Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-51450 February 10, 1989
SPOUSES VALENTIN SOLIVEL and PETRA MENTE, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE MARCELINO M. FRANCISCO, Presiding Judge, Court of First
Instance of Davao del Sur, Branch VI, and PAULINO CAGAS, respondents.
Jose B. Guyo for petitioners.
Douglas RA. Cagas for respondent Cagas.

NARVASA, J .:
At issue in this appeal by certiorari from an amended decision by the then Court of First
Instance of Davao del Sur in its Civil Case No. 824 is whether or not title to real property
is passed to an innocent purchaser by a deed of sale in his favor executed in the name
of the owners by one falsely claiming to be said owners' duly appointed and authorized
attorney-in-fact.
The petitioners and the private respondent are substantially in agreement concerning
the facts as found by the Trial Court.
Petitioners, the spouses Valentin Solivel and Petra Mente (hereinafter called the
Solivels), are an old couple residing in Davao City. They are the registered owners,
under Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-10985 and T-10986 of the Registry of Deeds
of Davao del Sur, of two parcels of land located in the Municipality of Digos in said
Province with a combined area of twenty seven (27) hectares, more or less. The portion
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-10985 is the subject of this case.
1

On or about May 25, 1972, following a number of previous visits to said owners,
Federico Tompong, a practicing lawyer, and Isaias Ngoho obtained the former's
agreement to sell their property to a certain Espinosa of Masbate for P60,000.00. Giving
the Solivels a partial payment of P10,000.00 allegedly coming from Espinosa,Tompong
and Ngoho persuaded the Solivels to give them the certificates of title to the property,
for which they issued a receipt, and promised that the sale would be consummated and
the balance of P50,000.00 paid within six (6) months, failing which the partial payment
would be forfeited in the Solivels' favor and their certificates of title returned to them.
Tompong and Ngoho never returned to make good their promise. They could not in fact
be located until some months later when they were arrested by Philippine Constabulary
on complaint of a certain Atty. Hilario Mapayo to whom, it appeared, they had sold a
portion of the Solivels' property.
2

Following their arrest, Tompong and Ngoho were confronted by Valentin Solivel and his
son, Rafael, at the PC Headquarters in Davao City. That confrontation brought to light
the existence of the following documents purportedly executed by either or both of the
Solivels.
1) a deed of sale dated May 24, 1972 ratified by Tompong as notary public selling a
40,000 square-meter portion of the Solivels' property to Atty. Hilario Mapayo for the price
of P30,000.00 (Exhibit 1);
2) a power of attorney dated May 24, 1972, ratified also by Tompong as notary public,
constituting Isaias Ngoho the attorney-in-fact of Valentin Solivel to receive from Atty.
Hilario Mapayo partial payment of P15,000.00 in two installments (Exhibit H );
3) a power of attorney dated September 7, 1972 ratified also by Tompong as notary
public, authorizing Isaias Ngoho to sell the Solivels' property in question as said owners'
attorney-in-fact (Exhibit C);
The confrontation also uncovered the existence of other documents relating to the
Solivels' property. One was a deed dated September 8, 1972 acknowledged before
Atty. Peregrino Andres of Davao City, with Tompong as one of the instrumental
witnesses, whereby Isaias Ngoho, as alleged attorney-in-fact of the Solivels, sold the
property in question to Paulino Cagas for the price of P19,000.00 (Exhibit C). Two
others were receipts (Exhibits K and J) evidencing payment of the sums of P9,000.00
and P2,000.00 made by Atty. Mapayo to Ngoho in the presence of Tompong. A fourth
document was an affidavit of non-tenancy executed by Ngoho and sworn to before Atty.
Peregrino Andres (Exhibit D).
3

Disclosed, too, was the fact that on the basis of the deed of sale executed in favor of
Paulino Cagas by Ngoho as supposed attorney-in-fact of the Solivels, said Cagas had
obtained cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-10985 of Davao del Sur in the
name of the Solivels and the issuance, in lieu thereof, of Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T-6064 in his name.
4

Never having in fact executed the alleged sale of May 24, 1972 (Exhibit I), the power-of-
attorney of the same date (Exhibit H) as well as the power-of-attorney of September 7,
1972 (Exhibit C) on the strength of which Ngoho had sold their property to Cagas, the
Solivels procured inscription of an adverse claim on Cagas' Title No. 6064. They also
filed criminal cases for falsification of public documents against Tompong and Ngoho in
the City Court of Davao City and the Court of First Instance of Davao del Sur, as well as
disbarment proceedings against Tompong in this Court. Finally, they instituted the case
subject of the present appeal for annulment of contract and damages against Tompong,
Ngoho and Cagas.
5

