Philosophy of Nature II

Class Notes
(Taken at a Pontifical University)

First Lesson:

Philosophy of Science (PoS): Two different ways to calculate perfect gas, both with the same result. A scientist can make use of
both, the choice depends on the practicability. Still applicability/practicability does not mean something is automatically true. There
are scientists who say that it is not important to look for the truth. They are looking for a practical theory. A practical theory is
convenient reflection of the theories about nature and methods of science.

History: We can trace this way back to the Greek philosophers, esp. Aristotle with his way of arriving at ultimate causes and
deductions and constitutive elements, 4 causes, PM and SF.

PoS is limited as a movement in the 20th century. You have people like Auguste Comte (1798-1859), the founder of Positivism,
J. Herschel (1792-1871), W. Whewell (1794-1866), J.S. Mill (1806-1873), H. Poincare (1854-1912), P. Duhem (1861-1916). All
these are the influences prior to the formation of the movement. These dates coincided with other big dudes, all of which are
founders of other different schools, like S. Freud (1853-1934) for psychoanalysis, G. Frege (1848-1925) for mathematical logic, E.
Husserl (1859-1938) for phenomenology, H. Bergson (1859-1941) for élan vital and spiritualism.

Strictly speaking PoS as a movement started with Logical Positivism in the 1930ies. The logical positivists had a journal called
“Erkenntnis”. Logical positivism started on a Thursday in Vienna: “Vienna Circle”: They gather every late afternoon to drink tea.
The physicists and mathematicians discuss their discoveries, their work. They wanted to come up with a certain method as a
unifying factor. In the Vienna Circle you have R. Carnap (philosopher and logician), K Gödel (mathematician and logician), M.
Schlick (physicist and philosopher), O. Neurath (sociologist) and others.

There also formed the Berlin Circle with Hempel, Reichenbach and von Mises. Both circles were in constant contact and shared a
similar approach to their discipline. Schlick finally coordinated the groups. They decided to call their activities Logical Analysis of
what they do. It is positivism because it is based on Comte. It is limited in following an exclusive method, the method of
verification.

Prof Schlick, the coordinator, was killed by a student while going down the stairs. He had a kind character, which does not seem to
be a guarantee ;-). But work goes on. You have Alfred Ayer, responsible for refusing the idea of logical positivism in Great Britain.
Wittgenstein wrote a book “Logical tractatus” on philosophy of language, about reducing ordinary language to its simplest
mathematical form in order to avoid confusion. It is the analysis of mathematical logic and was meant to help formulate a language
that people use in science in order to avoid confusion. This book became the Bible of logical positivism. Every Thursday afternoon
they try to explain the tractatus and apply the rules. Popper was invited to the circle, but didn’t go and later was against logical
positivism. With WWII lots of people went to the USA and collected followers. Pragmatism was also very strong as a school, but
logical positivism had a big success in the USA.

The method of verification used by the logical positivists is based on induction. Karl Popper (critical period) exposed the fault of
that method and went against induction. He proposed the method of falsification. After Popper we have the post-critical period,
where people were criticizing Popper. Thomas Kuhn was one of them as well as Paul Feyerabend or Imre Lakatos. They said the
method of falsification is too simple. Disciples of all of these men are continuing their tradition. In Italy you have the Popperian
Antiseri, you have Agazzi the Aristotelian and moderately Popperian.

You have three major problems in PoS (this will be the division of our course):
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1.) The metaphysical problems: These are the question of the nature of theoretical
concepts like genes or black holes. Some theoretical terms have direct reference to real
objects, some don’t. Question here is: real or not -> metaphysical.
2.) The epistemological problems: Truth in science and its meaning.
3.) The ethical problems: They deal with questions of moral value. Is science susceptible
to moral evaluation? If yes, why?

Outline of the course:

I. Theory
1. Explanation/description
2. Theoretical terms (real or instrumental to organizations; realists <-> non-realists)
3. Theory, law, hypothesis (distinction)
4. Theory and truth (notion of scientific truth)
5. Choosing between two or more theories (criteria?)
6. Theory and observation (which comes first?)

II. Method
1. Inductive method (logical positivists)
2. Hypothetical-deductive method (Carl Hempel)
3. Program of scientific research (Lakatos)
4. Paradigms (Kuhn)
5. Research tradition (Lauden)
6. Anarchical method (Feyerabend)
7. Logical non-formal scientific method (Palanyi)

III. Ethical evaluation of science

Aspects of science:
1.) Social institute (you have whole villages of scientists)
2.) Generates knowledge (not opinion, hearsay or rumors) [5.) Dynamic (through discoveries)]
3.) Naturalism
4.) It is in evolution, undergoes progress (as opposed to revolution, which does not have continuity)

In these discoveries you have factors involved:

1.) Status of science (Penicillin could have been found in China but wasn’t because it is not as advanced)
2.) Economic and political status (Penicillin had to be manufactured in America because of the war in Europe)
3.) Role of the press (Presenting research as well documented and proven)
4.) Mysterious “X” (A gift, fortune, chance, something sudden, an illumination), still you have to be prepared for it to recognize it

Second Lesson:

Science: A well founded (with a modest degree of precision and certitude, though fallible (ontological aspect)) and organized
(follows a rigorous scientific method (epistemological aspect)) body of knowledge, that progresses by means of research and
discovery done by committed, competent and subsidized men and women of a special community, which can improve or damage
(ethical aspect) the life of man.

Science: Theoretical (physics, abstract things) and practical/applied (medicine etc.). Theoretical guys get practical to confirm
their theories.
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Theories: Through theories certain aspects of reality are represented. It is a conception of that certain aspect of reality. This
conception has to correspond with our experience, so it can be called a “true” theory.

Functions of a theory:
1.) Description: The theory has to describe what we observe (Lacmus-paper: red or blue).
2.) Explanation: Answer the question “Why?”. Why is it/does it have to be that way? Criterion for a choice between two theories is
the explanatory power (Newton has less explanatory power compared to Einstein)
3.) Prediction: Theories help to predict. We know what to expect (weather or quantity of gas in a rocket or dosage of morphine
etc). The prediction can function as a verification of your explanation.

