UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MAUNLAD HOMES, INC.

G.R. No. 190071

FACTS:
Union Bank is the owner of a commercial complex located in Malolos, Bulacan, known
as the Maunlad Shopping Mall.Sometime in August 2002, Union Bank, as seller, and respondent
Maunlad Homes, Inc. (Maunlad Homes), as buyer, entered into a contract to sell involving the
Maunlad Shopping Mall. Under the contract, Union Bank authorized Maunlad Homes to take
possession of the property and to build or introduce improvements thereon. The parties also
agreed that if Maunlad Homes violates any of the provisions of the contract, all payments made
will be applied as rentals for the use and possession of the property, and all improvements
introduced on the land will accrue in favor of Union Bank.
In the event of rescission due to failure to pay or to comply with the terms of the contract,
Maunlad Homes will be required to immediately vacate the property and must voluntarily turn
possession over to Union Bank.
When Maunlad Homes failed to pay the monthly amortization, Union Bank sent the
former a Notice of Rescission of Contract dated February 5, 2003, demanding payment of the
installments due within 30 days from receipt; otherwise, it shall consider the contract
automatically rescinded. Maunlad Homes failed to comply. Hence, on November 19, 2003,
Union Bank sent Maunlad Homes a letter demanding payment of the rentals due and requiring
that the subject property be vacated and its possession turned over to the bank.
On February 19, 2004, when Maunlad Homes continued to refuse, Union Bank instituted
an ejectment suit before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati City, Branch 64.
Maunlad Homes resisted the suit by claiming, among others, that it is the owner of the property
as Union Bank did not reserve ownership of the property under the terms of the contract. By
virtue of its ownership, Maunlad Homes claimed that it has the right to possess the property.
On May 18, 2005, the MeTC dismissed Union Banks ejectment complaint. It found that Union
Banks cause of action was based on a breach of contract and that both parties are claiming a
better right to possess the property based on their respective claims of ownership of the property.
The MeTC ruled that the appropriate action to resolve these conflicting claims was an
accion reivindicatoria, over which it had no jurisdiction. On appeal, the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Makati City, Branch 139, affirmed the MeTC in its decision dated July 17, 2008; it
agreed with the MeTC that the issues raised in the complaint extend beyond those commonly
involved in an unlawful detainer suit.
The RTC declared that Union Bank cannot rely on the waiver of venue provision in the
contract because ejectment is not an action arising out of or connected with the contract.
Union Bank disagreed with the CAs finding that it is claiming ownership over the property
through the ejectment action. The Court initially denied Union Banks petition in its Resolution
dated March 17, 2010. Upon motion for reconsideration filed by Union Bank, the Court set aside
its Resolution of March 17, 2010 (in a Resolution dated May 30, 2011) and required Maunlad
Homes to comment on the petition.
Maunlad Homes contested Union Banks arguments, invoking the rulings of the lower
courts. It considered Union Banks action as based on the propriety of the rescission of the
contract, which, in turn, is based on a determination of whether Maunlad Homes indeed failed to
comply with the terms of the contract; the propriety of the rescission, however, is a question that
is within the RTCs jurisdiction. Hence, Maunlad Homes contended that the dismissal of the
ejectment action was proper.

ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE RIGHT TO POSSESS THE PROPERTY WAS
EXTINGUISHED WHEN THE CONTRACT TO SELL FAILED TO MATERIALIZE

HELD:
Maunlad Homes acquired possession of the property based on its contract with Union
Bank. While admitting that it suspended payment of the installments, Maunlad Homes contended
that the suspension of payment did not affect its right to possess the property because its contract
with Union Bank was one of sale and not to sell; hence, ownership of the property has been
transferred to it, allowing it to retain possession notwithstanding nonpayment of installments.
The terms of the contract, however, do not support this conclusion. Section 11 of the
contract between Union Bank and Maunlad Homes provides;
"upon payment in full of the Purchase Price of the Property x x x, the SELLER shall execute and deliver
a Deed of Absolute Sale conveying the Property to the BUYER. Jurisprudence has established that where
the seller promises to execute a deed of absolute sale upon the completion by the buyer of the payment of
the price, the contract is only a contract to sell. The presence of this provision generally identifies the
contract as being a mere contract to sell. After reviewing the terms of the contract between Union Bank
and Maunlad Homes, we find no reasonable ground to exempt the present case from the general rule; the
contract between Union Bank and Maunlad Homes is a contract to sell.In a contract to sell, the full
payment of the purchase price is a positive suspensive condition whose non-fulfillment is not a breach of
contract, but merely an event that prevents the seller from conveying title to the purchaser. "

The non-payment of the purchase price renders the contract to sell ineffective and
without force and effect." Maunlad Homes act of withholding the installment payments
rendered the contract ineffective and without force and effect, and ultimately deprived itself of
the right to continue possessing Maunlad Shopping Mall.






























JOSEPHINE MARMO, NESTOR ESGUERRA, DANILO DEL PILAR
and MARISA DEL PILAR, vs. MOISES O. ANACAY
G.R. No. 182585


FACTS:
Respondent filed a case for Annulment of Sale, Recovery of Title with Damages against
the petitioners

and the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite. The complaint states, among
others, that: the respondent is the bona-fide co-owner, together with his wife, Gloria P. Anacay
(now deceased), of a 50-square meter parcel of land and the house built thereon.
They authorized petitioner Josephine to sell the subject property; petitioner Josephine
sold the subject property to petitioner Danilo for P520,000.00, payable in monthly installments
of P8,667.00 from May 2001 to June 2006; petitioner Danilo defaulted in his installment
payments from December 2002 onwards; the respondent subsequently discovered that TCT No.
815595 had been cancelled and TCT No. T-972424 was issued in petitioner Josephines name by
virtue of a falsified Deed of Absolute Sale dated September 20, 2001; petitioner Josephine
subsequently transferred her title to petitioner Danilo; TCT No. T-972424 was cancelled and
TCT No. T-991035 was issued in petitioner Danilos name. The respondent sought the
annulment of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated September 20, 2001 and the cancellation of TCT
No. T-991035; in the alternative, he demanded petitioner Danilos payment of the balance of
P347,000.00 with interest from December 2002, and the payment of moral damages, attorneys
fees, and cost of suit.
In her Answer, petitioner Josephine averred, among others, that the respondents
children, as co-owners of the subject property, should have been included as plaintiffs because
they are indispensable parties.

Petitioner Danilo echoed petitioner Josephines submission in his
Answer.
The respondent filed an Opposition, arguing that his children are not indispensable
parties because the issue in the case can be resolved without their participation in the
proceedings. They charged the RTC with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction for not dismissing the case after the respondent failed to include indispensable
parties. It found that the RTC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in denying the
petitioners motion to dismiss, noting that the respondents children are not indispensable parties.
The petitioners moved

but failed

to secure a reconsideration of the CA Decision.

ISSUE:
WHETHER THE CA CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE RTC DID NOT COMMIT
ANY GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN RULING THAT THE RESPONDENTS
CHILDREN ARE NOT INDISPENSABLE PARTIES.



RULING:
The RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the petitioners Motion to
Dismiss; the respondents co-owners are not indispensable parties. The RTC grounded its Order
dated March 14, 2006 denying the petitioners motion to dismiss on the finding that the
respondents children, as co-owners of the subject property, are not indispensable parties to the
resolution of the case. When the controversy involves a property held in common, Article 487 of
the Civil Code explicitly provides that any one of the co-owners may bring an action in
ejectment.

In the term action in ejectment includes a suit for forcible entry (detentacion) or
unlawful detainer (desahucio). Also, the term action in ejectment includes also, an accion
publiciana (recovery of possession) or accion reinvidicatoria (recovery of ownership). Most
recently in Estreller v. Ysmael, we applied Article 487 to an accion publiciana case; in Plasabas
v. Court of Appeals

we categorically stated that Article 487 applies to reivindicatory actions.
In sum, respondents children, as co-owners of the subject property, are not indispensable
parties to the resolution of the case. We held in Carandang v. Heirs of De Guzman

that in cases
like this, the co-owners are not even necessary parties, for a complete relief can be accorded in
the suit even without their participation, since the suit is presumed to be filed for the benefit of
all.
Thus, the respondents children need not be impleaded as party-plaintiffs in Civil Case
No. 2919-03. In light of these conclusions, no need arises to act on petitioners prayer for a TRO
to suspend the proceedings in the RTC and we find no reason to grant the present petition.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the petition for its failure to
show any reversible error in the assailed Decision dated December 28, 2007 and Resolution
dated April 11, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 94673, both of which we
hereby AFFIRM. Costs against the petitioners.












































HEIRS OF TOMAS DOLLETON, ET AL vs. FIL-ESTATE
MANAGEMENT INC, ET AL.
G.R. No. 170750

FACTS:
Petitioners before the RTC separate Complaints for Quieting of Title and/or Recovery of
Ownership and Possession with Preliminary Injunction/Restraining Order and Damages against
respondents. The eight Complaints were similarly worded and contained substantially identical
allegations. Petitioners claimed in their Complaints that they had been in continuous, open, and
exclusive possession of the afore-described parcels of land (subject properties) for more than 90
years until they were forcibly ousted by armed men hired by respondents in 1991. They had
cultivated the subject properties and religiously paid the real estate taxes for the same.
Respondents cannot rely on Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) No. 9176, No. 9177, No. 9178,
No. 9179, No. 9180, No. 9181 and No. 9182, issued by the Registry of Deeds of Las Pias in
their names, to support their claim over the subject properties since, petitioners averred, the
subject properties were not covered by said certificates.
Respondents filed before the RTC a Motion to Dismiss and Opposition to Application for
a Temporary Restraining Order/Writ of Preliminary Injunction. They moved for the dismissal of
the eight Complaints on the grounds of (1) prescription; (2) laches; (3) lack of cause of action;
and (4) res judicata. Respondents also contended that petitioners were guilty of laches. Despite
their alleged possession of the subject properties for 90 years, petitioners failed to take any steps
to oppose the land registration cases involving the same properties or to seek the nullification of
the decrees of registration and certificates of title which were entered and issued as early as 1966
and 1967.


