PHYSICS AND REALITY.

BY
ALBERT EINSTEIN.
(Translation by Jean Piccard.)
I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION CONCERNING THE METHOD OF SCmNCE.
I t has of t en been said, and cer t ai nl y not wi t hout j ust i -
fi cat i on, t h a t t he ma n of sci ence is a poor phi l osopher . Wh y
t hen shoul d i t not be t he r i ght t hi ng for t he physi ci st t o l et
t he phi l os opher do t he phi l osophi zi ng? Such mi ght i ndeed
be t he r i ght t hi ng at a t i me when t he physi ci st bel i eves he
has at his di sposal a rigid s ys t e m of f unda me nt a l concept s
and f unda me nt a l laws whi ch are so well est abl i shed t h a t
waves of doubt can not r each t he m; but , i t can not be r i ght
at a t i me when t he ver y f oundat i ons of physi cs i t sel f have
become pr obl emat i c as t he y are now. At a t i me like t he
pr esent , when exper i ence forces us t o seek a newer and mor e
solid f oundat i on, t he physi ci st c a nnot s i mpl y s ur r ender t o t he
p h i l o s o p h e r t he cri t i cal c ont e mpl a t i on of t he t heor et i cal
f oundat i ons ; for, he hi msel f knows best , and feels mor e sur el y
wher e t he shoe pi nches. I n l ooki ng for a new f oundat i on, he
mus t t r y t o ma ke cl ear in his own mi nd j us t how far t he
concept s whi ch he uses are j ust i fi ed, and are necessi t i es.
Th e whol e of sci ence is not hi ng mor e t ha n a r ef i nement of
ever y da y t hi nki ng. I t is for t hi s reason t ha t t he cri t i cal
t hi nki ng of t he physi ci st c a nnot possi bl y be r est r i ct ed t o t he
exami nat i on of t he concept s of his own specific field. He
c a nnot pr oceed wi t hout consi der i ng cri t i cal l y a muc h mor e
di ffi cul t pr obl em, t he pr obl em of anal yzi ng t he nat ur e of
e ve r yda y t hi nki ng.
On t he st age of our subconsci ous mi nd appear in col orful
successi on sense experi ences, me mo r y pi ct ur es of t hem, repre-
s ent at i ons and feelings. I n c ont r a s t t o psychol ogy, physi cs
t r eat s di r ect l y onl y of sense experi ences and of t he " under -
s t a ndi ng " of t hei r connect i on. But even t he concept of t he
Copyright, 1936 , by Albert Einstein.
349
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Physics and Reality by Albert Einstein
35 ALBERT EI NSTEI N. [J. F. I.
" real ext er nal worl d " of e ve r yda y t hi nki ng rest s excl usi vel y
on sense i mpressi ons.
Now we mus t first r e ma r k t ha t t he di f f er ent i at i on bet ween
sense i mpr essi ons and r epr es ent at i ons is not possi bl e; or, at
l east i t is not possi bl e wi t h absol ut e cer t ai nt y. Wi t h t he
di scussi on of t hi s pr obl em, whi ch affects also t he not i on of
real i t y, we will not concer n oursel ves but we shall t ake t he
exi st ence of sense experi ences as gi ven, t ha t is t o say as psychi c
experi ences of speci al ki nd.
I bel i eve t ha t t he first st ep in t he s et t i ng of a " real
ext er nal wor l d " is t he f or mat i on of t he concept of bodi l y
obj ect s and of bodi l y obj ect s of var i ous ki nds. Out of t he
mul t i t ude of our sense experi ences we t ake, ment al l y and
ar bi t r ar i l y, cer t ai n r epeat edl y occur r i ng compl exes of sense
i mpr essi on ( par t l y in conj unct i on wi t h sense i mpr essi ons
whi ch are i nt er pr et ed as si gns for sense experi ences of ot her s) ,
and we a t t r i but e t o t h e m a me a n i n g - - t h e meani ng of t he
bodi l y obj ect . Consi der ed l ogi cal l y t hi s concept is not i den-
t i cal wi t h t he t ot a l i t y of sense i mpr essi ons referred t o; but i t
is an ar bi t r ar y cr eat i on of t he h u ma n (or ani mal ) : ml nd. On
t he ot he r hand, t he concept owes i t s meani ng and i t s j us-
t i fi cat i on excl usi vel y t o t he t ot al i t y of t he sense i mpr essi ons
whi ch we associ at e wi t h it.
The second st ep is t o be f ound in t he fact t hat , in our
t hi nki ng (whi ch det er mi nes our expect at i on) , we a t t r i but e t o
t hi s concept of t he bodi l y obj ect a significance, whi ch is t o a
hi gh degree i nde pe nde nt of t he sense i mpr essi on whi ch orig-
i nal l y gi ves rise t o it. Thi s is wh a t we mean when we at t r i b-
ut e t o t he bodi l y obj ect " a real exi st ence. " The j ust i f i cat i on
of such a s et t i ng rest s excl usi vel y on t h a t fact t hat , by means
of such concept s and ment al rel at i ons bet ween t hem, we are
abl e t o or i ent oursel ves in t he l abyr i nt h of sense i mpressi ons.
Thes e not i ons and rel at i ons, a l t hough free s t a t e me nt s of our
t hought s , appear t o us as s t r onger ' and mor e unal t er abl e t ha n
t he i ndi vi dual sense experi ence itself, t he char act er of whi ch
as a nyt hi ng ot he r t ha n t he r esul t of an illusion or hal l uci nat i on
is never compl et el y guar ant eed. On t he ot her hand, t hese
concept s and rel at i ons, and i ndeed t he s et t i ng of real obj ect s
and, gener al l y speaki ng, t he exi st ence of " t he real wor l d, "
have j ust i f i cat i on onl y in so far as t he y are connect ed wi t h
March, 1936.] PHYSICS AND REALITY. 35I
sense impressions between which t hey form a mental con-
nection.
The very fact t hat the t ot al i t y of our sense experiences is
such t hat by means of thinking (operations with concepts, and
the creation and use of definite functional relations between
them, and the co6rdination of sense experiences to these con-
cepts) it can be put in order, this fact is one which leaves us
in awe, but which we shall never underst and. One may say
" the eternal myst er y of the world is its comprehensibility. "
It is one of the great realisations of Immanuel Kant t hat the
setting up of a real external world would be senseless wi t hout
this comprehensibility.
In speaking here concerning " comprehensibility," the
expression is used in its most modest sense. It implies: the
production of some sort of order among sense impressions, this
order being produced by the creation of general concepts, rela-
tions between these concepts, and by relations between the
concepts and sense experience, these relations being deter-
mined in any possible manner. It is in this sense t hat the
world of our sense experiences is comprehensible. The fact
t hat it is comprehensible is a miracle.
In my opinion, nothing can be said concerning the manner
in which the concepts are to be made and connected, and how
we are to co6rdinate t hem to the experiences. In guiding us
in the creation of such an order of sense experiences, success
in t he result is alone the determining factor. All t hat is
necessary is the statement of a set of rules, since wi t hout such
rules the acquisition of knowledge in the desired sense would
be impossible. One may compare these rules with the rules
of a game in which, while the rules themselves are arbitrary,
it is their rigidity alone which makes the game possible.
However, the fixation will never be final. It will have validity
only for a special field of application (i.e. there are no final
categories in the sense of Kant ).
The connection of the el ement ary concepts of every day
thinking with complexes of sense experiences can only be com-
prehended intuitively and it is unadapt abl e to scientifically
logical fixation. The t ot al i t y of these connect i ons, --none
of which is expressible in notional t erms, --i s the only thing
which differentiates the great building which is science from a
3 5 2 A L B E R T E I N S T E I N . [J. F. I.
logical but e mp t y scheme of concept s. By means of t hese
connect i ons, t he pur el y not i onal t heor ems of sci ence become
s t a t e me nt s a bout compl exes of sense experi ences.
We shall call " pr i ma r y concept s " such concept s as are
di r ect l y and i nt ui t i vel y connect ed wi t h t ypi cal compl exes of
sense experi ences. All ot her not i ons a r e - - f r o m t he physi cal
poi nt of vi ew- - pos s es s ed of meani ng, onl y in so far as t hey
are connect ed, by t heor ems, wi t h t he pr i ma r y not i ons.
Thes e t heor ems are par t i al l y defi ni t i ons of t he concept s (and
of t he s t a t e me nt s der i ved l ogi cal l y f r om t hem) and par t i al l y
t heor ems not der i vabl e f r om t he defi ni t i ons, whi ch express at
l e a s t i ndi r e c t r el at i ons bet ween t he " pr i ma r y concept s , " and
in t hi s way bet ween sense experi ences. The or e ms of t he
l at t er ki nd are " s t a t e me nt s a bout r eal i t y " or laws of nat ur e,
i.e. t heor ems whi ch have t o show t hei r usef ul ness when appl i ed
t o sense exper i ences c ompr e he nde d by pr i ma r y concept s.
The quest i on as t o whi ch of t he t heor ems shall be consi der ed
as defi ni t i ons and whi ch as nat ur al laws will depend l argel y
upon t he chosen r epr esent at i on. I t real l y becomes abs ol ut el y
necessar y t o ma ke t hi s di f f er ent i at i on onl y when one exami nes
t he degree t o whi ch t he whol e s ys t e m of concept s consi der ed
is not e mp t y f r om t he physi cal poi nt of view.
Stratification of the Scientific System,
The ai m of sci ence is, on t he one hand, a compr ehens i on,
as complete as possible, of t he connect i on bet ween t he sense
experi ences in t hei r t ot al i t y, and, on t he ot he r hand, t he
a c c ompl i s hme nt of t hi s ai m by the use of a minimum of primary
concepts and relations. (Seeking, as far as possible, logical
uni t y in t he wor l d pi ct ur e, i.e. pauci t y in logical el ement s. )
Science. concer ns t he t ot al i t y of t he pr i ma r y concept s, i.e.
concept s di r ect l y connect ed wi t h sense experi ences, and
t heor ems connect i ng t hem. I n i t s first st age of devel opment ,
sci ence does not cont ai n a nyt hi ng else. Our e ve r yda y
t hi nki ng is sat i sfi ed on t he whol e wi t h t hi s level. Such a
s t at e of affairs cannot , however, sat i sf y a spi r i t whi ch is
real l y sci ent i fi cal l y mi nde d; because, t he t ot a l i t y of concept s
and rel at i ons obt ai ned in t hi s ma nne r is ut t e r l y l acki ng in
logical uni t y. I n or der t o s uppl e me nt t hi s defi ci ency, one
i nvent s a s ys t em poor er in concept s and rel at i ons, a s ys t em
March, 1936.] PHYSICS AND REALITY. 353
retaining the pri mary concepts and relations of the " first
layer " as logically derived coneepts and relations. This new
" secondary syst em " pays for its higher logical uni t y by
having, as its own el ement ary concepts (concepts of the
second layer), only those which are no longer directly con-
nected with complexes of sense experiences. Furt her striving
for logical uni t y brings us to a t ert i ary system, still poorer in
concepts and relations, for the deduction of the concepts and
relations of the secondary (and so indirectly of the primary)
layer. Thus the story goes on unt i l we have arrived at a
syst em of the greatest concei+able unity, and of the greatest
povert y of concepts of the logical foundations, which are
still compatible with the observation made by our senses.
We do not know whet her or not this ambition will ever result
in a definite system. If one is asked for his opinion, he is
inclined to answer no. While wrestling with the problems,
however, one will never give up the hope t hat this greatest of
all aims can really be at t ai ned to a very high degree.
An adherent to the t heory of abstraction or induction
might call our layers " degrees of abstraction "; but, I do not
consider it justifiable to veil the logical independence of the
concept from the sense experiences. The relation is not
analogous to t hat of soup to beef but rat her of wardrobe
number to overcoat.
The layers are furt hermore not clearly separated. It is
not even absolutely clear which concepts belong to the pri mary
layer. As a mat t er of fact, we are dealing with freely formed
concepts, which, with a cert ai nt y sufficient for practical use,
are intuitively connected with complexes of sense experiences
in such a manner that, in any given case of experience, there
is no uncert ai nt y as to the applicability or non-applicability
of the st at ement . The essential thing is the aim to represent
the mul t i t ude of concepts and theorems, close to experience,
as theorems, logically deduced and belonging to a basis, as
narrow as possible, of fundament al concepts and fundament al
relations which themselves can be chosen freely (axioms).