Reality of the theory or terms in a theory:

A.) The non-realist (fictional) perspective on theories:
1.) Ernst Mach (1838 - 1916) about the atomic theory: “Something that helps us to co-ordinate our otherwise disorganized
knowledge. It gives structure to our knowledge.” So here the theory is just an instrument. It is useful but does not correspond with
our real experience.
2.) Henri Poincare compares a theory with a library-catalogue (author/subject/title) which is a piece of paper telling you where to
find a book. Each time you get another book you have to make a new piece of paper and insert it in the catalogue. If you have new
knowledge you insert it into your theory. But a library catalogue cannot be called true or false. It is convenient or not
convenient/good or bad. According to Poincare you talk about good or bad theories as well.
The non-realist perspective on theory can be enlarged by looking at a theory as a fiction: Think of a novel where you have an
author producing characters with roles. You think they are real when the author has a good plot. A theory can be like that with no
questions about reality, just properly arranged like a novel.
In the 16th century you had rivaling theories (Ptolemy, Keppler, Copernicus). Because the instruments back then were not as
advanced they opted for the criterion of usefulness and beauty.
B.) The realist perspective on a theory:
16th/17th century: Two theories about the origin of diseases: Mysterious power and bad odor.
19th century: Malaria eliminated the bad odor theory, because the victims didn’t smell weird. Yes, gas is responsible for bad odor,
but it does not necessarily cause disease. So the mysterious-power-theory took over and was developed into a theory of bacteria,
which was finally confirmed when the microscope was invented. Some diseases do not show bacterial criteria, these were called
virulent. So there is something in reality that the theory is referring to, be it odor or mysterious power or bacteria.
In calling an animal a “whale” you have the meaning and the (object of reference) referrant. The referrant does not change, but the
meaning sometimes does (whale - fish - mammal). The referrant object therefore is extralinguistic, but real.

Third Lesson:

Hans’ Notes:
Tractatus: The "bible" of the positivists, an analysis of language, was written by Wittgenstein. For Logic Positivist, a theory is real if
it has a "sense", because it is verifiable.

Wittgenstein says that things that don't have any sense - things that are not demonstrable, not verifiable - are not worth talking
about; you just have to show it.

How do you verify a theory? It must be reducible to a mathematical equation/language.

Why is it called Logical Positivism: Logical Positivist is concerned with what is concrete and observable, which is expressed by way
of mathematical language. This is why Metaphysics is excluded from its object.

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Definition of Scientific Truth:

What is the definition of Science? Is a body of well founded (with a modest degree of precision and certitude but fallible) and
organized knowledge (follows rigorous scientific methods) that progresses (by cumulative non linear evolutionary progress) through
research and discoveries made by competent men and women who are committed and subsidized, and that can possibly improve
or damage the life of man.

"With a modest degree of precision and certitude but fallible" - why? Because it can be modified or supplanted by new knowledge
and discoveries.

"Precision and Certitude": This characteristic speaks about the lack of absolute truth in science, that there is not a known
conformity with what is known.

What is Scientific Truth: We differentiate "Scientific" truth from other Truths, as is the case with Theological Truth. One of the
characteristics of Scientific truth is that it is not "absolute".

"Principle of Indetermination" of Heisenberg, involved in the making of the Atomic bomb. This principle is concerned with the lack of
precision while measuring place and speed of sub-atomic particles.

What is the importance of this statement? When you make this kind of experiment, you must have what is called a known "initial
condition": weight, place, etc. If you cannot determine the velocity and place of an object, then how can you measure other things?
But there is recourse in the use of the Probability.

What is a theory? It represents an aspect of reality. When you represent some reality, there is always the question of how that
representation conforms to reality.

Partial correspondence between theory and reality - only partial truth. What do we need for this? First, Evidence! Evidence (must
be confirmed and verified) in favor of our theory.

When we speak about Evidence, we also speak about "crucial experiment". In the case of Galileo, his discovery of the mountain-
surface on the moon was an example of this "crucial experiment."
Not often will science find "crucial experiment". Another characteristic needed in evidence is Coherence. Although this is
necessary, Coherence is not a perfect sign of a good theory.

Practicality/applicability of a theory serves as an evidence to the proposed theory. However, we shouldn't absolutize the use of this
since it leads to a Logical Positivism. It is a Pragmatist's approach to truth.

Logical Positivists thought that the theory that they put forth had 1:1 relationship. Why, because when you present a mathematical
theory, you are excluding any subjective influences that may interfere [The professor calls it a "photographic correspondence"].

What is the "Theory of Everything"? When you have a theory, then you apply it to everything. (Reductionism: means when you try
to reduce everything to mathematical equation)

The answer is to think of a system that can consists all of its parts. There are four parts described as: Cybernetic
(information/feedback), mechanical (mechanical physics), Indeterministic Process, and Statistical. This is opposed to Logical
Positivist who claimed that there could be one discipline constantly in contact with other discipline because it is expressed in
mathematical language.

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Peter’s Notes:
Tractatus (by Wittgenstein; the “bible” of positivism) is about a kind of analysis of language making use of mathematical logic
searching only for propositions with sense and propositions without sense. For positivists, a theory will be acceptable only if it can
guarantee that it follows this language analysis. It will have sense if it can be verified, if it is verifiable. Verification is already a
method. But we are still in the question of theory as real. A theory is real when it has a sense. And it has a sense because it is
verifiable. For instance, questions about God, the human soul, are not measurable, therefore are not verifiable and so they have no
sense. Same goes for propositions about morality, because – especially for Christians – they are in the divine law. Wittgenstein
says that when things are not demonstrable, they are not verifiable and therefore should not be talked about. Like charity, which is
not a matter of talking about it because it doesn’t have any sense, but you just have to show it. You verify a theory if you can
reduce it to something mathematically measurable (quantity). When you formulate a theory it can be verified easily when you make
this mathematical language. Again, we see the role of mathematics.

The classic definition of truth: The known conformity of the mind to reality. Just to make it explicit. The mind has to be conscious,
has to know. To make it explicit, you have to say it’s the known conformity. It did not change that much when you talk about
scientific truth.

Definition of science: Science is a body of well-founded (with a discrete degree of precision and certitude but fallible) and organized
knowledge (follows rigorous scientific methods) that progresses (by cumulative non-linear evolutionary progress) through research
discoveries made by competent men and women who are committed and subsidized and that can possibly improve or damage the
life of man.

