TAN VS COMELEC

TAN vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 73155 July 11, 1986
Governing law: Art XI Sec. 3 of Constitution in relation to Sec. 197 of Local Government Code
Facts:
This case was prompted by the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885, An Act Creating a New Province in the Island of Negros to be
known as the Province of Negros del Norte, effective Dec. 3, 1985. (Cities of Silay, Cadiz and San Carlos and the municipalities of
Calatrava, Taboso, Escalante, Sagay, Manapla, Victorias, E.R. Magalona, and Salvador Benedicto proposed to belong to the new
province).
Pursuant to and in implementation of this law, the COMELEC scheduled a plebiscite for January 3, 1986. Petitioners opposed, filing a
case for Prohibition and contending that the B.P. 885 is unconstitutional and not in complete accord with the Local Government Code
because:
The voters of the parent province of Negros Occidental, other than those living within the territory of the new province of Negros del
Norte, were not included in the plebiscite.
The area which would comprise the new province of Negros del Norte would only be about 2,856.56 sq. km., which is lesser than the
minimum area prescribed by the governing statute, Sec. 197 of LGC.
Issue:
WON the plebiscite was legal and complied with the constitutional requisites of the Consititution, which states that Sec. 3. No
province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered except in
accordance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a
plebiscite in the unit or units affected? NO.
Held:
Whenever a province is created, divided or merged and there is substantial alteration of the boundaries, the approval of a majority of
votes in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected must first be obtained. The creation of the proposed new province of Negros del
Norte will necessarily result in the division and alteration of the existing boundaries of Negros Occidental (parent province).
Plain and simple logic will demonstrate that two political units would be affected. The first would be the parent province of Negros
Occidental because its boundaries would be substantially altered. The other affected entity would be composed of those in the area
subtracted from the mother province to constitute the proposed province of Negros del Norte.
Paredes vs. Executive (G.R. No. 55628) should not be taken as a doctrinal or compelling precedent. Rather, the dissenting view of
Justice Abad Santos is applicable, to wit:
when the Constitution speaks of the unit or units affected it means all of the people of the municipality if the municipality is to be
divided such as in the case at bar or of the people of two or more municipalities if there be a merger.
The remaining portion of the parent province is as much an area affected. The substantial alteration of the boundaries of the parent
province, not to mention the adverse economic effects it might suffer, eloquently argue the points raised by the petitioners.
SC pronounced that the plebscite has no legal effect for being a patent nullity.
PELAEZ VS AUDITOR GENERAL
15 SCRA 569 Political Law Sufficient Standard Test and Completeness Test
In 1964, President Ferdinand Marcos issued executive orders creating 33 municipalities this was purportedly pursuant to Section 68
of the Revised Administrative Code which provides in part:
The President may by executive order define the boundary of any municipality and may change the seat of government within any
subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require
The then Vice President, Emmanuel Pelaez, as a taxpayer, filed a special civil action to prohibit the auditor general from disbursing
funds to be appropriated for the said municipalities. Pelaez claims that the EOs were unconstitutional. He said that Section 68 of the
RAC had been impliedly repealed by Section 3 of RA 2370 which provides that barrios may not be created or their boundaries altered
nor their names changed except by Act of Congress. Pelaez argues: If the President, under this new law, cannot even create a barrio,
how can he create amunicipality which is composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities?
The Auditor General countered that there was no repeal and that only barrios were barred from being created by the
President. Municipalities are exempt from the bar and that a municipality can be created without creating barrios. He further
maintains that through Sec. 68 of the RAC, Congress has delegated such power to createmunicipalities to the President.
ISSUE: Whether or not Congress has delegated the power to create barrios to the President by virtue of Sec. 68 of the RAC.
HELD: No. There was no delegation here. Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the government the power to fill in the
details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of
powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the
delegate and (b) fix a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable to which the delegate must
conform in the performance of his functions. In this case, Sec. 68 lacked any such standard. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of
policy, the delegate would, in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned
standard, there would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope
of his authority.
Further, although Sec. 68 provides the qualifying clause as the public welfare may require which would mean that the President
may exercise such power as the public welfare may require is present, still, such will not replace the standard needed for a proper
delegation of power. In the first place, what the phrase as the public welfare may require qualifies is the text which immediately
precedes hence, the proper interpretation is the President may change the seat of government within any subdivision to such place
therein as the public welfare may require. Only the seat of government may be changed by the President when public welfare so
requires and NOT the creation of municipality.
The Supreme Court declared that the power to create municipalities is essentially and eminently legislative in character not
administrative (not executive).

