#11

FACTS
the Central Bank of the Philippines filed a Petition for
Assistance in the Liquidation of the Philippine Veterans
Bank
On January 2, 1992, the Congress enacted Republic Act No.
7169 providing for the rehabilitation of the Philippine
Veterans Bank.
Despite the legislative mandate for rehabilitation and
reopening of PVB, respondent judge continued with the
liquidation proceedings of the bank. Moreover, petitioners
learned that respondents were set to order the payment
and release of employee benefits upon motion of another
lawyer, while petitioners claims have been frozen to their
prejudice
Petitioners argue that with the passage of R.A. 7169, the
liquidation court became functus officio, and no longer
had the authority to continue with liquidation
proceedings.

RULING
Republic Act No. 7169 entitled "An Act To Rehabilitate The
Philippine Veterans Bank Created Under Republic Act No.
3518, Providing The Mechanisms Therefor, And For Other
Purposes", which was signed into law by President
Corazon C. Aquino on January 2, 1992 and which was
published in the Official Gazette on February 24, 1992,
provides in part for the reopening of the Philippine
Veterans Bank together with all its branches within the
period of three (3) years from the date of the reopening of
the head office. The law likewise provides for the creation
of a rehabilitation committee in order to facilitate the
implementation of the provisions of the same
Clearly, the enactment of Republic Act No. 7169, as well as
the subsequent developments has rendered the
liquidation court functus officio. Consequently, respondent
judge has been stripped of the authority to issue orders
involving acts of liquidation.
Liquidation, in corporation law, connotes a winding up or
settling with creditors and debtors. It is the winding up of
a corporation so that assets are distributed to those
entitled to receive them. It is the process of reducing
assets to cash, discharging liabilities and dividing surplus or
loss.
Rehabilitation contemplates a continuance of corporate
life and activities in an effort to restore and reinstate the
corporation to its former position of successful operation
and solvency
Anent the claim of respondents Central Bank and
Liquidator of PVB that R.A. No. 7169 became effective only
on March 10, 1992 or fifteen (15) days after its publication
in the Official Gazette; and, the contention of intervenors
VOP Security, et. al. that the effectivity of said law is
conditioned on the approval of a rehabilitation plan by the
Monetary Board, among others, the Court is of the view
that both contentions are bereft of merit.
While as a rule, laws take effect after fifteen (15) days
following the completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines, the legislature has the authority to provide for
exceptions, as indicated in the clause "unless otherwise
provided."
Hence, it is clear that the legislature intended to make the
law effective immediately upon its approval. It is
undisputed that R.A. No. 7169 was signed into law by
President Corazon C. Aquino on January 2, 1992.
Therefore, said law became effective on said date.

#12
FACTS
On February 17, 1978, then President Ferdinand Marcos
issued Proclamation No. 1716 reserving certain parcels of
land of the public domain located in the Municipality of
San Juan, Metro Manila.
o After hundreds of squatter families were
resettled, the Municipality of San Juan started to
develop its government center by constructing
the INP Building, which now serves as the PNP
Headquarters, the Fire Station Headquarters,
and the site to house the two salas of the
Municipal Trial Courts and the Office of the
Municipal Prosecutors. Also constructed thereon
are the Central Post Office Building and the
Municipal High School Annex Building
On October 6, 1987, former President Corazon Aquino
issued Proclamation No. 164, amending Proclamation No.
1716: DECLARING THE LAND OPEN TO DISPOSITION
On June 1, 1988, the Corazon de Jesus Homeowners
Association, Inc., filed a petition against the Municipal
Mayor and Engineer of San Juan and the Curator of
Pinaglabanan Shrine, to enjoin them from either removing
or demolishing the houses of the association members
who were claiming that the lots they occupied have been
awarded to them by Proclamation No. 164.
the regional trial court dismissed the petition, ruling that
the property in question is being utilized by the
Municipality of San Juan for government purposes
Disregarding the ruling of the court, private respondents
hired a private surveyor to make consolidation-subdivision
plans of the land in question, submitting the same to
respondent (DENR) in connection with their application for
a grant under Proclamation No. 164
To prevent DENR from issuing any grant to private
respondents, petitioner municipality filed a petition for
prohibition against respondent DENR and private
respondent Corazon de Jesus Homeowners Association.
The regional trial court sustained petitioner municipality
The Court of Appeals reversed, hence, the present
recourse

