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Affirmative 1

I affirm, Resolved: In a democracy, voting ought to be compulsory.


Todays resolution questions how a government, specifically a democracy, conducts itself
with respect to those it governs. Because such a government must do so justly, I value justice.
The voting processthe democratic process as a wholeis best thought of as an equalizer. This
is the tenet upon which democracies like the United States are builtone man, one vote. Such a
system, in its ideal state, is inherently fair. Because such a system, in its ideal state would be
considered fair, fairness ought to be valued as the guiding criterion for this debate
The use of ought indicates a moral obligation, and the resolution needs to be treated
from that viewpoint. Here is what I mean: there is a wealth of information out there about
compulsory voting. Data abounds on voter turnout rates. Australia is practically a decades-long
case study in the practice. But again, we stumble back to ought. This debate cannot turn into
war of practicality. The idea of moral obligation is that while practicality can potentially be an
important consideration, it is not the primary consideration. This is about what is morally right,
even if what is morally right has practical implications.
That is to say, there is no one making voting compulsory. The resolution does not clarify
who ought to value the compulsion of voting; it only states what compulsory voting is in respect
to (democracy). We can therefore safely assume that the resolution is talking about what we as a
people should value. And, if we are discussing what a person should value, it is important to note
that I am not arguing for a law that states all must vote, as in the case of Australia, but rather
every individual is morally obligated to vote.
Contention One: Compulsory voting addresses the unfairness of socioeconomic divides
The framework through which to view voting equality is that of Jean-Jacques Rousseaus
Social Contract. What Rousseau considered the general will was just thatthe will of all the
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people. The implication of Rousseaus political contract is that when the general will is acting on
the direction of a state, it is generalit includes everyone, and can be considered general
inherently due to its inclusivity; it is a fair representation of the governed. Contrast this with the
realities of modern political processes. As noted by Annabelle Lever, the British have seen a
13% gap between manual and non-manual workers voter turnout by 2005; Arend Lijphart, in
1997, found this disparity to cross most other socioeconomic lines, with those of lower class
generally voting lessthus ending this general will claim we flaunt in the modern day.
The tendency to vote also decreases with youth. This is a problem. Even if these findings
were reversed, it would still be a problem. The reason for this is that the system itselfa
voluntary voting conceptallows such gaps to exist. Despite the gap, under the eye of any
democratic government, the vote of someone wealthy is the same as a vote of a disadvantaged
individual. The government represents both individuals equally. The government has jurisdiction
over both individuals, and both groups to which those individuals belong. Thus, the problem
with a voluntary voting system is that while the aforementioned assertions remain true, about
individuals, they cannot any longer apply to groups. The difference between individual voter
participation across socioeconomic groups equates to a difference in representation and
governance across those groups (and across ages as well as just about any other demographics).
This is in direct conflict with my criterion of fairness in democratic government, wherein a just
government allows for every group to be both represented and governed in a proportionally
consistent manner. For a government to govern in a just fashion, it must fulfill this responsibility
to fairness. And because voting is essentially an expression of the general will in context of
modern democracy, the process inherently has the necessity of being fair. This is best fulfilled
Affirmative 3

under a compulsory voting system, which works to prevent the kind of marginalization that lends
unfairness to the voluntary voting process.
Contention Two: Compulsory voting is an equalizer for voices of resistance
Inherent to many arguments against the requirement to vote is the idea that the right to vote is
balanced by the right not to vote. Heres the problem with this idea: the right not to vote is only a
positive element if there is something inherently and uniquely beneficial to it. But is there?
While not casting a vote is seen as a vote against whatever candidates are currently up for
election, this is still possible under two forms with compulsory voting: 1) Not casting a ballot, or
2) Casting a blank or invalid ballot. This first option wouldnt seem possible under compulsory
voting, but compulsion does not necessarily refer to the requirement to fill out a ballot; rather, it
can simply refer to having to show up to a polling place. More profoundly, however, the second
option is actually one that can more powerfully voice a peoples opinion and give them a clear
voice in a democracy (which really is what a just democracy ought to be doing). Consider the
case of Brazil, under whichas noted by Timothy J. Power casting invalid ballots was an
active form of protest against the military regime. Contrast this with voter abstention in
voluntary systems, which has done little other than spur further debate about how to increase
voter turnout. One of these two outcomes clearly does a more active job encouraging fair
treatment by the government of the populace, which is integral to its legitimacy. This again goes
back to notions of equality and the general will. A non-vote can be seen as a sign of protest, but
that non-vote action does not carry weight because in a democratic system, only a vote carries
legitimacy because it is counted. As such, for any act of resistance or protest to be valued equally
to a standard vote for a candidate, it must also be in the form of a vote. To make voting
compulsory and allow for resistance within the framework of compulsory voting would make
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protest a valid and equal way to show opinion, rather one that is nominal as under voluntary
voting.
We trust the state to uphold ideas of justice. But voluntary voting systems in democratic states
manage to subvert the foundations of such a state. For a democracy to be justto fulfill its core
objectivemeans an emphasis on fairnesssomething that is sorely lacking without compulsory
voting. A requirement to vote is not a burden. It is an enablerof socioeconomic representation
and equality, of resistance, and of electoral ideals. In essence, it is an enabler of a fair electoral
system, and by extension, a just government.

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