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CONTENTS
About the Contributors
Preface
PART 1 INTRODUCTION
1. Elaborating the "New Institutionalism"
JAMES G. MARCH & JOHAN P. OLSEN
PART Il APPROACHES
2. Rational Choice Institutionalism
KENNETH A. SHEPSLE
3. Historical Institutionalism
ELIZABETH SANDERS
4. Constructvst Institutionalism
COLIN HAy
5. Network Institutionalism
CHRISTOPHER ANSELL
6. OId Institutionalisms
R. A.W. RHODES
PART III INSTITUTIONS
7. The State and State-build.ing
BaH JESSOP
8. Development of Civil Society
Iose HARRIS
ix
xii
3
23
39
56
75
90
In
'3'
I
CHAPTER 4
CONSTRUCTIVIST
INSTITUTIONALISM
COLIN HAY
The proliferation o new institutionalist scholarahip has, perhaps unremarkably,
led to a corresponding proliferation in the adjectives used to characterize its
variante ', In G. March and Johan P. Olsen spoke quite eornfortably of
the new lnsttutlonalism in the singular. By 1996Peter A. Hall and RosemaryTaylor
eventually settled on three new nstitutionalisms (having toyed, in earlier iteraons
o the same now classc artiele, with four). And by 1998B. Guy Perers dentifiedno
Iess than new institutionallsms. Yet none ofthese authors made any reference
to construcnvtsm, far less to a distinctive constructvst varent of institutionalism
in its own right.t Indeed, until very recently, there has been very little [f any
reference to what is now variously described as an idearional, discursive oc as
here, constructivistinstitutionalism. This is for three very good reasons-c-construct-
is by far the most recent addition to the family of
institutinnalisms, rt ames out of an engagement with the limitations of the others,
and, as a consequence and in contrast the others, it is still very much in its
I aro !o Mark Blyth and to the edlters for encouragng and perceptive comments en
earller of thlS chapter,Alas,I must bcar scle rcsponsibility for the errors of substana: and
mterprcratlon.
1 .The first publlshed refercnres that I can dlscem to a di.scursiveandfor ideational institutionalism
are ID CampbeU. and Ove K. Pedersen's (2001) cditcd collection en The RiseofNeoliberalism
and InstltutlOllal Anal)'l'lS.
CONSTRUCTIVIST INSTITUTIONALISM 57
- -_.-----
inception. It s, nonetheless, already highly distinctive (ontologically, analytically,
and methodological1y), and it poses a series of challenges to extant institutional-
Isms (see also Abdelal, Blyth, and Parsons 2006; Schmidt 2006).
My aim in this briefchapter is quite slmple-e-to summarize the distinctiveness of
constructivist institutionalism and to identify the nature of the challenge that it
poses. The chapter proceeds in three sections. In the frst, 1 consider the origins
of constructivist institutionalism in an attempt to grapple with the limits of
pre-ex:isting institutionalist scholarship to deal with post-fonnative institutional
change, particularly that associated with disequilibrium dynamics. In the second,
1 consider the ontological and analytical dstnctveness of constructivist institu-
tionalism's tum to ideas and the associated nature of the challenge its poses to
existing neoinstitutionalist perspectives. In the thrd and conduding section,
1 consider the contribution to tbe analysis of complex institutional change tbat
constructivist institutionalism has thus far made,
1 FROM HISTORICAL TO CONSTRUCTIVIST
INSTITUTIONALISM
........................................- .
Constructivist [nstitutionalism, as 1 will label it, has its origins in attempts to
grapple with questions of complex [nstitutonal change-initially from within
the confines of existing neoinstitutionalist scholarship (see also Schmidt 2006).2
In thls respecr, rational choice and nonnative/sociological institutionalism proved
most obviously limiting (see Table 4.1). The reason was simple. Constructivist
institutionalists were motivated by rhe desire to capture, describe, and interrogate
1prefer the tenn constructlvst institutionalism to eith<:rideational or dscurslve institutionalism
since tae fonner mples a distinet onrology roch as migbt credibly infonn a distinctive approach to
institutional anaiysis. TItis would seem consstent with Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C. R. Tavlcr's
(l996) rcfereuce ro rational choice institutionalism, sociological institutionalism, and hstorral
institutlenalism, cach ofwhich mght lay claim to a distinctive ontology (or, in the case of htstorcal
instituticnalism, perhaps, a combination of entologes). TItis is a point to which we return. On the
ontological djferences betwceu Ihese four new institutionalisms, sce Figure 4-1. One of the implica-
tions oflabeling [nstitutionalisms in terms oftheir ontolcgcai assumptions is thet network instltu-
tionalism (see Chapter 5) is not furthcr diSCU5Scd in this chapter, slnce it is not characterizcd by its
distinct outology so much as by its empirical concerns. Al this point, it is perhaps aIso important to
note that the term sociological institutionalism is by no means a1ways enthusiasticaUy embraced
by those to whom it is intended to refer. In what fcllows I will, then, depart slightly (rom Hall and
Taylor's terminology by referring lO normativelsociologica1 institutionalism where they reer ro
sociological institutionalism.
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60
institutional dsequilibrium: As such, rational choice and normative/sociological
institutionalism, which rely albeit for rather different reasons 00 the assumption of
were theoretical non-starters.e Unremarkably, then, and by a process
of eliminaton, most routes to constructivist institutionalsm can trace their origins
to historicaI institutionalism {see, for instance, Berman 1998; Blyth 2002; Campbell
2001, 2004; Hay 2001, 2002; McNamara 1998; Schmidt 2002).
