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STUDENT ACADEMIC MISCONDUCT
I declare that I have read and understood the UNSW@ADFA policy on Student Academic
Miscon- duct and that this assignment is entirely my own work. I have fully acknowledged and
correctly docu- mented all sources for this assignment. This assignment has not been submitted
previously for assess- ment in any formal course of study. I understand that I may be examined
orally on the content of this assignment and that I may be required to submit for examination the
notes, plans and drafts used in its preparation. I also understand that if I am unable to supply such
evidence, or if its examination proves unsatisfactory to the marker, this will result in an
appropriate penalty.


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What should Japan's defence and security posture be? Trace the debate
and make, and justify, your own recommendations.

Introduction
Japans modern day defence and security posture is borne from its post-
World War 2 constitution, deriding war and forbidding the formation of
offensive armed-forces. This pacifist constitution currently necessitates a
reliance on the security alliance with the United States to provide umbrella
protection to Japan and has helped set the conditions for US hegemony
throughout the region for the last 60 years.
While the continuation of pacifism is mostly self-induced through a strict
adherence to Article 9 of the constitution and a popular denunciation of war,
there also remains deeply rooted memories of the atrocities of War World 2
within Japans neighbours, particularly China, who remains suspicious of any
relaxations in current defence restrictions. (Dupont 2004, p11)
Fifty years after its inception, does the constitution and its restrictions on
Japans normalcy remain a viable option for Japan against a post-9/11
background and perceived decline in US hegemony? The rise of China and
India, uncertain economics in the US, and threats from extremist terrorism
and a nuclear-armed North Korea have all altered the landscape significantly
to the point that Japan has pushed its security policy and its pacifist
constitution to new grounds.
This essay will examine the small steps of normalcy undertaken by Japan, the
apparent failing of multilateralism from Japans perspective, and the drive to
re-establish bilateral approaches to meet Japans comprehensive security
aims. Recommendations made on what Japans security and defensive
posture should be suggest using a reinvigoration of multilateralism to provide
regional transparency to aid Japans normative reform.
For the purposes of the essay I will discuss security in terms of Japans stated
objective of comprehensive security. (MoD 2009) This encompasses the
realms of economic, human and more traditional national security. Of note is
the economic security of Japan, as the second largest economy in the world,
and the historical significance it has placed on its economy post-World War II
as Japans main source of influence in global security.
Constitutional pacificism
The Japanese constitution is unique in its fundamental limitations and
proscription of armed conflict. Article 9 of the constitution states:
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Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the
Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and
the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.
In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air
forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of
belligerency of the state will not be recognized.
(National Diet 1946)
This has remained the basis for Japanese defence policy and the primary
consideration in the implementation of its security agenda.
The Yoshida doctrine, conceived in the 1950s and drawn from the
constitutional constraints, laid the basis for Japanese focus on economic
rebuilding and the minimization of defence expenditure. (Tang, 2007) These
policies have been clarified by subsequent administrations such that a series
of norms was established forbidding Japan from acquiring long-range
bombers, inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and attack aircraft
carriers. Additionally, military spending is limited to 1% of GDP and an anti-
nuclear policy prevent Japan from producing, possessing or introducing
nuclear weapons. (MOFA 2009) The Japanese Self-defence Force (JSDF) is
also strictly limited to the defence of the Japanese islands, however, as we
will see this has not always been the case in recent years.
Since the events of September 11, 2001 and the terrorist attacks on the
United States, pressure to reform the constitution and allow a more normal
approach to security have steadily been gathering pace. This comes in the
face of hurtful criticism of Japans involvement in the first Gulf Wars and its
use of chequebook diplomacy.
Towards constitutional reform
During the Cold War period, Japan kept to its self-bestowed international
military exemption. Through careful international diplomacy that minimized its
exposure to world security threats and events, Japan abstained from
overseas military activities. (Tang 2007) During the Gulf war in 1991, Japan
again remained protected behind its constitution but contributed to the
international effort in a way that the second-largest economy in the world
could by contributing US$13 billion to the war effort. This however, drew
criticism from abroad at the fact Japan was relying on the fighting efforts of
the US while the SDF sat comfortably back in Japan, especially when Japan
relied so heavily on energy supplied from the Gulf region. (Tang 2007)
These criticisms and the lack of recognition in Japans efforts during the Gulf
Wars sufficiently humiliated Tokyo that personnel from the SDF found
themselves bolstering United Nations Peace Keeping operations throughout
the 1990s.