The liberty of choice, however, is of a special kind; it is not
in any way similar to the liberty of a writer of fiction.
Rather, it is similar to t hat of a man engaged in solving a well
designed word puzzle. He may, it is true, propose any word
354 ALBERT E I NS T E I N. [J. F. I.
as the solution; but, there is only one word which really
solves the puzzle in all its forms. It is an outcome of faith
t hat nat ure - - as she is perceptible to our five senses - - takes
the charact er of such a well formulated puzzle. The suc-
cesses reaped up to now by science do, it is true, give a certain
encouragement for this faith.
The mul t i t ude of layers discussed above corresponds to
the several stages of progress which have resulted from the
struggle for uni t y in the course of development. As regards
the final aim, i nt ermedi ary layers are only of t emporary
nature. They must eventually disappear as irrelevant. We
have to deal, however, with the science of today, in which
these st rat a represent problematic partial successes which
support one anot her but which also t hreat en one another,
because t oday' s systems of concepts contain deep seated in-
congruities which we shall meet later on.
It will be the aim of the following lines to demonst rat e
what paths the constructive human mind has entered, in
order to arrive at a basis of physics which is logically as uni-
form as possible.
2. MECHANI CS AND THE ATTEMPTS TO BASE ALL PHYSI CS UP ON IT.
An i mport ant propert y of our sense experiences, and, more
generally, of all of our experience, is its time-like order. This
kind of order leads to the mental conception of a subjective
time, an ordinating scheme for our experience. The sub-
jective time leads then t hrough the concept of the bodily
object and of space, to the concept of objective time, as we
shall see later on.
Ahead of the notion of objective time there is, however,
the concept of space; and, ahead of the l at t er we find the
concept of the bodily object. The l at t er is directly connected
with complexes of sense experiences. It has been pointed
out t hat one propert y which is characteristic of the notion
" bodily object " is the propert y which provides t hat we
co6rdinate to it an existence, i ndependent of (subjective)
time, and i ndependent of the fact t hat it is perceived by our
senses. We do this in spite of the fact t hat we perceive
temporal alterations in it. Poincarfi has j ust l y emphasized
the fact t hat we distinguish two kinds of alterations of the
March, I936.] PHYSI CS AND REALITY. 355
bodi l y obj ect , " changes of s t a t e " a nd " changes of posi t i on. "
Th e l at t er , he r e ma r ke d, ar e al t er at i ons whi ch we can r ever s e
by a r b i t r a r y mot i ons of our bodi es.
Th a t t her e ar e bodi l y obj ect s t o whi ch we have t o ascr i be,
wi t hi n a cer t ai n s pher e of per cept i on, no al t er at i on of s t at e,
but onl y al t er at i ons of posi t i on, is a f act of f u n d a me n t a l i m-
por t a nc e f or t he f or mat i on of t he concept of space (in a cer t ai n
degr ee even f or t he j ust i f i cat i on of t he not i on of t he bodi l y
obj e c t i t sel f). Le t us call such an obj ect " pr act i cal l y r i gi d. "
If, as t he obj ect of our per cept i on, we cons i der si mul -
t a ne ous l y (i.e. as a si ngl e uni t ) t wo pr act i cal l y ri gi d bodi es,
t he n t her e exi st for t hi s ens embl e such al t er at i ons as can not
possi bl y be consi der ed as changes of posi t i on of t he whol e,
n o t wi t h s t a n d i n g t he f act t h a t t hi s is t he case f or each one of
t he t wo cons t i t uent s . Thi s l eads t o t he not i on of " c ha nge
of r el at i ve posi t i on " of t he t wo obj ect s ; and, in t hi s wa y al so
t o t he not i on of " r el at i ve posi t i on " of t he t wo obj ect s. I t is
f ound mor e ove r t h a t a mo n g t he r el at i ve posi t i ons, t her e is
one of a speci fi c ki nd whi ch we des i gnat e as " Co n t a c t . " 1
Pe r ma n e n t c ont a c t of t wo bodi es in t hr ee or mor e " poi nt s "
me a ns t h a t t h e y ar e uni t e d as a quasi ri gi d c o mp o u n d body.
I t is per mi ssi bl e t o s a y t h a t t he second body f or ms t he n a
(quasi ri gi d) c ont i nua t i on on t he fi rst body a nd ma y, i n i t s
t ur n, be c ont i nue d quasi ri gi dl y. The possi bi l i t y of t he quasi
ri gi d c ont i nua t i on of a body is unl i mi t ed. Th e real essence
of t he concei vabl e quasi ri gi d c ont i nua t i on of a body B0 is t he
i nf i ni t e " space " de t e r mi ne d by it.
I n my opi ni on, t he f act t h a t e v e r y bodi l y obj ect s i t ua t e d
in a n y a r b i t r a r y ma n n e r can be put i nt o c ont a c t wi t h t he
quasi ri gi d c ont i nua t i on of a pr e de t e r mi ne d a nd chosen body
B0 ( body of r el at i on) , t hi s f act is t he empi r i cal basi s of our
concept i on of space. I n pr e- sci ent i f i c t hi nki ng, t he solid
e a r t h' s cr us t pl ays t he rSle of B0 a nd i t s cont i nuat i on. Th e
v e r y n a me g e o me t r y i ndi cat es t h a t t he concept of space is
ps ychol ogi cal l y c onne c t e d wi t h t he e a r t h as an assi gned body.
Th e bol d not i on of " space " whi ch pr eceded all sci ent i fi c
i It is in t he nat ure of things t hat we are able to t al k about these objects
only by means of concepts of our own creation, concepts which themselves are
not subject to definition. It is essential, however, t hat we make use only of such
concepts concerning whose cogrdination t o our experience we feel no doubt.
356 ALBERT EINSTEIN. [J. F. I.
ge ome t r y t r ans f or med our ment al concept of t he rel at i ons of
posi t i ons of bodi l y obj ect s i nt o t he not i on of t he posi t i on of
t hese bodi l y obj ect s in " space. " Thi s, of itself, r epr esent s
a gr eat f or mal si mpl i fi cat i on. Thr ough t hi s concept of space
one reaches, mor eover , an a t t i t ude in whi ch any descr i pt i on
of posi t i on is a dmi t t e dl y a descr i pt i on of cont act ; t he st at e-
me n t t ha t a poi nt of a bodi l y obj ect is l ocat ed at a poi nt P
of space means t ha t t he obj ect t ouches t he poi nt P of t he
s t a nda r d body of reference B0 ( supposed appr opr i at el y con-
t i nued) at t he poi nt consi dered.
I n t he ge ome t r y of t he Greeks, space pl ays onl y a qual i t a-
t i ve r61e, since t he posi t i on of bodi es in rel at i on t o space is
consi der ed as gi ven, i t is t r ue, but is not descr i bed by means
of number s . Descar t es was t he first t o i nt r oduce t hi s met hod.
I n his l anguage, t he whol e c ont e nt of Eucl i di an ge ome t r y can
axi omat i cal l y be f ounded upon t he fol l owi ng s t a t e me nt s :
(I) Two specified poi nt s of a rigid body det er mi ne a di st ance.
(2) We ma y co6r di nat e t r i pl et s of numbe r s X1, X2, X3, t o
poi nt s of space in such a ma nne r t ha t for ever y di st ance
P' - P" unde r consi der at i on, t he c05r di nat es of whose end
poi nt s are Xx' , X ( , X3P; Xx", X ( ' , Xa 'p, t he expressi on
s = ( x? ' - + ( x; ' - x; ) 2 + ( x; p -
is i nde pe nde nt of t he posi t i on of t he body, and of t he posi t i ons
of a ny and all ot her bodies.
The (posi t i ve) n u mb e r S means t he l engt h of t he st r et ch,
or t he di st ance bet ween t he t wo poi nt s P' and P " of space .
(whi ch are coi nci dent wi t h t he poi nt s P' and P" of t he
st r et ch) .
The f or mul at i on is chosen, i nt ent i onal l y, in such a way
t ha t i t expresses clearly, not onl y t he logical and axi omat i c,
but also t he empi ri cal c ont e nt of Eucl i di an geomet r y. The
pur el y logical ( a xi oma t i c ) r e pr e s e nt a t i on of Eucl i di an geom-
e t r y has, it is t rue, t he a dva nt a ge of gr eat er si mpl i ci t y and
cl ari t y. I t pays for t hi s, however , by r enounci ng r epr esent a-
t i on of t he connect i on bet ween t he not i onal cons t r uct i on and
t he sense experi ence upon whi ch connect i on, alone, t he sig-
ni fi cance of ge ome t r y for physi cs rest s. The fat al er r or t h a t
t he necessi t y of t hi nki ng, pr ecedi ng all experi ence, was at
t he basis of Eucl i di an geomet r y and t he concept of space
March, 1936.] PHYSICS AND REALITY. 357
bel ongi ng t o it, t hi s fat al er r or arose from t he fact t hat t he
empi ri cal basis, on whi ch t he axi omat i c const r uct i on of
Eucl i di an geomet r y rests, had fallen i nt o oblivion.
I n so far as one Can speak of t he exi st ence of rigid bodies
in nat ur e, Eucl i di an ge ome t r y is a physi cal science, t he useful-
ness of whi ch mus t be shown by appl i cat i on t o sense experi-
ences. I t rel at es t o t he t ot al i t y of laws whi ch mus t hol d for
t he r el at i ve positions of rigid bodies i ndependent l y of t i me.
As one ma y see, t he physi cal not i on of space also, as ori gi nal l y
used in physics, is t i ed t o t he exi st ence of rigid bodies.
Fr om t he physi ci st ' s poi nt of view, t he cent r al i mpor t ance
of Eucl i di an geomet r y rests in t he fact t hat its laws are inde-
pendent of t he specific nat ur e of t he bodies whose rel at i ve
positions it discusses. It s formal si mpl i ci t y is char act er i zed
by t he propert i es of homogenei t y and i sot r opy (and t he
exi st ence of si mi l ar ent i t i es).
The concept of space is, i t is t rue, useful, but not indis-
pensabl e for geomet r y proper, i.e. for t he f or mul at i on of rules
about t he rel at i ve positions of rigid bodies. I n opposi t i on t o
this, t he concept of obj ect i ve t i me, wi t hout whi ch t he formu-
l at i on of t he f undament al s of classical mechani cs is impossible,
is l i nked wi t h t he concept of t he spacial cont i nuum.
The i nt r oduct i on of obj ect i ve t i me i nvol ves t wo st at e-
ment s whi ch are i ndependent of each ot her.
(I) The i nt r oduct i on of t he obj ect i ve local t i me by con-
nect i ng t he t empor al sequence of experiences wi t h t he indica-
t i ons of a " cl ock, " i.e. of a closed syst em wi t h periodical
occurrence.
(2) The i nt r oduct i on of t he not i on of obj ect i ve t i me for
t he happeni ngs in t he whol e space, by whi ch not i on al one t he
i dea of local t i me is enl ar ged t o t he i dea of t i me in physics.
Not e concerni ng (I). As I see it, i t does not mean a
" pet i t i o principii " if one put s t he concept of periodical
occur r ence ahead of t he concept of t i me, while one is con-
cerned wi t h t he clarification of t he origin and of t he empi ri cal
cont ent of t he concept of t i me. Such a concept i on corre-
sponds exact l y t o t he precedence of t he concept of t he rigid
(or quasi rigid) body in t he i nt er pr et at i on of t he concept of
space.
Fur t her discussion of (2). The illusion whi ch prevai l ed
VOL. 22I, NO. I 323- - 26
358 ALBERT EI NSTEI N. [J. F. I.
pr i or t o t he enunci at i on of t he t heor y of r e l a t i vi t y- - t ha t ,
f r om t he poi nt of vi ew of exper i ence t he meani ng of si mul -
t a ne i t y in rel at i on t o happeni ngs di s t a nt in space and con-
s equent l y t ha t t he meani ng of t i me in physi cs is a pri ori clear,
- - t h i s illusion had i t s ori gi n in t he fact t h a t in our e ve r yda y
experi ence, we can negl ect t he t i me of pr opagat i on of l i ght .
We are accus t omed on t hi s account t o fail t o di f f er ent i at e
bet ween " s i mul t aneous l y seen " and " s i mul t aneous l y hap-
peni ng "; and, as a r esul t t he di fference bet ween t i me and
local t i me fades away.
