ERNESTO S. MERCADO, petitioner, vs.

EDUARDO BARRIOS MANZANO

and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, J .:
Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano were candidates
for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. The other one was Gabriel
V. Daza III. The results of the election were as follows:
Eduardo B. Manzano 103,853
Ernesto S. Mercado 100,894
Gabriel V. Daza III 54,275
[1]

The proclamation of private respondent was suspended in view of a pending petition for
disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private respondent was not a
citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.
In its resolution, dated May 7, 1998,
[2]
the Second Division of the COMELEC granted the
petition of Mamaril and ordered the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of private
respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen and, under 40(d) of the Local Government
Code, persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective position. The
COMELECs Second Division said:
What is presented before the Commission is a petition for disqualification of Eduardo
Barrios Manzano as candidate for the office of Vice-Mayor of Makati City in the May
11, 1998 elections. The petition is based on the ground that the respondent is an
American citizen based on the record of the Bureau of Immigration and
misrepresented himself as a natural-born Filipino citizen.
In his answer to the petition filed on April 27, 1998, the respondent admitted that he is
registered as a foreigner with the Bureau of Immigration under Alien Certificate of
Registration No. B-31632 and alleged that he is a Filipino citizen because he was born
in 1955 of a Filipino father and a Filipino mother. He was born in the United States,
San Francisco, California, on September 14, 1955, and is considered an American
citizen under US Laws. But notwithstanding his registration as an American citizen,
he did not lose his Filipino citizenship.
Judging from the foregoing facts, it would appear that respondent Manzano is both a
Filipino and a US citizen. In other words, he holds dual citizenship.
The question presented is whether under our laws, he is disqualified from the position
for which he filed his certificate of candidacy. Is he eligible for the office he seeks to
be elected?
Under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, those holding dual citizenship
are disqualified from running for any elective local position.
WHEREFORE, the Commission hereby declares the respondent Eduardo Barrios
Manzano DISQUALIFIED as candidate for Vice-Mayor of Makati City.
On May 8, 1998, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration.
[3]
The motion
remained pending even until after the election held on May 11, 1998.
Accordingly, pursuant to Omnibus Resolution No. 3044, dated May 10, 1998, of the
COMELEC, the board of canvassers tabulated the votes cast for vice mayor of Makati City but
suspended the proclamation of the winner.
On May 19, 1998, petitioner sought to intervene in the case for
disqualification.
[4]
Petitioners motion was opposed by private respondent.
The motion was not resolved. Instead, on August 31, 1998, the COMELEC en banc
rendered its resolution. Voting 4 to 1, with one commissioner abstaining, the COMELEC en
banc reversed the ruling of its Second Division and declared private respondent qualified to run
for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections.
[5]
The pertinent portions of
the resolution of the COMELEC en banc read:
As aforesaid, respondent Eduardo Barrios Manzano was born in San Francisco,
California, U.S.A. He acquired US citizenship by operation of the United States
Constitution and laws under the principle of jus soli.
He was also a natural born Filipino citizen by operation of the 1935 Philippine
Constitution, as his father and mother were Filipinos at the time of his birth. At the
age of six (6), his parents brought him to the Philippines using an American passport
as travel document. His parents also registered him as an alien with the Philippine
Bureau of Immigration. He was issued an alien certificate of registration. This,
however, did not result in the loss of his Philippine citizenship, as he did not renounce
Philippine citizenship and did not take an oath of allegiance to the United States.
It is an undisputed fact that when respondent attained the age of majority, he
registered himself as a voter, and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998,
which effectively renounced his US citizenship under American law. Under
Philippine law, he no longer had U.S. citizenship.
At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the Second Division,
adopted on May 7, 1998, was not yet final. Respondent Manzano obtained the highest
number of votes among the candidates for vice-mayor of Makati City, garnering one
hundred three thousand eight hundred fifty three (103,853) votes over his closest rival,
Ernesto S. Mercado, who obtained one hundred thousand eight hundred ninety four
(100,894) votes, or a margin of two thousand nine hundred fifty nine (2,959)
votes. Gabriel Daza III obtained third place with fifty four thousand two hundred
seventy five (54,275) votes. In applying election laws, it would be far better to err in
favor of the popular choice than be embroiled in complex legal issues involving
private international law which may well be settled before the highest court
(Cf. Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections, 257 SCRA 727).
WHEREFORE, the Commission en banc hereby REVERSES the resolution of the
Second Division, adopted on May 7, 1998, ordering the cancellation of the
respondents certificate of candidacy.
We declare respondent Eduardo Luis Barrios Manzano to be QUALIFIED as a
candidate for the position of vice-mayor of Makati City in the May 11, 1998,
elections.
ACCORDINGLY, the Commission directs the Makati City Board of Canvassers,
upon proper notice to the parties, to reconvene and proclaim the respondent Eduardo
Luis Barrios Manzano as the winning candidate for vice-mayor of Makati City.
Pursuant to the resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the board of canvassers, on the
evening of August 31, 1998, proclaimed private respondent as vice mayor of the City of Makati.
This is a petition for certiorari seeking to set aside the aforesaid resolution of the
COMELEC en banc and to declare private respondent disqualified to hold the office of vice
mayor of Makati City. Petitioner contends that
[T]he COMELEC en banc ERRED in holding that:
A. Under Philippine law, Manzano was no longer a U.S. citizen when he:
1. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he attained the age of majority when he
was already 37 years old; and,
2. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he (merely) registered himself as a
voter and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998.
B. Manzano is qualified to run for and or hold the elective office of Vice-Mayor of the
City of Makati;
C. At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the Second Division
adopted on 7 May 1998 was not yet final so that, effectively, petitioner may not be
declared the winner even assuming that Manzano is disqualified to run for and hold
the elective office of Vice-Mayor of the City of Makati.
We first consider the threshold procedural issue raised by private respondent
Manzano whether petitioner Mercado has personality to bring this suit considering that he
was not an original party in the case for disqualification filed by Ernesto Mamaril nor was
petitioners motion for leave to intervene granted.
I. PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO BRING THIS SUIT

Private respondent cites the following provisions of Rule 8 of the Rules of Procedure of the
COMELEC in support of his claim that petitioner has no right to intervene and, therefore, cannot
bring this suit to set aside the ruling denying his motion for intervention:
Section 1. When proper and when may be permitted to intervene. Any person
allowed to initiate an action or proceeding may, before or during the trial of an action
or proceeding, be permitted by the Commission, in its discretion to intervene in such
action or proceeding, if he has legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the
success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or when he is so situated as
to be adversely affected by such action or proceeding.
. . . .
Section 3. Discretion of Commission. In allowing or disallowing a motion for
intervention, the Commission or the Division, in the exercise of its discretion, shall
consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the
adjudication of the rights of the original parties and whether or not the intervenors
rights may be fully protected in a separate action or proceeding.
Private respondent argues that petitioner has neither legal interest in the matter in litigation nor
an interest to protect because he is a defeated candidate for the vice-mayoralty post of Makati
City [who] cannot be proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City even if the private
respondent be ultimately disqualified by final and executory judgment.
The flaw in this argument is it assumes that, at the time petitioner sought to intervene in the
proceedings before the COMELEC, there had already been a proclamation of the results of the
election for the vice mayoralty contest for Makati City, on the basis of which petitioner came out
only second to private respondent. The fact, however, is that there had been no proclamation at
that time. Certainly, petitioner had, and still has, an interest in ousting private respondent from
the race at the time he sought to intervene. The rule in Labo v. COMELEC,
[6]
reiterated in
several cases,
[7]
only applies to cases in which the election of the respondent is contested, and the
question is whether one who placed second to the disqualified candidate may be declared the
winner. In the present case, at the time petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to File Intervention
on May 20, 1998, there had been no proclamation of the winner, and petitioners purpose was
precisely to have private respondent disqualified from running for [an] elective local position
under 40(d) of R.A. No. 7160. If Ernesto Mamaril (who originally instituted the
disqualification proceedings), a registered voter of Makati City, was competent to bring the
action, so was petitioner since the latter was a rival candidate for vice mayor of Makati City.
Nor is petitioners interest in the matter in litigation any less because he filed a motion for
intervention only on May 20, 1998, after private respondent had been shown to have garnered
the highest number of votes among the candidates for vice mayor. That petitioner had a right to
intervene at that stage of the proceedings for the disqualification against private respondent is
clear from 6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which
provides:
Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be
voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a
candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and
he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or
Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest
and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency
thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the
evidence of guilt is strong.
Under this provision, intervention may be allowed in proceedings for disqualification even
after election if there has yet been no final judgment rendered.
The failure of the COMELEC en banc to resolve petitioners motion for intervention was
tantamount to a denial of the motion, justifying petitioner in filing the instant petition for
certiorari. As the COMELEC en banc instead decided the merits of the case, the present petition
properly deals not only with the denial of petitioners motion for intervention but also with the
substantive issues respecting private respondents alleged disqualification on the ground of dual
citizenship.
This brings us to the next question, namely, whether private respondent Manzano possesses
dual citizenship and, if so, whether he is disqualified from being a candidate for vice mayor of
Makati City.
II. DUAL CITIZENSHIP AS A GROUND FOR DISQUALIFICATION

The disqualification of private respondent Manzano is being sought under 40 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), which declares as disqualified from running for
any elective local position: . . . (d) Those with dual citizenship. This provision is incorporated
in the Charter of the City of Makati.
[8]

Invoking the maxim dura lex sed lex, petitioner, as well as the Solicitor General, who sides
with him in this case, contends that through 40(d) of the Local Government Code, Congress has
command[ed] in explicit terms the ineligibility of persons possessing dual allegiance to hold
local elective office.
To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as
a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is
simultaneously considered a national by the said states.
[9]
For instance, such a situation may arise
when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus
sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and
without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both
states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the
following classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship:
(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the
principle of jus soli;
(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their
fathers country such children are citizens of that country;
(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latters country the former are considered
citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine
citizenship.
There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may, without performing
any act, be also a citizen of another state; but the above cases are clearly possible given the
constitutional provisions on citizenship.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously
owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary,
dual allegiance is the result of an individuals volition.
With respect to dual allegiance, Article IV, 5 of the Constitution provides: Dual allegiance
of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law. This provision was
included in the 1987 Constitution at the instance of Commissioner Blas F. Ople who explained
its necessity as follows:
[10]

. . . I want to draw attention to the fact that dual allegiance is not dual citizenship. I
have circulated a memorandum to the Bernas Committee according to which a dual
allegiance and I reiterate a dual allegiance is larger and more threatening than that
of mere double citizenship which is seldom intentional and, perhaps, never
insidious. That is often a function of the accident of mixed marriages or of birth on
foreign soil. And so, I do not question double citizenship at all.
What we would like the Committee to consider is to take constitutional cognizance of
the problem of dual allegiance. For example, we all know what happens in the
triennial elections of the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce
which consists of about 600 chapters all over the country. There is a Peking ticket, as
well as a Taipei ticket. Not widely known is the fact that the Filipino-Chinese
community is represented in the Legislative Yuan of the Republic of China in
Taiwan. And until recently, the sponsor might recall, in Mainland China in the
Peoples Republic of China, they have the Associated Legislative Council for
overseas Chinese wherein all of Southeast Asia including some European and Latin
countries were represented, which was dissolved after several years because of
diplomatic friction. At that time, the Filipino-Chinese were also represented in that
Overseas Council.
When I speak of double allegiance, therefore, I speak of this unsettled kind of
allegiance of Filipinos, of citizens who are already Filipinos but who, by their acts,
may be said to be bound by a second allegiance, either to Peking or Taiwan. I also
took close note of the concern expressed by some Commissioners yesterday, including
Commissioner Villacorta, who were concerned about the lack of guarantees of
thorough assimilation, and especially Commissioner Concepcion who has always
been worried about minority claims on our natural resources.
Dual allegiance can actually siphon scarce national capital to Taiwan, Singapore,
China or Malaysia, and this is already happening. Some of the great commercial
places in downtown Taipei are Filipino-owned, owned by Filipino-Chinese it is of
common knowledge in Manila. It can mean a tragic capital outflow when we have to
endure a capital famine which also means economic stagnation, worsening
unemployment and social unrest.
And so, this is exactly what we ask that the Committee kindly consider
incorporating a new section, probably Section 5, in the article on Citizenship which
will read as follows: DUAL ALLEGIANCE IS INIMICAL TO CITIZENSHIP AND
SHALL BE DEALT WITH ACCORDING TO LAW.
In another session of the Commission, Ople spoke on the problem of these citizens with dual
allegiance, thus:
[11]