Cagas and Tompong answered the Solivels' complaint; Ngoho did not.
6
Only Cagas,
however, presented evidence in his defense, and on his counterclaim for damages and
attorney's fees. Cagas' evidence, to which the Trial Court accorded credence and
which, it appears, the Solivels do not contradict, is to the effect that he came to know
about the property when a certain Mrs. Dumaquing called upon him with a photocopy of
its certificate of title and asked him if he was interested in buying it; that after visiting the
property and having seen its boundaries, he went to the Registry of Deeds of Davao del
Sur and ascertained that it was unencumbered; that later he met Tompong and Ngoho
in the office of Atty. Peregrino Andres where the two showed him the owner's copy of
the certificate of title and the power of attorney authorizing Ngoho to sell the property;
that after some haggling about the price, he agreed to and did pay Ngoho P19,000.00
for the property and Ngoho signed together with Tompong (the latter as instrumental
witness) a deed of sale prepared by Atty. Andres; that he was able to register the deed
of sale and obtain a certificate of title in his name, after securing the approval of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources; and that he never knew that the power-
of-attorney exhibited to him was forged and had relied on the assurance of Atty. Andres
that said document legally empowered Ngoho to execute the sale in his favor.
7

The Trial Court found that the power-of-attorney (Exhibit C) ostensibly empowering
Ngoho to sell the Solivels' property as said owners' attorney-in-fact was a forgery and
thus, albeit not expressly but by necessary implication, that the deed of sale executed
by Ngoho in favor of Cagas on the strength of said instrument was also falsified and
that the Solivels' claims against Tompong and Ngoho had been sufficiently established.
8

However, said Court also held that Cagas was an innocent purchaser for value, decided
that he had acquired valid title to the property in question by virtue of the sale, Exhibit C,
and was entitled to its possession and enjoyment, and gave the Solivels only the sop of
an award against the elusive defendants Tompong and Ngoho of the price paid by
Cagas for the property (P19,000.00) plus interest, and of damages, including attorney's
fees, in the amount of P8,500.00.
9

As was to be expected, said judgment did not satisfy the Solivels, who now claim that it
was legal error for the Trial Court to uphold the validity of Cagas' title as against theirs,
the former being founded upon forged documents.
The Trial Court anchors its questioned ruling on the first proviso of the second
paragraph of Section 55, Act No. 496, reproduced almost verbatim in Section 53 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529 (The Property Registration Decree), which recognizes
and protects the rights of an innocent holder for value of a certificate of title in cases of
registration procured by fraud, and on this Court's ruling in Blondeau vs. Nano.
10
In
Blondeau, the principle underlying the proviso that a forged transfer may become the
root of a valid title in a bona fide purchaser was invoked to sustain foreclosure of a
real estate mortgage under a deed which, though allegedly forged, had nonetheless
been duly registered because one of two joint owners had given the other, supposedly
the author of the forgery, not only his power-of-attorney but also possession of the title
papers. Said the Court in that case:
The Torrens system is intended for the registration of title, rather than the muniments of
title. It represents a departure from the orthodox principles of property law. Under the
common law, if the pretended signature of the mortgagor is a forgery, the instrument is
invalid for every purpose and will pass no title or rights to anyone, unless the spurious
document is ratified and accepted by the mortgagor. The Torrens Act on the contrary
permits a forged transfer, when duly entered in the registry, to become the root of a valid
title in a bona fide purchaser. The act erects a safeguard against a forged transfer being
registered, by the requirement that no transfer shall be registered unless the owner's
certificate was produced along with the instrument of transfer. An executed transfer of
registered lands placed by the registered owner thereof in the hands of another operates
as a representation to a third party that the holder of the transfer is authorized to deal
with the lands. (53 C.J. 1141, 1142; Act No. 496, as amended, secs. 47, 51, 55).
xxx xxx xxx
... in its final analysis, this is a case of a mortgagee relying upon a Torrens Title, and
loaning money in all good faith on the basis of the title standing in the name of the
mortgagors only thereafter to discover one defendant to be an alleged forger and the
other defendant, if not a party to the conspiracy, at least having by his negligence or
acquiescence made it possible for the fraud to transpire. Giving to the facts the most
favorable interpretation for Vallejo, yet, as announced by the Unites States Supreme
Court, the maxim is, as between two innocent persons, in this case, Angela Blondeau
and Jose Vallejo, the one who made it possible by his act of confidence must bear the
loss, in this case Jose Vallejo. ...
11