The l ack of defi ni t eness whi ch, f r om t he poi nt of vi ew of
empi r i cal i mpor t ance, adher es t o t he not i on of t i me in classical
mechani cs was vei l ed by t he axi omat i c r epr es ent at i on of space
and t i me as t hi ngs gi ven i nde pe nde nt l y of our senses. Such
a use of not i ons - - i nde pe nde nt of t he empi ri cal basis, t o whi ch
t he y owe t hei r exi s t ence- - does not necessari l y damage science.
One ma y however easi l y b e l ed i nt o t he er r or of bel i evi ng t h a t
t hese not i ons, whose ori gi n is f or got t en, are necessar y and
unal t er abl e a c c ompa ni me nt s t o our t hi nki ng, and t hi s er r or
ma y cons t i t ut e a seri ous danger t o t he progress of science.
I t was f or t unat e for t he de ve l opme nt of mechani cs and
hence also for t he de ve l opme nt of physi cs in general , t ha t t he
l ack of defi ni t eness in t he concept of obj ect i ve t i me r emai ned
obscur ed f r om t he earl i er phi l osopher s as regards i t s empi r i cal
i nt er pr et at i on. Ful l of confi dence in t he real meani ng of t he
space- t i me cons t r uct i on t he y devel oped t he f oundat i ons of
mechani cs whi ch w.e shall charact eri ze, schemat i cal l y, as
follows:
(a) Concept of a mat er i al poi nt : a bodi l y obj ect whi c h- - a s
regards i t s posi t i on and mo t i o n - - c a n be descr i bed wi t h suf-
ficient exact ness as a poi nt wi t h co6r di nat es X1, X~, X3. De-
scr i pt i on of i t s mot i on (in rel at i on t o t he " space " Bo) by
gi vi ng X1, X2, X3, as f unct i ons of t he t i me.
(b) Law of i ner t i a: t he di sappear ance of t he c ompone nt s
of accel er at i on for t he mat er i al poi nt whi ch is suffi ci ent l y far
away f r om all ot her poi nt s.
(c) Law of mot i on (for t he mat er i al poi nt ) : For ce = mass
X accel erat i on.
(d) Laws of force (act i ons and r eact i ons bet ween mat er i al
poi nt s) .
March, I936.] PHYSICS AND REALITY. 359
I n t hi s (b) is not hi ng mor e t ha n an i mpor t a nt speci al case
of (c). A real t he or y exi st s onl y when t he laws of force are
gi ven. The forces mus t in t he first pl ace onl y obey t he l aw of
equal i t y of act i on and r eact i on in or der t ha t a s ys t e m of
p o i n t s - - p e r ma n e n t l y connect ed t o each o t h e r - - ma y behave
like o n e mat er i al poi nt .
Thes e f unda me nt a l laws, t oget her wi t h Newt on' s l aw for
gr avi t at i onal force, f or m t he basis of t he mechani cs of cel est i al
bodi es. I n t hi s mechani cs of Newt on, and in cont r as t t o t he
above concept i ons of space der i ved f r om rigid bodi es, t he
space B0 ent er s in a f or m whi ch cont ai ns a new i dea; i t is not
for ever y B0 t ha t val i di t y is r equi r ed (for a gi ven l aw of force)
by (b) and (c), but onl y for a B0 in t he appr opr i at e condi t i on of
mot i on (i nert i al syst em) . On account of t hi s fact, t he co-
or di nat e space acqui r ed an i nde pe nde nt physi cal pr ope r t y
whi ch is not cont ai ned in t he pur el y geomet r i cal not i on of
space, a ci r cums t ance whi ch gave Newt on consi der abl e food
for t hought ( Exper i ment of El me r ) 3
Classical mechani cs is onl y a general s cheme; i t becomes a
t heor y onl y by expl i ci t i ndi cat i on of t he force laws (d) as was
done so ver y successful l y by Ne wt on for cel est i al mechani cs.
Fr om t he poi nt of vi ew of t he ai m of t he gr eat es t logical
s i mpl i ci t y of t he foundat i ons, , t hi s t heor et i cal me t hod is de-
fi ci ent in so far as t he laws of force c a nnot be obt ai ned by
logical and f or mal consi der at i ons, so t ha t t hei r choi ce is a
p r i o r i t o a l arge ext ent ar bi t r ar y. Also Newt on' s gr avi t at i on
l aw of force is di st i ngui shed f r om ot her concei vabl e laws of
force excl usi vel y by i t s s u c c e s s .
I n spi t e of t he fact t hat , t oday, we know posi t i vel y t ha t
classical mechani cs fails as a f oundat i on domi na t i ng all
physi cs, i t still occupi es t he cent er of all of our t hi nki ng in
physi cs. The reason for t hi s lies in t he fact t hat , regardl ess of
i mp o r t a n t progress r eached since t he t i me of Newt on, we have
not yet ar r i ved at a new f oundat i on of physi cs concer ni ng
This defect of the theory could only be eliminated by such a formulation
of mechanics as would command validity for all B0. This is one of the steps which
lead to the general theory of relativity. A second defect, also eliminated only
by the introduction of the general theory of relativity, lles in the fact that there
is no reason given by mechanics itself for the equality of the gravitational and
inertial mass of the material point.
360 A L B E R T E I N S T E I N . [ J . [ ; . I .
whi ch we ma y be cer t ai n t ha t t he whol e compl exi t y of in-
ves t i gat ed phenomena, and of par t i al t heor et i cal s ys t ems of a
successful ki nd, coul d be deduced l ogi cal l y f r om it. I n t he
fol l owi ng lines I shall t r y t o descri be bri efl y how t he ma t t e r
st ands.
Fi r st we t r y t o get cl earl y in our mi nds how far t he s ys t em
of classical mechani cs has shown i t sel f a de qua t e t o serve as a
basis for t he whol e of physi cs. Si nce we are deal i ng here onl y
wi t h t he f oundat i ons of physi cs and wi t h i t s devel opment , we
need not concer n oursel ves wi t h t he pur el y f ormal progresses
of mechani cs ( equat i on of Lagr ange, canoni cal equat i ons et c. ).
One r emar k, however , appear s i ndi spensabl e. The not i on
" mat er i al poi nt " is f unda me nt a l for mechani cs. If now we
seek t he mechani cs of a bodi l y obj ect whi ch i t sel f can not be
t r eat ed as a mat er i al p o i n t - - a n d st r i ct l y s peaki ng ever y obj ect
" per cept i bl e t o our senses " is of t hi s c a t e g o r y - - t h e n t he
quest i on ari ses: How shall we i magi ne t he obj ect t o be bui l t
up out of mat er i al poi nt s, and wha t forces mus t we as s ume as
act i ng bet ween t he m? The f or mul at i on of t hi s quest i on is
i ndi spensabl e, i f mechani cs is t o pr et end t o descri be t he obj ect
completely.
I t is nat ur al t o t he t e nde nc y of mechani cs t o assume t hese
mat er i al poi nt s, and t he laws of forces act i ng bet ween t hem, as
i nvari abl e, since t i me al t er at i ons woul d lie out si de of t he scope
of mechani cal expl anat i on. Fr om t hi s we can see t h a t
classical mechani cs mus t l ead us t o an at omi st i c cons t r uct i on
of mat t er . We now realize, wi t h speci al cl ari t y, how muc h in
er r or are t hose t heor i st s who bel i eve t ha t t heor y comes
i nduct i vel y f r om experi ence. Eve n t he gr eat Ne wt on coul d
not free hi msel f f r om t hi s er r or (" Hypot hes es non fingo ").*
I n or der t o save i t sel f f r om becomi ng hopel essl y l ost in t hi s
line of t hought (at omi st i c), science pr oceeded first in t he
fol l owi ng manner . The mechani cs of a s ys t em is de t e r mi ne d
if i t s pot ent i al ener gy is gi ven as a f unct i on of i t s confi gurat i on.
Now, if t he act i ng forces are of such a ki nd as t o guar ant ee
mai nt enance of cer t ai n qual i t i es of or der of t he s ys t em' s
confi gurat i on, t hen t he conf i gur at i on ma y be descri bed wi t h
suffi ci ent accur acy by a r el at i vel y smal l numbe r of confi gura-
t i on var i abl es qr; t he pot ent i al ener gy is consi der ed onl y i nsofar
* " I m a k e n o h y p o t h e s e s . "
March, 1936.] P~IYSlCS AND REALITY. 361
as i t is de pe nde nt upon these var i abl es (for i nst ance, descri p-
t i on of t he conf i gur at i on of a pr act i cal l y rigid body by six
vari abl es).
A second me t hod of appl i cat i on of mechani cs, whi ch
avoi ds t he consi der at i on of a subdi vi si on of ma t t e r down t o
" real " mat er i al poi nt s, is t he mechani cs of so-cal l ed con-
t i nuous medi a. Thi s mechani cs is char act er i zed by t he
fiction t h a t t he dens i t y of ma t t e r and speed of ma t t e r is
de pe nde nt in a cont i nuous ma nne r upon co6r di nat es and t i me,
and t h a t t he pa r t of t he i nt er act i ons not expl i ci t l y gi ven can be
consi der ed as surface forces (pressure forces) whi ch agai n are
cont i nuous f unct i ons of l ocat i on. Her ei n we find t he hydr o-
dyna mi c t heor y, and t he t heor y of el ast i ci t y of solid bodi es.
Thes e t heor i es avoi d t he expl i ci t i nt r oduct i on of mat er i al
poi nt s by fictions whi ch, in t he l i ght of t he f oundat i on of
classical mechani cs, can onl y have an appr oxi mat e significance.
I n addi t i on t o t hei r gr eat practical significance, t hese
cat egor i es of Science h a v e - - b y enl ar gement of t he mat he-
mat i cal wor l d of i de a s - - c r e a t e d t hose f or mal auxi l i ar y i nst r u-
me nt s (part i al di fferent i al equat i ons) whi ch have been neces-
sar y for t he s ubs equent a t t e mp t s at f or mul at i ng t he t ot al
s cheme of physi cs in a ma nne r whi ch is new as c ompa r e d wi t h
t h a t of Newt on.
Thes e t wo modes of appl i cat i on of mechani cs bel ong t o t he
so-cal l ed " phenomenol ogi cal " physi cs. I t is char act er i st i c
of t hi s ki nd of physi cs t ha t i t makes as muc h use as possi bl e of
concept s whi ch are close t o exper i ence but whi ch, for t hi s
reason, have t o gi ve up, t o a l arge degree, uni t y in t he f ounda-
t i ons. Heat , el ect r i ci t y and l i ght are descr i bed by speci al
var i abl es of s t at e and cons t ant s of ma t t e r ot her t ha n t he
mechani cal s t at e; and t o det er mi ne all of t hese var i abl es in
t hei r r el at i ve dependence was a r at her empi r i cal t ask. Ma n y
cont empor ar i es of Maxwel l saw in such a ma nne r of pr esent a-
t i on t he ul t i ma t e ai m of physi cs, whi ch t he y t h o u g h t coul d be
obt ai ned pur el y i nduct i vel y f r om experi ence on account of t he
r el at i ve cl oseness of t he concept s used t o t he experi ence.
Fr o m t he poi nt of vi ew of t heor i es of knowl edge St . Mill and E.
Ma c h t ook t hei r s t a nd appr oxi mat el y on t hi s gr ound.