The fact that you put scientific truth or truth about other theories, we distinguish or we differentiate scientific truths from other truths,
for instance, theological truths – we say it is absolute certain because we talk about absolutes. One character of scientific truth:
There is no absolute truth. This is reflected in the phrase “with a modest degree of precision and certitude but fallible”: It can be a
mistake. If it is not absolutely true it can be in error after a year or after 20 years to be replaced by another. It can be continuously
modified, because more positive information is being added every time.

Heisenberg’s principle of indetermination: A physicist, who was involved in the making of the atomic bomb. His principle concerns
that lack of precision in determining the place or the speed of subatomic particles. It’s not that we cannot determine it but because
of the influence of the observer, because if he concentrates on the place, he loses track of the speed and vice versa. What’s the
importance? In order to do an experiment you need to know what you call in physics or even in biology “initial conditions”. You have
to know the property or the nature of the subject or the object under study. If you’re measuring the velocity or the place but you
can’t determine it, then how will you proceed in your experiment? But of course you can measure by probability, which means you
also always have a probability of error.
Fallible: It’s not only the fact that it’s incomplete, but it can be totally wrong. Remember that our theories somehow represent a
certain aspect, certain framework of reality, so it cannot cover everything. Even Einstein’s theory only represents particular aspects
of reality (time, space, gravitation). This theory of Einstein it is confirmed or verified by other observations and experiments
performed and so the conformity with reality becomes closer and closer to reality. So let’s say you have Einstein’s theory. Then you
have reality. This theory of Einstein maybe covers only a part of this reality. Time will come, when a certain observation will be
done which will contradicts this theory so that it can turn out to be fallible. But at the moment, Einstein’s theory is proving to be a
robust theory – it explains new observations.
The logical positivists insisted on a very strict correspondence with reality. They wanted theories to represent reality like a photo.
When you use mathematical logic as language you reduce everything to mathematics, which is verifiable and you can present an
argument which is mathematical and so you are sure that there is not much place for confusion and there’s not much place for
personal interference. Now they were confident that as soon as you arrive at this level of mathematicizing, you get a complete copy
of what it represents in reality. So this is what I call the photographic correspondence of theory with reality . Now of course this
has become an obsolete rendering of what we mean by scientific truth. There cannot be a photographic correspondence between
theory and reality. And even sometimes our photo’s re not well.
Unified science and the theory of everything. It means that when you have a theory it would be applied to everything. There’s not
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one theory that can be considered as absolutely true. That also implies that everything will be reduced to a theory. Let’s say my
theory or the theory of Einstein is correct. It’s proven but it is mathematical. If you have a theory of everything that means that
everything will have to be reduced to math. That’s what you call reductionism. The domain of biology deals with living things and is
therefore anti-reductionism. Reductionism: Reducing everything to physics and mathematics. It covers one aspect of reality. It can
simply explain one aspect of reality. So in fact as an Aristotelian you need other philosophers or other experts dealing with their
own disciplines – so you have to work together – another way of explaining now is not to reduce everything to one theory but to
think of a system consisting of different theories so you think of a whole reality represented by different theories and this whole
reality you call it a system.
There are four processes or parts described as cybernetic (information/Feedback), mechanical (mechanical physics),
indeterministic process (represented by quantum physics), and statistics. In a way it’s a unified system made up of different parts.
These can be connected because there is a metaphorical application of terms. For instance, when I talk about information,
feedbacks, input, output in industrial machines, in computers, I can also talk about feedback between inner cell and environment of
the cell. There is an exchange of information from outside the cell and inside the cell. The DNA is filled with information. And unified
science in contemporary context. So photographic correspondence doesn’t exist. So again, we say partial correspondence
between theory and reality. So we’re talking only of partial truth. What are the different elements that somehow will make us arrive
at least at this partial truth in regards to our theory? We need to have evidence in favor of our theory, in this sense evidence can
confirm or verify our theory – so in favor, not against. So when Galileo saw through his telescope that the moon has mountainous
surfaces, it contradicted Ptolemeic’s and Aristotle’s view of the moon, which is a perfect sphere. In the telescope Galileo saw this
mountainous surface of the moon, that means it’s not perfectly spherical. So that observation was the evidence – maybe he was
formulating another theory – but not in favor of Aristotle’s theory. When you talk of evidence, you also talk about crucial
experiments. That observation of Galileo can be considered a crucial observation because it somehow disproved the claim of
Aristotle and proved Galileo’s claim. And that’s crucial. And sometimes when a theory is very complex, it’s very hard to arrive at
crucial experiments. Like for instance, they is this completing theories regarding the nature of light. Light is made up of particles. It
took 250 years. And of course, the debate hasn’t really stopped, because light also shows wavy characteristics. So particles, and
yet they show wavy characteristics. The point is that you need to wait a very long period of time for a crucial experiment. Another
aspect is coherence. The scientists and astronomers following the geocentric theory tried their best to conserve that theory. There
were not contradictory laws or principles within their theory so they try their best to maintain coherence, even when there are
observations not in favor of their theories. It’s very hard to conserve coherence when you are explaining an observation that seems
to be contradictory to your theory. Finally, when it became hard to maintain coherence, the theory got busted. So coherence is
necessary but coherence is not the absolute sign of a true theory. Remember my story. Ptolemy’s theory was coherent up until a
certain time. But it was not true. Another aspect is the practicality or applicability of a theory. When a theory is applied to a
research and that research proves to be successful, that same applicability of a theory serves as an evidence in favor of your
theory. The theory behind the construction of bridges seems to be working well because that bridge going to the Vatican is still
standing. So the theory behind construction proves to be true and also efficient. We should not pay attention solely to the
applicability. Otherwise, we will fall into pragmaticism. One theory solves more problems compared to another theory. We should
not absolutize this aspect. It is a good sign but not an absolute sign.

Fourth Lesson:

List of criteria in choosing a theory:

Practicality (no absolute criterion because theory is about truth and practicality is only a part of truth)
Predictability
Evidence in favor (predictability)
Coherence
Verifiable/Falsifiable

Scientific truth:
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What is a true theory? Scientific truth is expressed in a true theory. Science is one way of representing reality. The something that
represents reality must correspond with reality, to have truth in it. Does the image of the world correspond with the real world?
Basically we follow the same concept of truth in science.