. . . A significant number of Commissioners expressed their concern about dual
citizenship in the sense that it implies a double allegiance under a double sovereignty
which some of us who spoke then in a freewheeling debate thought would be
repugnant to the sovereignty which pervades the Constitution and to citizenship itself
which implies a uniqueness and which elsewhere in the Constitution is defined in
terms of rights and obligations exclusive to that citizenship including, of course, the
obligation to rise to the defense of the State when it is threatened, and back of this,
Commissioner Bernas, is, of course, the concern for national security. In the course of
those debates, I think some noted the fact that as a result of the wave of
naturalizations since the decision to establish diplomatic relations with the Peoples
Republic of China was made in 1975, a good number of these naturalized Filipinos
still routinely go to Taipei every October 10; and it is asserted that some of them do
renew their oath of allegiance to a foreign government maybe just to enter into the
spirit of the occasion when the anniversary of the Sun Yat-Sen Republic is
commemorated. And so, I have detected a genuine and deep concern about double
citizenship, with its attendant risk of double allegiance which is repugnant to our
sovereignty and national security. I appreciate what the Committee said that this
could be left to the determination of a future legislature. But considering the scale of
the problem, the real impact on the security of this country, arising from, let us say,
potentially great numbers of double citizens professing double allegiance, will the
Committee entertain a proposed amendment at the proper time that will prohibit, in
effect, or regulate double citizenship?
Clearly, in including 5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional
Commission was not with dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who maintain their
allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase dual
citizenship in R.A. No. 7160, 40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, 20 must be understood as referring
to dual allegiance. Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this
disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict
process with respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it
should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine
citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their
condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states. As Joaquin G.
Bernas, one of the most perceptive members of the Constitutional Commission, pointed out:
[D]ual citizenship is just a reality imposed on us because we have no control of the laws on
citizenship of other countries. We recognize a child of a Filipino mother. But whether or not she
is considered a citizen of another country is something completely beyond our control.
[12]

By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to
the other country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual
citizens. It may be that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an
individual has not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment as the
following discussion on 40(d) between Senators Enrile and Pimentel clearly shows:
[13]

SENATOR ENRILE. Mr. President, I would like to ask clarification of line 41, page 17: Any person
with dual citizenship is disqualified to run for any elective local position. Under the present
Constitution, Mr. President, someone whose mother is a citizen of the Philippines but his father is
a foreigner is a natural-born citizen of the Republic. There is no requirement that such a natural
born citizen, upon reaching the age of majority, must elect or give up Philippine citizenship.
On the assumption that this person would carry two passports, one belonging to the country of his or
her father and one belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, may such a situation disqualify
the person to run for a local government position?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. To my mind, Mr. President, it only means that at the moment when he
would want to run for public office, he has to repudiate one of his citizenships.
SENATOR ENRILE. Suppose he carries only a Philippine passport but the country of origin or the
country of the father claims that person, nevertheless, as a citizen? No one can renounce. There
are such countries in the world.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Well, the very fact that he is running for public office would, in effect, be an
election for him of his desire to be considered as a Filipino citizen.
SENATOR ENRILE. But, precisely, Mr. President, the Constitution does not require an
election. Under the Constitution, a person whose mother is a citizen of the Philippines is, at birth,
a citizen without any overt act to claim the citizenship.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes. What we are saying, Mr. President, is: Under the Gentlemans
example, if he does not renounce his other citizenship, then he is opening himself to
question. So, if he is really interested to run, the first thing he should do is to say in the
Certificate of Candidacy that: I am a Filipino citizen, and I have only one citizenship.
SENATOR ENRILE. But we are talking from the viewpoint of Philippine law, Mr. President. He
will always have one citizenship, and that is the citizenship invested upon him or her in the
Constitution of the Republic.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. That is true, Mr. President. But if he exercises acts that will prove that he
also acknowledges other citizenships, then he will probably fall under this disqualification.
This is similar to the requirement that an applicant for naturalization must renounce all
allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty
[14]
of which at the
time he is a subject or citizen before he can be issued a certificate of naturalization as a citizen of
the Philippines. In Parado v. Republic,
[15]
it was held:
[W]hen a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that he
renounces his loyalty to any other country or government and solemnly declares that
he owes his allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the condition imposed by
law is satisfied and complied with. The determination whether such renunciation is
valid or fully complies with the provisions of our Naturalization Law lies within the
province and is an exclusive prerogative of our courts. The latter should apply the law
duly enacted by the legislative department of the Republic. No foreign law may or
should interfere with its operation and application. If the requirement of the Chinese
Law of Nationality were to be read into our Naturalization Law, we would be
applying not what our legislative department has deemed it wise to require, but what a
foreign government has thought or intended to exact. That, of course, is absurd. It
must be resisted by all means and at all cost. It would be a brazen encroachment upon
the sovereign will and power of the people of this Republic.
III. PETITIONER'S ELECTION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP

The record shows that private respondent was born in San Francisco, California on
September 4, 1955, of Filipino parents. Since the Philippines adheres to the principle of jus
sanguinis, while the United States follows the doctrine of jus soli, the parties agree that, at birth
at least, he was a national both of the Philippines and of the United States. However, the
COMELEC en banc held that, by participating in Philippine elections in 1992, 1995, and 1998,
private respondent effectively renounced his U.S. citizenship under American law, so that now
he is solely a Philippine national.
Petitioner challenges this ruling. He argues that merely taking part in Philippine elections is
not sufficient evidence of renunciation and that, in any event, as the alleged renunciation was
made when private respondent was already 37 years old, it was ineffective as it should have been
made when he reached the age of majority.
In holding that by voting in Philippine elections private respondent renounced his American
citizenship, the COMELEC must have in mind 349 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of
the United States, which provided that A person who is a national of the United States, whether
by birth or naturalization, shall lose his nationality by: . . . (e) Voting in a political election in a
foreign state or participating in an election or plebiscite to determine the sovereignty over foreign
territory. To be sure this provision was declared unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court
in Afroyim v. Rusk
[16]
as beyond the power given to the U.S. Congress to regulate foreign
relations. However, by filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post, private
respondent elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American
citizenship. Private respondents certificate of candidacy, filed on March 27, 1998, contained the
following statements made under oath:
6. I AM A FILIPINO CITIZEN (STATE IF NATURAL-BORN OR
NATURALIZED) NATURAL-BORN
. . . .
10. I AM A REGISTERED VOTER OF PRECINCT NO. 747-A, BARANGAY SAN
LORENZO, CITY/MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, PROVINCE OF NCR .
11. I AM NOT A PERMANENT RESIDENT OF, OR IMMIGRANT TO, A FOREIGN
COUNTRY.
12. I AM ELIGIBLE FOR THE OFFICE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED. I WILL
SUPPORT AND DEFEND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES AND WILL
MAINTAIN TRUE FAITH AND ALLEGIANCE THERETO; THAT I WILL OBEY THE
LAWS, LEGAL ORDERS AND DECREES PROMULGATED BY THE DULY
CONSTITUTED AUTHORITIES OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND
THAT I IMPOSE THIS OBLIGATION UPON MYSELF VOLUNTARILY, WITHOUT
MENTAL RESERVATION OR PURPOSE OF EVASION. I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT
THE FACTS STATED HEREIN ARE TRUE AND CORRECT OF MY OWN PERSONAL
KNOWLEDGE.
The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American citizenship,
effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. Thus, in Frivaldo v.
COMELEC it was held:
[17]

It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo became an American. Would the
retroactivity of his repatriation not effectively give him dual citizenship, which under
Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code would disqualify him from running for any
elective local position? We answer this question in the negative, as there is cogent
reason to hold that Frivaldo was really STATELESS at the time he took said oath of
allegiance and even before that, when he ran for governor in 1988. In his Comment,
Frivaldo wrote that he had long renounced and had long abandoned his American
citizenshiplong before May 8, 1995. At best, Frivaldo was stateless in the
interimwhen he abandoned and renounced his US citizenship but before he was
repatriated to his Filipino citizenship.
On this point, we quote from the assailed Resolution dated December 19, 1995:
By the laws of the United States, petitioner Frivaldo lost his American citizenship
when he took his oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government when he ran for
Governor in 1988, in 1992, and in 1995. Every certificate of candidacy contains an
oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government.
These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign nationality long before the
elections of 1995 have not been effectively rebutted by Lee. Furthermore, it is basic
that such findings of the Commission are conclusive upon this Court, absent any
showing of capriciousness or arbitrariness or abuse.
There is, therefore, no merit in petitioners contention that the oath of allegiance contained
in private respondents certificate of candidacy is insufficient to constitute renunciation of his
American citizenship. Equally without merit is petitioners contention that, to be effective, such
renunciation should have been made upon private respondent reaching the age of majority since
no law requires the election of Philippine citizenship to be made upon majority age.
Finally, much is made of the fact that private respondent admitted that he is registered as an
American citizen in the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation and that he holds an American
passport which he used in his last travel to the United States on April 22, 1997. There is no merit
in this. Until the filing of his certificate of candidacy on March 21, 1998, he had dual
citizenship. The acts attributed to him can be considered simply as the assertion of his American
nationality before the termination of his American citizenship. What this Court said in Aznar v.
COMELEC
[18]
applies mutatis mutandis to private respondent in the case at bar:
. . . Considering the fact that admittedly Osmea was both a Filipino and an
American, the mere fact that he has a Certificate stating he is an American does not
mean that he is not still a Filipino. . . . [T]he Certification that he is an American does
not mean that he is not still a Filipino, possessed as he is, of both nationalities or
citizenships. Indeed, there is no express renunciation here of Philippine citizenship;
truth to tell, there is even no implied renunciation of said citizenship. When We
consider that the renunciation needed to lose Philippine citizenship must be express,
it stands to reason that there can be no such loss of Philippine citizenship when there
is no renunciation, either express or implied.
To recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that
he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support
the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so
without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are
concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said
before as a dual citizen.
On the other hand, private respondents oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when
considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education,
practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no
doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under
oath. Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his
Philippine citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-
Santiago,
[19]
we sustained the denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that,
after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese
passport and declared in commercial documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese
national. A similar sanction can be taken against any one who, in electing Philippine citizenship,
renounces his foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his
Philippine citizenship.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Quisumbing, Buena,
Gonzaga-Reyes, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Panganiban, and Purisima, JJ., on leave.
Pardo, J., no part.



[1]
Petition, Rollo, p. 5.
[2]
Per Commissioner Amado M. Calderon and concurred in by Commissioners Julio F. Desamito and Japal M.
Guiani.
[3]
Id., Annex E, Rollo, pp. 50-63.
[4]
Rollo, pp. 78-83.
[5]
Per Chairman Bernardo P. Pardo and concurred in by Commissioners Manolo B. Gorospe, Teresita Dy-Liaco
Flores, Japal M. Guiani, and Luzviminda G. Tancangco. Commissioner Julio F. Desamito dissented.
[6]
176 SCRA 1 (1989).
[7]
Abella v. COMELEC, 201 SCRA 253 (1991); Benito v. COMELEC, 235 SCRA 436 (1994); Aquino v.
COMELEC, 248 SCRA 400 (1995); Frivaldo v. COMELEC, 257 SCRA 727 (1996).
[8]
R.A. No. 7854, the Charter of the City of Makati, provides: Sec. 20 The following are disqualifiedfrom
running for any elective position in the city: . . . (d) Those with dual citizenship.
[9]
JOVITO R. SALONGA, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 166 (1995).
[10]
Id., at 361 (Session of July 8, 1986).
[11]
Id., at 233-234 (Session of June 25, 1986).
[12]
1 RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 203 (Session of June 23, 1986).
[13]
Transcript, pp. 5-6, Session of Nov. 27, 1990.
[14]
C.A. No. 473, 12.
[15]
86 Phil. 340, 343 (1950).
[16]
387 U.S. 253, 18 L. Ed. 2d 757 (1967), overruling Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 2 L. Ed. 2d 603 (1958).
[17]
257 SCRA 727, 759-760 (1996).
[18]
185 SCRA 703, 711 (1990). See also Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717, 96 L. Ed. 1249 (1952).
[19]
169 SCRA 364 (1989).



MARIO SIOCHI,
Petitioner,


- versus -


ALFREDO GOZON,
WINIFRED GOZON, GIL TABIJE,
INTER-DIMENSIONAL REALTY, INC.,
and ELVIRA GOZON,
Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

INTER-DIMENSIONAL REALTY,
INC.,
Petitioner,

- versus-

MARIO SIOCHI, ELVIRA GOZON,
ALFREDO GOZON, AND
WINIFRED GOZON,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 169900














G.R. NO. 169977

Present:

CARPIO, J.,
CHAIRPERSON,
BRION,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD, AND
PEREZ, JJ.

Promulgated:
MARCH 18, 2010
X - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - X

R E S O L U T I O N

CARPIO, J .:

This is a consolidation of two separate petitions for review,
[1]
assailing the 7
July 2005 Decision
[2]
and the 30 September 2005 Resolution
[3]
of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74447.

THIS CASE INVOLVES A 30,000 SQ.M. PARCEL OF LAND
(PROPERTY) COVERED BY TCT NO. 5357.
[4]
THE PROPERTY IS
SITUATED IN MALABON, METRO MANILA AND IS REGISTERED IN THE
NAME OF ALFREDO GOZON (ALFREDO), MARRIED TO
ELVIRA GOZON (ELVIRA).

ON 23 DECEMBER 1991, ELVIRA FILED WITH THE CAVITE CITY
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT (CAVITE RTC) A PETITION FOR LEGAL
SEPARATION AGAINST HER HUSBAND ALFREDO. ON 2 JANUARY 1992,
ELVIRA FILED A NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS, WHICH WAS THEN
ANNOTATED ON TCT NO. 5357.