ISSUE:
WHETHER THE RTC PROPERLY GRANTED RESPONDENTS MOTION TO
DISMISS.

RULING:
Respondents seek the dismissal of petitioners Complaints for failure to state a cause of
action. Even assuming as true that the subject properties have been in the possession of
petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest for 90 years; that petitioners have been paying the
realty taxes thereon; and that petitioners are able to submit a sketch plan of the subject
properties, respondents maintain that their ownership of the subject properties, evidenced by
certificates of title registered in their names, cannot be defeated.
This contention is untenable. This Court is convinced that each of the Complaints filed by
petitioners sufficiently stated a cause of action. The Complaints alleged that petitioners are the
owners of the subject properties by acquisitive prescription. As owners thereof, they have the
right to remain in peaceful possession of the said properties and, if deprived thereof, they may
recover the same. The Court notes that petitioners prayer for the cancellation of respondents
certificates of title are inconsistent with their allegations.
Admittedly, while petitioners can seek the recovery of the subject properties, they
cannot ask for the cancellation of respondents TCTs since petitioners failed to allege any
interest in the land covered thereby. Still, the other reliefs sought by petitioners, i.e., recovery of
the possession of the subject properties and compensation for the damages resulting from
respondents forcible taking of their property, are still proper. In all, this Court pronounces that
respondents failed to raise a proper ground for the dismissal of petitioners Complaints.
Petitioners claims and respondents opposition and defenses thereto are best ventilated in a trial
on the merits of the cases.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The Decision
dated 16 September 2005 and Resolution dated 9 December 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 80927 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE
SO ORDERED.

COLITO T. PAJUYO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 146364


FACTS:
Petitioner paid P400 to a certain Pedro Perez for the rights over a 250-square meter lot in
Barrio Payatas, Quezon City. Pajuyo then constructed a house made of light materials on the lot.
Pajuyo and his family lived in the house from 1979 to 7 December 1985.On 8 December 1985,
Pajuyo and private respondent Eddie Guevarra executed a Kasunduan or agreement. Pajuyo, as
owner of the house, allowed Guevarra to live in the house for free provided Guevarra would
maintain the cleanliness and orderliness of the house. Guevarra promised that he would
voluntarily vacate the premises on Pajuyos demand.
In September 1994, Pajuyo informed Guevarra of his need of the house and demanded
that Guevarra vacate the house however, Guevarra refused. Pajuyo filed an ejectment case
against Guevarra with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 31.
On 15 December 1995, the MTC rendered its decision in favor of Pajuyo. Aggrieved,
Guevarra appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 81. The RTC affirmed
the MTC decision. Guevarra received the RTC decision on 29 November 1996. Guevarra had
only until 14 December 1996 to file his appeal with the Court of Appeals. Instead of filing his
appeal with the Court of Appeals, Guevarra filed with the Supreme Court a Motion for
Extension of Time to File Appeal by Certiorari Based on Rule 42 (motion for extension).
Guevarra theorized that his appeal raised pure questions of law.
The Receiving Clerk of the Supreme Court received the motion for extension on 13
December 1996 or one day before the right to appeal expired.On 3 January 1997, Guevarra filed
his petition for review with the Supreme Court.On 8 January 1997, the First Division of the
Supreme Court issued a Resolution referring the motion for extension to the Court of Appeals
which has concurrent jurisdiction over the case. The case presented no special and important
matter for the Supreme Court to take cognizance of at the first instance. The Thirteenth Division
of the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution granting the motion for extension conditioned on the
timeliness of the filing of the motion.
On 21 June 2000, the Court of Appeals issued its decision reversing the RTC decision.
Pajuyo filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision. The Court of Appeals declared that
Pajuyo and Guevarra are squatters. Pajuyo and Guevarra illegally occupied the contested lot
which the government owned.


ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT IN RULING THAT THE KASUNDUAN VOLUNTARILY
ENTERED INTO BY THE PARTIES WAS IN FACT A COMMODATUM, INSTEAD OF A
CONTRACT OF LEASE AS FOUND BY THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT AND IN
HOLDING THAT THE EJECTMENT CASE FILED AGAINST DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
IS WITHOUT LEGAL AND FACTUAL BASIS


RULING:
Ownership or the right to possess arising from ownership is not at issue in an action for
recovery of possession. The parties cannot present evidence to prove ownership or right to legal
possession except to prove the nature of the possession when necessary to resolve the issue of
physical possession. The absence of title over the contested lot is not a ground for the courts to
withhold relief from the parties in an ejectment case.
The case for review before the Court of Appeals was a simple case of ejectment. The
Court of Appeals refused to rule on the issue of physical possession. Nevertheless, the appellate
court held that the pivotal issue in this case is who between Pajuyo and Guevarra has the
priority right as beneficiary of the contested land under Proclamation No. 137. According to the
Court of Appeals, Guevarra enjoys preferential right under Proclamation No. 137 because Article
VI of the Code declares that the actual occupant or caretaker is the one qualified to apply for
socialized housing.
The ruling of the Court of Appeals has no factual and legal basis.
First. Guevarra did not present evidence to show that the contested lot is part of a
relocation site under Proclamation No. 137. Proclamation No. 137 laid down the metes and
bounds of the land that it declared open for disposition to bona fide residents.
The records do not show that the contested lot is within the land specified by Proclamation No.
137. Guevarra had the burden to prove that the disputed lot is within the coverage of
Proclamation No. 137. He failed to do so.
Second. The Court of Appeals should not have given credence to Guevarras
unsubstantiated claim that he is the beneficiary of Proclamation No. 137. Guevarra merely
alleged that in the survey the project administrator conducted, he and not Pajuyo appeared as the
actual occupant of the lot. There is no proof that Guevarra actually availed of the benefits of
Proclamation No. 137. Pajuyo allowed Guevarra to occupy the disputed property in 1985.
President Aquino signed Proclamation No. 137 into law on 11 March 1986. Pajuyo made his
earliest demand for Guevarra to vacate the property in September 1994.
During the time that Guevarra temporarily held the property up to the time that Proclamation No.
137 allegedly segregated the disputed lot, Guevarra never applied as beneficiary of Proclamation
No. 137. Even when Guevarra already knew that Pajuyo was reclaiming possession of the
property, Guevarra did not take any step to comply with the requirements of Proclamation No.
137.
Third. Even assuming that the disputed lot is within the coverage of Proclamation No.
137 and Guevarra has a pending application over the lot, courts should still assume jurisdiction
and resolve the issue of possession. However, the jurisdiction of the courts would be limited to
the issue of physical possession only.
In Pitargue, we ruled that courts have jurisdiction over possessory actions involving public land
to determine the issue of physical possession. The determination of the respective rights of rival
claimants to public land is, however, distinct from the determination of who has the actual
physical possession or who has a better right of physical possession. The administrative
disposition and alienation of public lands should be threshed out in the proper government
agency. The Court of Appeals determination of Pajuyo and Guevarras rights under
Proclamation No. 137 was premature. Pajuyo and Guevarra were at most merely potential
beneficiaries of the law. Courts should not preempt the decision of the administrative agency
mandated by law to determine the qualifications of applicants for the acquisition of public lands.
Instead, courts should expeditiously resolve the issue of physical possession in ejectment cases to
prevent disorder and breaches of peace.





















