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1.Mustang vs.

Lesson: Words construed in their ordinary sense
-It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary,
words and phrases used in a statute should be given their plain,
ordinary, and common usage meaning.
1. etitioner, a domestic corporation and registered as lumber
dealer with the !ureau of Forest "evelopment #!F"$. %wned
by &i 'huy o.
(. &espondent:
a. Fulgencio ). Factoran
-)ecretary of "*+&
b. ,tty. -incent ,. &obles
-'hief of ),I" #)pecial ,ctions and Investigation "ivision$
.. &obles /led with the "%0 a complaint against the petitioner
under violation of )ection 12 of ." +o. 345 stated that all forest
products that were cut, gathered collected and without legal
document or any legal authority shown shall be punished.
6. etitioner /led a complaint against the ( respondent for
con/scating his lumbers without any search and sei7ure order
issued by the 8udge. ,lso, contending that the written /led
against the con/scation that all were stated as lumber that were
not included in the phrase stated /led against him.
5. 9he 'ourt of appeals dismissed the order of petitioner
emphasi7ing that forest o:cer has a right to con/scate any
forest product under violation of section 12 of ." no. 345.
1. 9he o;enses ac<uired herein that any cutting, gathering,
collection or removal of timber or other forest products without
the re<uired of legal documents or license.
Issues: Whether the word =lumber> is considered as =timber> that
was stated in sec. 12 ." no 345.
-9he )' says that =lumber> considered by its ordinary sense of word
or common usage meaning is deemed and included as =timber>.
-!y simply means that lumber de/nes as @processed log or
processed timber.
2. Claudio vs. Comelec
Word or phrase construed in relation to other provisions.
1. etitioner:
-0ovito ,. 'laudio A was duly elected mayor of asay 'ity.
(. &espondent:
-&ichard ,dvincula A the private respondent and as designated
chair together with the some chairs of several barangays in
asay 'ity gathered to discuss the possibility of /ling a petition
for recall against Bayor 'laudio for loss of con/dence and they
formed an ad hoc committee for the purpose of covening the
-9he petition for recall was /led on the o:ce of the mayor and
the '%B*L*' also posted the petition on the bulletin boards of
certain public places.
-'laudio /led an opposition against the petition alleging procedural and
substantive e;ects, and the main issue that the petition for recall was /led
within one year from his assumption into o:ce and therefore prohibited.
?e argued that the &, was convened within 1 year prohibited
period as provided by a certain law under Local CovDt 'ode.
-9he 'omelec granted the petition for recall that recall is a process
which starts with the /ling of the petition for recall and since the
petition was /led eEactly one year and a day after 'laudioFs
assumption of o:ce, the petition was /led on time. 9hereafter, '%B*L*'
set the date of the recall elections.
W%+ the petition for recall was /led within the proper period provided for
by )ection 36 of the Local Covernment 'ode
-Ges. )' ,:rmed '%B*L*'
-9he limitations in )ection 36 apply to the eEercise of the power of
recall #i.e. the recall election itself$ which is vested with the registered
voters of the LCH. It does not apply to the preparatory processes to such
eEercise of recall such as the proceedings of the &,.
II)*'9I%+ 36. Limitations on &ecall.
- #a$ ,ny elective local o:cial may be the sub8ect of a
recall election only once during his term of o:ce for loss of
-#b$ +o recall shall taJe place within one #1$ year from the date of
the o:cialFs assumption to
o:ce or one #1$ year immediately preceding a regular local election.
3.Motoomull vs. Dela Paz
Word or phrase construed in relation to other provisions.
-Latchme Botoomull and Banuel Lacson A the initial directors of the
-Filomena ,ranas, 0oe;re dela a7 and !hagwani 'hugani.
%:cers: Lacson as treasurer, ,ranas as secretary
Latchme Botoomull @ a business activity on sugar
I9he etitioners and the &espondents were the initial directors of
the )arJara 9rading 'orporation.
I9he 'orporation issued a resolution authori7ing the issuance of
unissued stocJs on a one is to one basis to its stocJholders. 9he
resolution was then amended authori7ing the issuance of unissued
shares of stocJ on a two is to one basis to its stocJholders payable
on ,ug. .1, 1K36.
Ietitioner sought issuance of a preliminary in8unction by the 'ourt
of ,ppeals to stop the enforcement of the )*' decision pending
resolution of the appeal.
