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In this unpublished decision, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) remanded the record for further consideration of the respondent’s derivative citizenship claim under former INA 321(a)(3) because the immigration judge erroneously believed he was required to submit court-issued documentation establishing that his parents were legally separated at the time his mother naturalized. The decision was issued by Member Anne Greer and joined by Member Roger Pauley and Member Linda Wendtland.
Looking for IRAC’s Index of Unpublished BIA Decisions? Visit www.irac.net/unpublished/index
In this unpublished decision, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) remanded the record for further consideration of the respondent’s derivative citizenship claim under former INA 321(a)(3) because the immigration judge erroneously believed he was required to submit court-issued documentation establishing that his parents were legally separated at the time his mother naturalized. The decision was issued by Member Anne Greer and joined by Member Roger Pauley and Member Linda Wendtland.
Looking for IRAC’s Index of Unpublished BIA Decisions? Visit www.irac.net/unpublished/index
In this unpublished decision, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) remanded the record for further consideration of the respondent’s derivative citizenship claim under former INA 321(a)(3) because the immigration judge erroneously believed he was required to submit court-issued documentation establishing that his parents were legally separated at the time his mother naturalized. The decision was issued by Member Anne Greer and joined by Member Roger Pauley and Member Linda Wendtland.
Looking for IRAC’s Index of Unpublished BIA Decisions? Visit www.irac.net/unpublished/index
1624 Voorhies Avenue Brooklyn, NY 11235 U.S. Department of Justice Executive Offce fr Imigration Review Board of Immigration Appeals Qfce of the Clerk 5107 leesburg Pik, Suie 2000 Fals Church, Virginia 20530 OHS/ICE Ofice of Chief Counsel - NEW P.O. Box 1898 Newark, NJ 07101 Name: BORDAMONTE, ROBINSON W A 035-979-158 Date of this notice: 10/8/2014 Enclosed is a copy of the Board's decision and order in the above-refrenced case. Enclosure Panel Members: Greer, Anne J. Pauley, Roger Wendtland, Linda S. Sincerely, Dc c t Donna Carr Chief Clerk Userteam: Docket For more unpublished BIA decisions, visit www.irac.net/unpublished I m m i g r a n t
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w w w . i r a c . n e t Cite as: Robinson W. Bordamonte, A035 979 158 (BIA Oct. 8, 2014) BORDAMONTE, ROBINSON W A035-979-158 ICE/ESSEX COUNTY JAIL 354 DOREMUS AVENUE NEWARK, NJ 07105 U.S. Department of Justice Executive Ofce fr Immigration Review Board of Immigration Appeals Ofce of the Clerk 5 J 07 Leesburg Pik, Suite 2000 Fals Church, Vrginia 20530 OHS/ICE Ofice of Chief Counsel - NEW P .0. Box 1898 Newark, NJ 07101 Name: BORDAMONTE, ROBINSON W A 035-979-158 Date of this notice: 10/8/2014 Enclosed is a copy of the Board's decision in the above-refrenced case. This copy is being provided to you as a courtesy. Your attorey or representative has been served with this decision pursuant to 8 C.F.R. 1292.S(a). If the attached decision orders that you be removed fom the United States or affrs a Immigration Judge's decision ordering that you be removed, ay petition fr review of the attached decision must be fled with and received by the appropriate cour of appeals witin 30 days of the date of the decision. Enclosure Panel Members: Greer, Anne J. Pauley, Roger Wendtland, Linda S. Sincerely, Donna Car Chief Clerk lucamd Useream: PgfJ:!!. I m m i g r a n t
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w w w . i r a c . n e t Cite as: Robinson W. Bordamonte, A035 979 158 (BIA Oct. 8, 2014) .i U.S. Deparment of Justice Executive Ofce fr Immigration Review Decision of the Boad of Immigation Appeals Falls Chuch, Virginia 20530 File: A035 979 158-Newak, NJ Date: OCT -82014 I re: ROBINSON W BORAMONTE IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS APPEAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: Umit Mike Gursoy, Esquire CHAGE: Notice: Sec. 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), l&N Act [8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)] - Convicted of aggravated flony (as defned in section 101(a)(43)(G)) Sec. 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), l&N Act [8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)] - Convicted of aggravated felony (as defned in section 10l(a)(43)() Sec. 