NELSON LAGASO vs. GERALD B. SORIANO and GALILEO B.
SORIANO
G.R. No. 170864

FACTS:
Respondents filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Tabuk, Kalinga, a complaint for
Forcible Entry with Application for Termporary Restraining Order and a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction and Damages against petitioner. Respondents claimed they were the owners of a
parcel of land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-665, Lot No. 816, Pls-93 with an
area of 58,171 square meters. They allegedly acquired the same by purchase from their
grandfather, Arsenio Baac, on September 10, 1998, but even prior thereto, they were already
allowed by Arsenio Baac to cultivate said land. They paid real property taxes for said property
from 1990 to 1998 and had been in actual possession from that time.
However, on January 6, 2001, herein petitioner allegedly unlawfully entered the property
by means of force, stealth, and strategy and began cultivating the land for himself. Petitioner
insisted in his Answer that he, together with his mother, brothers, and sisters, were the lawful
owners of the land in question, being the legal heirs of Alfredo Lagazo, the registered owner
thereof. They denied that the subject land was sold to Arsenio Baac, alleging instead that the
agreement between Alfredo Lagazo and Arsenio Baac was merely one of mortgage. Petitioner,
likewise maintained that he and his co-heirs had always been in possession of the disputed land.
They allegedly tried several times to redeem the property, but Baac increased the redemption
price from P10,000.00 to P100,000.00. This prompted them to bring the matter before the
Barangay Lupon of Balong, Tabuk, Kalinga, but no agreement was reached.
On November 23, 2001, the MTC rendered a Decision and which was appealed to the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tabuk, Kalinga. Said appellate court ruled that herein
respondents failed to prove prior physical possession, thus, it reversed the MTC Decision and
dismissed the complaint against herein petitioner. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the
same was denied per CA Resolution dated December 20, 2005.

ISSUE:
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE
TO THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY PETITIONER SUBSTANTIATING HIS PRIORITY IN
POSSESSION OVER THE LOT IN CONTROVERSY.


RULING:
The Court finds the petition unmeritorious. Prior physical possession is an indispensable
element in forcible entry cases. Thus, the ultimate question here is who had prior physical
possession of the disputed land. Ordinarily, in a Petition for Review on Certiorari, this Court
only considers questions of law, as it is not a trier of facts. However, there are exceptions to this
general rule, such as, when the findings of fact of the appellate court are contrary to those of the
trial court. The most important evidence for respondents was the testimony of Brgy. Capt.
Artemio Fontanilla, who stated that he was born and had continuously resided in Balong, Tabuk,
Kalinga; that the disputed land was only about three kilometers from his house; that for the
longest time, he had always known that it was Arsenio Baac who was cultivating and occupying
said property; and that it was only sometime in January 2001, when the police asked him to
accompany them to the subject land, that he saw petitioner with some other men working said
land.
On the other hand, what petitioner's evidence sought to establish was that he and his co-
heirs continued to be the owners of the land, as his predecessor never intended to sell the
property to Arsenio Baac, the true agreement being only one of a mortgage. Petitioner never
established the fact of his physical possession over the disputed land. Ironically, the most telling
pieces of evidence that doomed petitioner's case were the testimonies of petitioner himself and
his sister, Marina Nialga. Their own admissions on the witness stand proved that respondents
were indeed the ones in physical possession of the subject property. Meanwhile, Marina Nialga
also recounted that in 1979, they left the subject property out of fear because Arsenio Baac
allegedly wanted to grab the land for himself. She testified that after they left in 1979, it was
already Arsenio Baac who cultivated said land. Despite such claim that Arsenio Baac took their
land with force and intimidation, Marina said they never reported the matter to the police, and
never filed any criminal action in court against Arsenio Baac.
Verily, the foregoing leaves no doubt in our mind that it was only on January 6, 2001 that
petitioner, believing himself to be the lawful owner of the disputed land, entered the same,
thereby disturbing respondents' peaceful possession thereof.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is dismissed. The Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated October 28, 2005 and December 20, 2005,
respectively, in CA G.R. SP No. 80709 are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.















































SPOUSES LETICIA & JOSE ERVIN ABAD ET AL vs. FIL-HOMES
REALTY and DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and MAGDIWANG
REALTY CORPORATION
G.R. No. 189239

FACTS:
Respondents were co-owners of two lots situated in Sucat, Paraaque City, filed a
complaint for unlawful detainer on May 7, 2003 against above-named petitioners before the
Paraaque Metropolitan Trial Court.
Respondents alleged that petitioners, through tolerance, had occupied the subject lots
since 1980 but ignored their repeated demands to vacate them. Petitioners countered that there is
no possession by tolerance for they have been in adverse, continuous and uninterrupted
possession of the lots for more than 30 years; and that respondents predecessor-in-interest,
Pilipinas Development Corporation, had no title to the lots. In any event, they contend that the
question of ownership must first be settled before the issue of possession may be
resolved.During the pendency of the case or on June 30, 2004, the City of Paraaque filed
expropriation proceedings covering the lots before the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque with
the intention of establishing a socialized housing project therein for distribution to the occupants
including petitioners. A writ of possession was consequently issued and a Certificate of Turn-
over given to the City.
Branch 77 of the MeTC, by Decision of March 3, 2008, rendered judgment in the
unlawful detainer case against petitioners. The MeTC held that as no payment had been made to
respondents for the lots, they still maintain ownership thereon. It added that petitioners cannot
claim a better right by virtue of the issuance of a Writ of Possession for the project beneficiaries
have yet to be named. On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), by Decision of September 4,
2008, reversed the MeTC decision and dismissed respondents complaint. The court a quo ruled
that the case filed by plaintiffs is unlawful detainer as shown by the allegations of the Complaint.
The ruling of the court a quo is not accurate. It is not the allegations of the Complaint that finally
determine whether a case is unlawful detainer, rather it is the evidence in the case.
The RTC went on to rule that the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the City bars the
continuation of the unlawful detainer proceedings, and since the judgment had already been
rendered in the expropriation proceedings which effectively turned over the lots to the City, the
MeTC has no jurisdiction to disregard the . . . final judgment and writ of possession due to
non-payment of just compensation

ISSUE:
WHETHER RESPONDENTS ACT OF ALLOWING SEVERAL YEARS TO PASS
WITHOUT REQUIRING [THEM] TO VACATE NOR FILING AN EJECTMENT CASE AGAINST
THEM AMOUNTS TO ACQUIESCENCE OR TOLERANCE OF THEIR POSSESSION.


RULING:

Petitioners did not present evidence to rebut respondents allegation of possession
by tolerance, and considering petitioners admission that they commenced occupation of
the property without the permission of the previous owner Pilipinas Development
Corporation as indicium of tolerance by respondents predecessor-in-interest, ruled in
favor of respondents. Respondents bought the lots from Pilipinas Development
Corporation in 1983. They stepped into the shoes of the seller with respect to its
relationship with petitioners.
Even if early on respondents made no demand or filed no action against petitioners
to eject them from the lots, they thereby merely maintained the status quo allowed
petitioners possession by tolerance.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED.

MILAGROS SALTING vs. JOHN VELEZ and CLARISSA R. VELEZ
G.R. No. 181930

FACTS:
Respondents filed a complaint for ejectment against petitioner. They obtained a favorable
decision when the Metropolitan Trial Court of Taguig City, ordered petitioner to vacate the
subject parcel of land and to pay attorneys fees and costs of suit. The decision became final and
executory, after which respondents filed a motion for execution which was opposed by
petitioner.
Thereafter, petitioner instituted an action before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
153, for Annulment of Sale of the Property covered by TCT No. 38079, with prayer for the
issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction against
respondents. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 70859-TG. Petitioner claimed that she
purchased the subject parcel of land from Villamena as evidenced by a notarized document
known as Sale of Real Estate. She further explained that respondents were able to obtain title to
the subject property through the fraudulent acts of the heirs of Villamena. Finally, she averred
that the decision in Civil Case No. 2524 had not attained finality as she was not properly
informed of the MeTC decision. Petitioner thus prayed that a TRO be issued, restraining
respondents and all persons acting for and in their behalf from executing the MeTC decision
dated March 28, 2006.

ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE WRIT OF
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AGAINST THE EXECUTION OF A JUDGMENT FOR
EJECTMENT.

RULING:
We find no merit in the petition. We first determine the validity of the service of the
March 28, 2006 MeTC decision on petitioners counsel who, as of that date, was already
deceased. If a party to a case has appeared by counsel, service of pleadings and judgments shall
be made upon his counsel or one of them, unless service upon the party himself is ordered by the
court.
Thus, when the MeTC decision was sent to petitioners counsel, such service of judgment
was valid and binding upon petitioner, notwithstanding the death of her counsel. It is not the
duty of the courts to inquire, during the progress of a case, whether the law firm or partnership
continues to exist lawfully, the partners are still alive, or its associates are still connected with the
firm. Litigants, represented by counsel, cannot simply sit back, relax, and await the outcome of
their case. It is the duty of the party-litigant to be in contact with her counsel from time to time in
order to be informed of the progress of her case. It is likewise the duty of the party to inform the
court of the fact of her counsels death. Her failure to do so means that she is negligent in the
protection of her cause, and she cannot pass the blame to the court which is not tasked to monitor
the changes in the circumstances of the parties and their counsels.
Petitioner is not entitled to a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the execution of the
MeTC decision. The enforcement of the writ of execution which would evict petitioner from her
residence is manifestly prejudicial to her interest. However, she possesses no legal right that
merits the protection of the courts through the writ of preliminary injunction. Her right to possess
the property in question has been declared inferior or inexistent in relation to respondents in the
ejectment case in the MeTC decision which has become final and executory.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The
Court of Appeals Decision dated November 29, 2007 and Resolution dated February 27, 2008 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 97618 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