Accor di ng t o my belief, t he gr eat es t achi evement of
Newt on' s mechani cs lies in t he fact t ha t i t s cons i s t ent appl i ca-
362 ALBERT EINSTEIN. [J. F. I.
t i on has led beyond this phenomenol ogi cal represent at i on,
par t i cul ar l y in t he field of heat phenomena. Thi s occurred in
t he ki net i c t heor y of gases and, in a general way, in st at i st i cal
mechani cs. The former connect ed t he equat i on of st at e of
t he ideal gases, viscosity, diffusion and heat conduct i vi t y of
gases and r adi omet r i c phenomena of gases, and gave t he
logical connect i on of phenomena whi ch, from t he poi nt of
vi ew of di rect experience, had not hi ng what ever to do wi t h one
anot her . The l at t er gave a mechani cal i nt er pr et at i on of t he
t her modynami c ideas and laws as well as t he di scovery of t he
l i mi t of appl i cabi l i t y of t he not i ons and laws t o t he classical
t heor y of heat . Thi s ki net i c t heor y whi ch surpassed, by far,
t he phenomenol ogi cal physics as regards t he logical uni t y of
its foundat i ons, pr oduced mor eover defi ni t e val ues for t he t r ue
magni t udes of at oms and molecules whi ch resul t ed from
several i ndependent met hods and were t hus pl aced beyond t he
r eal m of reasonabl e doubt . These decisive progresses were
pai d for by t he co6rdi nat i on of at omi s t i c ent i t i es t o t he ma-
terial points, t he const r uct i vel y specul at i ve char act er of
whi ch ent i t i es bei ng obvious. Nobody coul d hope ever t o
" percei ve di r ect l y " an at om. Laws concerni ng vari abl es
connect ed more di r ect l y wi t h experi ment al facts (for exampl e:
t emper at ur e, pressure, speed) were deduced from t he funda-
ment al ideas by means of compl i cat ed cal cul at i ons. In this
manner physics (at least par t of it), ori gi nal l y more phenom-
enologically const ruct ed, was reduced, by being founded upon
Newt on' s mechani cs for at oms and molecules, t o a basis
f ur t her r emoved from di rect experi ment , but more uni form in
charact er.
3. THE FI ELD CONCEPT.
I n expl ai ni ng opt i cal and electrical phenomena Newt on' s
mechani cs has been far less successful t han it had been in t he
fields ci t ed above. I t is t r ue t hat Newt on t ri ed t o reduce
light t o t he mot i on of mat eri al poi nt s in his corpuscul ar t heor y
of light. Lat er on, however, as t he phenomena of polariza-
tion, diffraction and i nt erference of light forced upon his
t heor y more and more unnat ur al modifications, Huyghens '
undul at or y t heor y of light, prevai l ed. Pr obabl y t hi s t heor y
owes its origin essent i al l y t o t he phenomena of cryst al l o-
graphi c optics and t o t he t heor y of sound, whi ch was t hen
March, I936. ] PHYSI CS AND REALI TY. 363
al r eady el abor at ed t o a cer t ai n degree. I t mus t be a dmi t t e d
t ha t Huyghe ns ' t heor y also was based in t he first i nst ance upon
classical mechani cs ; but , t he al l - penet r at i ng et her had t o be
as s umed as t he carri er of t he waves and t he s t r uct ur e of t he
et her , f or med f r om mat er i al poi nt s, coul d not be expl ai ned by
any known phe nome non. One coul d never get a cl ear pi ct ur e
of t he i nt er i or forces gover ni ng t he et her , nor of t he forces
act i ng bet ween t he et her and t he " ponder abl e " ma t t e r .
The f oundat i ons of t hi s t heor y r emai ned, t herefore, et er nal l y
in t he dar k. The t r ue basi s was a par t i al di fferent i al equa-
t i on, t he r educt i on of whi ch t o mechani cal el ement s r emai ned
al ways pr obl emat i c.
For t he t heor et i cal concept i on of el ect ri c and magnet i c
phe nome na one i nt r oduced, agai n, masses of a speci al ki nd,
and bet ween t hese masses one as s umed t he exi st ence of forces
act i ng at a di st ance, si mi l ar t o Ne wt on' s gr avi t at i onal forces.
Thi s speci al ki nd of mat t er , however , appear ed t o be l acki ng in
t he f unda me nt a l pr ope r t y of i ner t i a; and, t he forces act i ng
bet ween t hese masses and t he ponder abl e ma t t e r r emai ned
obscure. To t hese difficulties t her e had t o be added t he
pol ar char act er of t hes e ki nds of ma t t e r whi ch di d not fit i nt o
t he s cheme of classical mechani cs. The basis of t he t heor y
became still mor e uns at i s f act or y when el ect r odynami c phe-
nome na became known, not wi t hs t a ndi ng t he fact t ha t t hese
phe nome na br ought t he physi ci st t o t he expl anat i on of
magnet i c phe nome na t hr ough el ect r odynami c phe nome na
and, in t hi s way, ma de t he a s s umpt i on of magnet i c masses
super f l uous. Thi s progress had, i ndeed, t o be pai d for by
i ncr easi ng t he compl exi t y of t he forces of i nt er act i on whi ch had
t o be as s umed as exi st i ng bet ween el ect ri cal masses in mot i on.
The escape f r om t hi s uns at i s f act or y s i t uat i on by t he elec-
t ri c field t heor y of Fa r a da y and Maxwel l r epr esent s pr obabl y
t he mos t pr of ound t r ans f or mat i on whi ch has been exper i enced
by t he f oundat i ons of physi cs since Newt on' s t i me. Agai n, i t
has been a st ep in t he di r ect i on of cons t r uct i ve specul at i on
whi ch has i ncreased t he di st ance bet ween t he f oundat i on of
t he t he or y and wh a t can be exper i enced by means of our five
senses. The exi st ence of t he field mani f es t s itself, i ndeed,
onl y when el ect ri cal l y char ged bodi es are i nt r oduced i nt o it.
The di fferent i al equat i ons of Maxwel l connect t he spaci al and
364 ALBERT E I NS T E I N. [J. F. I.
t empor al differential coefficients of t he el ect ri c and magnet i c
fields. The el ect ri c masses are not hi ng more t han places of
non- di sappear i ng di ver gency of t he el ect ri c field. Li ght
waves appear as undul at or y el ect r omagnet i c field processes
in space.
To be sure, Maxwel l still t ri ed t o i nt er pr et his field t heor y
mechani cal l y by means of mechani cal et her models. But
t hese at t empt s receded gr adual l y t o t he backgr ound following
t he r epr es ent at i on- - pur ged of a ny unnecessar y addi t i ons - - by
Hei nr i ch Hert z, so t hat , in this t heor y t he field finally t ook t he
f undament al position whi ch had been occupi ed in Newt on' s
mechani cs by t he mat er i al points. At first, however, this
applies onl y for el ect r omagnet i c fields in e mpt y space.
I n its initial st age t he t heor y was yet qui t e unsat i sf act or y
for t he i nt eri or of mat t er , because t here, t wo el ect ri c vect ors
had t o be i nt roduced, whi ch were connect ed by rel at i ons
dependent on t he nat ur e of t he medi um, t hese rel at i ons bei ng
inaccessible t o any t heoret i cal analysis. An anal ogous situa-
t i on arose in connect i on wi t h t he magnet i c field, as well as in
t he rel at i on bet ween electric cur r ent densi t y and t he field.
Her e H. A. Lor ent z found an escape whi ch showed, at t he
same t i me, t he way t o an el ect r odynami c t heor y of bodies in
mot i on, a t heor y whi ch was more or less free of ar bi t r ar y
assumpt i on. His t heor y was bui l t on t he following funda-
ment al hypot hesi s:
Ever ywher e (i ncl udi ng t he i nt eri or of ponderabl e bodies)
t he seat of t he field is t he e mpt y space. The par t i ci pat i on of
mat t er in el ect r omagnet i c phenomena has its origin onl y in t he
fact t ha t t he el ement ar y part i cl es of mat t er car r y unal t er abl e
el ect ri c charges, and, on this account are subj ect on t he one
hand t o t he act i ons of ponder omot i ve forces and on t he ot her
hand possess t he pr oper t y of gener at i ng a field. The ele-
ment ar y part i cl es obey Newt on' s law of mot i on for t he ma-
t eri al poi nt .
Thi s is t he basis on whi ch H. A. Lor ent z obt ai ned his
synt hesi s of Newt on' s mechani cs and Maxwel l ' s field t heory.
The weakness of this t heor y lies in t he fact t hat it t ri ed t o
det er mi ne t he phenomena by a combi nat i on of part i al differ-
ent i al equat i ons (Maxwel l ' s field equat i ons for e mpt y space)
and t ot al differential equat i ons (equat i ons of mot i on of
March, I936.] PHYSICS AND REALITY. 365
poi nt s), whi ch pr ocedur e was obvi ousl y unnat ur al . The
unsat i sf act or y par t of t he t heor y showed up ext er nal l y by t he
necessi t y of assumi ng finite di mensi ons for t he part i cl es in
or der t o pr event t he el ect r omagnet i c field exi st i ng at t hei r
surfaces from becomi ng i nfi ni t el y great . The t heor y failed
mor eover t o give any expl anat i on concerni ng t he t r emendous
forces whi ch hold t he el ect ri c charges on t he i ndi vi dual
particles. H. A. Lor ent z accept ed t hese weaknesses of his
t heor y, whi ch were well known t o him, in or der t o explain t he
phenomena cor r ect l y at least as regards t hei r general lines.
Fur t her mor e, t her e was one consi derat i on whi ch r eached
beyond t he f r ame of Lor ent z' s t heor y. I n t he envi r onment of
an el ect ri cal l y char ged body t her e is a magnet i c field whi ch
furni shes an ( appar ent ) cont r i but i on t o its i nert i a. Shoul d i t
not be possible t o explain t he total i ner t i a of t he part i cl es
el ect r omagnet i cal l y? I t is cl ear t hat t hi s pr obl em coul d be
wor ked out sat i sfact ori l y onl y if t he part i cl es coul d be i nt er-
pr et ed as r egul ar sol ut i ons of t he el ect r omagnet i c part i al
differential equat i ons. The Maxwel l equat i ons in t hei r
original f or m do not , however, allow such a descri pt i on of
particles, because t he i r correspondi ng sol ut i ons cont ai n a
si ngul ari t y. Theor et i cal physi ci st s have t ri ed for a long t i me,
t herefore, t o r each t he goal by a modi fi cat i on of Maxwel l ' s
equat i ons. These at t empt s have, however, not been crowned
wi t h success. Thus i t happened t ha t t he goal of er ect i ng a
pure el ect r omagnet i c field t heor y of mat t er r emai ned un-
at t ai ned for t he t i me being, al t hough in pri nci pl e no obj ect i on
coul d be raised agai nst t he possi bi l i t y of r eachi ng such a goal.
The t hi ng whi ch det er r ed one in any f ur t her a t t e mpt in t hi s
di rect i on was t he l ack of any syst emat i c met hod l eadi ng t o t he
sol ut i on. Wha t appear s cer t ai n t o me, however, is t hat , in
t he f oundat i ons of any consi st ent field t heor y, t her e shall not
be, in addi t i on t o t he concept of field, any concept concerni ng
particles. The whol e t heor y mus t be based solely on part i al
differential equat i ons and t hei r si ngul ari t y-free solutions.
, . THE T ~ ORY OF ~ LATI V~ TY.
Ther e is no i nduct i ve met hod whi ch coul d l ead t o t he
f undament al concept s of physics. Fai l ure t o under s t and t hi s
fact const i t ut ed t he basic phi l osophi cal er r or of so ma ny in-
366 ALBERT E I NS T E I N. [J. F. I.
vest i gat or s of t he ni ne t e e nt h cent ur y. I t was pr obabl y t he
reason why t he mol ecul ar t heor y, and Maxwel l ' s t heor y were
abl e t o est abl i sh t hems el ves onl y at a r el at i vel y l at e dat e.
Logi cal t hi nki ng is necessari l y deduct i ve; i t is based upon
hypot het i cal concept s and axi oms. How can we hope t o
choose t he l at t er in such a ma nne r as t o j us t i f y us in expect i ng
success as a consequence?
The mos t sat i sf act or y si t uat i on is evi dent l y t o be f ound in
cases wher e t he new f unda me nt a l hypot hes es are suggest ed by
t he worl d of experi ence itself. The hypot hes i s of t he non-
exi st ence of per pet ual mot i on as a basis for t he r modyna mi c s
affords such an exampl e of a f unda me nt a l hypot hes i s sug-
gest ed by experi ence; t he same t hi ng hol ds for t he pr i nci pl e of
i ner t i a of Gallileo. I n t he same cat egor y, mor eover , we find
t he f unda me nt a l hypot hes es of t he t heor y of r el at i vi t y, whi ch
t heor y has led t o an unexpect ed expansi on and br oadeni ng of
t he field t heor y, and t o t he super cedi ng of t he f oundat i ons of
classical mechani cs.