Scientific truth as correspondence: if I have a theory it has to correspond with reality.

A theory mirrors reality. This means it is faithful to the ultimate (maybe not the apparent) reality. There has to be conformity
between linguistic description and factual experience. So in order for a theory to mirror reality you have to reduce language to a
simple mathematical form. The theory has to be formalized. Because of the impossibility to mirror reality as faithful to the ultimate
reality as you can (see photo = sometimes it does not “mirror” us and we are not contented), the “mirror”-correspondence was
transformed into “approximation” of reality. So in the “mirror”-phase there was belief in absolute scientific truth, the
“approximators” settle for partial scientific truth.

In science you don’t attain any absolute truth. This is a result of certain events in the history of science. There is the thesis of
uncertainty relationship by Heisenberg (quantum physics). There also is limitation of science per se:
First science describes only a part/an aspect of reality.
Secondly science is limited because of a lack of total absolute certainty.

Because of the instruments for quantum physics and the disposition of the scientist, there is uncertainty. You need light, you have
to know how to adjust the mirror. In quantum physics you have to know the place where you can find the subatomic particle and
you need to know the speed of it. If you use long wavelength light the place of the particle can be measured exactly, but the speed
is inexact. Making use of shorter wavelength it will be the other way round. For this reason quantum physics work with probability.
In the science of complex systems even a small difference can influence the behavior of an object. This influence is somehow
unpredictable. In a very sensitive environment - like in playing a billiard game - the breath of the spectators can influence the
course of the ball (“Butterfly effect”).

Different features/characteristics of a partially true theory:

I.) Coherence
A partially true theory is coherent but a coherent theory does not have to be true. The geocentric theory of Ptolemy was coherent
but in the end could not explain contradictory explanations, was not true. Coherence can not be absolutized. Neurath: “A coherent
theory is essentially true.” But it is not.
II.) Practicality:
PV = nRT ; (P+a/V2) ((V-b) = nRT: Two different ways to calculate perfect gas, both with the same result. A scientist can make use
of both, the choice depends on the practicability. Still applicability/practicability does not mean something is automatically true.
There are scientists who say that it is not important to look for the truth. They are looking for a practical theory. A practical theory is
convenient.
Metaphysical truth and scientific truth: Scientists do not have the job to prove metaphysical constructions or propositions.
Unconsciously they use metaphysics to be able to do their research. It is not a question of “What is a being?” but metaphysics in
the sense of being able to make their own universal vision of the world. Through this vision they put things into their places.
Popper: “Metaphysics is necessary but we do not have a way of veri-/falsifying it.”
We make use of the term metaphysics in a general way. Einstein insisted on observation in the earlier part of his research. He
rejected the concept of ether, because it is not observable. Ether is a metaphysical concept, but without it you wouldn’t be able to
capture the nature of light as wave. So in a way it is metaphysical because it goes beyond the observable. Einstein also made use
of some metaphysical assumptions later on: “Light must be of constant speed”.
The model of an atom is also a work with a metaphysical component, because how can you show the correspondence between the
model and the atom?
III.) Evidence: Can be good or bad. Good if it is in favor, bad if not. Can be observable or theoretical: Theoretical when you induce
a secondary principle from a major principle and there is logical deduction. You need a modest degree of precision. Precision is
different from certitude. Certitude is a personal contribution of the scientist to the project, when he measured with precision, for
instant, and then says: “I am certain!”
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Fifth Lesson:

Scientific truth mainly is truth as correspondence (as in corresponding with our experiences)
In science you cannot attain absolute truth, only partial truth or approximate truth. Neo-Positivism: If you think of an abstract theory
it can be reduced to a basic proposition, which is fundamentally observable. That depends on an enunciation of mathematical
position. Not all abstract things can be reduced to something empirical.
Partial/limited truth has two meanings:
1.) You can only treat one aspect of reality as partial at a time. It is limited etymologically. If it is biology it is only about biology.
2.) Lack of precision/ignorance: Heisenberg’s indeterminacy principle. Things cannot be determined exactly. There is always an
aspect that escapes knowledge.

In scientific truth we mainly need correspondence with reality and also coherence (but Ptolemy was wrong), practicality (leads to
pragmatism when it stands alone) and evidence (not absolute every time).

It is also partial truth when we look at the whole truth. Ptolemy  Copernicus  Galileo  Newton  Einstein  ?. Ptolemy was
only partially right, as was Copernicus, as was Galileo, Newton, Einstein. You have an evolving truth here. So it is partial, not
absolute. Popper made an analogy. Somebody who scales a mountain sees clouds and thinks it’s the peak. But when the clouds
disappear he sees that he has to climb higher.

Hypothesis and Theories.

To be distinguished from hypothetical theory.
Even in ordinary language, when we say “hypothesis” it is almost like an opinion, a guess. “I have a hypothesis regarding…” means
that you are not so sure.
Theories have passed more control compared to hypothesis. Hypothesis is more particular, has less control.
Theory  Law  Hypothesis  Observation = protocol statement (Lacmus paper, i.e.)
Based on the particular protocol statements you can formulate a hypothesis. Still more universal than a hypothesis would be a law
or a theory.
Some philosophers say: “A theory is just a hypothesis.” but this is not equivalent to a hypothetical theory. “Hypothetical
theory” means that it is changeable, can be modified or rejected and it can be correct or wrong. But a theory is not a hypothesis,
because it has undergone more tests and control.

Theory and Observation

This is like talking about the egg and the hen. Which came first? Scientifically the egg, but according to creation God did not put
eggs on the face of the earth but animals, so hen. You have to distinguish.
In theory and observation you have theory supported by observation, but sometimes it’s doubtful when you just observe. Theories
are connected with observations. Observations have to support a theory, but how is observation connected with a theory? In as far
as you have to know what to observe. If you indicate it, you have to have the idea of what it is, that you should observe. “Observe a
good-looking Mexican.” You need a theory of what “good-looking” and “Mexican” is.
When you make use of an instrument, you have to know the theory of that instrument in order to observe. The theory in the use of
an instrument: If you don’t know the theory of light, how do you want to adjust your tele- or microscope?
“Theory laden observation”: (Hansen) Your observation must contain a certain theory. It depends on your background, your
formation and your studies. Somebody who is primitive and look at a computer-screen will see nothing. Somebody who is good in
computer will see a lot of things. It furthermore depends on the easiness/convenience of organic-seeing or on optical deceptions.