ERLINDA REYES and ROSEMARIE MATIENZO vs. HON. JUDGE BELEN B. ORTIZ,
G.R. No. 137794

SPS. ALBERTO EMBORES and LOURDES EMBORES vs. HON. RAYMUNDO G.
VALLEGA
G.R. No. 149664

FACTS:
The parcels of land which are the subject matter of these cases are part of the Tala Estate,
situated between the boundaries of Caloocan City and Quezon City and encompassing an area of
7,007.9515 hectares more or less. In G.R. No. 137794, respondents Segundo Bautista and
spouses Bernard and Florencia Perl sought the ouster from the contested lots of Erlinda Reyes,
spouses Rene and Rosemarie Matienzo and Sergio Abejero, who are occupants of separate home
lots in Camarin, Caloocan City.
The first case was commenced on December 11, 1996, by respondent Segundo Bautista, a
registered owner of the parcel of land occupied by spouses Rene and Rosemarie Matienzo. The
case was a complaint for Recovery of Possession and/or Ownership of Real Property (Recovery
case) against the latter spouses with the RTC Caloocan City, Branch 124. This was docketed as
Civil Case No. C-17725. Shortly thereafter, a separate but related action, was initiated by the
Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of Lands on December 27, 1996, before
the Quezon City RTC, Branch 85 (re-raffled to Branch 93). This was a complaint for Annulment
of Title/Reversion (Annulment/Reversion case) against Biyaya Corporation and the Register of
Deeds of the Cities of Pasig, Caloocan, and Quezon, the City of Manila, and the Administrator of
the Land Registration Authority involving the Tala Estate. The case, docketed as Civil Case No.
Q-96-29810, sought to declare null and void the transfer certificates of title issued in the name of
Biyaya Corporation, and all derivative titles emanating therefrom, and to declare the land in suit
to be reverted to it as part of the patrimonial property of the State, and the same be awarded to
the actual occupants. One of the intervenors therein is Samahan ng Maliliit na Magkakapitbahay
(SAMAKABA) of which petitioners Erlinda Reyes and Rosemarie Matienzo are members.
On May 28, 1997, the Quezon City RTC in the Annulment/Reversion case issued a
Preliminary Injunction freezing all ejectment cases involving the Tala Estate pending in the
MeTCs of Quezon City and Caloocan City. Believing that the Injunction issued by the Quezon
City RTC can be beneficial to them in the Recovery case pending before the Caloocan City RTC,
on June 27, 1997, spouses Rene and Rosemarie Matienzo filed a motion to suspend the
proceedings of the Recovery case. On December 8, 1997, the Caloocan City RTC, Branch 124
denied said motion. Spouses Matienzo moved for the reconsideration of the motion, but the same
was denied on May 14, 1998. The spouses received the order denying their motion for
reconsideration on June 9, 1998. Trial on the merits started on December 2, 1998.
The second case, an ejectment complaint, was commenced by spouses Bernard and
Florencia Perl on June 25, 1997, against Erlinda Reyes before the Caloocan City MeTC, Branch
49. It was docketed as Civil Case No. 23477. Shortly thereafter, on July 8, 1997, spouses Perl
filed the third case, an ejectment action against Sergio Abejero. The case, which was raffled off
to Branch 49 of the Caloocan City MeTC, was docketed as Civil Case No. 23519. Subsequently,
these two ejectment cases were consolidated Ejectment cases.
In its Order dated January 22, 1999, the MeTC did not entertain Reyess motion, instead,
it required her to submit a position paper. Erlinda Reyes received the order on March 11, 1999.
On April 16, 1999, the trial court issued a Decision ordering Erlinda to vacate the contested
property. The Recovery case and the Ejectment cases converged when petitioners Rosemarie
Matienzo and Erlinda Reyes, joined on March 25, 1999 in filing directly with this Court the
instant petition denominated as Declaratory Relief, Certiorari, and Prohibition, mainly
assailing the denial of their respective motions for suspension. Petitioners Matienzo and Reyes
asked that the proceedings in the Ejectment cases and the Recovery case be declared null and
void for violating the Injunction order of the Quezon City RTC. This case is docketed as G.R.
No. 137794. During the pendency of G.R. No. 137794, certain events supervened when the
Ejectment cases ran their course and petitioner Reyes appealed the MeTC decision to the RTC.
G.R. No. 149664, on the other hand, emanated from four distinct ejectment complaints
filed against petitioners. The parcels of land from which petitioners were sought to be evicted
were located in Camarin, Caloocan City and within the Tala Estate. Petitioners were members of
Alyansa Ng Mga Naninirahan Sa Tala Friar Lands (ALNATFRAL), an intervenor in the
Reversion case. On March 4, 2003, the petitioners in G.R. No. 149664 filed a motion for
consolidation asking that the said case be consolidated with G.R. No. 137794. On July 28, 2006,
petitioners in G.R. No. 149664 filed a Motion to Withdraw and/or Dismiss Instant Petition,
stating that since a decision in the Annulment/Reversion case (Civil Case No. Q-96-29810) was
already issued (although they did not attach a copy thereof), the petition is therefore rendered
moot and academic as the injunction order was effective only pending determination of the
merits.On August 30, 2006, the Court granted the motion to withdraw petition in G.R. No.
149664 and considered the same closed and terminated. On October 11, 2006, G.R. No. 149664
became final and executory.
Petitioners specifically alleged that the MeTCs refusal to suspend the Ejectment cases
despite the Injunction order is tantamount or amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction. As
to the Caloocan City RTC, its desistance to heed the Injunction is unjustified and contrary to
well-settled jurisprudence. It must be recalled that on December 8, 1997, the Caloocan City
RTC, Branch 124 denied Matienzos motion to suspend proceedings. It was only on March 25,
1999 that petitioner Matienzo assailed the order denying her motion for reconsideration, albeit
wrongly before this Court. From this, it can be inferred that petitioner Matienzos recourse is a
belated attempt designed to salvage her lost opportunity to assail the order denying her motion to
suspend proceedings.

ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT CALOOCAN CITY RTC AND METC COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN THEY DENIED PETITIONERS MOTIONS TO
SUSPEND PROCEEDINGS.

RULING:
Let a writ of preliminary Injunction be issued ordering defendant representing Biyaya
Corporation, its agents, assigns, and transferees, as well as all other persons representing
themselves as owners of certain portions of the land in question, otherwise known as the Tala
Estate, to immediately cease and desist from doing or causing to do, further acts of disposition of
the lots subject of the present complaint, such as the filing of ejectment cases in the Municipal
Trial Courts of Quezon City and Caloocan City and, the demolition and ejectment therefrom of
the members of the herein Intervenors. Accordingly, the Metropolitan Trial Courts of Quezon
City and Caloocan City are specifically ordered to cease and desist from further conducting trials
and proceedings in the ejectment cases filed and to be filed involving the lots of the present
complaint, until further orders from this Court. Hence, petitioners posture that the Ejectment
cases should be suspended due to the pendency of the Annulment/Reversion case is not
meritorious.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. The
Temporary Restraining Order dated October 25, 2000 issued by this Court is LIFTED.

SO ORDERED.







VIEGELY SAMELO vs. MANOTOK SERVICES, INC
G.R. No. 170509

FACTS:
Respondent alleged that it is the administrator of a parcel of land known as Lot 9-A,
Block 2913, situated at 2882 Dagupan Extension, Tondo, Manila. On January 31, 1997, the
respondent entered into a contract with the petitioner for the lease of a portion of Lot 9-A, Block
2913, described as Lot 4, Block 15 (subject premises). The lease contract was for a period of one
(1) year, with a monthly rental of P3,960.00. After the expiration of the lease contract on
December 31, 1997, the petitioner continued occupying the subject premises without paying the
rent. On August 5, 1998, the respondent, thru its President Rosa Manotok, sent a letter to the
petitioner demanding that she vacate the subject premises and pay compensation for its use and
occupancy. The petitioner, however, refused to heed these demands.
Respondent filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against the petitioner before the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 3, Manila.
The petitioner alleged that the respondent had no right to collect rentals because the
subject premises are located inside the property of the Philippine National Railways (PNR). She
also added that the respondent had no certificate of title over the subject premises. The petitioner
further claimed that her signature in the contract of lease was obtained through the respondents
misrepresentation. She likewise maintained that she is now the owner of the subject premises as
she had been in possession since 1944.
The MeTC, decided in favor of the respondent. The MeTC held that the only issue to be
resolved in an unlawful detainer case is physical possession or possession de facto, and that the
respondent had established its right of possession over the subject premises. It added that the
petitioners right under the lease contract already ceased upon the expiration of the said contract.
It further ruled that the petitioner is already estopped from questioning the right of the
respondent over the subject premises when she entered into a contract of lease with the
respondent.
The petitioner filed an appeal on the RTC. The RTC set aside the MeTCs
decision, and dismissed the complaint for unlawful detainer. The RTC held, among others, that
the respondent had no right to collect rentals as it failed to show that it had authority to
administer the subject premises and to enter into a contract of lease with the petitioner. It also
ruled that the subject premises, which were formerly owned by the PNR, are now owned by the
petitioner by virtue of her possession and stay in the premises since 1944.
The CA, in its decision of June 21, 2005, reversed and set aside the RTC decision, and
reinstated the MeTC judgment. The CA held that the petitioner is now estopped from
questioning the right of the respondent over the subject property. It explained that in an action
involving the possession of the subject premises, a tenant cannot controvert the title of his
landlord or assert any rights adverse to that title, without first delivering to the landlord the
premises acquired by virtue of the agreement between themselves. The appellate court added that
the petitioner cannot claim that she repudiated the lease contract, in the absence of any
unequivocal acts of repudiation.

ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT HAD NO AUTHORITY TO LEASE THE
SUBJECT PREMISES BECAUSE THE LATTER FAILED TO PROVE THAT IT IS ITS
OWNER OR ADMINISTRATOR.


RULING:
We find the petition unmeritorious. It is undisputed that the petitioner and the
respondent entered into a contract of lease. We note in this regard that in her answer with
affirmative defenses and counterclaim before the MeTC, the petitioner did not deny that she
signed the lease contract (although she maintained that her signature was obtained through the
respondents misrepresentations). Under the lease contract, the petitioner obligated herself to pay
a monthly rental to the respondent in the amount of P3,960.00. The lease period was for one
year, commencing on January 1, 1997 and expiring on December 31, 1997. It bears emphasis
that the respondent did not give the petitioner a notice to vacate upon the expiration of the lease
contract in December 1997 (the notice to vacate was sent only on August 5, 1998), and the latter
continued enjoying the subject premises for more than 15 days, without objection from the
respondent. By the inaction of the respondent as lessor, there can be no inference that it intended
to discontinue the lease contract.
We find no merit in the petitioners allegation that the respondent had no authority to
lease the subject premises because the latter failed to prove that it is its owner or administrator.
Additionally, the petitioner is liable to pay interest by way of damages for her failure to pay the
rentals due for the use of the subject premises. We reiterate that the respondents extrajudicial
demand on the petitioner was made on August 5, 1998. Thus, from this date, the rentals due from
the petitioner shall earn interest at 6% per annum, until the judgment in this case becomes final
and executory. After the finality of judgment, and until full payment of the rentals and interests
due, the legal rate of interest to be imposed shall be 12%.

WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, we DENY the petition. The decision and
the resolution of the Court of Appeals dated June 21, 2005 and November 10, 2005, respectively,
in CA-G.R. SP No. 85664 are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the unpaid rentals
shall earn a corresponding interest of six percent (6%) per annum, to be computed from August
5, 1998 until the finality of this decision. After this decision becomes final and executory, the
rate of legal interest shall be computed at twelve percent (12%) per annum from such finality
until its satisfaction.

SO ORDERED.






















HEIRS OF ROGELIO ISIP ET AL vs. RODOLFO QUINTOS ET AL
G.R. No. 172008

FACTS:
Rogelio Isip, Sr occupied and took possession of a parcel of land where Rogelio Sr.
constructed a small house to serve as his place of residence. A year later, Toyo Keiki Philippines,
Inc. (Toyo Keiki) requested Rogelio Sr. that it be allowed to dig a deep well on the subject
property and to put up thereon a water distribution system. Since Rogelio Sr. was a stockholder
of Toyo Keiki, he allowed the corporation to build the water distribution system. Thus, Toyo
Keiki tore down Rogelio Sr.s house and replaced it with a bigger structure with a room for the
latter and an office in front. The water distribution project, however, did not become fully
operational. In January 1991, the deep well was rehabilitated with funding from Sunrise
Management Corporation and Jiro Yamashita. Upon the completion of the rehabilitation work,
Sunrise Management Corporation operated the water distribution system with Rogelio Sr. as
General Manager, assisted by his two sons Rolando Isip and Rogelio Isip, Jr. and brother-in-law
Alfredo Lobo.In 1997, Rodolfo Quintos proposed to Rogelio Sr. to operate a car repair shop in
the compound. Since Quintos is a former claims manager in an insurance company and is
familiar with running a business, Rogelio Sr. agreed and, hence, a car repair shop was
constructed in the compound.
However, despite the completion of the repair shop, they were not able to start the
business due to Rogelio Sr.s illness. Upon Rogelio Sr.s death his son Rolando was appointed
General Manager of the water distribution system of Sunrise Management Corporation. Quintos
then revived to Rolando the proposal to establish the car repair shop. When Rolando returned to
the compound, however, he was refused entry by three armed security guards allegedly upon the
instructions of Quintos, Rodolfo De Guzman and Isagani Isip.
Thus, on January 4, 1999, petitioners Celedonia Isip, Rolando, Rogelio Jr. and Irene Isip-
Silvestre, claiming to be the legitimate children and legal heirs of Rogelio Sr., filed before the
MeTC of Taguig City a complaint for forcible entry against respondents Quintos, De Guzman,
and Isip, all doing business under the name Roniro Enterprises. Petitioners claimed that
respondents, through deceit, strategy, and stealth, succeeded in entering the deep well compound
and once inside the premises, prevented the petitioners from re-entering the same through the use
of force, intimidation, and threat. Respondents claimed that Rogelio Sr., the petitioners
predecessor-in-interest, was an employee of Sunrise Management Corporation. After the death of
Rogelio Sr., De Guzman wrote a letter dated August 14, 1998 addressed to the president and
chairman of the board of Sunrise Management Corporation stating that he is terminating the
services of the said corporation because of the unfortunate death of Rogelio Sr.
The MeTC rendered a Decision on May 22, 2001 dismissing the complaint for lack of
cause of action. It held that no forcible entry was committed since Roniro Enterprises was merely
exercising its right over the premises. Upon appeal, the RTC initially reversed and set aside the
MeTCs Decision. Aggrieved, petitioners filed a petition for review before the CA. On June 18,
2003, the CA rendered the herein assailed Decision dismissing the petition and affirming the
Order of the RTC. Undeterred, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but it was likewise
denied.

ISSUE:
WHETHER THE RESPONDENTS COMMITTED FORCIBLE ENTRY.


RULING:

The petition lacks merit. Under Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, a case of
forcible entry may be filed by, "a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth x x x." In cases of forcible entry, "the possession is illegal
from the beginning and the basic inquiry centers on who has the prior possession de facto."
In the case at bench, It is clear that respondents have prior possession de facto. The
possession of respondents was lawful from the beginning since it was acquired through lawful
means and thus no forcible entry was committed.
It is clear from the facts that when the rights over the subject lot was relinquished in favor
of De Guzman, Rogelio Sr. was employed in order to help the respondents run the water
distribution system. Hence, it was actually through the respondents that the petitioners
predecessor-in-interest was able to enter the disputed lot. And although Rogelio Sr. was able to
occupy the lot, he was in fact possessing the same in the name of the respondents. Verily,
whatever right to possess petitioners have in this case cannot be superior to that of the
respondents since it was from the latter that their predecessor-in-interest derived his claim of
possession.
Actual possession of land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such
a nature as those a party would naturally exercise over his own property. It is not necessary that
the owner of a parcel of land should himself occupy the property as someone in his name may
perform the act. In other words, the owner of real estate has possession, either when he himself is
physically in occupation of the property, or when another person who recognizes his rights as
owner is in such occupancy. This declaration is in conformity with Art. 524 of the Civil Code
providing that possession may be exercised in ones own name or in the name of another.

To conclude and to finally put this case to rest, forcible entry being an ejectment case is
summary in nature. When the findings of facts of the trial court have been affirmed by the CA,
such are binding and deemed conclusive upon the Supreme Court.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision
dated June 18, 2003 and Resolution dated March 21, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 74178 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.





























SPOUSES EULOGIO N. ANTAZO vs.
LEONIDES DOBLADA, ET AL
G.R. No. 178908

FACTS:
Respondents, Leonides Doblada, Diosdado Celestra, Leopoldo Celestra, Ferdinand Celestra,
and Roberto Doblada, filed a complaint for forcible entry against petitioners, spouses Eulogio N.
Antazo and Nelia C. Antazo. The complaint alleged that respondents have been in open and peaceful
possession of a parcel of land, identified as Assessors Lot Nos. 112 and 113, located in Barangay
Pila-Pila, Binangonan, Rizal, with an area of, approximately, 551.87 square meters. In May 2003,
they received a letter from petitioners, through the Panganiban Law Office, informing them that the
latter had bought the property. It was made to appear in the said letter that respondents forcibly took
possession of the property from petitioners. Petitioners admitted that they sent a letter to respondents
through the Panganiban Law Office, but they denied that respondents had been in possession of the
property since time immemorial. They averred that respondents failed to show their right to recover
possession of the property. On the contrary, petitioners claimed that they are the ones entitled to
possess the property considering that they purchased it from a certain Carmencita S. Anciano,
registered it for taxation purposes in their names, and paid the real property tax thereon.
The records reveal that the subject property is part of the parcel of land owned by Eduardo
Paralejas, respondents great grandfather, who died in 1939. Paralejas had three daughters: Matea,
Eufemia and Leoncia. On April 12, 1983, Eufemia and Atanacio Buesa, Mateas son, purportedly
executed an Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale, adjudicating to themselves the entire parcel of land
and, at the same time, selling it to Guadalupe Morales Sevillano. The document bears the
thumbprints of Eufemia and Atanacio, which, respondents claim, are not genuine. After Sevillano
died on November 24, 1995, her sole heir, Carmencita S. Anciano, petitioners predecessor-in-
interest, executed a document, denominated as Sinumpaang Salaysay ng Paglilipat sa Sarili ng Mga
Lupang Naiwan ng Namatay, adjudicating to herself the properties that Sevillano left, which included
the subject property. On April 21, 2003, Anciano sold the subject property to petitioners.
On July 2, 2004, the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) dismissed the complaint because
respondents failed to prove by preponderance of evidence that they had prior possession of the
subject property. On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) initially affirmed the MTC Decision.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the motion was denied by the RTC on August 1, 2006.
Unrelenting, petitioners filed a petition for review with the CA. On February 28, 2007, the CA
affirmed the RTC.According to the CA, petitioners may not eject respondents from the subject
property since it appears that, as between them, the latter had prior possession thereof. Assuming that
petitioners have the legal title to the property and that respondents are mere usurpers thereof, the
latter are nonetheless entitled to stay until they are lawfully ejected therefrom.