The Trial Court professes to see Blondeau as "very much in point in the determination
of this suit." It does not so appear to this Court. In the first place, as correctly stated in
the later case of De Lara vs. Ayroso,
12
it was found as a fact in Blondeau that the
mortgage in question had not been forged, and this, in addition to the circumstance that
the registered owner had by his negligence or acquiescence, if not actual connivance,
made possible the commission of the fraud. Thus, in Ayroso, this Court annulled a
mortgage executed by an impostor who had unauthorizedly gained possession of the
certificate of title thru the owner's daughter and forged said owner's name to the deed of
mortgage which was subsequently registered. In so doing, the Court found more
applicable the case of Ch. Veloso vs. La Urbana and Del Mar,
13
which also voided a
mortgage of real property owned by plaintiff Veloso constituted by her brother-in-law,
the defendant Del Mar, using two powers-of-attorney to which he had forged the
signatures of said plaintiff and her husband, and which mortgage was later registered
with the aid of the certificate of title that had come into Del Mar's possession by
unknown means. In Ayroso the Court also rejected the defendants' contention that the
La Urbana doctrine had been overruled by Blondeau,
14
pointing out that the former was
still good precedent, having been quoted with approval in Lopez vs. Seva
15
which was
decided after Blondeau.
Even more in point and decisive of the issue here raised, however, is the much later
case of Joaquin vs. Madrid,
16
where the spouses Abundio Madrid and Rosalinda Yu,
owners of a residential lot in Makati, seeking a building construction loan from the then
Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, entrusted their certificate of title for surrender to the
RFC to Rosalinda's godmother, a certain Carmencita de Jesus, who had offered to
expedite the approval of the loan. Later having obtained a loan from another source, the
spouses decided to withdraw the application they had filed with the RFC and asked
Carmencita to retrieve their title and return it to them. Carmencita failed to do so, giving
the excuse that the employee in charge of keeping the title was on leave. It turned out,
however, that through the machinations of Carmencita, the property had been
mortgaged to Constancio Joaquin in a deed signed by two persons posing as the
owners and that after said deed had been registered, the amount for which the
mortgage was constituted had been given to the person who had passed herself off as
Rosalinda Yu. Constancio Joaquin admitted that the spouses Madrid and Yu were in
fact not the persons who had signed the deed of mortgage. Based on these facts, the
Court issued the following ruling, which definitively deals with the question at issue here
in all its aspects:
In the first assignment of error, it is argued that since par. 2 of Sec. 55 of the Land
Registration Act expressly provided that "in all cases of registration by fraud the owner
may pursue all his legal and equitable remedies against the parties to the fraud, without
prejudice to the rights of any innocent holder for value of a certificate of title," the second
proviso in the same section "that a registration procured by the presentation of a forged
deed shall be null and void" should be overlooked. There is no merit in this argument,
which would have the effect of deleting the last proviso. This last proviso is a limitation of
the first part of par. 2 in the sense that in order that the holder of a certificate for value
issued by virtue of the registration of a voluntary instrument may be considered a holder
in good faith for value, the instrument registered should not be forged. When the
instrument presented is forged, even if accompanied by the owner's duplicate certificate
of title, the registered owner does not thereby lose his title, and neither does the assignee
in the forged deed acquire any right or title to the property.
In the second assignment of error, it is further argued that as the petitioner is an innocent
purchaser for value, he should be protected as against the registered owner because the
latter can secure reparation from the assurance fund. The fact is, however, that petitioner
herein is not the innocent purchaser for value protected by law. The innocent purchaser
for value protected by law is one who purchases a titled land by virtue of a deed executed
by the registered owner himself, not by a forged deed, as the law expressly states. Such
is not the situation of the petitioner, who has been the victim of impostors pretending to
be the registered owners but who are not said owners.
The next assignment of error is predicated on the assumption that both the petitioner and
the respondents are guilty of negligence. The giving of the certificate of title to
Carmencita de Jesus is in itself no act of negligence on the part of respondents; it was
perfectly a legitimate act. Delay in demanding the certificate of title is no act of neglect
either, as respondents have not executed any deed or document authorizing Carmencita
de Jesus to execute deeds for and on their behalf. It was petitioner who was negligent,
he did not take enough care to see to it that the persons who executed the deed of
mortgage are the real registered owners of the property. The argument raised by
petitioner's counsel that in case of negligence on the part of both the one who committed
a breach of faith is responsible, is not applicable. Petitioner alone is guilty of neglect, so
he must suffer from it.
17