ON 31 AUGUST 1993, WHILE THE LEGAL SEPARATION CASE WAS
STILL PENDING, ALFREDO AND MARIO SIOCHI (MARIO) ENTERED
INTO AN AGREEMENT TO BUY AND SELL
[5]
(AGREEMENT) INVOLVING
THE PROPERTY FOR THE PRICE OF P18 MILLION. AMONG THE
STIPULATIONS IN THE AGREEMENT WERE THAT ALFREDO
WOULD: (1) SECURE AN AFFIDAVIT FROM ELVIRA THAT THE
PROPERTY IS ALFREDOS EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY AND TO ANNOTATE
THE AGREEMENT AT THE BACK OF TCT NO. 5357; (2) SECURE THE
APPROVAL OF THE CAVITE RTC TO EXCLUDE THE PROPERTY FROM
THE LEGAL SEPARATION CASE; AND (3) SECURE THE REMOVAL OF
THE NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS PERTAINING TO THE SAID CASE AND
ANNOTATED ON TCT NO. 5357. HOWEVER, DESPITE REPEATED
DEMANDS FROM MARIO, ALFREDO FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THESE
STIPULATIONS. AFTER PAYING THE P5 MILLION EARNEST MONEY AS
PARTIAL PAYMENT OF THE PURCHASE PRICE, MARIO TOOK
POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY IN SEPTEMBER 1993. ON 6 SEPTEMBER
1993, THE AGREEMENT WAS ANNOTATED ON TCT NO. 5357.
Meanwhile, on 29 June 1994, the Cavite RTC rendered a decision
[6]
in the legal
separation case, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered decreeing the legal
separation between petitioner and respondent. Accordingly, petitioner Elvira
Robles Gozon is entitled to live separately from respondent
Alfredo Gozon without dissolution of their marriage bond. The conjugal
partnership of gains of the spouses is hereby declared DISSOLVED and
LIQUIDATED. Being the offending spouse, respondent is deprived of his share in
the net profits and the same is awarded to their child Winifred R. Gozon whose
custody is awarded to petitioner.

FURTHERMORE, SAID PARTIES ARE REQUIRED TO MUTUALLY SUPPORT THEIR
CHILD WINIFRED R. GOZON AS HER NEEDS ARISES.

SO ORDERED.
[7]


As regards the property, the Cavite RTC held that it is deemed conjugal property.

ON 22 AUGUST 1994, ALFREDO EXECUTED A DEED OF DONATION
OVER THE PROPERTY IN FAVOR OF THEIR DAUGHTER, WINIFRED
GOZON (WINIFRED). THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MALABON, GIL
TABIJE, CANCELLED TCT NO. 5357 AND ISSUED TCT NO. M-10508
[8]
IN
THE NAME OF WINIFRED, WITHOUT ANNOTATING THE AGREEMENT
AND THE NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS ON TCT NO. M-10508.

ON 26 OCTOBER 1994, ALFREDO, BY VIRTUE OF A SPECIAL
POWER OF ATTORNEY
[9]
EXECUTED IN HIS FAVOR BY WINIFRED,
SOLD THE PROPERTY TO INTER-DIMENSIONAL REALTY, INC. (IDRI)
FOR P18 MILLION.
[10]
IDRI PAID ALFREDO P18 MILLION, REPRESENTING
FULL PAYMENT FOR THE PROPERTY.
[11]
SUBSEQUENTLY, THE
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MALABON CANCELLED TCT NO. M-
10508 AND ISSUED TCT NO. M-10976
[12]
TO IDRI.

MARIO THEN FILED WITH THE MALABON REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT (MALABON RTC) A COMPLAINT FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
AND DAMAGES, ANNULMENT OF DONATION AND SALE, WITH
PRELIMINARY MANDATORY AND PROHIBITORY INJUNCTION AND/OR
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER.

ON 3 APRIL 2001, THE MALABON RTC RENDERED A
DECISION,
[13]
THE DISPOSITIVE PORTION OF WHICH READS:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, JUDGMENT IS HEREBY
RENDERED AS FOLLOWS:
01. On the preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction:
1.1 THE SAME IS HEREBY MADE PERMANENT BY:
1.1.1 ENJOINING DEFENDANTS ALFREDO GOZON,
WINIFRED GOZON, INTER-DIMENSIONAL REALTY, INC.
AND GIL TABIJE, THEIR AGENTS, REPRESENTATIVES
AND ALL PERSONS ACTING IN THEIR BEHALF FROM
ANY ATTEMPT OF COMMISSION OR CONTINUANCE OF
THEIR WRONGFUL ACTS OF FURTHER ALIENATING OR
DISPOSING OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY;
1.1.2. ENJOINING DEFENDANT INTER-DIMENSIONAL REALTY, INC. FROM
ENTERING AND FENCING THE PROPERTY;
1.1.3. ENJOINING DEFENDANTS ALFREDO GOZON, WINIFRED GOZON, INTER-
DIMENSIONAL REALTY, INC. TO RESPECT PLAINTIFFS POSSESSION OF THE
PROPERTY.
02. THE AGREEMENT TO BUY AND SELL DATED 31 AUGUST
1993, BETWEEN PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT ALFREDO GOZON IS
HEREBY APPROVED, EXCLUDING THE PROPERTY AND RIGHTS OF
DEFENDANT ELVIRA ROBLES-GOZON TO THE UNDIVIDED ONE-HALF
SHARE IN THE CONJUGAL PROPERTY SUBJECT OF THIS CASE.
03. THE DEED OF DONATION DATED 22 AUGUST 1994, ENTERED INTO BY AND
BETWEEN DEFENDANTS ALFREDO GOZON AND WINIFRED GOZON IS HEREBY
NULLIFIED AND VOIDED.
04. THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE DATED 26 OCTOBER 1994, EXECUTED BY
DEFENDANT WINIFRED GOZON, THROUGH DEFENDANT ALFREDO GOZON, IN
FAVOR OF DEFENDANT INTER-DIMENSIONAL REALTY, INC. IS HEREBY
NULLIFIED AND VOIDED.
05. DEFENDANT INTER-DIMENSIONAL REALTY, INC. IS HEREBY ORDERED TO
DELIVER ITS TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. M-10976 TO THE REGISTER OF
DEEDS OF MALABON, METRO MANILA.
06. THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MALABON, METRO MANILA IS HEREBY ORDERED
TO CANCEL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NOS. 10508 IN THE NAME OF WINIFRED
GOZON AND M-10976 IN THE NAME OF INTER-DIMENSIONAL REALTY, INC.,
AND TO RESTORE TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 5357 IN THE NAME OF
ALFREDO GOZON, MARRIED TO ELVIRA ROBLES WITH THE AGREEMENT TO BUY
AND SELL DATED 31 AUGUST 1993 FULLY ANNOTATED THEREIN IS HEREBY
ORDERED.
07. DEFENDANT ALFREDO GOZON IS HEREBY ORDERED TO DELIVER A DEED OF
ABSOLUTE SALE IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF OVER HIS ONE-HALF UNDIVIDED
SHARE IN THE SUBJECT PROPERTY AND TO COMPLY WITH ALL THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR REGISTERING SUCH DEED.
08. ORDERING DEFENDANT ELVIRA ROBLES-GOZON TO SIT WITH PLAINTIFF TO
AGREE ON THE SELLING PRICE OF HER UNDIVIDED ONE-HALF SHARE IN THE
SUBJECT PROPERTY, THEREAFTER, TO EXECUTE AND DELIVER A DEED OF
ABSOLUTE SALE OVER THE SAME IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF AND TO COMPLY
WITH ALL THE REQUIREMENTS FOR REGISTERING SUCH DEED, WITHIN FIFTEEN
(15) DAYS FROM THE RECEIPT OF THIS DECISION.
09. THEREAFTER, PLAINTIFF IS HEREBY ORDERED TO PAY DEFENDANT ALFREDO
GOZON THE BALANCE OF FOUR MILLION PESOS (P4,000,000.00) IN HIS ONE-HALF
UNDIVIDED SHARE IN THE PROPERTY TO BE SET OFF BY THE AWARD OF
DAMAGES IN PLAINTIFFS FAVOR.
10. PLAINTIFF IS HEREBY ORDERED TO PAY THE DEFENDANT ELVIRA ROBLES-
GOZON THE PRICE THEY HAD AGREED UPON FOR THE SALE OF HER ONE-HALF
UNDIVIDED SHARE IN THE SUBJECT PROPERTY.
11. DEFENDANTS ALFREDO GOZON, WINIFRED GOZON AND GIL TABIJE ARE
HEREBY ORDERED TO PAY THE PLAINTIFF, JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY, THE
FOLLOWING:
11.1 TWO MILLION PESOS (P2,000,000.00) AS ACTUAL AND
COMPENSATORY DAMAGES;
11.2 ONE MILLION PESOS (P1,000,000.00) AS MORAL DAMAGES;
11.3 FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00) AS EXEMPLARY DAMAGES;
11.4 FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P400,000.00) AS ATTORNEYS FEES; AND
11.5 ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00) AS LITIGATION EXPENSES.
11.6 THE ABOVE AWARDS ARE SUBJECT TO SET OFF OF PLAINTIFFS OBLIGATION
IN PARAGRAPH 9 HEREOF.
12. DEFENDANTS ALFREDO GOZON AND WINIFRED GOZON
ARE HEREBY ORDERED TO PAY INTER-DIMENSIONAL REALTY, INC.
JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY THE FOLLOWING:
12.1 EIGHTEEN MILLION PESOS (P18,000,000.00) WHICH
CONSTITUTE THE AMOUNT THE FORMER RECEIVED FROM THE
LATTER PURSUANT TO THEIR DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE
DATED 26 OCTOBER 1994, WITH LEGAL INTEREST THEREFROM;
12.2 ONE MILLION PESOS (P1,000,000.00) AS MORAL DAMAGES;
12.3 FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00) AS EXEMPLARY DAMAGES;
AND
12.4 ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00) AS ATTORNEYS FEES.
13. DEFENDANTS ALFREDO GOZON AND WINIFRED GOZON
ARE HEREBY ORDERED TO PAY COSTS OF SUIT.

SO ORDERED.
[14]



ON APPEAL, THE COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMED THE MALABON
RTCS DECISION WITH MODIFICATION. THE DISPOSITIVE PORTION OF
THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED 7 JULY 2005 READS:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, THE ASSAILED
DECISION DATED APRIL 3, 2001 OF THE RTC, BRANCH 74, MALABON
IS HEREBY AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS, AS FOLLOWS:

1. THE SALE OF THE SUBJECT LAND BY DEFENDANT ALFREDO GOZON TO
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT SIOCHI IS DECLARED NULL AND VOID FOR THE
FOLLOWING REASONS:
A) THE CONVEYANCE WAS DONE WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF DEFENDANT-
APPELLEE ELVIRA GOZON;
B) DEFENDANT ALFREDO GOZONS ONE-HALF () UNDIVIDED SHARE HAS BEEN
FORFEITED IN FAVOR OF HIS DAUGHTER, DEFENDANT WINIFRED GOZON, BY
VIRTUE OF THE DECISION IN THE LEGAL SEPARATION CASE RENDERED BY THE
RTC, BRANCH 16, CAVITE;
2. DEFENDANT ALFREDO GOZON SHALL RETURN/DELIVER TO PLAINTIFF-
APPELLANT SIOCHI THE AMOUNT OF P5 MILLION WHICH THE LATTER PAID AS
EARNEST MONEY IN CONSIDERATION FOR THE SALE OF THE SUBJECT LAND;
3. DEFENDANTS ALFREDO GOZON, WINIFRED GOZON AND GIL TABIJE ARE
HEREBY ORDERED TO PAY PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT SIOCHI JOINTLY AND
SEVERALLY, THE FOLLOWING:
A) P100,000.00 AS MORAL DAMAGES;
B) P100,000.00 AS EXEMPLARY DAMAGES;
C) P50,000.00 AS ATTORNEYS FEES;
D) P20,000.00 AS LITIGATION EXPENSES; AND
E) THE AWARDS OF ACTUAL AND COMPENSATORY DAMAGES
ARE HEREBY ORDERED DELETED FOR LACK OF BASIS.
4. DEFENDANTS ALFREDO GOZON AND WINIFRED GOZON ARE
HEREBY ORDERED TO PAY DEFENDANT-APPELLANT IDRI JOINTLY
AND SEVERALLY THE FOLLOWING:
A) P100,000.00 AS MORAL
DAMAGES;
B) P100,000.00 AS EXEMPLARY
DAMAGES; AND
C) P50,000.00 AS
ATTORNEYS FEES.

DEFENDANT WINIFRED GOZON,
WHOM THE UNDIVIDED ONE-HALF SHARE OF DEFENDANT ALFREDO GOZON WAS
AWARDED, IS HEREBY GIVEN THE OPTION WHETHER OR NOT TO DISPOSE OF HER
UNDIVIDED SHARE IN THE SUBJECT LAND.

THE REST OF THE DECISION NOT
INCONSISTENT WITH THIS RULING STANDS.

SO
ORDERED.
[15]





Only Mario and IDRI appealed the decision of the Court of Appeals. In his
petition, Mario alleges that the Agreement should be treated as a continuing offer
which may be perfected by the acceptance of the other spouse before the offer is
withdrawn. Since Elviras conduct signified her acquiescence to the sale, Mario
prays for the Court to direct Alfredo and Elvira to execute a Deed of Absolute Sale
over the property upon his payment of P9 million to Elvira.

ON THE OTHER HAND, IDRI ALLEGES THAT IT IS A BUYER IN
GOOD FAITH AND FOR VALUE. THUS, IDRI PRAYS THAT THE COURT
SHOULD UPHOLD THE VALIDITY OF IDRIS TCT NO. M-10976 OVER
THE PROPERTY.

WE FIND THE PETITIONS WITHOUT MERIT.