Sixth Lesson:

Norwood Russell Hanson concentrated in convincing others. There is no such thing as pure observation. Every observation has a
theory behind it: “Theory-laden observation”
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We need to select a framework, we can not observe everything at the same time. Even in seeing we choose, depending on the
comfort for the eyes.

“Methodology of Science” or “Scientific Methods”

When you consider scientific research, PoN-ers divide that into two contexts in scientific Process/research: The context of
discovery and the context of justification (justification in the sense of control/tests). This distinction was made by Reichenbach.
Classical physics (in a time when chemistry and biology weren’t really regarded as sciences because they weren’t precise enough)
deals with macro-objects or big objects. Quantum physics is on micro-objects or small particles. In studying sub-atomic particles
the degree of precision you obtain is smaller than with macro-objects, because the behavior is hard to catch.
Heisenberg and the principle of uncertainty: When you look through your microscope you need light, which contains particles.
Longer wave-lengths of light show the position (precise) of the electron and the speed (less precise). With short wave-lengths it is
the other way. Since you cannot obtain both information precisely, you talk about probability measurement.

Method of induction
Attributed to logical positivism, where they call their method “method of verification”, which actually is method of induction. A
generalized theory is verified in the observed particular cases. In “method of induction” you start with particular cases, observe
them, make a general hypothesis based on these particular cases. From a couple of particular cases we make a conclusion and
apply it to a big part or reality, which is kind of ridiculous and that’s why Popper criticized it. Of course, for the theory to be serious
you need more particular examples. You only know the few examples but you amplify them (it is called an amplification). You have
new knowledge because your general hypothesis drawn from the particulars becomes applied. It is not a tautology, where no new
knowledge is gained (7+7 = 14 = 9+5).
John Stewart Mill and Francis Bacon were the inductivists of the past.
The method of induction can be traced back to David Hume “Problem of induction”. There is no necessary link between the cause
and the effect (“every time we see smoke there’s fire.” but what about dried ice?). Hume: “How come we know that it’s not valid and
still make use of the induction?” Because of habit. Every time an event is repeated we believe more. Habit and belief. Instead of
making use of cause and effect Hume says we don’t have cause and effect linked it is just a succession of events. It is like in a
movie, where the stuff on the screen is one coherent movement. But the film is made up of frames and one event follows the other.

Seventh Lesson:

Induction: From particular cases we do a general inference (also: ampliative inference).

Carnap (probability logic): Yes, 10 cases, but it is probable that it is applicable to the rest of reality. But even in terms of probability
you are still doing induction and have to justify the jump from particular to general. Bayesianism (based on Bayes theory):
Mathematical calculation for probability of the connection between the general inference and the evidence. This is just a
mathematical support for calculation, not inductivism.
Deduction: Nomological deductive method (Hempel): explanans explanandum refers to a particular phenomenon, which is
empirical. Explanans will be about laws and conditions. I.e.: We are surprised, because the casserole of water is not yet boiling (in
2000 meter height). Try to recall laws. Water always boils at 100°C, so that’s a constant. But the altitude is different to my
apartment. It’s about height. So you have laws and conditions and this particular phenomenon has been explained (explanandum)
recalling laws and the actual conditions where I found myself in. But what if you miss some of the factors that are decisive
conditions? Sometimes they can be very subtle. Example: You see a dead man. Besides him there’s a small bottle of arsenic. And
you see a trace of the substance on his lips. So you see the conditions, you know the laws (arsenic in a certain amount kills within
15 minutes). So you think you explained it. But what if 5 minutes before the man died from poison he stumbled across the street in
his poisoned state and was hit by a bus?
Hypothetical deductive falsification (Popper “the killer of logical positivism”):
You have some cases where up to case 100 you always get the same result. But you think “what if it is needed until case #200?”.
You have to continue experimenting. Only one negative case and your inference will be proven wrong. Popper: “It is easier to falsify
than to prove.” If a theory has not been falsified yet, it is a corroborate theory. (Cemetery of theories)
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Abduction (Charles Pierce): He added abduction to in- and deduction. Abduction is the formulation of hypothesis. We see a
phenomenon and right away we have a hypothesis, which is relative to the observation. Abduction would say: “What if A is true and
applicable as an explanation of this phenomenon? Then A will be true.” It is hypothetical, but you jump to the formulation of a truth.
This abduction did not have many followers. It has caught attention of some AI-dudes and also in medicine. It is now called
inference to the best explanation (IBE).
Program of research (Imre Lakatos): Student of Popper, criticized him: “When you talk of theory it is like a system (Einstein,
Newton), a researched program, not just one sentence. It is a system composed of observations, laws, hypotheses. If something
goes wrong you don’t trash the whole theory but try to find out what made it go wrong. So it is more like a program of research.
There is a nucleus in that program/system. This is surrounded by secondary laws, instruments, observations. So before an
anomaly hits the heart, it must first attack the “protective belt”. Negative aspect: You don’t throw away the program right away, you
maintain the nucleus. The positive aspect is the protection that is rendered by the protective belt. So when the anomaly comes you
try to reconstruct and repair, you have to explain the anomaly. You can do that by forming an ad hoc hypothesis, that you can
invent right there and then. This hypothesis will have to be integrated into the whole system in order to have coherence. But what if
there are many anomalies? You need an ad hoc hypothesis every time. You retain the research program as long as it can solve
problems, predict the future or bring up interesting questions. If it stops doing that, you have to replace it. Ptolemy’s theory did all
the stuff for a while, but suddenly there were more questions than it could explain, so it had to be replaced. (Hospital of theories).
Paradigm (Thomas Kuhn): History of science has four stages: Pre-science, normal science 1, Crisis to Revolution, normal
science 2. Per-science: Primitive community of scientists to be. There are different paradigms, which are models that have heuristic
(guiding your research and reception of reality) function. You have several paradigm-candidates and sciences and people adhering
to each of these (merit of Kuhn to consider the sociological aspect of science). Suddenly one scientist becomes curious and looks
what the neighbors are doing. “Am I doing better?” If not, he transfers to the others, informs his friends and so on. If all are united in
one paradigm, you have normal science 1. You try to deepen the study of reality using the paradigm, you try to exhaust the
capacity of the paradigm. In the process you don’t eliminate the experience that there are small anomalies trying to bite a bit off you
paradigm. Then comes a big fat anomaly and the paradigm cannot resist. And what if the anomaly becomes another competing
theory? The scientists in the old paradigm see the anomaly. They try to join forces against it but it is not enough. They see that the
candidate paradigm is ready to eliminate the paradigm. Crisis: Abandon ship and transfer to the other side or stick around and try
to fight off the anomaly? One by one they jump over and rightly so, because the new paradigm indeed is able to eliminate the
anomaly. Revolution! And you have normal science 2. Kuhn: “Paradigm 1 is incommensurable to paradigm 2. You cannot compare
them and say one is true the other is false.” Because of this attitude Kuhn is said to have invented relativism in science.
Research Tradition (Larry Lauden): The principle aim of science is to solve problems. If you have two “Research Traditions” and
want to choose one, your criterion will be the traditions’ capacity to solve problems. Determine how many problems each RT solves
and how many of these were important. If your choice is rational, if you pick the RT that solved more problems and also more
important ones, than you inject rationalism beck into science (ref. Hume, who thought induction was not rational and sticking with it
was just a matter of habit and belief).
Asking questions (Jaako Hintikka): “We ask questions to nature” (instead of solving problems). Hintikka combined Kant
(“Questions are a means”) and Lauden (“Solving problems is an aim”). Combined: “Big questions (aim) answered by little questions
(means)”.
Methodological anarchism (Paul Feyerabend): “Anything goes!” This is different from political anarchism. What is meant here is
that I have a method but I am ready to defend it, to fight for it, if it is endangered. Feyerabend is not contented with the relativism of
Kuhn and fights against a universal tradition. He wants there to be nothing imposing and criticizes inductivists for renouncing
everything (faith, values, hunger) just to work in the laboratory. He calls that inhuman. He says that methodological anarchism
produces more human scientists.