The doctrine, it may be added, finds affirmation in the fairly recent case of Duran vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court,
18
which rests on the same principles but reached a
different result because of a crucial difference in the factual situation. In that case, a
mother allegedly forged her daughter's signature to a deed of sale in her (the mother's)
favor of the former's properties, obtained registered titles in her name, and thereafter
mortgaged the properties to the private respondents. Upon her failure to redeem the
mortgage, the mortgagees foreclosed and purchased the properties at the ensuing
sheriffs auction sale. This Court ruled that the mortgage was valid with respect to the
mortgagees because at the time of its constitution title to the property was already in the
name of the party who had executed the mortgage (the mother):
... But even if the signatures (of the petitioner to the deed of sale in favor of her mother)
were a forgery, and the sale would be regarded as void, still it is Our opinion that the
Deed of Mortgage is VALID, with respect to the mortgagees, the defendants-appellants.
While it is true that under Art. 2085 of the Civil Code, it is essential that the mortgagor be
the absolute owner of the property mortgaged, and while as between the daughter and
the mother, it was the daughter who still owned the lots, STILL insofar as innocent third
persons are concerned, the owner was already the mother (Fe S. Duran) inasmuch as
she had already become the registered owner (Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 2418
and 2419). The mortgagee had the right to rely upon what appeared in the certificate of
title, and did not have to inquire further. If the rule were otherwise, the efficacy and
conclusiveness of Torrens Certificate of Titles would be futile and nugatory. Thus the rule
is simple: the fraudulent and forged document of sale may become the root of a valid title
if the certificate has already been transferred from the name of the true owner to the
name indicated by the forger (See De la Cruz v. Fabie, 35 Phil. 144; Blondeau, et al. v.
Nano, et al., 61 Phil. 625; Fule et al. v. Legare et al., 7 SCRA 35 1; see also Sec. 55 of
Act No. 496, the Land Registration Act). The fact that at the time of the foreclosure sale
proceedings (1970-1972) the mortgagees may have already known of the plaintiffs' claim
is immaterial. What is important is that at the time the mortgage was executed, the
mortgagees in good faith actually believed Fe S. Duran to be the owner, as evidenced by
the registration of the property in the name of said Fe S. Duran (pp. 146147, Rollo).
19

