy,
andth e
relationsh ip
betweenvoters and
electedof f icials. We sh are som e of th e
u nderlying
con-
cerns abou t
f ram ing
ef f ects andth e
m u ltiple
dim en-
sions of issu es th at leadB artels todism iss th e
notionof m ass
pref erences
as
m isgu ided
(B artels
2003).
B u t we
part com pany
intwo
respects.
First,
we m aintainth at
popu lar pref erences
ontax ationare
discernible. Indeed,
inth e case of tax es andbu d-
gets, su rvey
research ers
possess
th e
capacity
toask vot-
ers to
ex press
th eir views abou t
trade-of f s,
wh ich
dim inish es th e
problem s
of inconsistent andnonex is-
tent
opinion
th at B artels
righ tly em ph asizes.
Sec-
ond,
if su ch
f ram ing
ef f ects indeed
powerf u lly
inf lu ence
opinion-a proposition
with wh ich we are inf u ll
accord-th at
su ggests
all th e m ore
strongly
th e lim -
its of stu dies th at evalu ate
"opinions"
or "atti-
tu des" abou t
policies
with ou t
any attem pt
toconsider
elite ef f orts totake
advantage
of citizens'
cognitive
vu lnerabilities.
9 On
f ram ing
and
persu asion,
see
Jacobs
and
Sh apiro
2000.
10 For am ore detailed
su rvey
and
analysis
of th e Old
andNew
Plu ralism ,
see Pierson2001.
11
C am pbell
et al.
1960;
C onverse 1964.
12 Dah l 1961. For acritical review of
plu ralist th ou gh t,
see L u kes 1974.
13 L indblom
1977;
Olson1965.
14
Key
works inclu de
C h ong
2000;
Ferejoh n
andKu -
klinski
1990;
Iyengar
1990;
L u pia
andMcC u bbins
1998; MacKu en, Erikson,
andStim son2002;
Page
and
Sh apiro
1992; Sniderm an,
B rody,
andT et-
lock 1991.
15 Sniderm an,
B rody,
andT etlock 1991,
12. See also
C h ong
2000;
Ferejoh n
andKu klinski
1990;
L u pia,
McC u bbins,
and
Popkin,
2000.
16
Iyengar
1990,
160.
17 T h e sem inal
analysis
is Downs 1957. Reviews of th e
m edian-voter f ram ework andits
application
inclu de
Greenand
Sh apiro
1994;
Sh epsle
andB onch eck
1997.
18
B rady
andVolden1998;
Kreh biel 1998.
19 MacKu en, Erikson,
andStim son2002; Stim son,
MacKu en,
andErikson1995.
20
MacKu en, Erikson,
andStim son2002, 7.
21
Ibid., 316.
22
Ibid., 374.
23 Arnold1990.
24 Pierson
1994;
Weaver 1986.
25 Arnold
1990;
C oh en
1997; Jacobs
and
Sh apiro
2000.
26 Arnold
1990, 15.
27 C onverse
1990, 373-74.
28 Rosenstone andHansen
1993, 248.
29 National Pu blic Radio/Kaiser
Fam ily
Fou ndation/
Kennedy
Sch ool of Governm ent 2003.
30 B artels
2005, 16, 21.
31
Kru gm an
2003;
Sh apiro
and
B irney
2004.
32 Hansen
1998, 514.
33 T h ese
su rvey f indings
were obtainedf rom th e
f ollowing
sou rces: B owm an
2004; NationalJou rnal's
Poll T rack
(h ttp://nationaljou rnal.com );
and
PollingReport.com (h ttp://www.pollingreport.com ).
34 B owm an
2004,
10.
35
Nagou rney
andElder
2004,
Al.
36 B artels 2005.
37
C NN/Gallu p/
USA
T oday,
su rvey
of March
9-11,
2001, retrievedf rom
NationalJou rnal
Poll T rack
database
(h ttp://nationaljou rnal.com ).
38 AB C News/
Wash ington
Post,
su rvey
of
Septem ber
6-9, 2001,
retrievedf rom iPOL L
Databank,
Roper
C enter f or Pu blic
Opinion
Research ,
University
of C onnecticu t
(h ttp://www.ropercenter.u conn.edu /
ipoll.h tm l).
39 Investors B u siness
Daily/C h ristian
Science Monitor,
su rvey
of
Au gu st
6-10, 2004,
retrievedf rom
National
Jou rnal
Poll T rack database
(h ttp://
nationaljou rnal.com ).
40 NB C News/ Wall Street
Jou rnal,
su rvey
of March
6-8, 2004,
retrievedf rom
NationalJou rnal
Poll
T rack database
(h ttp://nationaljou rnal.com ).
41 Su skind2004.
42 Davis 2004.
43 B ai 2003,
24.
44
C arey
2002, 3128.
45 See Am ericans f or T ax Ref orm 1986.
46 Fenno1977, 887.
47 T h eriau lt 2004.
48
McC arty,
Poole,
andRosenth al 1997.
49 Stonecash andMilstein2001.
B y way
of
illu stration,
th e f irst tax bill
th ey
consider, th e 1950 Revenu e
Act,
passed
with th e
su pport
of 98
percent
of Dem o-
crats and99
percent
of
Repu blicans.
T h e
last,
a
series of
Repu blican
tax cu t bills
eventu ally
vetoed
by
President C lintonin
2000,
gainedsu pport
f rom
100
percent
of
Repu blicans
and
ju st
28
percent
of Dem ocrats. Inth e
1990s, indeed,
th e
average gap
betweenth e
parties
inlevels of
su pport
was alm ost
80
percentage points.
50
Skocpol
2003.
51 B u rden2004.
52 Ansolabeh ere,
Snyder,
andStewart 2001.