ISSUE: the central question and bone of contention in the petition
before us boils down to the correct interpretation of Proclamation
No. 164 in relation to Proclamation No. 1716.

RULING
There exists a fundamental and gross error in the issuance
of Proclamation No. 164 on October 16, 1987 by then
President Aquino.
Proclamation No. 1716 was issued by the late President
Ferdinand E. Marcos in the due exercise of legislative
power; being a valid act of legislation, said Proclamation
may only be amended by an equally valid act of legislation.
Proclamation No. 164 is obviously not a valid act of
legislation
She issued her historic Proclamation No. 3, promulgating
the Provisional Constitution, or the Freedom Constitution.
Under Article II, Section 1 of the Freedom Constitution, the
President shall continue to exercise legislative power
until a legislature is elected and convened under a new
constitution. Then came the 1987 Constitution. When
Congress was convened on July 26, 1987, President
Aquino lost this legislative power under the Freedom
Constitution. Proclamation No. 164, amending
Proclamation No. 1716 was issued on October 6, 1987
when legislative power was already solely on Congress.
This Court cannot help noticing this basic flaw in the
issuance of Proclamation No. 164. Because this
unauthorized act by the then president constitutes a direct
derogation of the most basic principle in the separation of
powers between the three branches of government
enshrined in our Constitution, we cannot simply close our
eyes and rely upon the principle of the presumption of
validity of a law.

DECISION: We, therefore, hold that the issuance of Proclamation No.
164 was an invalid exercise of legislative power. Consequently, said
Proclamation is hereby declared NULL and VOID.

#13
FACTS
Before the 2007 Synchronized Barangay and (SK) Elections,
some of the then incumbent officials of several barangays
of Caloocan City filed with the RTC a petition for
declaratory relief to challenge the constitutionality of RA
9164; The RTC agreed with the respondents contention
The COMELEC moved to reconsider this decision but the
RTC denied the motion. Hence, the present petition
Petitioner COMELECs argument - assailed law is valid and
constitutional; RA 9164 is an amendatory law to RAA 7160
and not a penal law hence it is not an ex post facto law;
the three term limit is merely a restatement; since the law
is not penal, it may be applied retroactively when
expressly provided and when it does not impair vested
right; rtcs invalidation involves wisdom of law and rtc has
no right to inquire into under the separation of powers
principle; there is no violation of the one subject-one title
rule.