A significant step towards the normalizing of Japans military occurred post-
September 11 attacks, when Japan dispatched its Maritime SDF in support of
US operations in Afghanistan. This began a period of alliance strengthening
with the US and is seen by some as a step towards the softening of the long-
held position against collective self-defence. (Sebata 2001, p. 147)
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The long-standing position of the Japanese government is to acknowledge
that Japan is entitled to exercise collective self-defence under international
law. However, the constitution prohibits this under the premise that this
exceeds its mandate to maintain minimum self-defence. (Sebata 2001, p
146)
This prohibition on collective self-defence, or the ability to defend another
nation even if Japan is not directly threatened, forms the basis for
considerable debate on constitutional reform from within and outside of
Japan. This would necessitate the amendment of Article 9 which some see
may herald a return to Japanese militarism. (VOA News 2006)
A number of factors are driving this impetus for constitutional change. Not the
least is the changing security environment within Asia. Primarily the nuclear
and ballistic missile threat from North Korea, which has launched several test
firings of its Taepodong-I and Taepodong-II ballistic missiles that Japan fears
could be equipped with conventional, biological, chemical or even nuclear
warheads. This poses a significant threat to the security of Japan and to
counter this, Japan has been actively participating in the Ballistic Missile
Defence program with the United States. It is the inter-reliance of Japan and
US BMD systems that Bisley says, sits uneasily within the current
understanding of the constitutional limits to collective defence. (Bisley 2008,
p. 81) Within Japan there is growing public anxiety about external threats
however it is still only a minority of the population that are in favour to the
amendment of Article 9. (Kliman 2006, p. 54)
Japanese security ambitions
Throughout the Cold War, Japans alliance with the US remained strong.
Japan provided the US with an unsinkable aircraft carrier (Purnentraand and
Bruni 2003) and was far less worried about the Soviet threat than the
Europeans or Americans, taking a lackadaisical attitude toward defence in
the belief that the US would come to the aid of Japan in the event of an attack
due to the strategic importance of Japanese-hosted US bases. (Tang 2007, p.
20)
With the end of the Cold War, the diminishing Soviet threat and a rising China,
a more fluid Asia-Pacific security landscape emerged, such that Japan saw
opportunities to establish a region-wide security forum. Factors driving this
include a growing motivation from Japan to play a more active role in the
Asia-Pacific beyond purely the economic and the belief of the Japanese
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) that the Asia-Pacific region was ripe for
an expansion of political and security cooperation to strengthen stability post-
Cold War American alliances. (Yuzawa 2005, p. 465)
Throughout the 1990s, Japan embarked on a policy of comprehensive
security within the Asian region, drawing from regional influences like ASEAN.
With the formation of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1994, Japan
hoped that regional security and its own security objectives could be
promoted through Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) between
participants aimed at greater military transparency.