GARCIA VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
211 SCRA 219 Political Law Congress Authorizing the President to Tax
In November 1990, President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 438 which imposed, in addition to any other duties, taxes
and charges imposed by law on all articles imported into the Philippines, an additional duty of 5% ad valorem tax. This additional duty
was imposed across the board on all imported articles, including crude oil and other oil products imported into the Philippines. In
1991, EO 443 increased the additional duty to 9%. In the same year, EO 475 was passed reinstating the previous 5% duty except that
crude oil and other oil products continued to be taxed at 9%. Enrique Garcia, a representative from Bataan, avers that EO 475 and
478 are unconstitutional for they violate Section 24 of Article VI of the Constitution which provides:
All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall
originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.
He contends that since the Constitution vests the authority to enact revenue bills in Congress, the President may not assume such
power by issuing Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 which are in the nature of revenue-generating measures.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 475 and 478 are constitutional.
HELD: Under Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, the enactment of appropriation, revenue and tariff bills, like all other bills is, of
course, within the province of the Legislative rather than the Executive Department. It does not follow, however, that therefore
Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478, assuming they may be characterized as revenue measures, are prohibited to be exercised by the
President, that they must be enacted instead by the Congress of the Philippines.
Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution provides as follows:
(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it
may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the
national development program of the Government.
There is thus explicit constitutional permission to Congress to authorize the President subject to such limitations and restrictions as
[Congress] may impose to fix within specific limits tariff rates . . . and other duties or imposts . . . . In this case, it is the Tariff and
Customs Code which authorized the President ot issue the said EOs.

BIROGO VS PTC
FACTS:
Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC) dated July 30, 2010.
PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption
committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous
administration, and to submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. PTC has all the
powers of an investigative body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in
disputes between contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and corruption and make
recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt, much less order their arrest. Although
it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information in our
courts of law.
Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing its functions. They argued that:
(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the Congress to create a public office and appropriate funds for
its operation.
(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the
delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieve economy, simplicity and efficiency
does not include the power to create an entirely new public office which was hitherto inexistent like the Truth Commission.
(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and statutes when it vested the Truth Commission with quasi-judicial powers
duplicating, if not superseding, those of the Office of the Ombudsman created under the 1987 Constitution and the DOJ created under
the Administrative Code of 1987.
(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for investigation and prosecution officials and personnel of the
previous administration as if corruption is their peculiar species even as it excludes those of the other administrations, past and
present, who may be indictable.
Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal standing of petitioners and argued that:
1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress because the Presidents executive power and power of control necessarily
include the inherent power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed and that, in any event, the
Constitution, Revised Administrative Code of 1987, PD No. 141616 (as amended), R.A. No. 9970 and settled jurisprudence, authorize
the President to create or form such bodies.
2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds because there is no appropriation but a mere allocation of
funds already appropriated by Congress.
3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of the Ombudsman and the DOJ, because it is a fact-finding
body and not a quasi-judicial body and its functions do not duplicate, supplant or erode the latters jurisdiction.
4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause because it was validly created for laudable purposes.
ISSUES:
1. WON the petitioners have legal standing to file the petitions and question E. O. No. 1;
2. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the powers of Congress to create and to appropriate
funds for public offices, agencies and commissions;
3. WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;
4. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.