RULING
Judicial Power - we consider it established that whatever
Congress, in its wisdom, decides on these matters are
political questions beyond the pale of judicial scrutiny,[11]
subject only to the certiorari jurisdiction of the courts
provided under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution
and to the judicial authority to invalidate any law contrary
to the Constitution; we can inquire into a congressional
enactment despite the political question doctrine,
although the window provided us is narrow;
Retroactive Application Issue - Our own reading shows
that no retroactive application was made because the
three-term limit has been there all along as early as the
second barangay law (RA No. 6679) after the 1987
Constitution took effect; it was continued under the LGC
and can still be found in the current law. We find this
obvious from a reading of the historical development of
the law; it was not under RA 9164; RA 6653 provided the
term limitation of two consecutive term; RA 6679 changed
it to three consecutive term; RA 7160 (LGC) followed
An alternative perspective is to view Sec. 43(a), (b) and (c)
separately from one another as independently standing
and self-contained provisions, except to the extent that
they expressly relate to one another. Thus, Sec. 43(a)
relates to the term of local elective officials, except
barangay officials whose term of office is separately
provided under Sec. 43(c). Sec. 43(b), by its express terms,
relates to all local elective officials without any exception.
Thus, the term limitation applies to all local elective
officials without any exclusion or qualification.
That Congress had the LGCs three-term limit in mind
when it enacted RA No. 9164 is clear from the following
deliberations in the House of Representatives (House) on
House Bill No. 4456
The House therefore clearly operated on the premise that
the LGC imposed a three-term limit for barangay officials,
and the challenged proviso is its way of addressing any
confusion that may arise from the numerous changes in
the law.
All these inevitably lead to the conclusion that the
challenged proviso has been there all along and does not
simply retroact the application of the three-term limit to
thebarangay elections of 1994. Congress merely integrated
the past statutory changes into a seamless whole by
coming up with the challenged proviso.With this
conclusion, the respondents constitutional challenge to
the proviso based on retroactivity must fail.
Constitutional Challenge - the constitutional challenge
must fail for a more fundamental reason the
respondents retroactivity objection does not involve a
violation of any constitutional standard. The Civil Code
established a statutory norm, not a constitutional
standard.
we find no merit in the respondents retroactivity
arguments because: (1) the challenged proviso did not
provide for the retroactive application to barangay officials
of the three-term limit; Section 43(b) of RA No. 9164
simply continued what had been there before; and (2)
the constitutional challenge based on retroactivity was not
anchored on a constitutional standard but on a mere
statutory norm.
Equal Protection Clause - we see no reason to apply the
equal protection clause as a standard because the
challenged proviso did not result in any differential
treatment between barangay officials and all other
elective officials.
One subject one title rule - We find, under these settled
parameters, that the challenged proviso does not violate
the one subject-one title rule. First, the title of RA No.
9164 states the laws general subject matter the
amendment of the LGC to synchronize the barangay and
SK elections and for other purposes. Second, the
congressional debates we cited above show that the
legislators and the public they represent were fully
informed of the purposes, nature and scope of the laws
provisions. Finally, to require the inclusion of term
limitation in the title of RA No. 9164 is to make the title an
index of all the subject matters dealt with by law; this is
not what the constitutional requirement contemplates

DECISION premises considered, we GRANT the petition and
accordingly AFFIRM the constitutionality of the challenged proviso
under Section 2, paragraph 2 of Republic Act No. 9164.

#14
FACTS
Petitioner Judge Tomas C. Leynes was assigned to the
Municipality of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro as the sole
presiding judge of the Municipal Trial Court
His salary and representation and transportation
allowance (RATA) were drawn from the budget of the
Supreme Court and he received a monthly allowance of
P944 from the local funds[2] of the Municipality of Naujan
starting 1984
On May 7, 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan unanimously
approved Resolution No. 101 increasing petitioner
judges monthly allowance from P944 to P1,600 starting
May 1993
In 1994, the Municipal Government of Naujan again
provided for petitioner judges P1,600 monthly allowance
in its annual budget which was again approved
On February 17, 1994, Provincial Auditor Salvacion M.
Dalisay sent a letter to the Municipal Mayor and the
Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan directing them to stop the
payment of the P1,600 monthly allowance or RATA to
petitioner judge because it was against Section 36, RA No.
7645, General Appropriations Act of 1993 and National
Compensation Circular No. 67 dated January 1, 1992, in
addition Section 3 of Local Budget Circular No. 53 dated
September 1, 1993 according to the COA Regional Director
Petitioner appealed to COA but was denied.. and filed a
motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the
Commission. Aggrieved, petitioner filed the instant
petition
POSITION OF COA:
National Compensation Circular (NCC) No. 67 which
provides that (a) the RATA of national officials and
employees shall be payable from the programmed
appropriations or personal services savings of the agency
where such officials or employees draw their salary and
(b) no one shall be allowed to collect RATA from more
than one source;
General Appropriations Act of 1993 (RA 7645) which
provided that the RATA of national officials shall be
payable from the programmed appropriations of their
respective offices
Local Budget Circular (LBC) No. 53 prohibits local
government units from granting allowances to national
government officials or employees stationed in their
localities when such allowances are also granted by the
national government or are similar to the allowances
granted by the national government to such officials or
employees
POSITION OF PETITIONER: the municipality is expressly and
unequivocally empowered by RA 7160 (the Local
Government Code of 1991) to enact appropriation
ordinances granting allowances and other benefits to
judges stationed in its territory; only one condition, that is,
when the finances of the municipal government allow;
DBM cannot amend or modify a substantive law like the
Local Government Code of 1991 through mere budget
circulars
PRINCIPLES: the power of LGUs to grant allowances to
judges has long been recognized; the issuance of DBM and
LBC recognizes the power of LGUS to grant such
allowances; DBM provides the guidelines for the allowance
while LBC tries to limit the allowance; autonomy of LGUs
to grant allowance in any amount depending on the
availabity of funds