It is obvious that the last-cited case was decided differently only because unlike Joaquin
vs. Madrid and the other cases earlier referred to, it involved a situation where title to
the property had already been registered in favor of a person other than the true owner
before being conveyed or mortgaged to the party claiming the rights of an innocent
transferee.
WHEREFORE, finding merit in the appeal, the Court REVERSES and VACATES the
Amended Decision of the Trial Court insofar as it divests the petitioners Valentin Solivel
and Petra Mente of the ownership of the property in question and MODIFIES it insofar
as it orders the defendants Federico Tompong and Isaias Ngoho to pay said petitioners
P19,000.00, plus interests from August 13, 1974, said defendants being ordered to pay
such amount instead to private respondent Paulino Cagas. The deed of sale of
September 8, 1972 executed by Isaias Ngoho as purported attorney-in-fact of the
petitioners in favor of Paulino Cagas is declared null and void, and Transfer Certificate
of Title No. T-6064 of the Registry of Deeds of Davao del Sur in the name of Cagas by
virtue of said deed is cancelled. Paulino Cagas is ordered to reconvey to the petitioners
by registrable deed the property covered by said certificate of title. The reckless and
bare-faced deceits practiced by defendants Federico Tompong and Isaias Ngoho on the
petitioners and the private respondent are clearly evincive of extreme bad faith, intent to
defraud and criminal propensities which, in the mind of the Court, the Trial Court's
award of damages is inadequate either to punish or to discourage. Accordingly, the
Amended Decision is further MODIFIED as to said award by sentencing defendants
Federico Tompong and Isaias Ngoho jointly and severally to pay: (a) the petitioners
P10,000.00 as moral damages, P10,000.00 as exemplary damages and P10,000.00 as
attorney's fees; (b) respondent Paulino Cagas the further sum of P10,000.00 as
exemplary damages; and (c) the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Gancayco, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concu
THIRD DIVISION
[A.M. No. RTJ-04-1856. September 30, 2004]
LORETO JOAQUIN, petitioner, vs. JUDGE FE ALBANO MADRID, Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court Second Judicial Region Branch 21, Santiago City, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
On complaint of Loreto Joaquin,1[1] Judge Fe Albano Madrid, Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Santiago City, Branch 21, is administratively charged of Gross Misconduct
arising from her issuance of orders in Criminal Case No. 3946, People v. Engr. Loreto Joaquin,
for Homicide, of which complainant is the accused.
THE FACTS
An Information for Homicide,2[2] following an inquest, was filed on July 19, 2002 by the
Santiago City Prosecutor against complainant at the RTC of Santiago City where it was docketed
as Criminal Case No. 3946. The victim being a minor, the case was raffled to Branch 21, of
which respondent is the Presiding Judge.
Upon the filing of the Information, complainant at once posted a bailbond which was approved
by respondent, on account of which she, by Order of July 19, 2002, ordered his release.
The case was set for arraignment on August 5, 2002 which was reset to September 18, 2002 and
then to October 21, 2002.
The scheduled arraignment on October 21, 2002 did not push through, complainants counsel
having filed a Motion to Reset arraignment. The private prosecutor also moved for a deferment
of the arraignment in light of a pending Motion for Reinvestigation before the Office of the City
Prosecutor in order to upgrade the charge from Homicide to Murder. On even date, the attention

1[1] Rollo at 1-10.
2[2] Id. at 11-12.
of respondent having been invited by the prosecution that an unlicensed firearm was used in the
killing of the victim, she, on review of the information, found out that indeed complainant was
charged with the killing of a minor with the use of an unlicensed firearm, hence, she believed the
crime to be non-bailable. Respondent thereupon issued an Order3[3] for the detention of
complainant during the pendency of the case and reset the pre-trial and arraignment of the case
to November 26, 2002.
The following day or on October 22, 2002, respondent left for Baguio City to attend a 2-day
seminar. On even date, at about 10:00 a.m., complainant filed a Motion for the Release of
Accused,4[4] with notice that said motion be heard at 2:00 p.m. of the same day. Since
respondent had left for Baguio City, the motion was referred to the pairing judge, Judge
Anastacio D. Anghad, for resolution. Also on even date, Judge Anghad issued an Order5[5]
granting complainants Motion for the Release of Accused upon the following evaluation:
There is no question that the charge filed against the accused is Homicide, which is a bailable
offense. Indeed, the accused posted his bail and was approved by the Court. The accused was
given temporary liberty.
A perusal of the arguments raised by the accused, thru counsel, convinced this Court that the
accused should not have been detained. With due respect to the position taken by the Executive
Judge, this Pairing Judge is of the considered view that until and after the charge of Homicide is
amended, or a new charge of Murder is filed by the prosecution, the official Information of
Homicide so filed by the prosecution dated July 19, 2002, should remain as the proper
Information. For obvious reasons, this Court defers to the wide discretion of the prosecution in
the filing of charges against suspects. Unless tainted with abuse of discretion or judgment, the
Court, normally cannot interfere into the terrain of the prosecution.
Besides, there was an urgent motion to reset and defer the arraignment of the accused filed by the
Private Prosecutor, Atty. Nicasio Bautista III, and this fact was noted by the Court when it issued
the October 21, 2002 Order. This should have been a caution for the Court that the private
prosecutor is also in accord with the resolution of the City Prosecution regarding the filing of
Homicide. Declaring the offense charged to be non-bailable, the accused should have been given
his day in court to rebut and traverse what the prosecution, thru Private Prosecutor, orally
manifested on October 21, 2002.
Finding the urgent motion filed by the accused, thru counsel Atty. Pedro R. Perez, Jr., to be
justified and in order, and with due respect to the Order of Detention issued by the Honorable
Executive Judge Fe Albano Madrid, this Pairing Judge finds that there is basis in ordering the
release of the accused from further detention. This order shall take effect immediately upon

