HEADLINE = Does India really need the Rafale jet fighter?

STRAP = Spending $20 billion on a stop-gap aircraft seems reckless when cheaper and arguably better
options are available.

In January 2012 when France won the Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) competition to
supply 126 advanced Rafales jets to the Indian Air Force (IAF) it was supposed to bolster the countrys
air power. Instead, the Rafale is threatening to blow a gaping hole in Indias overstretched defence
budget.
Originally pegged at $10 billion, the size of the deal has ballooned to $30 billion. India may the third
largest economy on the planet but in the backdrop of numerous projects such as roads, railways,
sanitation and housing requiring bucket loads of cash, New Delhi cant afford to splurge on weapons,
especially when alternatives are available for far less.
The IAFs requirement of 126 aircraft can be quickly met at a fraction of the cost of the Rafale by
inducting more numbers of the technologically superior Su-30s, the IAFs air dominance fighter, and
which is being produced at Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL). These aircraft will be the high end of
Indias air power, and can be expected to remain in the force past 2030, and are competitive with or
superior to top-end European fighters and American F-15 variants, says Defense Industry Daily.
Another option is to buy more MiG-29s, which is the mainstay of Indias interceptor force, and which
had scared the living daylights of the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) pilots during the 1999 Kargil War.
Also, $30 billion saved is $30 billion earned. If just a quarter of the amount is plowed into the home
made light combat aircraft Tejas, Indias listless aircraft industry could come to life. The rest of the cash
could even be spent on Indias manned space mission. Both projects will spark more innovation in Indian
industry than licensed production, which is a euphemism for screwdriver technology.
To be sure, when the MMRCA tender was floated over a decade ago, it seemed like a good idea. One, it
was aimed at lowering Indias overwhelming dependence on Russia for advanced weapons. Secondly,
India wanted to acquire the full technology suite of an ultra-modern aircraft for local production. French
technology was being pitched as the magic potion that would turbo-charge the homemade Tejas jet
fighter, while also providing a boost to aerospace and defence electronics industries in India.
The third reason was to shore up the IAF's depleting fighter fleet. The IAFs sanctioned strength is 39.5
squadrons (an IAF combat squadron consists of 18 aircraft in service with another 3-4 in maintenance)
but its current fleet is down to 34 squadrons. The air force says it requires 44 squadrons to meet a full-
scale war with Pakistan, while also maintaining "a dissuasive posture" against China.
Earlier this year, the IAF told a Parliamentary standing committee on defence that a "collusive threat"
from China and Pakistan would be difficult for it to handle. However, the IAF admitted China may not
pose a collusive threat if hostilities were to break out between India and Pakistan.
Indeed, why would the Chinese team up with a rapidly balkanizing Pakistan and attack a fellow BRICS
member? It is not only counterintuitive but also a ridiculous idea. The Chinese have realised belatedly
of course that Pakistan is the source of the Islamic insurgency in its Xinjiang province. Also, the Chinese
are cruising to superpower status and are unlikely to launch a foolhardy attack on nuclear-armed India.
As for the threat from Pakistan, it is really a joke. The arrival of the MiG-29 and the Sukhoi-30 in the
1990s has given the IAF a fearsome qualitative advantage over the PAF. For the first time since the
1960s when the PAF acquired the F-104 Starfighters and F-86 Sabres from the United States the IAF
has aircraft that is a generation and a half ahead of the PAF.
This qualitative edge was demonstrated before the entire world during the 1999 Kargil War. While a
number of IAF aircraft took part in that campaign, it was the cover provided by the MiG-29 armed with
beyond visual range (BVR) missiles that exposed the PAFs plight. Analyses by Pakistani experts
revealed that when the rubber met the road, PAF simply refused to play any part in support of the
Pakistan Army, angering the latter, says Strategy Page in a report dated May 20, 2005.