The successes of t he Maxwel l - Lor ent z t heor y have gi ven
gr eat confi dence in t he val i di t y of t he el ect r omagnet i c equa-
t i ons for e mp t y space and hence, in par t i cul ar , t o t he st at e-
me n t t h a t l i ght t ravel s " in space " wi t h a cer t ai n cons t ant
speed c. Is t hi s l aw of t he i nvar i abi l i t y of l i ght vel oci t y in
r el at i on t o a ny desi red i nert i al s ys t e m val i d? If i t were not ,
t hen one specific i nert i al s ys t em or mor e accur at el y, one
specific s t at e of mot i on (of a body of reference), woul d be
di st i ngui shed f r om all ot hers. I n opposi t i on t o t hi s idea,
however, s t and all t he mechani cal and el ect r omagnet i c- opt i cal
fact s of our experi ence.
For t hese reasons i t was necessar y t o raise t o t he degree of
a pri nci pl e, t he val i di t y of t he l aw of cons t ancy of l i ght vel oci t y
for all i nert i al syst ems. Fr om this, i t follows t ha t t he spaci al
co6r di nat es X1, X2, X3, and t he t i me X4, mus t be t r ans f or med
accor di ng t o t he " Lor ent z- t r ans f or mat i on " whi ch is charac-
t eri zed by i nvar i ance of t he expressi on
ds 2 =dx12 +dx22 +dx3~-dx4 ~
(if t he uni t of t i me is chosen in such a ma nne r t h a t t he speed
of l i ght c = I).
By t hi s pr ocedur e t i me l ost i t s absol ut e char act er , and was
March, I936.] PHYSICS AND REALITY. 367
i ncl uded wi t h t he " spaci al " co6r di nat es as of al gebrai cal l y
(nearl y) si mi l ar char act er . The absol ut e char act er of t i me
and par t i cul ar l y of s i mul t a ne i t y were des t r oyed, and t he f our
di mensi onal descr i pt i on became i nt r oduced as t he onl y
a de qua t e one.
I n or der t o account , also, for t he equi val ence of all i nert i al
s ys t ems wi t h r egar d t o all t he phe nome na of nat ur e, i t is
necessar y t o pos t ul at e i nvar i ance of all s ys t ems of physi cal
equat i ons whi ch express general laws, wi t h r egar d t o t he
Lor ent zi an t r ans f or mat i on. Th e el abor at i on of t hi s requi re-
me n t f or ms t he c ont e nt of t he speci al t heor y of r el at i vi t y.
Thi s t he or y is compat i bl e wi t h t he equat i ons of Maxwel l ;
but , i t is i ncompat i bl e wi t h t he basis of classical mechani cs.
I t is t r ue t h a t t he equat i ons of mot i on of t he mat er i al poi nt
can be modi f i ed ( and wi t h t h e m t he expressi ons for mo me n t u m
and ki net i c ener gy of t he mat er i al poi nt ) in such a ma nne r as
t o sat i sf y t he t heor y; but , t he concept of t he force of i nt er-
act i on, and wi t h i t t he concept of pot ent i al ener gy of a syst em,
lose t hei r basis, because t hese concept s rest upon t he i dea of
absol ut e i ns t ant aneous nes s . The field, as d e t e r mi n e d by
di fferent i al equat i ons, t akes t he pl ace of t he force.
Si nce t he foregoi ng t heor y allows i nt er act i on onl y by fields,
i t requi res a field t he or y of gr avi t at i on. I ndeed, i t is not
di ffi cul t t o f or mul at e such a t heor y in whi ch, as in Ne wt on' s
t heor y, t he gr avi t at i onal fields can be r educed t o a scal ar
whi ch is t he sol ut i on of a par t i al di fferent i al equat i on. How-
ever, t he exper i ment al fact s expr essed in Newt on' s t heor y of
gr avi t at i on l ead in a not he r di rect i on, t ha t of t he general
t he or y of r el at i vi t y.
Cl assi cal mechani cs cont ai ns one poi nt whi ch is unsat i s-
f act or y in t hat , in t he f undament al s , t he same mass c ons t a nt
is me t t wi ce over in t wo di f f er ent r61es, na me l y as " i nert i al
mass " in t he l aw of mot i on, and as " gr avi t at i onal mass "
in t he l aw of gr avi t at i on. As a r esul t of t hi s, t he accel erat i on
of a body in a pur e gr avi t at i onal field is i nde pe nde nt of its
mat er i al ; or, in a co6r di nat e s ys t e m of uniform acceleration
( accel er at ed in r el at i on t o an " i nert i al s ys t e m ") t he mot i ons
t ake pl ace as t he y woul d in a homogeneous gr avi t at i onal field
(in r el at i on t o a " mot i onl ess " s ys t e m of co6r di nat es) . If
one assumes t h a t t he equi val ence of t hese t wo cases is corn-
368 ALBERT EINSTEIN. [J. F. I.
pl et e, t hen one at t ai ns an a da pt a t i on of our t heor et i cal t hi nk-
i ng t o t he fact t ha t t he gr avi t at i onal and i nert i al masses are
i dent i cal .
Fr om t hi s i t follows t ha t t her e is no l onger a ny reason for
favori ng, as a f unda me nt a l pri nci pl e, t he " i nert i al s ys t ems ";
and, we mus t a dmi t as equi val ent in t hei r own ri ght , also
n o n - l i n e a r t r ans f or mat i ons of t he co6r di nat es (Xl, x~, x~, x4).
If we ma ke such a t r ans f or mat i on of a s ys t e m of co6r di nat es
of t he special t heor y of r el at i vi t y, t hen t he met r i c
ds ~ = d x l 2 + dx2 2 +d x 3 2 - dx4Z
goes over t o a general ( Ri emanni an) met r i c of Bane
ds ~ =g " , d x . d x , ( Summed over ~ and ~)
wher e t he g,,, s ymmet r i cal in u and v, are cer t ai n f unct i ons of
x l . . . x 4 whi ch descri be bot h t he met r i c pr oper t y, and t he
gr avi t at i onal field in rel at i on t o t he new s ys t e m of co6r di nat es.
The foregoi ng i mpr ove me nt in t he i nt er pr et at i on of t he
mechani cal basis mus t , however, be pai d for in t h a t - - a s
becomes evi dent on closer s c r u t i n y - - t h e new co6r di nat es
coul d no l onger be i nt er pr et ed, as resul t s of me a s ur e me nt s by
rigid bodi es and clocks, as t he y coul d in t he ori gi nal s ys t em
(an i nert i al s ys t em wi t h vani s hi ng gr avi t at i onal field).
The passage t o t he general t heor y of r el at i vi t y is realized
by t he a s s umpt i on t h a t such a r epr es ent at i on of t he field
pr oper t i es of space al r eady ment i oned, by f unct i ons g,, ( t hat
is t o say by a Ri e ma nn met r i c) , is also j ust i fi ed in t he g e n e r a l
case in whi ch t her e is no s ys t em of co6r di nat es in rel at i on t o
whi ch t he met r i c t akes t he si mpl e quasi - Eucl i di an f or m of t he
special t heor y of r el at i vi t y.
Now t he co6r di nat es, by t hemsel ves, no l onger express
met r i c rel at i ons, but onl y t he " nei ghborl i ness " of t he t hi ngs
descri bed, whose co6r di nat es differ but l i t t l e f r om one anot her .
All t r ans f or mat i ons of t he co6r di nat es have t o be a dmi t t e d so
l ong as t hese t r ans f or mat i ons are free f r om si ngul ari t i es.
Onl y such equat i ons as are covar i ant in rel at i on t o ar bi t r ar y
t r ans f or mat i ons in t hi s sense have meani ng as expressi ons of
general laws of nat ur e ( post ul at e of general covar i ancy) .
The first ai m of t he general t heor y of r el at i vi t y was a pre-
March, I936.] PHYSICS AND REALITY. 369
l i mi nar y s t a t e me n t whi ch, by gi vi ng up t he r e qui r e me nt of
c ons t i t ut i ng a cl osed t hi ng in itself, coul d be connect ed in as
si mpl e a mai aner as possi bl e wi t h t he " fact s di r ect l y ob-
ser ved. " Ne wt on' s gr avi t at i onal t heor y gave an exampl e, by
r est r i ct i ng i t sel f t o t he pur e mechani cs of gr avi t at i on. Thi s
pr el i mi nar y s t a t e me n t ma y be char act er i zed as follows:
(I) The concept of t he mat er i al poi nt and of i t s mass is
r et ai ned. A l aw of mot i on is gi ven for it, t hi s l aw of mot i on
bei ng t he t r ans l at i on of t he l aw of i nert i a i nt o t he l anguage
of t he general t heor y of r el at i vi t y. Thi s l aw is a s ys t e m of
t ot al di fferent i al equat i ons, t he s ys t em char act er i st i c of t he
geodet i c line.
(2) I n pl ace of Newt on' s l aw of i nt er act i on by gr avi t at i on,
we shal l find t he s ys t e m of t he si mpl est gener al l y covar i ant
di fferent i al equat i ons whi ch can be set up for t he g~v-tensor.
I t is f or med by e qua t i ng t o zero t he once cont r act ed Ri eman-
ni an c ur va t ur e t ens or (R~, = 0).
Thi s f or mul at i on per mi t s t he t r e a t me n t of t he pr obl em of
t he pl anet s. Mor e accur at el y speaki ng, i t allows t he t r eat -
me n t of t he pr obl em of mot i on of mat er i al poi nt s of pr act i cal l y
negl i gi bl e mass in t he gr avi t at i onal field pr oduced by a ma-
t eri al poi nt whi ch i t sel f is s uppos ed t o have no mot i on (cent ral
s ymme t r y) . I t does not t ake i nt o account t he r eact i on of t he
" move d " mat er i al poi nt s on t he gr avi t at i onal field, nor does
i t consi der how t he cent r al mass pr oduces t hi s gr avi t at i onal
field.
Anal ogy wi t h classical mechani cs shows t h a t t he fol l owi ng
is a wa y t o compl et e t he t heor y. One set s up as field equat i on
Ri ~ - gi k R = - - Ti k ,
wher e R r epr es ent s t he scal ar of Ri e ma nni a n cur vat ur e, T~k
t he ener gy t e ns or of t he ma t t e r in a phenomenol ogi cal repre-
sent at i on. The l eft si de of t he equat i on is chosen in such a
ma n n e r t h a t i t s di ver gence di sappear s i dent i cal l y. The re-
s ul t i ng di s appear ance of t he di ver gence of t he r i ght si de
pr oduces t he " equat i ons of mot i on " of mat t er , in t he f or m
of par t i al di fferent i al equat i ons f or t he case wher e Tik i nt r o-
duces, for t he descr i pt i on of t he mat t er , onl y f our f ur t her
f unct i ons i nde pe nde nt of each ot he r (for i nst ance, densi t y,
pressure, and vel oci t y component s , wher e t her e is bet ween
370 ALBERT E I NS T E I N. [J. F. I.
t he l at t er an i dent i t y, and bet ween pr essur e and dens i t y an
equat i on of condi t i on) .
By t hi s f or mul at i on one reduces t he whol e me c h a n i c s of
gr avi t at i on t o t he sol ut i on of a si ngl e s ys t em of covar i ant
par t i al di fferent i al equat i ons. The t heor y avoi ds all i nt er nal
di screpanci es whi ch we have char ged agai nst t he basis of
classical mechani cs. I t is suf f i ci ent - - as far as we k n o w- - f o r
t he r epr es ent at i on of t he obser ved fact s of cel est i al mechani cs.
But , i t is si mi l ar t o a bui l di ng, one wi ng of whi ch is ma de of
fine mar bl e (left par t of t he equat i on) , but t he ot her wi ng of
whi ch is bui l t of low gr ade wood (ri ght side of equat i on) . The
phenomenol ogi cal r epr esent at i on of ma t t e r is, in fact, onl y a
cr ude s ubs t i t ut e for a r epr es ent at i on whi ch woul d cor r espond
t o all known pr oper t i es of mat t er .
Ther e is no di ffi cul t y in connect i ng Maxwel l ' s t heor y of t he
el ect r omagnet i c field wi t h t he t heor y of t he gr avi t at i onal field
so l ong as one r est r i ct s hi msel f t o space, free of ponder abl e
ma t t e r and free of el ect ri c densi t y. All t ha t is necessar y is t o
p u t on t he r i ght hand side of t he above equat i on for Tik, t he
ener gy t ens or of t he el ect r omagnet i c field in e mp t y space and
t o associ at e wi t h t he so modi f i ed s ys t em of equat i ons t he
Maxwel l field equat i on for e mp t y space, wr i t t en in general
covar i ant form. Unde r t hese condi t i ons t her e will exist,
bet ween all t hese equat i ons, a suffi ci ent numbe r of t he dif-
ferent i al i dent i t i es t o guar ant ee t hei r consi st ency. We ma y
add t ha t t hi s necessar y formal pr ope r t y of t he t ot al s ys t e m of
equat i ons l eaves ar bi t r ar y t he choi ce of t he sign of t he me mbe r
Tik, a fact whi ch was l at er shown t o be i mpor t a nt .