3[3] Id. at 19-21.
4[4] Id. at 15-18.
5[5] Id. at 19-21.
receipt of this Order considering that on record his bail of P40,000.00 has not been increased
revoked or disapproved.
If by this order of release it takes the ire of the Honorable Fe Albano Madrid, then so be it but
this judge would not harbor any ill feeling or personal grudge. This judge did it, based from his
conscience and based from legal grounds. (Underscoring supplied)
On respondents return from the seminar in Baguio City and apprised of the grant by Judge
Anghad of the Motion for the Release of Accused in her absence, she issued on October 29,
2002 an order setting aside the order of Judge Anghad which granted complainants Motion for
the Release of Accused and setting to November 5, 2002 the hearing of said motion, along with
the Motion to Inhibit her which was also filed.
After the November 5, 2002 hearing of complainants motions, respondent denied the Motion
for the Release of Accused in this wise, by Order of even date:6[6]
Indeed the accused is charged with homicide but it is also alleged in the body of the information
that he killed Andrew Ancheta a 16-year old minor with an unlicensed firearm. The accused
conceded that the use of an unlicensed firearm is an aggravating circumstance in homicide but
insists that there is no change in the penalty.
Republic Act 8294 which took effect on July 6, 1997 provides that if homicide or murder is
committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use shall be considered as an special
aggravating circumstance. With the enactment of Republic Act 8294 which amended P.D. 1866
the use of an unlicensed forearm is no longer distinct and separate offense but a special
aggravating circumstance such that penalty for homicide or murder with the use of an unlicensed
firearm was increased from reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua to death. (Underscoring
supplied)
Respondent denied too the Motion to Inhibit her.
Complainants wife thereupon filed on November 19, 2002 a Petition for Habeas Corpus7[7] at
the Court of Appeals (CA), docketed as SP Proc. No. 73901.
THE COMPLAINT
On May 6, 2003, complainant filed the present administrative complaint for gross misconduct
constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct arising from
[t]he violation of the constitutional and legal rights of the Complainant by the Respondent
Judge, taken together with the palpable mistakes in the application of fundamental legal

6[6] Id. at 24-26.
7[7] Id. at 27-35.
principles, utter disregard of the rights of the Petitioner, showing bias, partiality, and abuse of
authority, and the errors in the appreciation and interpretation of laws and jurisprudence.
In the meantime, the CA, which issued a writ of Habeas Corpus,8[8] granted complainants
petition by Decision of June 25, 2003,9[9] it holding that since complainant was not charged with
a capital offense or one which, under the law at the time of its commission and at the time of
application for bail, is punishable by reclusion perpetua and the evidence of guilt is strong, bail
was a matter of right.
RESPONDENTS COMMENT
In her Comment, respondent admits having ordered the detention of complainant during his
scheduled arraignment on October 21, 2002 as she does admit having issued the Order of
November 5, 2003.
Inviting attention to the Information filed against complainant, denominated as Homicide,10[10]
which reads:
That on or about the 3
rd
day of July 2002 in the City of Santiago (Isabela), Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused did then and there,
willfiully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with intent to kill Andrew Ancheta a sixteen-year old
minor, assault, attack and wound the said Andrew Ancheta with an unlicensed firearm thereby
inflicting upon him a gunshot wound on his face which directly caused the death of the said
Andrew Ancheta (Underscoring supplied),11[11]
respondent explains: Since the victim was a minor, the case was immediately sent by the
Officer-in-Charge Clerk of Court to her sala which is the designated Family Court in RTC
Santiago City. On noting that the information alleged that the accused-herein complainant did
assault, attack and wound the minor victim with the use of an unlicensed firearm, she
wondered why the designation of crime was Homicide in light of her belief that the killing was
qualified by abuse of superior strength. Respondent amplifies:
In its Resolution the prosecution did not find the presence of treachery. I did not even think of
questioning this but treachery is not only the qualifying circumstance to elevate homicide to
murder. Certainly there are others such as abuse of superior strength (Article 248, No. 1,
Revised Penal Code). When the prosecution made a finding that the accused did assault, attack
and wound the minor victim with the use of unlicensed firearm does it not mean that there