RULING:
The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of
judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance;
otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury
as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body to which they belong as members. To the extent
the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the
exercise of the powers of that institution.
Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office remain
inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the validity of any official action which, to their mind, infringes on their prerogatives as
legislators.
With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of sustaining, any personal and direct injury attributable
to the implementation of E. O. No. 1.
Locus standi is a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question. In private suits, standing is governed by the real-
parties-in interest rule. It provides that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest. Real-
party-in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the
suit.
Difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a public right in assailing an allegedly
illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general public. He has to show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. He
has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a citizen or taxpayer.
The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result. The Court, however, finds reason in Biraogos assertion that the petition covers
matters of transcendental importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional issues in the petition
which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents
The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. The powers of the President are not limited to
those specific powers under the Constitution. One of the recognized powers of the President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-
mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws
have been faithfully executed. The purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters which the
President is entitled to know so that he can be properly advised and guided in the performance of his duties relative to the execution
and enforcement of the laws of the land.
2. There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds already appropriated. There is no usurpation on
the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate funds. There is no need to specify the amount to be earmarked for the
operation of the commission because, whatever funds the Congress has provided for the Office of the President will be the very source
of the funds for the commission. The amount that would be allocated to the PTC shall be subject to existing auditing rules and
regulations so there is no impropriety in the funding.
3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective powers. If at all, the investigative function of the
commission will complement those of the two offices. The function of determining probable cause for the filing of the appropriate
complaints before the courts remains to be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman. PTCs power to investigate is limited to obtaining facts
so that it can advise and guide the President in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of
the land.
4. Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its apparent transgression of the equal
protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution.
Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. The
purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a states jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary
discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the states duly constituted
authorities.
There must be equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Equal protection clause permits classification.
Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests
on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies
equally to all members of the same class.
The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and
obligations imposed.
Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of truth commission is to
investigate and find out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration only. The
intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest.
Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include
past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such
discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution.
Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification.
The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at least, have the authority to investigate all past
administrations.
The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with
which all private rights determined and all public authority administered. Laws that do not conform to the Constitution should be
stricken down for being unconstitutional.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of
the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
GANCAYCO VS QUEZON CITY GOVERNMENT
Facts: Retired Justice Emilio A. Gancayco bought a parcel of land located EDSA,
3
Quezon City. A few years later, the Quezon City
Council issued Ordinance No. 2904, entitled "An Ordinance Requiring the Construction of Arcades, for Commercial Buildings to be
Constructed in Zones Designated as Business Zones in the Zoning Plan of Quezon City, and Providing Penalties in Violation Thereof. It
required the relevant property owner to construct an arcade along EDSA. An arcade is defined as any portion of a building above the
first floor projecting over the sidewalk beyond the first storey wall used as protection for pedestrians against rain or sun. It bears
emphasis that at the time Ordinance No. 2904 was passed by the city council, there was yet no building code passed by the national
legislature. Thus, the regulation of the construction of buildings was left to the discretion of local government units. Under this
particular ordinance, the city council required that the arcade is to be created by constructing the wall of the ground floor facing the
sidewalk a few meters away from the property line. Thus, the building owner is not allowed to construct his wall up to the edge of the
property line, thereby creating a space or shelter under the first floor. In effect, property owners relinquish the use of the space for use
as an arcade for pedestrians, instead of using it for their own purposes.
The ordinance covered the property of Justice Gancayco. Subsequently, Justice Gancayco sought the exemption of a two-storey
building being constructed on his property from the application of Ordinance No. 2904 that he be exempted from constructing an
arcade on his property. The City Council acted favorably on Justice Gancaycos request "subject to the condition that upon notice by
the City Engineer, the owner shall, within reasonable time, demolish the enclosure of said arcade at his own expense when public
interest so demands."
The MMDA then sent a notice of demolition to Justice Gancayco alleging that a portion of his building violated the National Building
Code of the Philippines in relation to Ordinance No. 2904. He did not comply with the notice. The MMDA then proceeded to demolish
the party wall of the ground floor structure. The City Government of Quezon City claimed that the ordinance was a valid exercise of
police power, regulating the use of property in a business zone.
Justice Gancayco filed a Petition with prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. The RTC ruled
that the ordinance was unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals reversed the RTCs decision and ruled that the ordinance was a valid
exercise of the right of the local government unit to promote the general welfare of its constituents pursuant to its police powers.
Issue: Whether Ordinance No. 2094 is a valid exercise of police power.
Held: Yes, it is a valid delegation of Police Power
Ratio: Police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. It has been defined as the power vested by the Constitution in the
legislature to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with penalties
or without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and for the
subjects of the same. The power is plenary and its scope is vast and pervasive, reaching and justifying measures for public health,
public safety, public morals, and the general welfare. In the exercise of police power, property rights of individuals may be subjected to
restraints and burdens in order to fulfil the objectives of the government.
For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined by the legislature, property rights must bow to the primacy of police
power because property rights, though sheltered by due process, must yield to general welfare.
Police power as an attribute to promote the common good would be diluted considerably if on the mere plea of petitioners that they will
suffer loss of earnings and capital, the questioned provision is invalidated. Moreover, in the absence of evidence demonstrating the
alleged confiscatory effect of the provision in question, there is no basis for its nullification in view of the presumption of validity which
every law has in its favor.
It is clear that the primary objectives of the city council of Quezon City when it issued the questioned ordinance ordering the
construction of arcades were the health and safety of the city and its inhabitants; the promotion of their prosperity; and the
improvement of their morals, peace, good order, comfort, and the convenience. At the time that the ordinance was passed, there was no
national building code enforced to guide the city council; thus, there was no law of national application that prohibited the city council
from regulating the construction of buildings, arcades and sidewalks in their jurisdiction.
EDU VS ERICTA
Judge Ericta and Teddy C. Galo filed suit for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction assailing the validity of enactment
of the Reflector as well as Admin Order No. 2 implementing it, as an invalid exercise of the police power for being violative of the due
process clause. Galo followed with a manifestation that in the event that Judge would uphold said statute constitutional, A.O. No. 2 of
the Land Transportation Commissioner, implementing such legislation be nullified as an undue exercise of legislative power.