I9he 'ourt however held that it had no 8urisdiction according to &,
56.6 which reads:
=,ppeal shall not stay the award, order ruling, decision or 8udgment
unless the o:cer or body rendering the same or the court, on
motion, after hearing, and on such terms as it may deem 8ust,
should provide otherwise. 9he propriety of a stay granted by the
o:cer or body rendering the award, order, ruling, decision or
8udgment may be raised only by motion in the main case.>
1. W%+ the word =court> refers to a trial court and not the 'ourt of
(. W%+ the 'ourt of ,ppeals can grant a stay in the eEecution of
the decision.
-Ges, the word court refers to the trial court. =9he law une<uivocally
stated its declared ob8ection that appeal shall not stay the appealed
decision, award, order.> 9he eEception is given where the o:cer or
body rendering the same, or the court on motion, after hearing
should provide otherwise.
-9he law provides further that the propriety of a stay granted by the
o:cer or body rendering the award, order, decision or ruling may be
raised only by motion in the main case.
-Bore importantly where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in
itself or is e<ually susceptible of various meanings, its obscurity or
doubt may be reviewed by reference to associate words.
-,ccordingly, an interpretation which leads to patent inconsistency
must be re8ected as not in accordance with the legislative intent.
!.Pe"alta vs. CSC
Where the law does not distinguish.
-, well-recogni7ed rule that where the law does not distinguish,
courts should not distinguish.
Hbe leE non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemus
W%+ provision of &, (1(5, that govDt employees are entitled to 15
days vacation leaves of absence with full pay and 15 days sicJ
leaves with full pay, eEclusives of )aturday, )undays or holidays in
both cases, applies only to those who have leave credits and not to
those who have none.
-Law speaJs of granting of a right and does not distinguish between
those who have accumulated and those who have none.
#. $a"vida vs. Sales% &".
"issimilum dissimilis est ratio.
Lynette Carvida @ seeJs to annul and set aside the order from
'omelec suspending her proclamation as duly elected 'hairman of
)L in !arangay )an Loren7o, !angui, Ilocos +orte.
I)9%&G FL%W:
-9he board of *lection 9ellers @ denied her application for sheDs (1
yrs. ,nd 14 months old that were not <uali/ed to run as laid down in
)ec . #b$ of '%B*L*' &esolution +o. (2(6.
-9he petitioner /led an order in B'9' to consider her and <uali/ed
her to run and court granted it.
-9he !oard of *lection 9ellers appealed to &9' then the presiding
8udge however inhibited himself from acting on the appeal due to
his close association with petitioner.
-When the election is near, the petitioner /led his certi/cate of
candidacy where in *lection %:cer &ios with advise from the
rovincial )upervisor +oli ipo to disapproved her due to her age
again. )o the petitioner appealed to '%B*L*' to set aside this
-rivate respondent Florencio )ales a rival candidate
of the )angguniang Labataan, /led with the '%B*L*' en banc a
=etition of "enial andMor 'ancellation of 'erti/cate of 'andidacy>
against petitioner Carvida for falsely representing her age
<uali/cation in her certi/cate of candidacy.
-)ame day, respondent &ios issued the memorandum to petitioner,
the '%B*L*' en banc issued an order directing the !oard of
*lection 9ellers and !oard of 'anvassers of !arangay )an Loren7o to
suspend the proclamation of petitioner in the event she won in the
-%n the day of election, petitioner was won over the respondent and
wasnDt declared by the board of electors but so on they still did to
proclaimed the petitioner as winner.
-etitionerDs age is admittedly beyond the limit set in )ection . NbO
of '%B*L*' &esolution +o. (2(6. etitioner, however, argues that it
is unlawful, ultra vires and beyond the scope in a certain law of the
Local Covernment 'ode of 1KK1. )he contends that the 'ode itself
does not provide that the voter must be eEactly (1 years of age on
*lection "ay. )he urges that so long as she did not turn twenty-two
#(($ years old, she was still twenty-one years of age on *lection "ay
and therefore <uali/ed as a member and voter in the Latipunan ng
Labataan and as candidate for the )L elections.
- W%+ the '%B*L*' en banc has 8urisdiction to act on the petition
to deny or cancel her certi/cate of candidacy.
- W%+ the petitioner who was over (1 but below (( was <uali/ed to
be an elective )L member.
-9he )ection 5.( #a$ of the Local Covernment 'ode of 1KK1 provides
that the conduct of the )L elections is under the supervision of the
'%B*L*' and shall be governed by the %mnibus *lection 'ode
-9he distinction is apparent: the member may be more than (1
years of age on *lection "ay or on the day he registers as member
of Latipunan ng Labataan. !ut the *lective %:cial, must not be
more than (1 years of age on the day of election.