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), l&N Act [8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(i i i)] - Convicted of aggavated flony (as defned in secton 101(a)(43)(M)) (withdrawn) Sec. 237(a)(2)(A)(ii), l&N Act [8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii)] - Convicted of two or more crimes ivolving moral turitude Lodged: Sec. 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), l&N Act [8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)] - Convicted of aggravated felony (as defned in section 10l{a)(43)()) APPLICATION: Terination of proceedings The respondent appeals the Immigration Judge's May 1, 2014, decision denying his motion to terminate his prceedings based on his clam that he derved United States citizenship by virte of his moter's natalizaton under frer section 32l(a)(3) of te Imgation ad Nationaity Act, 8 U.S.C. 1432(a)(3). The appeal will be susted, ad the record will be remanded to the Imigration Judge fr fher proceedings consistent with this opinion ad fr entry of a new decision. In her decision, te Imigation Judge dened the respondent's motion to terinate his proceedings based on his clam of derivative citizenship under frer section 321(a)(3) of the Act (I.J. at 6-13). 1 Specifcally, relying on the Tird Circuit's decision in Morgan v. At' Gen., 432 F.3d 226 (3d Cir. 2005), the Immigration Judge apparently concluded that because the 1 Forer section 32l(a)(3) of the Act provides, in pertinent pa, tat a child derves United States citizenship though "[t]he naturalization of the paent having legal custody of the child when there has been a legal s eparation of the paents ... " (emphases added). I m m i g r a n t
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w w w . i r a c . n e t Cite as: Robinson W. Bordamonte, A035 979 158 (BIA Oct. 8, 2014) A035 979 158 respondent could not provide a document issued by a cour atering the marital relationshp of his paents, he could not establish they had been legally sepaated at the time his mother naturalized (Tr. at 13). 2 The Immigration Judge does not appear to have fher considered the merits of the respondent's claim. On appeal, the respondent agues that the Immigration Judge erred in requiring a cou-issued document of legal separation in order fr him to meet his burden of proof under frmer section 321 ( a)(3) of the Act. In this regard, te respondent cites Philippine law which, he claims, does not require a couple to obtn legal documentation of a infrmal separaton but lows fr a spouse to legally remary afer having been sepaated fr 4 consecutive years. See Respondent's Brief at 7-9. The respondent claims that his paents were legally sepaated when hs moter naturalized because she wa permitted to legally rema under Philippine law, ad tat he was in her sole custody in the United States at that time. The issue in this case is not whether te respondent has a lega document issued by a cou, as the Immigaton Judge appaently concluded. Rather, the issue is whether there was a fral action by a competent goverent autorit alterng te marital relationship, thereby establishing with certainty that a legal separation occured. See Morgan v. Atty Gen., supra, at 234; see also Leslie v. At' Gen., 208 F. App'x 108, 113 (3d Cir. 2006) (unpublished). 3 Ideed, in Morgan, te Third Circuit noted that a "frmal action" need not necessarily be a judicial decree, citing te fct that tere is noting in the laguage of the statute tat requires that a court must act fr a legal sepaation to exist. Id. at 234 n.4. Tus, the Third Circuit appeas to be concered not with ay paicula legal document bt with te recogition by a state authority that the marital relationship was altered such that it could be deterined with some cernty that a "legal separation" occured. See id.; see also Mater of H-, supra. Here, the respondent claims that neither New Jersey nor the Philippines required a decree of frmal sepaation at te time his parents sepaated. Thus, he contends, he canot be fulted fr not having a judicial decree to present to the cour. See Leslie v. Atty Gen., supra (fnding no fult where the paents did not obtan a judicia decree where te relevant juisdiction did not provide fr one). However, the record does not indicate that the Immigation Judge considered any of te respondent's arguments as to the issue of whether there was a "legal separation" at te 2 Te substance of the Immigation Judge's decision that is at issue is fund primarly in the transcript. I her written decision, the Immigration Judge concluded without explanation tat the respondent provided no evidence that there was a legal separation (I.J. at 3-4). 3 In this regard, we note that te language used by the Board in Matter of H-, 3 I&N Dec. 742 (BIA 1949), could be read to suggest suppor fr te proposition that a "legal sepaation" refrs only to a "limited or absolute divorce obtained trough judicial proceedings." See id. at 743-44. However, Matter of H- stads fr the proposition that a sepaation must include state involvement, e.g., a cour order or some other recogition fom the state, in order to qualif under frmer section 32l(a)(3) of the Act. See, e.g., Brissett v. Ashcrof, 363 F.3d 130, 135 ad n.4 (2d Cir. 2004). 2 I m m i g r a n t