RULING
We rule in favor of petitioner judge
It is elementary in statutory construction that an
administrative circular cannot supersede, abrogate,
modify or nullify a statute. A statute is superior to an
administrative circular, thus the latter cannot repeal or
amend it. In the present case, NCC No. 67, being a mere
administrative circular, cannot repeal a substantive law
like RA 7160.
It is also an elementary principle in statutory construction
that repeal of statutes by implication is not favored, unless
it is manifest that the legislature so intended
Respondent COA alleges that Section 36 of RA 7645 (the
GAA of 1993) repealed Section 447(a)(l)(xi) of RA 7160 (the
LGC of 1991). A review of the two laws, however, shows
that this was not so. Section 36 of RA 7645 merely
provided for the different rates of RATA payable to
national government officials or employees, depending
on their position, and stated that these amounts were
payable from the programmed appropriations of the
parent agencies to which the concerned national officials
or employees belonged. Furthermore, there was no other
provision in RA 7645 from which a repeal of Section 447(a)
(l)(xi) of RA 7160 could be implied
the presumption against implied repeal becomes stronger
when, as in this case, one law is special and the other is
general. In this case, RA 7160 (the LGC of 1991) is a special
law which exclusively deals with local government units
(LGUs), outlining their powers and functions in consonance
with the constitutionally mandated policy of local
autonomy. RA 7645 (the GAA of 1993), on the other
hand, was a general law which outlined the share in the
national fund of all branches of the national government
NCC: no one is allowed to collect RATA from more than
one source.. Does this mean judges cannot receive
allowance from LGUs? According to court. NO.
NCC No. 67 as a whole seeks to prevent is the dual
collection of RATA by a national official from the budgets
of more than one national agency. the prohibition is
only against the dual or multiple collection of RATA by a
national official from the budgets of two or more national
agencies or he should get his RATA only from his parent
national agency and not from the other national agency he
is detailed to.
Furthermore, the NCC refers to national agency. National
agency refers to the different offices, bureaus and
departments comprising the national government. An LGU
is obviously not a national agency.
Next contention: resolution of the Sangguniang Barangay
was null and void because it failed to comply with LBC.
RA 7160, LGC of 1991, clearly provides that provincial,
city and municipal governments may grant allowances to
judges as long as their finances allow
Section 3, paragraph (e) of LBC No. 53, by outrightly
prohibiting LGUs from granting allowances to judges
violates Section 447(a)(l)(xi) of LGC 1991.[29] As already
stated, a circular must conform to the law it seeks to
implement and should not modify or amend it
Respondent COA also argues that Resolution No. 101 of
the Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan failed to comply with
paragraphs (a) to (d) of LBC No. 53, thus it was null and
void.
Guidelines (a) to (d) were met when the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Oriental Mindoro approved Resolution
No. 101 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan granting the
P1,600 monthly allowance to petitioner judge as well as
the corresponding budgets of the municipality providing
for the said monthly allowance to petitioner judge. Under
Section 327 of the Local Government Code of 1991, the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan was specifically tasked to
review the appropriation ordinances of its component
municipalities to ensure compliance with Sections 324 and
325 of the Code