'. Ca"andang vs. Santiago
+oscitur a )ociis
-?onorable )antiago found 9omas -alenton as guilty of the crime of
frustrated homicide committed against 'arandang. 'arandang
appealed the decision to the '%,.
-ending said appeal, 'arandang bring about to the 'ourt of
instance in Banila a complaint to recover from -alenton and his
parents for the damages that he received against -alenton.
--alenton, /led a motion to suspend the trial of the civil case,
pending the termination of the criminal case against him in the
-9he 8udge ruled that the trial civil action must await the result of
the criminal case on appeal.
-Whether an o;ended party can /le a separate and independent
civil action for damages arising from physical in8uries during
pendency of criminal action for frustrated homicide.
---9he resolution of the above issue hinges on the interpretation of
the term =physical in8uries> as used in ,rticle ..: won the term
means physical in8uries in the &' only, or any physical in8ury or
bodily in8ury, whether inPicted with intent to Jill or not.
-,rticle .. uses the words =defamation>, =fraud> and =physical in8uries.>
"efamation and fraud are used in their ordinary sense because there are
no speci/c provisions in the &' using these terms as means of o;enses
de/ned therein, so that these two terms must have used not tom impart
any technical meaning, but in their generic sense.
-?ence, it is evident then that the term =physical in8uries> could not have
been used in its speci/c sense as a crime de/ned in the &'.
-In other words, the term =physical in8uries> should be
understood to mean any bodily in8ury, not the crime of physical
in8uries, because the terms used with the latter are general terms
(. Caga)an *alle) Ente"+"ises vs. CA
*8usdem generis #or the same Jind or species$
-La Tondena registered with the Philippine Patent Ofce, pursuant to
RA 6231,the 35 c!c! white "int #ottles it has #een using $or its gin
popularl% &nown as '(ine#ra )an *iguel+!
-Therea$ter, a case was initiated against Petitioner $or using the 35
c!c!, white "int #ottles with the ,ar& 'La Tondena, -nc!+ and
'(ine#ra )an *iguel+ sta,ped or #lown-in therein #% .lling the
sa,e with Petitioner/s li0uor product #earing the la#el ')onn% 1o%+
$or co,,ercial sale and distri#ution, without La Tondena/s written
consent, and in 2iolation o$ )ec! 2 o$ RA 623 as a,ended #% RA
-W%+ La 9ondena was part of the protected beverages of &, 1(.
by &, 5344.
-9he words =other lawful beverages> is used in its general sense,
referring to all beverages not prohibited by law. !everage is de/ned
as a li<uor or li<uid for drinJing.
?ard li<uor, although regulated, is not prohibited by lawQ hence, it is
within the purview and coverage of &, 1(., as amended.
9o limit the coverage of the law only to those enumerated or of the
same Jind or class as those speci/cally mentioned will defeat the
very purpose of the law.
,. -ational Po.e" Co"+ vs. Angas
*8usdem generis #or the same Jind or species$
+ational ower
/. US vs. Santo -ino
Limitations of e8usdem generis
#Limitations of the same Jind or species$
-Respondent was caught possessing a deadl% weapon! 4e was
prosecuted under Act 5o! 136, which stated that 'it shall #e
unlaw$ul $or an% person to carr% concealed upon his person an%
#owie &ni$e, dir& dagger, &ris or other deadl% weapons, pro2ide that
this prohi#ition shall not appl% to .rear,s in the possession o$
persons who ha2e secured a license there$ore or who are entitled to
carr% the sa,eunder the pro2ision o$ this Act! The trial court ruled
that, using the principle o$ e7usde, generis, the law will onl% appl%
to #laded weapons
WM+ the trial court was correct in appl%ing e7usde, generis!
+o. 9he trial court erred in applying e8usdem generis because the
latter is only resorted to in determining the legislative intent, such
that if the intent is clear, the rule must give way. In this case, the
proviso provides that unlicensed revolvers were covered by the law
and as such the law is not limited to bladed weapons.
10. Centeno vs. *illalon1*o"millos
- In 1K25, the o:cers of )amahang Latandaan ng +ayon ng 9iJay
launched a
fund drive for the purpose of renovating the chapel of !arrio 9iJay in
!ulacan. Bartin 'enteno, chairman of the group, approached 0udge
,ngeles, resident of 9iJay, and the latter solicited 1,544.
?owever, this solicitation was made without a permit from the
")W" and as a result, it was contended that 'enteno violated .".