8[8] Id. at 39-40.
9[9] Id. at 50-56.
10[10] Vide Note 2.
11[11] Rollo at 73-74.
was abuse of superior strength. Can it not be said that the assault and attack of a child with the
use of a gun is inherently murder notwithstanding that the prosecution refuse[d] to call it as such.
Ordinarily there is no need to assault and attack a child with the use of a firearm. Harsh words or
the fist is enough to cow and chastise a child and he could not fight back.
The judge wondered. What will prevail? The name given to the crime or the allegations of the
information on how the crime was committed. It has been held many times that it is the
allegations of the information that controls (sic).
To best illustrate what happens sometimes. An information for child abuse is filed wherein it is
alleged that the accused whipped a child which caused injury to him. What really is the crime
charged? Is it slight physical injuries or child abuse. It is my humble opinion that the crime is
only slight physical injuries because the element of prejudice to the childs development is not
alleged in the information. Can the judge allow the accused his liberty on recognizance
considering that slight physical injuries is a light offense or exact the recommended bailbond of
P20,000.00 or more because the penalty for child abuse is prision mayor minimum (Sect. 10,
R.A. 7610)? For whatever action the judge takes, can he be administratively charged with gross
misconduct?
To illustrate another situation. An information for acts of lasciviousness was filed alleging that
the accused inserted his penis into the mouth of the child. What is the crime? Is it acts of
lasciviousness or rape under R.A. 8353? How about an information itself states that the taking of
the property was through force ad intimidation? What is the crime? Is it theft or robbery?
How does a judge act when confronted with these situations? Shall the judge follow the safe and
even path, remain passive and wait what will happen. Or shall he do something to correct any
errors that might result in the miscarriage or worst, mockery of justice. Wouldnt judges be a
little more aggressive and innovative. Would not the judge be a little creative to remedy such
procedural mistakes or irregularities that might result in the imbalance of justice?
In this particular case would I allow the accused to be free because of a defect in the
designation of the crime as homicide when in fact the allegations of the information on how
the crime was committed shows that it is murder, even if the exact words of use of superior
strength was not used?12[12] (Underscoring and emphasis supplied)
OCAs MEMORANDUM-RECOMMENDATION
After respondents filing of her Comment-Answer, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA),
by Memorandum of April 12, 2004,13[13] extenuates respondent from liability for grave
misconduct. It holds respondent liable, however, for gross ignorance of the law because it is
basic that a person not charged with a capital offense or with an offense punishable by reclusion

12[12] Id. at 74-75.
13[13] Id. at 90-92.
perpetua is entitled to bail as a matter of right, citing Arcilla v. Palaypayon (364 SCRA 469)
which involved the premature issuance by a municipal trial judge during preliminary
investigation of a warrant of arrest without affording the accused his right to controvert the
evidence presented against him, thereby violating his constitutionally protected right to due
process.
The OCA thus recommends that respondent be meted a FINE of P10,000.00 and sternly warned
that repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
In a Manifestation14[14] received on August 20, 2004, respondent, complying with this Courts
Resolution of May 31, 200415[15] directing the redocketing of the complaint as a regular
administrative matter and requiring the parties to manifest whether they are submitting the case
on the basis of the pleadings/records already filed and submitted, answered in the affirmative and
proffered what she calls extraneous details . . . to better explain her position, to wit:
x x x
2. After a preliminary investigation was conducted by the Office of the City Prosecutor, an
information was filed on July 19, 2003 against the complainant only. His companion who he
said was a confidential agent of the NBI was exonerated based on the complainants
counteraffidavit. On that same day that the information was filed the complainant posted his
bailbond which the respondent approved in the course of her routine work.
3. After the release of the complainant from detention, there was a feeling of outrage in the
community and the release of the accused became an issue as it seems that everyone wants to
know why the complainant was released. This prompted the respondent to review the records of
the case. It was then that the respondent realized that the information was coached in ambiguity.
It seemed that there was an effort made to enable the accused to post bail.
x x x
5. I just felt that I could not condone much less contribute to an injustice. In our seminars as
judges of Family Courts we were always prodded to be more vigilant, active and innovative in
the protection of the rights of children. I guess I found a chance to heed such proddings.
6. I issued my questioned order for the detention of the accused. I wanted to force the issue with
the prosecution for them to state whether the circumstance of abuse of superior strength was
present or not considering their express finding that there was assault committed by the accused
complainant and his NBI companion (who they exonerated) when they shot the minor victim
with their unlicensed firearm.