THIS CASE INVOLVES THE CONJUGAL PROPERTY OF ALFREDO
AND ELVIRA. SINCE THE DISPOSITION OF THE PROPERTY OCCURRED
AFTER THE EFFECTIVITY OF THE FAMILY CODE, THE APPLICABLE
LAW IS THE FAMILY CODE. ARTICLE 124 OF THE FAMILY CODE
PROVIDES:

Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership
property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the
husbands decision shall prevail, subject to the recourse to the court by the wife
for a proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of
the contract implementing such decision.

IN THE EVENT THAT ONE SPOUSE IS INCAPACITATED OR OTHERWISE
UNABLE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE CONJUGAL
PROPERTIES, THE OTHER SPOUSE MAY ASSUME SOLE POWERS OF
ADMINISTRATION. THESE POWERS DO NOT INCLUDE THE POWERS OF
DISPOSITION OR ENCUMBRANCE WHICH MUST HAVE THE AUTHORITY OF
THE COURT OR THE WRITTEN CONSENT OF THE OTHER SPOUSE. IN THE
ABSENCE OF SUCH AUTHORITY OR CONSENT, THE DISPOSITION OR
ENCUMBRANCE SHALL BE VOID. HOWEVER, THE TRANSACTION SHALL BE
CONSTRUED AS A CONTINUING OFFER ON THE PART OF THE CONSENTING
SPOUSE AND THE THIRD PERSON, AND MAY BE PERFECTED AS A BINDING
CONTRACT UPON THE ACCEPTANCE BY THE OTHER SPOUSE OR AUTHORIZATION
BY THE COURT BEFORE THE OFFER IS WITHDRAWN BY EITHER OR BOTH
OFFERORS. (EMPHASIS SUPPLIED)

In this case, Alfredo was the sole administrator of the property because
Elvira, with whom Alfredo was separated in fact, was unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal property. However, as sole administrator of the
property, Alfredo still cannot sell the property without the written consent of
Elvira or the authority of the court. Without such consent or authority, the sale is
void.
[16]
The absence of the consent of one of the spouse renders the entire sale
void, including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the spouse who
contracted the sale.
[17]
Even if the other spouse actively participated in negotiating
for the sale of the property, that other spouses written consent to the sale is still
required by law for its validity.
[18]
The Agreement entered into by Alfredo and
Mario was without the written consent of Elvira. Thus, the Agreement is entirely
void. As regards Marios contention that the Agreement is a continuing offer
which may be perfected by Elviras acceptance before the offer is withdrawn, the
fact that the property was subsequently donated by Alfredo to Winifred and then
sold to IDRI clearly indicates that the offer was already withdrawn.

However, we disagree with the finding of the Court of Appeals that the one-
half undivided share of Alfredo in the property was already forfeited in favor of his
daughter Winifred, based on the ruling of the Cavite RTC in the legal separation
case. The Court of Appeals misconstrued the ruling of the Cavite RTC that
Alfredo, being the offending spouse, is deprived of his share in the net profits and
the same is awarded to Winifred.

THE CAVITE RTC RULING FINDS SUPPORT IN THE FOLLOWING
PROVISIONS OF THE FAMILY CODE:

ART. 63. THE DECREE OF LEGAL SEPARATION SHALL HAVE
THE FOLLOWING EFFECTS:
(1) THE SPOUSES SHALL BE ENTITLED TO LIVE SEPARATELY
FROM EACH OTHER, BUT THE MARRIAGE BONDS SHALL
NOT BE SEVERED;
(2) THE ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY OR THE CONJUGAL
PARTNERSHIP SHALL BE DISSOLVED AND LIQUIDATED
BUT THE OFFENDING SPOUSE SHALL HAVE NO RIGHT
TO ANY SHARE OF THE NET PROFITS EARNED BY THE
ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY OR THE CONJUGAL
PARTNERSHIP, WHICH SHALL BE FORFEITED IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 43(2);
(3) THE CUSTODY OF THE MINOR CHILDREN SHALL BE
AWARDED TO THE INNOCENT SPOUSE, SUBJECT TO THE
PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 213 OF THIS CODE; AND
THE OFFENDING SPOUSE SHALL BE DISQUALIFIED FROM INHERITING FROM THE
INNOCENT SPOUSE BY INTESTATE SUCCESSION. MOREOVER, PROVISIONS IN
FAVOR OF THE OFFENDING SPOUSE MADE IN THE WILL OF THE INNOCENT
SPOUSE SHALL BE REVOKED BY OPERATION OF LAW.

Art. 43. The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article
shall produce the following effects:
X X X
(2) THE ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY OF PROPERTY OR THE
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP, AS THE CASE MAY BE, SHALL BE
DISSOLVED AND LIQUIDATED, BUT IF EITHER SPOUSE CONTRACTED
SAID MARRIAGE IN BAD FAITH, HIS OR HER SHARE OF THE NET
PROFITS OF THE COMMUNITY PROPERTY OR CONJUGAL
PARTNERSHIP PROPERTY SHALL BE FORFEITED IN FAVOR OF
THE COMMON CHILDREN OR, IF THERE ARE NONE, THE CHILDREN
OF THE GUILTY SPOUSE BY A PREVIOUS MARRIAGE OR, IN DEFAULT
OF CHILDREN, THE INNOCENT SPOUSE; (EMPHASIS SUPPLIED)

Thus, among the effects of the decree of legal separation is that the conjugal
partnership is dissolved and liquidated and the offending spouse would have no
right to any share of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership. It is only
Alfredos share in the net profits which is forfeited in favor of Winifred. Article
102(4) of the Family Code provides that [f]or purposes of computing the net
profits subject to forfeiture in accordance with Article 43, No. (2) and 63, No. (2),
the said profits shall be the increase in value between the market value of the
community property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market
value at the time of its dissolution. Clearly, what is forfeited in favor of Winifred
is not Alfredos share in the conjugal partnership property but merely in the net
profits of the conjugal partnership property.

WITH REGARD TO IDRI, WE AGREE WITH THE COURT OF
APPEALS IN HOLDING THAT IDRI IS NOT A BUYER IN GOOD FAITH. AS
FOUND BY THE RTC MALABON AND THE COURT OF APPEALS, IDRI
HAD ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH
SHOULD IMPEL A REASONABLY CAUTIOUS PERSON TO MAKE
FURTHER INQUIRIES ABOUT THE VENDORS TITLE TO THE
PROPERTY. THE REPRESENTATIVE OF IDRI TESTIFIED THAT HE KNEW
ABOUT THE EXISTENCE OF THE NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS ON
TCT NO. 5357 AND THE LEGAL SEPARATION CASE FILED BEFORE
THE CAVITE RTC. THUS, IDRI COULD NOT FEIGN IGNORANCE OF THE
CAVITE RTC DECISION DECLARING THE PROPERTY AS CONJUGAL.

Furthermore, if IDRI made further inquiries, it would have known that the
cancellation of the notice of lis pendens was highly irregular. Under Section 77 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529,
[19]
the notice of lis pendens may be cancelled (a)
upon order of the court, or (b) by the Register of Deeds upon verified petition of
the party who caused the registration of the lis pendens. In this case,
the lis pendens was cancelled by the Register of Deeds upon the request of
Alfredo. There was no court order for the cancellation of the lis pendens. Neither
did Elvira, the party who caused the registration of the lis pendens, file a verified
petition for its cancellation.

Besides, had IDRI been more prudent before buying the property, it would
have discovered that Alfredos donation of the property to Winifred was without
the consent of Elvira. Under Article 125
[20]
of the Family Code, a conjugal property
cannot be donated by one spouse without the consent of the other spouse. Clearly,
IDRI was not a buyer in good faith.

Nevertheless, we find it proper to reinstate the order of the Malabon RTC
for the reimbursement of the P18 million paid by IDRI for the property, which was
inadvertently omitted in the dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals decision.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petitions. We AFFIRM the 7 July 2005
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74447 with the
followingMODIFICATIONS:

(1) We DELETE the portions regarding the forfeiture of
Alfredo Gozons one-half undivided share in favor of Winifred Gozon and the
grant of option to Winifred Gozonwhether or not to dispose of her undivided share
in the property; and

(2) We ORDER Alfredo Gozon and Winifred Gozon to pay Inter-
Dimensional Realty, Inc. jointly and severally the Eighteen Million Pesos
(P18,000,000) which was the amount paid by Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc. for
the property, with legal interest computed from the finality of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.



ANTONIO T. CARPIO
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE


WE CONCUR:





ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice






MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice Associate Justice






JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate
Justice

ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.



ANTONIO T. CARPIO
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE
CHAIRPERSON


CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO SECTION 13, ARTICLE VIII OF THE CONSTITUTION,
AND THE DIVISION CHAIRPERSONS ATTESTATION, I CERTIFY THAT
THE CONCLUSIONS IN THE ABOVE RESOLUTION HAD BEEN REACHED
IN CONSULTATION BEFORE THE CASE WAS ASSIGNED TO THE
WRITER OF THE OPINION OF THE COURTS DIVISION.



REYNATO S. PUNO
CHIEF JUSTICE



[1]
Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
[2]
ROLLO (G.R. NO. 169900), PP. 65-128. PENNED BY ASSOCIATE JUSTICE REMEDIOS A. SALAZAR-
FERNANDO WITH ASSOCIATE JUSTICES ROSMARI D. CARANDANG AND MONINA
AREVALO-ZENAROSA, CONCURRING.
[3]
Id. at 153-154.
[4]
Rollo (G.R. No. 169977), pp. 166-168.
[5]
Rollo (G.R. No. 169900), pp. 163-168.
[6]
Id. at 169-176.
[7]
Id. at 175-176.
[8]
Rollo (G.R. No. 169977), pp. 169-170.
[9]
Id. at 171-173.
[10]
SEE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE DATED 26 OCTOBER 1994, ROLLO (G.R. NO. 169977), PP. 174-177.
[11]
See Memorandum for Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc., rollo (G.R. No. 169900), p. 588. In their joint
memorandum, Alfredo and Winifred did not deny receipt of full payment from IDRI and in fact prays that
IDRI be considered a buyer in good faith and for value, rollo, (G.R. No. 169900), pp. 421-440.
[12]
Rollo (G.R. No. 169977), pp. 178-179.
[13]
Rollo (G.R. No. 169900), pp. 221-259.
[14]
Id. at 257-259.
[15]
Id. at 126-127.
[16]
Spouses Guiang v. CA, 353 Phil. 578 (1998).
[17]
Alinas v. Alinas, G.R. No. 158040, 14 April 2008, 551 SCRA 154, citing Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank
v. Dailo, 493 Phil. 436, 442 (2005).
[18]
Jader-Manalo v. Camaisa, 425 Phil. 346 (2002).
[19]
SEC. 77. Cancellation of lis pendens. - Before final judgment, a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled upon
order of the court after proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or
that it is not necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be registered. It may also be
cancelled by the Register of Deeds upon verified petition of the party who caused the registration thereof.
[20]
Art. 125. Neither spouse may donate any conjugal partnership property without the consent of the other.
However, either spouse may, without the consent of the other, make moderate donations from the conjugal
partnership property for charity or on occasions of family rejoicing or family distress.



FIRST DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 159017-18 March 9, 2011
PAULINO S. ASILO, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and Spouses VISITACION AND CESAR C.
BOMBASI, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 159059
VICTORIA BUETA VDA. DE COMENDADOR, IN REPRESENTATION OF DEMETRIO T.
COMENDADOR,Petitioner,
vs.
VISITACION C. BOMBASI AND CESAR C. BOMBASI, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PEREZ, J .:
At bench are appeals by certiorari
1
from the Decision
2
of the Fourth Division of the Sandiganbayan;
(1) finding Demetrio T. Comendador
3
(Mayor Comendador) and Paulino S. Asilo, Jr.
4
guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of Sec. 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019; (2) dismissing the cases against
accused Alberto S. Angeles;
5
(3) ordering the defendants Municipality of Nagcarlan, Laguna,
Demetrio T. Comendador and Paulino S. Asilo, Jr. to pay the plaintiffs now respondents Visitacion C.
Bombasi (Visitacion) and Cesar C. Bombasi damages; and (4) dismissing the cases against the
spouses Alida and Teddy Coroza
6
and Benita and Isagani Coronado.
7

The factual antecedents of the case are:
On 15 March 1978, Private Respondent Visitacions late mother Marciana Vda. De Coronado (Vda.
De Coronado) and the Municipality of Nagcarlan, Laguna (represented by the then Municipal Mayor
Crisostomo P. Manalang) entered into a lease contract whereby the Municipality allowed the use
and enjoyment of property comprising of a lot and a store located at the corner of Coronado and E.
Fernandez Sts. at Poblacion, Nagcarlan, Laguna, in favor of the respondents mother for a period of
twenty (20) years beginning on 15 March 1978 until 15 March 1998, extendible for another 20
years.
8

The lease contract provided that the late Vda. De Coronado could build a firewall on her rented
property which must be at least as high as the store; and in case of modification of the public market,
she or her heir/s would be given preferential rights.
Visitacion took over the store when her mother died sometime in 1984.
9
From then on up to January
1993, Visitacion secured the yearly Mayors permits.
10