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However, Japanese officials grew frustrated with the ARF and its slow
progress amongst reluctant countries to adopt CBMs. Adding to this, hopes
that the ARF could provide a forum of Preventive Diplomacy (PD) also
suffered while the ASEAN chair continued to espouse adherence to the
ASEAN way and policy of non-interference that saw a number of sensitive
issues removed from the topics able to be negotiated as PD. (Yuzawa 2005,
p. 478)
Yuzawa highlights the lack of faith that MOFA has in regional multilateralism
that stems from the failure of the ARF towards the end of the 1990s to
progress Japanese security concerns including the transparency of Chinese
military ambition and the threat of North Korea. Concurrently, the US
harboured criticism of Japans multilateral aims, seeing it as undermining the
bilateral relationship. (Yuzawa 2005, p. 480) The outcome is a shying away
from regional multilateralism towards the end of the 1990s and a new
strengthening of bilateral engagement post-9/11. (Limaye 2006, p. 250)
Japanese Bilateralism
The rejuvenated alliance with the US and the diminishing importance placed
on regionalism by Japan may owe itself largely to the failures of multilateral
bodies to secure a more open security agenda from key countries like China
and North Korea. There is also an argument using alliance theory that Japan
would face abandonment post-9/11 if it failed to demonstrate its relevance to
the needs of US security. (Kliman 2006, p. 13)
This strengthening of the US alliance took the shape of participation in BMD
and military commitments to the War on Terror. It is these two key
contributions to the alliance that paved the way for a subtle change in
Japanese security norms when Prime Minister Koizumi introduced Anti-Terror
laws, stretching the interpretation of collective defence and bypassing head-
on constitutional reform of Article 9. (Sebata 2007, p. 147)
As Japan continues to erode norms, some commentators are saying it has
adopted a stance of pragmatic realism. It recognises rising threats to its
interests in the form of North Korean brinkmanship, Chinese economic and
military expansion and, in the case of recent Gulf wars, threats to its energy
supplies in the Middle East. (Dupont 2004, p. 4-6)
Protecting these interests is best achieved, given constitutional and military
constraints, through its bilateral relationship with the United States. It has also
established a recent bilateral security arrangement with Australia in 2007,
aimed at enhancing cooperation in a variety of fields including border security,
anti-terrorism and law enforcement. (MOFA 2007) This was the first such
bilateral agreement undertaken by Japan since it signed the US alliance treaty
in 1947. Some believed China could be alarmed in a move by the US, Japan
and Australia to form some sort of axis of democracy. (Misaki 2007). Hugh
White also highlights the possible consequences from Chinas point of view in
that it may consider this an attempt at containment whereas the US, Japan
and Australia justify this as balancing. (White 2007)
9

Interestingly, White follows on that Tokyo, Canberra and Washington have,
through the Australian security agreement, endorsed a concept that Asias
future will be blocs organised on ideological grounds. (White 2007) Hughes
and Krauss also imbue this in their opinion of Prime Minister Abe, in which
they claim his hope is to demonstrate to China that Japan can construct a
regional counter-coalition, including India. (Hughes and Krauss 2007, p. 170)
Whether such a democratic alliance remains an achievable objective within
the region depends on a number of factors. Certainly there already exists a
strong defence tie, not to mention common political and economic ground,
between the United States and Australia, which makes the cooperation
between at least these states nothing if not expected. As for India, indeed
they share the same ideology of democracy but other government
relationships are relatively nascent.
The second factor is whether such an alliance really is in the game of
balancing China. From Japans perspective, the relationship it enjoys with
China has been historically somewhat shaky owing largely to territorial
disputes, the Taiwan issue and Chinas rapid military build-up.
The China Factor
An ongoing point of dispute between Japan and China is centred on the
Senkaku islands. The dispute over these islands is a combination of
traditional claims and the oil and gas deposits that lie beneath the East China
Sea. Both Japan and China have sent warships to bolster their presence and
while they have recently struck a deal to develop the resources jointly, China
remains reticent about giving up any ground over the sovereignty issue.
Indeed it has been pointed out how this dispute underlies competition
between the two for energy resources and fuels Chinese international
lobbying, especially in Africa. (Smith 2009, p. 234)
Chinese control of Taiwan may prove to be another critical point for Japanese
defence policy. Traditionally, Japan has supported Taiwan in line with US
policy. However should conflict arise between the US and China over Taiwan,
the US would ultimately seek support from Japan. This risks drawing Japan
into direct conflict with China. In any case, Chinese control of Taiwan is
unpalatable to Japan, as China would assume control over the Taiwan Strait
and the Sea Lines of Communication that Japan relies on for the supply of its
energy. (Dupont 2004, p. 43)
The Chinese military build-up has sparked concern from many regional
neighbours. Both the US and Japan have aired criticism over the lack of
transparency in Chinese military expenditure and accompanying motivations
for the increase. (Masahiko 2008) China has responded with comments
attempting to assuage concerns, attributing the expenditure to modernization
and costs including the provision of uniforms and increased wages, etc.
