I affirm, Resolved: In a democracy, voting ought to be compulsory.
Todays resolution questions how a government, specifically a democracy, conducts itself with respect to those it governs. Because such a government must do so justly, I value justice. The voting processthe democratic process as a wholeis best thought of as an equalizer. This is the tenet upon which democracies like the United States are builtone man, one vote. Such a system, in its ideal state, is inherently fair. Because such a system, in its ideal state would be considered fair, fairness ought to be valued as the guiding criterion for this debate The use of ought indicates a moral obligation, and the resolution needs to be treated from that viewpoint. Here is what I mean: there is a wealth of information out there about compulsory voting. Data abounds on voter turnout rates. Australia is practically a decades-long case study in the practice. But again, we stumble back to ought. This debate cannot turn into war of practicality. The idea of moral obligation is that while practicality can potentially be an important consideration, it is not the primary consideration. This is about what is morally right, even if what is morally right has practical implications. That is to say, there is no one making voting compulsory. The resolution does not clarify who ought to value the compulsion of voting; it only states what compulsory voting is in respect to (democracy). We can therefore safely assume that the resolution is talking about what we as a people should value. And, if we are discussing what a person should value, it is important to note that I am not arguing for a law that states all must vote, as in the case of Australia, but rather every individual is morally obligated to vote. Contention One: Compulsory voting addresses the unfairness of socioeconomic divides The framework through which to view voting equality is that of Jean-Jacques Rousseaus Social Contract. What Rousseau considered the general will was just thatthe will of all the Affirmative 2
people. The implication of Rousseaus political contract is that when the general will is acting on the direction of a state, it is generalit includes everyone, and can be considered general inherently due to its inclusivity; it is a fair representation of the governed. Contrast this with the realities of modern political processes. As noted by Annabelle Lever, the British have seen a 13% gap between manual and non-manual workers voter turnout by 2005; Arend Lijphart, in 1997, found this disparity to cross most other socioeconomic lines, with those of lower class generally voting lessthus ending this general will claim we flaunt in the modern day. The tendency to vote also decreases with youth. This is a problem. Even if these findings were reversed, it would still be a problem. The reason for this is that the system itselfa voluntary voting conceptallows such gaps to exist. Despite the gap, under the eye of any democratic government, the vote of someone wealthy is the same as a vote of a disadvantaged individual. The government represents both individuals equally. The government has jurisdiction over both individuals, and both groups to which those individuals belong. Thus, the problem with a voluntary voting system is that while the aforementioned assertions remain true, about individuals, they cannot any longer apply to groups. The difference between individual voter participation across socioeconomic groups equates to a difference in representation and governance across those groups (and across ages as well as just about any other demographics). This is in direct conflict with my criterion of fairness in democratic government, wherein a just government allows for every group to be both represented and governed in a proportionally consistent manner. For a government to govern in a just fashion, it must fulfill this responsibility to fairness. And because voting is essentially an expression of the general will in context of modern democracy, the process inherently has the necessity of being fair. This is best fulfilled Affirmative 3
under a compulsory voting system, which works to prevent the kind of marginalization that lends unfairness to the voluntary voting process. Contention Two: Compulsory voting is an equalizer for voices of resistance Inherent to many arguments against the requirement to vote is the idea that the right to vote is balanced by the right not to vote. Heres the problem with this idea: the right not to vote is only a positive element if there is something inherently and uniquely beneficial to it. But is there? While not casting a vote is seen as a vote against whatever candidates are currently up for election, this is still possible under two forms with compulsory voting: 1) Not casting a ballot, or 2) Casting a blank or invalid ballot. This first option wouldnt seem possible under compulsory voting, but compulsion does not necessarily refer to the requirement to fill out a ballot; rather, it can simply refer to having to show up to a polling place. More profoundly, however, the second option is actually one that can more powerfully voice a peoples opinion and give them a clear voice in a democracy (which really is what a just democracy ought to be doing). Consider the case of Brazil, under whichas noted by Timothy J. Power casting invalid ballots was an active form of protest against the military regime. Contrast this with voter abstention in voluntary systems, which has done little other than spur further debate about how to increase voter turnout. One of these two outcomes clearly does a more active job encouraging fair treatment by the government of the populace, which is integral to its legitimacy. This again goes back to notions of equality and the general will. A non-vote can be seen as a sign of protest, but that non-vote action does not carry weight because in a democratic system, only a vote carries legitimacy because it is counted. As such, for any act of resistance or protest to be valued equally to a standard vote for a candidate, it must also be in the form of a vote. To make voting compulsory and allow for resistance within the framework of compulsory voting would make Affirmative 4
protest a valid and equal way to show opinion, rather one that is nominal as under voluntary voting. We trust the state to uphold ideas of justice. But voluntary voting systems in democratic states manage to subvert the foundations of such a state. For a democracy to be justto fulfill its core objectivemeans an emphasis on fairnesssomething that is sorely lacking without compulsory voting. A requirement to vote is not a burden. It is an enablerof socioeconomic representation and equality, of resistance, and of electoral ideals. In essence, it is an enabler of a fair electoral system, and by extension, a just government.