ISSUE:
Whether Reflector Law and Administrative Order is constitutional and valid.

RULING:
Yes. Reflector Law is enacted under the police power in order to promote public safety and order.

Justice Laurel identified police power with state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in
order to promote the general welfare. Persons and property could thus "be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to
secure the general comfort, health and prosperity of the state." The police power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from
precisely defined, rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its government limitations to safeguard
constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the
enactment of such salutary measures calculated to insure communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare.

The same lack of success marks the effort of respondent Galo to impugn the validity of Administrative Order No. 2 issued by petitioner
in his official capacity, duly approved by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, for being contrary to the principle of non-
delegation of legislative power. Such administrative order, which took effect on April 17, 1970, has a provision on reflectors in effect
reproducing what was set forth in the Act.

It is a fundamental principle flowing from the doctrine of separation of powers that Congress may not delegate its legislative power to
the two other branches of the government, subject to the exception that local governments may over local affairs participate in its
exercise. What cannot be delegated is the authority under the Constitution to make laws and to alter and repeal them; the test is the
completeness of the statute in all its term and provisions when it leaves the hands of the legislature. To determine whether or not there
is an undue delegation of legislative power the inquiry must be directed to the scope and definiteness of the measure enacted. The
legislature does not abdicate its functions when it describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of his
authority.

It bears repeating that the Reflector Law construed together with the Land Transportation Code. Republic Act No. 4136, of which it is
an amendment, leaves no doubt as to the stress and emphasis on public safety which is the prime consideration in statutes of this
character. There is likewise a categorical affirmation Of the power of petitioner as Land Transportation Commissioner to promulgate
rules and regulations to give life to and translate into actuality such fundamental purpose. His power is clear. There has been no
abuse. His Administrative Order No. 2 can easily survive the attack, far-from-formidable, launched against it by respondent Galo.