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w w w . i r a c . n e t Cite as: Robinson W. Bordamonte, A035 979 158 (BIA Oct. 8, 2014) ' A035 979 158 time of his mother's nataization, and it appears that she instead relied solely on his lack of a cou-issued document (Tr. at 13). We conclude that the record does not indicate that the Immgration Judge properly applied the Third Circuit's decision in Morgan to the respondent's case when she apparently required him to present a cou-issued docuent (Tr. at 13). See 8 C.F.R. 1003.l(d)(3)(ii) (2014) (de novo review). Fuer, the content of freig law is a question of fct, and we generally canot mae fndings of fct on appea. See Mater of A-G-G-, 25 I&N Dec. 486, 505 n.19 (BIA 2011) (citing Matter of Annang, 14 l&N Dec. 502, 503 (BIA 1973)); 8 C.F.R. 1003.l(d)(3)(iv). Therefre, we fnd that a remad is warated fr the Imigration Judge to consider the respondent's agument regading his claim under frmer section 321(a)(3) of te Act. Should the Immigation Judge deterine tat the respondent ha met his burden of proof fr his claim of dervative citizenship, te proceedings should be terminated. Accordingly, the appeal will be sustained, ad the record will be remaded to the Immigation Judge fr fher proceedings consistent with tis opinion and fr enty of a new decision. ORER: Te appeal is sustained, and the record is remanded to te Immigration Judge fr fher proceedings consistent wit tis opinion and fr enty of a new decision. 3 I m m i g r a n t
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w w w . i r a c . n e t Cite as: Robinson W. Bordamonte, A035 979 158 (BIA Oct. 8, 2014) , I ' UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTI CE EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR I MMIGRATI ON REVIEW UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION COURT NEWARK, NEW JERSEY File: A035-979-158 In the Mater of May 1, 2014 ROBI NSON W. BORDAMONTE RESPONDENT ) ) ) ) IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS CHARGES: Section 237(a)(2){A)(iii) Immigration and Nationality Act - aggravated felony; Section 237(a){2)(A){iii) Immigration and Nationality Act -- aggravated felony; Section 237(a)(2)(A)(ii) Immigrtion and Nationalit Act - two crimes involving moral turpitude; Section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) Immigration and Nationality Act - - aggravated felony APPLICATIONS: Termination ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: LETI CIA ZUNIGA 832 Clifon Avenue Clifon, New Jersey 07013 ON BEHALF OF DHS: SETH RUGER Assistant Chief Counsel Deparment of Homeland Security Newark, New Jersey ORAL DECISION OF THE I MMIGRATION JUDGE The respondent is a 48-year-old male native of the Philippines who was admited to the United States at Anchorage, Alaska, on August 28, 1976, as a legal I m m i g r a n t
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w w w . i r a c . n e t / I permanent resident. On Januar 6, 2011, he was convicted in the United States District Cour, District of New Jersey, for the ofense of conspiracy to transpor stolen securities in violation of 18 U.S. Code Section 371 and conspiracy to receive falsely made interstate securities in violation of 18 U. S. Code Section 371. On Januar 6, 2011, he was sentenced to 33 months in Federal Prison for these ofenses. On April 23, 2013, he was convicted in the New Jersey Superior Cour, Sussex County, for conspiracy in violation of New Jersey Statute 2C5-2 and thef by deception in violation of New Jersey Statute 2C:20-4. On April 23, 2013, he was sentenced to four years in State Prison for this ofense. These crimes did not arise out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct. The respondent denied factual allegation 1 on the Notice to Appear (Exhibit 1 ), but conceded that the is a native of the Philippines as alleged in factual allegation 2, although he denied that he is a citizen of the Philippines as alleged in factual allegation 2. He admitted factual allegations 3 through 8 as contained on the Notice to Appear, but denied factual allegation 6.1 as contained on Form 1-261 dated