14[14] Id. at 94-97.
15[15] Id. at 93.
x x x
Respondent supposes that the paramount question now in the minds of the Honorable Supreme
Court is why did not I mention the issue of abuse of superior strength in my questioned order. It
was because there was a motion for reconsideration filed by the complainants with the Office of
the Prosecutor. I did not think it wise then to give any ideas to any of the parties. All I wanted
was to force the issue with the prosecutor.
As respondent said in the beginning the above narration of events are extrenuous matters. But
perhaps in a way they might explain why I sincerely and humbly believe that I did not abuse my
discretion. I only tried to balance the scales of justice. It might prove to be disadvantageous to
me. I only beg for understanding. (Underscoring supplied)
THIS COURTS FINDING
The Revised Penal Code provision on Murder reads:
Art. 248. Murder. - Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall kill
another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death, if
committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or
employing means to weaken the defense or means or persons to insure or afford impunity.
2. In consideration of a price, reward or promise.
3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment
or assault upon a railroad, fall of an airship, or by means of motor vehicles, or with the use of
any other means involving great waste and ruin.
4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an
earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic, or any other public calamity.
5. With evident premeditation.
6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or
outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse. (Underscoring and italics supplied)
As said Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code provides, the killing of another shall be guilty of
murder when committed with any of the therein enumerated attendant circumstances, one of
which is taking advantage of superior strength.
It has been the consistent ruling of this Court that what is controlling are the actual recital of
facts in the body of the information and not the caption or preamble of the
information.16[16]
As gathered from the earlier quoted November 5, 2002 Order of respondent, she ordered the
detention of complainant, his being out on bail notwithstanding, she being of the opinion that the
information, albeit denominated as one for Homicide, alleged the fatal assault of a minor child
with the use of an unlicensed firearm, hence, to her belief, is punishable by reclusion perpetua to
death.
Respondent was to later explain in her August 18, 2003 Comment-Answer to the Complaint that
the allegation in the information that the killing of the minor child was with the use of an
unlicensed firearm shows that [the offense committed] is murder, even if the exact words use
of superior strength [as a qualifying aggravating circumstance] w[ere] not used.
In fine, at the time respondent ordered complainants detention on October 21, 2002, she was of
the opinion that the allegation in the information that an unlicensed firearm was used in
assaulting the minor victim called for the imposition of an increased penalty of reclusion
perpetua, which opinion is of course erroneous. For the use of an unlicensed firearm in the
commission of Homicide (or Murder), being a special aggravating circumstance, merely calls for
the application of the penalty reclusion temporal in the case of Homicide in its maximum
period.17[17]
At the time she gave her Comment-Answer to the Complaint, she explained that the allegation in
the information contemplated the use of superior strength to qualify the killing to murder, which
explanation could be tenable and puts her in good light.
To warrant a finding of gross ignorance of the law, it has been repeatedly held that the error must
be so gross and patent as to produce an inference or bad faith. For to hold a judge
administratively accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision he renders, assuming that he
erred, would be intolerable.

16[16] People v. Alagon, 325 SCRA 296 (2000).
17[17] Art. 64. The Revised Penal Code.
Rules for the application of penalties which contain three periods.
x x x
(3) When only an aggravating circumstance is present in the commission of the act, they
shall impose the penalty in its maximum period.
x x x
From the allegations of the information against complainant and the facts and circumstances
surrounding respondents issuance of and justification for her order for complainants detention
despite his earlier posting of bailbond, this Court is not inclined to infer that respondent acted
maliciously or in bad faith, or with patent abuse of authority or in sheer ignorance of the law.
It bears noting that after the information against complainant was filed on July 19, 2002,
complainant readily posted a bailbond and respondent just as readily approved it and ordered his
release on even date. It was only three months later or during the scheduled arraignment on
October 21, 2002, when her attention was called by the prosecution about the use of an
unlicensed firearm in the killing, and after her review of the information, that she believed that
the crime for which the accused was charged was non-bailable.
This Court does not thus find respondent liable for grave misconduct or ignorance of the law.
WHEREFORE, the administrative complaint against respondent, Judge Fe Albano Madrid, is
hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Corona, JJ., concur.



LIGHT ATTENDANTS AND STEWARDS ASSOCIATION OF THEPHILIPPINES (FASAP), PETITIONER,
VS.PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. (PAL), PATRIA CHIONG & CA
G.R. No. 178083,