DECISION: the petition is hereby GRANTED

#15
FACTS
On February 8, 1965, Juan Augusta B. Primacias plaintiff
appellee, was driving his car within the jurisdiction of
Urdaneta when a member of Urdaneta's Municipal Police
asked him to stop. He was told that he had violated
Municipal Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964, "and more
particularly, for overtaking a truck." The policeman then
asked for his which he surrendered, and a temporary
operator's permit was issued to him. This incident took
place about 200 meters away from a school building
A criminal complaint was filed in the Municipal Court of
Urdaneta against Primicias for violation of the Ordinance.
Plaintiff Primicias initiated an action for the annulment of
said ordinance with prayer for the issuance of preliminary
injunction for the purpose of restraining defendants
Municipality of Urdaneta, Mayor Perez, Police Chief Suyat,
Judge Soriano and Patrolman Andrada from enforcing the
ordinance
the Court of First Instance rendered the questioned
decision holding that the ordinance was null and void and
had been repealed by Republic Act No. 4136, or the Land
Transportation and Traffic Code

ISSUE: the validity of Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964

RULING
Appellants contend that the Ordinance is valid, being
"patterned after and based on Section 53, 5 par. 4 of Act
No. 3992, as amended (Revised Motor Vehicle Law) but
failed to note that Act No. 3992 has been superseded by
Republic Act No. 4136, the Land Transportation and
'Traffic Code about three months after the questioned
ordinance was approved by Urdaneta's Municipal Council;
there was an explicit repeal.
By this express repeal, and the general rule that a later
law prevails over an earlier law
The validity of Ordinance must therefore be determined
vis-a-vis Republic Act No. 4136, the "mother statute",
which was in force at the time the criminal case was
brought against Primicias for the violation of the said
ordinance.
An essential requisite for a valid ordinance is, among
others, that is "must not contravene . . . the statute," for it
is a "fundamental principle that municipal ordinances are
inferior in status and subordinate to the laws of the state."
Following this general rule, whenever there is a conflict
between an ordinance and a statute, the ordinance "must
give way.
the Municipal Council of Urdaneta did not make any
classification of its thoroughfares, contrary to the explicit
requirement laid down by Section 38, Republic Act No.
4136
local legislative body intending to control traffic in public
highways is supposed to classify, first, and then mark them
with proper signs, all to be approved by the Land
Transportation Commissioner; In this case, however, there
is no showing that the marking of the streets and areas
falling under Section 1, par. (a), Ordinance No. 3, Series of
1964, was done with the approval of the Land
Transportation Commissioner. Thus, on this very ground
alone, the Ordinance becomes invalid. Since it lacks the
requirement imposed by Section 38, the provincial, city, or
municipal board or council is enjoined under Section 62 of
the Land Transportation and Traffic Code from "enacting
or enforcing any ordinance or resolution in conflict with
the provisions of this Act.

DECISION: appealed decision was affirmed

#16
FACTS
De La Cruz et al were club & cabaret operators. They
assailled the constitutionality of Ord. No. 84, Ser. of 1975
or the Prohibition and Closure Ordinance of Bocaue,
Bulacan
On November 5, 1975, two cases for prohibition with
preliminary injunction were filed
Then came on January 15, 1976 the decision upholding the
constitutionality and validity of Ordinance No. 84 and
dismissing the cases. Hence this petition for certiorari by
way of appeal.
the lower court dismissed the petitions: hereby [upholds]
in the name of police power the validity and
constitutionality of said Ordinance of the Municipal
Council of Bocaue, Bulacan

ISSUE: whether or not a municipal corporation, can, prohibit the
exercise of a lawful trade, the operation of night clubs, and the
pursuit of a lawful occupation, such clubs employing hostesses