The desi re t o have, for t he f oundat i ons of t he t heor y, t he
gr eat est possible uni t y has r esul t ed in several a t t e mpt s t o
i ncl ude t he gr avi t at i onal field and t he el ect r omagnet i c field in
one formal but homogeneous pi ct ure. Her e we mus t me nt i on
par t i cul ar l y t he fi ve-di mensi onal t heor y of Kal uza and
Klein. Ha vi ng consi der ed t hi s possi bi l i t y ver y car ef ul l y I
feel t ha t i t is mor e desi rabl e t o accept t he l ack of i nt er nal
uni f or mi t y of t he ori gi nal t heor y, because I do not consi der
t ha t t he t ot al i t y of t he hypot het i cal basis of t he fi ve-di men-
si onal t heor y cont ai ns less of an ar bi t r ar y nat ur e t ha n does
t he ori gi nal t heor y. The same s t a t e me nt ma y be made for
t he pr oj ect i ve var i et y of t he t heor y, whi ch has been el abor at ed
wi t h gr eat care, in par t i cul ar , by v. Dant zi g and by Paul i .
Ma r c h , I936. ] P HYS I C S AND R E AL I T Y. 37I
The f or egoi ngYcons i der at i ons ' concer n, excl usi vel y, t he
t heor y of t he field, free of mat t er . How are we t o pr oceed
f r om t hi s poi nt in or der t o obt ai n a compl et e t he or y of at omi -
cal l y cons t r uct ed ma t t e r ? I n such a t heor y, si ngul ar i t i es mus t
cer t ai nl y be excl uded, si nce wi t hout such excl usi on t he dif-
ferent i al equat i ons do not compl et el y det er mi ne t he t ot al
field. Here, in t he field t he or y of general r el at i vi t y, we meet
t he s ame pr obl em of a t heor et i cal f i el d- r epr esent at i on of
ma t t e r as was me t or i gi nal l y in connect i on wi t h t he pur e
Maxwel l t heor y.
Her e agai n t he a t t e mp t t o cons t r uct part i cl es out of t he
field t heor y, l eads a ppa r e nt l y t o si ngul ari t i es. Her e also t he
e nde a vor has been made t o over come t hi s def ect by t he i nt r o-
duct i on of new field var i abl es and by el abor at i ng and ext end-
i ng t he s ys t e m of field equat i ons. Recent l y, however, I dis-
covered, in col l abor at i on wi t h Dr. Rosen, t h a t t he above
ment i oned si mpl est combi nat i on of t he field equat i ons of
gr avi t at i on and el ect r i ci t y pr oduces cent r al l y s ymmet r i cal
sol ut i ons whi ch can be r epr es ent ed as free of s i ngul ar i t y ( t he
well known cent r al l y s ymmet r i cal sol ut i ons of Schwar zschi l d
for t he pur e gr avi t at i onal field, and t hose of Rei ssner for t he
el ect ri c field wi t h consi der at i on of i t s gr avi t at i onal act i on).
\Ve shal l refer t o t hi s s hor t l y in t he par agr aph next but one.
In t hi s wa y it seems possi bl e t o get for ma t t e r and i t s i nt er -
act i ons a pur e field t heor y free of addi t i onal hypot hes es , one
mor eover whose t es t by submi ssi on t o fact s of experi ence does
not r esul t in difficulties ot her t ha n pur el y ma t he ma t i c a l ones,
whi ch difficulties, however , are ver y serious.
5. QUANTUM THEORY AND THE FUNDAMENTALS OF PHYSICS.
The t heor et i cal physi ci st s of our gener at i on are expect i ng
t he er ect i on of a new t heor et i cal basis for physi cs whi ch woul d
make use of f unda me nt a l concept s gr eat l y di f f er ent f r om t hose
of t he field t he or y consi der ed up t o now. The reason is t ha t
i t has been f ound necessar y t o us e - - f or t he ma t he ma t i c a l
r epr es ent at i on of t he so-cal l ed q u a n t u m p h e n o me n a - - n e w
sort s of me t hods of consi der at i on.
Whi l e t he fai l ure of classical mechani cs, as r eveal ed by t he
t heor y of r el at i vi t y, is connect ed wi t h t he finite speed of l i ght
(its avoi dance of bei ng oo), i t was di scover ed at t he begi nni ng
372 ALBERT E I NS T E I N. [J. F. 1.
of our cent ury t hat there were other kinds of inconsistencies
between deductions from mechanics and experimental facts,
which inconsistencies are connected with the finite magni t ude
(the avoidance of being zero) of Planck' s constant h. In par-
ticular, while molecular mechanics requires t hat both, heat
cont ent and (monochromatic) radiation density, of solid
bodies should decrease in proportion to the decreasing absolute
t emperat ure, experience has shown t hat t hey decrease much
more rapidly t han the absolute temperature. For a theo-
retical explanation of this behavior it was necessary to assume
t hat the energy of a mechanical syst em cannot assume any
sort of value, but only certain discrete values whose mathe-
matical expressions were always dependent upon Planck' s
constant h. Moreover, this conception was essential for the
t heory of the at om (Bohr' s theory). For the transitions of
these states into one anot her, --wi t h or wi t hout emission or
absorption of radi at i on, --no causal laws could be given, but
only statistical ones; and, a similar conclusion holds for the
radioactive decomposition of atoms, which decomposition was
carefully investigated about the same time. For more t han
two decades physicists tried vainly to find a uniform inter-
pretation of this " quant um character " of systems and
phenomena. Such an at t empt was successful about ten years
ago, through the agency of two entirely different theoretical
methods of attack. We owe one of these to Heisenberg and
Dirac, and the other to de Broglie and Schr6dinger. The
mat hemat i cal equivalence of the two methods was soon recog-
nized by Schr6dinger. I shall t ry here to sketch the line of
t hought of de Broglie and Schr6dinger, which lies closer to the
physicist' s met hod of thinking, and shall accompany the
description with certain general considerations.
The question is first: How can one assign a discrete suc-
cession of energy value H, to a syst em specified in the sense
of classical mechanics (the energy function is a given function
of the co6rdinates q~ and the corresponding moment a p,)?
Planck' s constant h relates the frequency H,/h to the energy
values H,. It is therefore sufficient to give to the syst em a
succession of discrete frequency values. This reminds us of
the fact t hat in acoustics, a series of discrete frequency values
is co6rdinated to a linear partial differential equation (if
March, I936.] PHYSI CS AND REALI TY. 373
bounda r y val ues are gi ven) na me l y t he si nusoi dal peri odi c
sol ut i ons. I n cor r es pondi ng manner , Schr 6di nger set hi msel f
t he t a s k of co6r di nat i ng a par t i al di fferent i al equat i on for a
scal ar f unct i on ~b t o t he gi ven ener gy f unct i on ~( qr , Pr), wher e
t he q~ and t he t i me t are i nde pe nde nt vari abl es. I n t hi s he
succeeded (for a compl ex f unct i on $) in such a ma nne r t h a t
t he t heor et i cal val ues of t he ener gy Ho, as r equi r ed by t he
st at i st i cal t heor y, act ual l y r esul t ed in a sat i sf act or y ma nne r
f r om t he per i odi c sol ut i on of t he equat i on.
To be sure, i t di d not ha ppe n t o be possi bl e t o associ at e a
defi ni t e move me nt , in t he sense of mechani cs of mat er i al
poi nt s, wi t h a defi ni t e sol ut i on (qr, t) of t he Schr 6di nger
equat i on. Thi s means t ha t t he ~ f unct i on does not det er -
mi ne, at a ny r at e exact l y, t he s t or y of t he qr as f unct i ons of t he
t i me t. Accor di ng t o Born, however , an i nt er pr et at i on of t he
physi cal meani ng of t he ~ f unct i ons was s hown t o be possi bl e
in t he fol l owi ng ma nne r : S f (t he squar e of t he abs ol ut e val ue
of t he compl ex f unct i on ~) is t he pr obabi l i t y dens i t y at t he
poi nt unde r consi der at i on in t he conf i gur at i on- space of t he
qr, a t t he t i me t. I t is t her ef or e possi bl e t o char act er i ze t he
c ont e nt of t he Schr 6di nger equat i on in a manner , easy t o be
under s t ood, but not qui t e accur at e, as follows: i t det er mi nes
how t he pr obabi l i t y dens i t y of a st at i st i cal ensembl e of s ys t ems
var i es in t he conf i gur at i on- space wi t h t he t i me. Bri efl y: t he
Schr 6di nger equat i on det er mi nes t he al t er at i on of t he f unct i on
~b of t he qr wi t h t he t i me.
I t mus t be ment i oned t h a t t he r esul t of t hi s t he or y con-
t a i ns - - a s l i mi t i ng v a l u e s - - t h e r esul t of t he part i cl e mechani cs
if t he wave- l engt h encount er ed dur i ng t he sol ut i on of t he
Schr 6di nger pr obl em is ever ywher e so smal l t h a t t he pot ent i al
ener gy var i es by a pr act i cal l y i nfi ni t el y smal l a mo u n t for a
change of one wave- l engt h in t he conf i gur at i on- space. Unde r
t hes e condi t i ons t he fol l owi ng can in fact be shown : We choose
a regi on Go in t he conf i gur at i on- space whi ch, al t hough large
(in ever y di mensi on) in r el at i on t o t he wave l engt h, is smal l
in r el at i on t o t he pr act i cal di mens i ons of t he conf i gur at i on-
space. Unde r t hese condi t i ons i t is possi bl e t o choose a
f unct i on of ~ for an i ni t i al t i me to in such a ma nne r t h a t i t
vani shes out si de of t he regi on Go, and behaves, accor di ng t o t he
Schr 6di nger equat i on, in such a ma nne r t h a t i t r et ai ns t hi s
VOL. 221, NO. 1323--27
374 AL B E R T E I N S T E I N . [J. F. I.
pr ope r t y- - a ppr oxi ma t e l y at l eas t - - al s o for a l at er t i me, but
wi t h t he regi on Go havi ng passed at t ha t t i me t i nt o a not he r
regi on G. I n t hi s ma nne r one can, wi t h a cer t ai n degree of
appr oxi mat i on, s peak of t he mot i on of t he regi on G as a whol e,
and one can appr oxi mat e t hi s mot i on by t he mot i on of a
poi nt in t he conf i gur at i on- space. Thi s mot i on t hen coi nci des
wi t h t he mot i on whi ch is r equi r ed by t he equat i ons of classical
mechani cs.
Exper i ment s on i nt er f er ence made wi t h part i cl e r ays have
gi ven a br i l l i ant pr oof t ha t t he wave char act er of phe nome na
of mot i on as as s umed by t he t heor y does, really, cor r espond
t o t he facts. I n addi t i on t o this, t he t heor y succeeded, easily,
in de mons t r a t i ng t he st at i st i cal laws of t he t r ans i t i on of a
s ys t em f r om one q u a n t u m condi t i on t o a not he r under t he
act i on of ext er nal forces, whi ch, f r om t he s t a ndpoi nt of
classical mechani cs, appear s as a mi racl e. The ext er nal
forces were here r epr esent ed by smal l addi t i ons of t he pot en-
tial ener gy as f unct i ons of t he t i me. Now, whi l e in classical
mechani cs, such addi t i ons can pr oduce onl y cor r espondi ngl y
smal l al t er at i ons of t he syst em, in t he q u a n t u m mechani cs
t he y pr oduce al t er at i ons of any ma gni t ude however large, but
wi t h cor r espondi ngl y smal l pr obabi l i t y, a consequence in
per f ect ha r mony wi t h experi ence. Eve n an unde r s t a ndi ng of
t he laws of r adi oact i ve decomposi t i on, at l east in t hei r br oad
lines, was pr ovi ded by t he t heor y.