Yet if historical institutionalism has typically served as an initial source of
inspiration for constructivist institutionalists, it has increasingly become a source
of frustration and a point of departure. Por, whilst ostensibly concerned with
"procese tracing" and hence with questions of institutional change over time.
institutionalism has tended to be characterized by an emphasis upon
nstitutlonal gnesis et the expense of an adequate account of post-formative
insttutonal change." Moreover, in so far as post-fonnative institutonal dynamics
have been consdered (for instance Hall 1993; Hall and Soskice 2001; Pierson 1994),
they tend either to be seen as a consequence of path dependent lock-n effects or,
where more ruptura! in nature, as the product ofexogenous shocks such as wars or
revolutions (Hay and wncon 1998). Hetorcal institutionalism, it seems, is Incap-
able of offering its own (Le. endogenous) account of the determinants of the
"punctuated equilibria" (Krasner 1984) to which it invariably points. This, at
least, is the charge of many constructivist institutionaUsts (see, for instance, Blyth
2002, 19-23; Hay 2001, 194-5).
If one follows Peter A Hall and Rosemary C. R. Taylor (1996) in seeing historical
instltutionalism as animated by actors displaying a combination of "calculus" and
. ';nmugh hal'dly the work ofRobert H. Bates el al. (19911) is particularly interesting
m. this rega;d. Operntl.ng from rational choice institutionalist perspective, yet concemed
W11b questmns soca! an.d P?htl.cal conditions of disequilibrium which they freel
y
conce.de Ib.at chOIce LS poorly to deal with (1998, ;123), tbey
un'p0rt from. constructvst research In developing a more dynamic but still
choice modeL whsr the resulting synthess can certainly be challeuged
m temu; of lIS mtema! consLStency--ootologicaUy and epistemologically_it do
es
lend further
credence lo Ibe notion Ibal constructivlst insighlS have much to offer an analysis of institutional
change under disequilibrum conditious (for a aitical cornmentary see also Hay 200411, 57-9).
. speaking normativefsociological iustitutionalism does not so much assume as predict
For lbe "Iogics ?fappropriateness" lbat conslitute ilSprincipal analytical focus and that
tt discerns :md W1th institutioua!iaation are lbem.selves seen aS equilibrating.
key pomt, however, IS like rauonal choice institutionalism, it does not offer (nor, inde<:d,
claun to olTer) much analytLcal purchase ou lbe question of institutional dynarnism in contexts of
disequilibrium.
" this is. it se:ms have inherited from lbe attempt to lbe state
back mto (North Amencan) political soence m the 1980sout ofwhich it evolved (see. for instance,
et al. For, in the fom;-er's empha.ss, in particular, upon lbe institntional and organiza_
capacty to .wageW3r effectivelyupon lbe proces:; of state fOrmation, il carne lo identify the
corn",:,uenhal and nature of institutional genesis for post-formative institu_
tlonal evoluuon (se<: Mann 1988; Tilly 1975). In Charles Tilly's charaeteri.ltically incisive aphorism
"wars make states and states make war." ,
_____________ !NST!TUTIONAL! SM
"cultural" logics, then it is perhaps not difficult to see why. For, as already noted,
instrumental logics of calculation (calculus Iogcs) presume equilibrium (at least as
an inital condcn)e and norm-driven logics of appropriateness (culturallogics)
are themselves equilibrating. Accounts which see actors as driven either by
utility maximization in an institutionalized game scenario (rational choice insri-
tutionalism) or by institutionalized nonns and cultural conventions (normativei
socological institutionalism) or, ndeed, both (historical institutionalisrn}, are
unlike1y to offer much analytical purchase on questions ofcomplex post-formatve
institutional change. They are far better placed to account for the path-dependent
institutional change they tend to assume than they are to explain the periodic, if
infrequent, bouts of path-shaping institutional change they concede," In this
respect, historical instirutionalism is no different than its rational choice and
norrnatvejscciclogical counterparts. Indeed, desprte its ostensible analytical con-
cerns, historical institutionalism mere1y oompounds and reinforces the incapacity
of rational choice and normative/sociological institutionalism to deal with dis-
equilibrium dynamics. Given that one of its core contributions is seen to be its
identification of such dynamics, this is a significant failing.
This is all very well, and provides a powerful justification for a more construct-
ivist path from historical institutionalism. It does, however, rest on the assumed
accuracy of Hall and 'Iaylor's depiction of historical instituronalism-c-essentially
as an amalgarnation of rarional choice and normative/socioIogical institutionalist
conceptions of the subject. This is by no means uncontested. It has, for instance,
been suggested that historical instituticnalism is in fact rather more distinctive
ontologically than ths implies (compare Hay and Wincott 1998 with Hall and
Taylor 1998). Por if one returns to the introduction to the voume which launched
the term itself, and to other seminal and self-consciously defining statements
of historical nsttutonalism, one finds not a vacillation between rationalized and
socialized treatments of the human subject, but something altcgether different.
Thelen and Steinmo, for instance, are quite explicit in distancing historical
institutionalism from theviewofthe rational actor on which the calculus approach
This is, of course, not to deny that stalldard rationa! choicelneoclassical economic models can
describeJprediet disequilibrium oUlcomes (think, for irntance, of a multiplayer prisoner's dilemma
game). Yet lbey do, assuming ntial equilibrium couditiorn.
, The distinetiou between palb-dependcnt and palb-shaping logics and dynamics is a crucial oue.
New institutioualists in general have tended to place far greater emphasis on the fonoer than lbe lalter.