ISSUES:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
ERRED IN REVERSING ITS EARLIER DECISION DATED AUGUST 18, 2005 AND IN ORDERING
THE EJECTMENT OF PETITIONERS FROM LOTS 112 AND 113;
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT PETITIONERS HAVE PRIORITY
IN POSSESSION OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY.

RULING:
The petition is without merit. Petitioners argument is misplaced, considering that this is
a forcible entry case. They are apparently referring to "possession" flowing from ownership of
the property, as opposed to actual possession. In ejectment cases, possession means nothing more
than actual physical possession, not legal possession in the sense contemplated in civil law.
Prior physical possession is the primary consideration in a forcible entry case. A party
who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even against the owner himself.
Whatever may be the character of his possession, if he has in his favor prior possession in time,
he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until a person with a better right
lawfully ejects him. The party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be thrown out by a strong
hand, violence or terror. We are convinced that respondents were in prior possession of the
property and that petitioners deprived them of such possession by means of force.
The RTC correctly concluded that it would have been unnecessary to write the letter if
petitioners were already in possession of the property. The contents of the letter are clear
petitioners are demanding that respondents restore possession of the property to them.
We also note that petitioners did not deny in their Answer respondents allegation that
they constructed a concrete fence on the subject property. Failure to specifically deny the
allegation amounts to a judicial admission. While the Letter intimates that petitioners were in
possession of the property prior to respondents and that the latter were the ones who forcibly
evicted them therefrom, such statement is clearly self-serving and unsupported by other
evidence. Granting that petitioners had earlier possession and respondents were the ones who
first forcibly dispossessed them of the property, this circumstance would not have given
petitioners license to recover possession in the same way. Such course of action is precisely what
is sought to be avoided by the rule on ejectment. The underlying philosophy behind ejectment
suits is to prevent breach of the peace and criminal disorder and to compel the party out of
possession to respect and resort to the law alone to obtain what he claims is his. The party
deprived of possession must not take the law into his own hands. Petitioners would have had a
right of action against respondents to file an ejectment suit, but they evidently let the chance pass
and chose the easier and faster way. Unfortunately for them, this time, their opponents chose to
resort to appropriate judicial measures.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED DUE COURSE. The CA Decision dated
February 28, 2007 and Resolution dated July 18, 2007 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.



































ANTONIO ARBIZO vs. PACITA MARCELO
G.R. No. 171315

FACTS:
The respondents filed with the MCTC three separate Complaints for Ejectment against the
petitioner. In their Complaints, the respondents averred that right after they purchased the subject
properties in 1998, they immediately enclosed the same with a wooden perimeter fence with barbed
wire. Sometime in September 2000, the petitioner, without their knowledge, much less consent,
unlawfully occupied the subject properties by removing and destroying the fence they had installed,
and later replacing it with his own concrete fence. Despite repeated demands to vacate the subject
properties, petitioner vehemently refused to do so. Thus, respondents prayed that the petitioner be
ordered to vacate the subject properties, and to pay each of them. In response, the petitioner
countered that the subject lots formed part of the 29,345-square meter property previously owned by
his father, Celestino Arbizo, who occupied the same during his lifetime as early as 1921. Since then,
petitioner claimed to have been in peaceful, continuous and uninterrupted possession of the 11,230-
square meter parcel of land which included the subject properties.
On 18 August 2003, on the basis of the position papers and documentary evidence adduced
by the parties, the MCTC rendered a Decision dismissing the three Complaints for Ejectment filed by
the respondents after finding that the petitioner had preferred possession over the subject properties.
Dissatisfied, the respondents then elevated the matter to the RTC.
On 20 February 2004, the RTC sustained the dismissal by the MCTC of the respondents
Complaints for Ejectment, holding that the petitioner had a better right of possession over the subject
properties for having been in possession of the same long before they were acquired by the
respondents in 1998. The respondents then sought the reconsideration of the Decision, but the RTC
denied the same for lack of merit in the Order dated 17 March 2004.

ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAVE A VALID GROUND TO
EVICT PETITIONER FROM THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES.

RULING:
The Court of Appeals, in its assailed Decision, found that (1) respondents had prior
physical possession of the subject properties, and (2) they were deprived thereof by petitioner by
means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth.We agree in the conclusion of the Court
of Appeals.
On the issue of who has prior possession, respondents prior physical possession of the
subject properties and deprivation thereof are clear from the allegation that they are the owners
of the subject properties which petitioner forcibly entered, of which they were unlawfully turned
out of possession and for which they pray to be restored in possession.
In ejectment cases, the plaintiff merely needs to prove prior de facto possession and
undue deprivation thereof. Respondents in their complaint averred that after they purchased the
lots in 1998 they immediately enclosed the same with a fence. We emphasize that our
disquisition in this case is provisional and only to the extent necessary to determine who between
the parties has the better right of possession. In an appropriate proceeding before the court
having jurisdiction, petitioner may still have the sale of the subject property to respondents
annulled, and the latters title cancelled if petitioners case is truly meritorious. Additionally, it
must also be remembered that the subject property is registered under the Torrens System in the
names of the respondents whose title to the property is presumed legal and cannot be collaterally
attacked, less so in an action for forcible entry.
Admittedly, there are recognized exceptions to this rule when the evidence presented
during the trial may be examined and the factual matters resolved by this Court. Among these
exceptional circumstances is when the findings of fact of the appellate court differ from those of
the trial court.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 31 January 2006 in CA-G.R. SP No. 86456 is
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.
PAZ DE JESUS MESINA and PETER DE JESUS vs. CA and CETUS
DEVELOPMENT, INC.
G.R. No. 100228

FACTS:
The property is designated as No. 502 Quezon Boulevard, Quiapo, Manila. It was originally
owned by Gregorio Araneta from whom Clemente de Jesus, petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, leased it
way back in the late 1800's. In 1921, Clemente bought the two (2) houses erected on the lot. He died in
1972 survived by petitioners who are his daughter Paz Mesina and his grandchild by his deceased son,
Peter de Jesus, both of whom have lived in the property since birth. Paz has transferred residence to Pasay
City since then. Peter on the other hand has been staying in one of the two (2) houses while the other
house is being leased to different tenants who are paying monthly rentals to petitioners.
Meanwhile, Gregorio Araneta sold the land to Susana Realty, Inc., which in turn sold the same to
Cetus Development Corporation (CETUS, for brevity) sometime in 1984. On 14 February 1986, CETUS
filed a complaint for ejectment against Paz Mesina on the ground that the property was assigned by the
original lessor to her who in turn sublet the premises to other persons without the written consent of the
lessor.
Sometime in 1989, CETUS again initiated ejectment proceedings, this time impleading both Paz
Mesina and Peter de Jesus as defendants. On 18 June 1990, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Br.
10, rendered judgment ordering Paz Mesina and Peter de Jesus to vacate the leased premises.

On appeal,
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br. 41, reversed the judgment of the inferior court and ordered the
dismissal of the complaint filed by CETUS.
5
On 31 May 1991, the Court of Appeals reversed the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court and reinstated the Decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court;

hence,
this petition filed by Paz Mesina and Peter de Jesus.

ISSUE:
WHETHER RES JUDICATA APPLIES TO THE PRESENT ACTIONAND WHETHER OR
NOT THE INCLUSION OF AN ADDITIONAL PARTY DEFENDANT WOULD NOT
SUBSTANTIALLY AFFECT THE IDENTITY OF THE PARTIES BETWEEN THE FIRST AND THE
PRESENT CASE.