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Eighth Lesson:

If you have two competing theories, like for the extinction of dinosaurs (competitors adapted well, dinos didn’t / meteors killed the
dinosaurs), then a large part of scientists tends to prefer one of those theories (here the 2nd) not only because of fantasy but
because of explanations. In our example Tridium was discovered, which is always present in meteors. Tridium can be traced back
in time like carbon. And some meteors date back to hundreds of thousands of years. So here the explanation is simple and also
reasonable in the sense that it is probable. So in a case where you have two theories, you always prefer the one that is less
complicated but at the same time more probable.

Up to here we were talking about method of science based on good logic. But when you apply the language of symbolic logic to
science, you end up in sort of formalism.

Up to this point when you say science is rational, rationality is equated with the use of a certain formal logic (induction, deduction,
abduction), all of these are still formal logic. But we can use informal logic to describe our science as rational science. One type of
this informal logic will be the logic of perception.

Rationality in science using informal logic: Logic of perception (by Michael Polanyi)
In this logic you have two types of awareness: Focal and subsidiary awareness. Example: When you play the piano, the focal
awareness is on the piece you play, while the subsidiary awareness is on the fingers. If focal awareness switches to the single
fingers, you mess up big time. In a scientific discovery you confront a problem. You try to look for a solution. In the process, there
are hints or clues that are not so evident. Here it is about intuition and imagination. You don’t care about single ones of these hints,
but some of them enter your process and a form develops, that is called “Gestalt” (= Form). Finally you arrive at a point where the
hints all hang together and you have the conclusion. As you go along in your search you try to perceive the solution with both
awarenesses. Experiments and testing is under focal awareness, there are other aspects however, that are in the area of your
subsidiary awareness.
Polanyi is not against experiments, induction or deduction. He just says that added to this we have to pay attention to the reality,
that in doing our experiments we make use of focal and subsidiary awareness.

Ninth Lesson:

Objectivity:
We find at least two or three concepts of objectivity.
Last century there was a tendency to investigate how to reinforce the concept of objectivity in science. In science you only get to
partial truth. You cannot avoid uncertainty, there is always a place for skepticism. You never know if your theory will be disproved in
the future, as history has shown. Since we do not have absolute certainty in science we want to at least conserve a maximum
amount of objectivity, because that will keep us most probably closer to the truth. Swing of attention from truth to objectivity does
not mean that they don’t care for truth anymore. They just want to make sure they can approach the truth closely.

Three concepts:
Two general ones:
I.: Objectivity without a subject/a scientist (also called objectivism): can be conserved in the context of justification, expressed in
control/test/measuring about your discovery
II.: Objectivity with a subject/a scientist

Neo-Positivists/Popper claim that you only take into account what directly belongs to your scientific research. No addition of any
personal circumstances or interpretation.
Carnap and Nagl talk about testing when they consider objectivity. A regular manifestation of the result gives assurance that it is
objective.
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For Popper something that cannot be tested is not a scientific theory. He gives importance to
a) regularity and reproduction of the same result. He also talks about
b) intersubjectivity, where others can repeat the control and the result. This also
implies that whatever theory you have must be
c) explicit: Everybody can test, read, see, control it

Popper gave a metaphysical (not scientific) structure to reinforce his concept of objectivity. He divides reality into three worlds:
1.) Circle: Natural physical objects (Example: apple)
2.) Square: Mental-psychological states (Example: imaginative with strong-delicate intuition)
3.) Triangle: Ideas, problems, theories (Example: theory about apples)

In Popper I and II (two of the three stages in Popper’s intellectual formation) the third world is absolutely autonomous. Example: I
(subject) look at an apple (object) and try to study it. I experiment and use my imagination in the research as well as my strong-
delicate intuition. There is an interaction between object and my attempt to make a theory about it. After having studied the apple
with imagination and intuition I formulate a theory. My theory about the world of apples is: “One apple a day keeps laziness away.”
In Popper I and II, the moment you publish your theory, make it explicit, it attains absolute autonomy/independence from its author.
It gains an intersubjective dimension, because it is open to others. So it is objectivity without a subject. Also: Theories can
outlive the author (Einstein/relativity). From this, Popper goes on to present the mental experiment, where you just think about the
experiment but do not realize it. Imagine that one day all inhabitants of the earth die and all that remains are the books. Even then
those who are the 2nd world subjects will be gone, maybe even the 1st world. Only this one library with the books remains: the 3rd
world with the theories. In Popper III the 3rd world is relatively autonomous.