This perhaps refieclSlbe latenl structuralism ofthe attempt to bring institutions back into contem-
porary political anaIysis (5ee Hay 2002, 105-7). For iustitutions, as struetures, are invariably seen
lo limil, indeed d.limit, the pararneters of political choice. As such, they are constraints 00
political dynamism. This is certainly an important insight, yet lbere s a certain danger in tilting
Ibe stick loo strongiy in lbe direcliou of strueturc. For, under .:ertain conditions. institutions, and
lbe palb-dependent logics Ibey olberwise impose, are recast and redesigned through lbe
intended and uu1ntended consequences ofpolitical agency. Given lbe importanCl.' of such momenlS,
lbe new institutionalism ha.shad remarkably little to say on Ibese boulS of path-shaping institutional
change.
i
62 COLIN HAY
CONSTRUCTIVIST INSTITUTIONALISM
6,
is premised. Actors cannot simply be assumed to have a fixed (and irnmutable)
preference eet, to be blessed with extensive (oen perfect) infonnation and fore-
sght, or to be self-interested and self-servng utility maximizers. Rational choice
and historical institutionalism are, as Thelen and Stenmo note, "premised on
different assumptions that in fact reflect quite different approaches to the study of
politics" (1992, 7).
Yet, if this would seem to imply a greater affinity with nonnativefsociological
institutionalism, then further inspection reveals this not to be the case either. Por,
to the extent that the latter assumes conventional and norm-driven behavior
thereby downplaying the significance of agency, it is equal1y at odds with the
defining statements of historical institutionalism. A$ Thelen and Steinmo again
suggest:
institutional analysis... allows us to examine rhe relationship between political ectors as
objects and as agents 01 history. The institutions that are at rhe centre of historical
institutionalist analysis ... can shape and constran pclitical strategies in important ways,
but they are themselves also the outcome (COnsciOU5 or rmintended) of deliberate political
strategies of politicalamfJictand 01choice. (Thelen and Steinmo 1992, 10; emphasis added)
Set in this context, the social ontology of historica1 institutionalism Is highly
distinctive, and indeed quite compatible with the consrructivist institutionalism
which t now more consistently seemsto informo This brings us to a most important
point. Whether constructivist institutonalism is seen as a varlant, further develcp-
ment, or rejection ofhlstorical institutionalismdepends crucially on what historica1
institutionalism is taken to imply ontologica1ly. If the latter is seen, as in Hall and
'Iaylor's influential account, as a tlexible combination of cultural and calculus
approaches to the institutionally-embedded subject, then t is considerably at
odds with constructivist institutionalism. Seen in this way, it is, moreover, incom-
patible with the attempt to develop an endogenous institutionalist account of the
mechansms and determinants of complex institutional change. Yet, ifit is seen, as
the aboye passages from Thelen and Steinmo might suggest, as an approach
predicated upon the dynamic interplayofstructure and agent (institutional context
and institutional architect) and, indeed, material and ideational factors (see Hay
2002, chs. 2, 4, and 6), then the difference between historica1 and constructivist
institutionalisms is at most one of emphasis.
Whilst the possibility still exists of a common historical and constructivist
institutionalist research agenda, it might seem unnecessarily divisive to refer to
constructivist institutionalism as a new addition to the family of institutionalisms.
Yet this can, 1think, be justified. Indeed, sad though thls may well be, the prospect
of such a common research agenda s perhaps not as great as the above comments
might suggest. That this is so Is the product of a recent "hollowing-out" of
historica1 institutionalism. Animated, t seems, by the (laudable) desire to
build bridges, many of the most prominent contemporary advocates of historica1
institutionalism (notably Peter Hall (with David Soskice, 2001) and Paul Pierson
(2
004
seem increasingly to have resolved the calculus-cuhural balance which
they discem at the heart of historica1 institutionalism in favor of the
bridge which tbey would seem to be anxious to build, then, runs from hstorcal
institutionalism, by way of an acknowledgment of the need to incorporate micro-
foundations into institutionalist analysls, to rational choice institutionalism. This
is a trajectory that not only places a szable and ever-growing wedge between
cultural and calculus approaches to institutional analysis, but one which essentially
also closes off the alternative path to a more dynamic historical constructivist
institutionalism.
2 THE ANALYTICAL AND ONTOLOGICAL
D,ST,NCTIVENESS OF CONSTRUCTIVIST
INSTITUTIONALISM
In the ccntext, then, of contemporary developments in new institutionalist schol-
arship, the analytica1and ontological assumptinns ofconstructivist
are highly distinctive. They represent a considerable advance on their ranonalist
and normative/sociologica1 predecessors, at least in terms of their capaciry to
inform an endogenous account of complex nsttutional evolution, adaptation,
and nnovaton."