Pr obabl y never before has a t heor y been evol ved whi ch
has gi ven a key t o t he i nt er pr et at i on and cal cul at i on of such
a het er ogeneous gr oup of phe nome na of experi ence as has
t he q u a n t u m t heor y. I n spi t e of this, however , I bel i eve
t ha t t he t heor y is a pt t o begui l e us i nt o er r or in our sear ch for
a uni f or m basis for physi cs, because, in my belief, it is an
incomplete r epr es ent at i on of real t hi ngs, al t hough i t is t he
onl y one whi ch can be bui l t out of t he f unda me nt a l concept s
of force and mat er i al poi nt s ( qua nt um cor r ect i ons t o classical
mechani cs). The i ncompl et eness of t he r epr es ent at i on is t he
out come of t he st at i st i cal nat ur e ( i ncompl et eness) of t he laws.
I will now j ust i f y t hi s opi ni on.
I ask first: How far does t he ~ f unct i on descri be a real
condi t i on of a mechani cal s ys t em? Let us assume t he ~r t o
be t he peri odi c sol ut i ons ( put in t he or der of i ncr easi ng ener gy
March, I936.1 PHYSI CS AND REALI TY. 375
val ues) of t he Schr 6di nger equat i on. I shal l l eave open, f or
t he t i me bei ng, t he ques t i on as t o how f ar t he i ndi vi dual t r
ar e complete des cr i pt i ons of physi cal condi t i ons. A s ys t e m is
fi rst in t he corj di t i on 1 of l owest e ne r gy ~1. Th e n dur i ng a
fi ni t e t i me a smal l di s t ur bi ng force act s upon t he s ys t em. At
a l at er i ns t a nt one obt ai ns t he n f r om t he Schr 6di nger e qua t i on
a ~b f unct i on of t he f or m
whe r e t he Cr ar e ( compl ex) cons t ant s . If t he ~ ar e " nor -
mal i zed, " t he n I cll is ne a r l y equal t o ~, [ c2] et c. is smal l
c ompa r e d wi t h I. One ma y now as k: Does descr i be a real
condi t i on of t he s ys t e m? If t he a ns we r is yes, t he n we can
ha r dl y do ot her wi s e t h a n ascr i be 3 t o t hi s condi t i on a def i ni t e
e ne r gy 8, and, in par t i cul ar , s uch an e ne r gy as exceeds ~1 by
a smal l a mo u n t (in a n y case 81 < 8 < 82). Such an as s ump-
t i on is, however , a t va r i a nc e wi t h t he e xpe r i me nt s on el ect r on
i mpa c t s uch as ha ve been ma d e by J. Fr a n c k a nd G. Her t z,
if, in addi t i on t o t hi s, one accept s Mi l l i kan' s de mons t r a t i on
of t he di s cr et e n a t u r e of el ect r i ci t y. As a ma t t e r of fact , t hes e
e xpe r i me nt s l ead t o t he concl usi on t h a t e ne r gy val ues of a
s t a t e l yi ng be t we e n t he q u a n t u m val ues do not exi st . Fr o m
t hi s i t follows t h a t our f unct i on does not in a n y wa y descr i be
a homoge ne ous condi t i on of t he body, but r epr es ent s r a t he r
a st at i st i cal des cr i pt i on in whi ch t he c~ r epr es ent pr obabi l i t i es
of t he i ndi vi dual e ne r gy val ues. I t seems t o be cl ear, t her e-
fore, t h a t t he Bor n s t at i s t i cal i nt e r pr e t a t i on of t he q u a n t u m
t h e o r y is t he onl y possi bl e one. Th e ~ f unct i on does not in
a n y wa y descr i be a condi t i on whi ch coul d be t h a t of a si ngl e
s ys t e m; i t r el at es r a t he r t o ma n y s ys t ems , t o " an ens embl e
of . s ys t e ms " in t he sense of s t at i s t i cal mechani cs . If, except
for cer t ai n speci al cases, t he ~b f unct i on f ur ni shes onl y statis-
tical d a t a concer ni ng me a s ur a bl e ma gni t ude s , t he r eason lies
not onl y in t he f act t h a t t he operation of measuring i nt r oduces
u n k n o wn el ement s , whi c h can be gr as ped onl y st at i st i cal l y,
but becaus e of t he v e r y f act t h a t t he f unct i on does not , in
a n y sense, descr i be t he condi t i on of one si ngl e s ys t em. Th e
Because, accordi ng t o a well est abl i shed consequence of t he r el at i vi t y
t heory, t he energy of a compl et e syst em (at rest ) is equal t o i t s i nert i a (as a
whole). This, however, must have a well defined val ue.
376 ALBERT E I NS T E I N. [J. F. I.
Schr 6di nger equat i on det er mi nes t he t i me var i at i ons whi ch are
exper i enced by t he ensembl e of s ys t ems whi ch ma y exist wi t h
or wi t hout ext er nal act i on on t he single syst em.
Such an i nt er pr et at i on el i mi nat es also t he par adox re-
cent l y de mons t r a t e d by mysel f and t wo col l aborat ors, and
whi ch rel at es t o t he fol l owi ng pr obl em.
Consi der a mechani cal s ys t em cons t i t ut ed of t wo par t i al
s ys t ems A and B whi ch have i nt er act i on wi t h each ot her onl y
dur i ng l i mi t ed t i me. Let t he ~ f unct i on before t hei r i nt er-
act i on be gi ven. Th e n t he Schr 6di nger equat i on will f ur ni sh
t he ~ f unct i on af t er t he i nt er act i on has t aken pl ace. Let us
now det er mi ne t he physi cal condi t i on of t he par t i al s ys t e m A
as compl et el y as possible by meas ur ement s . Th e n t he
q u a n t u m mechani cs allows us t o det er mi ne t he ~ f unct i on of
t he par t i al s ys t em B f r om t he meas ur ement s made, and f r om
t he ~ f unct i on of t he t ot al syst em. Thi s det er mi nat i on,
however, gi ves a r esul t whi ch depends upon whi c h of t he det er -
mi ni ng ma gni t ude s speci fyi ng t he condi t i on of A has been
meas ur ed (for i nst ance co6r di nat es or mome nt a ) . Si nce
t her e can be onl y one physi cal condi t i on of B af t er t he i nt er-
act i on and whi ch can r easonabl y not be consi der ed as de-
pe nde nt on t he par t i cul ar me a s ur e me nt we per f or m on t he
s ys t em A s epar at ed f r om B i t ma y be concl uded t h a t t he
f unct i on is not una mbi guous l y co6r di nat ed wi t h t he physi cal
condi t i on. Thi s co6r di nat i on of several ~ f unct i ons wi t h t he
same physi cal condi t i on of s ys t em B shows agai n t h a t t he
f unct i on cannot be i nt er pr et ed as a ( compl et e) descr i pt i on of
a physi cal condi t i on of a uni t syst em. Her e also t he co6r-
di nat i on of t he ~ f unct i on t o an ensembl e of s ys t ems el i m-
i nat es ever y di ffi cul t y. 4
The f act t ha t q u a n t u m mechani cs affords, in such a si mpl e
manner , s t a t e me nt s concer ni ng ( appar ent l y) di s cont i nuous
t r ansi t i ons f r om one t ot al condi t i on t o a not he r wi t hout act u-
al l y gi vi ng a r epr es ent at i on of t he specific process, t hi s fact is
connect ed wi t h anot her , namel y t he fact t ha t t he t heor y, in
real i t y, does not oper at e wi t h t he si ngl e syst em, but wi t h a
t ot a l i t y of syst ems. The coefficients c, of our first exampl e
* The oper at i on of meas ur i ng A, for exampl e, t hus i nvol ves a t r a ns l t i on t o a
nar r ower ensembl e of syst ems. The l a t t e r ( hence al so i t s ~ f unct i on) depends
upon t he poi nt of vi ew accor di ng t o whi ch t hi s nar r owi ng of t he en. sembl e of
s ys t ems is made.
March, I936.] PHYSICS AND REALITY. 377
are real l y al t er ed ver y little under t he act i on of t he ext er nal
force. Wi t h this i nt er pr et at i on of qua nt um mechani cs one
can under s t and why t hi s t heor y can easi l y account for t he
fact t ha t weak di st ur bi ng forces are able t o produce al t erat i ons
of any magni t ude in t he physi cal condi t i on of a syst em. Such
di st ur bi ng forces produce, i ndeed, onl y cor r espondi ngl y small
al t er at i ons of t he statistical density in t he ensembl e of syst ems,
and hence onl y i nfi ni t el y weak al t er at i ons of t he ~b functions,
t he mat hemat i cal descri pt i on of whi ch offers far less difficulty
t han woul d be i nvol ved in t he mat hemat i cal r epr esent at i on
of finite al t er at i ons experi enced by par t of t he single syst ems.
Wha t happens t o t he single syst em remai ns, it is t rue, ent i r el y
uncl ari fi ed by t hi s mode of consi derat i on; t hi s eni gmat i c hap-
peni ng is ent i r el y el i mi nat ed from t he r epr esent at i on by t he
st at i st i cal manner of Consideration.
But now I ask: Is t her e real l y any physi ci st who believes
t hat we shall never get any inside vi ew of t hese i mpor t ant
al t er at i ons in t he single syst ems, in t hei r st r uct ur e and t hei r
causal connect i ons, and this regardless of t he fact t ha t t hese
single happeni ngs have been br ought so close t o us, t hanks t o
t he mar vel ous i nvent i ons of t he Wilson chamber and t he
Gei ger count er ? To believe t hi s is logically possible wi t hout
cont r adi ct i on; but , i t is so ver y cont r ar y t o my scientific
i nst i nct t ha t I cannot forego t he search for a more compl et e
concept i on.
To t hese consi derat i ons we shoul d add t hose of anot her
ki nd whi ch also voice t hei r pl ea agai nst t he i dea t hat t he
met hods i nt r oduced by qua nt um mechani cs are l i kel y t o give
a useful basis for t he whol e of physics. I n t he Schr6di nger
equat i on, absol ut e t i me, and also t he pot ent i al energy, pl ay
a deci si ve rSle, while t hese t wo concept s have been recogni zed
by t he t heor y of r el at i vi t y as i nadmi ssabl e in principle. If
one wi shes t o escape from t hi s difficulty he mus t f ound t he
t heor y upon field and field laws i nst ead of upon forces of
i nt eract i on. Thi s leads us t o t ranspose t he st at i st i cal met hods
of qua nt um mechani cs t o fields, t ha t is t o syst ems of i nfi ni t el y
ma ny degrees of freedom. Al t hough t he at t empt s so far
made are rest ri ct ed t o l i near equat i ons, whi ch, as we know
f r om t he resul t s of t he general t heor y of rel at i vi t y, are insuf-
ficient, t he compl i cat i ons met up t o now by t he ver y i ngeni ous
at t empt s are al r eady t erri fyi ng. The y cer t ai nl y will rise
378 AT~BERT EIXSTEIN. [J. F. I.
s ky hi gh if one wi shes t o obey t he r equi r ement s of t he general
t heor y of r el at i vi t y, t he j ust i f i cat i on of whi ch in pr i nci pl e
nobody doubt s.
To be sure, i t has been poi nt ed out t ha t t he i nt r oduct i on
of a space- t i me c ont i nuum ma y be consi der ed as c ont r a r y t o
nat ur e in vi ew of t he mol ecul ar s t r uct ur e of ever yt hi ng whi ch
happens on a smal l scale. I t is mai nt ai ned t ha t per haps t he
success of t he Hei senber g me t hod poi nt s t o a pur el y alge-
brai cal me t hod of descr i pt i on of nat ur e, t ha t is t o t he el i mi na-
t i on of cont i nuous f unct i ons f r om physi cs. Then, however ,
we mus t also gi ve up, by pri nci pl e, t he space- t i me c ont i nuum.
I t is not uni magi nabl e t ha t h u ma n i ngenui t y will some day
find me t hods whi ch will ma ke it possi bl e t o pr oceed al ong such
a pat h. At t he pr es ent t i me, however , such a pr ogr am l ooks
like an a t t e mp t t o br eat he in e mp t y space.