Sometime in 1986, a fire razed the public market of Nagcarlan. Upon Visitacions request for
inspection on 15 May 1986, District Engineer Marcelino B. Gorospe (Engineer Gorospe) of the then
Ministry of Public Works and Highways,
11
Regional Office No. IV-A, found that the store of Visitacion
remained intact and stood strong. This finding of Engineer Gorospe was contested by the
Municipality of Nagcarlan.
The store of Visitacion continued to operate after the fire until 15 October 1993.
On 1 September 1993, Visitacion received a letter
12
from Mayor Comendador directing her to
demolish her store within five (5) days from notice. Attached to the letter were copies of
Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 156
13
dated 30 August 1993 and a Memorandum issued by Asst.
Provincial Prosecutor Marianito Sasondoncillo of Laguna.
The relevant provisos of the Resolution No. 156 states that:
NOW THEREFORE, be it RESOLVED, as it hereby resolved to authorize Hon. Demetrio T.
Comendador to enforce and order the Coronados to demolish the building constructed on the space
previously rented to them in order to give way for the construction of a new municipal market
building.
RESOLVED FURTHER, to authorize Demetrio T. Comendador, Honorable Mayor of Nagcarlan to
file an Unlawful Detainer Case with damages for the expenses incurred due to the delay in the
completion of the project if the Coronados continuously resists the order.
On 3 September 1993, Visitacion wrote a reply letter to Mayor Comendador saying that: (1) the
lease contract was still existing and legally binding; (2) she was willing to vacate the store as long as
same place and area would be given to her in the new public market; and (3) in case her proposals
are not acceptable to Mayor Comendador, for the latter to just file an unlawful detainer case against
her pursuant to Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 156. Pertinent portions of the letter read:
x x x With all due respect to the resolution of the Municipal Council and the opinion rendered by the
Laguna Asst. Provincial Prosecutor, it is my considered view, however, arrived at after consultation
with my legal counsel, that our existing lease contract is still legally binding and in full force and
effect. Lest I appear to be defiant, let me reiterate to you and the council that we are willing to vacate
the said building provided that a new contract is executed granting to us the same space or lot and
the same area. I believe that our proposal is most reasonable and fair under the circumstance. If you
are not amenable to the said proposal, I concur with the position taken by the Council for you to file
the appropriate action in court for unlawful detainer to enable our court to finally thresh out our
differences.
14
1avvphi1
On 15 September 1993, Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Florencio Buyser sent a letter to Visitacion
ordering her to vacate the portion of the public market she was occupying within 15 days from her
receipt of the letter; else, a court action will be filed against her.
On 11 October 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Nagcarlan, Laguna issued Resolution No. 183
authorizing Mayor Comendador to demolish the store being occupied by Visitacion using legal
means. The significant portion of the Resolution reads:
Kung kaya ang Sangguniang Bayan ay buong pagkakaisang IPINASIYA: Ang pagbibigay
kapangyarihan kay Kgg. Demetrio T. Comendador na ipagiba ang anumang istrakturang nagiging
sagabal sa mabilis at maayos na pagbabangon ng pamilihang bayan.
15

On 14 October 1993, Municipal Administrator Paulino S. Asilo, Jr. (Asilo) also sent a letter
16
to
Visitacion informing her of the impending demolition of her store the next day. Within the same day,
Visitacion wrote a reply letter
17
to Asilo, alleging that there is no legal right to demolish the store in
the absence of a court order and that the Resolutions did not sanction the demolition of her store but
only the filing of an appropriate unlawful detainer case against her. She further replied that if the
demolition will take place, appropriate administrative, criminal and civil actions will be filed against
Mayor Comendador, Asilo and all persons who will take part in the demolition.
On 15 October 1993, Mayor Comendador relying on the strength of Sangguniang Bayan Resolution
Nos. 183 and 156 authorized the demolition of the store with Asilo and Angeles supervising the
work.
Engineer Winston Cabrega (Engineer Cabrega), a licensed civil engineer, estimated the cost of the
demolished property as amounting to P437,900.00
18

On 19 August 1994, Visitacion, together with her husband Cesar Bombasi (Spouses Bombasi) filed
with the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City, Laguna a Civil Case
19
for damages with preliminary
injunction against the Municipality of Nagcarlan, Laguna, Mayor Demetrio T. Comendador, Paulino
S. Asilo, Jr., and Alberto S. Angeles. The complaint was soon after amended to include the Spouses
Benita and Isagani Coronado and Spouses Alida and Teddy Coroza as formal defendants because
they were then the occupants of the contested area.
The spouses prayed for the following disposition:
1. RESTRAINING or ENJOINING defendant Municipality and defendant Municipal Mayor
from leasing the premises subject of lease Annex "A" hereof, part of which is now occupied
by PNP Outpost and by the Municipal Collectors Office, and the equivalent adjacent area
thereof, and to cause the removal of said stalls;
2. UPHOLDING the right of plaintiffs to occupy the equivalent corner area of the leased
areas being now assigned to other persons by defendants Municipality and/or by defendant
Municipal Mayor, and to allow plaintiffs to construct their stalls thereon;
3. MAKING the injunction permanent, after trial;
4. ORDERING defendants to pay plaintiffs, jointly and severally, the following
(a) P437,900.00 for loss of building/store and other items therein;
(b) P200,000.00 for exemplary damages;
(c) P200,000.00 for moral damages;
(d) P30,.00 for attorneys fees and P700.00 for every attendance of counsel in court.
5. GRANTING further reliefs upon plaintiffs as justice and equity may warrant in the
premises.
20

Spouses Bombasi, thereafter, filed a criminal complaint
21
against Mayor Comendador, Asilo and
Angeles for violation of Sec. 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 otherwise known as the "Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act" before the Office of the Ombudsman. On 22 February 1996, an
Information
22
against Mayor Comendador, Asilo and Angeles was filed, which reads:
That on or about October 15, 1993, at Nagcarlan, Laguna, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, all public officers, accused Demetrio T.
Comendador, being then the Municipal Mayor, accused Paulino S. Asilo, Jr. being then the
Municipal Administrator and accused Alberto S. Angeles being then the Municipal Planning and
Development Coordinator, all of the Municipality of Nagcarlan, Laguna, committing the crime herein
charged in relation to, while in the performance and taking advantage of their official functions,
conspiring and confederating with each other, and with evident bad faith, manifest partiality or
through gross inexcusable negligence, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, criminally cause the
demolition of a public market stall leased by the municipal government in favor of one Visitacion
Coronado-Bombasi without legal or justifiable ground therefor, thus, causing undue injury to the
latter in the amount of PESOS: FOUR HUNDRED THIRTY SEVEN THOUSAND AND NINE
HUNDRED ONLY (P437,900.00).
Upon their arraignments, all the accused entered their separate pleas of "Not Guilty."
On 4 March 1997, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a Resolution ordering the consolidation of Civil
Case No. SP-4064 (94)
23
with Criminal Case No. 23267 pending before the Third Division pursuant
to Section 4, Presidential Decree No. 1606, which pertinently reads:
Any provision of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and the
corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall at all
times be simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determined in the same proceeding by the
Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts, the filing of the criminal action being deemed to
necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil action, and no right to reserve the filing of such civil
action separately from the criminal action shall be recognized; Provided, however, that where the
civil action had heretofore been filed separately but judgment therein has not yet been rendered, and
the criminal case is hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, said civil action
shall be transferred to the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court as the case may be, for
consolidation and joint determination with the criminal action, otherwise the separate civil action shall
be deemed abandoned.
24

During the pendency of the case, Alberto S. Angeles died on 16 November 1997. Accordingly, the
counsel of Angeles filed a motion to drop accused Angeles. On 22 September 1999, the Third
Division of Sandiganbayan issued an Order
25
DISMISSING the case against Angeles. The germane
portion of the Order reads:
In view of the submission of the death certificate of accused/defendant Alberto S. Angeles, and there
being no objection on the part of the Public Prosecutor, cases against deceased accused/defendant
Angeles only, are hereby DISMISSED.
The death of Mayor Comendador followed on 17 September 2002. As a result, the counsel of the
late Mayor filed on 3 March 2003 a Manifestation before the Sandiganbayan informing the court of
the fact of Mayor Comendadors death.
On 28 April 2003, the Sandiganbayan rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
In Criminal Case No. 23267, the court finds accused Demetrio T. Comendador and Paulino S. Asilo,
Jr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sec. 3(e) of Republic Act. No. 3019 as amended,
and in the absence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, said accused are sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 6 years and 2
months imprisonment as minimum to 10 years and 1 day as maximum.
The order of the court dated September 22, 1999 dismissing the cases against the accused Alberto
S. Angeles, who died on November 16, 1997 is hereby reiterated.
In Civil Case No. 4064, defendants Municipality of Nagcarlan, Laguna, Demetrio T. Comendador
and Paulino S. Asilo, Jr. are hereby ordered jointly and severally to pay plaintiff P437,900.00 as
actual damages for the destruction of the store; P100,000.00 as moral damages; P30,000.00 as
attorneys fees, and to pay the cost of the suit. The prayer for exemplary damages is denied as the
court found no aggravating circumstances in the commission of the crime.
In view of this courts finding that the defendant spouses Alida and Teddy Coroza are lawful
occupants of the subject market stalls from which they cannot be validly ejected without just cause,
the complaint against them is dismissed. The complaint against defendant spouses Benita and
Isagani Coronado is likewise dismissed, it appearing that they are similarly situated as the spouses
Coroza. Meanwhile, plaintiff Visitacion Bombasi is given the option to accept market space being
given to her by the municipality, subject to her payment of the appropriate rental and permit fees.
The prayer for injunctive relief is denied, the same having become moot and academic.
The compulsory counterclaim of defendant Comendador is likewise denied for lack of merit.
26

Within the same day, Asilo, through his counsel, filed a Motion for Reconsideration
27
of the Decision
alleging that there was only an error of judgment when he complied with and implemented the order
of his superior, Mayor Comendador. He likewise alleged that there is no liability when a public officer
commits in good faith an error of judgment. The Sandiganbayan, on its Resolution
28
dated 21 July
2003 denied the Motion for Reconsideration on the ground that good faith cannot be argued to
support his cause in the face of the courts finding that bad faith attended the commission of the
offense charged. The Court further explained that the invocation of compliance with an order of a
superior is of no moment for the "demolition [order] cannot be described as having the semblance of
legality inasmuch as it was issued without the authority and therefore the same was patently
illegal."
29

The counsel for the late Mayor also filed its Motion for Reconsideration
30
on 12 May 2003 alleging
that the death of the late Mayor had totally extinguished both his criminal and civil liability. The
Sandiganbayan on its Resolution
31
granted the Motion insofar as the extinction of the criminal liability
is concerned and denied the extinction of the civil liability holding that the civil action is an
independent civil action.
Hence, these Petitions for Review on Certiorari.
32

Petitioner Asilo argues that in order to sustain conviction under Sec. 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019
or "The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act," the public officer must have acted with manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross negligence. He also contended that he and his co-accused acted
in good faith in the demolition of the market and, thereby, no liability was incurred.
On the other hand, Petitioner Victoria argues that the death of Mayor Comendador prior to the
promulgation of the decision extinguished NOT ONLY Mayor Comendadors criminal liability but also
his civil liability. She also asserted good faith on the part of the accused public officials when they
performed the demolition of the market stall. Lastly, she contended that assuming arguendo that
there was indeed liability on the part of the accused public officials, the actual amount of damages
being claimed by the Spouses Bombasi has no basis and was not duly substantiated.
Liability of the accused public officials
under Republic Act No. 3019
Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 provides:
In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following
shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
x x x x
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or
judicial functions throughmanifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This
provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with
the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
The elements of the offense are as follows: (1) that the accused are public officers or private
persons charged in conspiracy with them; (2) that said public officers commit the prohibited acts
during the performance of their official duties or in relation to their public positions; (3) that they
caused undue injury to any party, whether the Government or a private party; (4) OR that such injury
is caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to the other party; and (5) that
the public officers have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faithor gross inexcusable
negligence.
33

We sustain the Sandiganbayan in its finding of criminal and civil liabilities against petitioner Asilo and
petitioner Mayor Comendador as here represented by his widow Victoria Bueta.
We agree with the Sandiganbayan that it is undisputable that the first two requisites of the criminal
offense were present at the time of the commission of the complained acts and that, as to the
remaining elements, there is sufficient amount of evidence to establish that there was an undue
injury suffered on the part of the Spouses Bombasi and that the public officials concerned acted with
evident bad faith when they performed the demolition of the market stall.
Causing undue injury to any party, including the government, could only mean actual injury or
damage which must be established by evidence.
34

In jurisprudence, "undue injury" is consistently interpreted as "actual." Undue has been defined as
"more than necessary, not proper, [or] illegal;" and injury as "any wrong or damage done to another,
either in his person, rights, reputation or property [that is, the] invasion of any legally protected
interest of another." Actual damage, in the context of these definitions, is akin to that in civil law.
35

It is evident from the records, as correctly observed by the Sandiganbayan, that Asilo and Mayor
Comendador as accused below did not deny that there was indeed damage caused the Spouses
Bombasi on account of the demolition. We affirm the finding that:
xxx. Clearly, the demolition of plaintiffs store was carried out without a court order, and
notwithstanding a restraining order which the plaintiff was able to obtain. The demolition was done in
the exercise of official duties which apparently was attended by evident bad faith, manifest partiality
or gross inexcusable negligence as there is nothing in the two (2) resolutions which gave the herein
accused the authority to demolish plaintiffs store.
"Evident bad faith" connotes not only bad judgment but also palpably and patently fraudulent and
dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill
will.
36
[It] contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive
or self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes.
37