Actors are strategic, seeking to realize certain complex, contingent, and con-
stantly changing goals. They do so in a context which favors certain strategies
over others and must rely upon perceptions of that context which are at best
incomplete and which may very often prove to bave been neccurate after the
event. Moreover, ideas in the form of perceptions "matter" in a second sense--
for actors are oriented normative1y towards their environment. Their desres,
preferences, and motivations are not a contextually given fact-a reflection of
material or even social circumstance--but are irredeemably ideatonal, retlecting
a normative (indeed moral, ethical, and political) orientation towards the context
8 This ls an important caveat. Ontologies are not contending theories that be
empirically-since whal counts as evidence in the first place is an
Thus, while certaln onlological assumplons can preclude a conslderallon, say, of disequilibrium
dynamics (by essentiaJly denying their existence), thts does not in tself invalidale them. On the
dangers of ontological evange1ism, see Hay (2005).
coLlN HAY
CONSTRUCTIVIST lNST1TUTIONALlSM
------
65
in which they will have to be realized. As this suggests, for constructivists, polltics
is rather less about the blind pursuit of transparent material nterest and rather
more about both the fashioning. identification, and rendering actionable of such
ccnceptions, and the balancing of (presumed) instrumentality and rather more
affective motivations (see also Wendt 1999. Consequently, actors are not
analytically substitutabJe (as in rational choice or nonnative/sociological insritu-
tionalsm), just as their preference sets or logics of conduct cannot be derived
from the (institutional) sertng in which they are located. Inrerests are social
constructons and cannot serve as proxies for material factors; as a consequence
they are far more difficult to operationalze empirically than is conventionally
assumed (at least, in a non-tautological way: see also Abdelal, Blyth, and Parsons
2005; Blyth 2003).
In common with rationalist variants of institutionalism, the contexr is viewed in
largely institutional terms. Yetinsrirutions are understocd Iessas functional means
of reducing uncertaintj; so much as strucrures whose functionality or dysfunction-
aliry is an open-empirical and historical-c-queetion. Indeed, constructivist insti-
tutionalists place considerable emphasis 00 the potentially ineffective and
inefficient nature of social Institutions; 00 institurions as the subject and focus of
poltical struggle; and 00 the contingent nature of such struggles whose
ourcomes can in 00 sense be derived from the extant nsttutonal context itself
(see, espedally. Blyth 2002).
These are the basic analytical ingredients of constructivist institutionalsrn's
approach to institutional innovatinn, evolution, and transformation. Within this
perspective, change is seen to reside in the relationship between actors and the
context in which they find themselves. between institutional "architects;' iostitu-
tionalized subjects. and institutional environmeots. More specifically. institutional
change is understood in terms ofthe interaction between strategic conduct and the
strategic context within which it is conceived. and in the later unfolding of its
eonsequences. both intended and unintended. As in historical institutionalism.
such a formulatioo is pathdependent: the arder in which things happen affects how
they happen; the trajectory of change up to a certain poiot itself constrains the
trajectory after that point; and the strategic choices made at a particular moment
9 The affinities belWeen constructivism in internalional relations Iheory and conslructivist insli-
tutionaJism are, perhaps on this point especially. considerable. And, on Ihe fuceofit, there is nothing
lerribly remarkable abonl that. Yet however tempting it mighl be to attl'ibule the latter's view of
preferenceJinteresl fonnation lo the fonner. this would be mistaken. For while lhe stiJl recent labeling
of constructivist institutionalism as a dislinctive posilion in ilSown righl has clearly been inflnenced
by the prominence of conslructivism within inlemational reJalinns theory (Abdelal el al, 2005), the
causal and conslilUtive role accorded lOideas by such irutitutionalists predates the risc of construct.
ivisrn in inlemational relations (see, for instance, Blyth 1997; Ha11199J Hay 1996). As suro, con-
strnctivism In inlemational relations and COnstructivisl instilUtionalism are perhaps besl secn as
paralleJ if inilially distinct developmenlS.
eliminate whole ranges of possbilities from later choices while serving as the very
condition of existence of others (see also TilIy1994). Yet, polnting to path depend-
ence does not predude the identification of moments of peth-shepng nstitutional
change, in which the institutional architectw::e
Moreover, and at odds with most existing new institutionalist scholarship, ,such
path-shaping institutional change is not merely seen as a more-or-less functional
response to exogenous shocks. , .
Further dfferentiating t from new insttutionalisr orthodoxy, constructwist
institutionalists emphasze not only nstitutional path dependence. but alsu
ideational path dependence. lo other words, it is !ust ',but the
very ideas on which they are predicated and which nform deslgn
development. that exert constraints on pcltical autonomy. Insttutons are built
00 ideational foundations which exert an independent path dependent effect 00
their subsequent development. ,...
Constructivist insttutionalism thus seeks to dentify, detall. and tnterrogate
the extent to which-through processes of normalization and institutional-
embedding-established ideas become codified, serving as filters through
which actors come to interpret environmental signals. Yet, crudally, they are also
eoncerned with the conditions under which such established eognitive filters
and paradigms are contested, challenged, and replaced. Moreover, they see
paradigmatic shifts as heralding significant,institutional ,.
Such a fonnuiation implies a dynamic understanding of the relatonship
berween nsrirutions on the ene hand, and the individuals and groups who
oomprise them (and on whose experience they impinge) on the other, It empha-
sizes institutional innovation. dynamism. and transfonnation. as well as the need
for a consideration of processes of change over a of time.
doing it offers the potential to overturn new lIl.stJtutlOnalisms charactenstlc
emphasis upon institutional inertia. At the same time. however. such a
recognizes that institutional change indeed a Which IS
structured (not least by institutions and ideas about m a.nd
eonstantIy changing ways which facilitate certain forms of mterventl?n whilst
militating against others. Mareover. access to strategic resou:ces. and to
knowledge of the institutional environment. is unevenly distnbuted. ThlS m
affects the ability of actors to transfonn the contexts (institutional and otherwtse)
in which they find themselves. . ...
Finally, it is important to emphasize the crucial space granted,to this
formulation. Actors appropriate strategically a world replete Wlth mstJtutlons and
ideas about institutions, Their perceptions about what is feasible. legitimate.
possible. and desirable are shaped both by the institutional in
which they find themselves and by existing policy paradigms and It
is through such cognitive filters that strategic cooduct is conceptualized and
uItimately assessed.