Polanyi was against objectivism and wanted “objectivity with a subject”. This is includes “personal” knowledge and objectivity
with personal contribution (beliefs, passion, intuition…) of the subject.
Focal and subsidiary awareness: When you change the focal awareness to one of the elements of the subsidiary awareness you
will be distracted and take attention and sense from what you are doing. Change in focal awareness will change the productivity of
the activity. Both awarenesses go together in your search for solutions. By imagination and intuition you know that one or the other
clues/hints will help you in your tests, experiments, observations, that your focal awareness is on. The hints/clues, but also your
passions, believes, intuitions are in the subsidiary awareness. The process from problem to solution has to be looked at as a
whole, so you get to the “Gestalt”. Popper insisted on making things explicit in order to be repeated, tested by others. Polanyi also
accepts this. But because of the subsidiary awareness not everything can be made explicit. We know that we know it, but we
cannot really explain (like how you learned to ride a bike or how to swim: you know you can do it but you cannot explain how you
learned it.) Polanyi’s point: You can know more than you can tell.

How to distinguish the “objectivity with a subject/a scientist” from subjectivism:

Subjectivism: You have the criterion of truth inside the subjects head and the reality outside. But the subject does not care about
reality. If you ask the subject, why it took theory A instead of B it might say “Its appeal was stronger”. The criterion for the choice is
inside the subject.
Objectivism: You have the intuition, imagination, belief, passion, interest inside the subjects head and the reality outside. Here the
subject will answer the A/B-question: “My intuition/imagination pushes me towards this decision. My interests and passions drive
me towards making tests and I saw the correspondence with reality.” Here the last word comes from reality. Polanyi: We have a
moral obligation to declare what is real, what correspond to reality, when we use our intuition, imagination, belief, passion.

Tenth Lesson:

Objectivity without a subject: Objectivism (Popper)

Objectivity with a subject: Related with personal knowledge (Polanyi), not equivalent with being subjective.
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Relativism: More related with subjectivism

Thomas Nagl: An effort to bring objectivity closer to science.

The question of objectivity is both overestimated (by objectivism) and underestimated (by relativism and subjectivism). There are
instances where we can put together objectivity and subjectivity in the sense not of subjectivism but in the sense that the subject
has a role. The subject decides or chooses with the aid of subjectively given guide-posts. In some instances it is better to separate
objectivity and subjectivity. For instance: If a machine does not work, it does not work. Then the machine has to be rejected. If a
result was negative, no matter how sad it is to accept it, you have to accept that.

Thomas Kuhn: Paradigms

You can have two paradigms, where paradigm A is a world with its own language, laws, visions, techniques etc and a paradigm B
is another world with different language, laws, visions, techniques etc. In Kuhn’s way of seeing things there cannot be a point of
comparison, they are incommensurable. When you compare them you have to make use of your own language, rules, visions,
techniques. The only comparison is that one paradigm may solve more problems than the other. So from Copernicus to Einstein
Kuhn sees no progress towards truth by comparing the different scientists because they all belong to their own paradigm.

Paul Feyerabend: Methodological anarchism; “anything goes”

He was not content with the version of Kuhn. He wants a stronger type of relativism. When you arrive at normal science, you have
stability and somehow you have to conform to that paradigm used in the normal science. There is some sort of dogmatism, which is
necessary, because it is normal science and you have to/want to join. Feyerabend says that even in the normal science usually the
ones that moderate science to go forward are in the minority that continues to provoke.
(How come Feyerabend is not contented with the version of relativism according to Kuhn?)

Rorty: He does not talk about objectivity or rationality or truth. He talks about solidarity. It is a kind of what a community accepts as
procedure, each one has to do. If the community accepts it, everyone accepts it. This is his version of relativism. His solidarity also
would be on language. It’s like a game. We try to adapt a language, so we can communicate better. This does not mean that this
language is the best one. Or it can be like a game having its own rules. If it suits you, let’s play. If you intend to come into the
community, you have to play the game. For instance (analogy): A ball. In football you use your feet. The same size of ball you use
in Volleyball but you use your hand. Same ball, different tools. It is not a question of truth, rationality, objectivity, but of a game that
suits you. “Is there any truth remaining we have not obtained outside” turns into “Is there any description we have not considered
yet?”

Relativism: Truth and objectivity are related/connected to independent reality. Like it or not, it’s there. Relativists deny that truth
and objectivity are an independent reality and denying the reality itself.
Arguments against:
1.) They make use of Heisenberg’s principle of indeterminacy. According to the relativists that is a support of relativism because
they say “this is for me (observer one) the place of the atomic particle and this is for another observer the place of the same atom.”
What is true to the one does not have to be true for the other: relative. From the independent reality point of view whether the other
has another measure or not, whatever he measures is an object. There is the independent reality, otherwise there wouldn’t be
anything to measure.
2.) Comparison and Continuity: Progress in knowledge: In order to say that paradigm A solves more problems than paradigm B
you need a point of reference to compare them. It might just be a matter of solving problems, but that already shows you that you
are progressing. There is a continuity, a sense of progress. So it is not true that you do not see any progressive orientation from
Ptolemy, Kepler, Copernicus, Galilei, Newton to Einstein, because comparing what we know now to what we knew in the past, it is
clear that we know more now, we are progressing. So there must be the continuity, because we know more now and we are able to
say that one solves more problems than the other.
3.) Doubt: Different methods of justification. Relativists say that to make use of one method is not a sure way. There are so many
methods. So relativists would say, since there are so many methods and each one can do some service, I need to doubt, because
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the other might be as useful. When you doubt, though, at least you need to maintain a certain stable knowledge, which will serve as
a point of reference to your doubt, otherwise there will be complete doubt. Even the fact that you are doubting is a stable
knowledge.
(Different versions of relativism and our arguments against relativism?)

Agazzi: Objectivity related to operation (4.))