April 1, 2014 (Exhibit 1A). Respondent denied the charges contained on the Notice to Appear which were that he is removable under Section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (Act) in that afer admission he was convicted of an aggravated felony as defned in Section 101 (a)(43)(G) of the Act, Section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Act in that afer admission he was convicted of an aggravated felony as defined in Section 101 (a)(43)(U) of the Act, Section 237(a)(2)(A)(ii) in that afer admission he was convicted of to crimes involving moral turpitude that did not arise out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct and, as contained on the Form 1- 261, that he is removable under Section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Act in that afer admission he was convicted of an aggravated felony as defined in Section 101 (a)(43)(M)(i) of the Act. A035-979-158 2 May 1, 2014 I m m i g r a n t
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w w w . i r a c . n e t Because the respondent was born in the Philippines, he is presumed to be an alien and bears the burden of establishing his claim to United States citizenship by a preponderance of credible evidence. Matter of Tijeriana-Villareal, 13 l&N Dec. 327 (BIA 1969). The Child Citizenship Act of 2000 (CCA) does not apply because the respondent was over 18 before Februar 27, 2001, the efective date of the CCA. Mater of Rodriguez-Tejedor, 23 l&N Dec. 153 (BIA 2001). Therefore, former Section 321 (a) of the Act applies to this case. Former Section 321 (a) provides that a legitimate child born outside the United States of alien parents becomes a citizen of the United States upon the naturalization of the parent having legal custody of the child when there has been a legal separation of the parents and if such naturalization takes place when the child is under 18 and the child is residing in the United States pursuant to a lawful admission for peranent residence at the time of the naturalization of the parent. Former Section 321 (a) of the Act furher provides that a legitimate child born outside the United States citizen of alien parents becomes a citizen of the United States upon the naturalization of both parents i such naturalization occurs while the child is under 18 and the child is residing in the United States puruant to a lawful -admission for permanent residence at the time of the naturalization of the applicable parent or parents. In this case, as noted above, respondent was bor November 15, 1965. He was admited as a lawful permanent resident on August 28, 1976; therefore, he was admited as a lawful permanent resident at the age of 10. The respondent's mother naturalized on October 6, 1978, and his father naturalized on May 2, 1986. Therefore, while his mother naturalized while he was under 18, he was over 18 when his father naturalized and the respondent therefore did not derive citizenship based on the naturalization of his parents. We have no evidence in the record that there was a legal A035-979-158 3 May 1, 2014 I m m i g r a n t
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w w w . i r a c . n e t ( separation of the parents such that the naturalization of only his mother would allow him to derive citizenship through her naturalization. Therefore, based on the evidence before the Court, the respondent has failed to show by a preponderance of credible evidence that he derived citizenship through the naturalization of his mother. Factual allegation 1 on the Notice to Appear is sustained. The Deparment of Homeland Security has the burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence to show respondent is removable as charged. An alien is removable under Section 237(a)(2)(A)(ii) of the Act if, afer admission, he has been convicted of an aggravated felony as defined in Section 101 (a)(43)(G) of the Act, a law relating to a thef ofense (including receipt of stolen propery) or burglar ofense for which the term of imprisonment of at least one year was imposed. In this case, the respondent admitted that he was convicted on April 23, 2013, of conspiracy and thef by deception in violation of New Jersey Statutes 2C:5-2 and 2C:20-4. The Cour concludes based on the rationale described in the case of Nugent v. Ashcrof, 367 F .3d 162 (3rd Cir. 2004), that the crime of thef by deception in violation of New Jersey Statute 2C:20- is a thef ofense within the meaning of Section 101 (a)(43)(G) of the Act. Specifically, the crime of thef by deception discussed by the Third Circuit in Nugent is identical to the New Jersey Statute under which the respondent is convicted. Although Nugent v. Ashcrof was overruled on the theory of a "hybrid ofense" by Alcohol-Sharif v. U. S. Citizenship and Immigration Serices, 734 F.3d 2007 (3rd Cir. 2013), the Court considers the reasoning and holding of the Nugent cour regarding the character of a factually identical Pennsylvania Statute to be dispositive of the issue of whether the respondent's conviction by thef by deception meets the definition of a thef ofense under Section 101 (a)(43)(G) of the Act as the respondent admitted he was convicted and sentenced to four years in prison for that ofense. Therefre, the A035-979-158 4 May 1, 2014 I m m i g r a n t