It is quite evident in the case at bar that the accused public officials committed bad faith in
performing the demolition.
First, there can be no merit in the contention that respondents structure is a public nuisance. The
abatement of a nuisance without judicial proceedings is possible if it is nuisance per se.
38
Nuisance
per se is that which is nuisance at all times and under any circumstance, regardless of location and
surroundings.
39
In this case, the market stall cannot be considered as a nuisance per se because as
found out by the Court, the buildings had not been affected by the 1986 fire. This finding was
certified to by Supervising Civil Engineer Wilfredo A. Sambrano of the Laguna District Engineer
Office.
40
To quote:
An inspection has been made on the building (a commercial establishment) cited above and found
out the following:
1. It is a two-storey building, sketch of which is attached.
2. It is located within the market site.
3. The building has not been affected by the recent fire.
4. The concrete wall[s] does not even show signs of being exposed to fire.
41

Second, the Sangguniang Bayan resolutions are not enough to justify demolition. Unlike its
predecessor law,
42
the present Local Government Code
43
does not expressly provide for the
abatement of nuisance.
44
And even assuming that the power to abate nuisance is provided for by the
present code, the accused public officials were under the facts of this case, still devoid of any power
to demolish the store. A closer look at the contested resolutions reveals that Mayor Comendador
was only authorized to file an unlawful detainer case in case of resistance to obey the order or to
demolish the building using legal means. Clearly, the act of demolition without legal order in this
case was not among those provided by the resolutions, as indeed, it is a legally impossible
provision.
Furthermore, the Municipality of Nagcarlan, Laguna, as represented by the then Mayor
Comendador, was placed in estoppel after it granted yearly business permits
45
in favor of the
Spouses Bombasi. Art. 1431 of the New Civil Code provides that, through estoppel, an admission or
representation is rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved
as against the person relying thereon. The representation made by the municipality that the Spouses
Bombasi had the right to continuously operate its store binds the municipality. It is utterly unjust for
the Municipality to receive the benefits of the store operation and later on claim the illegality of the
business.
The bad faith of the petitioners completes the elements of the criminal offense of violation of Sec.
3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019. The same bad faith serves as the source of the civil liability of Asilo,
Angeles, and Mayor Comendador.
It must be noted that when Angeles died on 16 November 1997, a motion to drop him as an accused
was filed by his counsel with no objection on the part of the prosecution. The Sandiganbayan acted
favorably on the motion and issued an Order dismissing all the cases filed against Angeles. On the
other hand, when Mayor Comendador died and an adverse decision was rendered against him
which resulted in the filing of a motion for reconsideration by Mayor Comendadors counsel, the
prosecution opposed the Motion specifying the ground that the civil liability did not arise from delict,
hence, survived the death of the accused. The Sandiganbayan upheld the opposition of the
prosecution which disposition was not appealed.
We note, first off, that the death of Angeles and of Mayor Comendador during the pendency of the
case extinguished their criminal liabilities.
We now hold, as did the Sandiganbayan that the civil liability of Mayor Comendador survived his
death; and that of Angeles could have likewise survived had it not been for the fact that the
resolution of the Sandiganbayan that his death extinguished the civil liability was not questioned and
lapsed into finality.
We laid down the following guidelines in People v. Bayotas:
46

Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as
the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of
the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly
arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso
strictiore."
Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of (the) accused, if the same
may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code
enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the
same act or omission:
a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) Acts or omissions punished by law; and
e) Quasi-delicts. (Emphasis ours)
Where the civil liability survives, as explained [above], an action for recovery therefore may be
pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action
47
and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either
against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of
obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.
Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action
by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its
extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the
statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal
case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the New Civil Code, which should thereby avoid
any apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription.
Upon death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is extinguished
inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action instituted therein
for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal.
48

The New Civil Code provisions under the Chapter, Human Relations, were cited by the prosecution
to substantiate its argument that the civil action based therein is an independent one, thus, will stand
despite the death of the accused during the pendency of the case.
On the other hand, the defense invoked Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended by
Republic Act No. 8249, in support of its argument that the civil action was dependent upon the
criminal action, thus, was extinguished upon the death of the accused. The law provides that:
Any provision of law or the Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and the
corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall at all
times be simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determined in the same proceeding by, the
Sandiganbayan, the filing of the criminal action being deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of
the civil action, and no right to reserve the filing of such action shall be recognized. (Emphasis ours)
We agree with the prosecution.
Death of Mayor Comendador during the pendency of the case could have extinguished the civil
liability if the same arose directly from the crime committed. However, in this case, the civil liability is
based on another source of obligation, the law on human relations.
49
The pertinent articles follow:
Art. 31 of the Civil Code states:
When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as
a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of
the result of the latter.
And, Art. 32(6) states:
Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats,
violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another
person shall be liable to the latter for damages:
(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;
x x x x
In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the defendant's act or omission
constitutes a criminal offense, the aggrieved party has a right to commence an entirely separate and
distinct civil action for damages, and for other relief. Such civil action shall proceed independently of
any criminal prosecution (if the latter be instituted), and may be proved by a preponderance of
evidence.
As held in Aberca v. Ver:
It is obvious that the purpose of the above codal provision [Art. 32 of the New Civil Code] is to
provide a sanction to the deeply cherished rights and freedoms enshrined in the Constitution. Its
message is clear; no man may seek to violate those sacred rights with impunity. x x x.
50

Indeed, the basic facts of this case point squarely to the applicability of the law on human relations.
First, the complaint for civil liability was filed way AHEAD of the information on the Anti-Graft Law.
And, the complaint for damages specifically invoked defendant Mayor Comendadors violation of
plaintiffs right to due process. Thus:
x x x x
In causing or doing the forcible demolition of the store in question, the individual natural defendants
did not only act with grave abuse of authority but usurped a power which belongs to our courts of
justice; such actuations were done with malice or in bad faith and constitute an invasion of the
property rights of plaintiff(s) without due process of law.
x x x x
The Court is in one with the prosecution that there was a violation of the right to private property of
the Spouses Bombasi. The accused public officials should have accorded the spouses the due
process of law guaranteed by the Constitution and New Civil Code. The Sangguniang Bayan
Resolutions as asserted by the defense will not, as already shown, justify demolition of the store
without court order. This Court in a number of decisions
51
held that even if there is already a writ of
execution, there must still be a need for a special order for the purpose of demolition issued by the
court before the officer in charge can destroy, demolish or remove improvements over the contested
property.
52
The pertinent provisions are the following:
Before the removal of an improvement must take place, there must be a special order, hearing and
reasonable notice to remove. Section 10(d), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides:
(d) Removal of improvements on property subject of execution. When the property subject of
execution contains improvements constructed or planted by the judgment obligor or his agent, the
officer shall not destroy, demolish or remove said improvements except upon special order of the
court, issued upon motion of the judgment obligee after due hearing and after the former has failed
to remove the same within a reasonable time fixed by the court.
The above-stated rule is clear and needs no interpretation. If demolition is necessary, there must be
a hearing on the motion filed and with due notices to the parties for the issuance of a special order of
demolition.
53

This special need for a court order even if an ejectment case has successfully been litigated,
underscores the independent basis for civil liability, in this case, where no case was even filed by the
municipality.
The requirement of a special order of demolition is based on the rudiments of justice and fair play. It
frowns upon arbitrariness and oppressive conduct in the execution of an otherwise legitimate act. It
is an amplification of the provision of the Civil Code that every person must, in the exercise of his
rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith.
54

Notably, the fact that a separate civil action precisely based on due process violations was filed even
ahead of the criminal case, is complemented by the fact that the deceased plaintiff Comendador was
substituted by his widow, herein petitioner Victoria who specified in her petition that she has
"substituted him as petitioner in the above captioned case." Section 1, Rule III of the 1985 Rules in
Criminal Procedure mentioned in Bayotas is, therefore, not applicable. Truly, the Sandiganbayan
was correct when it maintained the separate docketing of the civil and criminal cases before it
although their consolidation was erroneously based on Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606
which deals with civil liability "arising from the offense charged."
We must, however, correct the amount of damages awarded to the Spouses Bombasi.
To seek recovery of actual damages, it is necessary to prove the actual amount of loss with a
reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence
obtainable.
55
In this case, the Court finds that the only evidence presented to prove the actual
damages incurred was the itemized list of damaged and lost items
56
prepared by Engineer Cabrega,
an engineer commissioned by the Spouses Bombasi to estimate the costs.
As held by this Court in Marikina Auto Line Transport Corporation v. People of the Philippines,
57

x x x [W]e agree with the contention of petitioners that respondents failed to prove that the damages
to the terrace caused by the incident amounted to P100,000.00. The only evidence adduced by
respondents to prove actual damages claimed by private respondent were the summary
computation of damage made by Engr. Jesus R. Regal, Jr. amounting to P171,088.46 and the
receipt issued by the BB Construction and Steel Fabricator to private respondent for P35,000.00
representing cost for carpentry works, masonry, welding, and electrical works. Respondents failed to
present Regal to testify on his estimation. In its five-page decision, the trial court
awardedP150,000.00 as actual damages to private respondent but failed to state the factual basis
for such award. Indeed, the trial court merely declared in the decretal portion of its decision that the
"sum of P150,000.00 as reasonable compensation sustained by plaintiff for her damaged
apartment." The appellate court, for its part, failed to explain how it arrived at the amount
of P100,000.00 in its three-page decision. Thus, the appellate court merely declared:
With respect to the civil liability of the appellants, they contend that there was no urgent necessity to
completely demolish the apartment in question considering the nature of the damages sustained as
a result of the accident. Consequently, appellants continue, the award of P150,000.00 as
compensation sustained by the plaintiff-appellee for her damaged apartment is an unconscionable
amount.
Further, in one case,
58
this Court held that the amount claimed by the respondent-claimants witness
as to the actual amount of damages "should be admitted with extreme caution considering that,
because it was a bare assertion, it should be supported by independent evidence." The Court further
said that whatever claim the respondent witness would allege must be appreciated in consideration
of his particular self-interest.
59
There must still be a need for the examination of the documentary
evidence presented by the claimants to support its claim with regard to the actual amount of
damages.
The price quotation made by Engineer Cabrega presented as an exhibit
60
partakes of the nature of
hearsay evidence considering that the person who issued them was not presented as a
witness.
61
Any evidence, whether oral or documentary, is hearsay if its probative value is not based
on the personal knowledge of the witness but on the knowledge of another person who is not on the
witness stand. Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, has no probative value unless the
proponent can show that the evidence falls within the exceptions to the hearsay evidence
rule.
62
Further, exhibits do not fall under any of the exceptions provided under Sections 37 to 47 of
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
Though there is no sufficient evidence to award the actual damages claimed, this Court grants
temperate damages for P200,000.00 in view of the loss suffered by the Spouses Bombasi.
Temperate damages are awarded in accordance with Art. 2224 of the New Civil Code when the
court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the
case, be proven with certainty. The amount of temperate or moderated damages is usually left to the
discretion of the courts but the same should be reasonable, bearing in mind that the temperate
damages should be more than nominal but less than compensatory.
63
Without a doubt, the Spouses
Bombasi suffered some form of pecuniary loss in the impairment of their store. Based on the record
of the case,
64
the demolished store was housed on a two-story building located at the markets
commercial area and its concrete walls remained strong and not affected by the fire. However, due
to the failure of the Spouses Bombasi to prove the exact amount of damage in accordance with the
Rules of Evidence,
65
this court finds thatP200,000.00 is the amount just and reasonable under the
circumstances.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision of the Sandiganbayan
dated 28 April 2003 is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. The Court affirms the decision
finding the accused Paulino S. Asilo, Jr. and Demetrio T. Comendador guilty of violating Section 3(e)
of Republic Act No. 3019. We declare the finality of the dismissal of both the criminal and civil cases
against Alberto S. Angeles as the same was not appealed. In view of the death of Demetrio T.
Comendador pending trial, his criminal liability is extinguished; but his civil liability survives. The
Municipality of Nagcarlan, Paulino Asilo and Demetrio T. Comendador, as substituted by Victoria
Bueta Vda. De Comendador, are hereby declared solidarily liable to the Spouses Bombasi for
temperate damages in the amount of P200,000.00 and moral damages in the amount
of P100,000.00.
Costs against the petitioners-appellants.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson
CONCHITA CAPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice


Footnotes
1
Additional membeMANUEL G. ALMELOR, G.R. No. 179620
Petitioner,
Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
- versus - Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
THE HON. REGIONAL TRIAL REYES, JJ.
COURT OF LAS PIAS CITY,
BRANCH 254, and Promulgated:
LEONIDA T. ALMELOR,
Respondent. August 26, 2008

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x


D E C I S I O N


REYES, R.T., J .:


MARRIAGE, in its totality, involves the spouses right to the community of
their whole lives. It likewise involves a true intertwining of personalities.
[1]


This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision
[2]
of the Court of
Appeals (CA) denying the petition for annulment of judgment and affirming in
toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Las Pias, Branch 254. The
CA dismissed outright the Rule 47 petition for being the wrong remedy.

The Facts

Petitioner Manuel G. Almelor (Manuel) and respondent Leonida
Trinidad (Leonida) were married on January 29, 1989 at the Manila
Cathedral.
[3]
Their union bore threechildren: (1) Maria Paulina Corinne, born
on October 20, 1989; (2) Napoleon Manuel, born on August 9, 1991; and (3)
Manuel Homer, born on July 4, 1994.
[4]
Manuel and Leonida are both medical
practitioners, an anesthesiologist and a pediatrician, respectively.
[5]


After eleven (11) years of marriage, Leonida filed a petition with
the RTC in Las Pias City to annul their marriage on the ground that Manuel was
psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations. The case,
docketed as LP-00-0132 was raffled off to Branch 254.