53 Ibid.,
141.
50
Perspectives
onPolitics
54 Onth e
dif f icu lties,
see
especially
Fiorina2001. If
pol-
iticians m ove towardth e base becau se of its
growing
role in
reelection,
th enth e actions of
party
leaders
m igh t
be seenas
sim ply enabling
th is sh if t. B u t if
party
leaders are active in
strength ening
th at base
and
h elping
it
bringpressu re
onrank-and-f ile m em -
bers,
th enth ose leaders are
playing
anenf orce-
m ent role as well.
55 Sch attsch neider
1960,
68.
56
B rady
andVolden
1998;
Kreh biel 1998.
57 Van
Hou weling
2003.
58 B u t see Arnold1990.
59 Jacobs and
Sh apiro
2000.
60 Su llivan2003, 1872.
61
C ongressional B u dget
Of f ice 2001. See
especially
th e discu ssionof "baseline
concept" ch ap.
1, 5-7
(h ttp://www.cbo.gov/sh owdoc.cf m ?index =2727&
sequ ence
=2).
62
Greenstein,
Kogan,
andFriedm an2003.
63 Su llivan2003, 1869.
64
Ibid., 1871.
65 Ibid., 1873.
66 B u sh
2000;
FactC h eck.org
2004.
67
Eilperin
and
Morgan
2001.
68 Wh ite Hou se 2001 a.
69 See B owm an2004.
70 B artels
2005, 15.
71
Kru gm an
2001.
72 Jacobs and
Sh apiro
2000.
73 As
Sh apiro
and
B irney
(2004) note,
th e decisionto
go
f or
gradu al-abolition-with -su nsets,
rath er th an
th e considerable increase inth e th resh oldf or th e
estate tax
proposedby
Dem ocrats,
was a
design
th at alsobenef iteda
tiny segm ent
of th e estate tax
coalition-essentially
th e
su perrich .
Inoth er
words,
even
am ong
th e rich est 2
percent
of
Am ericans,
th e interests of th e
m any
were sacrif icedtoth e con-
cerns of th e m ost
privileged.
74 C itizens f or T ax
Ju stice
2002.
75 Gale and
Orszag
2003.
76 Inth is belief
th ey
are backed
u p by
recent stu dies of wel-
f are state
retrench m ent,
wh ich sh ow h ow dif f icu lt it
is totake benef its
away
f rom citizens once
th ey
start
receiving
th em . Hacker
2002;
Pierson
1994;
Weaver 1986.
77
L indberg
2003, A17.
78 B u rm an, Gale,
and
Roh aly
2003.
79 T h e needto
stay
with inth e overall
bu dget
ou tline was not th e
only
constraint
im posedby
th e
reconciliation
process.
Prom inent
Repu blicans
h ave
argu ed
th at th e su nsets inth e 2001
legislation
were anu navoidable
response
toth e so-called
B yrd
Ru le. One
provision
of th e
B yrd
Ru le
requ ires
th at all
spending
andrevenu e
ch anges beyond
th e
period
of tim e covered
by
th e
bu dget-in
th is case
ten
years-be f u lly
f u nded; oth erwise,
th ey
are
vu lnerable toaSenate f ilibu ster. Yet th e
B yrd
Ru le
does not
f u lly ex plain
th e
Repu blicans' aggressive
u se of su nsets. First,
Repu blicans
cou ldh ave
speci-
f ied
of f settingreceipts
tof u ndth e tax cu ts.
T h ey
did
not,
as we h ave
argu ed,
becau se
ou tlining
th e
necessary
trade-of f s wou ldh ave m ade th em
wildly
u npopu lar.
Second,
th ey
cou ldh ave riskeda
f ilibu ster.
T h ey
didnot,
as we h ave
argu ed,
becau se
th ey
didnot h ave su f f icient
su pport
toovercom e
one.
T h ird,
th e
B yrd
Ru le does not
ex plainwh y
th e su nsets took ef f ect in
2010,
th e
year
bef ore th e
close of th e
ten-year bu dget
window
(2011).
T h at
provision
can
only
be
ex plained
with ref erence to
Repu blicans'
ef f orts-revealedina
variety
of
design
ch oices inadditiontoth e su nsets-to
disgu ise
th e
tru e size anddistribu tionof th e tax cu ts.
Finally,
th e
B yrd
Ru le cannot
ex plain
th e oth er
pecu liar
f eatu res of th e tax cu ts we h ave
h igh ligh ted.
On
th e
B yrd
Ru le andth e
su nsets,
see Gale and
Orszag
2003.
80
Friedm an,
Kogan,
andGreenstein2001.
81 Wh ite Hou se 200 b.
82 For a
goodanalysis, f ocu sing
onth e estate
tax ,
wh ich
em ph asizes
th e Dem ocrats' tactical errors m ore th an
th eir
strategic disadvantages,
see
Sh apiro
andB ir-
ney
2004.
83
Mayh ew
1974.
84
Inskeep
2003.
85 Of f ice of
Managem ent
and
B u dget
2004. Dataat
h ttp://www.gpoaccess.gov/u sbu dget/f y05/sh eets/
h ist02z3.x ls and
h ttp://www.gpoaccess.gov/u sbu dget/
f y05/sh eets/h ist02z2.x ls
86
Stim son, MacKu en,
andErikson1995.
Ref erences
Am ericans f or T ax Ref orm . 1986.
Qu estions
andanswers
abou t th e National
T ax payer
Protection
Pledge. h ttp://
www.atr.org/nationalpledge/index .h tm l.
Ansolabeh ere,
Steph en, Jam es
M.
Snyder
Jr.,
andC h arles
Stewart III. 2001. C andidate
positioning
inU.S.
Hou se elections. Am erican
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