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w w w . i r a c . n e t Deparment of Homeland Security has established by clear and convincing evidence respondent is removable as charged under Section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Act, in that afer admission he was convicted of a thef ofense as defined in Section 101 (a)(43)(G) of the Act for which he was sentenced to prison of at least a year. See also judgment of conviction at Exhibit 5. That charge is sustained. An alien is removable pursuant to Section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Act if afer admission he has been convicted of an aggravated felony as defined in Section 101 (a)(43)(U) of the Act, a law relating to an attempt or conspiracy to commit an ofense described in Section 101 (a)(43) of the Act. As discussed above, the Cour has concluded that respondents conviction for thef by deception meets the definition of an aggravated felony under Section 101 (a)(43)(G) of the Act. On April 23, 2013, he was convicted of conspiracy to commit that ofense in violation of New Jersey Statute 2C:5- 2. Therefre, the Deparment of Homeland Securit has met its burden to show by clear and convincing evidence respondent is removable as charged under Section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Act in that afer admission he was convicted of an aggravated felony as defined in Section 101 (a)(43)(U) of the Act. See also Exhibit 5. That charge is sustained. An alien is removable under Section 237(a)(2)(A)(ii) if afer admission he has been convicted of two crimes of moral turpitude not arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct. As the respondent admited and as confirmed by the judgments of conviction at Exhibit 5, he was convicted on Januar 6, 2011, in the U. S. District Cour, District of New Jersey, of conspiracy to transpor stolen securities in violation of 18 U.S. Code Section 371, and conspiracy to receive falsely made interstate securities in violation of 18 U.S. Code 371, and on April 23, 2013, of conspiracy in violation of New Jersey Statute 2C:5-2 and thef by deception in violation of New Jersey Statute 2C:20-4. A035-979-158 5 May 1, 2014 I m m i g r a n t
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w w w . i r a c . n e t He also admitted that these ofenses did not arise out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct. The Third Circuit has adopted the Board's defnition of a crime involving moral turpitude. Parka v. Attorney General, 417 F.3d 408, 413 (3rd Cir. 2005), citing Knapik v. Ashcrof, 384 F.3d 84, 89 (3rd Cir. 2004). The term "moral turpitude" generally refers to conduct which is inherently base, vile, or depraved, and contrar to the accepted rules of morality and the duties owed beteen persons, or the duties owed to society in general. Parka, 417 F .3d 413; Mater of Olquin, 23 l&N Dec. 896 ( BIA 2006). Whether a paricular crime involves moral turitude is determined by the statutor definition, not by a respondent's specific conduct. Parka, 417 F.3d 411. Neither the seriousness of the criminal ofense nor the severity of the sentence imposed is determinative of whether a crime involves moral turpitude; it is the specific statute under which the conviction occurs that is controlling. Matter of Serna, 20 l&N Dec. 579 (BIA 1992). Cours generally assess "whether the act is accompanied by a vicious motive or a corrupt mind" in order to determine the existence of moral turpitude. See Parka, 417 F.3d 413, citing Matter of Franklin, 20 l&N Dec. 867, 868 (BIA 1994). The Third Circuit Cour of Appeals presumptively applies the categorical approach to look at the elements of the statutory ofense to discern the least culpable conduct hypothetically necessar to sustain the conviction. Jean-Louis v. Attorney General, 582 F.3d 462, 471 (3rd Cir. 2009). The Cour concludes that the crime of conspiracy to transpor stolen securities in violation of 18 U. S. Code Section 371 is a crime involving moral turpitude and furher concludes that conspiracy to receive falsely made interstate securities in violation of 18 U.S. Code 371 is a crime involving moral turpitude. Furher, the Cour concludes the ofense of conspiracy to commit thef by deception is a crime involving A035-979-158 6 May 1, 2014 I m m i g r a n t