During the trial, Leonida testified that she first met Manuel in 1981 at the
San Lazaro Hospital where they worked as medical student clerks. At that time,
she regarded Manuel as a very thoughtful person who got along well with other
people. They soon became sweethearts. Three years after, they got married.
[6]


Leonida averred that Manuels kind and gentle demeanor did not last
long. In the public eye, Manuel was the picture of a perfect husband and
father. This was not the case in his private life. At home, Leonida described
Manuel as a harsh disciplinarian, unreasonably meticulous, easily
angered. Manuels unreasonable way of imposing discipline on their children was
the cause of their frequent fights as a couple.
[7]
Leonida complained that this was
in stark contrast to the alleged lavish affection Manuel has for his
mother. Manuels deep attachment to his mother and his dependence on her
decision-making were incomprehensible to Leonida.
[8]


Further adding to her woes was his concealment to her of his
homosexuality. Her suspicions were first aroused when she noticed Manuels
peculiar closeness to his male companions. For instance, she caught him in an
indiscreet telephone conversation manifesting his affection for a male
caller.
[9]
She also found several pornographic homosexual materials in his
possession.
[10]
Her worse fears were confirmed when she saw Manuel kissed
another man on the lips. The man was a certain Dr. Nogales.
[11]
When she
confronted Manuel, he denied everything. At this point, Leonida took her children
and left their conjugal abode. Since then, Manuel stopped giving support to their
children.
[12]


Dr. Valentina del Fonso Garcia, a clinical psychologist, was presented to
prove Leonidas claim. Dr. del Fonso Garcia testified that she conducted
evaluative interviews and a battery of psychiatric tests on Leonida. She also had a
one-time interview with Manuel and face-to-face interviews with Ma. Paulina
Corrinne (the eldest child).
[13]
Sheconcluded that Manuel is psychologically
incapacitated.
[14]
Such incapacity is marked by antecedence; it existed even before
the marriage and appeared to be incurable.

Manuel, for his part, admitted that he and Leonida had some petty arguments
here and there. He, however, maintained that their marital relationship was
generally harmonious. The petition for annulment filed by Leonida came as a
surprise to him.

Manuel countered that the true cause of Leonidas hostility against him was
their professional rivalry. It began when he refused to heed the
memorandum
[15]
released by Christ the King Hospital. The memorandum ordered
him to desist from converting his own lying-in clinic to a primary or secondary
hospital.
[16]
Leonidas family owns Christ the King Hospital which is situated in
the same subdivision as Manuels clinic and residence.
[17]
In other words, he and
her family have competing or rival hospitals in the same vicinity.

Manuel belied her allegation that he was a cruel father
to their children. He denied maltreating them. At most, he only imposed the
necessary discipline on the children.

He also defended his show of affection for his mother. He said there was
nothing wrong for him to return the love and affection of the person who reared
and looked after him and his siblings. This is especially apt now that his mother is
in her twilight years.
[18]
Manuel pointed out that Leonida found fault in this
otherwise healthy relationship because of her very jealous and possessive nature.
[19]


This same overly jealous behavior of Leonida drove Manuel to avoid
the company of female friends. He wanted to avoid any further misunderstanding
with his wife. But, Leonida instead conjured up stories about his sexual
preference. She also fabricated tales about pornographic materials found in his
possession to cast doubt on his masculinity.
[20]



To corroborate his version, he presented his brother, Jesus G.
Almelor. Jesus narrated that he usually stayed at Manuels house during his
weekly trips to Manila from IrigaCity. He was a witness to the generally
harmonious relationship between his brother Manuel and sister-in-
law, Leonida. True, they had some quarrels typical of a husband and wife
relationship. But there was nothing similar to what Leonida described in her
testimony.
[21]


Jesus further testified that he was with his brother on the day Leonida
allegedly saw Manuel kissed another man. He denied that such an incident
occurred. On that particular date,
[22]
he and Manuel went straight home from a trip
to Bicol. There was no other person with them at that time, except their driver.
[23]


Manuel expressed his intention to refute Dr. del Fonso Garcias findings by
presenting his own expert witness. However, no psychiatrist was presented.

RTC Disposition

By decision dated November 25, 2005, the RTC granted the petition for
annulment, with the following disposition:

WHEREFORE, premised on the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Declaring the marriage contracted by herein parties on 29
January 1989 and all its effects under the law null and void
from the beginning;

2. Dissolving the regime of community property between the
same parties with forfeiture of defendants share thereon in
favor of the same parties children whose
legal custody is awarded to plaintiff with visitorial right
afforded to defendant;

3. Ordering the defendant to give monthly financial support to all
the children; and

4. Pursuant to the provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC:

a. Directing the Branch Clerk of this Court to enter this
Judgment upon its finality in the Book of Entry of
Judgment and to issue an Entry of Judgment in
accordance thereto; and

b. Directing the Local Civil Registrars of Las Pias City
and Manila City to cause the registration of the said
Entry of Judgment in their respective Books of
Marriages.

Upon compliance, a decree of nullity of marriage shall be issued.

SO ORDERED.
[24]
(Emphasis supplied)

The trial court nullified the marriage, not on the ground of Article 36, but
Article 45 of the Family Code. It ratiocinated:

x x x a careful evaluation and in-depth analysis of the surrounding
circumstances of the allegations in the complaint and of the evidence presented in
support thereof (sic) reveals that in this case (sic) there is more than meets the
eyes (sic).

Both legally and biologically, homosexuality x x x is, indeed, generally
incompatible with hetero sexual marriage. This is reason enough that in this
jurisdiction (sic) the law recognizes marriage as a special contract exclusively
only between a man and a woman x x x and thus when homosexuality has
trespassed into marriage, the same law provides ample remedies to correct the
situation [Article 45(3) in relation to Article 46(4) or Article 55, par. 6, Family
Code]. This is of course in recognition of the biological fact that no matter how a
man cheats himself that he is not a homosexual and forces himself to live a
normal heterosexual life, there will surely come a time when his true sexual
preference as a homosexual shall prevail in haunting him and thus jeopardizing
the solidity, honor, and welfare of his own family.
[25]


Manuel filed a notice of appeal which was, however, denied due
course. Undaunted, he filed a petition for annulment of judgment with the CA.
[26]


Manuel contended that the assailed decision was issued in excess of the
lower courts jurisdiction; that it had no jurisdiction to dissolve the absolute
community of property and forfeit his conjugal share in favor of his children.

CA Disposition

On July 31, 2007, the CA denied the petition, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, the present Petition for Annulment of Judgment is hereby
DENIED. The Court AFFIRMS in toto the Decision (dated November 25, 2005)
of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 254), in Las Pias City, in Civil Case No. LP-
00-0132. No costs.
[27]


The CA stated that petitioner pursued the wrong remedy by filing the
extraordinary remedy of petition for annulment of judgment. Said the appellate
court:

It is obvious that the petitioner is questioning the propriety of the decision
rendered by the lower Court. But the remedy assuming there was a mistake is not
a Petition for Annulment of Judgment but an ordinary appeal. An error of
judgment may be reversed or corrected only by appeal.

What petitioner is ascribing is an error of judgment, not of jurisdiction,
which is properly the subject of an ordinary appeal.

In short, petitioner admits the jurisdiction of the lower court but he claims
excess in the exercise thereof. Excess assuming there was is not covered by
Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The Rule refers the lack of
jurisdiction and not the exercise thereof.
[28]


Issues

Petitioner Manuel takes the present recourse via Rule 45, assigning to the
CA the following errors:


I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT TREATING THE
PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT AS A PETITION FOR
REVIEW IN VIEW OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ISSUES
INVOLVED AND IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE;

II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE
DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT AS REGARDS THE ORDER
DECLARING THE MARRIAGE AS NULL ANDVOID ON THE GROUND OF
PETITIONERS PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY;

III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE
DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT AS REGARDS THE ORDER TO
FORFEIT THE SHARE OF PETITIONER IN HIS SHARE OF THE
CONJUGAL ASSETS.
[29]


Our Ruling

I . The stringent rules of procedures may be relaxed to serve the demands of
substantial justice and in the Courts exercise of equity jurisdiction.

Generally, an appeal taken either to the Supreme Court or the CA by the
wrong or inappropriate mode shall be dismissed.
[30]
This is to prevent the party
from benefiting from ones neglect and mistakes. However, like most rules, it
carries certain exceptions. After all, the ultimate purpose of all rules of
procedures is to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as possible.
[31]


Annulment of judgment under Rule 47 is a last remedy. It can not be
resorted to if the ordinary remedies are available or no longer available through no
fault of petitioner.
[32]
However, in Buenaflor v. Court of Appeals,
[33]
this Court
clarified the proper appreciation for technical rules of procedure, in this wise:

Rules of procedures are intended to promote, not to defeat,
substantial justice and, therefore, they should not be applied in a very rigid
and technical sense. The exception is that while the Rules are liberally
construed, the provisions with respect to the rules on the manner and periods
for perfecting appeals are strictly applied. As an exception to the exception,
these rules have sometimes been relaxed on equitable considerations. Also, in
some cases the Supreme Court has given due course to an appeal perfected out of
time where a stringent application of the rules would have denied it, but only
when to do so would serve the demands of substantial justice and in the exercise
of equity jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
[34]
(Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

For reasons of justice and equity, this Court has allowed exceptions to the
stringent rules governing appeals.
[35]
It has, in the past, refused to sacrifice justice
for technicality.
[36]


After discovering the palpable error of his petition, Manuel seeks the
indulgence of this Court to consider his petition before the CA instead as a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

A perusal of the said petition reveals that Manuel imputed grave abuse of
discretion to the lower court for annulling his marriage on account of his alleged
homosexuality. This is not the first time that this Court is faced with a similar
situation. In Nerves v. Civil Service Commission,
[37]
petitioner Delia R. Nerves
elevated to the CA a Civil Service Commission (CSC) decision suspending her for
six (6) months. The CSC ruled Nerves, a public school teacher, is deemed to have
already served her six-month suspensionduring the pendency of the
case. Nevertheless, she is ordered reinstated without back wages. On appeal,
Nerves stated in her petition, inter alia:

1. This is a petition for certiorari filed pursuant to Article IX-A, Section 7 of
the Constitution of the Philippines and under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

2. But per Supreme Court Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 (Revised
Circular No. 1-91) petitioner is filing the instant petition with this Honorable
Court instead of the Supreme Court.
[38]
(Underscoring supplied)

The CA dismissed Nerves petition for certiorari for being the wrong
remedy or the inappropriate mode of appeal.
[39]
The CA opined that under the
Supreme Court Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 x x x appeals from
judgments or final orders or resolutions of CSC is by a petition for review.
[40]


This Court granted Nerves petition and held that she had substantially
complied with the Administrative Circular. The Court stated:

That it was erroneously labeled as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court is only a minor procedural lapse, not fatal to the appeal. x x
x

More importantly, the appeal on its face appears to be impressed with
merit. Hence, the Court of Appeals should have overlooked the insubstantial
defects of the petition x x x in order to do justice to the parties concerned. There
is, indeed, nothing sacrosanct about procedural rules, which should be liberally
construed in order to promote their object and assist the parties in obtaining just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action or proceeding. As it has
been said, where the rigid application of the rules would frustrate substantial
justice, or bar the vindication of a legitimate grievance, the courts are justified in
exempting a particular case from the operation of the rules.
[41]
(Underscoring
supplied)

Similarly, in the more recent case of Tan v. Dumarpa,
[42]
petitioner Joy
G. Tan availed of a wrong remedy by filing a petition for review
on certiorari instead of a motion for new trial or an ordinary appeal. In the interest
of justice, this Court considered the petition, pro hac vice, as a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

This Court found that based on Tans allegations, the trial court prima
facie committed grave abuse of discretion in rendering a judgment by default. If
uncorrected, it will cause petitioner great injustice. The Court elucidated in this
wise:

Indeed, where as here, there is a strong showing that grave miscarriage of
justice would result from the strict application of the Rules, we will not hesitate to
relax the same in the interest of substantial justice.
[43]
(Underscoring supplied)

Measured by the foregoing yardstick, justice will be better served by giving
due course to the present petition and treating petitioners CA petition as
one for certiorariunder Rule 65, considering that what is at stake is the validity or
non-validity of a
marriage.

In Salazar v. Court of Appeals,
[44]
citing Labad v. University of Southeastern
Philippines, this Court reiterated:

x x x The dismissal of appeals on purely technical grounds is frowned
upon. While the right to appeal is a statutory, not a natural right, nonetheless it is
an essential part of our judicial system and courts should proceed with caution so
as not to deprive a party of the right to appeal, but rather, ensure that every party-
litigant has the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his
cause, free from the constraints of technicalities.
[45]


Indeed, it is far better and more prudent for a court to excuse a technical
lapse and afford the parties a review of the case on the merits to attain the ends of
justice.
[46]



Furthermore, it was the negligence and incompetence of Manuels
counsel that prejudiced his right to appeal. His counsel, Atty. Christine
Dugenio, repeatedly availed of inappropriate remedies. After the denial of her
notice of appeal, she failed to move for reconsideration or new trial at the first
instance. She also erroneously filed a petition for annulment of judgment rather
than pursue an ordinary appeal.