RULING
This Court is unable to agree; reliance on the police
power is insufficient to justify the enactment of the
assailed ordinance. It must be declared null and void.
It is a general rule that ordinances passed by virtue of the
implied power found in the general welfare clause must be
reasonable, consonant with the general powers and
purposes of the corporation, and not inconsistent with
the laws or policy of the State. If night clubs were merely
then regulated and not prohibited, certainly the assailed
ordinance would pass the test of validity
Certainly the ordinance on its face is characterized by
overbreadth. The purpose sought to be achieved could
have been attained by reasonable restrictions rather than
by an absolute prohibition
The Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action
when there is not a clear invasion of personal or property
rights under the guise of police regulation." It is clear that
in the guise of a police regulation, there was in this
instance a clear invasion of personal or property rights,
personal in the case of those individuals desirous of
patronizing those night clubs and property in terms of the
investments made and salaries to be earned by those
therein employed.
The decision now under review refers to Republic Act No.
938 as amended.
Then on May 21, 1954, the first section was amended to
include not merely "the power to regulate, but likewise
"Prohibit ... " 20 The title, however, remained the same. It
is worded exactly as Republic Act No. 938
The title was not in any way altered. It was not changed
one whit. The exact wording was followed. The power
granted remains that of regulation, not prohibition
There is thus support for the view advanced by petitioners
that to construe Republic Act No. 938 as allowing the
prohibition of the operation of night clubs would give rise
to a constitutional question. The Constitution mandates:
"Every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof. " Since there is no dispute
as the title limits the power to regulating, not prohibiting,
it would result in the statute being invalid if, as was done
by the Municipality of Bocaue, the operation of a night
club was prohibited
It is clear that municipal corporations cannot prohibit the
operation of night clubs. They may be regulated, but not
prevented from carrying on their business.

DECISION: WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted and the
decision of the lower court dated January 15, 1976 reversed, set
aside, and nullied. Ordinance No. 84, Series of 1975 of the
Municipality of Bocaue is declared void and unconstitutional. The
temporary restraining order issued by this Court is hereby made
permanent. No costs.

#17
FACTS
Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding
the disclosure of a number of presidential decrees which
they claimed had not been published as required by law.
The government argued that while publication was
necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was "otherwise
provided," as when the decrees themselves declared that
they were to become effective immediately upon their
approval. In the decision of this case on April 24, 1985, the
Court affirmed the necessity for the publication of some of
these decrees, declaring in the dispositive portion as
follows
The petitioners are now before us again, this time to move
for reconsideration/clarification of that decision

RULING
We have come to the conclusion, that the clause "unless it
is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and
not to the requirement of publication itself. This clause
does not mean that the legislature may make the law
effective immediately upon approval, or on any other
date, without its previous publication.
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the
legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual
fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended
It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause
publication may be dispensed with altogether. The reason
is that such omission would offend due process insofar as
it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are
supposed to govern the legislature
The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to
those of general application; We hold therefore that all
statutes, including those of local application and private
laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity,
which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a
different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive
orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of
legislative powers whenever the same are validly
delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly
conferred by the Constitution. administrative rules and
regulations must a also be published if their purpose is to
enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid
delegation
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in
nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the
administrative agency and not the public, need not be
published. Neither is publication required of the so-called
letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors
concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their
subordinates in the performance of their duties.
even the charter of a city must be published
notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the
national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants
of that place.
We agree that publication must be in full or it is no
publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public
of the contents of the laws. As correctly pointed out by the
petitioners, the mere mention of the number of the
presidential decree, the title of such decree, its
whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed
date of effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the
Official Gazette cannot satisfy the publication requirement

DECISION: WHEREFORE, it is hereby declared that all laws as above
defined shall immediately upon their approval, or as soon thereafter
as possible, be published in full in the Official Gazette, to become
effective only after fifteen days from their publication, or on another
date specified by the legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the
Civil Code


#18