RULING:
There is no dispute as to the presence of the first three requisites. Hence, the bone of
contention is reduced to whether there is identity of parties and of causes of action between the
first case and the instant proceedings. For sure, there is identity of parties with respect to
petitioner Paz Mesina who was impleaded in the first action and again in the present case. With
regard however to petitioner Peter de Jesus, although he is a proper party in the first case,
there is no identity of parties between the two actions as he was never impleaded in the first court
proceedings. Consequently, he cannot be bound by pronouncements of the court therein. But the
question regarding the identity of parties is not the sole issue.
In ascertaining whether res judicata applies, it also has to be determined whether there is
identity of causes of action in both. There is none. The first case was based on the demand letter
to vacate dated 18 November 1985 for subleasing the leased premises, in express violation of
B.P. 877, whereas the present case is based on the demand letter dated 12 July 1989 for
subleasing the premises after 18 November 1985 and before 12 July 1989. While the first action
has already attained finality, it merely refers to the principal lease contract and the act of
subleasing the property prior to 18 November 1985. Considering that the existing contract
between petitioners and private respondent CETUS is admittedly a verbal month-to-month lease
contract which expires at the end of every thirty-day period but which is automatically renewed
for the next thirty-day period, repeating the same cycle for the succeeding thirty-day periods
until the implied lease is expressly terminated, each thirty-day lease contract is separate and
distinct from the other thirty-day leases. Hence, a cause of action based on one thirty-day period
is separate and distinct from a cause of action based on another thirty-day period. Accordingly,
there can be no identity in the causes of action between the two cases.
The contract of lease was impliedly renewed after the effectivity of B.P. 877, that
renewed lease became subject to the provisions of the statute and any act of subleasing the
premises without the consent of the lessor would be invalid under its provisions. Thus, the lessor
is prohibited from arbitrarily increasing the rentals and leaving the lessee no choice except to pay
up or vacate the leased premises for the shelterless streets. On the other hand, the lessee is not
permitted to insist on paying inordinately low rentals grown absurd and unrealistic in view of
rising costs, including the expenses of administering and maintaining the leased premises.
The Court is not unaware of the many gambits employed by landlords to eject their
incumbent tenants whose rentals may not be increased beyond the statutory maximum and who
may even enjoy the right to purchase the rented premises under certain conditions. Thus, lessor
may pretend to need the premises themselves or to have to undertake urgent repairs thereon or
not to have received rentals on time when their real purpose is to lease the properly to new
tenants at higher rentals not covered by the rental laws.
On the other hand, there are lessees who have taken undue advantage of the rental laws
by holding on to the leased premises although they no longer need them for their own residence
or administering them to the prejudice of the landlord by partitioning the apartment or lot and
subleasing them to separate families or individuals, or accepting bedspacers and boarders, each
paying rentals that in the aggregate are much more than the regulated rentals the original lessee is
paying the landlord.

The petitioner's contention that BP 877 is an ex post facto law must also be rejected. It is
not penal in nature and the mere fact that it contains penal provisions does not make it so. At any
rate, she is not being prosecuted under the said penal provisions. She was sued in the municipal
court in a civil complaint to eject her from the lot on the ground that she had unlawfully
subleased it.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of
merit. The questioned Decision of respondent Court of Appeals dated 31 May 1991 is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.





























SHOEMART, INC. vs. CA and ANSON EMPORIUM CORPORATION
G.R. No. 86956

FACTS:
On August 1, 1971, Anson Emporium Corporation leased from Shoemart, Inc. a portion
of the building known as the Makati Arcade for a period of two (2) years. It was stipulated in the
lease that after termination of the lease for any reason whatsoever, if the Owner shall permit
the tenant to remain in possession of the leased premises, it is expressly understood and agreed
that the lease shall be on a month to month basis in the absence of a written agreement to the
contrary.
Anson remained in possession after the two year period but on an increased rental. Four
years later, Shoemart terminated the month to month lease and gave notice to Anson to vacate
not later than August 31, 1977. Notwithstanding the notice and demand, Anson continued to stay
on, thus the complaint for ejectment filed with the then Municipal Court of Makati, Civil Case
No. 16896.
Anson raised the defenses that (1) the lease did not express the true intention and real
agreement of the parties, the true one being that its stay was guaranteed by Shoemart for a
maximum period of twenty-four (24) years and (2) assuming that the lease had expired, it still
cannot be ejected until a longer term is fixed in accordance with Article 1673 in relation to
Article 1687 of the Civil Code.
After proceedings were on their way, Shoemart asked for and was granted leave to file
supplemental complaint which alleged that the rental of all the tenants of the premises had been
increased which Anson refused to pay. In its answer to the supplemental complaint, Anson raised
the defenses that Shoemart's claim for increased rentals has been barred by estoppel, novation,
statute of frauds/limitations condonation, release and/or laches and in any event, the increase was
inequitable, unconscionable and arbitrary.

ISSUE:
WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN
LIMITING ANSON TO PAY ONLY THE SUM OF P45,142.00 MONTHLY STARTING JANUARY 1,
1979 UNTIL IT VACATES THE PREMISES DESPITE THE FACT THAT THERE WERE FOUR (4)
RENTAL INCREASES EFFECTED ON THE SUBJECT PREMISES DURING THE UNLAWFUL
DETAINER PERIOD AND DURING PENDENCY OF THE INSTANT CASE WHICH INCREASES
WERE PROVEN DURING THE TRIAL.

RULING:
In support of its first assignment of error, petitioner contends that there were four rental
increases effected during the period of unlawful detainer and during the pendency of the case,
which increases were duly proven during the trial. However, according to respondent court,
petitioner failed to present evidence on other approved and accepted rental increases and since
the supplemental complaint limited itself only to P45,142.00, the award of damages cannot go
beyond the said amount.
Contrary to the conclusion of respondent court, petitioner's recovery is not limited by the
amount of P45,142.00 prayed for in the supplemental complaint as increased rental effective
January 1, 1979. Petitioner, therefore, did not foreclose its right to demand increased rentals that
may be recovered expressed in terms of the fair rental value or the reasonable compensation for
the use and occupation of the real property.
In view of the failure of private respondent to object to the presentation of evidence
showing that there were four rental increases on the subject premises although three of said
increases are not alleged in the pleadings, judgment may be rendered validly as regards the said
increases or issues which shall be considered as if they have been raised in the pleadings .
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 2, 1988 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision of the Regional Trial Court dated November 10,
1987 is Reinstated with the modification that the award of 1% interest starting October 1, 1977
and the reimbursement of cost of electrical consumption is excluded without prejudice to the
institution of the proper collection case to enforce recovery and/or reimbursement of such cost
for electrical consumption. SO ORDERED.



GLICERIO AGUSTIN (Deceased) vs. LAUREANO BACALAN and the
PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF CEBU
G.R. No. L-46000

FACTS:
Bacalan is a lessee of a one-door ground floor space in a building owned by the late
Susana Agustin. Due to nonpayment of rentals despite repeated demands an action to eject him
was filed. the plaintiff-appellant prayed that the defendant-appellee be ordered to immediately
vacate the place in question, to pay plaintiff-appellant the sum of P2,300.00 representing
arrearages in rentals plus the corresponding rentals until he actually vacates the place, attorney's
fees, expenses, and costs. the defendant-appellee included a counter-claim alleging that the
present action was "clearly unfounded and devoid of merits, as it is tainted with malice and bad
faith on the part of the plaintiff for the obvious reason that plaintiff pretty well knows that
defendant does not have any rentals in arrears due to the estate of Susana Agustin, but
notwithstanding this knowledge, plaintiff filed the present action merely to annoy, vex,
embarrass and inconvenience the defendant. The City Court of Cebu subsequently rendered
judgment dismissing the counterclaim and ordering the defendant to vacate the premises in
question and to pay the plaintiff the sum of P3,887.10 as unpaid back rentals and the sum of
P150.00 as attorney's fees' From this decision, the defendant filed an appeal with Branch Ill of
the Court of First Instance of Cebu.
A motion to dismiss was filed by the defendant on the grounds that the plaintiff has no
cause of action and that the court lacks jurisdiction to declare the nullity of a decision of another
branch of the Court of First Instance of Cebu.
Plaintiff-appellant's motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting him to file an
appeal before the Court of Appeals, which, in a resolution, certified the same to us on the ground
that it involves pure questions of law.

ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE MAY, IN AN APPEAL,
AWARD THE DEFENDANT-APPELLEE'S COUNTERCLAIM IN AN AMOUNT
EXCEEDING OR BEYOND THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF ORIGIN.

RULING:
Thus, the defendant-appellee's counterclaim beyond P10,000.00, the jurisdictional
amount of the city Court of Cebu, should be treated as having been deemed waived. It is as
though it has never been brought before trial court. It may not be entertained on appeal.
The amount of judgment, therefore, obtained by the defendant-appellee on appeal, cannot
exceed the jurisdiction of the court in which the action began. Since the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the defendant's counterclaim in excess of the jurisdictional amount, the
appellate court, likewise, acquired no jurisdiction over the same by its decisions or otherwise.
Appellate jurisdiction being not only a continuation of the exercise of the same judicial power
which has been executed in the court of original jurisdiction, also presupposes that the original
and appellate courts are capable of participating in the exercise of the same judicial power (See 2
Am. Jur. 850; Stacey Cheese Company v. R.E. Pipkin, Appt. 155 NC 394, 71 S.E. 442, 37 LRA
606) It is the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction that it revises and corrects the
proceedings in a cause already instituted, and does not create that cause.
The nullity of such portion of the decision in question, however, is not such as to affect
the conclusions reached by the court in the main case for ejectment. Consequently, the decision
over the main action, in the case at bar, must stand, best remembering that a counter-claim, by its
very nature, is a cause of action separate and independent from the plaintiff's claim against the
defendant.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch III in Civil
Case No. R-12430 for ejectment is hereby DECLARED NULL AND VOID insofar as it
awards damages on the defendant-appellee's counterclaim in excess of P6,000.00 beyond its
appellate jurisdiction. The decision in all other respects is AFFIRMED.