(Smith 2009, p. 240)
These issues aside, bilateral alliances that could be conceivably deemed to
contain or even balance Chinese growth face the problem of becoming self-
fulfilling as China becomes pushes back and continues seeking to secure a
:

place in the international community commensurate with its growing status.
(Sato 2006, p. 211) To this end, Chinas participation in multilateral
arrangements should be key for Japan in ensuring that its bilateralism does
not result in a new security dilemma for the region.
This plays to the core of how Japans security objectives may shape the
region. On one hand, Japan is faced with two conceivable and principal
threats to its security an expanding China and a potentially nuclear and
estranged North Korea and on the other hand it has its normative
constraints. Rod Lyon suggests two possible directions for the Asia-Pacific.
The multi-polar arrangement recognises the rise of China and India as
regional powers to rival US hegemony in the Asia-Pacific. To this end, a more
normal Japan would emerge as a counter. The other option is a more
normative and multilateral approach, within which regional countries
increasingly tie their own security to regional norms and codes of behaviour.
(Lyon 2007, p. 2)
However at this point, it appears as though the latter option becomes less
certain given a cyclic argument for the changing of Japanese security posture.
Events including the end of the Cold War and global terrorism threatened
Japan and its defensive alliance, which was shored up with a slow erosion of
norms. This erosion precipitates a continuation of an otherwise hitherto
dormant threat in a rising China. Unsuccessful multilateralism becomes a
driver for greater bilateralism, more slow erosion of norms and all of a sudden
regional powers are concerned with containment as a seemingly power-
balancing series of arrangements are struck.
Recommendations
It is somewhat inevitable that generational change and a different global
security landscape will continue to push Japan to becoming a more normal
state. Japans moves for inclusion in the UN Security Council and its stated
policy of comprehensive security should already have provided indicators of
its desire to become a normal player. It now faces the task of finding
acceptance of this normalcy within the global and regional community.
The principle recommendation to be made on Japans security posture is to
reinvigorate multilateralism, especially where it concerns the inclusion of
China as an integral participant. Key to an expansion of security capacity for
Japan will be the lubrication and transparency that multilateral arrangements
with China could provide to ease the friction of two very large neighbours as
they respectively find their places.
This is not to say that defensively Japan cannot continue to rely on security
alliances with the US and Australia and forms the basis of my
recommendation on Japans defensive posture. This recommendation is that
Japan should proceed cautiously with the inevitable normative reform,
something that it has been doing successfully for the last couple of decades.
Tiptoeing around the dragon with an open palm would best sum up this
approach. Wartime memories, Chinese sensitivities and regional suspicions
do not favour Japanese normative intentions, especially when it comes to any
offensive interpretation of military activities. Bilateral arrangements offer
;

Japan the best opportunity to progress towards a more normal security
presence while offering the firmest defensive position. It should not be a
surprise that the wording of the Japan-Australia Joint Declaration has been
compared to the wording of the ANZUS treaty. (White 2007)
Conclusion
This essay has examined the forces at work and made recommendations on
Japanese security and defensive posture.
The peace constitution and the restrictions in Article 9 remain a hurdle for the
Japanese in terms of becoming a normal player. The drivers to this desire
stem from the changing economic and security landscape post-Cold War.
Japans fear of abandonment in the US alliance was the catalyst for a more
proactive role in global security. In conjunction, the inability of regional
multilateralism in the late 1990s to allay concerns about an opaque military
build-up in China and a rogue, nuclear-armed North Korea, has made a
strengthening of bilateral relationships more attractive as a deterrent to
economic and security threats.
However, this strengthening of bilateralism has not been met with a similar
increase in multilateral transparency, alarming principally China, that blocs
are developing to hem China in and are leading to regional instability. (US
DoD 1998)
While Japan progresses its slow-paced normalization and Asian
multilateralism fails to keep up, the multi-polar scenario of Asian relationships
becomes more of a reality. Japans defence policy is inextricably tied to its
normalcy and the provisions of Article 9 but with the changing policy on
collective self-defence, JSDF commitments and circumventing legislation
appear to be providing the precursors to the revision of Japanese security
norms. The security posture Japan takes should be one that considers the
pace of these revisions in relation to the ability of multilateral engagements to
placate the rising powers into accepting a normal Japan.
<

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