I
66 COLIN HAY
3 CONSTRUCTIVIST INSTITUTIONALISM
ApPLIED: CRISES, PARADIGM SHIFTS, AND
UNCERTAINTY
Whilst there may well be something ofa tension between the contemporary trajee-
tory ofhistorical institutionalism and the developing constructivist institutionalist
research agenda, this should not hidethe considerable indebtedness of the latter to
earlier versions ofthe fonner. TheworkofPeter A. Hall, in particular that on policy
paradigms, social leaming, and institutional change (1993), has proved a crucial
source ofinspiration for manycontemporary currents in constructivist institution-
alism. Indeed, the latter's indebtedness to historical institutionalism is arguably
rather greater than its indebtedness to constructivism in international relations
theory. Por despite the ostensible similarities between constructivist iostitutionalism
and constructivism in intemationalrelations theory, the former has been driven to a
far greater extent than the latter by the attempt to resolve particular empirical
puzzles. Those puzzles, prindpally concerned with understanding the conditions
of existence ofsignificant path-shaping institutionaI change, have led institutional-
sts to consider the role of ideas in influendng the developmental trajectory of
institutions under conditions of uncertainly and/or crisis. They were explored first
by historica1 institutionalists, most notably Peter A Hall.
Hall's work represents by far the most sustained, consistent, and systematic
attempt within the historcal institutionalist perspective to accord a key role
for ideas in the determinatlon of institutional outcomes. Like most of the con-
structivist institutionalist scholarship which it would come to inform, Hall's
approach to ideas comes not from a prior ontologica1 cornmitment (as' in
constructivist international relations theory), but from the observation of an
empirical regularity-ideational change invariably precedes institutional change.
Drawing inspiration from Kuhn, Hall argues that policy is made within the context
of "policy paradigms," Such interpretative schema are internalized by politicians,
state managers, policy experts, and the like. They come to define a range o
legitimate policy techniques, mechanisms, and instruments, thereby delimiting
the very targets and goals o policy itself. In short, they come to drcumscribe the
realm o the politically feasible, practical, and desirable. A$ Hall elaborates:
policy mekers customarilyworkwithin a frarnework of ideas and standards that specfies
nct onlythe goals ofpolicyand rhekind ofinstruments that can be usedto attain them, but
abo the verynature of the problemstheyare meant te be addressing. . .. IT}his framework
is erabedded in the very terminologythrough which pclicy makers communicate about
their work, and it is influential precisely becauseso much of it ts taken for granted and
unamenable te scrutinyas a whole. (1993, 279)
The identification of such dstinctive policy paradigms allows Hall to differentiate
between: (a) periods of "normal" policy-making (and change) in which the
CONSTRUCTIVIST INSTITUTIONALlSM 67
paradigm remains largely unchallenged {at least within the confines of. the
policy-making arena) and in which change is largely incremental; and (b) penods
of"exceptional" policy-making (and change), often associated with crises, in which
the very parameters that previously circumscribed policy options are cast asunder
and replaced, and in which the realm of the politically possble, feasible, and
desirable s correspondingly reccnfigured.
Hall concentrates on developing an abstracted, largely deductive, and
theoretically-informed periodization of the policy process which might be applied
in a variety of contexts. It stresses the significance o ideas (in the form of
policy-making paradigms which are seen to act as cognitiv: filters). and leads.to a
periodization o institutional change in terms of the policy-making paradigms
such institutions instantiate and reflecto Yet it remains largely descriprive, having
little to say about the processes of change which underlie the model.
Ths provides the point ofdeparture for a significant bodyofmore recent, and more
self-consciously constructivst, scholarship (see, especially, BIyth 2002; Hay 2001).
This still nascent literarure asks under what conditions paradigms emerge, consoli-
date, accumulate ancmalies, and become subject to challenge and replacement.
Attention has focused in particular upon the moment of crisis tself a concept much
invoked but rarelyconceptualized oc further explicated in the existing literature.w
Blyth's meticulous work on the US and Swedish cases (2002) shows well
the additional anaIytica1 purchase that constructivism offers to nstrutionalists
interested not only in institutional process tracing but in accounting for the
emergence of new policy paradigms and attendant institutional logics in and
through moments of crss.u Indeed, his landmark study demonstrates the causal
and constitutive role ofideas in shaping the developmental trajectories ofadvanced
capitalist economes.Ir has rapidIy become a, perhaps the, key referent and point o
departure for the constructivist institutionalist reseurch prograrnme.
The analytical focus ofhis attentions is the moment of crisis itself, in which one
policy paradigm s replaced by another. Crises, he suggests, can be viewed
as moments in which actors' perceptions of their own self-interest become
problematized. Consequently, the resolution of a crisis entails the restoration of a
more "normal" conditon in which actors' interests are once again made clear and
transparent to them. A$ nature abhors a vacuum, so, it seems, political systems abhor
uncertainry. Crises thus unleash short bouts of intense ideationaI contestation in
which agente struggle to provide compelling and convindng diagnoses of the
pathologies afflictng the old regime/policy paradigm and the reforms appropriate
to the resolution of the crisis. Moreover, and crucially for bis analysis, such crisis
theories, arising as they do in moments ofuncertainry, playa genuinelyconstructive
'0 I1 s perhaps again importanl to note thal although constructivst co,?"e te a
position verysimilar lO that of their fellowconstructvsts in intemati?n,aJ suggeslIDg, .fur
instance, that "crises are what states make ofthem" (cf. Wendt 199Z), this IS an empirical observalIon
nol a logical correlate of a prior ontological comrn.ilment. .