These manifest errors were clearly indicative of counsels
incompetence. These gravely worked to the detriment of Manuels appeal. True it
is that the negligence of counsel binds the client. Still, this Court has recognized
certain exceptions: (1) where reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the
client of due process of law; (2) when its application will result in outright
deprivation of the clients liberty and property; or (3) where the interest of justice
so require.
[47]


The negligence of Manuels counsel falls under
the exceptions. Ultimately, the reckless or gross negligence of petitioners former
counsel led to the loss of his right to appeal. He should not be made to suffer for
his counsels grave mistakes. Higher interests of justice and equity demand
that he be allowed to ventilate his case in a higher court.

In Apex Mining, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
[48]
this Court explained thus:

It is settled that the negligence of counsel binds the client. This is based on
the rule that any act performed by a counsel within the scope of his general or
implied authority is regarded as an act of his client. However, where counsel is
guilty of gross ignorance, negligence and dereliction of duty, which resulted in the
clients being held liable for damages in a damage suit, the client is deprived of his
day in court and the judgment may be set aside on such ground. In the instant case,
higher interests of justice and equity demand that petitioners be allowed to present
evidence on their defense. Petitioners may not be made to suffer for the lawyers
mistakes. This Court will always be disposed to grant relief to parties
aggrieved by perfidy, fraud, reckless inattention and downright incompetence
of lawyers, which has the consequence of depriving their clients, of their day in
court.
[49]
(Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, this Court has the power to except a particular case from the
operation of the rule whenever the demands of justice require it. With more
conviction should it wield such power in a case involving the sacrosanct institution
of marriage. This Court is guided with the thrust of giving a party the fullest
opportunity to establish the merits of ones action.
[50]


The client was likewise spared from counsels negligence
in Government Service Insurance System v. Bengson Commercial Buildings,
Inc.
[51]
and Ancheta v. Guersey-Dalaygon.
[52]
Said the Court in Bengson:

But if under the circumstances of the case, the rule deserts its proper office
as an aid to justice and becomes a great hindrance and chief enemy, its rigors must
be relaxed to admit exceptions thereto and to prevent a miscarriage of justice. In
other words, the court has the power to except a particular case from the operation
of the rule whenever the purposes of justice require it.
[53]


I I . Concealment of homosexuality is the proper ground to annul a marriage,
not homosexuality per se.

Manuel is a desperate man determined to salvage what remains of his
marriage. Persistent in his quest, he fought back all the heavy accusations of
incapacity, cruelty, and doubted masculinity thrown at him.

The trial court declared that Leonidas petition for nullity had no basis at all
because the supporting grounds relied upon can not legally make a case under
Article 36 of the Family Code. It went further by citing Republic v. Molina:
[54]



Indeed, mere allegations of conflicting personalities, irreconcilable
differences, incessant quarrels and/or beatings, unpredictable mood swings,
infidelities, vices, abandonment, and difficulty, neglect, or failure in the
performance of some marital obligations do not suffice to establish psychological
incapacity.
[55]


If so, the lower court should have dismissed outright the petition for not
meeting the guidelines set in Molina. What Leonida attempted to demonstrate
were Manuelshomosexual tendencies by citing overt acts generally predominant
among homosexual individuals.
[56]
She wanted to prove that the perceived
homosexuality rendered Manuelincapable of fulfilling the essential marital
obligations.

But instead of dismissing the petition, the trial court nullified the marriage
between Manuel and Leonida on the ground of vitiated consent by virtue of
fraud. In support of its conclusion, the lower court reasoned out:

As insinuated by the State (p. 75, TSN, 15 December 2003), when there is
smoke surely there is fire. Although vehemently denied by defendant, there is
preponderant evidence enough to establish with certainty that defendant is really a
homosexual. This is the fact that can be deduced from the totality of the marriage
life scenario of herein parties.

Before his marriage, defendant knew very well that people around him
even including his own close friends doubted his true sexual preference (TSN,
pp. 35-36, 13 December 2000; pp. 73-75, 15 December 2003). After receiving
many forewarnings, plaintiff told defendant about the rumor she heard but
defendant did not do anything to prove to the whole world once and for all the
truth of all his denials. Defendant threatened to sue those people but nothing
happened after that. There may have been more important matters to attend to
than to waste time and effort filing cases against and be effected by these people
and so, putting more premiums on defendants denials, plaintiff just the same
married him. Reasons upon reasons may be advanced to either exculpate or nail
to the cross defendant for his act of initially concealing his homosexuality to
plaintiff, but in the end, only one thing is certain even during his marriage with
plaintiff, the smoke of doubt about his real preference continued and even got
thicker, reason why obviously defendant failed to establish a happy and solid
family; and in so failing, plaintiff and their children became his innocent and
unwilling victims.




Yes, there is nothing untoward of a man if, like herein defendant, he is
meticulous over even small details in the house (sic) like wrongly folded bed
sheets, etc. or if a man is more authoritative in knowing what clothes or jewelry
shall fit his wife (pp. 77-81, TSN, 15 December 2003); but these admissions of
defendant taken in the light of evidence presented apparently showing that he had
extra fondness of his male friends (sic) to the extent that twice on separate
occasions (pp. 4-7, TSN, 14 February 2001) he was allegedly seen by plaintiff
kissing another man lips-to-lips plus the homosexual magazines and tapes
likewise allegedly discovered underneath his bed (Exhibits L and M), the
doubt as to his real sex identity becomes stronger. The accusation of plaintiff
versus thereof of defendant may be the name of the game in this case; but the
simple reason of professional rivalry advanced by the defendant is certainly not
enough to justify and obscure the question why plaintiff should accuse him of
such a very untoward infidelity at the expense and humiliation of their children
and family as a whole.
[57]


Evidently, no sufficient proof was presented to substantiate the allegations
that Manuel is a homosexual and that he concealed this to Leonida at the time of
their marriage. The lower court considered the public perception of Manuels
sexual preference without the corroboration of witnesses. Also, it took cognizance
of Manuels peculiarities and interpreted it against his sexuality.

Even assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that Manuel is a homosexual, the lower
court cannot appreciate it as a ground to annul his marriage with Leonida. The law
is clear amarriage may be annulled when the consent of either party was obtained
by fraud,
[58]
such as concealment of homosexuality.
[59]
Nowhere in
the said decision was it proven by preponderance of evidence that Manuel was a
homosexual at the onset of his marriage and that he deliberately hid such fact to his
wife.
[60]
It is the concealment of homosexuality, and not homosexuality per se, that
vitiates the consent of the innocent party. Such concealment presupposes bad faith
and intent to defraud the other party in giving consent to the marriage.



Consent is an essential requisite of a valid marriage. To be valid, it must be
freely given by both parties. An allegation of vitiated consent must be proven by
preponderance of evidence. The Family Code has enumerated an exclusive list of
circumstances
[61]
constituting fraud. Homosexuality per se is not among those
cited, but its concealment.

This distinction becomes more apparent when we go over the
deliberations
[62]
of the Committees on the Civil Code and Family Law, to wit:

Justice Caguioa remarked that this ground should be eliminated in the
provision on the grounds for legal separation. Dean Gupit, however, pointed out
that in Article 46, they are talking only of concealment, while in the article on
legal separation, there is actuality. Judge Diy added that in legal separation, the
ground existed after the marriage, while in Article 46, the ground existed at the time
of the marriage. Justice Reyes suggested that, for clarity, they add the phrase
existing at the time of the marriage at the end of subparagraph (4). The
Committee approved the suggestion.
[63]


To reiterate, homosexuality per se is only a ground for legal separation. It is
its concealment that serves as a valid ground to annul a marriage.
[64]
Concealment
in this case is not simply a blanket denial, but one that is constitutive of fraud. It is
this fundamental element that respondent failed to prove.

In the United States, homosexuality has been considered as a basis for
divorce. It indicates that questions of sexual identity strike so deeply at one of the
basic elements of marriage, which is the exclusive sexual bond between the
spouses.
[65]
In Crutcher v. Crutcher,
[66]
the Court held:

Unnatural practices of the kind charged here are an infamous indignity to
the wife, and which would make the marriage relation so revolting to her that it
would become impossible for her to discharge the duties of a wife, and would
defeat the whole purpose of the relation. In the natural course of things, they would
cause mental suffering to the extent of affecting her health.
[67]


However, although there may be similar sentiments here in the Philippines,
the legal overtones are significantly different. Divorce is not recognized in the
country. Homosexuality and its alleged incompatibility to a healthy heterosexual
life are not sanctioned as grounds to sever the marriage bond in our
jurisdiction. At most, it is only a ground to separate from bed and board.

What was proven in the hearings a quo was a relatively blissful marital
union for more than eleven (11) years, which produced three (3) children. The
burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage rests on Leonida. Sadly, she
failed to discharge this onus.

The same failure to prove fraud which purportedly resulted to a vitiated
marital consent was found in Villanueva v. Court of Appeals.
[68]
In Villanueva,
instead of proving vitiation of consent, appellant resorted to baseless portrayals of
his wife as a perpetrator of fraudulent schemes. Said the Court:

Factual findings of the Court of Appeals, especially if they coincide with
those of the trial court, as in the instant case, are generally binding on this
Court. We affirm the findings of the Court of Appeals that petitioner freely and
voluntarily married private respondent and that no threats or intimidation, duress
or violence compelled him to do so, thus

Appellant anchored his prayer for the annulment of his marriage on the
ground that he did not freely consent to be married to the appellee. He cited
several incidents that created on his mind a reasonable and well-grounded fear of
an imminent and grave danger to his life and safety. x x x

The Court is not convinced that appellants apprehension of danger to his
person is so overwhelming as to deprive him of the will to enter voluntarily to a
contract of marriage. It is not disputed that at the time he was allegedly being
harassed, appellant worked as a security guard in a bank. Given the rudiments of
self-defense, or, at the very least, the proper way to keep himself out of harms
way. x x x

Appellant also invoked fraud to annul his marriage, as he was made to
believe by appellee that the latter was pregnant with his child when they were
married. Appellants excuse that he could not have impregnated the appellee
because he did not have an erection during their tryst is flimsy at best, and an
outright lie at worst. The complaint is bereft of any reference to his inability to
copulate with the appellee. x x x

x x x x

x x x The failure to cohabit becomes relevant only if it arises as a result of
the perpetration of any of the grounds for annulling the marriage, such as lack of
parental consent, insanity, fraud, intimidation, or undue influence x x x. Since the
appellant failed to justify his failure to cohabit with the appellee on any of these
grounds, the validity of his marriage must be upheld.
[69]


Verily, the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion, not only by
solely taking into account petitioners homosexuality per se and not its
concealment, but by declaring the marriage void from its existence.

This Court is mindful of the constitutional policy to protect and strengthen
the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the
foundation of the family.
[70]
The State and the public have vital interest in the
maintenance and preservation of these social institutions against desecration by
fabricated evidence.
[71]
Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity
of marriage.



I I I . I n a valid marriage, the husband and wife jointly administer and enjoy
their community or conjugal property.

Article 96 of the Family Code, on regimes of absolute community
property, provides:

Art. 96. The administration and enjoyment of the community property
shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husbands
decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for a proper
remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract
implementing such decision.

In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to
participate in the administration of the common properties, the other spouse may
assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of
disposition or encumbrance without the authority of the court or the written
consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the
disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be
construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third
person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the
other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either
or both offerors.

A similar provision, Article 124
[72]
prescribes joint administration and
enjoyment in a regime of conjugal partnership. In a valid marriage, both spouses
exerciseadministration and enjoyment of the property regime, jointly.

In the case under review, the RTC decreed a dissolution of the community
property of Manuel and Leonida. In the same breath, the trial court forfeited
Manuels share in favor of the children. Considering that the marriage is upheld
valid and subsisting, the dissolution and forfeiture of Manuels share in the
property regime is unwarranted. They remain the joint administrators of the
community property.

WHEREFORE, the petition
is GRANTED. The appealed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the
petition in the trial court to annul the marriage isDISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.



RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice


WE CONCUR:



CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson



MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice Associate Justice



ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice



A T T E S T A T I O N


I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.



CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson


C E R T I F I C A T I O N


Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.




REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice



[1]
See Separate Opinion of Justice Romero in Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108763, February 13, 1997,
268 SCRA 198.
[2]
Rollo, pp. 22-42. Dated July 31, 2007. Penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, with Associate Justices
Regalado E. Maambong and Arturo G. Tayag, concurring.
[3]
Id. at 46.
[4]
Id.
[5]
Id.
[6]
Id.
[7]
Id.
[8]
Id. at 26.
[9]
Id.
[10]
Id.
[11]
Id.
[12]
Id.
[13]
Id. at 47.
[14]
Id. x x x defendant x x x suffer(s) from Narcissistic Personality Disorder of lack of empathy or unresponsiveness
to the needs and feelings of his spouse and children, sense of entitlements or expectations of automatic compliance,
manipulative and deceit stance, grandiose sense of self-importance, the strong need to seek approval and recognition
and to prove his self-worth with Anti-social Features of irritability, verbal and physical aggression and lack of
genuine remorse. Rigidly pervasive and egosyntonic in nature and hence no effective psychiatric therapeutic
modality could satisfactorily remedy his unremitting psychology, defendants psychological incapacity has its
antecedence as early as before his marriage. x x x
[15]
Id. at 48. Dated October 27, 1998.
[16]
Id.
[17]
Id.
[18]
Id.
[19]
Id.
[20]
Id.
[21]
Id.