LA CAMPANA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,vs. ARTURO
LEDESMA, ET AL
G.R. No. 154152


FACTS:
Petitioner filed an ejectment case with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) against private
respondent Ledesma, alleging that despite expiration of the contract of lease executed between them and
demands to vacate subject premises and pay rentals therefor, the latter failed to comply with such
demands. Private respondent countered in his Answer that he had paid the rentals over subject premises
and petitioner no longer had the right to possess the property as it had been foreclosed by the
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP). Private respondent further pointed out that subject premises
had in fact been in the possession of the DBP since March or April of 1997, so since that time, it was with
the DBP that he made arrangements for his continued occupation of the subject premises.
The MeTC then rendered judgment in favor of petitioner, ordering private respondent to surrender
possession of subject premises to petitioner. Private respondent appealed to the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), and to stay execution of said judgment, private respondent filed a supersedeas bond with the
MeTC.
The RTC affirmed the MeTC judgment. Petitioner then moved for the immediate execution of the
RTC Decision, which motion was granted by the RTC. Meanwhile, private respondent elevated the case
to the CA via a petition for review on certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order or writ of preliminary injunction. A temporary restraining order was issued by the CA, effectively
staying implementation of the writ of execution issued by the RTC. Eventually, the CA also issued a writ
of preliminary injunction per Resolution dated February 13, 2002.

ISSUE:
WHETHER THE CA COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT ORDERED THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION TO STAY THE IMMEDIATE EXECUTION OF THE RTC
JUDGMENT AND WHETHER MANDAMUS LIES TO COMPEL RESPONDENT RTC JUDGE TO
ISSUE A WRIT OF EXECUTION.

RULING:
The Court finds the petition unmeritorious. Grave abuse of discretion means a capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of
discretion is not enough; it must be so grave as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as
to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or
to act at all in contemplation or law.
The CA did not gravely abuse its discretion in this case; rather, it acted prudently when it
stayed execution of the RTC Decision until such time that a final resolution of the main case is
reached. Since the only damages that petitioner may be entitled to in an action for unlawful
detainer are those arising from its loss of the use or occupation of subject premises, the only
damages petitioner can claim by reason of the stay of execution of the RTC judgment is also
only for the "rent" or "fair rental value" for the property in question.
Therefore, the CA did not err in considering the supersedeas bond filed with the MTC,
which answers for unpaid rentals, as sufficient bond for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction.

In light of the foregoing, it is quite clear that there is no reason to compel the RTC to
immediately implement the writ of execution in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Resolutions of the
Court of Appeals, dated February 13, 2002 and June 28, 2002, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No.
66668, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.


ERNESTO VILLEZA vs. GERMAN MANAGEMENT AND
SERVICES, INC., ET AL
G.R. No. 182937


FACTS:
Petitioner filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution with the MeTC. On February
28, 1992, the MeTC issued an order holding in abeyance the resolution of his motion to issue
writ of execution until his return. Three years later, as there was no further movement, the said
court issued an order dated January 9, 1995 denying petitioners pending Motion for Issuance of
Writ of Execution for lack of interest.
More than three (3) years had passed before petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration
dated May 29, 1998 alleging that he had retired from his job in Iloilo City and was still interested
in the issuance of the writ. On October 8, 1998, the MeTC issued a writ of execution.
Respondent German Management moved to dismiss the complaint. It alleged that it had been
more than 10 years from the time the right of action accrued, that is, from October 5, 1989, the
date of the finality of the Court's decision to October 3, 2000, the date of the filing of the
complaint for its revival. It further argued that, pursuant to Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court in relation to Article 1144 of the Civil Code, the complaint is now barred by the statute of
limitations.
On March 29, 2001, the MeTC granted the motion to dismiss reasoning that Article 1144
of the Civil Code was categorical that an action to enforce a judgment must be brought within
ten years from the time such right accrues. Since it had been almost 11 years from the time the
1989 Courts decision became final and executory, the action to revive it was barred.

ISSUE:
WHETHER THE INTERRUPTION OR SUSPENSION GRANTED BY THE METC MUST BE
CONSIDERED IN COMPUTING THE PERIOD BECAUSE IT HAS THE EFFECT OF TOLLING
OR STOPPING THE COUNTING OF THE PERIOD FOR EXECUTION.

RULING:
The Court finds no merit in this petition. The rules are clear. Once a judgment becomes
final and executory, the prevailing party can have it executed as a matter of right by mere
motion within five years from the date of entry of judgment. If the prevailing party fails to have
the decision enforced by a motion after the lapse of five years, the said judgment is reduced to a
right of action which must be enforced by the institution of a complaint in a regular court within
ten years from the time the judgment becomes final.
When petitioner Villeza filed the complaint for revival of judgment on October 3, 2000, it
had already been eleven (11) years from the finality of the judgment he sought to revive.
Clearly, the statute of limitations had set in.
The Court has pronounced in a plethora of cases that it is revolting to the conscience to
allow someone to further avert the satisfaction of an obligation because of sheer literal adherence
to technicality; that although strict compliance with the rules of procedure is desired, liberal
interpretation is warranted in cases where a strict enforcement of the rules will not serve the
ends of justice; and that it is a better rule that courts, under the principle of equity, will not be
guided or bound strictly by the statute of limitations or the doctrine of laches when to do so,
manifest wrong or injustice would result. These cases, though, remain exceptions to the general
rule. The purpose of the law in prescribing time limitations for enforcing judgment by action is
precisely to prevent the winning parties from sleeping on their rights.



WHEREFORE, the May 9, 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR No. SP No.
84035 is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.



CITY OF NAGA vs.
HON. ELVI JOHN S. ASUNCION, ET AL
G.R. No. 174042

FACTS:
Macario A. Mariano and Jose A. Gimenez were the registered owners of a 229,301-
square meter land in Naga City. The land was subdivided into several lots and sold as part of
City Heights Subdivision (CHS). In a Letter dated July 3, 1954, the officers of CHS offered to
construct the Naga City Hall on a two (2)-hectare lot within the premises of the subdivision. Said
lot was to be designated as an open space for public purpose and donated to petitioner in
accordance with the rules and regulations of the National Urban Planning Commission. On
September 17, 1959, Mariano wrote a letter to Mayor Imperial inquiring on the status of the
latters proposal for the city government to buy the lots instead. Then, through a note dated May
14, 1968, Mariano directed Atty. Eusebio Lopez, Jr., CHS General Manager, to disregard the
proposed donation of lots and insist on Mayor Imperials offer for the city government to
purchase them.On December 2, 1971, Macario A. Mariano died.
Meanwhile, the city government continued in possession of the lots, and constructed the
Naga City Hall on Block 25 and the public market on Block 26. It also conveyed to other
government offices portions of the land which at present, house the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI), Land Transportation Office, and Hall of Justice, among others.Thus, on
February 12, 2004, respondent filed a Complaint for unlawful detainer against petitioner before
the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Naga City, Branch 1.
In a Decision dated February 14, 2005 of the MTC in Civil Case No. 12334, the MTC
dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. It ruled that the citys claim of ownership over the lots
posed an issue not cognizable in an unlawful detainer case.

ISSUE:
WHETHER RTC JUDGE MONTENEGRO COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN GRANTING EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL.

RULING:
Petitioner City of Naga ascribes grave abuse of discretion on Judge Montenegro for
allowing execution pending appeal and for refusing to inhibit himself from the proceedings. It
contends that its claim of ownership over the lots behooved the RTC of jurisdiction to try the
illegal detainer case. Granting arguendo that the RTC had jurisdiction and its judgment was
immediately executory, petitioner insists that the circumstances in the case at bar warranted
against it. For one, the people of Naga would be deprived of access to basic social services even
before respondents right to possess the land has been conclusively established. The City of Naga
assails the validity of the order of execution issued by the court inasmuch as it excluded the NBI,
City Hall and Hall of Justice from its coverage; ordered garnishment of government funds; and
directed the Sangguniang Panlungsod to appropriate money in violation of the Supreme Court
Administrative Circular No. 10-2000.
A writ of preliminary injunction is available to prevent threatened or continuous
irremediable injury to parties before their claims can be thoroughly studied and adjudicated. Its
sole objective is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard fully. As a
rule, the issuance of a preliminary injunction rests entirely within the discretion of the court
taking cognizance of the case and will not be interfered with, except in cases of manifest abuse.
Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to
lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Similarly, in our view, the charge of grave abuse of discretion against Clerk of Court
Atty. Jesus Mampo and Sheriff Jorge B. Lopez cannot prosper. When Judge Montenegro issued
the order directing the issuance of a writ of execution, Atty. Jesus Mampo was left with no
choice but to issue the writ.