Ther e is no doubt t h a t q u a n t u m mechani cs has seized hol d
of a beaut i f ul el ement of t r ut h, and t ha t i t will be a t es t s t one
for a ny f ut ur e t heor et i cal basis, in t h a t i t mu s t be deduci bl e
as a l i mi t i ng case f r om t ha t basis, j us t as el ect r ost at i cs is
deduci bl e f r om t he Maxwel l equat i ons of t he el ect r omagnet i c
field or as t he r modyna mi c s is deduci bl e f r om classical me-
chani cs. However , I do not bel i eve t ha t q u a n t u m mechani cs
will be t he starting point in t he sear ch for t hi s basis, j us t as,
vi ce versa, one coul d not go f r om t he r modyna mi c s (resp.
st at i st i cal mechani cs) t o t he f oundat i ons of mechani cs.
I n vi ew of t hi s si t uat i on, i t seems t o be ent i r el y j ust i fi abl e
seri ousl y t o consi der t he quest i on as t o whe t he r t he basis of
field physi cs cannot by any means be p u t i nt o h a r mo n y wi t h
t he fact s of t he q u a n t u m t heor y. Is t hi s not t he onl y basis
whi ch, cons i s t ent l y wi t h t oday' s possi bi l i t y of ma t he ma t i c a l
expressi on, can be a da pt e d t o t he r equi r ement s of t he general
t heor y of r el at i vi t y? The belief, pr evai l i ng a mong t he
physi ci st s of t oday, t ha t such an a t t e mp t woul d be hopel ess,
ma y have i t s r oot in t he unj ust i f i abl e i dea t ha t such a t heor y
shoul d lead, as a first appr oxi mat i on, t o t he equat i ons of
classical mechani cs for t he mot i on of corpuscl es, or at l east
t o t ot al di fferent i al equat i ons. As a ma t t e r of fact up t o now
we have never succeeded in r epr es ent i ng corpuscl es t heor et i -
cal l y by fields free of si ngul ari t i es, and we can, a priori, say
not hi ng a bout t he behavi or of such ent i t i es. One thing,
March, 1936.] PHYSI CS AND REALI TY. 379
however , is cer t ai n : if a field t heor y resul t s in a r epr es ent at i on
of cor puscl es free of si ngul ari t i es, t hen t he behavi or of t hese
cor puscl es wi t h t i me is de t e r mi ne d sol el y by t he di fferent i al
equat i ons of t he field.
6. RELATIVITY THEORY AND CORPUSCLES.
I shall now show t hat , accor di ng t o t he general t heor y of
r el at i vi t y, t her e exi st si ngul ar i t y- f r ee sol ut i ons of field equa-
t i ons whi ch can be i nt er pr et ed as r epr es ent i ng corpuscl es. I
r est r i ct mysel f here t o neut r al par t i cl es because, in a not he r
r ecent publ i cat i on in col l abor at i on wi t h Dr. Rosen, I have
t r eat ed t hi s quest i on in a det ai l ed manner , and because t he
essent i al s of t he pr obl em can be compl et el y shown by t hi s case.
The gr avi t at i onal field is ent i r el y descr i bed by t he t ensor
g,~. I n t he t hr ee- i ndex s ymbol s r j , t her e appear also t he
c ont r a va r i a nt s g" whi ch are defi ned as t he mi nor s of t he g,~
di vi ded by t he de t e r mi na nt g(-- [g~ [). I n or der t ha t t he R~k
shal l be defi ned and finite, i t is not suffi ci ent t ha t t her e shall
be, for t he e nvi r onme nt of ever y pa r t of t he c ont i nuum, a
s ys t e m of co6r di nat es in whi ch t he g,, and t hei r first differ-
ent i al quot i ent s are cont i nuous and di fferent i abl e, but i t is
also necessar y t h a t t he de t e r mi na nt g shall nowher e vani sh.
Thi s l ast r est r i ct i on is, however , el i mi nat ed if one repl aces t he
di fferent i al equat i ons Rik = o by g2R~k = o, t he l eft hand si des
of whi ch are w h o l e r at i onal f unct i ons of t he g;k and of t hei r
der i vat i ves.
The s e equat i ons have t he cent r al l y s ymmet r i cal sol ut i ons
i ndi cat ed by Schwar zschi l d
d s 2 - i _ I m / r d r 2 - r2(dO2 + sin2Od~2) + ( i 2 m ) d t 2 .
Thi s sol ut i on has a s i ngul ar i t y a t r = 2m, si nce t he coefficient
of d r 2 (i.e. g11), becomes i nfi ni t e on t hi s hyper sur f ace. I f ,
however , we repl ace t he var i abl e r by o defi ned by t he equat i on
p~ = r - - 2m
we obt ai n
d s 2 = - 4( 2m + p2) do2 - (2m + p2)2(d02 + sin20d92)
p2
+
2 m + p ~dt2"
380 ALBERT E I NS T E I N. [J. F. I.
Thi s s ol ut i on be ha ve s r egul ar l y for all val ues of p. The
vani s hi ng of t he coeffi ci ent of dt ~ i.e. (g44) for p = o r esul t s, i t is
t r ue, in t he cons equence t h a t t he d e t e r mi n a n t g vani s hes for
t hi s val ue ; but , wi t h t he me t hods of wr i t i ng t he field e qua t i ons
a c t ua l l y a dopt e d, t hi s does not c ons t i t ut e a si ngul ar i t y.
I f p ext ends f r om - ~ t o + ~ , t hen r r uns f r om + oo t o
r = 2m and t hen ba c k t o + ~ , whi l e for such val ues of r as
cor r es pond t o r < 2m t her e ar e no cor r es pondi ng real val ues
of p. He nc e t he Schwar zs chi l d s ol ut i on be c ome s a r egul ar
s ol ut i on b y r epr es ent at i on of t he phys i cal s pace as consi st i ng
of t wo i dent i cal " shel l s " nei ghbor i ng upon t he hype r s ur f a c e
o = o, t ha t i s r = 2m, whi l e for t hi s hype r s ur f a c e t he de-
t e r mi na nt g vani shes. Le t us call such a connect i on be t we e n
t he t wo ( i dent i cal ) shel l s a " br i dge. " He nc e t he exi st ence of
s uch a br i dge be t we e n t he t wo shel l s in t he fi ni t e r eal m corre-
s ponds t o t he exi st ence of a mat er i al neut r al par t i cl e whi ch is
des cr i bed in a ma nne r free f r om si ngul ar i t i es.
Th e sol ut i on of t he pr obl e m of t he mot i on of neut r al
par t i cl es e vi de nt l y a mo u n t s t o t he di s c ove r y of s uch s ol ut i ons
of t he gr avi t at i onal e qua t i ons ( wr i t t en free of de nomi na t or s ) ,
as cont ai n s ever al br i dges.
The concept i on s ke t c he d a bove cor r esponds, a pri ori , t o
t he a t omi s t i c s t r uc t ur e of ma t t e r i ns of ar as t he " br i dge "
is b y i t s na t ur e a di s cr et e el ement . Mor e ove r , we see t h a t t he
mas s c ons t a nt rn of t he neut r al par t i cl es mus t neces s ar i l y be
posi t i ve, si nce no s ol ut i on free of si ngul ar i t i es can cor r es pond
t o t he Schwar zs chi l d s ol ut i on for a negat i ve va l ue of m. 0 n l y
t he exami nat i on of t he s ever al - br i dge- pr obl em, can s how
whe t he r or not t hi s t heor et i cal me t h o d f ur ni shes an expl ana-
t i on of t he empi r i cal l y d e mo n s t r a t e d e qua l i t y of t he mas s es of
t he par t i cl es f ound in nat ur e, and wh e t h e r i t t a ke s i nt o
a c c ount t he f act s whi ch t he q u a n t u m mechani cs has so
wonde r f ul l y c ompr e he nde d.
I n an anal ogous manner , i t is possi bl e t o d e mo n s t r a t e t h a t
t he c ombi ne d e qua t i ons of gr a vi t a t i on a nd el ect r i ci t y ( wi t h
a ppr opr i a t e choi ce of t he si gn of t he el ect r i cal me mb e r in t he
gr avi t at i onal equat i ons ) pr oduces a s i ngul ar i t y- f r ee br i dge-
r epr es ent at i on of t he el ect r i c cor puscl e. Th e s i mpl es t sol u-
t i on of t hi s ki nd is t h a t for an el ect r i cal par t i cl e wi t h o u t
gr avi t at i onal mass.
March, 1936.] PHYSICS AND REALITY. 38I
So long as t he i mpor t ant mat hemat i cal difficulties con-
cerned wi t h t he sol ut i on .of t he several -bri dge-probl em, are not
overcome, not hi ng can be said concerni ng t he usefulness of t he
t heor y from t he physi ci st ' s poi nt of view. However , it
const i t ut es, as a mat t er, of fact, t he first a t t e mpt t owar ds t he
consi st ent el aborat i on of a field t heor y whi ch present s a
possi bi l i t y of expl ai ni ng t he propert i es of mat t er . I n favor of
t hi s a t t e mpt one shoul d also add t hat it is based on t he
si mpl est possible rel at i vi st i c field equat i ons known t oday.
SDMMARY.
Physi cs const i t ut es a logical syst em of t hought whi ch is in
a st at e of evol ut i on, and whose basis cannot be obt ai ned
t hr ough di st i l l at i on by any i nduct i ve met hod from t he ex-
periences lived t hr ough, but whi ch can onl y be at t ai ned by
free i nvent i on. The j ust i fi cat i on ( t r ut h cont ent ) of t he sys-
t em rests in t he proof of usefulness of t he resul t i ng t heor ems on
t he basis of sense experiences, wher e t he rel at i ons of t he l at t er
to t he former can onl y be compr ehended i nt ui t i vel y. Evol u-
t i on is going on in t he di rect i on of i ncreasi ng si mpl i ci t y of t he
logical basis. I n or der f ur t her t o appr oach t hi s goal, we mus t
make up our mi nd t o accept t he fact t hht t he logical basis
depar t s more and more from t he facts of experience, and t ha t
t he pat h of our t hought from t he f undament al basis t o t hese
resul t i ng t heorems, whi ch correl at e wi t h sense experiences,
becomes cont i nual l y har der and longer.
Our ai m has been t o sket ch, as briefly as possible, t he de-
vel opment of t he f undament al concept s in t hei r dependence
upon t he facts of experi ence and upon t he strife t owar ds t he
goal of i nt er nal perfect i on of t he syst em. Today' s s t at e of
affairs had t o be i l l umi nat ed by t hese consi derat i ons, as t hey
appear t o me. ( I t is unavoi dabl e t hat hi st ori c schemat i c
r epr esent at i on is of a personal color.)
I t r y t o demons t r at e how t he concept s of bodi l y obj ect s,
space, subj ect i ve and obj ect i ve t i me, are connect ed wi t h one
anot her and wi t h t he nat ur e of t he experience. I n classical
mechani cs t he concept s of space and t i me become i ndependent .
The concept of t he bodi l y obj ect is repl aced in t he f oundat i ons
by t he concept of t he mat er i al poi nt , by whi ch means me-
chani cs becomes f undament al l y at omi st i c. Li ght and elec-
382 ALBERT EINSTEIN. [J. F . I.
t r i ci t y pr oduce i ns ur mount abl e difficulties when one a t t e mp t s
t o make mechani cs t he basis of all physi cs. We are t hus led
t o t he field t heor y of el ect ri ci t y, and, l at er on t o t he a t t e mp t t o
base physi cs ent i r el y upon t he concept of t he field (aft er an
a t t e mp t e d compr omi s e wi t h classical, mechani cs) . Thi s at -
t e mp t l eads t o t he t heor y of r el at i vi t y ( evol ut i on of t he not i on
of space and t i me i nt o t h a t of t he c ont i nuum wi t h met r i c
st r uct ur e) .
I t r y t o demons t r at e, f ur t her mor e, why in my opi ni on
t he q u a n t u m t heor y does not seem l i kel y t o be abl e t o pro-
duce a usabl e f oundat i on for physi cs: one becomes i nvol ved
in cont r adi ct i ons if one t ri es t o consi der t he t heor et i cal quan-
t u m descr i pt i on as a complete descr i pt i on of t he i ndi vi dual
physi cal s ys t em or happeni ng.
On t he ot her hand, up t o t he pr esent t i me, t he field t heor y
is unabl e t o gi ve an expl anat i on of t he mol ecul ar s t r uct ur e of
ma t t e r and of q u a n t u m phenomena. I t is shown, however ,
t ha t t he convi ct i on t o t he effect t ha t t he field t heor y is unabl e
t o give, by i t s met hods , a sol ut i on of t hese pr obl ems rest s upon
pr ej udi ce.