While PAF fighters did fly Combat Air Patrols (CAP) during the conflict, they stayed well within Pakistani
air space. On occasions, IAF MiG-29s armed with the deadly R-77 BVR air-to-air missiles were able to
lock on to PAF F-16s, forcing the latter to disengage. In the absence of a PAF threat, the IAF was able to
deliver numerous devastating strikes on intruder positions and supply dumps.
In the report Airpower at 18,000 feet: IAF in the Kargil War published by the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace in 2012, Benjamin Lambeth explains in detail how the IAF ground down both the
Pakistan Army and the PAF: Throughout the campaign, whenever IAF reconnaissance or ground attack
operations were under way in the immediate combat zone, Western Air Command ensured that MiG-
29s or other air-to-air fighters were also airborne on combat air patrol stations over the ground fighting
on Indias side of the LoC to provide top cover against any attempt by the PAF to enter the fray in a
ground attack role. PAF F-16s to the west typically maintained a safe distance of 10 to 20 miles on the
Pakistani side of the LoC, although they occasionally approached as close as 8 miles away from the
ongoing ground engagements.
The effectiveness of the IAFs operations can be measured by the fact that Pakistans hawkish foreign
minister Sartaj Aziz rushed to New Delhi on June 12, 1999, and implored the IAF to stop its air strikes.
You dont get more desperate than that.
The situation changed little during the 2002 border crisis. Strategy Page says: One Pakistani military
expert observed that the PAFs perceived inability to defend Pakistans airspace and even put up a token
fight against the IAF was the biggest driver for Pakistani leaders warnings that any Indian attack would
lead to an immediate nuclear strike by Pakistan. It would be no exaggeration to say that after the Kargil
and 2002 experiences, PAFs psyche took a big beating.
Qualitatively, the IAF is on an upward curve. According to former air force chief N.A.K. Browne, the IAF is
replacing older MiG-21s and MiG-27s with much better aircraft. Whats going to happen is that at least
in the 12th Plan which finishes in 2017 we will continue to maintain 34 squadrons.Right now we have
34 combat squadrons and in spite of these drawdowns of the MIG-21s, we are supplementing them with
Su-30 squadrons, he told the media in October 2012. And he added the IAF will have far greater
capability than even what we have today.
How is that possible? The midlife upgrade of the battle tested MiG-29 and the increasing numbers of the
Sukhoi-30 are making the IAF a qualitatively superior force.
If India and France sort out the numerous issues dogging the deal and a contract is signed this year, then
the first 18 Rafales will arrive from France in 2016. If all goes smoothly, the rest of the 102 aircraft could
start rolling off HALs assembly lines by 2018. But heres the rub: around that time Sukhois stealth
fighter, the PAK-FA, in which India is a junior partner, will be ready to join the IAF. Why India should
commit to a stopgap aircraft is mysterious.
Alexander Kadakin, Russias ambassador in New Delhi, says Russian-built Sukhois of the Chinese air force
will shoot down the Rafales like mosquitoes on an August night. But then big-ticket defence deals are
rarely based on technical merit alone. The Rafale isnt the first nor will it be the last aircraft to be
picked for non-military reasons.
BOX ITEM
HEADLINE = History of kickbacks
With the IAF already fielding class leading aircraft such as the Su-30 which has beaten the US Air
Forces leading fighters in air combat exercises the IAFs insistence on getting the Rafale seems
curious.
Considering the long history of corruption and kickbacks in defence deals, no deal is clean in India. For
instance, former air chief marshal SP Tyagi has been booked by the police for his role in a helicopter
tender.
RSN Singh, a former military intelligence officer who later served in the Research & Analysis Wing, writes
in Canary Trap about the Chandigarh Gang that surfaced as the mainstay of the international arms
lobby during the decade long UPA rule. This gang is not necessarily in Chandigarh alone, but
nevertheless is centered around it, Singh writes. It comprises some retired officers, politicians,
journalists and prominent newspapers.