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w w w . i r a c . n e t moral turpitude. As these crimes did not arise out of a single scheme or criminal misconduct (in other words, the crime of conspiracy to commit thef by deception did not arise out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct with the crimes of conspiracy to transpor stolen securities and conspiracy to receive falsely made interstate securities) the Deparment of Homeland Security has met its burden to show by clear and convincing evidence respondent was convicted afer admission of to crimes involving moral turpitude not arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct. The charge under Section 237(a)(2)(A)(ii) is sustained. The Deparment of Homeland Security also charged respondent was removable pursuant to Section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Act in that afer admission he was convicted of an aggravated felony as defined in Section 101 (a)(43)(N)(i) of the Act, an ofense that involves fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victim or victims exceeds $10,000. See Form 1-261 at Exhibit 1A. The Deparment of Homeland Security alleged that the amount of loss to the victim in his crime for conspiracy to commit thef by deception was in excess of $10,000. Based on the evidence before the Court, the Deparment of Homeland Security has failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence the amount of loss exceeded $10,000, and, therefore, has failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence the respondent is removable under Section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Act in that afer admission he was convicted of an aggravated felony as defined in Section 101 (a)(43)(M)(i) of the Act. Specifically, the conviction record at Exhibit 5, which is the evidence ofered by the Deparment of Homeland Security to establish the amount of loss to the victim, does not specif the amount of loss. Therefore, the charge as contained on the Form 1-261 on Exhibit 1A was not sustained. The record consists of the Notice to Appear (Exhibit 1 ), Form 1-261 dated A035-979-158 7 May 1, 2014 I m m i g r a n t
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w w w . i r a c . n e t ( April 1, 2014 (Exhibit 1A), motion to terminate removal proceedings with attachments (Exhibit 2), naturalization application (Exhibit 3), naturalization application (Exhibit 4), Deparment of Homeland Security filing (Exhibit 5). The respondent designated the Philippines as countr of removal should such action become necessary. Respondent made no application for relief from removal and, based on the Cour's ruling that he has been convicted of an aggravated felony, does not appear eligible for any relief from removal. Therefore, the Cour has no choice but to order that he be removed from the United States on the charges sustained as discussed above. Undoubtedly the respondent has accrued many, many equities during his time in the United States as he came here as a young man and has citizen parents and grew to adulthood in this countr. Unforunately, because of the nature of his conviction being an aggravated felony he is not eligible to apply for discretionary relief before this Court where this Cour could take into account his many equities in the United States. ORDER IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that respondent be removed from the United States pursuant to Section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Act (aggravated felony as defined in Section 101 (a)(43)(G) of the Act), Section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Act (aggravated felony as defined in Section 101 (a)(43)(U) of the Act), Section 237(a)(2)(A)(ii) of the Act as contained on the Notice to Appear, as amended. A035-979-158 MARGARET R. REICHENBERG Immigration Judge 8 May 1, 2014 I m m i g r a n t
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w w w . i r a c . n e t 0 CERTIFICATE PAGE I hereby certif that the attached proceeding before JUDGE MARGARET R. REICHENBERG, in the matter of: ROBINSON W. BORDAMONTE A035-979-158 NEWARK, NEW JERSEY was held as herein appears, and that this is the original transcript thereof for the file of the Executive Ofice for Immigration Review. CASEY S. SMITH (Transcriber) DEPOSITION SERVICES, l nc.-2 AUGUST 28, 2014 (Completion Date) I m m i g r a n t