1516, which states =,ny person to solicit or receive contributions for
charitable or public welfare purposes shall secure a permit from the
regional %:ce of the "epartment of )ocial services and
WM+ the phrase =charitable purposes> in .". 1516 is meant to
religious purposes.
-+o. Where a statute is eEpressly limited to certain matters, it may
not, by
interpretation or construction, be eEtended to others.
-9he 1K23 'onstitution treats the words =charitable> and =religious>
separately and independently from each other. )ince .". 1516
merely states that charitable or public welfare purposes need a
permit from ")W", this means that the framers of the law never
intended to include solicitations for religious purposes within its
-9he term =charitable> should be strictly construed to eEclude
solicitations for =religious> purposes.
-Boreover, since this is a criminal case, penal law must be
construed strictly against the )tate and liberally in favor of the
11. $omez vs. *entu"a
lainti; had his license revoJed on unprofessional conduct due to
the administration of opium. etitioner claims that his
administration of opium to patients was not a ground for
unprofessional conduct because it has been repealed by subse<uent
%pium Laws.
WM+ lainti; should have his license restored.
+o, lainti; should not have his license restored. 9he subse<uent
%pium Laws cannot be held to have impliedly repealed prior ones as
these did not conPict or emove said prior laws. 9he %pium Laws are
in fact in force and the ill-de/ned term of unprofessional conduct
can include improper administration of opium to patients.
12. 2lo"entino vs. P-4
15e lu+a
13. Amado"a vs. CA
1!. C6inese Hou" Im+o"te"s Assn vs. Pu"e Sta7ilization
1#. AU 8 3UP vs. -5C
etitioners were employed by the +ational )teel 'orporation for
their /ve year eEpansion program. 9he worJers contend that they
should be considered regular worJers as opposed to pro8ect
worJers, as the +)' and +L&' ruled. ,LH-9H' claims that they
have been worJing in +)' for more than 1 years and that their worJ
is necessary for the business and that would have been more than
enough to consider them as regular employees. etitionersD
contentions stemmed from ,rt. (24 of the Labor 'ode.
W%+ etitioners should be considered regular employees.
+o. 9he provision calls for casual employees. )ince etitioners were
considered pro8ect employees, this provision does not apply to
them. Boreover, the fact that they have been worJing in +)' for
more than a year does not mean they are automatically converted
into regular employees. #9hey were hired as pro8ect employees for
the 5-year eEpansion program. %nce that =pro8ect> is done, their
services will no longer be needed.$ In Bercado, )r. vs. +L&', the
proviso in par. ( of ,rt.(24 relates only to casual employees and is
not applicable to those who do not <ualify under the de/nition of
such worJers in par. 1. 9he proviso is to be construed with reference
to the immediately preceding part of the provision to which it is
attached, and not to other sections thereof.
1'. Me"alco vs. Pu7lic Utilities Em+lo)ees Assn.
1(. 3olentino vs. Sec. o9 2inance
-etitioner assail the constitutionality of &, 3311 saying that ). +o.
11.4 did not pass three reading on separate days as re<uired in the
'onstitution because the second and the third readings were done
on the same day.
-9he resident had certi/ed ). +o. 11.4 as urgent and the
presidential certi/cation dispensed with the re<uirement not only of
the printing but also that of reading the bill on three separate days.
-WM+ &, 3311, an act that seeJs to widen the taE base of the
eEisting -,9 system and enhance its administration by amending
the +ational Internal &evenue 'ode, has been constitutionally
-9here is no merit in the contention that presidential certi/cation
dispenses only with the re<uirement for the printing of the bill and
its distribution three days before its passage but not with the
re<uirement of three readings on separate days.
-9he phrase ReEcept when the resident certi/es to the necessity of
its immediate enactment, etc.R in ,rt. -I, )ec (1#($ <uali/es the two
stated conditions before a bill can become a law:
#i$ the bill have passed three readings on separate days and
#ii$ it has been printed in its /nal form and distributed three days
before it is /nally approved.
-In other words, the RunlessR clause must be read in relation to the
ReEceptR clause, because the two are really coordinate clauses of
the same sentence.
9o construe the ReEceptR clause as simply dispensing with the
second re<uirement in the RunlessR clause #i!e., printing and
distribution three days before /nal approval$ would not only violate
the rules of grammar but it would also negate the very premise of
the ReEceptR clause: the necessity of securing the immediate
enactment of a bill which is certi/ed in order to meet a public
calamity or emergency.

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