" The following paragrophs draw on end further develop the argurnent first presented ID Hay
(zoo4b. 207-13).
12 Theparelllbeses areimportant bere.There issomethingof a tendencyinIbeexislingIiteraturelo
~ r t \he.issue of intere;l-formalion and representation as a question solelyof tbe accuracyof tbe
mfonnatlon actors bave about thcir external environment. If tbere is a disparitybetweenan aetor's
role in establlshlng a new trajeetory of institutional evolution. They are, in other
words, not reducible to the condition they seek to describe and explain.
TIte mplicaticns of this are clear-if we are to understand path-shapinginstitu-
tonal change we must acknowledge the independent causal and constitutive role
of ideas, since the developmental trajectory of a given regime nr palicy paradlgm
cannot be derived from the exhibired or latent contradcrons of the old regime
or palicy paradigm. It is, instead, contingent upon the ideational contestation
unleashed in the momenr of crisis tself Though this is not an inference that Blyth
himse1fdraws, there is, then, no hope ofa predictivescienceofcrisisresolution, capable
of pointing prior to the onset of crisis lo thepath of institutional ehange-fur the
causal chain isincomplete until such time as the crisishas been suceessfully narrated.
This s an important intervention and it provides a series of correspondingly
significant insights into the developmental trajectories of Swedish and US capital-
ism in the twentieth century. In particular, it draws attention to the role ofbusness
in proselytizing and sponsoring new andlor alternative economic theories and in
setting the discursive parameters withn which influential crisis narratives are likely
to be framed, and to the crucial relationship between business, think tanks,
and professional economsrs. It also reminds us, usefu1ly, that in order to preve
influential, (economic) ideas need not beer much relationship to the reality
they purportedly represento In a cIassically construetivist institutionalist vein, it
demonstrates that, ifbelieved and aeted upon, economic ideas have a tendency to
become self-fulfilling prophecies (see also Hay and Rosamond 2002).
Yet i15 limitations also show thar constructivist institutonalismis still very much
a work in progress. Blyth mises just as many theoretcal, methodological, and,
indeed, empirical questions as he answers. Moreover, tbe text s characterized
by sorne significant and by no means unrepresentative tensions, contradictions,
and silences. None of tbese are insurmountable impedirnents to the development
of a more consistently constructivist institutionalism. Yet they do perhaps serve to
indicate the work still required ifthe profound chaIlenge that constructivism poses
to more conventional approaches to institutional analysis, and the insights t offers,
are both to be more widely appreciated.
In the conrext of contemporary neoinstitutionalism, it is Blyth's comments
on tbe relationship between ideas and interests that are likely to prove most
controversia!. It is in these cornments that the distinctiveness of the construetivist
variant ofinstitutionalismresides. His core claimis, in essence, that actors' conducr is
not a (direcr) refleetion oftheir material interests but, rather, a reflection ofparticu-
lar perceptions oftheir material interests (see also Wendt 1999,113-35). Our material
circumstanees do not directly determine our behavior, though our perceptiona of
sueh circumstances [and, ndeed, of our stake in varions concevable outeomes),
may.i2 In hisown tenns, it isideas that render interests "actionahle" (Blyth 2002, 39).
perccived interestsand mosewcmight attribute lo \hemgivenan exhaustlve analysis of tbeir material
drcumslances, misis essumedlo be a funetionso1ely oftbe ncompleteness of me actor's information.
Arguably this is itselfa grosssimplification. Inlere;ts are nol merelya ref1cetion of perceived material
circumstance, bu! relate, crnciaUy, lo \he nonnative orientation of tbe actor towards her externa!
environmenl. Myperceived selfinterest with respeet lOquestions of environmenlal degradation, fur
instance, wi11 reflect lo a significant extent rny normative sense of obligation lOotber individuaI.s
(livingand yet lo be bom) and, conccivably, o\her species.
69 CONSTRUCTIVIST INSTITUTIONALISM
However intuitively plausible or obvious this may seem, it is important to note
that it sits in sorne considerable tension to almost aII exstng neoinstitutionalist
scholarship. Por, conventionally, it is actors' material interests rather than their
perceptions ofthose intereststbat areassumed the keydetermnanrs oftbeirbehavior.
Though convenient and parsimonious, ths is unrealistic-and tbis is the construc-
tivst's point. Yet,there is sorne ambiguity and inconsistency in the manner in which
he operationalizes this important insight, which speaks to a potentiaIly wider
ambiguity witbin constructivist institutionalism. Por, on occasions, Blyth refers to
interests as "social construets that are open to redetinirion through ideological
contestaton" (2002, 2j'I; see also Abdelal, Blyth, and Parsons 2006). AH trace of a
materialist conceptonofinterest s eliminated at a stroke. At other points in the text,
however, interests are treated as materiaIly given and as clearly separate from per-
ceptions ofinterests, as for instanee when he counterposes the "ideas held byagents"
and "their structurally-derived interests" (2002, 33-4). Here, like many other con-
structivists, Blythseems to faIIbackon an essentiaIly material conception ofinterests
(see also Berman1998; MeNamara1998; Wendt 1999). Obviouslyit makes no sense to
view the Iatter as social constructs. To be clear, though these two fonnulations are
mutualIyexclusive (interests are either social constructs or given by material circum-
stances, they cannot be both), neither is incompatible with Blyth's core claim (that in
order to be acticnable, interests have to be capable ofheing articuIated). They are
merely different ways of operationalizing that core assumption. Yet t does serve to
hide a potentiaIly more fundamentallacuna.