Objectivity here is always taken in the context of operation. There is an objectivity in a strong sense and an objectivity in a weak
sense. In the strong sense it refers to the object itself. In the weak sense it refers to the subject and becomes intersubjectivity.
In the strong sense there is a kind of difficulty presented already by Kant. “You cannot talk about the things themselves (the
noumena) but only about the phenomena, that show themselves on the outside.” When it comes to the phenomenon you already
cut an aspect of the object. You cannot present the object completely but only the phenomenon-side of it. Because we cannot
aspire for 100% precision with our quantum physics but only for probability, the objects presented cannot be presented 100%.
In the weak sense you can guarantee at least 100% because of intersubjectivity. There, always in the context of operation, you
follow rules with rigor and strictness (If you measure something, don’t sneeze). You also have to be able to repeat results. And
you have to make use of instruments. If sister wants to go to India, she observes the rules and wants to repeat the result and
uses the same instruments. I want to go to Germany and do the same. A third person wants to go to the USA and does the same.
So you can say that there is a confirmation of objectivity. Because of the use of instruments, repeated results and rules, you can
connect two paradigms because it is about the same aspects of reality. Example: You talk about mass in two different paradigms.
In Einstein mass is presented in a different way than in Newton. Whether you talk in a Newton- or Einstein-sense, you have to take
the same instrument, a scale. So you are touching the same object by using the same instrument, you are investigating the same
aspect in reality. This is the sense of the “operation” in Agazzi’s objectivity: You are touching the same reality. The “object X”
(scale?) will be the reference, the concept (“mass”) will be about language.
(Argument of Agazzi against relativism?) There is a connection, no complete separation between two paradigms.

Ethics: (Is it possible to morally evaluate science? Yes or no and why?)

Science divided into theoretical (paper and blackboard-level) and applied (experiment and research-level). Today the theoretical
people come down from the 5th to the 1st floor to find out if their theories work. If they do, it is evidence in favor of the theoretical
formula. Question in the original sense: Hume on the logic of the must and must not. In the premises of categorical syllogisms you
say “is” or “is not”. In the conclusion you will have a “is not” that is particular, if it pops up in one of the syllogisms. The conclusion is
declarative. But the “is not” can turn into a “must not” that is imperative. It is not only a question of induction but also the logical
sense of imperative conclusions.
When, in theory, you just make contact with reality, you move in the field of “is/are”. Like finding out about nuclear power: “It is like
that.” They can say that they are just making science, just looking for what is there in reality and that they are not about morals.
Can we or can we not morally evaluate science? Yes! Aristotelian response: You try to look at the finality, the means, the
conditions and consequences. There are four things you have to look into in order to morally evaluate science.
“We are just contacting reality?” But there’s always the applied science, which is not isolated from theoretical science anymore.
Evaluating science ethically according to:
Finality of the bomb: Kill
Means: Stolen uranium
Conditions: Poor people, invest in schools!
Consequences: Death

Eleventh Lesson:

Hume: We can’t morally evaluate science. What is the logical justification from the descriptive to the imperative? To Hume there’s
no justification for morally evaluating science because it only deals with descriptions and declarations.

Scientific research as moral/immoral  Values. Values are inside cultural contexts but there are some values that are generally
recognizable. All cultures see life as a high, if not the highest value. Values serve as an orientation of our actions towards the final
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ends. If human life is one of the highest virtues, your research must protect life.

Scientific research must also consider (partial) truth. If you are oriented towards that truth, you value it. So truth is a value and you
cannot say that science is value-less. Same with objectivity.

Responsibility: Scientists have to be aware of their responsibility for the society. When you see the disturbance or damage
science can cause, you know that you have to be responsible. The possibility of frauds and lying warrant responsibility in science
as well. You can have responsibility when you have norms (international norms) and freedom (liberty). Freedom has been a big
issue, esp. in formally socialist countries, where government directed scientific research and most of it was done to develop the
military capacity. So there was no freedom and therefore no responsibility. So the norms should be the (ethical) limit that modifies
the freedom, when it is misused and harms society. Because in freedom/liberty you do not only have rights but also duties.

How to promote the fact, that scientists should be aware of their responsibility?
1) Scientist has to consider that science is not the absolute tradition  he must avoid scientism
2) “Competition” with other traditions (religion/curing yourself with herbs instead of chemical medicine)
3) Scientists must among themselves promote a sense of obligation not just for themselves but also for others. When you talk of
physics and psychology, you do not expect a smooth relationship between these.
4) Democratic state. When you have that, you have freedom for scientists and they can practice responsibility (hopefully!)
Everybody is to be involved in the discussion about the limit, because it is about everybody.

Science and arts: 2 cultures  Science for the mind and art for the heart. In Thomism: you have intellectual virtues, divided into
speculative and practical. Art is a practical virtue, because it serves as a skill. It is a kind of knowledge that produces something
outside of the subject. In the Thomistic sense, science is a intellectual speculative virtue because it remains in the subject. (Justice,
prudence, temperance, fortitude  Cardinal virtues)
Truth: Both cultures are supposed to represent reality (Representation). In science formulas of theories like e=mc2 are a
representation of a reality. A painting is a representation of a reality as well. When you talk about representation you can talk about
the question of truth. Even in arts there is the question of representing the truth, even when it is just the correspondence of the
work of art with whatever the artist imagined and saw in his mind.
Objectivity in arts is hard to talk about, when you see arts as self-expression. Art used to be imitation of reality and it was more
perfect when the imitation was good. Success of art nowadays is not how close you are to reality but how close you are in
projecting in what is inside you. Objectivity in arts then would mean a certain kind of harmony in your work. It is a kind of
proportionality in whatever you have produced. The form shows up.
Beauty: When you have harmony and proportionality and form, you have beauty.
Creativity in arts/science: It is not in the strict sense like “ex nihilo”. If you are able to create something, how does the process of
creating take place? You have preparation (gather materials/instruments/books), you have incubation (no production, nothing,
solve problems, “how will I be able to make that from that?”), you have illumination (solution comes), finally you have verification
(your masterpiece).
Beauty in science? A mathematician compared the elegance of a formula/solution to the dome in Florence. Beauty in science is
there especially when you have symmetry, appeal to models (big and small balls to show gases), visualization,(expanding
universe is visualized like an expanding balloon), metaphysical features (it becomes abstract, universal and can be applied to
more particular cases).

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