This only becomes fully apparent when Blyth's second core premise is recalled:
crises are situatons in which actors' interests (presumably here conceptualized as
social constructs rather than material givens) become blurred. In itself this is far
from self-evident and, given the centrality of the claim to the overaII argument he
presente, it is perhapa surprising that Blyth chooses not to defend the clalm. lt is
not cIear that moments of crisis do indeed lead to uncertainty about actors'
interests. Indeed, whilst erises might plausibly be seen to provide focal points
around which competing political narratives might serve to reorient actcrs' sense
of their own self-interest, in the first instance are they not more likely to resuIt
in the vehement reassertion, expression, and articu1ation of prior conceptions of
self-interest-c-often in the ntecsty of political confllctl ls it not somewhat
perverse, for instance, to suggest that during the nfamous winter of Discontent
of 1978--9 (as clear an instance of crisis as one might imagine), Britaln's striking
COLIN HAY 6B
7
COLIN HAY
CONSTRUCTIVIST INSTITUTIONALISM
public sector workers were undear about their interests in ressting enforced wage
moderation? Or to see the Callaghan Govemment as unclear about its interests in
bringing such industrial militancy to an end!
A second problem relates to the rather uneven ontology that Blyth seems to reir
upon here. In situations in which actors' interests are not problematized, ideas
matter less end, presumably, non-constructivist techniques will suffice; yet in con-
dtions of crisis, in which interests are rendered problematic, and ideas "matter
more," only constructivism will do (for similar fonnuIations see Berman 1998;
Campbellcorn). As 1havesuggestedelsewhere(Hapoo2, 214-15), however tempting
it maybe to seeideas as somehow more significant in the uncertaintyand confusin
ofthe moment ofcrisis, this isa temptation we shouldsurelyreslst.It isnot that ideas
matter morein times ofcras, so much that newideas do and that we are particu1arly
interested in tbeir impact Once tbe crisis is resolved and a new paradigm installed,
the ideas actors hold may become intemalized and unquestioned once agaln, but this
does not mean that they cease to affect their behavior.
Yet this is not the keypoint at issue here. Por it is only once we accept as self-
evident the claim tbat moments of crisis problematize pre-existing conceptions of
self-interest that the problems really start. If crises are moments of radical inde-
tenninacy in which actors an incapable of articulating and hence rendering
"actionable" their interests (moments of "Knightian uncertanty' in BIyth's
tenns), then how is it that such situation are ever resolved? Blyth, it would seem,
must rely upon certain actors-notably influential opinion fonners with access to
significant resources for the promotion and dissemination of crisis narratives-to
be rather clearer about their own interests. For the resolution of the crisis requires,
in Blyth's terms, tbat such actors preve themselves capable of providing an idea-
tional focus for tbe reconstitution of the perceived self-interests of the population
at large. Whose self-interests does such a new paradigm advancei And' in a
situation of Knightian uncertainty; how is t that sueh actors are capable of
rendering actionable their own Inrerestsl In shcrt, where do such ideas come
from and who, in a moment of crisis, s capable of perceiving that they have a
clearly identified self-Interest to tbe served by the promotion of such ideas? If, as
Blyth consistently seems to suggest, it is organized interests with access to egn-
ificant material resources (such as business) that come to seize the opportunity
presented by a moment of crisis, tben the role of ideas in determining outcomes
would seem to have been significantly attenuated.lfaccess to material resources is a
condition of successful crisis-narration, if only organized business has access
to such resources, and if neoliberalism is held to reflect the (actual or perceived)
self-interest of business, tben won't a materialist explanation of the rise of
neolibera1ism in the USA in the 1970S or Sweden in the 1980s suffice? To prevent
this slippage towards a residual materialism, BIyth and other exponents of
constructivist institutionalism need to be able to tell us rather more about the
detenninants (material and ideational), internal dynamics, and narration of the
crisis itself. The overly parsimonious conception ofcrises as moments ofKnightian
uncertainty may, in tbis respect, obscure more tban it reveals.
This is perhaps suggestve of a broader, indeed somewhat rharacteristic, failing of
constructivist institutionalismto date--itstendencyto fall backupon, orat leastnotto
close olffully, thereturn to a rump materialismo Very often, as in this case, alternative
and more parsimonious accounts can be olfered oftheverysame data constructivst
institutionalists present that make little or no causal reference to the role ofdeas.
A second set of concerns relates to the theoretica1 status of constructivist
institutionalist insights. Again, the issue is a more general one. For, like much
work within this development tradition, although constructed as a work of
explanatory/causal analysis, it is not always clear that Blyth does adequate1y explain
the outcomes whose origins he details. Indeed, it would seem as though abstracted
redescription and explanation are frequently conflated. In other words, an
abstract and stylized sequence consistent witb the empirica1 evidence is presented
as an explanation ofspecific outcomes in the context beng considered. While crises
may well be what states malee of them, it is not clear tbat constructivist instiru-
tionalists have explained why states malee of them what they do--indeed, it s
precisely in this ambiguity that the possibility of the return to a residual materi-
alism arises.
This brings us to a further, and closely related, issue--the epistemological status
of the claims Blyth makes about the US and Swedish cases, specifical1y, and those
made by constructlvists about institutiona! ehange more generally. Understand-
ably, Blyth is keen to stress that his chosen constructvist brand of institutionalism
provides os with a "better understanding of political change" than more conven-
tional materialist modes of politica1 analysis (2002, ix; see also Abde1a!, Blyth, and
Parsons 2005; Berman 1998). Yet it is not c1ear from the text why sceptics should
accept such a view-Iargely because no sustained consideration is given to how ene
might adjudcate preferences between contending accounts (see, for instance, Bevir
and Rhodes 2003). Nor is it c1ear that constructivists can easily daim the kind of
epistemological required to pronounce the analytica1 superiority
of their perspective. Presumably, "better" here means more complex, more
nuanced, and more able to capture the rlch texture of social, polltical, and
economic interaction-in short, the standard that Blyth seems to construct is
one of correspondence to an externa! rea1ity. This is al1 very well, but external
realities, as most constmctivsts would concede, can be viewed dilferently.
Moreover, whilst complexity and correspondence can plausibly be defended as
providing the standards by whieh competing theories should be adjudicated,
parsimony, analytica1 purchase, and predictive capacity have arguably just as
much c1aimto provide such a standard. And by that standard, most constructivist
institutionalism is likely to be found wanting.
Constructivism has mueh to contribute to contemporary institutional analysis,
though its appeal is likely to be greatest foe those who do not believe that a
72 COLlN HAY
predictive science of polities is possble. Yet whether its dear superiority to other
contending posrcns has already been, or is ever likely to be, established, is another
matter. Blyth'scondudingremarksare, in this respect, particularly problematic. The
purpose of bis book, he suggests, s "to demonstrate that large-scale institutional
changecannot be understood from class alignments, materiallygiven coalitions, or
other structural prerequsites.... [Ijnstitutional change only makes sense by refer.,
ence to the ideas that inform agents' responses to moments ofuncertaintyand crisis"
(2002, 251). This is a bold and almost certainly overstated claim. Por, rarher than
demonstrating that structural prerequistes cannot inform a credible account of
institutional change, constructivisr institutionalism ls perhaps better seen as dem-
onstrating thcr altemative and compelling accounts can be constrncted that donot
restricr themselves to such material factors. Moreover, Blyth here seems to drive
somethingofawedge berweenthe considerationofdeatonal and material factors in
causal analyss. This s unfortunate, because as he at times seems quite happy ro
concede, there are almost certainly (sorne) material conditions of exstence of
ascendanr crisis narratives and crises themselves would seem to have both material
and ideational detenninants. Ideational factoes certainly need to be given greater
attention, but surely not at the expense of all other variables.
4 CONCLUSION
As the aboye paragraphs hopefully suggest, whilst constructivist institutionalism
has much to contribute to the analysis and, aboye all, the explanation of complex
institutional change, it is still very much a work in progress. Its particular appeal
resides in its ability to interrogate and open up the ofien acknowledged and yet
rarely explored question of institutional dynamics under disequilibrium condi-
tions. Asa consequence of this focus, it has already gone sorne way to overcoming
the new institutionalism's characteristic failure to deal adequately with post-
formative institutional change and its tendeney to find it rather easier to describe
(and, even more so, to explain) path-dependent as opposed to path-shaping logics.
Yet, in so doing, it has stumbled over other problems.ln particular, it seems unclear
whether constructivist institutionalists are prepared to abandon altogether the long
association ofinterests and material factors in political analysis that they ostensibly
challenge. Similariy, the extent to which constructivist institutionalism entails the
substitution of material by ideational explanations, the development of explan-
ations wbich dissolve the dualistic distinction between the two, or merely the
addition of ideational variables to pre-existing material accounts remains unclear.
:.
CONSTRUCTIVIST INSTlTUTIONALISM 73
Finally, there is still something of a tensin it and
confidence with which the superiority of constructvtst mSlghU: are
proclaimed and the theoretical modesty that a constructrvrst ontology and episte-
logy would seem almosr naturally to entail. None of these are fundamental
;:ediments to the development of a fourth new the
others: but they do provide a sense ofthe debates that must, and are likely to, anmate
the constructivist institutionalist research prograrnme over the next decade.
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-lf:'-

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:::{:
CHAPTER 5
NETWORK
INSTITUTIONALISM
CHRISTOPHER ANSELL
1 OVERVIEW
.....................................- .
In sorne respects, "networkinstitutionalism"isan oxyrnoron. The term"network"tends
to imply infonnality and personalism, while "institutionalism" suggests formality and
impersonalismo Networkperspectives alsotend tobe morebehavioralthan institutional.
Neverthe1ess, it is reasonable ro understandnetworks as informal nstruons (though
they may in sorne cases be formal). In this sense, a network can be thought of as an
institution to the extent that it represents a rtable or recurrent pattern of behavioral
interaction or exchange hetween individualsororganizations. Inmuch thesamespiritas
PeterHallhasdescribedinstitutonalism,thenetworkapproachviewsnetworks ascritlcal
mediatingvarables that affectthe distribution ofpower, the constructionofinterests and
identites,and the dynamics ofinreraction (Hall1986, 19-20).
No single network paradigm exlsts,but rather overlapplngdiscussionsin political
scence,organization theory, public administration, and eoonomic sociology. Yet it is
fuir to say that four meta..principles or assumptions are shared across the various
strands of network institutioualism.
1
The first aud most general principIe is a
relational perspective on social, politica1, and eoonomic action. Emirbayer (1997)
contrasts relational with attributional approaches to social explanation. In the latter,
, Wellman(1988) providesboth an inteJJectnal historyof the nctworkapproachand an importanl
statcment of its distinctivcness.